

EXTERNAL EVALUATION

DECEMBER 2014

FOOD SECURITY AND LIVELIHOODS – FROM RECOVERY TO RESILIENCE



Funded by
DFID

By Jeff Duncalf

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude for the welcome and support extended to myself by the staff of ACF Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso Country Offices and sub offices visited, as well the Chad Country team interviewed from a distance. The hospitality and open dialogue with which i was greeted was most appreciated. Furthermore, I would also like to thank those from outside the ACF family: the Government officials and communities who took the time to talk and meet, and to share their thoughts, experience and expertise.

I would also like to express my gratitude towards Issouf Haidara who undertook the evaluation in Mali and has provided the necessary information and feedback for the completion of this report.

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Acronyms:

ACF	Action Contre la Faim International
AGR	Activités Génératrices de Revenus
CFW	Cash For Work
CFT	Cash For Training
DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DoH	Department of Health
ECHO	The Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department of the European Commission
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition
IEC	Information, Education, Communication
HCS	Household Consumption Score
HFIAS	Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
HH	Household(s)
HEA	Household Economic Analysis
IFDS	Individual Food Diversification Score
MAHFP	Months of Adequate Household Food Provision
MUAC	Mid-upper arm circumference
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOHO	NOveaux HOrizons
NUT	Nutrition
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SCA	Score de Consommation Alimentaire
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VFM	Value for Money
WARO	West Africa Regional Office (ACF)
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion
WFP	World Food Programme (PAM)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The African Sahel, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, has seen a number of recurring droughts in modern history, most recently in 2010, and again in 2012, where failed crops, high food prices, a lack of pasture, and regional conflict, left up to 18 million people experiencing both cyclic and chronic food insecurity.

Within their overriding strategic corporate objective of combatting malnutrition levels in targeted communities, and with the expected outcome of improved food security, over the last three years, utilising three separate Department for International Development (DFID) funding agreements, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) have responded with a mixture of emergency response and capacity/resilience building programmes across five of the most affected countries: Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Activities include unconditional cash distributions, cash for work programmes, food, agricultural and animal inputs, and livestock distributions, WASH interventions, health garden programmes aimed at diversifying nutritional intake, and Warrantage and Cereal Bank programmes. The third tranche of DFID funding, signed off on 14th August 2013 (£2,896,193), with a cost extension agreed on 7th May 2014 (£1,600,000), is aimed particularly at moving communities from recovery to resilience, and is the subject of this evaluation.

The evaluation was carried out by two independent consultants with the aim of assessing the success of the intervention while extracting lessons learnt that could support future operations in the region, and possibly elsewhere. Success was measured utilising a mixture of information gathering techniques based on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria¹. The evaluation team comprised one international consultant², who has undertaken the evaluation process for Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, together with a second, Malian consultant, who has undertaken the process in Mali. The international consultant spent three weeks visiting Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania to assess the operations implemented there. Chad was evaluated remotely. The Malian consultant spent one week visiting the ACF project in the Gao region of Eastern Mali.

The evaluation has concluded that ACF's multi layered and multi sectoral approach is both relevant and appropriate to the needs of the targeted pastoral and agricultural communities, being coherent to both its organisation's international strategy as well as each country's national and rural development strategy. By targeting the most vulnerable and addressing both short term emergency needs as well as medium/longer term developmental objectives with a range of community based activities the operation has generated a sustainable positive impact.

Key to this success has been the empowerment of individuals and communities, and the amelioration of longstanding practices in terms of improved dietary intake, animal husbandry techniques, and access to credit facilities and institutions. Trainings and knowledge shared with the communities can be utilised for years to come. More can be done, however, particularly with respect to the management and capacity building of the

¹ <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

² The same consultant who had undertaken the DFID I and II evaluation.

health gardens, the processing or transformation of crops and produce, and addressing needs to improve localised water retention and management.

In terms of operational effectiveness in reaching planned beneficiary targets the operation has been a success.

One internal factor that has led to the success of the operation is the skills and local knowledge of the ACF staff in each country. Unfortunately, the majority of these already appear to have been laid off due to the lack of a DFID IV on the near horizon. This is a disappointment, as is the inability for DFID and ACF to smoothly transition from one intervention to the next. Once more a gap has occurred between the end of DFID II and the start of DFID III³, meaning that operations started after the end of the 2013 lean period. This is a similar gap as to the one between DFID I and DFID II in 2012. Should DFID IV never appear, how to fund activities, into which at least two years of commitment have already been invested, needs to be addressed as soon as possible. Thereafter, interventions were mostly deemed to be on time except for one or two particular circumstances. Financial and logistical procedures seem to have improved since DFID II. WARO has played an important role in the operation, arranging and reporting on funds, and negotiating with the donor as required.

Overall, this has been an ongoing process to empower communities and individuals in them. This process needs to be continued, improving methodologies and expanding coverage wherever possible. The more ACF can integrate activities undertaken, working with a multi sectoral approach, then, again, the greater the sustainability of their impact will be.

Programmatic Recommendations:

- a. Methodologies that provide for impact measurement against project indicators need to be revised, formalised and incorporated into post distribution monitoring procedures.
- b. Measuring the impact of different activities on local levels of malnutrition should become a standard practice also to be included in PDM activities.
- c. PDM reports need to show actual values of crops produced or good received and what impact this has on a household's monthly/annual income.
- d. Community committees that undertake beneficiary targeting themselves need to follow the four level classification HEA system, and should be either elected or be made up of impartial and respected men and women.
- e. Wherever possible ACF should work alongside government counterparts re the selection of animals, seeds, and other relevant items so as to build mutual capacity and working relations. ACF should also participate in government/ regional assessment missions to ensure accurate beneficiary data.
- f. As much as possible an integrated approach between activities undertaken in one area should be actively pursued and undertaken.
- g. Complaint system procedures need to be standardised with all cases reported, logged, and analysed on a centralised country HQ basis to ensure a nationwide overview.

³ A gap of 5 months between March and September 2013.

- h. Wherever possible activities to improve water provision, retention and usage should be investigated and implemented across the region.
- i. Guidance as to which irrigation methodology works best in which conditions needs to be elaborated and made available for operational staff.
- j. The managerial capacity of the health gardens needs to be worked upon so as to enable long term empowerment and functional independence.
- k. More support and training with respect to the processing and “transformation” of gardening produce for their later usage should be undertaken.
- l. Annual cash/food distribution programmes over a number of years to the same communities should be carefully managed so as to avoid the possible creation of a dependency culture.
- m. The possibility of replicating the health garden baby centres and the roaming veterinary technicians in Chad to other countries in the region should be investigated.
- n. The impact of “Changement de Comportement” programme in Mauritania should also be investigated for possible replication elsewhere.
- o. To ensure its sustainability, social warrantage should only be undertake in the short term as an introductory measure.
- p. Beneficiaries need to be further encouraged to utilise Warrantage/Cereal Bank funds received for small income generating projects rather than just to purchase food.
- q. Wherever possible activities that should support the community as a whole should be implemented alongside those activities that support targeted individuals.
- r. Only female sheep and goats should be distributed as the males tend to get eaten or sold.
- s. Learning/“Capitalisation” processes need to be more structured both in terms of in-country and regional programming.


Administrative Recommendations:

- t. Funding for the continued implementation of the medium/long term developmental aspects of DFID III need to be sought after as a matter of urgency.
- u. How to ensure a smooth transition from one DFID funding to the next needs to be investigated and agreed with the donor, and clarity on what DFID expect from ACF in terms of measuring value for money is required.
- v. To avoid delays and lost opportunities, a funding mechanism at ACF European headquarters needs to be set up to enable monies to be forwarded to field offices to kick start operations in anticipation of delayed final donor signatures.
- w. Field officers/animateurs should become more of a “generalist” and should be trained to follow up on a number of projects at the same time.
- x. Staff exchange visits within the region should be promoted both as a learning experience and as a step towards future overseas deployment.
- y. Programme managers need ongoing training on budget management and the best practices of reporting.
- z. To ensure awareness of financial and logistical requirements localised kick off meetings should become a standard procedure when new projects are initiated.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information

The African Sahel, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, has seen a number of recurring droughts in recent years, most notably in 2012, when failed crops, high food prices, a lack of pastoral land, left up to 18 million people experiencing chronic food insecurity⁴. Having been unable to recover household asset levels since the previous drought in 2010, the affected populations found themselves even less equipped to meet this latest threat to their already precarious livelihoods.



Water is key to the day to day survival of communities in the Sahel. Inconsistent or virtually non-existent rainfall is a perennial issue faced by both pastoralist and agrarian communities, who, beyond this, also have to contend with animal and plant diseases and infestations, locusts, birds, crickets, untethered livestock that eat away at their crops, and a shortage of animal fodder, fertilizer and good quality seeds. Agricultural tools are often rudimentary and there is a lack of expertise on how to grow anything other than the most basic common crops. Government infrastructures in rural areas are often basic, and governments lack the financial resources to support communities to any great extent.

Malnutrition levels within the region often hover around the emergency threshold⁵. Care and feeding practices need to be improved, as do sanitary practices and facilities. Many villages lack educational facilities and literacy rates are low. Often, especially in rural communities, young girls do not stay in school beyond their early teens, and villages can be a remote distance from health facilities, agricultural suppliers, food stores and markets. In places the practice of teenage marriages is

⁴ <http://www.oxfam.org/en/sahel>.

⁵ For example, UNICEF in Chad reported that in January 2013 (Post Harvest season) the Global Acute Malnutrition Rate (GAM) in 6 regions of the Sahel belt was at or above the emergency threshold of 15%, while in the other regions, the GAM rate was critical (10% – 15%);

common. Women can also face cultural restraints that reduce their access to employment opportunities.

Overriding issues such as the ongoing desertification of the region exacerbate the situation, as does demographic growth, being one of the root causes of malnutrition and food insecurity in the Sahel that will be one of the main challenges to face over the next 20 years. Conflicts, particularly the ongoing situation in Mali, have led to large scale population movements and increased insecurity in the region. Good quality roads are in short supply, with access to some villages taking hours on dirt roads across rough terrain that become inaccessible during the rainy season.

Within their overriding strategic corporate objective of combatting malnutrition levels in targeted communities, and with the expected outcome of improved food security, over the last three years, utilising three separate Department for International Development (DFID) funding agreements, Action Contre la Faim (ACF) have responded with a mixture of emergency response and capacity/resilience building programmes across five of the most affected countries: Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Activities include unconditional cash distributions, cash for work programmes, food, agricultural and livestock input distributions, WASH interventions, and health garden programmes aimed at diversifying nutritional intake, and Warrantage and Cereal Bank programmes. The third tranche of DFID funding, signed off on 14th August 2013 (£2,896,193), with a cost extension agreed on 7th May 2014 (£1,600,000), is aimed particularly at moving communities from recovery to resilience, and is the subject of this evaluation.

The 2013 human development index for each of the supported countries⁶, and their international ranking out of the 187 countries assessed worldwide, are as follows:

Mauritania:	HDI: 0.487	Ranking: 161
Mali:	HDI: 0.407	Ranking: 176
Burkina Faso:	HDI: 0.388	Ranking: 181
Chad:	HDI: 0.372	Ranking: 184
Niger:	HDI: 0.337	Ranking: 187

All five of the countries supported fall under the “low human development” category and are in the bottom 15% globally of all countries ranked.

The medium and long term effects on the West African economy of the Mali conflict, the rise of what has been termed “Islamic militancy” in the region, and the current Ebola crisis, are yet to fully accrue. What is clear however, is that until structural issues are addressed, rural communities will remain susceptible to livelihood “shocks” that will intermittently affect their precarious food security situations, forcing them to resort to short term coping practices that will detract from any recent gains that may have occurred through either humanitarian or governmental support. For many years to come households in the region will continue to need multi sectoral integrated support, on an ongoing basis, aimed at building their livelihood capacity, and increasing their resilience to the future shocks that will inevitably arrive on their doorstep.

⁶ <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components>

As such, it is a major concern that the hoped for DFID IV funding may not materialise due to the recent announcement that DFID funding for West Africa will now pass through the West African ECHO Office. The concern being that ECHO are more well known for their emergency funding focus, and having their own priorities, may not want to support developmental resilience building activities such as those recently implemented by ACF. Should this occur, and no replacement donor can be found, then the experience gained, and the progress made, will be lost, as programmes started will have to close, and ACF staff that have been trained, will move on to other organisations⁷. Measures to avoid such an event need to be identified as early as possible.

1.2 Evaluation Methodologies

The evaluation was carried out by two independent consultants with the aim of assessing the success of the intervention while extracting lessons learnt that could support future operations in the region, and possibly elsewhere. Success was measured utilising a mixture of information gathering techniques based on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria⁸. The evaluation team comprised one international consultant⁹, who has undertaken the evaluation process for Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger, together with a second, Malian consultant, who has undertaken the process in Mali. The international consultant spent three weeks visiting Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania to assess the operations implemented there. Chad was evaluated remotely. The Malian consultant spent one week visiting the ACF projects in the Gao region of Eastern Mali.

A mixture of information gathering techniques was utilised by both consultants:

- Interviews with relevant ACF staff at each country office, relevant sub-offices, and with ACF regional staff and the Regional Representative in WARO (please see Annex E for the semi structured questionnaire).
- Key stakeholders interviews identified in close collaboration with ACF country staff including:
 - Interviews with local government representatives and relevant government departments.
 - Interviews with implementing partners.
 - Interviews with other relevant international and local organisations.
- Field visits to affected communities incorporating Individual discussions with affected households, beneficiary selection committees, and wherever possible group discussions with targeted communities (please also see Annex E for the FGD format). Local independent translators were used whenever available to provide impartiality.
- An evaluation matrix was drafted and agreed to ensure the consultants were clear on the questions raised in the TOR and how answers to such questions will be investigated during the course of the evaluation (this is available in the evaluation inception report).
- Desk review of relevant documentation:

⁷ As is already the case in Chad, and, to a certain extent in both Burkina Faso and Mauritania. As of the end of November 2014, the Niger DFID staff contracts will be terminated.

⁸ <http://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

⁹ The same consultant who had undertaken the DFID I and II evaluation.

- Individual and consolidated project proposals and progress reports.
- Donor agreements and reports.
- PDM reports, endline and baseline survey data.
- Previous evaluation reports.
- Other literature related to the assessment (Please see annex G for the bibliography).

Triangulation of the information gathered through the various sources mentioned above has been utilised to formulate findings and conclusions for the evaluation's initial feedback to WARO and for this final evaluation report.

1.3 Evaluation Limitations

Although originally approximately one week field trips were planned in four of the five countries was planned (Chad was excluded this time, but had been visited as a part of the DFID I & II evaluation process) with respect to the international evaluator, this plan was thrown off track somewhat by last minute flight changes imposed by regional airlines, and the anti-presidential riots and demonstrations that erupted in Burkina Faso which unfortunately coincided with the date of arrival of the evaluator. The latter led to a one day closure of the ACF sub office in Bogandé due to security concerns, and as such, the cancellation of one of the two days of planned field trips.

Also, due to the airport's closure, and the lack of clarity as to when the next available flight to the evaluator's subsequent destination of Niger might be, instead of passing by Ouagadougou the evaluator had to travel by road directly from Bogandé to Niame. This route, however, was blocked for two days due to the interim military government's decision to close all land borders as well. This has meant that some exit meetings didn't take place in Ouagadougou, plus a reduction of the evaluator's investigative time in Niger to three days instead of the planned five.

The fact that no places were available on internal Niger flights (no prior bookings could be made as it was never clear when the Burkina Faso land borders would open) meant that the only alternatives available for the evaluator on his arrival in Niame were either to drive for a full day (10 hours) in both directions to get one day in the field, or to spend three days in Niame talking directly with the programme managers while interviewing the field managers by phone. In consultation with the Country Director, the decision was made to opt for the second option, with the semi structured questionnaires sent to operational staff in the field bases for compilation. As such, again, time in the field collecting beneficiary feedback was lost. However, one of the two sub office managers, and two of the four SAME officers were travelling to Niame that week and were interviewed there in person.

Chad DFID staff had already been released prior to the start of the evaluation and as such could not be interviewed. A similar situation prevailed in Mauritania and Burkina Faso, although some senior staff were still accessible and as such were contacted.

2 FINDINGS

2.1 *Coherence and program coverage*

This third DFID funded intervention in the Sahel is in coherence, as were the two previous DFID interventions, with the ACF International Strategy (2010 – 2015), specifically with stated corporate aims 1 and 2¹⁰, in that the interventions undertaken across the countries are targeted at reducing levels of acute and moderate malnutrition through the provision of curative and preventive activities specifically targeted at women and young children, while responding to and preventing humanitarian crises, addressing vulnerability and reinforcing longer term resilience to food, water and nutritional crises. The programmes implemented also go some way to address the underlying factors that lead to such levels of malnutrition, focusing primary on the most vulnerable groups with a community centred comprehensive approach.

The programmes are also very much in coherence with governmental rural development plans and emergency support programmes, which often target the same threatened locations where pastoral and agricultural communities struggle to exist due to shortages of rainfall, potable water, arable land, and animal pastures. This is evident from the co-operation reciprocated, for example, during the distribution of sheep in Bogandé, Burkina Faso, and goats in Gao, Mali, whose good health were verified by local Ministry of Livestock veterinary staff, the vaccination of livestock undertaken by local governmental officials in Niger, Mali, and Mauritania, and the health garden trainings given by agricultural specialists from the local agricultural department in Selibaby, Mauritania, and in Gao, Mali. Similarly, non-functioning government Cereal Banks in Niger have been replaced by ones supported by ACF, and in Mali the Regional Water Bureau¹¹ has participated in the identification and rehabilitation of the water points.

There is a great deal of potential for future co-operation between ACF and the local authorities in all operational countries, not only with respect to programme interventions, such as the development and training of the vegetable growing co-operatives in Mauritania, but also with respect to ongoing assessments of malnutrition levels, the availability of livestock pastures, and urban and rural household food security levels. By participating in such assessments there is a greater likelihood that a true reflection of the current situation will be forthcoming, facilitating a clearer representation of any programmatic progress made to date.

It would be good also to work more at a planning level with government authorities. This would ensure good co-operation and co-ordination during the lifetime of any ACF programme, and would also encourage best practices within government interventions, creating a synergy where the capacity and knowledge of both organisations could be merged together. Building the capacity of the local authorities is one of the few exit strategies available.

¹⁰ ACF International Strategy (2010 – 2015).

¹¹ La Direction Régionale de l'Hydraulique.

The programmes undertaken are also very much in coherence with those of other donors and institutions active in the region. ACF has sought and received additional funding from other donors, e.g. ECHO, Europe Aid, to support the beneficiaries in the same targeted communities with complementary funding that also has an impact on the nutritional status of the communities supported. Beneficiary information is shared with other organisations and forums working in the region, e.g. the Cadre Harmonisé, FewNet, and CILSS.

Beneficiary coverage within the DFID III intervention is quite low as compared to the total number of food insecure people in the region. For example, according to a WFP/CSA assessment¹² in December 2013 in Mauritania the total number of food insecure people affected in rural areas was estimated at 383,000 of which 114,000 (6.6%) were in severe food insecurity. The total number of beneficiaries in the DFID III programme in Mauritania is 11,800, being 3.83% of the total affected. Frequently the total number of poor and very poor in the targeted communities exceeded the figure that funding would allow ACF to support. For example, with respect to the cash distribution in Mali, only 1750 families out of 2938 identified could be supported being a shortfall of 1188 families (40%). Of course, this has made beneficiary selection quite difficult.

On a broader scale, according to DFID's UK Humanitarian Response in the Sahel 2013 report the estimated number of food insecure people across the Sahel in 2013 was 11.3 million, with this expected to increase to 20m in 2014¹³. The total number of beneficiaries supported by ACF in their five countries was planned at 109,067 (although many are supported in a number of activities), however, ACF only receives 3% of DFID's total West Africa funding¹⁴. The total number of beneficiaries estimated to be food insecure in ACF's operational areas was estimated at 4,033,938¹⁵, of which the ACF supported 109,067 beneficiaries represents 2.7%.

As such ACF is not the most significant actor within the region as a whole, however, their work is very much appreciated in the communities with which they work. It should be also noted that DFID funding only represents 25% of the total ACF spending in the region¹⁶. This complementary funding often supplements the DFID support provided to targeted beneficiaries and is an added value of working with ACF in the region.

2.2 Relevance and Appropriateness

From country to country and location to location the needs of the supported communities across the Sahel are broadly similar in terms of low levels of food security and permanently precarious malnutrition levels. Similarly, the permanent issue of access to and the availability of water permeates the daily routine and the question of how to feed the family is, at times, a serious concern. Preparation for and survival through the "lean season" is a predominant issue.

¹² Enquête de suivi de la sécurité alimentaire des ménages Décembre 2013.

¹³ UN estimate.

¹⁴ DFID's UK Humanitarian Response in the Sahel 2013 report.

¹⁵ Cadre Harmonisé figures utilised in the DFID III cost extension document.

¹⁶ ACF Regional Representative.

The communities themselves are glad of any help that will alleviate their situation, and are clearly grateful for the support provided by ACF, who have adopted a multi layered approach that provides immediate emergency support as required in terms of cash¹⁷, food, seeds, and animal fodder distributions during the lean season, medium/long term resilience building support in terms of increasing food diversity via health garden co-operatives and the distribution of small ruminants (sheep, goats), and longer term structural support in terms of providing Cereal Banks and access to the Warrantage system within targeted communities. This approach is very much appropriate to the context as it deals with the multi-faceted reality of life in the Sahel, and the programmes undertaken are relevant to the needs of the beneficiary communities, as confirmed by the beneficiaries themselves.

Key to the interventions is ACF's desire to change the mind-set of the beneficiaries. The approach ACF has undertaken is about changing longstanding household practices, reviving community spirit, improving dietary norms, and introducing new coping mechanisms. Giving the beneficiaries the possibility to access credit facilities, often for the first time, and training them how to better cultivate their health gardens, introducing them to new vegetables, as well as instructing them how to manage their livestock, is building the beneficiaries' own capacity, and strengthening their resilience. This empowering methodology is clearly the best way forward, and as such again ACF's approach is relevant and appropriate. Alongside this, utilising cash for work activities for communal benefits provides both a household income and a community assets, while improved knowledge of good health, sanitation, and hygiene practices¹⁸ will reduce the incidence of diarrhoea and similar illnesses, especially amongst the beneficiary children, therefore impacted positively on malnutrition levels.

All is not perfect however, and improvements can still be made. For example, due to inadequate rainfall in some parts of the Sahel this year some communities have very little crops at hand. This somewhat negates the possibility of their access to the Warrantage process as the amount of loan available based on the crops deposited is very small and is unlikely to be sufficient to enable any income generating activities. That said, even in a good year not all beneficiaries seem to take full advantage of the Warrantage funds once received, using it to purchase food or medical/other supplies instead of trying to undertake income generating/resilience building activities (such as purchasing and feeding animals to make a quick profit, or engaging in some "petit commerce") which would increase household earnings and enable to better face the "lean" season. This latter practice need to be further encouraged.

The practice of "Social Warrantage"¹⁹ is a good way of encourage beneficiaries' involvement in the scheme. However, this must only occur in the short term as it is not sustainable, and ACF need to be fully clear that normally the loan needs to be repaid in full.

Similarly, the principle of destocking has met with some resistance from pastoralists who do not want to reduce the size of their herd (it is their security) the concern being that the

¹⁷ Being either CFW activities or unconditional cash distribution.

¹⁸ Although not covered by DFID funding, progress of the pilot "Changement de Comportement" programme in Mauritania should be monitored with a view to its possible replication elsewhere.

¹⁹ The version when only a proportion of the loan has to be repaid, amounts which are then consolidated by ACF and then returned to the community in a separate form of support.

money they would hold in their hand wouldn't stay there for long and might easily be wasted, and as such would not be there to repurchase their stocks after the lean season. The availability of banks in rural areas is weak.

Also ACF need to carefully manage any cash/food distribution programmes run over a number of years to the same communities to be sure to avoid the possible creation of a dependency culture.

The approach towards working with the "Jardins de la Santé" needs to move more towards the empowerment and capacity building of the beneficiaries as a body, rather than as a collection of individuals. The ladies who currently lead these collectives have little knowledge or capacity in terms of how to make the co-operative work in the long run, and are currently somewhat expectant of ACF to fix their problems for them (for example spare parts for the pump, the provision of pesticides, seeds, and the cost of fuel). Trainings need to go beyond production methodologies to management practices. A treasurer needs to be appointed for each site and ACF need to support them to make calculations as to what would the annual costs of inputs be over the course of a year, and as such to calculate the monthly or annual contribution from each beneficiary. This would need then to be compared to the monetary value of what can be produced on each individual's small plot of land. This may make the venture financially unviable for some²⁰, and may lead to the need for a minimum plot size. This approach would work well if undertaken alongside the relevant local government body that support the development of village co-operation, or perhaps at FAO "Farmer Field Schools".

Please note also in this respect, the provision of correct seeds is extremely important. Unfortunately in Mali, cowpea and sorghum seeds purchased in Niger, did not adapt to the local climate in Gao, and in some communities the beneficiaries would have preferred rice paddy seeds as this is what they are used to producing²¹. Seeds purchased in Senegal have worked in Mauritania, however it would be best to run nurseries on site, and trial crops, to ensure that investments are not wasted and opportunities are not lost. In terms of this and the paragraph above such approaches would need to be undertaken over a number of years.

Health garden produce is either eaten or sold, often in similar quantities²². Unfortunately, as products tend to be harvested at the same time by everyone the market price for such items is inevitably very low. However, if not sold then the items will soon decay and become inedible. As such, there needs to be more support and training provided with respect to the processing and "transformation" of such crops for their later usage (e.g. dried tomatoes, cabbage etc). This is equally important in terms of utilising livestock products as well, for example the production of goat's cheese.

²⁰ In which case ACF would need to look at if they wanted to support targeted individuals' contributions, e.g. those mothers with malnourished children. The concern would be how this would affect the sustainability of the co-operative.

²¹ For example in Gounzoureye in Gao, Mali.

²² Some will also be given away to neighbours and family.



Health garden co-operative in Wouro Farba, Guidimaka, Mauritania.

As mentioned previously, access to and the usage of water will always be an issue that needs attention in the Sahel and there is more that ACF can do in this respect. Despite recommendations otherwise there are still some health garden projects running in communities where water access is an issue²³, and as such crop production remains difficult. Currently there are a number of irrigation systems in use in ACF health gardens: the Californian (channels which direct water throughout the garden from nearby water sources), the “Goute à Goute” (water, stored in a tank, is dripped onto plants through a network of tubes cut into plastic pipes reaching accurately over individual plants), and the basic watering can method. Each have their own benefits and levels of efficiency, and are chosen on the basis of water availability. However, it would be good to have a more uniform approach, with greater guidance as to what system works best in which environment. A comparative study would benefit ACF in the region in as much that individual country offices would have guidelines on best practices that they could follow.

Some large donors are seemingly against investing in wells and as such alternative solutions need to be found. Sadly the “Hydroponie”²⁴ experiment does not seem to be working well (only one of four sites in Mauritania could be said to be functioning well). ACF need to increase their involvement with respect to water retention activities at a village level. “Rains come and the water disappears quickly” is a common thread amongst villagers interviewed. Activities targeted at water storage or improving water usage practices need to be designed in a participatory manner with the communities themselves, creating opportunities for cash for work, and generating a long term impact on water availability.

²³ Water sources can be up to four or even eight kilometres away – as mentioned in two villages in Southern Mauritania.

²⁴ A system whereby water is pumped under plants sitting on plastic pipes.

2.3 Effectiveness

As of the July - September 2014 quarterly report, performance against plan for each of the interventions in terms of beneficiaries supported was as follows:

Original Grant:

TOTAL EXPECTED	DFID III	BFASO	CHAD	MAURIT	NIGER	MALI	DFID III + MALI
HH	9,610	1,000	3,020	1,770	3,820	7,957	17,567
TOTAL	69,040	7,000	21,140	14,160	26,740	71,613	140,653
Women	34,030	3,482	10,354	6,823	13,370	35,445	69,475
Under five children	11,542	1,120	3,510	3,158	3,755	11,856	23,398
Elders (>60 years)	3,009	336	698	666	1,310	3,509	6,518
Girls	7,892	801	2,381	1,501	3,209	8,507	16,399

TOTAL REACHED	DFID III	BFASO	CHAD	MAURIT	NIGER	MALI	DFID III + MALI
HH	10,374	1,498	3,020	1,475	4,381	3,697	14,071
TOTAL	74,093	10,486	21,140	11,800	30,667	33,273	107,366
Women	36,589	5,216	10,354	5,686	15,333	16,637	53,225
Under five children	12,122	1,677	3,509	2,631	4,305	5,546	17,667
Elders (>60 years)	3,256	503	697	554	1,502	1,664	4,919
Girls	8,510	1,199	2,381	1,250	3,680	4,159	12,669

Beneficiary targets have been met in all countries although Mauritania and Mali appear to be under target. This is due to the fact that many HHs have benefited from several activities. For example, if a male head of HH has benefited from cash transfers and his wife has benefited from health garden activities, then this HH can only be counted once. In Mauritania and Mali more HHs than expected benefited from several of the activities implemented, with the objective being to maximize the impact for those beneficiaries targeted. However, the targeted HH per activity were reached, if not slightly exceeded.

Cost Extension:

Similarly all countries have managed to reach if not slightly exceed their beneficiary target figures during the cost extension interventions:

TOTAL EXPECTED	DFID III	BFASO	CHAD	MAURIT	NIGER	MALI	DFID III + MALI
HH	6279	1 048	3020	1311	900	1770	8049
TOTAL	45264	7 336	21140	10488	6300	15930	61194
Women	22206	3649	10354	5053	3150	7885	30091
Under five children	7906	1173	3510	2339	884	2637	10543
Elders (>60 years)	1850	352	698	492	308	781	2631
Girls	5088	839	2381	1112	756	1892	6980

TOTAL REACHED	DFID III	BFASO ²⁵	CHAD	MAURIT	NIGER	MALI	DFID III + MALI
HH	6723	1118	3020	1311	1274	1770	8493
TOTAL	48372	7 826	21140	10488	8918	15930	64302
Women	23760	3 893	10354	5054	4459	7885	31645
Under five children	8352	1 251	3510	2339	1252	2637	10989
Elders (>60 years)	2004	376	698	493	437	781	2784
Girls	5458	895	2381	1112	1070	1892	7351

This is a good performance across the board and should not go unrecognised.

Beneficiary targeting in itself still remains an issue within the communities visited during the evaluation. This process will always be fraught with difficulties and as it is impossible to support everyone²⁶. As such, there will inevitably be complaints from beneficiaries or their relatives who feel they have been wrongly excluded. The four category HEA process remains the dominant process utilised by ACF across the region²⁷, although at times, if village committees are established to undertake their own beneficiary selection process, they have been known to separate the village population into just the three categories, merging the poor and very poor into one group. This itself is quite understandable as the difference between the poor and very poor is often very hard to see, and on paper is quite marginal. However, this practice should be discouraged as it leads to difficulties should funding levels are not be high enough to support all of those deemed to be poor, making it even harder to exclude families from the beneficiary list.

Furthermore, in as much as ACF do verify all beneficiary lists facilitated by village committees, this needs to be done on a 100% basis and not using a sampling exercise. This may take longer, and would probably mean staying in communities overnight (already a common practice in most countries) as this is when the family animals return home, therefore enabling household HEA categorisation to be verified²⁸. Also, village committees, if established to undertake the beneficiary selection process, are best not established with the village chief/leader as a core member. Historically this has led to a distorted results. It would be better for communities to either democratically elect the committee members or for ACF to include those figures in the community that people would trust, for example, church leaders or village elders/sages, representative of both genders. As mentioned in the DFID I and II evaluation, the balance between time and accuracy needs to be closely monitored.

The usage of four programme impact indicators, having been adopted since the end of DFID I and II, in itself is a positive step, being:

- Food Consumption Score (FCS) – a composite score based on dietary

²⁵ Miscalculations have been noticed in the previous QR5 and have been corrected

²⁶ Reducing/sharing the support so that all poor and very poor members of the community benefit would dilute the support so as to render its impact ineffectual.

²⁷ The classification of beneficiaries into the four categories of very poor, poor, average/medium wealth, and comparatively well off.

²⁸ The difference between a family being classified as very poor or poor is normally only a matter of, for example, one category having three goats, while the next may have four, and a bicycle.

diversity, food frequency, and the relative nutritional importance of different food groups²⁹.

- Individual Diet Diversification Score (IDDS) – which measures the adequacy of nutritional intake (i.e. the coverage of basic needs in terms of macro and micro nutrients) and the variety/balance of a person’s diet³⁰.
- Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) – which measures whether households have experienced problems with accessing food during the last 30 days.
- Months of adequate food provisioning – which indicates how many months of adequate food stock a family has stored/available.

However, measuring programmatic progress against such indicators, especially as communities run through the peaks and troughs of the seasonal calendar, has not been undertaken with any great accuracy or consistency.

Objectives were set for each indicator in the original project logframe, for example, a 25% increase in FCSs of 35 or over by March 2014 (being an acceptable level of food consumption). To assess performance against the FCS objective the baseline FCS of each country programme’s beneficiaries³¹, compared to the endline results, as taken from latest available PDM reports are as follows:

	Baseline	Endline (or latest available)
Burkina Faso:	43%	26% (October 2014)
Chad:	53%	58% (September 2014)
Mali	68%	74% (October 2014)
Niger Mayahi,	36%,	60% (September 2014)
Keita	28%	60.5% (September 2014)
Mauritania	68%	84.6% (November 2014)


These figures do not show an increase in FCS by 25% except in the case of Niger, although they do show some improvement in Mali, Mauritania and Chad. More than simple numbers however, the issue is rather a question of having a working system in place that compares like with like. In this example the baseline results were taken in varying months from July 2013 (Burkina Faso, and Mauritania), September 2013 (Mali, Niger) and December 2013 (Chad). The endline results were taken at or later than the end of the current funding period in September 2014. As FCS scores fluctuate during the course of the year, any comparison of these numbers (except for Mali and Niger) makes little sense particularly if they are consolidated. The only true comparisons that can be made for the FCS are year on year, and not month on month, only then would it be impossible to ascertain whether a community is comparatively better off than previously, and as such, whether progress is being made or if the project needs to realign its activities or objectives specifically in terms of whether or not beneficiaries are more likely to have an acceptable FCS during the lean season. The same could be said for the other three indicators used as well. Also the notion of an across the board target for each country is a little too simplistic (in this case an increase FSC of 25%), and doesn’t take into account country specific circumstances.

²⁹ WFP definition.

³⁰ UN Standing Committee on Nutrition: Fact sheets on Food and Nutrition Security Indicators/Measures.

³¹ As taken from the July-September 2014 quarterly report.

In this respect, the application of the PDM processes, together with its analysis and reporting across the region remains inconsistent and need further improvement, although it has progressed somewhat since the end of the DFID I and II intervention³². Viable comparative figures in virtually all cases were not shown in the PDM reports, with the occasional exception as seen in the Chad endline report of September 2013:



Food Consumption Score comparison in Chad³³.

Although the baseline and endline months are different, at least the endline report attempts to give an indication of progress over time. This was rarely seen in other PDM/Endline reports, but should be.

Beyond this, some individual programme departments seem to have lost sight somewhat of one of the overall programmatic results/outputs of the intervention being the reduction of the seasonal peaks of malnutrition levels in the countries of intervention³⁴. This is not mentioned in many of the PDM reports and only mentioned in the quarterly reports to DFID in terms of progress made in Chad. It would be hard to know what effect each intervention in turn has had on malnutrition levels in supported communities as this doesn't seem to be incorporated into programme monitoring methodology, although the numbers may well be available in the nutritional programmes working in the same areas, albeit that they are funded by other partners.

In terms of the implementation of planned activities, for both the original programme proposal and the cost extension, ACF have performed, for the most part, as anticipated, and in places, where exchange rate gains (UK Sterling to the Euro) and cost savings have allowed³⁵, beyond what was expected, not only in terms of additional beneficiaries, but also in terms of add on activities, for example, the installation of two additional wells in Niger, and the distribution of the multi-tasking donkeys and donkey carts in Niger. In Chad, ACF "Baby Corners" have been added onto the standard health garden format. This is a welcome addition as it allows mothers to stay near their children, whilst also providing a space for

³² This point was raised in the DFID I and II assessment.

³³ Projet de Relèvement des ménages dans la région du Kanem affectés par la crise alimentaire de 2012 - Enquête finale Chad.

³⁴ Only the endline surveys in Burkina Faso and Niger mention the MUAC measurement results but do not give comparative figures.

³⁵ For example, by purchasing goats in Chad after the Tabaski festival

training and hygiene promotion. Regular MUAC measurements of the children have also been taken here.

Some output levels have been less than expected, for example, in Burkina Faso, 15 health gardens have been supported compared to the 18 planned, and Warrantage activities have been reduced in some countries³⁶ due to poor crops which leave beneficiaries with such small amounts to offer to the finance/cereal bank institutions that the sum loaned in return would be too small to be of any significant use regarding any small business ventures or income generation activities. Inefficiencies within operating partners have led to some delays, for example, the lack of network of the mobile phone company (Tigo) in Chad, has led to delays in cash distributions, and the need to find a new partner.

Similarly, with respect to the storage warehouses built to support the health gardens, although set up to the selling of produce in the short and long term it is unclear how these will be used. They are quite small³⁷ and cannot store produce for more than a few of the collective at any one time. Although they can be used as a storage space for the wheelbarrows, beyond this their daily functionality was not clear.

As can be seen external factors such as levels of rainfall, pestilence, and crop performance can affect the success or failure of the interventions, and as such can impact on the food security and malnutrition levels of the supported communities. Similarly, local conflict can have an immediate impact on activities. Ultimately, ACF can only contribute to the good health and well-being of the communities to the best of their ability. There is a need for local government legislature³⁸ and support to these communities, in unison with the ACF support, to ensure that the long term development of the communities proceeds in a positive direction.

Another external factor affected the effectiveness of the operation is the willingness of donors to support certain types of projects. Wells, for example, are seemingly hard to raise money for within some institutional donors, but can be covered with smaller local level donors such as European Embassies. The commitment period the donor is willing to sign up for is important as well. Health garden co-operative programmes, for example, are best suited to a three year funding cycle which will enable a participatory long term approach that will increase their impact. This type of funding is not available with DFID, whose annual funding mechanism can lead to a rushed performance as funding has to be spent before the end of its lifetime otherwise it will be lost.

Internally, ACF staff's knowledge, both of the areas of implementation, and of the technical aspects of their work, has proved an important factor with respect to the success of the operation to date. This important element of any operation is at risk of being lost as there seems to be little sign of a DFID IV on the horizon, and as of the end of November 2014, the majority of these staff have been made redundant.

³⁶ Particularly in Mauritania.

³⁷ Too small, according to the Le commissariat à la Sécurité Alimentaire (CSA), in Mali and not up to expected standards.

³⁸ For example with respect to the grazing of domestic animals and the damage they can do on private land and crops.

The availability of WARO with respect to the generation and management of regional funding as well as the consolidation of the DFID reports has also been a positive internal factor, and a clear added value that the office generates. Without its presence it is unlikely these operations would have taken place. Countries are particularly appreciative of the technical advisors that are normally available at WARO, even if not there currently, and this facility should be available as much as possible.

WARO's availability to represent ACF at regional meetings, and the regional analysis that they provide, is another positive aspect of their presence, as is their facilitation of learning and "capitalisation" workshops that have highlighted best practices and lessons learnt and enabled this information to be shared throughout the region. The more that this learning process can be formalised and structured, not just by WARO, but by each country office as well, the more effective and efficient operations will be.

2.4 Efficiency

Although beneficiary targets have been reached if not surpassed, the feeling in general is that the response, having started in September 2013, has started a couple of months late due to the late signing of the contract between ACF and DFID on August 15th 2013. The lean period for each country (please see annex F for the Niger seasonal calendar) runs from approximately from June to August. This is by far the most difficult time of year for the communities and it is disappointing that DFID II, which ended in March 2013, could not be followed up more quickly. A five month implementation gap for ongoing developmental projects is far from ideal. Both DFID and ACF need to look at this time experience so as to avoid such a repetition in future. Sadly, there was a similar gap between DFID I and DFID II. Somehow it seems that lessons are not being learnt in this respect.

ACF also need to look at what mechanisms can be put in place at an HQ level to advance start-up funds to operational countries once a donor agreement is in place, and the wait is merely for the final details to be amended and paperwork to be signed. This will enable assessments to get underway, staff recruitment procedures to be initiated, suppliers can be identified, and products can be prepositioned, thus reducing delays. Of course, there is a risk associated with this, however, the humanitarian need in such incidences should take priority over the corporate risk, which, after all, should only be small.

Although somewhat late in all countries, the initial cash disbursements undertaken in September and October were still very much welcome as far as the beneficiaries were concerned as they were used to buy food and pay off debts. Apart from further issues with cash distributions in Chad and Mali, according to the beneficiaries spoken to, the timing of the other interventions were very much on time, arriving at a moment when the beneficiaries were in most need, for example the wheat flour and cash distributions and the CFW activities in Mauritania that arrived in July 2014, right in the heart of the "période de soudure".

Financial and logistical efficiency seems to have improved significantly since DFID I and II, although it would appear that programme managers would still benefit from budget

management³⁹ and report writing training. Country expenditures have been within budget, and there were few complaints of goods and supplies being purchased late. Also, there doesn't seem to have been quite the last minute rush to spend money as was the case in DFID II, although this has happened to a certain extent in some places. That said, there are calls for localised kick off meetings to ensure all departments are on board with any new projects with roles and delivery schedules available at the start. Reporting to DFID has been on time, although there is some room for improvement according to DFID.

In terms of the value for money (VFM) of the operation, this is difficult to assess, especially as DFID themselves are not particularly clear on exactly how VFM should be measured. Clear guidelines and instructions would be beneficial for both parties. Costs per beneficiary per programme have been forwarded to DFID as a part of the quarterly reporting process. Unfortunately final figures are not as yet available for this report as the final financial package is still being put together.⁴⁰ How much this actually tells us is another issue. Without comparative figures for other organisations running exactly the same programmes in the same locations at the same time of year, it is hard to gauge exactly what these numbers mean.

What ACF do provide in return for the money invested is their ability to implement a broad spectrum of activities across a number of countries in a coherent fashion at the same time. The level of experience and local knowledge that each country office have to offer has enabled the operations to be run in a timely and efficient manner. The actual cost of the operation is difficult to compare to the long term impact and sustainable benefit that will accrue to the health garden participants in terms of annual production, and to those who have received animals in terms of milk, cheese, and future income and nourishment. The programmatic impact on communal resilience and individual capacity will reap its rewards in terms of operational cost savings next time a drought on similar shock threatens, assuming that these families will now need less emergency support than they would have done otherwise.

The fact that ACF are also supported by other donors working in the same communities is another example of the value for money ACF provide. Overhead costs are as such shared reducing individual donor costs, and the likelihood that integrated programming will provide synergies in terms of cumulative benefits to families and communities supported will rise.

Despite the number of separate ongoing programmes, due to the gaps between DFID funding tranches, some staff will need to be laid off at the end of each DFID funding cycle. Although mentioned in the DFID I and II evaluation report, unfortunately this loss of staff remains an issue, more so in case of the specialised field officers rather than the higher level programme managers who can be accommodated elsewhere on other programmes.

In an attempt to rectify this a move towards making animators/field staff more generalists would be useful. An all-round training programme could be orchestrated across the region to enable field officers to have the skills to work on any project, or a number of projects at

³⁹ For example, underestimates of cost have occurred in Mali (storage warehouses and goats), while overestimates of cost have happened in Chad (goats).

⁴⁰ This is expected in the first week of December 2014.

one time. This would also help regarding the integration of programmes, which, according to most staff questions, exists, but could be improved. It may also lead to some cost savings if field officers can work on a number of couple of projects at once.

Additionally, the retention of staff, particularly those on fixed end contracts, has been an issue in places, as staff move onto roles deemed either more permanent, or more lucrative. The promise of additional training skills and a broad range of experience may help to reduce that. Again, should longer term donor agreements be negotiable, both programme implementation and staff retention would be improved. Similarly, staff exchanges across the region would help facilitate the exchange of information and experience as well as improve staff retention. As it is, it is easy enough to share information on a centralised database in an individual country operation, however, having access to information across the region is not so easy. A centralised WARO cloud or similar device could be utilised to make pertinent files and information accessible to all country operations.

ACF have shown a great deal of flexibility throughout the region in providing a quality product, tailoring responses to the needs of the communities. It would be impossible and impractical to try to implement the same projects in all locations. The response to date has met the recognised needs within the budget available utilising the resources previously identified. Future responses may benefit from engaging the communities in a more participatory approach however, so as to gather what they see as their main priorities. This would create more ownership and hopefully commitment from the side of the community and less expectation for ACF to meet every need and fix every problem that arises.

2.5 Impact

As mentioned above, the actual statistical impact of the response has been difficult to measure as a result of a lack of year on year comparative data for the four indicators utilised in the proposal logframe, and the reality that even should such indicators show a marked improvement then, due to the number of other combining factors, ACF could not claim more than to have contributed to any change in beneficiary circumstances.

That said, in the eyes of the beneficiaries, they feel they have clearly benefited from the support provided by ACF whether it be cash, CFW, food, water, health garden support, livestock support, training, hygiene promotion, warrantage, cereal banks, donkeys, etc. The number of different activities is impressive. The impact has been both beneficial in the short term in terms of the injection of cash into communities during the lean period when emergency support is most needed, and in the medium to long term, developing water retention facilities and community assets through cash for work activities, as well as individual beneficiaries' future earnings capacity through crop production trainings and livestock management advice, therefore increasing their resilience to shocks. Support has been provided to both agriculturalists and pastoralists as required.

Access to water remains however, the one item that beneficiaries always mention as an area in which they need more support. Although ACF has provided wells in places⁴¹,

⁴¹ For example, 4 wells were rehabilitated in Mali.

experimented with new water management techniques, and even provided donkeys to help those less capable fetch and carry the water, there is always more than can be done, whether this is in the management of water, its retention, storage, education as to how to purify it, or training as how to best use it. Water is also an integral part of a lot of the programmes undertaken whether it be a DFID funded health garden or an ECHO funded WASH or Nutrition programme. As such any improvement in access or usage in one programme reflects well in another and increase the overall impact of the operations. As mentioned in the DFID I and II evaluation report, ACF will need to continue, and wherever possible, expand its activities in all water related activities.

Initially, there is a need to ensure consistency across the interventions with respect to hygiene promotion making sure the same message is repeated clearly no matter what team does the training⁴². In this respect the lack of education and high illiteracy rate within the communities is a constraint that needs to be navigated. Secondly, there is a need to extract an improved performance from Attica the facilitator of the hydroponic health garden system in Mauritania. At present the performance of their product is unsatisfactory as only one of their four sites is currently functioning properly, and their presence in the communities is somewhat spasmodic.

There is also a social impact of the work undertaken by ACF. For example, in Burkina Faso, where, as elsewhere, livestock is seen as a symbol of wealth and power, the distribution of sheep to very poor households was said to almost immediately move their social status beyond that of the poor in that community. As such, in order to allay any ill feeling, it is good that activities are organised that support all members of the community, for example, in Niger, when a government vaccination programme was brought to a village by ACF where livestock had been distributed and was available for all community members to vaccinate their animals⁴³.

ACF field staff need to be aware of any socio–anthropological aspect their programmatic activities may generate whether intentionally or not. It should be assumed that some part of any distribution will be shared with friends, neighbours, or family who did not receive anything. ACF need to monitor the level of sharing that is ongoing, and if possible factor this into the cash/food amounts to be distributed. Note also that CFW activities in terms in creating employment opportunities will tend to keep men from travelling in search of work. This is also a positive social impact as it keeps families together and social structures intact.

Unfortunately, the evaluation did not have time to investigate in detail the impact of the roaming veterinary technicians that were trained in Chad to support livestock communities. If this intervention has gone well, the possibility of replicating this in other similar environments should be investigated.

⁴² Hygiene promotion falls within the health gardens, WASH, and nutrition programmes.

⁴³ There is a need to inform villagers not to eat meat or drink milk 20 days after the vaccination of their animals due to the risk of passing on antibiotics that are in the food/milk.

As mentioned previously the management of the co-operative health gardens and the health gardens needs to be improved.⁴⁴ The usage of fertilisers and pesticides need to be organised by the groups themselves with ACF support and guidance. Furthermore, beneficiaries need support in how to protect the gardens from birds, pests, and other animals. There may be further CFW opportunities re the “sécurisation” of the perimeter fences that would be beneficial to both cash worker and health gardener. One further issue here is the ownership of the land. Once irrigated and furrowed, the land could be quite attractive to its owner to reclaim. Documented clarity as to the use of the land and for how long needs to be agreed and documented with the landowners in all incidences. Finally, access to good quality seeds is important for beneficiaries. The possibility of the beneficiaries running their own nurseries should be promoted and supported. ACF need also to provide guidance on the quality and type of seeds that are required.

These gardens provide a long term sustainable impact, not just in terms of the potential produce cultivated, but also in terms in the knowledged passed on from the ACF/Government trainers, but also between the women themselves. The gardens invoke a sense of solidarity amongst the women that goes beyond the health gardens and passes into day to day mutual support and knowledge sharing on a broader range of topics.

Possibly the most important impact may be the gradual change in the mind-set of the communities supported. Activities such as the Warrantage and Cereal Bank initiatives have encouraged participants to engage in activities that can boost the household nutritional status of the families themselves. The interventions have encouraged households to try new possibilities and change their habitual way of doing things. Trainings on composting, food preservation, and animal feeding/fodder techniques have imparted new knowledge that beneficiaries are now willing to use, proud in the sense of their new found capabilities. ACF need to continue to push these boundaries a little further, promoting and advising on small income generating activities for example, or on new vegetables to diversity or supplement traditional diets.

Similarly, ACF need to carefully manage any cash/food distribution programmes run over a number of years to the same communities to be sure to avoid the possible creation of a dependency culture. These distributions have seemingly had, in places, a short term upward effect on local prices. ACF need to continue to monitor such localised increases and to factor in such price fluctuations into the calculations for amounts to be distributed.

In terms of possible improvements for future interventions, the need for more detailed analysis within the PDMs has been mentioned previously. Reports need to consistently show actual financial values of crops produced and how this contributes to actual household income levels. Furthermore the actual impact of each different intervention modality on local malnutrition rates should become a standard practice.

Similarly, a comprehensive integrated approach has not been evident everywhere as some sectoral interventions are run in isolation in some locations, and programmes, when run alongside each other, would often benefit from greater integration.

⁴⁴ In this respect working with the already established “tontine” organisation may be fruitful.

Health gardens need to be expanded, crops diversified, and production improved wherever possible, and where there is a willingness in the community. The possibility of the commercial exploitation of the *Moringa Oleifera* plant in Niger could be looked into. Also, rather than a one fits all approach, the possibility of tailoring distributions of cash/food based on family size could be looked into. This would require prompt verification and monitoring of HEA assessment data, however, this should be standard practice. The possibility of distributing a mixture of goats and sheep should be looked into, with the female animal distributed as a preference⁴⁵.

2.6 Sustainability

There is a strong element of sustainability within the medium/long term development activities of the intervention. This is particularly clear in terms of the dissemination of capacity building knowledge as to how to cultivate plants and how to raise animals. This knowledge can now be passed on from generation to generation.

Similarly, the livestock, especially as the majority of them were female, will now breed and exponential expand the flocks of the poor and very poor families that were supported⁴⁶. Training in methodologies on the need to vaccinate and how to gather fodder and turn this into “feeding bricks” will accompany this process.

Health gardens are already improving nutritional levels and providing a diversity of diet. As such, it is reasonable to assume that this will continue for years to come. Training in the preparation and management of the health gardens, including the provision of seed nurseries would increase the longevity and the output of these projects. As always, guaranteeing the continuity of any water supply in the Sahel will always be difficult, as mentioned previously, the more ACF, in each of the countries, can do in this respect, the greater the sustainability of their impact will be.

All of the above will generate a medium to long term economic benefit for the beneficiaries. Similarly, any community asset and water management work will have a similar benefit. Beyond the beneficiaries, any capacity strengthening of local government counterparts will have an ongoing effect that will support communities in the medium to long term as well.

2.7 HEA approach and Beneficiary Involvement

As mentioned above beneficiary targeting can still create some confusion and dissatisfaction amongst the beneficiary communities. Although the HEA approach is still utilised throughout the region, in terms of the classification of beneficiaries, there has been no significant attempt to measure whether or not gaps in household incomes have been filled. This comes down again to the need of a more detailed and consistent monitoring and follow up approach. While using the HEA approach over time, field workers need to understand that communities have become wise to how the system works. The temptation to understate assets has to be closely scrutinised with evening visits to selected houses to verify asset levels recommended.

⁴⁵ The males tend to get eaten or sold.

⁴⁶ In Burkina Faso, of the 100 sheep distributed in one community, three had died, but ten lambs were born.

This need for a more systemised monitoring approach is evident also in the complaints mechanisms that have only just been established in most countries (Mauritania, and Niger for example). These should have been instigated during DFID I and II and were recommended in that evaluation report as an issue that needed attention. Although finally implemented, this has taken too long. The mechanism also needs to be systemised, collated on a national HQ basis, and analysed across the board to look for trends, and to ensure that complaints are answered on a timely basis. This does not appear to be happening just yet as complaints are handled in the field and issues that arise may not be brought to the attention of national supervisors.

Additional targeting criteria such as female headed households have also confused beneficiaries, as these may not always be the most vulnerable. Similarly, when health gardens are open to all who wish to partake in the activity, or for those living nearby, attempts to undertake systemised targeting becomes somewhat diluted. Women with young children have less time to work on the gardens, and although perhaps targeted due to having a malnourished child, may not reap the benefits that perhaps an elderly lady would.

On a positive note, the overall approach has had a strong gender bias towards women which is appropriate in these communities as women share a greater burden of the household responsibility in the provision of food and the caring of children. Female headed households have been targeted in both the distribution of cash, food and animals, as well as within the health garden and co-operative support programmes. The overall programmatic objective of managing malnutrition levels in children also supports the role of the woman in the household. Women have been well represented on beneficiary selection committees, and are invariably the leaders of the health garden co-operatives.

Beneficiaries have been very appreciative of the trainings undertake. Similarly, Warrantage and Cereal Banks beneficiaries are glad of the opportunities such facilities provide. An increased effort needs to be made however, to get the very poor/poor families to use these opportunities to their fullest potential. Micro credit facilities are available in some communities however families are reluctant to access them. Inevitably, VP/P families tend to “eat” the money they receive, and need support to help them invest in income generating activities as such building on the opportunities provided.

It is impossible for ACF to work in isolation in these communities. Other issues such as poor quality or access to health facilities, a lack of educational opportunities, illiteracy, young marriages, family sizes, access to and information about family planning etc., need to be addressed. ACF do not cover all these areas and need to establish long term partnerships with those organisations that do.

3 CONCLUSIONS

ACF's multi layered and multi sectoral approach is both relevant and appropriate to the needs of the targeted pastoral and agricultural communities, being coherent to both its organisation's international strategy as well as each country's national and rural development strategy, by targeting the most vulnerable, and addressing both short term emergency needs as well as medium/longer term developmental objectives such as increasing household resilience and individual capacity with a range of community based activities that have a sustainable impact.

Key to this success has been the empowerment of individuals and communities, the amelioration of longstanding practices in terms of improved dietary intake, animal husbandry techniques, and access to credit facilities, seed suppliers, and cereal banks. Trainings and knowledge shared with the communities can be utilised for years to come. More can be done, however, particularly with respect to the management and capacity building of the health gardens, the processing or transformation of crops and produce, as well as addressing needs to improve localised water retention and management.

In terms of operational effectiveness in reaching planned beneficiary targets the operation has also been a success. Another positive aspect of DFID III has been the inclusion of four core indicators. Unfortunately the operation hasn't been able to assess operational progression against such indicators as comparative statistics were not available for the previous years. Due to the peaks and troughs of the seasonal calendar there is little benefit in comparing month on month statistics as these give little indication of any programmatic impact as there are so many other factors that affect, for example, food security levels, that occur as the year turns. More work still needs to be done to ensure greater consistency within the post distribution monitoring process, and more salient information is produced so that analysis to be made and opinions to be formed as to exactly how well operations are performing.

The operation also needs to stay focused on its objective to manage malnutrition levels in the region. There seems little statistical evidence in the reports provided as to how the different interventions are contributing to reducing or improving malnutrition levels either on an individual or consolidated basis.

One internal factor that has led to the success of the operation is the skills and local knowledge of the ACF staff in each country. Unfortunately, the majority of these already appear to have been laid off due to the lack of a DFID IV on the near horizon. This is a disappointment, as is the inability for DFID and ACF to smoothly transition from one intervention to the next. Once more a gap has occurred between the end of DFID II and the start of DFID III, meaning that operations started after the end of the 2013 lean period. This is a similar gap as to the one between DFID I and DFID II in 2012. Should DFID IV never appear, how to fund activities, into which at least two years of commitment have already been invested, needs to be addressed as soon as possible.

Thereafter, interventions were mostly deemed to be on time except for one or two particular circumstances. Financial and logistical procedures seem to have improved since DFID II. WARO has played an important role in the operation, arranging and reporting on funds, and negotiating with the donor as required. This is an important added value of WARO. The added value of the operation is more difficult to gauge, although one would imagine that a comparison of the actual cost of the health garden interventions per beneficiary compared to the infinite benefits they will accrue from the gardens themselves would give a positive impression.

Beneficiaries are, in general, very happy with the impact that ACF's support has generated seeing it as both beneficial in the short term during the lean period when emergency support has been provided in terms of cash and food, and in the medium to long term, understanding that it is developing the beneficiaries' future earnings capacity and their resilience to shocks. Support has been provided to both agriculturalists and pastoralists as required. There is always more that can be done, however, especially with respect to water provision and retention in the Sahel, and programmatic methodologies can be improved throughout the project management cycle from the beneficiary selection process, to the actual measurement of impact.

ACF need also to be aware of the social implications of their action as well, wherever possible undertaking projects which will support the community as a whole, as well as the targeted selected families. Programmes to date have had a positive effect on the mind-set of the beneficiaries as well, opening up new avenues of credit in terms of the warrantage and cereal bank activities, and also in terms of diversifying their eating habits and their approach towards nutritional health and hygiene. The learnings which have been endowed on the beneficiaries are the sustainable impact of the intervention. This information can be passed on from generation to generation and from family to family.

It is difficult for families to break out of poverty in these West African communities. Without land or educational possibilities there are few exit routes available. When small amount of money are raised and saved these can be easily spent on minor family emergencies such as sickness or on events such weddings and funerals. The most ACF can achieve is an increased level of knowledge, resilience and capacity within each household. The work undertaken to date has certainly moved communities and beneficiaries in that direction.

Overall, this has been an ongoing process to empower communities and individuals in them. This process needs to be continued, improving methodologies and expanding coverage wherever possible. The more ACF can integrate activities undertaken, working with a multi sectoral approach, and alongside governmental counterparts, the greater the sustainability of their impact will be.

4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations have been split, as per the DFID I and II evaluation, between Programmatic and Administrative issues, prioritised to a certain extent, and grouped for the sake of clarification and to facilitate follow up.

4.1 *Programmatic Recommendations*

- a. Methodologies that provide for impact measurement against project indicators need to be revised, formalised and incorporated into post distribution monitoring procedures.
- b. Measuring the impact of different activities on local levels of malnutrition should become a standard practice also to be included in PDM activities.
- c. PDM reports need to show actual values of crops produced or good received and what impact this has on a household's monthly/annual income.
- d. Community committees that undertake beneficiary targeting themselves need to follow the four level classification HEA system, and should be either elected or be made up of impartial and respected men and women.
- e. Wherever possible ACF should work alongside government counterparts re the selection of animals, seeds, and other relevant items so as to build mutual capacity and working relations. ACF should also participate in government/ regional assessment missions to ensure accurate beneficiary data.
- f. As much as possible an integrated approach between activities undertaken in one area should be actively pursued and undertaken.
- g. Complaint system procedures need to be standardised with all cases reported, logged, and analysed on a centralised country HQ basis to ensure a nationwide overview.
- h. Wherever possible activities to improve water provision, retention and usage should be investigated and implemented across the region.
- i. Guidance as to which irrigation methodology works best in which conditions needs to be elaborated and made available for operational staff.
- j. The managerial capacity of the health gardens needs to be worked upon so as to enable long term empowerment and functional independence.
- k. More support and training with respect to the processing and "transformation" of gardening produce for their later usage should be undertaken.
- l. Annual cash/food distribution programmes over a number of years to the same communities should be carefully managed so as to avoid the possible creation of a dependency culture.
- m. The possibility of replicating the health garden baby centres and the roaming veterinary technicians in Chad to other countries in the region should be investigated.
- n. The impact of "Changement de Comportement" programme in Mauritania should also be investigated for possible replication elsewhere.
- o. To ensure its sustainability social warrantage should only be undertake in the short term as an introductory measure.

- p. Beneficiaries need to be further encouraged to utilise Warrantage/Cereal Bank funds received for small income generating projects rather than just for purchasing food.
- q. Wherever possible activities that should support the community as a whole should be implemented alongside those activities that support targeted individuals.
- r. Only female sheep and goats should be distributed as the males tend to get eaten or sold.
- s. Learning/“Capitalisation” processes need to be more structured both in terms of in-country and regional programming.

4.2 Administrative Recommendations

- t. Funding for the continued implementation of the medium/long term developmental aspects of DFID III need to be sought after as a matter of urgency.
- u. How to ensure a smooth transition from one DFID funding to the next needs to be investigated and agreed with the donor, and clarity on what DFID expect from ACF in terms of measuring value for money is required.
- v. To avoid delays and lost opportunities, a funding mechanism at ACF European headquarters needs to be set up to enable monies to be forwarded to field offices to kick start operations in anticipation of delayed final donor signatures.
- w. Field officers/animateurs should become more of a “generalist” and should be trained to follow up on a number of projects at the same time.
- x. Staff exchange visits within the region should be promoted both as a learning experience and as a step towards future overseas deployment.
- y. Programme managers need ongoing training on budget management and the best practices of reporting.
- z. To ensure awareness of financial and logistical requirements localised kick off meetings should become a standard procedure when new projects are initiated.

5 LESSONS LEARNT AND BEST PRACTICES

As requested in the TOR the evaluation has considered each type of activity, and the following list of selected lessons learnt and best practices are a result of discussions with programme managers and field staff in the countries under consideration:

Activity	Best Practices	Lessons Learnt
Unconditional cash distributions:	BP: It may sound obvious, but distributing the cash on time, i.e. during the course of, or at the start of the lean season, would be the most efficient and effective usage of these resources.	Cash distributions can lead to localised short term price rises. It is best therefore to include an allowance for this price rise so that the estimated number of days food needs expected to be covered would not be diminished. A similar adjustment could also be made for an assumed percentage that families will share with friends, families and neighbours. Distributing cash and food at the same time will reduce such short term price increases.
Cash for work activities	Stagger work over a number of days so that women can fully access this support being able to undertake the work without having to readjust their daily routine more than absolutely necessary.	The partition of cash payments between beneficiaries and their appointed representatives for cash for work projects needs to be monitored. Percentages could perhaps be stipulated to ensure that the original beneficiary receives at least a certain percentage of the support originally aimed for them.
Food Distributions (including vouchers)	Complement food distributions with small cash payments so that food does not need to be sold to buy other necessary but minor household items.	A greater proportion of food distributed is more likely to be shared than if it were cash that was distributed. Again, include an allowance for this so that the estimated number of days food needs expected to be covered would not be diminished.
Livestock Distributions:	Work alongside local authorities, for example, in terms of ensuring the good health of the animals provided. On site vaccination initiatives	Distribute female animals as they will reproduce and expand herds. There are always sufficient males in a community to procreate with.

	that are open for the whole community are a good way of supporting non-beneficiaries as well as those targeted beneficiaries.	
Health garden support:	Seed nurseries should be incorporated into the planning and development of each site.	Beneficiaries will always look to ACF to solve every problem unless it is clear from the start that health garden beneficiaries are aiming for self-sufficiency and independence.
Warrantage:	Social Warrantage is a good way to introduce the concept into communities but should only be implemented as such in the short term.	When the rainy season fails crops available for depositing within the Warrantage process will invariably be too small to be of any use in terms of starting up small business projects or income generating activities.
Cereal Banks:	Replacing failed government Cereal Banks (e.g. in Niger) shows alignment with Government priorities and provides a service that otherwise would not be available.	Very poor and poor household have a tendency to “eat” the funding received. Efforts need to be made to change this mind set and steer beneficiaries towards organising small business or IG activities.
Trainings:	Pick the right time of day for the training to take place in order that as much as possible the daily routine of the man/woman is not too much disturbed. Cater for husbands to accompany their wives on trainings. If necessary stagger the trainings over a number of days to fit in with other work pressures so that beneficiaries can attend all the sessions.	Don’t assume that once a training has been undertaken that everyone understands and can implement the new practice. Illiteracy rates are high and trainings are unusual events for beneficiaries. Expect to have to repeat the training and to have to disseminate messages a number of times. Current habits are well ingrained, it will take time to change them.
WARO/Proposal writing/reporting	Regional “capitalisation” workshops enable the sharing of best practices around the region as well as building bridges between individual countries of operation.	Don’t be too optimistic with cash expenditure rates at the start of any intervention. Proposals put together at the last minute don’t work out well. Recent collective practices are an improvement on what had happened previously.

Beneficiary Selection:	To include respected members of the community in the beneficiary selection process to help avoid complaints of any bias or favouritism.	To avoid having the village chief and his/her associates at the centre of the beneficiary selection process.
Programme implementation:	To recruit field staff from the operational area with local language skills and knowledge of the local cultural and environmental context.	In high security situations, the use of local service providers to distribute cash and organise CFW activities can facilitate the implementation process.

6. DIFD III VERSUS DFID I AND II

Utilising a format established in the quarterly reporting process, the following is an amended updated version, building on the September 2014 report feedback, indicating progress made against the recommendations highlighted in the DFID I and II evaluation:

	DFID I and II-Final external Evaluation summary	DFID III progress to date
Coherence	Information sharing between countries needs to be improved.	Improved to a certain extent as a number of regional workshops have been organised by WARO. However, there needs to be a centralized info sharing focal point, and country office need to be made more aware that such a function exists.
	Local partnerships should be proactively sought.	Visible with local authorities and with donors, but not so evident with other local stakeholders/actors in the field such as the Red Cross.
	Each country needs to have a strategic plan, with a contingency plan included therein, and a funding plan to support it.	Apparently now in place, but not really investigated by the evaluation. Would be worthwhile for WARO to further follow up.
	Improve procedural formalities with DFID so as to facilitate the speed of future funding.	Not happened at all. Five month gap between DFID II and DFID III.
	Formulation of proposal process centralized at capital and WARO level (poor field implication)	Improved: DFID III formulated firstly by field staff in relevant countries.
Relevance	WASH intervention purely « hygiene » and weak in water infrastructure realization. Need to integrate WASH as much as possible	Not enough water activities included in DFID III (except in Mali) there remain a number of health gardens in need of better water supplies.
	Targeting takes too long in an emergency setting. Need to differentiate targeting depending on the activity (lifesaving or development)	Targeting easier as stuck with same beneficiaries as on DFID II, similarly between original DFID III intervention and cost extension. Overall improvement visible.
	Establish links between beneficiaries and micro finance institutions.	Only visible in terms of Warrantage activities – little access to finance institutions in these communities.
	Select « pilot villages » in which realizing a package of integrated activities instead of current dispersion	Integrated in other grants, not with DFID since beneficiaries are almost the same in the 3 phases.
Effectiveness	The time allocated for training have been insufficient and the end of the project as residual activity	Improved: training has received an improved attention in DFID III but still need more.
	Programme was very ambitious given the timeframe and complexity	Programme still ambitious, not sure if team capacities to deal with an integrated intervention have improved over the two years
Efficiency	Logistic department far slower than programme department / rigidity	Some improvement, fewer complaints than previously. Still can be improved more.
	Loss of staff between phase I and phase II due to late approval	No improvement: staff left between phase II and phase III due to late approval of the grant. Same

		will happen now between DFID III and IV.
	Recruitment and training of staff should be incorporated into the planning process/timescales predicted.	Not done – but perhaps recommendation not realistic.
	Emergency logistical staff need to be on hand at European HQs in case required.	No information sought on this issue. Paris/Madrid do have emergency log staff already employed. Can assume these could be deployed if necessary.
	Budgetary control training to be undertaken.	Budgetary management seems to be in a better situation now. However, programme managers would still benefit from continued trainings.
	Implement according to the Seasonal Calendar	Yes, done wherever possible and when funding is available on time.
	Nationalisation of staff process should be carefully introduced.	There still seems to be mostly expat staff in senior positions throughout the region. Perhaps there has been a change of mind on this process.
	Finance department far slower than programme department / rigidity	Some improvement, fewer complaints than previously.
	Activities started on average two months after the contract signature – slow release of funding form HQs	Again less complaints, but need to have an early release mechanism established at European HQs. Shouldn't have to wait till exact day of signing contract before work can start.
Impact	Health Gardens impact difficult to estimate	Same situation despite new indicators for impact measurement. Needs greater detail in PDM and programme follow up.
	PDM analysis not optimal and low standardization between countries	Same situation: PDM reports still don't give sufficient impact on programmatic impact and progress.
	Reporting should be more focused on impact rather than statistical analysis.	As above.
	HEA targeting not implemented fully in the missions	HEA Still the backbone of targeting process – need greater alignment with this when communities themselves select own beneficiaries.
	Poor follow up of nutritional status of children of beneficiaries HH	Not integrated outside of nutrition programmes. Still not clear what nutritional impact is of interventions.
	Complaints collection system still weak in most of the countries	Only recently installed in a number of countries. System needs to be properly established, managed and analysed on a centralised basis.

Seemingly some progress has been made on the recommendations given in June 2013, however, there is still much work to be done. How to act upon the recommendations of this report will need to be agreed across the region through WARO.

Annex A: DAC Based Ratings Table

DAC Criteria	Classification (1 weak, 5 strong)					Justification
	1	2	3	4	5	
Impact			✓			There is a strong indication of good programmatic impact in both the short and medium/long term as a result of the interventions that have taken place. Exactly how much of an impact in terms of contributions to beneficiaries' monthly incomings and outgoings is difficult to determine precisely. Also still not clear information as to impact of activities on local malnutrition rates.
Sustainability				✓		Learnings passed on to beneficiaries through trainings given, as well as information shared within the beneficiary community will endure beyond the time that ACF are operational in the region.
Coherence				✓		ACF has co-operated and co-ordinated well with governmental institutions and other NGOs operational in the area. Support is in line with the plans and ambitions of local government, as well as with the ACF regional strategy.
Coverage		✓				The level of coverage has been dictated by the amount of funding available which is low in comparison to the numbers in need both regionally and in each country.
Relevance				✓		Activities undertaken are very much in line with the needs of both agriculturalist and pastoralist beneficiaries.
Effectiveness			✓			Numeric beneficiary target numbers have been reached on virtually all accounts, and surpassed in most. Due to monitoring difficulties it is not possible to assess if individual targets as per the proposal logframe have been reached.
Efficiency			✓			Despite delays at the start of the programme implementation period, thereafter the intervention seems to have coincided with the seasonal calendar with no significant delays. Financial and logistical performance seems to have improved from the previous evaluation.



TERMS OF REFERENCE

External Evaluation of the program

ACF Food Security and Livelihoods: From Recovery to Resilience

Funded by



Contract reference

203775-108

August 2014

1. CONTRACT DETAILS

1.1. Key dates

Foreseen starting date	11/10/14
Foreseen ending date	19/11/14
Draft submissions	12/11/14
Final report submission	19/11/14

1.2. Languages

Languages required for the evaluation	English and French
Language of the report	English

1.3. Workplan

Activities	Days of works
Grey review	3
Briefing - (Dakar)	1
Evaluation Niger	7
Evaluation Burkina	6
Evaluation Mauritania	7
Evaluation Mali (Evaluator number 2)	10
Compilation debriefing	1
Debriefing (Dakar)	1
Travel Dakar A/R (back to country of residence)	1
Report production	6
Total	33


2. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

2.1 Key Informations

Title	ACF Food Security and Livelihoods: From Recovery to Resilience
Intervention zones	<p>Mauritania : Guidimakha, Gorgol</p> <p>Tchad: Kanem</p> <p>Burkina Faso: La Tapoa, Gnagna</p> <p>Niger: Keita, Mayahi</p> <p>Mali : Gao, Asongo, Bourem</p>
Budget	Total: £ 4 496 193 GBP
Starting date	1/07/2013
Closing date	30/09/2014
Direct beneficiaries	<p>Food Assistance 72,316</p> <p>Livelihood 109,067</p> <p>WASH 18,000</p>
Impact, outcome and outputs	<p>Expected Impact: The Poor and Very Poor Households nutritional security has improved.</p> <p>Outcome: Seasonal and Structural vulnerabilities of Poor and Very Poor HH are reduced.</p>

	<p>Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Risk of seasonal peak of malnutrition for U5 of Poor and Very Poor HH is reduced through safety nets, diet diversification and measures protecting P-VP HH from seasonal price fluctuation (warrantage) 2. Livelihood full recovery from 2012 crisis is ensured for P-VP beneficiary HH's by supporting the restoration of productive assets, and by improving HH capacities for effective exploitation.
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2.2 Intervention map



2.3 Program description

The proposal will achieve the desired result thanks to a twin-track strategy axed on (i) tackling seasonal peaks of nutritional vulnerability and (ii) reducing structural vulnerability to malnutrition.

The proposal builds a bridge between humanitarian needs that Poor and Very Poor Households will face during the 2013 and 2014 lean season and the strengthening of their longer term resilience.

Flexibility is built on the opportunity to balance the weight of the two actions (three for the ACF WARO strategy, including the (iii) Response to malnutrition emergencies) according to the evolution of the external context and the specific needs that can be identified alongside the implementation.

2.4. Program Activities

Output 1. Risk of seasonal peak of malnutrition for U5 of Poor and Very Poor HH is reduced through safety nets, diet diversification and measures protecting P-VP HH from seasonal price fluctuation (warrantage)

Activity 1.1. Safety nets: Cash Transfer Programmes targeting 3445 HH with U5 malnourished children during the lean season

Activity 1.2. Promotion of diet diversification for 1700 HH: Health Gardens

Activity 1.3. Protection of 2399 HH from seasonal price fluctuation: Warrantage / Community Cereal Bank (CCB)

Output 2. Livelihood full recovery from 2012 crisis is ensured for P-VP beneficiaries HH by supporting the restoration of productive assets and improve HH capacities for effective exploitation

Activity 2.1. Restoration and protection of productive assets for 2385 HH: Agro-pastoral input distribution

Activity 2.2. Effective exploitation of productive assets: Capacity enhancement of 2540 HH

OUTPUT 3. Reinforce approaches on information systems and food security surveillance for improved early warning and enhanced response capacity - ONLY MALI

3. OBJECTIFS DE L'ÉVALUATION (FRENCH)

3.1. Utilisateurs-clés de l'évaluation

Practitioners Community	ONG Internationales, Bailleurs de Fonds, Acteurs humanitaires et du Développement, Agences, Fonds et Programmes du Système des Nations Unies
Niveau terrain	Missions pays de Mauritanie, Burkina Faso, Niger, Tchad (Chef de mission, Coordinateurs Techniques, Référent Sécurité Alimentaire, Chef de Projet et Superviseur d'équipe)
Coordination et Stratégie	ACF coordination régionale (Dakar) ACF Sièges opérationnels (France, Espagne) ACF Réseaux (US et UK)
Autre (secondaire)	DFID The Cash Learning Partnership Partenaires et Autorités locales Autres bailleurs et partenaires

3.2. Objectif(s) de l'évaluation

- ✓ Cette évaluation s'agit d'analyser et d'évaluer l'intervention dans les 5 pays selon les critères DAC.
- ✓ Cette étude devra aboutir sur des conclusions et des recommandations devant permettre à ACF et aux acteurs associés dans la mise en œuvre de ce projet de capitaliser l'ensemble des informations relatives à ce type d'intervention et de formuler des recommandations pour une suite éventuelle.
- ✓ L'évaluation devra lister les leçons apprises à travers ce projet et guider la prise de décision pour les futurs projets similaires. Ceci devra être mis en évidence et analysé à travers les informations quantitatives et qualitatives recueillies et qui devront donc figurer de manière suffisamment détaillées dans le rapport d'évaluation.
- ✓ L'évaluation devra produire deux pages d'actualisation du document de capitalisation des programmes DFID Sahel Grant I et II

3.3. Champs de l'évaluation

i. Pertinence

Mesure dans laquelle les activités d'aide correspondent aux priorités et aux politiques du groupe ciblé, partenaires ou donateurs. Dans quelle mesure les objectifs du programme sont-ils toujours valides ? Les activités menées dans le cadre du programme et les résultats observés sont-ils compatibles avec la finalité globale et la concrétisation des objectifs fixés ? Les activités menées dans le cadre du programme et les résultats observés sont-ils compatibles avec l'impact et les effets escomptés ?

ii. Efficacité

Mesure du degré de réalisation des objectifs de l'activité d'aide. L'évaluation de la pertinence d'un programme ou d'un projet doit prendre en compte les points suivants: Dans quelle mesure les objectifs ont-ils été atteints ou sont susceptibles de l'être ? Quels ont été les principales raisons de la réalisation ou de la non-réalisation des objectifs ?

iii. Efficience

L'évaluation de la pertinence d'un programme ou d'un projet doit prendre en compte les points suivants: Les activités étaient-elles efficaces par rapport à leur coût ? Les objectifs ont-ils été atteints dans les délais prévus ? Le programme/projet a-t-il été mis en œuvre dans les meilleures conditions d'efficience au vu des autres possibilités existantes ?

iv. Impact

Il s'agit des effets positifs et négatifs, directs ou indirects, intentionnels ou non, induits par une intervention à l'appui du développement. Sont couverts les principaux impacts et effets résultant de l'activité à l'aune des indicateurs sociaux, économiques, environnementaux et autres indicateurs de développement. L'examen doit prendre en considération les résultats souhaités et les résultats involontaires, de même que les impacts positifs et négatifs de facteurs externes, tels que l'évolution des termes de l'échange ou des conditions financières. L'évaluation de la pertinence d'un programme ou d'un projet doit prendre en compte les points suivants: Quelles sont les conséquences du programme/projet et comment s'expliquent-elles? Quel changement concret l'activité concernée a-t-elle apporté aux bénéficiaires?

v. Viabilité

La viabilité permet de mesurer si les bienfaits d'une activité de développement ont des chances de perdurer une fois que le donneur aura achevé du financier. Les projets doivent être aussi bien financièrement que sur l'environnement viables. L'évaluation de la pertinence d'un programme ou d'un projet doit prendre en compte les points suivants: Dans quelle mesure les bienfaits résultant d'un programme/projet perdurent-ils après le retrait des bailleurs de fonds? Quels sont les principaux facteurs qui influent sur la viabilité ou la non-viabilité d'un programme/projet?

vi. Questionnement par rapport aux bénéficiaires

Le pré-ciblage géographique des sites d'intervention répond-t-il aux objectifs et justifications du projet ? Le ciblage des populations bénéficiaires répond-t-il au souci de toucher les ménages les plus vulnérables en déficit de survie et de protection des moyens de subsistance suite à la crise de 2012 (déficit de production, crises des prix et de l'accès) ? Comment le ciblage a-t-il été perçu/compris par les communautés ? Quelle a été la prise en compte de l'aspect genre ? Quelle a été l'implication des femmes dans le programme ? L'approche méthodologique du projet et les types d'activités mis en place ont-ils répondu aux objectifs du projet et aux résultats attendus ? Quels ont été les effets négatifs ou positifs de l'approche méthodologique globale du projet et des types d'activités mises en œuvre vis-à-vis des bénéficiaires et de leur communauté ? Qualité et impact des formations dispensées aux bénéficiaires: approche pédagogique, contenu, supports ? Les ouvrages créés sont-ils appropriés par les bénéficiaires ? A travers quels outils en particulier ?

vii. Lien HEA et intervention du programme

Dans quelle mesure l'apport du projet correspond aux besoins détectés à travers les analyses HEA - Analyses des scénarii (Outcome Analyses) disponibles, en comparant notamment: Déficit/ ménage sur l'année 2011/ 12 vs. montant à distribuer par le programme: le gap identifié dans les HEA a-t-il été comblé par le projet ? période de déficit vs. période d'intervention du projet: l'aide est-elle arrivée à temps ? Catégories de richesse en déficit (de survie et de Protection des moyens d'existence) vs. catégories ciblées: les populations les plus vulnérables ont-elle été ciblées ? Nombre de personnes en déficit dans les zones d'intervention vs. nombre de bénéficiaires: Quelle a été la couverture du programme par rapport aux besoins détecté par les HEA ?

viii. Questionnement sur le montage régional et la valeur ajoutée de la coordination régionale

L'implication du bureau régional a-t-elle permis de lancer plus rapidement, d'augmenter l'échelle et la qualité des réponses ACF en termes de programme de mitigation par rapport à ce que chaque pays aurait pu le faire (prévoir argumentaire, éléments de « preuve » ? Quels ont été les points positifs de l'implication du bureau régional dans les différentes phases de gestion de cycle de programme (formulation, négociation bailleur, mise en œuvre, suivi-évaluation)? Quels sont les avantages et désavantages de ce montage régional pour ACF et vis-à-vis du bailleur ? Quelles améliorations peuvent être apportées sur le montage, la mise en œuvre et le suivi-évaluation de futur programme régional et le rôle de la coordination régionale?

ix. Questionnement d'amélioration

Quels sont les points forts et les points faibles de ce programme régional ? Quelles recommandations d'amélioration pour de futur programme analogue ? Y aurait-il une manière plus efficace d'atteindre les résultats de ce projet ? Quelles recommandations d'améliorations pour une mise en œuvre plus efficace d'une éventuelle suite de projet en terme de ciblage, montants distribué, méthodologie, approche globale? Quelles améliorations en termes d'activités et de groupe cible?

x. Recommandations précises et concrètes liées aux aspects analyses et fondées sur les leçons apprises.

- i) Leçons opérationnelles relatives au projet.
- ii) Leçons organisationnelles
- iii) Conclusions et Recommandations

3.4. Critères d'évaluation

ACF souscrit aux critères du Comité d'Assistance au Développement (DAC) pour les évaluations : impact, durabilité, cohérence, couverture, pertinence, efficacité et efficacie. ACF promeut également l'analyse systématique du système de suivi et des questions transversales (genre, HIV/AIDS etc.). Les évaluations ne sont pas obligées d'utiliser chaque critère du DAC dans l'analyse des données et le rapportage. Mais dans tous les cas, les évaluateurs doivent compléter le tableau ci-dessous et l'inclure dans le rapport final.

L'évaluateur devra utiliser le tableau suivant pour classer les performances de l'intervention en utilisant les critères du DAC. Le tableau devra être présenté dans une annexe.

Critère	Classement (1 Faible, 5 Elevé)					Justification
	1	2	3	4	5	
Impact						
Durabilité						
Cohérence						
Couverture						
Pertinence						
Efficacité						
Efficience						

3.5. Bonnes pratiques/leçons apprises

L'évaluation devrait fournir un (1) exemple bonnes pratiques clé du projet / programme pour chaque type d'activités (Ciblage, cash for work, cash contre formation). Cet exemple devrait porter sur le domaine technique d'intervention, soit en termes de processus ou de systèmes, et devrait être potentiellement applicable à d'autres contextes où ACF intervient. Cet exemple de bonne pratique devrait être présenté dans le résumé exécutif et / ou le corps principal du rapport.

3.6. Résultats attendus

Le résultat de cette évaluation devra être constitué par :

- rapport écrit provisoire et final (complet de sommaire exécutif résumant les principales leçons apprises, bonnes pratiques et recommandations)
- Document (2 à 4 pages) d'actualisation de la publication de capitalisation des programmes Sahel Grant I et II
- Rapport oral de débriefing par pays et au bureau régionale

3.7. Méthodologie

L'évaluation se basera sur :

- Les documents du projet (proposals, notes thématiques, PV's de rencontre, rapports),
- Des visites de terrain sur les lieux des réalisations
- Des rencontres avec les bénéficiaires et leur communauté, les partenaires, les autorités administratives et coutumières, des bénéficiaires et non bénéficiaires du projet, l'équipe du projet et d'ACF-E.

3.7.1. Documentation et Briefing

Avant l'évaluation, l'évaluateur devrait lire les documents du Projet et assister à une séance de briefing-Echange avec le Bureau régional de Dakar et avec le chef de mission et / ou les points focaux techniques pertinents. Des séances d'information par téléphone peuvent être convenues à l'avance selon les besoins de l'évaluateur. Documentation sur le programme :

- Document de projet, rapports intermédiaires et mensuels,
- Outils AMERL
- Rapports de missions de terrain,
- Enquêtes de base, midline, endline, CAP, PDM, etc..

Personnes à rencontrer (non exhaustif):

- Chefs de mission et coordinateur technique Sécurité Alimentaire d'ACF dans les pays
- Les Responsables de mise en œuvre du programme dans les 5 pays,
- Les bénéficiaires et leur communauté,
- Directions Provinciales de l'Agriculture et de l'Hydraulique, Autorités administratives et communales,
- Représentant des partenaires d'exécution (si possible),
- Représentante et coordinateur programme du bureau régional d'ACF à Dakar,

3.7.2. Activités de terrain

Il est attendu du consultant qu'il recueille toutes les informations et données nécessaires à l'évaluation via par exemple (non exhaustif) la collecte de:

- information directe: entrevues avec des bénéficiaires - Visites des sites du programme et des réalisations auprès des bénéficiaires ;
- informations indirectes: Entrevues avec des représentants locaux, avec le personnel du personnel de projet expatrié et national; réunion avec les autorités locales, avec des groupes de bénéficiaires, des agences humanitaires, des représentants des donateurs et autres parties prenantes. Pour la collecte de données indirecte, les méthodes d'évaluation standard et participative devraient être utilisés (entrevues individuelles avec les ménages, Focus groupe avec les bénéficiaires, les non-bénéficiaires, des informateurs clés ;
- analyse de l'information secondaire: y compris l'analyse des données de suivi du programme ou de toutes autres données statistiques pertinentes

3.7.3. Rapport

Le rapport se présentera en trois parties :

1. Le première parti du rapport devra (ou possible) être structuré selon le format standard qui suit les critères DAC. Le première parti devra d'une longueur de 20 pages et avec un vocabulaire orienté à la communauté internationale (techniciens et non).
2. Le deuxième parti devra suivre la structure envisagée pour les leçons apprises et les best practices. Le consultant sera libre d'organiser cette partie vers une utilisation interne, et ne devront pas dépasser les 10 pages et contenir les informations suivantes.
3. La troisième partie devra contenir une actualisation de la publication ACF DFID Sahel Grant I et II, elle ne devra pas dépasser les 4 pages

✓ **Partie 1 (points i-xi de section 3.3):**

1. Page de couverture

2. Table des matières

3. Résumé exécutif décrivant le programme, les principaux éléments de l'évaluation, et les conclusions et recommandations (maximum 2 pages), traduites en Anglais et Français

4. Corps principal: La structure principale du document devra suivre les critères DAC, et les recommandations devraient être aussi réalistes, opérationnelles et pragmatiques que possible en tenant soigneusement comptes des circonstances qui prévalaient lors de l'exécution du programme et des ressources disponibles. Le corps principal du rapport sera élaboré autour des points énumérés dans le résumé exécutif. Il comprendra des références à la méthodologie utilisée pour l'évaluation et le contexte de l'action. En particulier, pour chaque principale conclusion, il devrait y avoir une recommandation correspondante. Il comprendra également des annexes nécessaires qui devront être listées et correctement numérotées. Le Format pour le corps principal du rapport est la suivante :

4.1 Informations générales

4.2 Méthodologie appliquées

4.3 Constatations & Discussions sur l'évaluation générale et sur les questionnements particuliers (cf. § 3.3) concernant :

4.3.1 Cohérence et la couverture du programme

4.3.2 Pertinence / adéquation

4.3.3 Efficacité :

- Activités réalisées par rapport à celles programmées
- Résultats obtenus par rapport à celles attendus
- Objectifs atteints par rapport à celles attendus initialement
- Réponses aux questions à approfondir

4.3.4 Efficience

- Relation entre qualité et quantité des résultats obtenus ainsi que entre les ressources et moyens utilisés pour les atteindre

4.3.5 Impact du projet

- Impacts prévus et imprévus sur les bénéficiaires et/ou autres entités touchées (positifs et négatifs)
- Impacts prévus et imprévus au niveau institutionnel.
- Autre impacts importants du projet.
- Facteurs et procédés qui expliquent les impacts observés.
- Leçons plus larges relatives à l'approche des projets de développement pour ACF-

4.3.6 Durabilité/ viabilité

4.4 Conclusions et Recommandations

4.5 Annexe I – Les Bonnes Pratiques

4.6 Annexe II - DAC- Tableau

✓ **Partie 2. A suivre la structure envisagée pour les leçons apprises et les best practices:**

Le consultant sera libre d'organiser cette partie vers une utilisation interne, et ne devront pas dépasser les 10 pages et contenir les informations suivantes :

- iv) Leçons apprises
- v) Bonnes Pratiques
- vi) Recommandations

✓ **Partie 3. A suivre la structure envisagée pour l'actualisation de la publication ACF**

Le consultant sera libre d'organiser cette partie, en principe il sera importante de mettre en évidence les améliorations (recommandations DFID I et II adoptées dans la Phase III) et innovations, les cas échéants.

3.7.4. Débriefing au bureau régional de Dakar et au(x) siège(s) d'ACF (à confirmer) par Skype

L'évaluateur devra fournir aux responsables clés du Bureau régional d'ACF à Dakar son projet de rapport : principales constatations, conclusions et recommandations de l'évaluation. Les commentaires pertinents d'ACF devront être incorporés dans le rapport final.

4. PROFIL DE L'EVALUATEUR

- ✓ Agro, agroéconomiste, sociologue avec environ 10 à 15 ans d'expérience professionnelle
- ✓ Expérience significative de terrain en évaluation de projet humanitaire/développement Expérience de cash transfert et en particulier sur les aspects de ciblage
- ✓ Parfaite Maîtrise de l'Anglais et du Français à l'oral et à l'écrit
- ✓ Connaissance de l'approche de l'économie des ménages vivement souhaitée
- ✓ Bonne capacité de communication et de facilitation d'atelier
- ✓ Capacité rédactionnelle
- ✓ Capacité à gérer le temps et les moyens disponibles et à travailler sous pression
- ✓ Indépendance vis à vis des partis impliquées (ACF et Echo/UE)
- ✓ Connaissance du Sahel, si possible de la Mauritanie, du Burkina Faso, du Tchad et du Niger
- ✓ Connaissance et compréhension des exigences bailleurs
- ✓ Connaissance/application des normes sphères

5. DROITS

La propriété des drafts et la documentation finale du projet et de cette évaluation appartiennent à l'agence et le financement des donateurs exclusivement. Tout document, ou publication y afférant, sera partagée avec quiconque excepté avec ACF avant la livraison à ACF du document final pour le donateur.

ACF est le destinataire principal de l'évaluation et ses résultats pourraient avoir une incidence sur les stratégies opérationnelles et techniques. Ceci étant dit, ACF partagera l'évaluation en format publication avec les groupes suivants:

- ✓ Donateur (s)
- ✓ Les partenaires gouvernementaux
- ✓ Divers organismes de coordination

Droits de propriété intellectuelle

Tous les documents relatifs à ces TDR et à cette évaluation (ou non dans le cadre de vos fonctions) demeurent la propriété exclusive d'ACF

Annex C: Intervention Logical Framework

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK		ACF Food Security and Livelihoods: From Recovery to Resilience			
Impact: The nutritional security of poor and very poor households is improved					
Impact indicator 1		Baseline ⁴⁷	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number of beneficiaries with FCS above 35	Planned	0	November 2013: <i># of beneficiaries with acceptable FCS is increased by at least 20%</i>		March 2014: <i># of beneficiaries with acceptable FCS is increased by at least 25%</i>
	Achieved				
	Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys			

Outcome: Seasonal and Structural vulnerabilities of Poor and Very Poor HH are reduced						
Outcome indicator 1	Assumptions		Baseline ⁴⁸	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Average HFIAS - Household Food Insecurity Access Scale.	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition.	Planned	Baseline August 2013: TBM	November 2013: <i>HFIAS remain stable or improved across the lean season for 60% of beneficiaries (5442 HH)</i>		March 2014: <i>HFIAS remain stable or improved across the lean season for 80% of beneficiaries (7256 HH)</i>
		Achieved				

⁴⁷ FCS at DFID II endline will be updated if necessary, rates were: Burkina Faso Limit 17,1/Middle 35,7/Acceptable 47,2; Chad Limit 31,4/Middle 44/Acceptable 24,4; Mauritania (Gorgol: Limit 5/Middle 21/Acceptable 74 and Guidimaka: Limit 5/Middle 13/Acceptable 82); Niger: Limit 7,58/Middle 17,48/Acceptable 74,94.

⁴⁸ HFIAS at DFID II endline will be updated if necessary, rates were: Burkina Faso: Tapoa: 19,6%, Gnagna TBM Chad: TBM Mauritania: TBM; Niger: Mayahi: 30,49%; Keita: 20%

		Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys			
Outcome indicator 2	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
MAHFP-Month of Adequate Household Food Provision	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition.	Planned	TBM ⁴⁹	November 2013: <i>The # of beneficiaries close to MAHFP of the top tercile is increased by 60%</i>		March 2014: <i>The # of beneficiaries close to MAHFP of the top tercile is increased by 80%</i>
		Achieved				
		Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys			
Outcome indicator 3	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
IDDS-Individual Diet Diversification Score	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition.	Planned	TBM ⁵⁰	November 2013: <i>The # of children with a IDDS >= 4 is increased by 5%</i>		March 2014: <i>The # of children with a IDDS >= 4 is increased by 25%</i>

Output 1. Risk of seasonal peak of malnutrition for U5 of Very Poor HH is reduced through safety nets, diet diversification, and measures protecting P-VP HH from seasonal price fluctuation (warrantage)						
Output indicator 1.1	Activity 1.1 Provision of Safety net: Cash Transfer Programs for HH with U5 malnourished children in lean season					
	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number BNF HH supported in lean season through Cash transfer (direct or CFW)	Security and access conditions still stable in areas of intervention The complementarities of actions with Governments and other agencies remains stable and conducive Market assessment confirm cash transfer is possible and consistent	Planned	July 2013: Chad: 0 HH Mauritania: 0 HH	November 2013: (90%) Chad: 2700 HH Mauritania: 400 HH		March 2014 (100%): Chad: 3000 HH Mauritania: 445 HH
		Achieved				
		Source	Activity Progress Report PDMs			
Output indicator 1.2	Activity 1.2 Promotion of diet diversification: Health Gardens					
	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number of HH benefiting from input distribution to develop health garden.	Security and access conditions still stable in areas of intervention The complementarities of actions with Governments and other agencies remains	Planned	July 2013: BFaso: 0 HH Chad: 0 HH Mauritania: 0 HH	November 2013: (5%) BFaso: 22 HH Chad: 1 HH		March 2014 (100%): BFaso: 450 HH Chad: 20 HH Mauritania: 270 HH

⁴⁹ MAHFP is an indicator that ACF is introducing as part of the revised M&E framework of the ‘six core indicators’ mentioned in the narrative. As such, no baseline data is available, but will be collected in the Baseline Vulnerability Assessment

⁵⁰ IDDS have not been collected by all the countries in DFID II endline, therefore where necessary the indicator will be collected in baseline survey

	stable and conducive		Niger: 0 HH	Mauritania: 13 HH Niger: 48 HH		Niger: 960 HH
		Achieved				
		Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys PDMs			
Output indicator 1.3	Activity 1.3 Protection for seasonal price fluctuation					
	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number of HH benefiting from Warrantage and CCB	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition. IMF confirm reasonable rate for credits	Planned	July 2013: Mauritania: 0 HH Niger: 0 HH	November 2013: (10%): Mauritania: 89 HH Niger: 382 HH		March 2014 (100%): Mauritania: 899 HH Niger: 3820 HH
		Achieved				
		Source	Activity Progress Report PDMs			
Impact weighting (%)	52 %	Risk rating	10%			
Inputs						
Total (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)		DFID share (%)
						100%

Output 2: Livelihood full recovery from 2012 crisis is ensured for P-VP beneficiaries HH by supporting the restoration of productive assets and improve HH capacities for effective exploitation

Output indicator 2.1	Activity 2.1. Restoration and protection of productive assets					
	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number of HH benefiting from livelihood inputs distribution (agricultural or pastoral activities)	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition.	Planned	July 2013: BFaso: 0 HH Chad: 0 HH Mauritania: 0 HH	November 2013: (0%):		March 2014 (100%): BFaso: 850 HH Chad: 300 HH Mauritania: 1235 HH
		Achieved				
		Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys and HEA Baseline studies			
Output indicator 2.2	Activity 2.2. Effective exploitation of productive assets: Capacity enhancement					
	Assumptions		Baseline	Milestone 1	Milestone 2	Target date
Number of HH trained on livelihood activities	No major crisis affecting food security occurs during implementation. Stable security and access condition. Gov't Technical Services renew protocols of collaboration	Planned	July 2013: BFaso: 0 HH Chad: 0 HH Mauritania: 0 HH	November 2013: (0%):		March 2014 (100%): BFaso: 1000 HH Chad: 1090 HH Mauritania: 600 HH
		Achieved				
		Source	Vulnerability Assessment ACF – Baseline / End line Surveys and PDMs			
Impact weighting (%)	48 %	Risk rating	5%			

Annex D: Itinerary and meetings:

Work schedule:

			Jeff Duncalf	Issouf Haidar - Mali
Tue	21	October	Desk Research	Desk Research
Wed	22	October	Inception Report	
Thu	23	October	Inception Report	
Fri	24	October	Inception Report	
Sat	25	October		
Sun	26	October	Travel to Dakar: JD and second consultant	Travel to Dakar: JD and second consultant
Mon	27	October	Briefings in Dakar /	Briefings in Dakar
Tue	28	October	Travel to Burkina Faso 08.55 – 16.40	Travel to Mali
Wed	29	October	BF Evaluation	
Thu	30	October	BF Evaluation	
Fri	31	October	BF Evaluation	
Sat	1	November	Travel to Niger border – Kanchari.	
Sun	2	November	Kanchari BF/Niger Border crossing – No Access	
Mon	3	November	Travel by road from Kanchari, Burkina Faso to Niame, Niger.	Mali evaluation
Tue	4	November	Niger Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Wed	5	November	Niger Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Thu	6	November	Niger Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Fri	7	November	Flight to Dakar/Mauritania 14.00 – 21.30 – Cancelled	Mali evaluation
Sat	8	November	Flight Via Casablanca	Mali evaluation
Sun	9	November	Mauritania Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Mon	10	November	Mauritania Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Tue	11	November	Mauritania Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Wed	12	November	Mauritania Evaluation	Mali evaluation
Thu	13	November	Mauritania Evaluation	Draft report
Fri	14	November	Mauritania Evaluation /Return to Dakar. 15.10-16.10. Debrief with WARO. Depart for UK 23.35	Draft report
Sat	15	November	Return to the UK 07.45	Submission of draft report to JD
Sun	16	November		
Mon	17	November	Chad Evaluation skype calls	
Tue	18	November	Chad Evaluation skype calls/report writing	revision of report/ Final report
Wed	19	November	Chad Evaluation skype calls/report writing	
Thu	20	November	Report writing	
Fri	21	November	Report writing	
Sat	22	November		
Sun	23	November		

Mon	24	November	Report writing	
Tue	25	November	Report writing	
Wed	26	November	submission of draft report	
Thu	27	November	review of draft report	
Fri	28	November	review of draft report	
Sat	29	November		
Sun	30	November		
Mon	1	December	review of draft report	
Tue	2	December	Consolidated comments on draft	
Wed	3	December	revision of final report	
Thu	4	December	revision of final report	
Fri	5	December	submission of final report	
Sat	6	December		

Individual/group meetings: International Consultant

Friday October 24th

DFID Meeting (London):

Catherine Belfield-Haynes - Humanitarian Adviser, DFID UK.

Mark Wrighton, Finance Officer, DFID UK.

Monday – October 27th

Anais Lafite, Regional Representative, West Africa (WARO, Dakar), ACF.

Anne Foucray, WARO Admin and Finance Co-ordinator, ACF.

Charlotte Fontaine, Regional Grants Manager, ACF.

Issouf Haidara, Consultant, DFID III Mali Evaluation.

Wednesday October 28th

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso:

Thomas Loreaux, Head of Mission. ACF Burkina Faso.

Martin Loada, Head of Dept., Food Security and Livelihoods, ACF.

Hadaogo Yougbare, Asst. Head of Dept., Food Security and Livelihoods, ACF.

Bogandé Sub Office:

Patrice Ouanda, Programme Manager, Food Security and Livelihoods, Bogandé ACF.

Gabin Naganda, Asst. Programme Manager, Food Security and Livelihoods, Bogandé ACF.

Salif Palgo, Programme Manager, Food Security and Livelihoods, Tapoa ACF.

Yacouba Lankoande, Programme Officer, Food Security and Livelihoods, Tapoa ACF.

Thursday October 30th

Field Trip to Liptougou Central and Tolepsi Villages.

Lomkoande Guiamd, Representative Direction Provincial de Ressources Animaux et Halieutique (DPRAH). (Provincial Dept. for Animals and Water)

Friday October 31st

Field Trip to Mani Villages (cancelled due to political stability).

Beogo Laurent, Director, Action Sociale (Social Services Dept.), Bogandé.

Sawadogo Toudoubsom, Director, DPASA, (Provincial Dept. for Agriculture and Food Security).

Tanga Djiguemde, Focal Point for ACF, DPASA.

Aissata Tall, Head of Sub Office, Bogandé ACF.

Saturday November 1st

Travel to Kanchari, Burkina Faso/Niger Border (Closed until Monday November 3rd).

Monday November 3rd

Jean Marie Sawadogo, Programme Manager, Food Security, Kanchari, Tapoa. ACF

Travel to Niamey, Niger

Tuesday November 4th

Niamey, Niger:

Thierry Metais, Country Director, ACF.

Djibrilla Samna, Logistics Co-ordinator, ACF.

Boubacar Moussa, Food Security Officer, Keita, ACF.

Wednesday November 5th

Aljilani Benou, Head of Base, ACF Keita

Saidou Mani, Food Security Co-ordinator, ACF

Thursday November 6th

Noemi Poblador, Technical Co-ordinator, ACF

Oussoumane Aboubacar, Head of Base, Mayahi, ACF

Sani Harouna, Food Security Officer, Mayahi, ACF.

Friday November 7th

Thierry Metais, Country Director, ACF

Flight to Nouakchott – cancelled.

Saturday November 8th

Travel to Nouakchott, Mauritania.

Monday November 10th

Travel from Nouakchott to Keidi, Gorgol.

Veronique Renault, National Programme Co-ordinator.

Souleymane Bal, Interim Programme Manager, DFID III Programme.

Camara Bakari Seydi, Regional Delegate – Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.

Tuesday November 11th

Visit to Wouro Farba and Nahal communities in Gorgol.

Thiam Elhadj, Programme Officer, DFID III.

Travel to Selibaby, Guidimaka.

Wednesday November 12th

Louis Pedro Lobo, Head of sub Office, Selibabi

Diallo Mamadou Abdoulaye, Programme Officer, DFID III

Katry Atigh, Regional Delegate – Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock.
Visit to Guourel Adama and Nakaila 1 communities in Guidimaka

Thursday November 13th
Return by road to Nouakchott.

Friday November 14th
Mammadou Diop, Country Director. ACF Mauritania
Nadia Najma, Head of Logistics.
Mohammed Dah, National Programme Manager, SAME.
Return to Dakar
Debrief with Anais Lafite, Regional Representative, West Africa (WARO), ACF

Saturday November 15th
Flight to UK.

Monday November 17th
Skype call with Malika Fedala, Food Security and Livelihoods Manager, Chad.

Individual/group meetings: National Consultant - Mali

Lundi 27 Octobre à Dakar
Briefing avec le Consultant international.

Mercredi 29 Octobre
Voyage Dakar- Bamako

Jeudi 30 Octobre
Préparation/multiplication des outils de collecte de données.

Vendredi 31 Octobre et Samedi 1^{er} Novembre
Voyage sur Gao

Lundi 3 Novembre
Mohamed Sallah, Chef de Base ACF Gao
Salif Ibrahim, Superviseur NOUveau Horizon, ONG National partenaire d'ACF pour la mise
œuvre DFID III
Oumourou Soumana, animateur Nouveau Horizon
Imirana Souleymane, animateur Nouveau Horizon
Mohamadou Dicko, Chargé de Programme WASH ACF

Mardi 4 Novembre
Bakary Traoré, Chef projet DFID ACF
Soulifoulbra, Responsable chef de Projet Filets-sociaux
Anara Ag Mohamed, Assistant Chef de projet DFID III
Laurent Koné, Chef division aménagement, Direction régionale du Génie Rural
Bassirou Sylla, Prestataire privé/Commerçant, chargé de la distribution du CFW et CT

Mohamed Maïga, Comptable du commerçant Bassiro Sylla
Mahamadou Amadou, Chef Secteur Agriculture Ansongo, chargé de la formation agricole
DFID III

Yahiya Moussa Touré, Directeur régional de l'agriculture/ par intérim au moment de
l'exécution du projet DFID III

Mahamadou Djiteye, Chef Secteur Agriculture Gao, chargé de la formation agricole DFID III

Abdoulaye N'Diaye, Direction régional service vétérinaire Gao, chargé de la formation des
pasteurs bénéficiaires de DFID III et vaccination des animaux

Mercredi 05 Novembre

Rencontre avec les bénéficiaires du CFW et du bétail (chèvres) à Zindiga, Commune de Sony
Ali Ber

Rencontre avec les bénéficiaires du CFW (réhabilitation des digues de 500 m x2) et Cash
inconditionnel à Berrah, Commune de Sony Ali Ber

Rencontre avec les bénéficiaires (groupement des femmes maraichères)

Bakary Sissouma, Chargé de suivi-évaluation Base ACF Gao

Jeudi 06 Novembre

Rencontre avec les bénéficiaires des semences (niébé, sorgho) à Kadji, Commune de
Gounzoureye

Rencontre avec Saliou Bonkana, Chef de village de Arhabou, membre du comité de ciblage
des bénéficiaires d'aliments bétail, Commune de Gounzoureye

Rencontre avec Ibrahim O. Touré, Secrétaire Général de Mairie de Gounzoureye

Débriefing avec Mohamed Salah, Chef de Base ACF Gao

Vendredi 07 et Samedi 8 Novembre

Voyage Gao-Sévaré-Bamako

Annex E: Evaluation Tools

Semi Structured Questionnaire

RESPONDENT'S NAME:

RESPONDENT'S TITLE & FUNCTION:

DATE:

LOCATION:

<i>Question</i>	<i>Notes</i>
Appropriateness & Relevance	
1. What priority needs of the beneficiary populations do you believe the response has met?	
2. Have these needs changed over the last 2/3 years? If so, do we know that the intervention has remained relevant to beneficiary priorities?	
3. Have individual project activities contributed to overall programmatic objectives?	
4. How did we decide what programme/project activities were most relevant to meet beneficiary needs?	
5. What needs do you think the response did not address that it should have done?	
6. Are activities undertaken in line with governmental and donors' plans and strategies?	
Effectiveness and Impact	
7. What indicators did the operation use to measure its progress / success?	
8. What have been key achievements/outputs compared to plan?	

9. What internal and external factors have influenced the success/failure of the response?	
10. What have been the key issues or constraints encountered during the response? How did we deal with them?	
11. How effective has the response been in increasing agricultural production, improving livestock management, and reducing malnutrition in supported communities?	
12. How effective has the response been in terms of increasing HH food diversity, and reducing the number of months of HH food insecurity?	
13. How effective were the training activities? How do we know?	
14. What changes have you seen in the communities since the operation started?	
15. Do you believe the beneficiaries to be in a stronger position to survive future livelihood shocks than previously?	
16. What unanticipated positive or negative, direct or indirect, consequences have arisen as a result of the operation?	
Efficiency	
17. Has ACF been able to manage resources available, including the recruitment and training of staff?	
18. Was assistance provided in a timely manner in accordance with operational timelines and the seasonal calendar?	

19. Have financial procedures been able to allocate costs successfully to separate programmes?	
20. Who controlled the expenditure of funds/procurement of inputs? Did any delays occur as a result of these processes?	
21. Was there adequate integration between other ongoing projects and the DFID III intervention activities? What synergies arose?	
22. Were other, possibly more cost effective, programme activities considered? If so, why were they not utilised?	
23. Have good quality, standardised, PDMs been undertaken and acted upon?	
Sustainability	
24. How will the impact of the response go beyond the programme period?	
25. How has the intervention contributed to strengthening the resilience of targeted households?	
26. What future interventions are planned and how do they build on the current activities?	
27. Has an exit strategy been formalized and communicated with key stakeholders and beneficiary communities?	
Accountability to beneficiaries	
28. To what extent were the most affected or the most vulnerable HHs identified and supported?	

29. How did we select beneficiaries? Have the beneficiary communities understood and accepted the criteria?	
30. To what extent have cultural norms and practices detracted from the beneficiary selection process?	
31. What level of input did the communities have in the design and implementation of the response?	
32. Has an efficient complaints procedure been established at all sites throughout the intervention?	
33. How did the programmes incorporate cross cutting issues such as gender and protection?	
34. Has the intervention targeted women or other specific groups within the programme methodology?	
HEA linkages	
35. What coverage has the operation been able to achieve in comparison to needs identified in the HEA?	
36. Has the intervention been able to meet the income gap identified in the HEA survey?	
Functionality of WARO	
37. What leadership or support has WARO contributed to the response? What effect has this had on programme effectiveness and efficiency?	
38. What role has WARO played in respect to providing strategic guidance at a regional level?	

<p>39. In what ways could the performance of WARO be improved?</p>	
<p>Lessons learnt & Closing</p>	
<p>40. What lessons have been learnt in DFID I & II that have been incorporated into DFID III?</p>	
<p>41. What have been the main strengths and weaknesses of the response?</p>	
<p>42. What processes are in place to ensure that good practices are identified and adopted into future responses?</p>	
<p>43. What good practices or innovative ideas have you seen that could be replicated in future programmes?</p>	
<p>44. What aspects of the response would you do differently next time?</p>	
<p>45. Is there any other relevant information related to the evaluation that you would like to provide?</p>	

14. Did the support meet your needs? Fully = /Partially = /Hardly= / Not at all=
(ask to raise hands)
15. Which other organisations apart from ACF were active here? What support did they give?
To who?
16. Have there been any arguments or disputes that have arisen from the support ACF
provided?
17. Do you feel some people/groups of people have not been included in the programme that
should have been?
18. Who do you feel in your community benefited the most from the projects? Large/small
households? Men/Women?
19. How many people received Cash/CFW/Warrantage support? How was the Cash given to
you? In your hand? At the bank? How were you treated at the bank?
20. Did you feel insecure at any point receiving the cash?

Section 2: Sector Specific:

Health garden, plus Agricultural/livestock support/training

1. How much time do you now spend working the land? Is this more or less than before?
Less by: <1hr = , 1-2hrs = 2-3hs = 3 + hrs = (ask for a show of hands)
More by: <1hr = , 1-2hrs = 2-3hs = 3 + hrs =
2. Who actually does this work? Who did it before?
3. What training did you receive? Was it beneficial? Number Yes = / No=
4. Do you do anything differently now as compared to before?
5. Has the quantity of fruits/vegetables available to the household increased since the
programme started? Number Yes = / No=
6. What fruits/vegetables do you grow now that you did not used to?
7. Do you need any further support or do you know enough know to grow these
products yourselves now?
8. What additional support would you need now to help you further increase your
production?
9. Do you eat these extra products or sell them?
10. How many have received animals? Number Yes = / No= ? In what quantity?
11. Are the animals healthy? Have they had any offspring yet?
12. What difference has this made to your household?

13. How many have received tools or other inputs? Number Yes = / No= ? In what quantity?

14. What difference has this made to your household?

WASH Evaluation questions (only applicable in Mali – but may be useful elsewhere)

1. How much time do u now spend collecting water? Is this more or less than before?

2. by <1hr = , 1-2hrs = , 2-3hs = , >3 hrs = , (ask for a show of hands)

3. Who actually collects the water?

4. Has the quality of water improved since the project started? Number Yes = / No=

5. Has health in general improved as a result of the WASH projects? Number Yes = / No=

6. Have incidences of stomach problems and diarrhoea decreased since the project started?

Number Yes = / No=

7. Have any of your HHs received hygiene training? Number Yes = /No = . On what?

8. Who was it in your household? Number Men= / Women= / child=

9. Did they pass on the knowledge to others in your family or neighbours? : Number Yes = /No =

10. What changes have people made as a result of the WASH training and projects?
(List)

11. Did it make them change their habits for the better? Number Yes = /No =

12. Where do the inhabitants of the village/settlement go to the toilet? Is it individual/shared/communal?

13. Are the toilets clean? Who cleans the toilet?

14. Are there more or less toilets than before?

15. Has incidence of mosquito borne disease (malaria/dengue) reduced? Number Yes = / No=

16. In what other ways have the WASH projects helped your community?

Activity: Project Impact & Success: – Put 4 categories (visually different i.e. by drawing stars on paper or using different sized stones/piles) on the floor in different corners - and ask the level of success by standing next to the stars /stones. **Ask some of them each time to explain or discuss why and how.**

1. ASK – ‘Was the cash distribution successful in improving your short term food security?’

Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =

2. ASK – ‘Has the WASH program been successful in improving your hygiene habits/access to good quality water? (as appropriate)’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
3. ASK – ‘Has the WASH program been successful in improving your family’s access to improved sanitation facilities?’ (As appropriate)
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
4. ASK – ‘Has the agricultural support/training program been successful in improving your long term food security?’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
5. ASK – ‘Has the Warrantage program been successful in improving your long term food security?’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
6. ASK – ‘Has the cash program been successful in improving your family’s health and nutrition status?’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
7. ASK – ‘Has the WASH program been successful in improving your family’s health and nutrition status??’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =
8. ASK - ‘Did the support meet your overall needs?’
Not successful = / A Little successful = / successful = Very successful =

Wrap up questions:

- What could have been done better? What didn’t we do that we should have done?
- Have lifestyles returned to normal since the drought? Is anything better now than before?

Annex F: Seasonal Calendar - Niger⁵¹

Activités/Événements	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Fev	Mar	Avr	Mai	Juin	Juil	Aout	Sep
Période de Soudure												
Mois de pluies												
Agriculture												
Mil	Récolte	Vente			Préparation				semis	sarclage		Récolte
Sorgho	Récolte	Vente			Préparation				semis	sarclage		
Niébé	Récolte	Vente			Préparation				Semis			Récolte
Arachide	Récolte	Vente			Préparation				semis			Récolte
Oseille		Récolte	vente		Préparation					semis		
Sésame		Récolte	Vente		Préparation				Semis			
Elevage												
Bovins-production laitière	Lait											Lait
Caprins/Ovins-production laitière	Lait											Lait
Migration animaux			Transhumance (arrivé)						Transhumance (départ)			
Achat nourriture bétail/intrants												
Maladies du bétail												
achat/vente de bétails	achat gros et petits ruminants				vente gros ruminants			vente petits ruminants				
Exploitations forestière												
Cueillette					Feuille et fruits							
Autres												
Achats de vivres		Achat pour stock			Achat pour consommation							
Artisanat		Artisanat										
Emplois agricoles												
Emplois non agricoles												
Exode/migration												
Période de soudure												
Dettes/prêts/ remboursements		Remboursement								Prêts/Dettes		
Problème d'eau												

⁵¹ Livelihood Profile - Mayahi, Niger, February 2012

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