

FINAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

SEPTEMBER 2015

Humanitarian Multi-Sectorial Rapid Response Mechanism, Yobe State, Nigeria



Funded by
OFDA

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Authorship

The findings in this report are based on statements, views and perspectives of beneficiaries met, both Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and host families, community members from ward level to the Emirate, state government partners and ACF staff, both national and expatriate¹

In addition, the data and reports available in the project's monitoring system have proved to be a valuable source of information.

Findings presented in this report are the views of an independent consultant and are not necessarily shared by ACF.

Acknowledgments

This evaluation and report was commissioned by ACF-ELA. Field visits in Nigeria were organised by ACF country office, as well as the field coordinator (Dutse) and ACF staff in Damaturu field office. Discussions were always very open, and access to information and project documents was provided in a most transparent way.

On many occasions, colleagues in the field confirmed that discussions, (systemic) questions and exchanges, beyond their function of passing on information to the evaluator, had an own learning effect (whereby the learning was on both sides).

I would like to acknowledge the valuable contributions of all the people met, and in particular the ACF staff for their open and frank discussions on so many topics.

Limitations

As compared to the initial time schedule presented in the inception report, the time for actual field visits (beneficiaries, communities, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene infrastructure) was restricted, mostly due to security restrictions (withdrawal to Dutse over one week end), the restriction to urban areas only, and also the extended week end over the Eid holiday (end of Ramadan), which caused the evacuation of all expatriate staff to Abuja, also for security reasons. On the other hand, the experience of these restrictions were a vivid demonstration of the situation on which the project had been acting throughout the implementation period.

¹ Since movement of the consultant was restricted, for security reasons, to urban areas in Damaturu, Damagun and Potiskum, only urban communities (wards) could be visited.

Acronyms:

ACF	Action against Hunger
ADP	Agricultural Development Programme (GoN activity)
APR	Activity Progress Report
BH	Bore Hole
CDO	Community Development Officer
CO	Country Office
CRM	Complaints & Response Mechanism
CV	Community Volunteer
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of OECD)
EW	Extension Worker
FFP	Food for Peace
FO	Field Office
FSL	Food Security and Livelihood (Programme Component)
GoN	Government of Nigeria
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HH	Household
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INGO	International NGOs
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LFA	Logical Framework Analysis
LGA	Local Government Area
LRRD	Link between Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development (EU / ECHO strategy)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAPP	Method for Impact Assessment of Programmes and Projects
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEMA	National Emergency Management Authority
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGN	Nigerian Naira
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
OD	Organisation Development
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PCM	Project Cycle Management
PQA	Project Quality Assessment
RI	Reintegration
SEMA	State Emergency Management Agency (Yobe State)
SO	Specific Objective (or project objective)
SPHERE	International instrument for the formulation of HA standards
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VIP	Ventilated Improved Pit Latrine
WASH	Water, Sanitation & Hygiene
WS	Workshop

Executive Summary

ES 1: Project background and Purpose

ACF started the Nigeria Mission in 2010 to respond the complex emergency situation caused by religious conflict, weak care practices, and malnutrition in the area, especially in Northern parts of the country. In Yobe state, Nigeria, ACF is implementing a one-year project with the overall goal of providing critical humanitarian assistance to victims of the complex emergency (e.g. Internally Displaced Persons, as well as families hosting IDPs), using market-sensitive and capacity building approaches.

Intervention logic suggested to bring about this objective with three specific objectives, which at the same time describe the three project sectors:

- To prevent disease outbreaks and help those displaced by conflicts or disaster to carry out everyday requirements through the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs)
- To increase access to water and sanitation through emergency WASH interventions to victims of complex emergencies (Insurgency, natural disasters and waterborne/communicable diseases.
- To increase the affected population's short-term purchasing power, protect and restore their livelihood

ES2: Evaluation background

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the adequacy of ACF's intervention, as well as the level of effectiveness of the three sectors of the project, following a set of detailed evaluation question which are oriented by the international standard of the DAC² criteria. The evaluation was carried out from 4 – 21 July 2015, both in Abuja and Damaturu, and including field visits to all three areas of project intervention. Direct beneficiaries interviewed included IDPs and host families, but also government institutions on local and state level were included in the evaluation.

ES3: Evaluation methodology

The methodical repertoire used during this evaluation included the Method for Impact Assessment of Programmes and Projects (MAPP), by which impacts as per evaluation questions were shown and ranked. Consultations with beneficiaries and stakeholders, but also with project staff consisted mostly in individual interviews and, where feasible, in Focus Group

² Development Assistance Committee of the OECD

Discussions. Another important element was (participative) observation, both on communication ACF staff-beneficiaries and stakeholders, as well as within ACF. Finally, a participative debriefing workshop on initial findings with ACF staff (world café moderation) provided an excellent possibility to discuss relevant issues concerning the project. Last not least, and confirmed by several interlocutors, the discussions, interviews and other communication was perceived as learning process in its own merit.

ES4: Evaluation Findings
Design

Overall objective appears in parts too ambitious. Indicators being merely quantitative (responding to OFDA's demands). Specific objectives are realistic, and most of them have actually been achieved.

Relevance/Appropriateness

ACF complied throughout the implementation with donor policies and priorities agreed upon in the project proposal, always maintaining and respecting the ownership required by LGA and state structures.

Coherence

Collaboration with government stakeholders very good. A structural problem remains ACF's adherence to global humanitarian principles, these principles / standards not always in line with GoN policies.

Coverage

The planned number of most vulnerable members of target population where covered (some 20.000 individuals, as compared to 125.000 IDPs counted in the state, plus another additional caseload of 7.000 NFI recipients in Borno State). Logistical concentration on 3 LGAs, the pragmatic selection criterion "accessibility" and last not least security considerations justified the concentration on these selected households / communities.

Efficiency

ACF staff at all levels are assuring cost-effectivity. As to (technical) quality in WASH infrastructure and equipment, some serious quality shortcomings are reported. On the other hand, innovative technology had been installed.

Effectiveness

All quantitative planned targets were achieved (and indeed considerable numbers beyond, in a reaction to a new emergency situation in Borno State) against set indicators. On the other hand, qualitative results / objectives were not sufficiently captured.

Sustainability/Likelihood of Impact

WASH infrastructure has –in at least one case- considerably contributed to long lasting equipment with reduced maintenance cost. There were some activities of resilience capacity development with government; however, no further such interventions were requested or accepted. An obvious option in a Humanitarian Action project is the transition from HA to development, or other “durable solutions” like the return to the home area. This, for the time being, is not part of project design.

ES5: Conclusions / Lessons Learned

CRM policy / approach

The ACF specific “Complaints and Response Mechanism”, with its focus on “Complaints” appears not adequate in the local cultural setting whereby complaints are a concept not widely accepted and applied.³ Instead, respective (indirect) indicators on incidents of implementation shortcomings should be developed and applied for monitoring.

Extension Workers / Community Volunteers

Random samples of the structured reports (ACF templates) both by extension workers and by community volunteers revealed low quality of both instruments. This is in sharp contrast to the highly ambitious training modules to which both groups have been exposed. M&E data on quality / outcome of programme interventions are therefore based on rather doubtful, if not useless sources.

Monitoring

Low quality of Field Assistants’ FSL reports: no basic and relevant information collected on situation / sustainability of business (income per week / day, as well as other factors contributing to sustainability of FSL. No systematic reporting on observed (or observable) IDP movements in programme areas (spontaneous returns / arrivals; conflicts IDPs / host communities; other relevant information / observations).

³ Also the “toll free line” facility established since remains based on the “complaints” approach, inviting beneficiaries to contact ACF directly, avoiding the defunct CRM structures.

Coordination

Need for more coordination among various actors – sector / area related (level below SEMA coordination meetings); ACF direct link to the national INGO scene could be used to promote coordination in this.

IDP Return and Reintegration

IDP return and reintegration policy and strategy, as well as possible contributions for implementation as requested by SEMA seems to be met with some reservation by ACF staff on all levels, obviously fearing that GoN actors might be tempted to impose pre-mature, or even forced return of IDPs.

Management

Organisation Development (OD): There is a need perceived for re-organisation both on national and on field level. OD in general, and in particular amendments and changes affecting management staff require a great degree of consensus and acceptance. Therefore, an adequate change management strategy should be incorporated into such an OD exercise.

Human Resources: Fluctuation of national staff is a matter of concern. Staff interviews have revealed that there is a relatively high loyalty among national staff from the project area (North-East), as against frequent resignations of staff from other regions due to problems in social integration and / or exposure to an unsecure and at times dangerous environment. Therefore, national staff from the project area should be considered with priority for future recruitment

Operation

- In a camp-like agglomeration in Damaturu where NFI was distributed so far no WASH action taken (VIP, well etc.), in spite of an obvious need for such intervention (inter-sector-coordination)
- Water testing in private wells in use in NFI recipients compounds not assured by WASH component, as a regular intervention
- Educational activities for children not attending school considered beyond project mandate; a case of good practice (private school run by IDP teacher as a business activity) remained unnoticed among the many FSL activities.

Public Relations

ACF is enjoying a remarkable positive reputation not only with the beneficiaries but also with stakeholders at all levels. It did not go unnoticed that ACF, at a time when most (if not all) other INGOs and IO had left the state in situations of high tension and danger, had maintained a visible presence (mostly through national staff).

ES6: Recommendations

Resilience Capacity of National Actors

- Training modules to be adapted to level of comprehension of trainees: training methods / didactics and organisation should include more participative and interactive elements of training modules (Field Office)
- Provide certificates to training attendants (Field Office, Country Office)
- Capacity Building / Equipment supply to improve performance of Sanitation & Health structures (Country Office)

Monitoring

- Field staff to be guided / enabled to collect small business relevant status information, to provide advice, or to refer problems identified to PM. (Field Office)
- ACF field staff, as close observers to the field situation, should be encouraged to report on IDP movements (arrivals, spontaneous returns, “scouting” visits to abandoned premises and lands etc). (Country Office, Field Office)

CRM policy / approach

Review cultural applicability of the complaint-focused CRM approach (including toll-free line system), and possibly amend this instrument as a feasible qualitative monitoring tool. (Country Office)

Operation

- WASH
A more flexible approach beyond the mandate (social / community infrastructures only) would be in line with the specific objective “prevention of water borne diseases”. Project staff should thus be encouraged to extend such services to beneficiaries households reached by NFI activities. (Country Office)
- Education
Teachers among IDPs to be encouraged to provide education to IDP children (FSL contacts). Such a self-help approach by and for IDPs should serve as a model; message also to be spread in INGO coordination circles so that NGOs with a respective mandate (education) could take up the issue (Country Office, Field Office).

Coordination

Since ACF is hosting / incorporating the INGO coordinator (at Abuja), this seems to be an ideal constellation to promote / support INGO coordination also in the field (Country Office).

IDP Return and Reintegration

ACF should develop an own IDP return and reintegration policy and strategy that should be incorporated in HA /relief projects. (Country Office)

Management -

Organisation Development

It is suggested to plan a full-fledged organisational development process, preferably of a systemic and participatory approach, whereby both national and expat staff in Country Office and Field Office are to be involved. An Organisation Development consultant to be contracted for this exercise. The participative elaboration of the ToR for such an assignment would be a first and important step in this forthcoming Organisation Development process. (Country Office)

Human Resources

Wherever possible, candidates hailing from the region (North-East) should be selected. This criterion should be prior to gender considerations. (Country Office)

Public Relations


ACF should systematically maintain and strengthen their public appearance by suitable events and activities, including social contacts to relevant stakeholders in the communities, including the Emirs as traditional and spiritual leaders. (Country Office)

1. Background and Context

ACF started its Nigeria Mission in 2010 in order to respond a complex emergency situation caused by armed conflict, weak care practices, and malnutrition in the North-Western parts of the country.

In 2014, the **Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)** funded project for Yobe State had been designed and planned for the period of one year, starting in August 2014 and coming to an end in July 2015. Preparatory interventions included a base line survey (October 2014), which is describing socio-economic, demographic and health situation in the three (of 13) Local Government Areas (LGAs) into which Yobe state structured, and of which –at the time of project start- 7 were considered affected by IDP movements. The survey included the 650 households (both IDP and host families) selected to become beneficiaries of this programme.

Map 1: Yobe state LGAs / ACF Project Area



At the time of the start of the project, as per State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) data, 7 LGA were affected by the influx of some 60.000 IDP from neighbouring states, this exodus being caused by attacks of Boko Haram militants on villages and towns. At that time, all IDP had found shelter with host families / households, or in rented premises.

At the end of the project period (July 2015), the number of IDP has doubled (125.500), and 13 LGAs are now considered affected by this influx. Also, a number of camps have now come

into existence, housing some 4.000 IDPs: in Damaturu LGA, there are two official camps, and at least 20 informal camps have been found so far.


Due to intensified armed attacks of Boko Haram throughout 2015, the influx of IDPs into Yobe is continuing.⁴ ACF has been implementing a one-year project in Yobe State with the overall goal of providing critical humanitarian assistance in three sectors, namely Non-Food Items (NFIs), WASH and economic recovery. The project is funded by OFDA and runs from August 1st, 2014 until July 31st, 2015.

Project Objectives

Project objectives have been duly outlined in the ToR. The “complex emergency” –international euphemism for armed conflict- obviously refers to the Boko Haram terrorist threat, but also to military interventions –both national and regional- against this armed movement, and their impacts on the local population.

Map 2:

Boko Haram-attributed Attacks in Nigeria Since July 2009



In addition, other possible emergencies (floods) and their consequences, in particular in view to waterborne diseases, are in the focus of this intervention.

⁴ Interview with SEMA in July 2015

Table 1: Project Objectives

Principal Objective	Specific Objectives
Critical humanitarian assistance in NFIs, WASH and economic recovery provided to victims of the complex emergency using market-sensitive and capacity building approaches.	To prevent disease outbreaks and help those displaced by conflicts or disaster to carry out everyday requirements through the distribution of Non Food Items (NFIs)
	To increase access to water and sanitation through emergency WASH interventions to victims of complex emergencies (Insurgency, natural disasters and waterborne/ communicable diseases.
	To increase the affected population’s short-term purchasing power, protect and restore their livelihood

2. Methodology

The overall evaluation process during the field phase lasted from 04 – 21 July 2015, and involved

- interviews / consultations with ACF key informants at country office level (Abuja), as well as on field level (Yobe State, Damaturu).⁵
- Participative Observation
- Review of project documents and general information on the overall situation in the project area
- Workshop on preliminary findings (with ACF expatriate staff)

2.1 Field visits

Field visits included interviews with beneficiaries (e.g. IDPs and Host Households / families), as well as stakeholders on various levels:

- community leaders / volunteers / CRM Committees / WASH committees
- LGA, State Government staff at various levels, including SEMA
- an interview with the Emir of Potiskum), the latter being addressed by arriving IDPs for help, in his capacity as a traditional and religious leader

Also, where applicable, WASH infrastructures were visited, in the presence of ACF WASH PM as well as WASH committees and beneficiaries.

⁵ Details on these contacts are provided in the Mission Journal (Annex A.5)

The following overview reveals that meetings with beneficiaries, communities as well as all types of stakeholders cooperating with ACF in this programme had been contacted:

Table 2: Field Visits (LGAs / project sector / Stakeholders)

Sector LGA/entity	NFI	WASH	FSL	Stakeholders
Damaturu	“Blue Camp” (100 HH)	1 Borehole (rehab.) 2 Wells (rehab)	Fruit Stall (market) Cattle fattening Cooking Tailor	Com.Volunteer / CRM LGA – WatSan 3 Community Leaders WASHCom
Fone		<i>No access due to security limitations</i>	Electrician Workshop	LGA WatSan CDO
Potiskum	4 IDP HH 2 Host HH	<i>No access due to security limitations beyond town</i> 1 Community Well (rehab not yet started)	Poultry Ram fattening	LGA-WatSan CDO 2 Ext.Workers 1 Community Leader WashCom CRM secretary Community Volunteer
UNDP Field Office Northeast				UNDP Field Officer
Potiskum Emirate				Emir of Potiskum
Yobe State				SEMA officials

2.2 Participative Observation

The actual field presence of the evaluator did not only allow for the physical verification of project provided infrastructure and objects (NFI), but also their acceptance / appreciation by beneficiaries as well as by stakeholders. Besides, working relations, communication culture and attitudes of respect between the various actors and beneficiaries have been subject to analytical observation.

2.3 Review of Documents

A number of basic documents had been made available before the departure to the field. However, too little time had been assigned for an overall desk study, so that documents were consulted during the field phase. Many more relevant documents had been discovered, and made available by various interlocutors both Abuja and the field, some of them towards the end of the field visit, to be reviewed / consulted while writing this report.⁶

⁶ The list of documents consulted is provided as Annex A.8

2.4 Workshop with ACF on Preliminary Findings

At the end of the field mission, an interactive workshop (world café approach) with ACF expatriate staff / managers, both country office and field, had been hold in Abuja.⁷

The objectives of this end-of-mission workshop on preliminary findings are:

- Information of stakeholders on first impressions of the evaluator after the field missions, as well as (critical) discussion of these findings, in order to avoid factual mistakes
- Feedback by stakeholders on suggested findings per evaluation criterion: affirmative – rejection – amendments – additional aspects lacking
- The WS as such (which will be documented as an annex to the evaluation report) is, in addition, a means of triangulation (self-conception and self-evaluation as against external evaluation) by stakeholders present on various aspects of the programme (concept – implementation – achievements of results / objectives)

Method

- Participants had briefly been introduced to the MAPP impact evaluation technique, namely the MAPP Impact Profile. - MAPP (Method for Impact Assessment of Programmes and Projects) is an actor-centred evaluation method requiring an open and participative approach. The MAPP Impact Profile as per evaluation question has also allowed to provide for the ranking of DAC evaluation criteria⁸. Details on the MAPP approach are presented in the evaluation report.⁹
- The WS, in major parts, has been moderated as a World Café event, a method allowing group work and promoting a micro-consensus on various topics. World Café is aiming at pre-structuring comments to findings along a micro-consensus within the 3 working groups; also, these comments are made available as a written document for discussion in the plenum (chart). A guide on procedures and set questions had structured this exercise.¹⁰

Participants

The workshop was attended by all participants, nominated by management. Interest was high, and staff members who did not find their names on the original list of nominated participants requested to participate; accordingly, they had been added to the final list of participants. The

⁷ The workshop –including handouts issued and participants’ observations / suggestions- is documented as Annex WS 1 –WS 7

⁸ Annex A.4

⁹ Refer to Annex A.2

¹⁰ For more details on World Café refer to: <http://www.theworldcafe.com/>

fact that all expatriate field staff from Yobe and Borno States had been withdrawn to Abuja, for security reasons, during the extended week end around the Eid holiday (end of Ramadan) had provided for this opportunity to discuss preliminary findings both with Country Office staff, and field staff. In addition, the presence of two colleagues from HQ (New York) allowed for a unique possibility of exchange and discussion on all management levels.¹¹

Organization

Detailed preliminary findings, presented in the form of a MAPP profile, as well as a list of lessons learned had been provided to participants as handouts, and were to be dealt with in detail in the working groups. Groups (structured at random) received a guide structuring the group work, and providing a set of questions to be replied to (as a group), so that group results were to be comparable.

As it were, the time for elaborating comments (pro / con) on lessons learned and findings had to be extended; additional time had been agreed upon beforehand. The groups worked intensively, and came up with –sometimes quite different- results.¹²

Groups presented their respective results / comments to the plenum, and discussions with participants and the evaluator followed. Participants were assured that suggested amendments will be entered into an amended version of the MAPP profile¹³, as well as the list of Lessons Learned – as appropriate, and by discretion of the (independent) evaluator. Also, it was announced that group proposals will be documented, so that transparency of this participatory process is assured.¹⁴

3. Key Findings

3.1 Design

Logical Framework

There are a number of different versions of an overall LFA. Besides, Field Office Damaturu had been assigned to elaborate updated LFA per sector/component based on overall LF as an example, however without having undergone sufficient prior orientation in LFA technique / Project Cycle Management.¹⁵

¹¹ See annex WS2-Participants

¹² Group charts elaborated are documented (transcribed) in Annex WS7-Group Results

¹³ See Annex A.3

¹⁴ See Annex WS7

¹⁵ Interview with Umar Salisu, M&E TA at Damaturu FO on 10.07.15

Overall Objective:

The Overall Objective appears in parts too ambitious: neither market-sensitivity nor capacity building measures could be implemented at a relevant and sustainable level. These issues belong –in the LFA-logic- anyway to results. Indicators are merely quantitative; impact of awareness building measures (WASH) and training / capacity building (FSL) thus not being captured by these indicators; however, the donor requirements are only addressing quantitative indicators.

Specific Objectives:

Specific objectives, by contrary, are realistic and likely to be achieved. However, while the project design is suggesting 3 different sectors (NFI + WASH + FSL), related to respective specific objectives in the LFA, it is obvious that the “SH” part of WASH is directly linked to the NFI kit distribution and –use. The same applies to SH awareness activities (advocacy, training) implemented by the programme.

In the LFA logic, it would thus be more adequate to have only 2 specific objectives (WASH – FSL); the two aspects under WASH, namely Water Infrastructure (=WA) and sanitation / hygiene (=SH) would become respective results under the WASH specific objective. However, it is due to OFDA’s format that requires NFI being assigned to logistics instead of embedding it in its respective sector (be it WASH, FSL or Shelter for example). So this formal split is not the design of ACF but an effect of the donor’s requirement.

Monitoring and Evaluation:¹⁶

Monitoring instruments established in the project, and relative to the OFDA contribution¹⁷, consist of:

- Quarterly reports (3 reports, up to March 2015)
- APR - Activity Progress Report
- WASH Post Distribution Monitoring Report (June 2015)
- FFP-OFDA Monthly Update¹⁸
- Project Quality Assessment Report (of June 2015)
- FSL Reports (by Field Assistants and Extension Workers (EW))
- CRM Reports (by Community Volunteers and CRM secretaries)
- Lessons Learned Workshop (March 2015)
- Financial reports

¹⁶ ToR had assigned M&E evaluation question to the “Design” criterion. However, the usual LFA logic assigns M&E –as part of project management- to the efficiency criterion, were it would be more adequately placed.

¹⁷ A number of other monitoring instruments (some of the APR, financial reports, lessons learned workshops) are either addressing other donor contributions, or are related to the overall ACF management / implementation

¹⁸ FFP-Food-for-Peace Programme is another USAID support instrument under which ACF is providing food Aid

M&E system as suggested in concept and design is up to the standard in HA projects, in particular on quantitative data, with weaknesses in qualitative data (the latter not being required by OFDA, but relevant in the ACF own quality management / monitoring system). Quantitative input/output data (efficiency) are adequate and well documented. Qualitative data –indicating outcomes and results being achieved (effectivity), are depending on reporting by different monitors (field assistants, extension workers, community / CRM volunteers), whose reports – in their majority- are of poor quality. Checking these reports at random revealed that staff entrusted with providing these reports –based on regular meetings with FSL beneficiaries (interviews, targeted questions, open questions, observations) are far from meeting the intended standards. Though monitoring was one of the training subjects for this field monitoring staff, none of the very basic requirements can be traced in the reports of volunteers (CRM reports), and very little in the extension workers' reports (FSL reports). In the meantime, while maintaining the CRM structures and its instruments (including CRM reports, see below), a direct “toll free line” system has been established to encourage beneficiaries to directly inform ACF management about problems, shortcomings etc. in the programme implementation.

- FSL reports:

For the monitoring and ongoing support of FSL ventures –in particular in the field of agriculture- ACF had agreed with the management of Yobe State ADP¹⁹ on certain support inputs, which was formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding on the secondment of Extension Workers to ACF to help in the area by providing technical assistance to beneficiaries.

The technical supports consist of advice on processing of agricultural produce or related activities and follow-up visits / supervisions of beneficiaries. Part of the MoU is a monthly allowance of 10.000 NGN that EW are to receive for these services rendered. Also, EWs were receiving some orientation training concerning their expected contributions.

These contributions consist in regular (at least monthly) contacts with FSL beneficiaries; result of the contacts are documented in a structured report. Given the professional background these EWs have, as well as the rather ambitious ACF orientation training they had been undergoing, their performance, as documented in the FSL reports is disappointing – an impression that did so far not occur within the project's monitoring system.

Reports basically contain the information that the FSL sponsored ventures (micro business) are still existing, with no other relevant information on commercial status or achievements; occasionally,

¹⁹ ADP= Agriculture Development Program (GoN funded program / establishment)

some technical problems (in agriculture) are addressed. The reports are accepted as such by field assistants / field monitoring, and there is no feedback or corrective action on the issue – it is not perceived as a problem.²⁰ Thus, also relevant information occasionally provided in some reports (like the one on an IDP-school) are not perceived by the institution. Reports filled by field assistants themselves are of a better quality, but the factual basic business data (expenditures / income, stock etc.) are not systematically required in the report template.

- CRM reports:

Are to be filled by community volunteers and / or members of the CRM committees, both having been instructed in (too) much detail on CRM policy, principles, classification of complaints etc. – Obviously, this ACF induced instrument is not compatible –at that level- with local culture in which complaints are not a socially accepted concept, especially when addressing a community leader. Thus, cases of bribes being requested by some community leaders for putting beneficiaries on the recipients' lists became known, and even led to corrective action by LGA authorities – but were not seized by the respective monitoring instrument (CRM report): it was confirmed that it is not possible for a community volunteer, and difficult for a CRM committee member to denounce in writing a community leader. Hence these reports remain a formal compliance with an established procedure, with almost no relevant feedback on the livelihood situation of beneficiaries, or of community related findings on IDP issues. The few complaints / suggestions registered are marked “management look into it” – but it became apparent that there is no internal reference system by which “management” is to be approached, and even less taking action. As to the additional facility of “toll free calls” for beneficiaries to ACF management, no record of such incoming calls is available for monitoring purposes as yet.

Gender policy:

Project design was based on ACF gender policy requirements. Accordingly, gender mainstreaming had been a guiding principle during implementation. While most expat staff are gender sensitive due to previous similar HA assignments, the gender issue among national staff requires awareness building, as well as a culturally sensitive adaptation of pre-conceived foreign policies (ACF Gender Policy) to local and regional customs (cultural sensitivity). It is rather the (gender independent) team spirit that is ensuring and promoting a very positive work environment than premises, which are much different in each field situation: issues like water and electricity supply and security are much more relevant than, for instance, gender separate toilets (which are not existing). Field staff saw this requirement also to be applied in

²⁰ Interview with extension workers and with M&E TA Damaturu

infrastructures supported (health facilities, schools) – in the circumstances not the first implementation priority, though.

3.2 Relevance / Appropriateness

The project included some activities on capacity building on LGA level (CRM committees, LGA sector facilitators), with some doubts on their adequacy in the given local context. Also, some capacity building inputs are reported in favour of NEMA and SEMA. Thus, these stakeholders can be considered direct and indirect beneficiaries of the intervention. As to the Ministry of Agriculture, the training of Extension Workers as FSL field monitors cum advisors is such a contribution. However, this was more guided by the need of the programme than by a requirement of MinAgric.

The intervention complied with donor policies and priorities agreed upon in the project proposal; deviations and changes (time schedule, services) were due to the dynamic conflict environment, in particular security considerations. Some deviations from donor requirements (livestock, agro) are due to necessary flexibility in response to actual beneficiary needs.²¹ This is the case in which beneficiaries used their cash aid to invest in agricultural or livestock ventures, not typical activities in an emergency situation according to OFDA guidelines. The donor also accepted / respected ACF (and global) humanitarian principles and approaches observed and applied by ACF.

3.3 Coherence

Collaboration with stakeholders in the areas of intervention (3 LGAs in Yobe state) is very good; LGA agents (of various line ministries) are instrumental in project implementation; beneficiary identification as well as goods and services provided by ACF coordinated / agreed by SEMA, thus coherence with national/state policies assured the project's complementing government and other actors' intervention in satisfactory manner. Additional coordination and consultation on specific sectors suggested by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), however without substantiating this suggestion in detail (sectors, issues, participants etc.).²²

A structural problem remains ACF's adherence to its own (and global) humanitarian principles, as well as to technical standards set by SPHERE in the area of WASH. These principles /

²¹ Refer to debriefing WS, statement of Group 1 "disagree" where the issue was raised. Other groups did not share this view, though.

²² The suggestion was made by a UNDP field officer for the Northeast during a meeting with SEMA.

standards are not always in line with GoN policies. Respective communications on harmonisation of these issues are being established.


ACF has no coordination role beyond its own programme, but is part of state coordination system (SEMA); however, with the INGO coordinator assigned to ACF CO, there is an obvious option for some coordination role in the INGO field, in particular in a situation where, due to the protracted crisis, the INGO and Humanitarian Aid actors are considerably increasing.

The formal instrument to assure coordination (including consultation) is the SEMA led “Coordination Working Group Meetings” in, which ACF (with other actors) was actively present. However, a closer consultation and sector-related coordination, beyond that overall coordination body, has been queried by a UNDP representative (a request addressed to all HA actors, not particularly to ACF). A clear definition of / distinction between partners and stakeholders is not existing; the term seems to be used as a synonym. While SEMA (in its supervision function) is clearly in control, and thus not in need of ownership promotion, LGA structures were decisive in relevant issues like beneficiary identification and supportive in implementation. Thus the process maintained and respected ownership required by LGA structures.

3.4 Coverage

- Most vulnerable members of target population were actually covered – however only within the limitations established by project funds (some 25.000 beneficiaries, of which some 75% IDPs and 25% host HH, as compared 125.000 IDPs (without affected host HH members)).
- The other restriction is the logistical concentration on 3 LGAs, assigned to ACF by SEMA, out of 13 LGAs considered “affected” by SEMA, and as against 17 LGAs in total:

Table 3: Coverage as per LGA



- In addition, there is the occasional pragmatic selection criterion “accessibility”, which allows for increased efficiency and is based, in the particular situation in the region, mostly on security considerations.

Beneficiary selection is perceived by GoN (SEMA) as the responsibility of LGA representatives, mostly CDOs, whereby criteria are set by SEMA – and in the best case agreed upon in SEMA coordination meetings.²³ Detailed beneficiary targeting procedures are elaborated by ACF, according to field standards own to the organisation, and complementing underlying general GoN / LGA policies. Potential source for conflict are humanitarian standards, if to be defended against tendencies of favouritism (community leaders, pressure groups etc.).²⁴

The addressed beneficiary unit for 2 project sectors (WASH, FSL) are households, where gender-disaggregation of data does not make sense; the number of girls and boys among the (statistically 5) children to a HH would not really be a suitable criterion. The case is different with the FSL cash aid and ongoing follow-up and advice: here individuals were chosen along a balanced gender quota, with the category “Widow” as a particular element of vulnerability.

²³ ACF is insisting that “Criteria were not set by SEMA but by ACF, then discussed with SEMA for the identification of most vulnerable and verified by ACF.” This perception is not shared by SEMA, and it is ACF and LGA staff that are jointly selecting beneficiaries.

²⁴ A number of cases whereby community leaders had tried to receive a kickback from beneficiaries for supporting their selection as beneficiaries; corrective action has been taken by LGA authorities, upon ACF intervention.

With the recently intensifying of Boko Haram attacks in the region, influx of IDP is ongoing, and the planned extension of the programme (OFDA II) is required resp. timely and necessary.

Also, in the view of SEMA, additional areas need to be covered such as

- shelter
- education
- return / Reintegration

(all of which are out of OFDA mandate, though)

3.5 Efficiency

Project Implementation Status (per sector):

Total Number of Beneficiaries Targeted:

- Total Number of People Targeted : 14,000
- Total Number of IDP Targeted as subset of above: 7,000 individuals²⁵
- Logistic support and Relief commodities: 2,000 HH (plus additional emergency needs triggered following cholera outbreak in Maiduguri = 1,000 HH)
- Economic Recovery and Market Systems: A total of 4,550 people individuals (650 Households x 7 members)
- Water, Sanitation & Hygiene: Sanitation infrastructure targeted 7,350 individuals & Water infrastructure targeted 5,000 individuals

3.5.1 Logistics Support and Relief Commodities (NFI)

Objective: Prevent disease outbreaks and help those displaced by conflict or disaster as well as members of overstretched host communities to carry out everyday requirements through the distribution of NFIs.

Table 4: Distribution pattern of the 2,000 NFIs per LGA (IDP / Host HH):

	Name of LGA	IDP HH beneficiaries	host HH beneficiaries	Total beneficiary HHs
1	Damaturu	707	219	926
2	Fune	442	122	564
3	Potiskum	393	117	510
	Total	1,542	458	2,000

An interesting feature here is the discrimination between IDP and host HH, in other sectors difficult to quantify (WASH), or not applicable.²⁶ The table shows that IDPs represent some

²⁵ The planned quota of IDP / host HH had been 50:50 %

²⁶ Since host HH did not suffer loss of their property and / or usual income, they are not considered FSL beneficiaries.

75% of beneficiaries. The impression of ACF staff on the quota IDP / Host HH vary between 80:20 (quite close) and 50:50. On the other hand, considering that 80% of project funds are spent on WASH infrastructure projects, which are community based and thus address IDP only as a minority, the overall balance between IDPs and host HH / communities is acceptable. Respective recommendations / standards as established by the Do no Harm-Approach thus are observed.

3.5.2 Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Objective: Increase access to water and sanitation through emergency WASH interventions to victims of complex emergencies (insurgency, natural disasters and waterborne/communicable diseases).

Table 5: Sites / locations / beneficiaries identified for the water supply infrastructures:

Total water points realized: 24

- MTI= Mobile Tanks Installed
- RB=Rehab of Boreholes
- THF= tap head fixed

Facility / Community	WaSH Water Supply Infrastructures Constructed Breakdown			
	MTI	RB	THF	total IDPs
Sanda Kyarimi	3	1	0	3,000
Women Teachers College	3	2	12	7,000
Arabic Teacher's college	3	0	0	8,000
Total	9	3	12	18,000

Table 6: Latrine Constructions

Name of health facility	LGA	Proposed sanitation facility
Murfakalam MCH –	Damaturu	New latrine construction
Shanga MCH	Fune	New latrine construction
Gubana MCH	Fune	New latrine construction
Baushe MCH	Fune	New latrine construction
Bula MCH	Potiskum	New latrine construction

As to technical quality in WASH infrastructure and equipment, some serious shortcomings are reported: collapsing latrines, some water points too low, overall management weak.²⁷

²⁷ Such information was provided on various levels: WASH TA at New York HQ (Skype interview 12.06.15); WASH field staff both in CO and FO.

The recent Programme Quality Assessment report (June 2015) provides the following details²⁸:

- *The waste water collection point, 4ft deep, was observed to be left uncovered in both Bula and Mazagane. In Bula, the community members reported that a woman had already fallen into the pit and broken her leg.*
- *At the 2 boreholes under construction in Mazagane and Bula, the taps were noted to be lower than the usual jerrycan which community members use for fetching water. This would likely lead to damaging of the tap heads as the jerrycan require to be forced under the taps. It is also important to note, that the borehole in Mazagane was abortive. However, the community members had given another site for the contractor to drill.*
- *Borehole rehabilitation and improvement of hand dug wells have not commenced yet, as there was delay in signing the SPO. The PR was raised by the field team on 28th March, while the SPO was signed by 3rd June and sent to the field team around 10th June. The delays are affecting the timely completion of the projects. It is also likely to affect the quality as a rush job might be done on these sites due to time constraints.*

On the other hand, innovative technology installed at borehole visited: solar pumps, anti-corrosion pipes). The favourable exchange rate USD/NGN has considerably increased available funds, so that additional interventions were made possible (1.000 HH in Borno State).

3.5.3 Economic and Market Recovery

Objective: Increase the affected population’s short-term purchasing power, protect and restore their livelihoods.

Table 7: Cash Distribution

LGA / location	Cash Distributed Breakdown			
	# of HH	Male headed	Female headed	Total individuals
Potiskum	151	100	51	1,573
Fune	101	68	33	680
Damaturu	398	236	162	3,231
Total	650	404	246	5,484

650 selected beneficiaries received cash in total of 39,000 NGN for their livelihood and asset restoration. As to the gender quota to be observed here, an interesting feature contained in the beneficiary selection list indicating the vulnerability “reason for selection” is not visible here: most female beneficiaries mentioned there are classified “Widows” – whereby it can be

²⁸ REPORT OF THE PQA FIELD VISIT FOR OFDA FUNDED EMERGENCY PROJECT IN YOBE STATE - May 31 – June 18, 2015 (draft), by Ifeanyi Maduanusi, PQA Technical Advisor. In an interview, the TA gave even more details of such shortcomings.

assumed that in the majority of these cases the husbands had been killed during the Boko Haram raids.

General

ACF staff at all levels have been found to assure cost-effectivity at all levels.

Given the short time of actual intervention (2 of 12 months, delays due to dynamic environment and security restriction to movements / presence in the field) the search for other approaches was not an issue. However, the example of using unspent funds (currency gains) for an additional emergency distribution in the neighbouring Borno State shows high flexibility in reaction to changed situations.

3.6 Effectiveness

All quantitative planned targets were achieved (and indeed considerable numbers beyond, in a reaction to a new emergency situation in Borno State) against set (quantitative) indicators. Main challenges were extended restricted access to project areas due to security situation. On the other hand, qualitative results / objectives had no adequate indicators, and thus were not captured by the M&E system. Results there remain poor, and if achieved, probably often not due to programme activities, but to own capacities of beneficiaries. Main challenges here were mobilisation / identification of suitable community / LGA structure to promote and support this aspect of programme implementation.

Host communities –through existing traditional and –to a limited extent- a rudimentary community development structure- have been formally involved in the programme from selection to distribution and monitoring. This however within the limitations of national / state legislation and procedures:

SEMA is decisive (as the central coordinator) from beneficiary selection to implementation.

IDPs had mostly not given access to participation in the programme implementation (neither targeting nor later), with exception of occasionally identified traditional leaders among IDPs (CRM committees). The fact that the original evaluation question does not address the IDPs as an own entity (besides the local communities) is another indicator that IDPs were not included in the programme's participation approach.²⁹

²⁹ Accordingly, the Lessons Learned workshop of March 2015 had stated that “Only host community leaders were involved and IDPs community leaders were not involved in all the process, which caused error of exclusion (e.g. discussion, selection)”.

The highly volatile situation leading populations to leave their homes and become IDPs also affected repeatedly the programmes activities. Security considerations and frequent incidents of armed attacks in the project areas caused considerable delays in the delivery of planned services and goods. In the circumstances, the programme team was able to implement all planned activities within a restricted space of time. This was due to a high degree flexibility allowing to react adequately to these limitations, and to overcome these objective obstacles.

Project management capacities / structures put in place by ACF itself are of high standard and reliability, with exception of the WASH infrastructure component, which only towards the end of the project phase can be considered up to the necessary technical and management standard.

As to NFI and cash aid for FSL, management capacities have been of good quality – the NFI distribution of an additional 1.000 HH in Borno State being an indicator for such effectiveness.

As to WASH related awareness building measures (sanitation and hygiene) as well as FSL small business training and follow up, training modules applied, and organisation of trainings are far from being suitable to contribute to achievement of expected results. Incidents of one-day courses for up to 100 participants (with an ex-palestra didactic) are certainly a rather doubtful means to pass on information, or to promote awareness.

Also, the follow-up system for micro-enterprises (by EW, CV and field assistants) is not adequate. Success depends more on the beneficiaries' existing capacities - and thus also on the right choice during the selection process by project staff and partners.

Beneficiaries (chosen from among the much bigger number of affected population, both IDPs and Host households) remained much object to project activities with no relevant access to participation; the instrument referred to as “Claims and response Management” (CRM), which had foreseen CRM committees, beneficiary reference groups etc. have not really become operational and was “put on halt” on the occasion of a lessons learned workshop³⁰. Thus, beneficiaries remain recipients of a set of externally designed / decided goods and services. On the other hand, with a population who was never exposed to (or spoiled by) HA related handouts and services, the overall perception of even modest project handouts (like the NFI kit) is very positive and appreciative.

³⁰ In the perception of an ACF field staff

3.7 Sustainability / Likelihood of Impact

The most visible unforeseen outcome has been the NFI support to IDP camps in neighbouring Borno State, at the request of the government, and made possible by additional availability of NGN funds due to favourable exchange rates. This additional effort was also due to the flexibility and availability of ACF staff to undertake this additional and highly relevant action.

WASH infrastructure has –in at least one case- considerably contributed to long lasting equipment with reduced maintenance cost (solar pumps, particular corrosion protected pipes etc.), which also may serve as an example for future GoN investment in this sector. The low quality of some other infrastructure works (latrines, wells) has been an issue of permanent concern.

Sanitation & Hygiene

The mostly one-day training events (WASH, small business) are not suitable for any sustainable impact (see above): awareness changes (in sanitation/health) need ongoing interventions beyond the perspective of an emergency project, and business development would require qualified follow-up over at least one year. The apparent assumption that this function can be assured by CVs trained for this task must be doubted, given the shortcomings of training modules, but also in view to the deplorable state in which the State Sanitation and Hygiene department (RUWASSA) in Damaturu (e.g. the project Partner in this sector) has been found.³¹

SEMA

There were some few activities of resilience capacity development with government; however, no further such interventions were requested or accepted by SEMA or other GoN / Yobe State stakeholders. Only the state department of sanitation and health, during an interview with the ACF field staff, has expressed the need for support – that need being obvious at the view of the deplorable condition of this institution.

There is no particular sustainability strategy suggested in project planning documents, which would go beyond the PCML/LFA inbuilt sustainability criterion.

An obvious option in HA project is the transition from HA to development (such as the EU LRRD concept). However, such a strategy has not been part of project design. In the particular

³¹ An interview with the staff in this office has drastically revealed the weakness of the institution (physical, equipment, motivation) – in spite of various institutional support from international agencies over the years which was reported: NoG / state spending in this sector appears to be non-existent.

situation of these IDPs, the long term (sustainability) option is obviously the return to, reintegration in and reconstruction of devastated communities of origin.

SEMA has indicated that this is an issue to be taken in consideration, and that contingency planning for return/RI would be an adequate sustainability strategy in the given situation.

A formal end of grant meeting (standard ACF procedure) is being prepared- In the light of the OFDA II perspective, an exit strategy is not required, at that stage. Also, the main partner/stakeholder SEMA is strongly counting on ACFs (and OFDAs) ongoing support, considering that the Boko Haram attacks are increasing the number of IDPs in Yobe state.

4. Conclusions

4.1 Lessons Learned

4.1.1 CRM policy / approach

- The ACF specific “Complaints and Response Mechanism”, with its focus on “Complaints” appears not adequate in the local cultural setting whereby complaints are a concept not widely accepted and applied.³² Instead, respective (indirect) indicators on incidents of implementation shortcomings should be developed and applied for monitoring.
- The issue of some bribe taking community leaders is a case in questions of this non-functioning CRM approach: the (few) cases are not reported in monitoring data, resp. in the CRM reports, in spite of an over-elaborated CRM policy. But: issues are perceived, and dealt with on district level, and respective leaders have been warned by LGA authorities – on the initiative of ACF field assistants.
- These (positive) interventions remain invisible to the M&E system.

4.1.2 Extension Workers / Community Volunteers

Random samples of the structured reports (ACF templates) both by extension workers and by community volunteers revealed low quality of both instruments. This is in sharp contrast to the highly ambitious training modules to which both groups have been exposed (4 pages of highly abstract elaborations on capturing, perceiving, categorising and responding to complaints; elaborate discussion on monitoring concepts and methodology). Apparently, the suggested pre-test suggested to trainers to “gauge the level of (participants) knowledge” has either not been done, or came to the wrong conclusions.³³

M&E data on quality / outcome of programme interventions are therefore based on rather doubtful, if not useless sources.

No certificates are issued to functional training attendants.³⁴

³² Also the “toll free line” facility established since remains based on the “complaints” approach, inviting beneficiaries to contact ACF directly, avoiding the defunct CRM structures.

³³ Interviews with EW and CV revealed a complete absence of understanding of underlying concepts as communicated in these trainings – or at least the competence in translating these concepts into actual practice (reporting, systematic communication with beneficiaries)

³⁴ Certificates are often perceived as an additional incentive; besides, they contribute to the corporate identity.

4.1.3 Monitoring

- Low quality of Field Assistants' FSL reports: no basic and relevant information collected on situation / sustainability of business (income per week / day, as well as other factors contributing to sustainability of FSL).
- No systematic reporting on observed (or observable) IDP movements in programme areas (spontaneous returns / arrivals; conflicts IDPs / host communities; other relevant information / observations).
- Requirements on Gender disaggregation of data appear overdone: in HH related data they are just a statistical figure without any signification, indicating the gender quota of children in a HH / in the IDP population, which is rather a demographic category, not relevant for project management.

4.1.4 Coordination

Need for more coordination among various actors – sector / area related (level below SEMA coordination meetings) – as suggested by UNDP field officer.

4.1.5 IDP Return and Reintegration

IDP return and reintegration policy and strategy, as well as possible contributions for implementation as requested by SEMA seems to be met with some reservation by ACF staff on all levels, obviously fearing that GoN actors might be tempted to impose pre-mature, or even forced return of IDPs.

4.1.6 Management

Organisation Development

During a debriefing with project management (CO, HQ), the issue of a possible amendment to the organisational structure of ACF in Nigeria had been raised, in particular in field level, and suggestions to that end invited.

There is –at least at upper management level- a need perceived for re-organisation both on national and on field level. Looking at the organigrams of the Country Office and Damaturu Field Office, it appears –at a first glance – that there is room for some adjustment, possibly also a more lean / flat management structure.

One particular challenge in the organisation of this type of operation seems to be the multitude of donors (eight at the time of this evaluation), whereby each donor is coming up with own objectives and monitoring, and in some cases with donor visibility requirements.

To the outside (GoN, state government, partners, beneficiaries) the operation is perceived as an ACF undertaking – whereby the acquisition of funds (from these various donors) is yet another management task / achievement of ACF.

In addition to the donor structure, the institutional environment in which ACF is placed is also of relevance: this refers to (implementing) partners, as well as to stakeholders, both national and international.

Organisational Development in general, and in particular amendments and changes affecting management staff require a great degree of consensus and acceptance. Experiences in OD show that there are actual or felt losers and winners of such institutional changes. Therefore, dysfunctional features like dissatisfaction, actual and “internal” resignations etc. should be avoided by an adequate change management strategy, to be incorporated into such an OD.

- Programme Sectors / Components

While the project design is suggesting 3 different sectors (NFI + WASH + FSL), related to respective specific objectives in the LFA, it is obvious that the “SH” part of WASH is directly linked to the NFI kit distribution and –use. The same applies to SH awareness activities (advocacy, training) implemented by the programme. While finance had actually incorporated both activities under the same account, management structures do not reflect a respective division of labour in the organisational set-up

- Human Resources

Fluctuation of national staff is a matter of concern: with the advent of a sizeable “HA Industry” –a new feature in Nigeria, as a consequence of the protracted Boko Haram crisis-, there is growing competition between INGOs, and probably also with IOs (UN, EU and others). Staff interviews have revealed that there is a relatively high loyalty among national staff from the project area (North-East), as against frequent resignations of staff from other regions due to problems in social integration and / or exposure to an unsecure and at times dangerous environment.

4.1.7 Operation

- The “Blue Camp” in Damaturu – 100 HH = 700 IDPs in one Compound (NFI recipients): so far no WASH action taken (VIP, well etc.), though obvious need there (inter-sector-coordination)
- Water testing in private wells found in NFI recipients compound (case: 3 IDP HH, 1 Host HH)

- Educational activities for children not attending school (with IDP women assigned / trained for the function)
- The IDP-School as a business for an IDP teacher: a highly interesting model (“best practice”), which remained unnoticed as one among many FSL activities

4.1.8 Public Relations

ACF is enjoying a remarkable positive reputation not only with the beneficiaries (who are modest in their expectations and grateful for any help received), but also with stakeholders at all levels, from the community over LGA administration up to state level (line ministries, SEMA), and also the Emir of Potiskum expressed a high esteem for ACF contributions for IDPs and support for community and state actors in this crises. It did not go unnoticed that ACF, at a time when most (if not all) other INGOs and IO had left the state in situations of high tension and danger, had maintained a visible presence (mostly through national staff).

4.2 Recommendations

Issue / priority (as applicable)	Short Term (for project including OFDA II) (referring to country office or field office)	Long Term (ACF Nigeria) (all referring to Country Office)
1. Resilience Capacity of National Actors (Extension Workers / Community Development Officers / Sanitation and Health Structures	Training modules to be adapted to level of comprehension of trainees: training methods / didactics and organisation should include more participative and interactive elements of training modules (Field Office) Instead of overloaded 1-day trainings (with no apparent follow-up), continuous quality control (and assistance for improvement) along submitted reports by CVs and EWs (Field Office) Amendments of report templates according to actual M&E requirements (EW, CV) (Field Office) Provide certificates to training attendants (Field Office)	Provide certificates to training attendants

		Capacity Building / Equipment supply to improve performance of Sanitation & Health structures (State, LGA)
2. Monitoring	<p>Field staff (ACF, but also Extension Workers and Community Volunteers) to be guided / enabled to collect small business relevant status information, to provide advice, or –in the absence of such competence- to refer problems identified to PM, so that if necessary such particular advice can be organised (additional function of the business trainers). (Field Office)</p> <p>Though overall movement statistics are produced by other actors (SEMA, IOM etc.), ACF field staff, as close observers to the field situation, should be encouraged to report on such movements (arrivals, spontaneous returns, “scouting” visits to abandoned premises and lands etc., which would be a useful complementary source of information on the overall situation (Country Office, Field Office)</p>	
3. CRM policy / approach		Review cultural applicability of the complaint-focused CRM approach (including toll-free line system), and possibly amend this instrument as a feasible qualitative monitoring tool
4. Operation	<p><u>WASH</u> Statements by project staff during the WS revealed that a more flexible approach as mentioned above would be beyond the mandate (social / community infrastructures only). However, the SO (prevention of water borne diseases) perfectly allows such interventions. Project staff should thus be more flexible, so as to serve suitable</p>	

	<p>beneficiaries households identified through NFI activities. (Country Office)</p> <p><u>Education</u> Teachers among IDPs to be encouraged to provide education to IDP children, thus contributing to education access for IDP children so far widely deprived of public schooling. Such a self-help approach by and for IDPs should serve as a model; message also to be spread in INGO coordination circles so that NGOs with a respective mandate (education) could take up the issue. In addition, this would be an innovative response to GoN (SEMA) request for support in this sector. (Country Office, Field Office)</p>	
5. Coordination	<p>Since ACF is hosting / incorporating the INGO coordinator (at Abuja), this seems to be an ideal constellation to promote / support INGO coordination also in the field (Country Office)</p>	
6. IDP Return and Reintegration		<p>ACF –preferably together with other INGOs and international organisations (UN High Commissioner for Refugees - UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration – IOM, International Committee of the Red Cross - ICRC) should develop an own IDP return and reintegration policy and strategy that should be incorporated in HA /relief projects Reference to the EU / ECHO LRRD approach, or similar approaches that cover the gap from emergency aid to development</p>
7. Management	.	<p><u>Organisation Development</u> It is suggested to plan a full-fledged organisational development process,</p>

		<p>preferably of a systemic and participatory approach, whereby both national and expat staff in Country Office and Field Office are to be involved. An Organisation Development consultant to be contracted for this exercise.</p> <p>The elaboration of the ToR for such an assignment –to be elaborated in a transparent and participatory manner, and in a suitable sequence, would be a first and important step in this forthcoming Organisation Development process</p> <p><u>Human Resources</u> Wherever possible, candidates hailing from the region (North-East) should be selected. This criterion should be prior to gender considerations.</p>
<p>8. Public Relations</p>		<p>ACF should systematically maintain and strengthen their public appearance by suitable events and activities, including social contacts (beyond the mere technical contacts) to relevant stakeholders in the communities, including the Emirs as traditional and spiritual leaders.</p>

Annexes

A. General

- A.1 ToR Nigeria
- A.2 MAPP Impact analysis – briefing paper
- A.3 MAPP Impact Profile – Version 2
- A.4 OECD DAC Ranking Table
- A.5 Good Practice
- A.6 Mission Journal
- A.7 Contacts
- A.8 Documents Consulted

WS. Workshop Documentation

- WS 1 Workshop on Preliminary Findings
- WS 2 Participants
- WS 3 Table Field Visits
- WS 4 Lessons Learned 21.07.15
- WS 5 MAPP Impact Profile – Version 1
- WS 6 Guide Groups WS
- WS 7 Group Results World Café