

# COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

Sri Lanka: An Evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011–2015)

## Evaluation Report

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
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# Fact Sheet: WFP's portfolio in Sri Lanka


Timeline and funding level of WFP portfolio in Sri Lanka 2011 - 2015




Source: APR 2015, Project Documents, SPRs 2011-2015 and Resource Situation (WFP The Factory) as of 23 Feb 2016 and PGG Combined Report of Contributions and Forecasts Statistics. Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) in US\$

## Top 5 donors:

Multilateral, USA, UN CERF, Canada, Japan



## % of actual beneficiaries by activity 2011-2015



## Distribution of WFP portfolio activities 2011-2015 by beneficiaries

	School feeding	MCHN	GFD	FFA	Cash and Vouchers
DEV 106070		X			
IR EMOP 200233			X		
PRRO 200143	X	X	X	X	X
EMOP 200239		X	X	X	
PRRO 200452	X	X	X	X	X
R-EMOP 200809			X		
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>52%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>8%</b>
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>3%</b>

Source: SPRs. Data not available for Trust Funds. SO 105390 was a non-food operation, so not included here. Note: FFA includes FFW and FFT activities.

## Executive Summary

### Evaluation features

1. This country portfolio evaluation covered all WFP operations in Sri Lanka during 2011–2015. It assessed WFP’s alignment and strategic positioning, the influencing factors and quality of strategic decision-making, and portfolio performance and results. Data and document review was supplemented by field work in July 2016 and interviews with more than 200 stakeholders. The evaluation was timed to assist the country office in its next round of strategic planning<sup>1</sup> and in designing an operation to succeed the current country programme (2016–2017). The evaluators were asked to pay special attention to application of the humanitarian principles and to the analysis underpinning the choice and assessment of cash-based transfers (CBTs).

### Context

2. Sri Lanka has a population of 21 million people,<sup>2</sup> of whom 75 percent are Sinhalese and 11 percent Sri Lankan Tamils.<sup>3</sup> A 26-year war between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ended in May 2009. The most evident humanitarian legacy of the war was the displacement and loss of livelihoods experienced in Northern and Eastern Provinces, which continue to lag behind the rest of the country economically.<sup>4</sup>

3. Sri Lanka is changing from a post-conflict to a developing economy. Gross domestic product per capita grew at 5.6 percent per year between 2002 and 2013.<sup>4</sup> Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income country on the threshold of upper-middle-income status. The country performs strongly in most health and education indicators as a result of the Government’s long-standing commitment to providing universal basic services and social protection. However, sustained economic growth has not alleviated regional disparities, which have widened since 2009. With 29 percent of the population, Western Province accounts for 44.4 percent of gross domestic product, while one quarter of Sri Lankans are considered “nearly poor”, living above the official poverty line of USD 1.50 per day but with less than USD 2.50 per day.<sup>6</sup> Food insecurity – chronic, seasonal and occasional – is widespread (Map 1) and Sri Lanka’s nutrition situation is unusual, with an exceptionally high wasting prevalence of 19.6 percent – well above the World Health Organization (WHO) “serious” threshold of 15 percent – contrasting with a relatively low prevalence of chronic malnutrition (stunting) at 13.1 percent. For reasons that are not well understood, these indicators have changed little over the past decade.<sup>5</sup>

4. After a peak following the 2004 tsunami, both humanitarian aid and other official development assistance to Sri Lanka declined throughout the evaluation period. Relations between the international community and the Government, which became more difficult in the latter years of the war, improved substantially after a new coalition government took office in 2015.

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<sup>1</sup> This is expected to take the form of a Country Strategic Plan (CSP).

<sup>2</sup> Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, 2014 projections from the 2012 census <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/VitalStatistics/MidYearPopulation/Mid-year%20population%20by%20district.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Statistics Department. 2014. *Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka*.

<sup>4</sup> World Bank. 2015. *Sri Lanka – Ending Poverty and Promoting Shared Prosperity: A Systematic Country Diagnostic*.

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and Government of Sri Lanka. 2012. *National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey*.



## WFP portfolio

5. Since 1968, a basic agreement between WFP and the Government has designated the Government as the primary implementer of all WFP operations, bearing all costs associated with in-country transportation and distribution of food commodities and sharing responsibility for project monitoring.<sup>6</sup> Letters of understanding for each operation reflect agreements between WFP and the Government on project design and beneficiary targeting.


6. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 2011–2015 portfolio; and Map 2 shows the location of WFP’s interventions. The portfolio comprised early relief and recovery activities in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces through two protracted relief and recovery operations (PRROs), a mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) development operation in the same provinces and elsewhere, and three emergency responses in flood- and drought-affected areas. Special operation 105390 to support logistics capacity was concluded in 2011. The total budget for these operations was USD 178 million, of which 66 percent was funded.<sup>7</sup> Three trust funds are currently supporting work on climate adaptation and nutrition. A country programme (2016–2017) is continuing several previous PRRO activities but with a wider geographical scope. Figure 1 shows that actual beneficiaries were close to the numbers planned for each operation, although actual tonnage was lower than planned in all cases.

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<sup>6</sup> *Basic Agreement between the Government of Ceylon and the United Nations Concerning Assistance from the World Food Programme*, Colombo, 10 November 1968.


<sup>7</sup> This figure excludes trust funds.

**Map 1: Sri Lanka food security, January 2014**




Source WFP and Government of Sri Lanka. 2014. Consolidated livelihood exercise for analysing resilience)

**Map 2: Typical distribution of WFP activities, 2011–2015**



Source: Country office vulnerability analysis and mapping exercise, 2016

**Figure 1: Context for WFP's Sri Lanka Portfolio**




DEV: development project  
 EMOP: emergency operation  
 GFD: general food distribution  
 IR-EMOP immediate response EMOP

LMIC: lower-middle income country  
 SO: special operation  
 TF: trust fund


7. Many current country office staff members were first employed during the war and the tsunami response in 2005, and their perspectives reflect experience during these events. Overall, the scale of WFP operations has been steadily shrinking, as illustrated in Figure 2 for staff, Figure 3 for funding and for general food distribution (GFD) in the central panel of Figure 1. Figure 3 shows the percentage of each operation that was funded.

**Figure 2: Number of WFP country office staff members, 2011–2016**



Source: Country Office data

**Figure 3: Percentage of portfolio funded, by year**




Source: Country office data. Excludes special operation 105390, immediate-response emergency operation 200233, development project 106070, the country programme and trust funds.

Direct contributions are from bilateral donors and the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund. Non-direct contributions include multilateral allocations, miscellaneous income, stock transfers and carry-overs from previous years or projects.

8. While funding levels have declined – especially of direct contributions from bilateral donors (Figure 1) – the Government has become an increasingly significant contributor to WFP activities.<sup>8</sup>

9. Thematically, the portfolio comprised humanitarian relief to support resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) through GFDs and food assistance for assets (FFA), and emergency relief for people affected by floods or drought; MCHN activities focused on treating moderate acute malnutrition (MAM);<sup>9</sup> and school feeding – WFP supported the school meals programme (SMP) in Northern Province while the Government took full responsibility for school feeding in the rest of the country. Figure 4 shows the percentages of planned and actual beneficiaries for each activity.

**Figure 4. Percentage of beneficiaries by activity 2011–2015**



Source: Standard Project Reports. Data are not available for trust funds. As special operation 105390 was a non-food operation, it is not included.

FFA includes food-for-work and food-for-training activities.

10. Geographically, most WFP activities were concentrated in Northern and Eastern Provinces, which were the most severely affected by the war, but other provinces were included in emergency relief and MCHN activities (Map 2). Government ministries and academic institutions undertook a broad range of capacity development and analytical work.

11. There was significant innovation in the use of CBTs, including a cash/voucher pilot to assist IDPs in Jaffna; the use of cash in emergency relief and FFA operations; and a short pilot project to provide schools with cash to purchase school meals locally. As illustrated in Figure 1, CBTs accounted for less than 5 percent of GFD.

<sup>8</sup> In addition to meeting the landside costs of programme implementation, the Government has donated more than 50,000 mt of rice since 2011 to support international responses and programmes in Sri Lanka. A shortage of complementary funding slowed the country office's progress in utilizing in-kind donations.

<sup>9</sup> A preventive element was dropped because of funding constraints.

## **WFP Strategy**

12. There was no formal country strategy in place during 2011–2015 despite continual attempts to formulate one. Two draft strategy documents were prepared for 2013–2017 and 2014–2017, but neither was formally approved by the regional bureau or Headquarters, although the 2014–2017 draft influenced the formulation of the current country programme.

## **Evaluation Findings**

### *Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning*

13. The evaluation found that WFP’s portfolio in Sri Lanka was relevant to humanitarian needs in the aftermath of the war, responding to emergencies and addressing enduring nutrition problems. The challenge was in adapting activities to remain relevant to the country’s changing circumstances amid waning donor resources. While WFP’s interventions in the conflict-affected provinces were relevant in supporting basic service restoration, the slow release of land in the high-security zone and the decline in donor support meant that WFP’s assistance to returnees was often inadequate.<sup>10</sup>

14. The 1968 basic agreement provided a strong basis for dialogue and operational alignment between WFP and the Government. The quality of collaboration and alignment with national policies was more mixed however, reflecting strained relationships between the Government and international agencies, which limited the space for policy dialogue for most of the review period; and restricted WFP’s ability to engage with non-governmental organizations. Opportunities for constructive dialogue increased from 2015, reflecting the incoming government’s approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation, and progress in the release of land in the high-security zone.

15. Inter-agency communications were generally perceived to be good, partly reflecting the well-established cluster system left over from the conflict. However, interviewees acknowledged that strategic coherence and operational integration between WFP and other United Nations agencies were weak. The two United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) in place during the evaluation period did not anchor WFP’s programming or facilitate a One UN approach. Competition and overlaps persisted, and One UN remained more of an aspiration than a reality.

16. Against the background of the United Nations’ reflections on its actions during the war,<sup>11</sup> the evaluation reviewed WFP’s application of the humanitarian principles.<sup>11</sup> It noted that a review of the work of a single agency in one country during peacetime cannot address the broad systemic failures highlighted in the United Nations post-war report. WFP’s peacetime dilemmas were less dramatic and the evaluation found that humanitarian principles were generally well reflected in WFP’s work. WFP’s programmes targeted vulnerable groups through impartial beneficiary selection, and its focus on displaced persons and returnees resulted in an important contribution to peacebuilding. However, WFP’s ability to fulfil the principle of humanity in seeking “to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found” has been constrained by declining funding.

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<sup>10</sup> Land taken over by the military.

<sup>11</sup> The four main humanitarian principles are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.

17. In principle, the basic agreement risks being an obstacle to WFP's operational independence, but it has been implemented with safeguards. The roles of WFP and the Government are stipulated in letters of understanding that incorporate principles of impartiality, while independent monitoring mitigates the risk of undue influence from the Government.

18. WFP's strategic positioning evolved with the changing context, moving from emergency programming towards a more strategic orientation. This was more the result of piecemeal adjustments than of a formal strategy: significant changes included the recent use of trust funds to support "upstream" work – analysis, advocacy and piloting – in nutrition and climate-resilience interventions.

19. Partly for the same contextual reasons, alignment among United Nations agencies and with government policies was limited during the period under review. The context for joint planning with the Government has improved since 2015, but United Nations agencies can all be expected to face similar constraints during the next UNDAF period, commencing in 2018, with financial resources continuing to diminish. Interview respondents were aware that the cost structures of their agencies will make it difficult for them to remain relevant and viable, unless they can achieve a more streamlined One UN presence.

#### *Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making*

20. The principal factors affecting WFP's strategic decision-making were the diminishing funds available to the country office, a shrinking staff base (Figures 2 and 3) and the difficult relationship with the Government for much of the period. The country office also had to keep pace with developments in WFP policies and organizational change. Despite the absence of a formal strategy document, the strategic choices implicit in the portfolio's evolution and implementation had positive features. The PRROs have been succeeded by a country programme, albeit more slowly than first envisaged. The "upstream" orientation of the portfolio is reflected in the trust fund activities linked to nutrition and climate change interventions. Project documents set the objectives of integrating nutrition programming into national systems and handing over responsibility for the SMP to the Government, although neither of these objectives has yet been achieved.

21. The evaluation found an appropriately pragmatic approach to decision-making in the choice of modalities. Although inconsistent with WFP's standard terminology of "food assistance for assets", "soft food for assets" – using food assistance to support relatively simple schemes – was a reasonable adaptation to resource constraints and the difficulty and delay in obtaining government approval for more elaborate FFA projects.<sup>12</sup> The cash pilot in the SMP was timed to avoid losing time-bound grant funding from Canada.

22. The country office undertook useful analytical work, including support to livelihoods mapping and cost-of-diet studies, although the collation – especially at the outcome level – and use of regular monitoring data were weak, partly because of constraints in staff capacity. The use of economic analysis throughout the portfolio was also weak, with an uncritical emphasis on maximizing beneficiary numbers and

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<sup>12</sup> The country context inhibited implementation of WFP's preferred approach to FFA; however, recent use of FFA to support climate adaptation has been consistent with WFP guidance.

insufficient analysis of the implications of thinly spread resources on effectiveness.<sup>13</sup>

23. The country office made consistent efforts to target the most vulnerable groups, despite the difficulties. For example, the PRRO extension for 2012 incorporated a move away from blanket GFD towards needs-based targeting;<sup>14</sup> the 2015 emergency operation used a community-based approach to beneficiary selection targeting women-headed households, elderly people and people living with disabilities; MCHN preventive activities were dropped to concentrate limited resources on MAM treatment; and WFP advocated – unsuccessfully – for the Government’s adoption of a more targeted approach to the use of *Thripasha*, a fortified blended food produced in Sri Lanka since the 1970s.<sup>15</sup>

24. The evaluation found commendable innovations in CBTs, which were increasingly linked to Sri Lanka’s social protection systems. For example, the Jaffna pilot for IDPs was a remarkably sophisticated intervention, with vouchers targeting households and individuals precisely, being adjusted regularly to take food price fluctuations into account, and allowing beneficiaries a much wider choice of locally available foods. However, WFP’s analytical tools for calculating alpha and omega values<sup>16</sup> to compare in-kind assistance with CBTs are seriously flawed, ignoring costs incurred by the Government and therefore overstating the competitiveness of in-kind assistance. When determining the best modality, there was also insufficient attention to post-distribution monitoring of CBT outcomes as opposed to hypothetical calculations prior to providing assistance. It is wrong to consider the nutrient value score as an outcome indicator.

#### *Portfolio Performance and Results*

25. At the output level, WFP succeeded in maintaining beneficiary numbers close to planned levels (Figure 1). However, tonnage shortfalls meant that beneficiaries received smaller amounts or were assisted for shorter periods than planned.

26. At the outcome level, shortfalls in necessary complementary support and WFP resources reduced the effectiveness of relief and recovery activities for IDPs, and often prevented the attainment of durable solutions.<sup>17</sup>

27. In school feeding, WFP’s SMP in Northern Province was effectively delivered; it fulfilled its safety net function and contributed to the post-war recovery of basic education. However, the lack of progress towards integration with the national SMP is a concern, and there is little justification for providing in-kind assistance using imported food, considering the cash-based SMP being implemented by the Government elsewhere in the country and the positive results of the SMP cash pilot. The intended hand-over was delayed by the absence of a national school feeding policy<sup>18</sup> and WFP’s concerns that switching to the Government’s modality would lower

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<sup>13</sup> The country programme launched in 2016 recognizes this weakness: “Targeted communities will receive assistance for the duration of country programme 200866 to maximize its benefits. This approach differs from previous food-for-work activities characterized by short-term assistance over a wide area.”

<sup>14</sup> PRRO 200143, budget revision 1.

<sup>15</sup> This reflected a wider concern about the Government’s blanket approach to safety nets as opposed to a more targeted system. *Thripasha* has suffered from production constraints, linked to reliance on local inputs and technical problems at the factory. As a result, although it has become familiar and popular, it has been distributed in portions that are too small to be effective for undernourished mothers and infants.

<sup>16</sup> The alpha value compares the costs of foods delivered by WFP with the market prices of the same foods purchased locally. The omega value compares the cost-effectiveness of an in-kind food basket with a CBT alternative.

<sup>17</sup> The general insufficiency of support to IDPs was evident at all sites visited by the evaluation team.

<sup>18</sup> There are recent signs of progress in developing such a policy using the Systems Approach to Better Education Results (SABER) advocated in WFP’s 2013 Revised School Feeding Policy.



nutritional standards.

28. Nutrition activities were adequately aligned with national systems, but efforts to address MAM and prevent low birthweight through supplementary feeding were not effective, and national indicators remained poor. This was partly because of difficulties in delivering WFP assistance at the intended scale, but mainly because of chronic bottlenecks in *Thripasha* production and the lack of an effectively targeted approach to the distribution of supplementary foods. The “upstream” focus of the trust funds and advocacy for a more targeted approach to supplementary feeding were appropriate, given WFP’s limited resources.

29. Underfunding was a serious constraint to programme efficiency. Maintaining beneficiary numbers while reducing per capita support is a natural short-term response to resource shortfalls, but almost certainly limits efficiency – results per unit of input – as well as effectiveness.

30. Despite the attention paid to gender considerations in planning and monitoring, Sri Lanka was not exempt from the characteristic weaknesses identified in the 2013 evaluation of WFP’s Gender Policy. There are signs that the 2015 Gender Policy is beginning to raise the quality of gender analysis, for example, by including gender marker codes in all project documents.

## **Overall Assessment**

31. This marked a difficult period for the country office, which needed to adjust to a new peacetime context and to Sri Lanka’s ascent to middle-income status. The adjustment was not easy in a context of declining resources and, until 2015, strained relations between the Government and its development partners. Despite awareness of the need for strategic reorientation, most of the country office’s strategic planning efforts were unsuccessful, and the portfolio remained more a collection of inherited activities and continuing obligations than a coherent expression of an explicit, proactive strategy. However, in all of its main focus areas, including humanitarian relief, nutrition, school feeding and related analytical work, WFP had a relevant mandate and distinctive expertise, and achieved significant results. It was appropriate to focus on the districts that were hardest hit by the war while responding to emergencies elsewhere. The most obvious shortcomings in performance were in areas where success was not dependent solely on WFP.

32. Although the principal components of the portfolio were all relevant, its effectiveness was more mixed. Funding constraints meant that resources for support to IDPs were spread too thinly, and this, together with shortfalls from agencies supporting other aspects of IDPs’ re-establishment, undermined the possibility of achieving durable solutions. School feeding was effectively delivered in Northern Province, serving as a useful element of social protection in the districts most affected by the war and contributing to restoration of the education system. The combined efforts of WFP and the Government to address MAM and low birthweight through supplementary feeding were not effective, partly because of difficulties in delivering WFP assistance at the intended scale, but mainly because of shortcomings in the national strategy for supplementary feeding.

33. The most serious impediment to efficiency was chronic underfunding. While the portfolio was strongly oriented towards institutional sustainability – as reflected in close cooperation with government agencies, including on capacity development

and technical support for national policy-making – there was little progress on the hand-over strategies envisaged in WFP’s project documents. There is a continuing risk that the process of resettling IDPs and returnees will fall short of international standards, notably the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,<sup>19</sup> and will fail to ensure sustainable livelihoods for the resettled people; this could have negative implications for the reconciliation process.

34. There were significant internal synergies across the portfolio, linked to its geographical focus, common analytical work and the need to adapt GFD and FFA approaches to different contexts, including assistance to IDPs, emergency relief and climate change interventions. The pursuit of external synergies was less successful, as evidenced by the collective failure of the Government and its humanitarian partners to provide sufficient support to IDPs. The potential for synergies between WFP and the Government on MCHN was not realized. In addition, WFP’s SMP in Northern Province has persisted as a distinct programme using a different modality from the national school feeding programme. There are encouraging signs that the review mechanisms associated with WFP’s new Gender Policy are raising the quality of gender analysis.

35. The design and implementation of WFP’s operations were consistent with the humanitarian principles. However, the challenge of preventing and alleviating human suffering needs to be understood in context. Direct interventions are less feasible – and arguably less appropriate – in a middle-income country. WFP will increasingly need to adopt an “upstream” focus – helping to establish systems to ensure that human needs are not overlooked in middle-income countries.

36. As noted in the findings on strategic positioning, the evaluation found positive features in the evolution of the portfolio, but the challenge – as reflected in hand-over strategies that were not carried out – is for WFP to move further “upstream”, with more focus on technical support and capacity development and less direct support to service delivery. WFP’s adoption of the country strategic planning process is timely for Sri Lanka: it coincides with preparation of the successors to the UNDAF – the United Nations Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF) (2018–2022) – and to WFP’s current country programme, the CSP. The country office has already initiated preparation of the CSP, commissioning a gender analysis and commencing a country strategic review.

37. Since 2015, there has been closer alignment between WFP and the Government’s objectives, which is a positive sign for the next phase of WFP’s engagement in Sri Lanka. The Government needs to be a full partner in the strategic planning exercise, because WFP’s future role will depend on effective government demand for “upstream” services from WFP. The evaluation determined that these services are likely to include technical support to the formulation of nutrition policy, including on the role of specialized foods; technical support to school feeding; and continued support to nutrition and food security assessments, including emergency assessments and emergency preparedness linked to analysis of the implications of climate change.

38. The evaluation makes six recommendations, most of which need to be

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<sup>19</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2004. *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, second edition.

implemented in collaboration with the Government or other international agencies.

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
1.	Country Strategic Plan	<p>The country strategic planning process is very timely for Sri Lanka: it coincides with preparation of the UNSDF (2018–2022) and the successor to WFP’s current country programme, while the political context in Sri Lanka is more favourable than it has been for many years.</p> <p>The Government needs to be a full and active partner in the exercise, because future demand for WFP’s services will depend mainly on the Government.</p> <p>On the basis of this evaluation, these services are likely to include technical support to nutrition policy formulation, including on the role of specialized foods (Recommendation 4); technical support to school feeding (Recommendation 5); and continued support to nutrition and food security assessments, including emergency assessments and emergency preparedness linked to analysis of the implications of climate change.</p>	<p>Adopt a zero-based approach towards considering what long-term role, if any, WFP should have in Sri Lanka. WFP needs to:</p> <p>a) engage the Government as a full partner and jointly identify areas where WFP can maximize value in the next few years; and</p> <p>b) develop time-bound exit strategies when WFP’s engagement cannot be indefinitely justified, such as the SMP in Northern Province.</p>	<p>This recommendation should be incorporated into preparation of the CSP during 2016 and 2017.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters</p> <p>The Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs will coordinate the government agencies that engage with WFP</p>

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
2.	Joint adaptation of United Nations agencies to the new aid landscape in Sri Lanka	<p>UNDAFs have not succeeded in changing the way in which United Nations agencies work. WFP's CSP needs to be based on consideration of the roles of WFP and other United Nations agencies in WFP's areas of engagement. Other United Nations agencies face similar challenges in strategic planning. The UNSDF exercise offers a unique opportunity for United Nations agencies, in consultation with the Government, to rationalize and streamline their operations in Sri Lanka.</p> <p>Country-level coordination of support to food security and nutrition is of particular concern for WFP.</p>	WFP should advocate for preparation of the UNSDF to include a radical and costed review of the roles of all major United Nations agencies working in Sri Lanka.	Roles should be reflected in the UNSDF process during 2017, with equal engagement of the Government and United Nations agencies active in Sri Lanka.	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, reflecting Headquarters- and regional-level agreements on coordination among United Nations agencies involved in nutrition and food security
3.	Addressing the needs of IDPs	WFP alone cannot resolve all the resettlement challenges faced by IDPs; the situation deserves the urgent attention of the Government, United Nations agencies and other development partners.	WFP should work with other United Nations agencies, international humanitarian agencies and the Government to develop a comprehensive and adequately resourced plan for completing the resettlement of IDPs and returning refugees.	Relevant commitments should be incorporated into the forthcoming UNSDF (Recommendation 2); however the issue is too urgent to be deferred until then.	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters in strongly urging joint action by United Nations agencies and the Government

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
4.	Future engagement in nutrition	WFP's significant comparative advantages in, for example, food fortification and specialized foods are highly relevant in middle-income countries and should guide its future "upstream" support to improving nutrition in Sri Lanka.	WFP should maintain in-country nutrition expertise and continue to support and facilitate multi-sector approaches. It should continue to advocate for targeted approaches to supplementary feeding and offer its technical expertise – linked to rigorous economic analysis – on nutritious foods. Coherent support to a national nutrition strategy should be one of the themes of the UNSDF.	During 2017, the country office should work with the Government and United Nations partners to position the nutrition strategy at the centre of the UNSDF and to reflect WFP's important role in the CSP.	WFP, in coordination with other United Nations agencies working in nutrition and food security

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
5.	Managed hand-over of the SMP	The current situation, with a different and more generous SMP operating in Northern Province than elsewhere, is unsustainable. WFP has been understandably reluctant to step aside without assurance that a successor programme will comply with its standards for school feeding, but this concern cannot be allowed to be a decisive consideration. The two school feeding initiatives are bound to converge: WFP can urge but cannot insist that SMPs throughout the country be brought up to the standards in Northern Province. Because school feeding needs to be embedded in Sri Lanka's social protection system, it is important to bring the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education to the centre of these discussions. As there will inevitably be convergence towards a cash-based system, the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs will need to be involved in overseeing phase-out of the ongoing logistics exercise.	WFP and the Government should jointly develop a time-bound strategy for hand-over of the Northern Province SMP to the Government.	An agreed, time-bound strategy for hand-over should be reflected in the CSP.	Country office, with the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Education

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
6.	Strengthening WFP's economic analysis	Review of decision-making on CBTs in Sri Lanka has exposed basic flaws in WFP's analysis of modality choices. Ignoring the costs incurred by the Government introduces an unjustified bias in decision-making. It is wrong to consider the nutrient value score as an outcome indicator and, more seriously, there must be less emphasis on hypothetical comparison of modalities prior to operations and more attention to gathering and using performance data during implementation. Such data are crucial in convincing WFP's donors of the effectiveness of its work and will result in more robust information into future ex ante assessments. Although the collection and analysis of CBT performance data, including gender analysis, should take place at the country office level, it also requires sufficient prioritization and resourcing by Headquarters and regional bureaux.	WFP should strengthen its guidance on the choice and design of modalities – cash, vouchers and in-kind. Cost analyses should include all costs and focus less exclusively on the costs incurred by WFP. It is even more important that WFP improves the quality and use of the performance data it collects during the implementation of CBT programmes.	WFP should review guidelines on CBT analysis and monitoring as part of the roll-out of its new Strategic Plan.	Guidance and support from Headquarters and regional bureaux; data collection and analysis by country offices



## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Evaluation Features

#### Rationale

1. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPEs) address the full set of WFP activities in a particular country during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to guide future strategic and operational decision-making. CPEs address three key evaluation questions, as follows:

Question 1: *Alignment and Strategic Positioning of WFP's Country Strategy & Portfolio*

Question 2: *Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision Making*

Question 3: *Performance and Results of the WFP Portfolio.*

2. Sri Lanka was selected for an independent evaluation managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) as part of its ongoing series of CPEs, which seeks to provide systematic coverage of WFP's country presence. There have been no previous evaluations of WFP's full portfolio of activities in Sri Lanka, and this CPE was seen as an opportunity for the Country Office (CO) to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2011–2015 portfolio and to generate corporate lesson-learning around WFP's adaptation to Sri Lanka's transition from recovery to development. The evaluation will inform the next round of CO strategic planning and the design of the operation that will succeed the present Country Programme (2016–2017).

#### Intended users

3. The principal intended users of the evaluation are the WFP CO, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), WFP Regional Bureau and senior management, UN country team, NGOs, donors and the WFP Executive Board.

#### Objectives and Approach

4. As per the Terms of Reference (TOR), reproduced in full at o, the evaluation addresses the dual objectives of accountability and learning, with the accent upon learning. As such, the evaluation is required to:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate, CO strategic positioning and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Sri Lanka; and
- determine the reasons for observed success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Sri Lanka, forming strategic partnerships, and improving operations' design and implementation.

5. The evaluation was undertaken by an independent team. Their work involved inception visits to Rome and Colombo in May 2016 feeding into the Inception Report (Lister et al., 2016) which was approved in June. The main visit to Sri Lanka took place over three weeks in July 2016: it incorporated a week of visits to the districts and sites where WFP has been active and included introductory and closing sessions with the CO and with other principal stakeholders.

6. A full methodology for the evaluation was set out in the Inception Report (Lister et al., 2016) and is summarised in Annex B, while the evaluation matrix is reproduced as Annex C. The evaluation process is fully described in Annex D, and interviewees are listed in Annex E. An extensive bibliography is provided at Annex R.

7. The team were supported in their reporting by two quality assurance experts who reviewed all draft deliverables, providing particular insights on the subjects of cost analysis and the humanitarian principles. The main limitations experienced (see Annex B, ¶13ff) were: the scarcity of good quality data, particularly on costs and on outcomes; a bias towards the present (many potential informants from the early years having moved on); and the lack of an explicit strategy against which to evaluate the portfolio. These limitations were managed by seeking a wide range of interviews, particularly with agency staff with institutional memory of the latter years of the war, by seeking to understand the implicit strategy implied in WFP's programming documents (see the discussion in Annex J), and by triangulation across information sources. See Annex O for discussion of data limitations with reference to the cost analysis.

8. This report has benefited from comments on earlier drafts by WFP stakeholders and discussion of its conclusions and recommendations at a learning workshop in Colombo on 6 October 2016.

## **1.2 Country Context<sup>20</sup>**

9. This section provides an overview of significant economic and social factors that have affected the Sri Lanka country portfolio and which are relevant to the evaluation. A chronological overview of developments relevant to the portfolio is presented in Annex F, and Annex G provides key contextual data.

### **Population and political framework**

#### *Population and ethnicity*

10. The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka is an island nation that achieved independence from the British Empire in 1948.<sup>21</sup> Since independence, Sri Lankan politics have been heavily influenced by ethnic and linguistic tensions between the, mainly Buddhist, Sinhalese majority and the, mainly Hindu, Tamil minority group.

11. As of 2015, the total population of Sri Lanka was estimated at almost 21 million.<sup>22</sup> The ethnic composition of the population is 75 percent Sinhalese, 11 percent Sri Lankan Tamil, 9 percent Sri Lankan Moor, 4 percent Indian Tamil as well as small proportions of Burghers, Malays and other minorities (CBSL, 2014). The civil war which ended in 2009 had ethnic roots going back to the period of British colonial rule. Sri Lanka's Tamil population is broadly made up of those present in the Northern districts since the 2<sup>nd</sup> century BCE, and Indian Tamils – those brought to Sri Lanka by the British in the 19<sup>th</sup> century to work on the tea estates. Independence gave way to Sinhalese perceptions of a disproportionate Tamil share of power and representation in civil administration, and subsequent legislation, such as the Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948) and the Sinhala Only Act (1956), contributed to the eventual outbreak of war in

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<sup>20</sup> EQ1 (What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in Sri Lanka?) is addressed in this chapter.

<sup>21</sup> Under a revised constitution in 1972, the country's official name was changed from Ceylon to Sri Lanka.

<sup>22</sup> Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, projections from 2012 census (see <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/VitalStatistics/MidYearPopulation/Mid-year%20population%20by%20district.pdf>)

1983, led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who fought to create an independent Tamil state in the north and east of the island.

12. There have also been somewhat lesser tensions involving the Moslem population, including riots in 2014 that left 8 people dead and over 80 injured (Colombage, 2014). Within the Sinhala community itself there have been serious upheavals reflecting social and economic disaffection, such as the JVP (*Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna*) upheavals of 1971 (estimated 5,000 to 15,000 dead) and 1987–89 (estimated 40,000 to 70,000 deaths). This may point to wider and deeper underlying issues concerning the need to build and sustain a country that is socio-economically prosperous, communally harmonious and environmentally viable (Bennett, 2013).

### *Political framework*

13. Sri Lanka follows a presidential system of government, where the President is the Head of State and Head of Government. The majority of the evaluation period fell under the presidency of Mahinda Rajapaksa who came to power in 2005 and presided over the defeat of the LTTE. Rajapaksa was defeated in local and national elections in 2015. The current President is Maithripala Sirisena, the former Minister of Health, who leads a coalition between the former ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party.

14. There are three tiers of political governance in Sri Lanka – national, provincial and local, but in practice power remains highly centralised. Though decentralisation through the provincial administration is in place, and devolution of power to minorities is nominally enshrined in the 13<sup>th</sup> Amendment,<sup>23</sup> much of the political, administrative, planning and implementation authority rests with the central government, and is exercised through the centrally managed structure of District Secretariats and Divisional Secretariats (Aliff, 2015).<sup>24</sup>

15. Changes in administration often result in ministry name changes and reallocation of portfolios, but generally over the review period the key counterpart ministries for WFP have included the Ministry for National Planning and Economic Affairs (MNPEA) and the ministries of Health, Education, Resettlement, and Disaster Management.

## **The civil war and its aftermath**

### *The end of the war*

16. 26 years of civil conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE ended in May 2009. The final years of the war saw an escalation of violence and displacement of people. This intensified after the breakdown of a cease fire brokered by Norway in 2002, and after the election of Rajapaksa in 2005 there was a return to full-scale war. During 2007 to 2009, a major humanitarian crisis unfolded in the north

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<sup>23</sup> This amendment, passed in 1987, also made Sinhalese and Tamil the official languages.

<sup>24</sup> In practice, these central government structures overshadow the elected local governments:

*The failure of the provincial council system may be attributed to the fact the government never intended to devolve power in an effective manner, which is illustrated by article 2 of the Constitution which states that Sri Lanka is a unitary state (Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978) with the executive and legislative power vested in the centre, i.e. only the centre is considered sovereign. Furthermore, article 2 is an entrenched provision, which can be amended only by a two-thirds majority and referendum. The fact that the government enacted the Provincial Councils Act without amending the unitary state provision in the Constitution is proof that effective devolution was never intended. (Aliff, 2015, p70)*

of the country as the LTTE suffered significant defeats with thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone and subject to human rights abuses on both sides of the conflict. The stages of the civil war are further described in the chronology in Annex F and the areas of conflict and displacement at the end of the war are illustrated in Annex Q (Map 3).

#### *Continuing humanitarian needs and other consequences*

17. While the long civil war has ended, its after-effects are still being felt. The most evident humanitarian legacy is that of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees who face serious resettlement challenges; 80 percent of them are women and children (UNFPA, 2015). Recovery of High Security Zone (HSZ) land is yet to be completed and in Jaffna at the start of 2015 there were over 5,000 acres in HSZ and 11,200 families<sup>25</sup> still in a state of displacement, living either in welfare centres or with host families (UN, 2016). There are also about 100,000 displaced people living as refugees in Tamil Nadu, India.<sup>26</sup>

18. The psychological and psychosocial fallout from 26 years of war is also yet to be comprehensively addressed or fully understood in the North and East, which continues to lag economically. Heavy investment in infrastructure rehabilitation and the proliferation of financial institutions and retail organisations have not resulted in equitable growth, and indebtedness is a common problem. The reasons behind the slow socio-economic growth of the war-affected areas are complex and manifold, but it is clear that community restoration is not fully taking place and reconciliation therefore may be compromised (SDC, 2016, IRDG, n.d.).

#### *Post-war reflections and relationships*

19. The defeat of the LTTE was paraded by the then government as an ultra-nationalistic victory. For the UN it was a time of sombre reflection, and issues arising from their performance and relationship with the GoSL have continued to reverberate. A post-war inquest instituted by the Secretary-General produced a highly critical report concerning the UN's role during the conflict. It reported a systemic failure by the UN organisation to uphold humanitarian law and its mandate of protection, in part by under-reporting state crimes in order to avoid confrontation and gain greater physical access (UNSG, 2012). For the UN, a direct result of the Sri Lanka experience was the *Human Rights Up Front* initiative (OCHA, 2015), and in 2014 the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution which mandated an independent international investigation into alleged war crimes in Sri Lanka (OHCHR, 2015). See Annex L for a full evaluation of the application of the humanitarian principles in the (post-war) evaluation period.

20. The relationship between the state and the aid community fluctuated during the war, but in the years leading up to its climax the working environment became increasingly antagonistic. There was minimal improvement in the relationship after the war ended, with growing state suspicion and mistrust towards the NGO sector in particular as international advocacy groups spoke out about human rights issues (AsDB, 2013). The situation was particularly restrictive for international NGOs, many

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<sup>25</sup> The data for this figure were collected in 2003/04 so it does not therefore take account of 'new families' (i.e. children that have now become adults), and families that may not have registered at the time. However these figures were further verified in interviews.

<sup>26</sup> Estimate by Ministry of Resettlement in July 2016, comprising about 65,000 living in camps and 35,000 living with families in Tamil Nadu.

of whom were thrown out, while the government's NGO Secretariat was located in the Ministry of Defence. All UN project proposals had to be approved by a Presidential Task Force (PTF), essentially a political body which was often a cause of delays. Government preferred to deal separately with international aid agencies, and there was no official development forum for the GoSL to engage with the aid community as a whole.

21. Sirisena's unexpected election in early 2015 marked a move away from the perceived encroaching authoritarianism of Rajapaksa's later years. In particular, there was a significant opening up of dialogue between the government and the international community. Under the new administration, there has been a major shift in outlook, with a concerted effort to acknowledge and engage pragmatically with previously sidelined issues, such as resettlement and the restoration of HSZ land, which has resulted in a better operational climate for the UN and NGOs. However obstacles remain, not least due to the fragility of the political coalition, the turnover of government personnel and the reorganisation of government ministries, along with the economic challenges facing Sri Lanka as it uneasily grows into its middle-income country (MIC) status.

#### *Evolving government policies and priorities*

22. Key national policies for the evaluation period were articulated in "Mahinda Chintana: Vision for the Future" (GoSL, n.d. – 2010?) which served as Sri Lanka's overall development strategy, though no longer used by the post-Rajapaksa government. Other supporting policies and strategies included the National Nutrition Policy (GoSL, 2010a), the National Resettlement Policy (GoSL, 2013b) and National Policy for Disaster Management (GoSL, 2013a), among others. The present status of various policy documents is uncertain, following the change of government in 2015. However, just outside the review period a new Public Investment Plan has been drafted (MNPEA, 2016) and a National Development Plan for 2016–2020 was in preparation. A Sustainable Development Act, intended to embed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in national policy, was also in the process of parliamentary approval during the evaluation team's visit.

23. Sri Lanka's political and fiscal power is still highly centralised (see ¶14 above), which is regarded as a constraint on the reconciliation process (interviewees, IRDG, n.d.).

### **A changing framework for aid**

#### *Economy and Poverty Trends<sup>27</sup>*

24. Sri Lanka is in transition from a post-conflict economy, and the country's relative peace and economic growth have had an impact on donor perceptions and the availability of aid. Sri Lanka is currently classified as a lower-middle income country,<sup>28</sup> and ranked 73 out of 188 in the 2015 UNDP human development index (HDI); therefore in the "high human development category". The country experienced sustained, pro-poor economic growth between 2002 and 2013 with GDP per capita growing at 5.6 percent a year (World Bank, 2016). The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) forecast that the economy will grow by 6 percent in 2016, and by an average of 6.2 percent a year in 2017–20 (EIU, 2016).

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<sup>27</sup> Background data are presented in Annex G, Table 16.

<sup>28</sup> But is close to the threshold for upper middle income status.

25. However, problems of equitable growth persist and regional disparities are highly pronounced. Out of nine provinces in the country, Western Province (29 percent of the population) accounts for 44.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Poverty is most marked in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces, while elsewhere, pockets of severe poverty are most pronounced in the Central, Uva, and Sabaragamuwa Provinces. In all cases low-income households are severely constrained in the ability to access basic public services. Between 2009 and 2013, inequality increased sharply and Sri Lanka's impressive HDI decreases by 11.6 percent in value when it is discounted for inequality (UNDP, 2015b).<sup>29</sup> A World Bank study notes that "Despite the low levels of extreme poverty, roughly one quarter of Sri Lankans are nearly poor, as defined by living above the official poverty line (equivalent to about \$1.50 per day in 2005 PPP<sup>30</sup> terms) but below \$2.50 per day in 2005 PPP terms" (World Bank, 2015).

### *Social protection*

26. Sri Lanka's human development record has been historically good due to the government's long-standing approach to universal social protection and services, including the provision of free education (from primary to university level) and health services since 1948. As a result, Sri Lanka's social indicators are some of the best in South Asia, with near universal literacy. Of particular relevance to the portfolio is the government social safety net system which provides cash assistance to vulnerable households through the Samurdhi Bank network, and the national government school feeding programme. There is also an impressive primary healthcare structure, well-established down to the grass roots level through community public health midwives.

### *International assistance*

27. After a peak linked to the 2004 tsunami, both humanitarian aid and other official development assistance (ODA) to Sri Lanka have steadily declined (Figure 10 in Annex G). Total ODA is below 1 percent of Gross National Income (GNI). Japan is by far the largest donor, followed by the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Korea, the USA and the European Union (Figure 11 in Annex G). As Sri Lanka's economy grows, aid is likely to become even less significant.

28. External development assistance in the form of loans is of increasing importance to the GoSL, with a particular focus on infrastructure. In 2014 over half of total foreign financing came as loans from China and over 60 percent of sector-wise commitments were on transport infrastructure (GoSL, 2014a) – see illustrative figures for 2014 in Annex G, Figure 12.

## **Livelihoods**

29. Despite high population density in urban areas, over 80 percent of Sri Lanka's population is considered rural and nearly 40 percent of the workforce is employed in agriculture (UNDP, 2015b). Sri Lanka's distinct topographic and climatic characteristics create a mosaic of agro-ecological areas that inform livelihood patterns. The majority of agricultural workers operate at subsistence level and are engaged in paddy farming, coconut and grain cultivation, with tea and rubber produced in the

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<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, Sri Lanka remains less unequal than its neighbours: by the same metric, Pakistan and India show losses due to inequality of 29.9 percent and 28.6 percent respectively (UNDP, 2015b).

<sup>30</sup> Purchasing power parity.

mid- and up-country estate areas (WFP & GoSL, 2014). Since 2002 the growth of Sri Lanka's industrial economy has outpaced agriculture and services (World Bank, 2016).

### **Food Security and Nutrition<sup>31</sup>**

#### *Food security*

30. Food insecurity – chronic, seasonal and occasional – is widespread. Overall 4.7 million people, 22 percent of the total population, are reported as undernourished (FAO, 2015a). WFP's most recent Cost of Diet analysis (WFP, 2014n), found that almost 6.8 million people, one third of the population, cannot afford a nutritious diet; dietary diversity is also poor (WFP, 2015f).

31. Regionally, chronic food insecurity persists amongst poor households in the up-country tea estate and south-eastern rain-fed paddy farming and other field crop zones. This is partly due to a reliance on wage labour with low wages, limited household production of food and poor physical and financial access to food from markets. Seasonal food insecurity is highest in the northern zones and some areas in the southern region. In the north, limited water supply for irrigation between May and September, often due to the destruction or damage of tanks during the conflict, restricts year-round agricultural production. As households work to rebuild livelihoods, taking on loans is common and many become burdened by indebtedness.

#### *Nutrition*

32. Sri Lanka's nutrition situation is highly unusual with exceptionally high wasting prevalence at 19.6 percent, well above the WHO threshold (serious level >15 percent),<sup>32</sup> contrasted with a low prevalence of chronic malnutrition (stunting) at 13.1 percent, which has shown little change over the past decade (UNICEF & GoSL, 2012). The 2009 Nutrition and Food Security Assessment by the Medical Research Institute found that 21.6 percent of children under 5 were underweight, 19.2 percent were stunted, and 11.7 percent wasted, with anaemia at 22 percent among lactating mothers (MRI, 2010). Micronutrient deficiencies also remain pervasive, affecting 26 percent of women of reproductive age and 15 percent of children aged 6–59 months (UNICEF & GoSL, 2012).

33. Low birth weight in Sri Lanka affects nearly one in five infants and has been closely associated with heavy labour demands in agriculture and poor nutrition and high prevalence of anaemia, particularly among women who work in the plantation sector (Jayawardena, 2014). In a World Bank analysis, household food insecurity, limited access to safe water and sanitation, and poor maternal and child care practices were found to underlie the high levels of undernutrition in Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2007). As illustrated in Figure 13 (in Annex G), and despite the generally favourable economic and social indicators discussed earlier, the past 15 years have seen little progress in reducing undernutrition for children under five.

34. A National Nutrition Policy was formulated in 2010 (GoSL, 2010a) and nutrition was also one of the key priorities of the government's "Mahinda Chintana" development plan (GoSL, n.d.). In 2012 Sri Lanka joined the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement with a commitment from the President's Office. At the time, Sri

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<sup>31</sup> The Sri Lanka Food Security Atlas (WFP, 2015f) is an important source for this section; in turn the Atlas drew directly on the 2012 nutrition survey (UNICEF & GoSL, 2012). The World Bank's earlier analysis (World Bank, 2007) remains relevant.

<sup>32</sup> And close to the maximum recorded (22.7 percent) for any country in the 2015 Global Health Indicators (WHO, 2015, Table 5).

Lanka established an Inter-ministerial National Nutrition Council and a multi-sectoral National Steering Committee for Nutrition. In addition, a National Nutrition Secretariat was set up in 2013 under the Office of the President. In the same year a Multi-Sector Action Plan (MSAP) on nutrition was launched, prepared in collaboration with 17 government ministries (GoSL, 2013d).

### *Geographic Vulnerability*

35. Sri Lanka is prone to climate-related natural hazards and shocks occurring with increasing frequency in recent years. This poses a particular toll on food security, especially among the most vulnerable. On average, 750,000 people were affected annually between 2000 and 2013 (WFP & GoSL, 2014).<sup>33</sup> The increase in incidents is largely due to erratic monsoon patterns resulting in more frequent and intense floods and droughts. Long-term projections predict increasingly erratic rainfall, particularly during the north-east monsoon period. Hazards such as tsunamis, sea level rise, soil salinization as well as storms are additional climate-related threats for many livelihood groups along Sri Lanka's coast (WFP, 2015f).

36. Climate change in Sri Lanka has also affected water availability for both human and animal consumption, as well as for agriculture and industry, prompting the government to distribute water to selected communities every year, leaving fewer budgetary resources for more acute disaster response (WFP, 2014x).

### **Gender dimensions**

37. Sri Lanka has made positive strides in gender equality in the education system. The adult literacy rate for females is 90 percent and among youths (15–24 years) the rate is 99 percent. Girls and boys are evenly represented in secondary education; 82 percent of adult women have reached a secondary level of education.

38. However, the 2015 Global Gender Gap Index report found Sri Lanka to be one of five countries whose gender gap has widened over the last 10 years by more than 1 percent, falling from a rank of 12 in 2008 to 84 in 2015 out of 135 countries (World Economic Forum, 2015). The excellent record on gender parity in education has not translated into equality in the workplace or politics, and gender-based violence remains a challenge. Universal adult suffrage has been established since 1931, yet the representation of women in the national parliament has never exceeded 6 percent; it is even lower at the local and provincial levels. Inequalities are most striking in labour force participation; female participation is 39 percent compared to 81 percent for men, and the women's unemployment rate has been double that of men for more than three decades. Employment for women is concentrated in low-productivity and low-income sectors such as agriculture and plantations as well as the garment industry and domestic service labour, with minimal opportunity for progression.

39. Disparities are accentuated at district level, with the former conflict-affected districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces, the plantation districts and the severely disadvantaged district of Monaragala having the highest mortality rates among women. The war led to an increase in female-headed households with approximately 90,000 women widowed by the conflict. In 2015 there were 58,000 female-headed households in Northern Province who are particularly vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion (UNFPA, 2015). Women also make up the majority of Sri

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<sup>33</sup> See also Annex G, Table 17 and Figure 9.



Lanka's increasing population of the elderly; female life expectancy of 79.6 years compares with 72.4 years for men (AsDB & GIZ, 2015).

### **1.3 WFP's Portfolio in Sri Lanka**

#### **Background to WFP's engagement in Sri Lanka**

40. WFP has been present in Sri Lanka since 1968, with 76 operations and a total budget to date of just over USD 1 billion. This has encompassed a wide variety of support to emergency, recovery and development operations. See Table 18 in Annex H for a full list.

41. Almost all WFP activity in Sri Lanka over its long engagement has been governed by an important basic agreement between WFP and the Government (GoC & WFP, 1968) that designates the Government as the primary implementer of all WFP operations:

1. The primary responsibility for the execution of development projects and emergency operations shall rest with the Government, which shall provide all personnel, premises, supplies, equipment, services and transportation and defray all expenditure necessary for implementation of any development project or emergency operation.

2. The World Food Programme shall deliver commodities as a grant without payment at the port of entry or the frontier station and shall supervise and provide advisory assistance in the execution of any development project or emergency operation. (Article II, ¶1 –see Annex H, Box 10)

42. At the same time, the agreement requires the Government to enable monitoring by WFP:


4. The Government shall provide facilities to the World Food Programme for observing all stages of implementation of development projects and emergency operations. (Article II, see Annex H, Box 10; Article III elaborates information-sharing requirements.)

43. WFP's presence in Sri Lanka has been continuous since this agreement. The Basic Agreement is complemented for each operation by Letters of Understanding (LoUs), which spell out the mutual responsibilities of GoSL and WFP and typically incorporate a significant provision for capacity support and development.

44. The evaluation period falls under the shadow of two especially formative events: the 2004 tsunami and the emergency relief operations that took place during the war and shortly after. Many of the present country staff were employed during the war and the tsunami response in 2005, and their approaches are significantly moulded by having worked through both these events.

45. Over the review period the CO decreased in size classification, from large in 2012 to small in 2015. Figure 1 below shows the decline in staffing over the review period. See Annex H for further information on CO size over the review period (Table 19) and detailed staffing data (Table 20).

**Figure 1** Number of WFP country office staff 2011–2016



Source: WFP CO data

## Definition of the portfolio

### *Operations included*

46. The portfolio evaluation period (2011–2015) covers eight operations and three trust funds. These operations have comprised: Special Operation 105390 (2006 to late 2011) and Development Programme 106070 (2008 to September 2013), which were both extended into the review period through numerous budget revisions; Immediate Response-Emergency Operation (IR-EMOP) 200233 following flooding in early 2011, and EMOP 200239 (2011 to early 2012) and IR-EMOP 200809 (2015), both developed to meet the needs of flood-affected populations; and two Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations – 200143 (2011 to late 2012) and PRRO 200452 (2013 to late 2015) focusing on former conflict-affected areas. Three Trust Funds were also active during the period: the SDG-F Trust Fund 10024563 (2015 to 2016) and with a focus on scaling up nutrition; SUN MPTF 00089100 (2014 to 2015, extended) for support to the SUN civil society alliance; and Trust Fund 10022993 (2014 to 2018), addressing climate change. The Factsheet at the front of this report gives an overview of operations during the period and of funding for them (see also Figure 17 in Annex H).

47. The portfolio is a time-slice of WFP operations; as such it includes some operations which started before 2011 and others which continued beyond. The Country Programme 200866 (2016 to 2017), which carried on a number of activities which had been supported by the PRROs, and an EMOP in 2016, which responded to flooding and landslides in May 2016, sit just outside the review period. These are not part of the evaluation subject, but they are revealing in terms of WFP’s evolving strategy and approach in Sri Lanka.

### *Chronological development of the portfolio*


48. Since 2011, WFP's portfolio has been shaped by Sri Lanka's transition from recovery to development with programme objectives realigned from relief and recovery to a policy and capacity development approach. Broadly, the portfolio can be divided into early relief and recovery operations in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern provinces, maternal and child nutrition development operations in those provinces and elsewhere, and emergency responses to flood and drought-affected populations mainly in the North Central, North Western, Eastern, Central and Uva provinces. See Figure 2 below for an overview of the Sri Lanka portfolio in context.

49. Following the 2004 tsunami and the escalation of violence in 2005, SO 105390 was launched toward the end of 2006 with the aim of addressing operational logistics gaps and improving emergency response. In effect it reinforced WFP's independent logistics capacity, and it was extended beyond its five-month initial projection to the end of 2011. The SO supported PRRO 200143 and EMOP 200239 in addition to providing support to the Logistics Cluster, led by WFP.

50. In line with the Government's commitment to address malnutrition, WFP launched a five-year development project 106070 in 2008 to improve the nutritional status of children aged between 6-29 months, and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) through supplementary feeding as well as building government capacity in the production of Thripasha, a locally-produced supplementary food.

51. Despite the formal ending of the conflict between the Government and the LTTE in 2009, at the start of 2011 over 400,000 people remained displaced, living abroad as refugees, in IDP camps or in host communities and exposed to high levels of food insecurity. PRROs (200143 and 200452) were launched in 2011 and 2013 to provide relief and early recovery and to rebuild livelihoods and reduce the prevalence of malnutrition among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnee populations affected by the violence in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

**Figure 2 The Sri Lanka Portfolio in Context**



52. With extensions, the two PRROs spanned the entire evaluation period from 2011 to the end of 2015. Both PRROs combined general food distribution (GFD), school feeding, MCHN, FFA and capacity building activities, with an increasing focus on assisting a closely targeted group of the most vulnerable households.


53. These operations were expanded to the eastern districts after severe flooding and subsequent landslides in late-2010 to early-2011 displaced 1.2 million people, and in 2014 and 2015 to assist further drought and flood-affected victims. At the request of the government, WFP also launched IR-EMOP 200233 in response to the widespread 2011 flooding which then rolled into a regular EMOP (200239). An IR-EMOP 200809 was also initiated in early 2015 following record high levels of rainfall which affected over one million people in 22 districts. The operation provided immediate emergency relief to those in the 13 worst-affected districts.

54. The CP 2016–2017 was launched to precede the Country Strategic Plan (CSP) in the pipeline for 2018–2022. It covers a shorter timeframe than is usual for WFP CPs in order to fit the UNDAF cycle, due to restart in 2018. An EMOP was also approved in June 2016 to respond to flooding and landslides in May 2016.

*Funding of the portfolio*

55. The total budget for the portfolio was USD 178,387,506 and the trust funds were budgeted at USD 8,974,249. The top source of funding for the portfolio was through multilateral funds, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and bilateral funds (USA, Canada and Japan), with the Sri Lankan government also a significant donor. Figure 3 shows the top five donors to WFP’s portfolio over the period as well as the percentage funded per operation.


**Figure 3 Top 5 donors 2011–2015 and percentage funded per operation**



Source: WFP SPRs 2011–2015 and WFP CO.


56. Funding of the portfolio has generally declined over the period. Figure 4 below shows direct donations per year and demonstrates the decline in the value of disbursements. Figure 5 below shows the drop in total funding over the period (including miscellaneous income, stock transfer etc.) as well as the level of direct contributions.

**Figure 4 Annual donations 2011–2016**



Source: CO data (PRRO 200143, 200452, EMOP 200239, IR-EMOP 200809 and CP 200866 only)

**Figure 5 Total funded across the portfolio by year**



Source: CO (excludes the SO, IR EMOP 200233, DEV 106070, the CP and the Trust Funds).

Note: Direct contributions are from bilateral donors and UN CERF funds. Non-direct contributions include multilateral allocations, miscellaneous income, stock transfer and carry-over from a previous year or project.

57. Figure 6 below focuses on the PRROs, which dominate the portfolio, showing the total percentage funded and the proportion of that funding received from donor contributions. These direct contributions have particularly fallen over the period, and funding shortfalls have been the dominant reason for pipeline breaks. Documents note that this is likely due to Sri Lanka’s graduation to MIC status which for many donors means automatic removal from their recipient country register.<sup>34</sup> Concerns around


<sup>34</sup> This is illustrated in PRRO 200452 comments:

Compared to the current PRRO’s 2 year budget of \$66.7 million, the new PRRO budget, also for 2 years, has drastically reduced to \$35.7 million. The reduction in requirement follows a Country Strategy Review (CSR) held two months ago (see NFR attached) when a strong recommendation was made by OD, ERD and other divisions for the CO to reduce its

donor fatigue have been marginally offset by the GoSL's emergence as a donor to WFP Sri Lanka activities and increasing interest in becoming a commercial supplier to WFP.<sup>35</sup> The GoSL gave its first in-kind donation to WFP in 2011 for activities in Sri Lanka, and in 2012 a contribution of 10,000 MT of rice was donated to WFP for the Horn of Africa response, though a ban on rice exports during the 2012 drought halted the disbursements (WFP, 2012k).<sup>36</sup>

58. Sri Lanka certainly has the potential to grow in this regard as rice harvests improve, though vulnerable to climatic shock in certain areas. In 2013 the GoSL donated a further 50,000 MT to WFP, of which 12,000 was earmarked for WFP Sri Lanka. So far the CO has managed to absorb half of the donation with the remainder awaiting a donor to provide the twinning fund.<sup>37</sup>

**Figure 6 Percentage of PRRO budgets funded and proportion of direct contributions 2011–2015**



Source: CO data

overall CS requirement, following a lengthy debate around the economic progress of the country coupled with the evolving role of WFP in Sri Lanka and the changing global funding landscape.

Donor support for WFP's PRRO in Sri Lanka has been waning since 2009 when it received almost \$63 million from 13 donors. In the following year, total funding dropped by more than half to just \$30 million from 10 donors and last year, support decreased even further to \$15.4 million from 7 donors. To date, the PRRO has received just \$4.8 million in 2012. It is clear that funding for Sri Lanka has been decreasing rapidly since over the past few years. This is likely due to Sri Lanka's ranking as a middle-income country, economic downturn and other global emergencies that have become a priority for many donors. (WFP, 2013l)

<sup>35</sup> This was reflected in the draft 2014–2017 Country Strategy (WFP, 2013i) in which a main strategic priority was the building of government capacity to develop public-private partnerships, though the aim to realise this through WFP's Purchase for Progress (P4P) expertise was not possible. (See Annex I for a review of the main themes in successive draft country strategies.)

<sup>36</sup> These donations are distinct from GoSL's contributions towards the implementation of the WFP projects, i.e. the full land-side cost of implementation, including transport, storage management and the operational cost of the DMU. In 2012 the government allocated LKR 5 billion of the budget to support the PRROs over a two-year period.

<sup>37</sup> WFP Sri Lanka receives significant donations as in-kind assistance, such as canned fish from Japan and dates from Saudi Arabia for the school meals programme. These donations normally have to be provided along with funds to cover the associated costs of using the in-kind donation, but the GoSL is exempt from this requirement. Therefore in-kind donations from the GoSL, without the twinning fund, do not entirely offset the ongoing challenge of donor fatigue in Sri Lanka.

59. Looking forward, the recent political changes and the subsequent opening up of UN-government relations set an encouraging tone for future GoSL-WFP partnerships in terms of state financial assistance for WFP's activities.

### **Thematic components of the portfolio**

#### *Humanitarian relief and recovery*

60. A significant component of WFP's portfolio under review has been in assisting populations affected by both the aftermath of the violent conflict and by recurrent climatic shocks, particularly caused by heavy precipitation and drought. In two instances (IR-EMOPs) WFP assisted the government in providing emergency assistance to flood-affected victims through GFD and FFA activities. Under the PRROs, IDPs and returnee households were supported through GFD and FFA (complemented by community-wide school feeding and MCHN activities).

#### *Climate change*

61. The FFA approach was later adapted to support a climate change initiative. Following the accreditation of WFP to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Adaptation Fund (AF) in 2011, the AF approved in December 2012 a project for Sri Lanka called "Addressing Climate Change Impacts on Marginalized Agricultural Communities Living in the Mahaweli River Basin of Sri Lanka" to be implemented in three districts and over three years. This is intended as a pilot to be replicated if successful.

#### *School feeding*

62. Support to the national school feeding programme was carried out under both PRROs and continued under the CP, targeting the five conflict-affected districts of the Northern Province. WFP has also been committed to supporting the Government to establish a sustainable national school feeding strategy through various workshops, training and technical assistance.

#### *Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition (MCHN)*

63. Support to MCHN has been continuous throughout the period, supported through the development project and both PRROs. WFP prioritised interventions targeting children under five and PLW through supporting the government's national supplementary feeding programme. This included efforts to strengthen government capacity to produce and distribute Thripasha (a locally manufactured supplementary food) and provide corn soy blend (CSB) and Supercereal Plus. WFP has worked with GoSL and other partners in supporting the development of national nutrition policy, and (via a trust fund) is also supporting civil society work in nutrition through the SUN People's Forum.

#### *Capacity development and analytical work*

64. With the government acting as WFP's main implementing partner throughout the period, capacity support has been an important cross-cutting component of the portfolio. WFP supported the strengthening of in-country emergency preparedness and response systems and food security and nutrition surveillance systems as well as contributing broad technical support to the development of Thripasha production, the capacity building of public health staff concerning infant and young child feeding practices and various trainings around distribution logistics, monitoring and modalities. WFP also contributed to the improvement of national food security



information collection, livelihood mapping and vulnerability targeting. Towards the end of the period, WFP was also supporting the methodological development of a rice fortification pilot programme (RIU, 2016). Capacity building was also provided to government institutions through the SDG-F Trust Fund, providing technical support to the multi-sector scale up of nutrition (WFP, 2014g).

65. Analytical work undertaken or commissioned by WFP is a key element of capacity development as well as a support to WFP's own planning and learning. Over the period WFP has undertaken various joint district and national-level food security assessments, as well as a Food Security Atlas (WFP, 2015f), and research around the cost of a nutritious diet (WFP, 2014a, WFP, 2014n). WFP and UNICEF also supported the Medical Research Institute (MRI) and in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Development, prepared a Consolidated Livelihood Exercise for Analysing Resilience (CLEAR) report (WFP & GoSL, 2014). In partnership with MasterCard, a school feeding Cost Benefit Analysis was produced (WFP, 2015n) and towards the end of the period, a WFP food technologist was preparing to conduct an independent assessment of Thripasha. See Annex K for an overview of WFP's analytical work in Sri Lanka.

#### *Cash based transfers*

66. Growing use of cash based transfers (CBTs) was another cross-cutting trend in the portfolio. Sri Lanka implemented the first ever WFP cash and voucher project in 2005 during the tsunami response (Majewski et al, 2014). Over the review period CBTs (including vouchers) have been implemented in both PRROs and the cash modality is built into the design of the 2016–2017 CP. A cash voucher programme was piloted in Jaffna district for IDPs and returnees in 2012, and was continued in 2013–15. Cash assistance planned for 60,000 flood-affected victims in 2013 had to be cancelled due to funding shortfalls, but in 2014 CBTs were implemented in three districts affected by drought with increased field support from NGO partners, and received positive feedback. A cash modality was also trialled under WFP's school meal programme in late 2014. However, despite efforts to extend the use of CBTs, they remained a very small proportion of the total programme (this is illustrated by the central graphic in Figure 2 above). See Annex O for an extensive review of CBTs, especially the cash voucher programme.

#### **WFP context**

67. Over the evaluation period, WFP has continued its efforts to shift from food aid to food assistance and to build up its capacity to support economic and social development, in addition to its traditional emergency relief mandate. The review period straddles two Strategic Plans (2008–13 and 2014–17) marked by the use of a broader toolbox, including more use of cash and vouchers, and by moves towards greater financial and administrative flexibility, more emphasis on alignment with and capacity development of partner governments, and a more strategic approach to country portfolios. An important shift has been greater decentralisation and assignment of responsibility to Regional Bureaus and COs under the Fit for Purpose initiative (WFP, 2012h). The evaluation took place as a new strategic plan was under preparation.

68. WFP policy and guidance relevant to many elements of the Sri Lanka portfolio continued to develop during the evaluation period. Relevant materials have been systematically accumulated in the evaluation's e-library, including, as well as

successive strategies and Strategic Results Frameworks (SRFs), the evolution of policy and guidance on humanitarian protection, nutrition, school feeding, social protection, gender, cash-based transfers, resilience and food assistance for assets. These are important points of reference, although the evaluation team has taken care to avoid the anachronism of judging performance against guidelines that were not available at the time.

### **Was there a Country Strategy?**

69. There was no formal strategy in place during the evaluation period, though there were continual attempts at strategy formulation. These efforts are charted in Annex J which also draws on project documents, the various draft strategies prepared and other sources to suggest the main elements of the implicit strategy during the period. Key findings are:

- a) Project documents were explicitly aligned with WFP's corporate Strategic Objectives.
- b) WFP also participated in successive rounds of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The 2013–2017 UNDAF outlined four main areas of cooperation: equitable economic growth, quality social services, social inclusion and protection, and environmental sustainability. There were efforts in subsequent WFP draft strategy documents to show how WFP activities fitted under the different UNDAF pillars, but the UNDAF seems to have remained a collection of project proposals by disparate UN agencies that has not genuinely led to a One UN approach or significantly influenced WFP strategy.
- c) Throughout the evaluation period there were successive attempts to draft an overarching country strategy, often involving systematic consultations with in-country stakeholders. At one point, a country strategy for the period 2011–2015 was envisaged, which would have seen the PRRO superseded by Development Projects in 2012, giving way to a Country Programme aligned with the UNDAF, in 2013 (see Figure 18 in Annex I), but this did not materialise.
- d) The main strategy documents prepared over the period were a Country Strategy 2013–2017 (WFP, 2012c) and a subsequent 2014–2017 Country Strategy (WFP, 2013i) entitled 'Supporting the Sri Lankan Government meeting the Zero Hunger Challenge'. Neither document was formally approved by the RB or HQ though it is clear that the latter fed into the formulation of the CP.
- e) Towards the end of the period, there is more evidence of a proactive role by the RB in seeking and supporting development of the country strategy (e.g. in developing an appropriate MIC orientation (Annex I, ¶15), but interviews (alongside the record of uncompleted processes) support the view that the CO lacked the resources and the sustained support from the Regional Bureau (RB) and HQ that would have been necessary to make the strategic planning processes more fruitful.

70. There is thus no ex ante statement of country strategy for the evaluation period against which the portfolio can be assessed. The strategy in practice is mainly characterised by the PRROs (as the largest component of the portfolio) and implicit in the operational documents. These documents recognise the dual challenges on WFP's resources: to provide both emergency relief and early recovery to IDPs and returnees and to those affected by climatic shocks, and also to provide livelihood and asset creation support to those same populations as their situations stabilised. At the same

time, a sense of the strategic challenges facing the CO in Sri Lanka does emerge not only from the PRRO documents but also from the evolving strategy iterations and informal discussions that took place. From the beginning of the period, draft documents are couched in terms of the need for WFP to modify its approach alongside the wider political and economic transitions taking place at national level (from relief to development and from conflict to peace, while MIC status was being consolidated). There was recognition that the PRRO instrument was less appropriate as the conflict and the most acute humanitarian needs receded, and that donor funds were becoming much scarcer, and that in the long run WFP's role would need to become less operational and more focused on advice and capacity development. The PRRO documents themselves made explicit reference to handing over WFP activities in MCHN and school feeding to government (see Box 11 in Annex J). However, as discussed in section 2.3 below, it proved difficult to put such handover into effect; in the case of MCHN this reflected underlying constraints on the national strategy for supplementary feeding, and for school meals, handover was not straightforward because of the differences in approach between the WFP programme in Northern Province and the national programme elsewhere.

71. There were a number of relevant innovations within the portfolio. There were moves towards more use of CBTs (see ¶66 above) and the trust funds facilitated an opportunistic shift towards more upstream work related to nutrition and to climate change. But the shift towards a Country Programme, first mooted for 2013, did not take place until 2016, and the handover of operations to the government was a continuing agenda under the CP.

72. Going forward, a Country Strategic Plan is in the process of being prepared for the period 2018–2022 to align with the next UNDAF. Preceding this, there will be an independent Country Strategic Review of the food security and nutrition situation in Sri Lanka. The CSP will need to grapple with the same basic issues that were recognised in strategic discussions during the evaluation period.

## 2. Evaluation Findings

### 2.1 Portfolio Alignment and Strategic Positioning

#### Relevance to Sri Lanka's humanitarian and developmental needs<sup>38</sup>

73. All the main elements of the WFP portfolio were relevant in terms of addressing specific needs in Sri Lanka – particularly in relation to the humanitarian aftermath of the war, but also in seeking to address enduring nutrition problems, and respond to emergencies. It was appropriate to prioritise the greatest and most immediate needs, and hence to focus mainly on districts which had borne the brunt of the war, and on the victims of subsequent emergencies.<sup>39</sup> As becomes more apparent later in this report, the CO's main challenges were not with the intrinsic relevance of its operations, but with adapting the portfolio to the changing circumstances of Sri Lanka over the period and with being able to bring sufficient resources to bear to ensure lasting benefits for those assisted. These challenges are discussed further in the assessments of the design and implementation of portfolio components in section 2.3 below (see ¶108ff on humanitarian support; ¶127ff on school feeding; ¶146ff on MCHN). All elements of the portfolio rightly included an orientation towards capacity development and handover, but handover plans proved difficult to carry through (see discussions of school feeding in ¶122–124 below, and of MCHN in ¶136 and ¶147–149 below).

#### Alignment with national agenda and policies<sup>40</sup>

74. Alignment with government systems and with government policies was conditioned by the 1968 Basic Agreement and by the legacy of the war in terms of its effects on relationships between GoSL and the international community. The Basic Agreement ensured that GoSL was normally the implementer of WFP projects (see ¶41–43 above), although the projects were not necessarily implemented in the same fashion as GoSL's own programmes (school feeding and MCHN were cases in point). During the period there was some pressure from GoSL for WFP to proceed further with the integration of its programmes<sup>41</sup> but, as discussed in the programme-wise reviews in section 2.3 below, there were technical and practical reasons why such integration was not necessarily straightforward. Nevertheless, WFP was strongly oriented towards working with and supporting government systems; this is apparent for example in the CPE review of CBTs, which found that they characteristically built on existing government procedures and organisations (see Annex O).

75. Alignment with government policies was a more vexed issue. Before the change of government in 2015, the relationship between GoSL and the international community was poor (see ¶19–21 above). WFP generally had good working relationships with its GoSL counterparts, but there was no systematic dialogue

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<sup>38</sup> EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Sri Lanka's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?

<sup>39</sup> The subsequent CP 2016–2017 is less narrowly focused on the north –see Map 6 in Annex Q.

<sup>40</sup> EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?

<sup>41</sup> A letter from the External Resources Department (ERD) dated 2 October 2013 (i.e. well after PRRO 200452 had been launched) expressed gratitude for WFP support since 2009, but included suggestions "to make the programme more productive: (a) the Mother and Child Nutritional Programme (MCHN) could be merged together with the existing Thripasha programme which is being implemented by the Ministry of Health; (c) the School Meal Programme (SMP) could be merged together with the Mahinda Chintana School Feeding Programme which is being implemented by the Ministry of Educational Services; (c) the component of the Food for Asset Programme (FFA) could be merged with the Puran Kumburu Programme which is being implemented by the Department of Agrarian Development. ..."

between the Government and its aid partners over policies and strategy, and there were serious tensions over issues such as IDPs. The UNDAF (UN & GoSL, 2012) formally linked UN agency priorities to GoSL's, and WFP's operational documents referenced relevant government policies such as the nutrition strategy (GoSL, 2010a) and the Mahinda Chintana (GoSL, n.d. – 2010?), but the quality of collaboration was limited. After the new government took office in 2015, there was a much closer alignment of objectives on humanitarian issues in particular, and the government was more open to genuine collaboration, but the reorganisation of government ministries and the time it inevitably took to redraft and issue relevant policies was a continuing constraint.

### **Alignment with UN and other partners<sup>42</sup>**

76. Two UNDAFs were in operation during the evaluation period, but as noted in Annex I (¶20–23) the UNDAFs seem to have remained a collection of project proposals by disparate UN agencies that neither genuinely led to a One UN approach nor significantly influenced WFP strategy. Although their different strategies were not integrated, there appears to have been regular communication and coordination amongst UN agencies in Sri Lanka. Interviewees observed that this was facilitated by the continuation of the cluster system until 2013 and by the fact that the previous government's antagonism to the UN gave the agencies more incentive to collaborate. There is a strong Resident Coordinator's Office (RCO), with staff deployed beyond Colombo. Support to resettlement (reviewed in detail in section 2.3 below, ¶98ff) was a joint effort amongst WFP, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF and other agencies and NGOs.

77. As noted in section 1.2 (¶27–28), the aid environment in Sri Lanka changed dramatically during the evaluation period, with a diminution in the involvement of bilateral agencies, and less scope for systematic aid coordination. For most of the period GoSL, in practice, did not offer a lead on such coordination. Scope for collaboration with NGOs was also restricted, by the Basic Agreement, and, for much of the period, by GoSL's reluctance to engage with the NGO sector. However, WFP did engage with several NGOs in the course of its emergency responses, and has supported the SUN People's Forum, which now has several hundred NGO participants (see ¶142 below).

### **Alignment with humanitarian principles and the peacebuilding process<sup>43</sup>**

#### *Supporting the peace-building process*

78. Peace has been maintained since the end of the civil war, but progress in peacebuilding and reconciliation has been qualified, although undoubtedly boosted by the revised approach of the post-2015 government. There has been more progress in reconstructing infrastructure after the war than in restoring institutions and building trust between communities (IRDG, n.d., SDC, 2016). WFP along with other UN agencies advocated for durable solutions for IDPs and contributed to their support when it became possible for them to return to their places of origin. Unfortunately, as

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<sup>42</sup> EQ4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?

<sup>43</sup> Addressing two EQs:

EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand?

EQ7. To what extent has WFP's portfolio has been consistent with the status of the peacebuilding and reconciliation process?

also detailed in section 2.3 below (¶105ff), Government was slow to release land to facilitate returns before 2015, and by the time the process accelerated, international funding for resettlement was scarce, so that resources were typically inadequate to ensure sustainable livelihoods for returnees; this was a collective shortcoming, not one for which WFP has independent responsibility. As reviewed in more detail in section 2.3 below (¶116ff), support to the SMP in Northern Province was appropriate both in helping to restore basic social services and as a significant income transfer to war-affected families.

### *Applying the humanitarian principles*

79. Against the background of UN reflections on the war (¶19 above), the CPE was required to review WFP's application of the humanitarian principles. An important caveat is that a one-agency, one-country review in peace time cannot engage with the systemic failures highlighted in the UN's post-war report (see Box 1 below). The CPE's more limited aim was to assess how well the humanitarian principles have been reflected in WFP's post-war portfolio. The four main principles are humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence. Annex L provides an extended assessment of WFP's application of these principles and of the supporting "foundations of effective humanitarian action" and "standards of accountability and professionalism" which are part of the WFP policy on humanitarian principles (and which have ramifications for almost every aspect of what WFP does).<sup>44</sup>

80. The application of humanitarian principles during the war had been under the spotlight. The dilemmas of impartiality and neutrality were less evident in the post-war period covered by the CPE. In principle, the Basic Agreement could be seen as an obstacle to WFP's operational independence, but it has been implemented with safeguards: the respective roles of WFP and GoSL are spelled out in Letters of Understanding (LoUs) for each operation, which incorporate principles of impartiality. The fact that WFP operations were jointly planned with government institutions (central and local), and that the Basic Agreement vests primary responsibility for execution with the Government has ensured a high degree of ownership by the Government and alignment with its priorities. At the same time, independent monitoring has acted as a check on undue influence by the Government.

### **Box 1 Criticisms of UN shortcomings in war-time**

In addressing the humanitarian principles, it is important to situate findings by reference to the historical context of the war and the experiences and perceptions of UN organisations and WFP more specifically. Two reports are of particular relevance:

- a) In 2009 WFP held a conference on its role in humanitarian conflict and complex emergencies (WFP, 2009e); one of the papers was a Sri Lanka case study by David Keen entitled "*Compromise or Capitulation: Report on WFP and the Humanitarian Crisis in Sri Lanka*" (Keen, 2009). This found that WFP "was seen as having reacted flexibly and with ingenuity in its logistical operations, including on the establishment of logistics hubs, the use of local purchase, the practice of sealing trucks, and the use of ships as an alternative to trucks. In many ways this represents a significant contribution in a context where many agencies were left as virtual bystanders". On the other hand, the Keen paper also raised issues potentially impinging on WFP's

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<sup>44</sup> These are: respect, self-reliance, participation, capacity-building, coordination, accountability and professionalism. (WFP, 2012b)

independence, impartiality and neutrality – questioning for example whether WFP’s relationship with the Government was “too close for comfort”, and noted that “In general, WFP and other UN agencies need to be mindful of the dangers in giving the impression that key protection and relief gaps are being met when in reality they remain extremely grave” (a comment which foreshadows the Petrie report findings discussed below).

- b) Following the end of the conflict, the UN Secretary-General set up an Internal Review Panel (led by Charles Petrie) on United Nations Actions in Sri Lanka (UNSG, 2012). It was highly critical of UN performance (e.g. "The UN, in headquarters and in Sri Lanka, did not appear to fully recognize the scope of its responsibility to respond to Government violations and did not realize until very late that its protection actions were largely empty"; and "the UN almost completely omitted to explicitly mention Government responsibility for violations of international law. UN officials said they did not want to prejudice humanitarian access by criticizing the Government – and maintained this position even when access within the Wannu was almost non-existent"). It concluded "The UN's failure to adequately respond to events like those that occurred in Sri Lanka should not happen again”.

Several things stand out from the Keen and Petrie reports:

- Humanitarian dilemmas are hugely magnified by armed conflict; observing the humanitarian principles during peacetime is a very different proposition.
- The failures identified by Petrie were collective – not simply the joint and several actions of UN agencies on the ground in Sri Lanka, but a lack of appropriate support from agency HQs.
- In turn, the atmosphere in which the UN failed to confront the GoSL with its responsibilities under humanitarian law reflected the unwillingness of Member States to hold the GoSL (in contrast to the LTTE) to account.

The question for the UN agencies and Member States in the light of the Petrie report is whether they have put in place global systems that will prevent a repetition of the failures it identifies – a question which is far beyond the scope of an evaluation of one UN agency's portfolio in peacetime in one country.

81. In the design of the main operations (PRROs and EMOPs), humanitarian principles were, on the whole, well reflected. Programmes targeted vulnerable populations through impartial selection of beneficiaries with a majority of funding in the period directed towards those most susceptible following decades of displacement (including children and single mother headed households), as well as victims of natural disasters. Protection considerations were taken into account in design and implementation, in line with the policy on Humanitarian Protection adopted in 2012 (WFP, 2012b, see Box 16 in Annex L).

82. The focus on displaced persons and returnees was an important contribution to the peacebuilding process. However, as discussed elsewhere in this report, there is more to do before those affected regain sustainable livelihoods. WFP’s ability to fulfil the humanitarian principle that it should seek "to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found" has been hampered by declining access to donor funds; its own direct intervention is less feasible, and arguably less appropriate in a MIC context (Rohwerder, 2016). WFP will increasingly need an upstream focus –helping to ensure that systems are in place which ensure that human need is not overlooked, even when it subsists in a middle income country.

## **Strategic positioning<sup>45</sup>**

83. Against a background of considerable review of its strategic role (including various consultations with government stakeholders in particular), WFP's portfolio in practice emerged more as the result of ad hoc pragmatic decisions than as the implementation of a consistent underlying strategy (see ¶69ff above, and the fuller treatment in Annex J). By early 2011 there was, apparently, awareness of the need to move on from emergency programming (PRROs) towards a more strategic (development operation – DEV) orientation (see especially Figure 18 in Annex J), but it was another four years before the PRRO was phased out.

84. Nevertheless, WFP's main areas of focus – humanitarian relief, MCHN, school feeding, and related analytical work, were all areas in which WFP has a relevant mandate and distinctive expertise; it worked closely with relevant GoSL agencies, and participated in relevant coordinating exercises (such as preparation of the MSAP) when there were opportunities to do so. The strategic challenges for WFP in Sri Lanka are to adjust further to the shifting country context and aid landscape, which will inevitably change perceptions of how WFP can make the most difference. It will involve in particular a change in the balance between direct operational (downstream) work and upstream engagement in advocacy and policy support – an issue which was prominent in strategic discussions during the evaluation period and which underpins much of the discussion in the remainder of this report.

## **2.2 Factors and Quality of Strategic Decision-Making**

### **Space for strategic decision-making<sup>46</sup>**

85. The scope for strategic decision-making by the Sri Lanka CO was affected by both internal and external constraints, and it makes sense to consider these constraints before passing judgement on the decisions made. As shown in section 1.3 above, WFP's staff and budgets in Sri Lanka were shrinking throughout the period, and it was a continual struggle to secure adequate resources for commitments already entered into. WFP's relationship with GoSL would be at the centre of any strategic reorientation, but the atmosphere for strategic dialogue with GoSL and its other aid partners was poor for most of the period. Against this background it is not surprising that the strategic planning exercises chronicled in Annex J were mostly abortive. The practical choices open to WFP were in any case somewhat limited by the Basic Agreement, although the relationship with GoSL was likely to become more important anyway as reduced humanitarian need and Sri Lanka's strengthening MIC status implied growing government responsibility for front-line services and a WFP move upstream towards capacity development and technical support. This was recognised in the handover strategies included in the PRROs (and subsequently in the CP for 2016–2017), but slow progress towards handover<sup>47</sup> meant that strategic considerations were continually squeezed out by the day-to-day concerns of project management. At the same time (in addition to coping with the inevitable turnover of international staff) the CO had to absorb significant developments on overall WFP policies and guidelines. Thus the evaluation period saw new corporate policies and guidelines on (among others) school feeding, nutrition, gender, protection and CBTs,

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<sup>45</sup> EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?

<sup>46</sup> EQ11. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?

<sup>47</sup> See discussions of school feeding in ¶122–124, and of MCHN in ¶136 and ¶147–149.



a new Strategic Plan and SRF, and considerable decentralisation under the Fit for Purpose initiative. These offered new opportunities for strategic decision-making, but must also have tested the absorptive capacity of a small CO struggling to cope with diminished resources.

### **Analysis and advocacy<sup>48</sup>**

86. The CO undertook, commissioned and/or participated in a substantial body of analytical work, which is catalogued in Annex K). The CPE's review shows that:

- WFP's PRROs and EMOPs were informed by high quality situation analyses;
- WFP collaborated with GoSL and UNICEF on significant nutrition studies;
- work was done in collaboration with national institutions, including HARTI and the MRI, with conscious attention to capacity building in the process;
- WFP's nutrition-related work included studies on Thripasha and rice-fortification, which drew on WFP's expertise in specialised foods;
- WFP helped to consolidate and disseminate existing knowledge through a Food Security Atlas;
- a gender assessment was commissioned at the end of the evaluation period, to feed into subsequent strategy;
- there were significant pieces of advocacy work, including a Cost of Diet study (in collaboration with HARTI) and modelling of the potential benefits of school feeding.

87. The detailed review of CBTs, see Annex O, shows that planning for CBTs drew on specific market studies and special reviews as well as food security assessments. However, it also shows that, in relation to the cash voucher in particular, collation and analysis of monitoring data was patchy and some learning opportunities were missed.

88. Although some analysis was strongly linked to advocacy, WFP did not make as much progress with some key pieces of advocacy as it had hoped to. In particular (as described in more detail in section 2.3 below), Thripasha continued to be a frustrating saga (Box 7), and there was only limited progress towards stimulating a review of national school feeding policy as a precursor to the handover of WFP's SMP. Nevertheless, WFP clearly engaged with national agendas on nutrition, school feeding, disaster management and climate change, was recognised as having relevant expertise both by GoSL and by other development partners and contributed to capacity development by collaborating systematically with research institutions (such as HARTI and MRI) and line ministries such as the Ministry of Disaster Management (MDM).

### **Gender analysis**

89. The CPE undertook an extensive review of gender analysis and monitoring within the portfolio – see Annex N. This suggests that the Sri Lanka portfolio, like

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<sup>48</sup> This section addresses two EQs:

EQ8. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Sri Lanka – including gender issues?

EQ9. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?

many others, was rather weak in its gender analysis and monitoring prior to the adoption of the new WFP Gender Policy (WFP, 2015c), although there were persistent efforts to take gender issues into account. The review mechanisms associated with the new Gender Policy have clearly had an effect on the standard of gender analysis in project documents, and the recent gender assessment will feed into the preparation of the forthcoming country strategy. It remains to be seen whether this will translate into more consistent gender monitoring and stronger programme performance in gender dimensions. The comparative advantages of WFP in understanding the linkages between gender inequalities and food insecurity are beginning to be understood and should be developed further. The quality of continuing gender training for WFP staff will be crucial, particularly given the ongoing and complex vulnerabilities faced by Sri Lankan women in the post-conflict context.

### **Coverage of vulnerable groups<sup>49</sup>**

90. There were systematic efforts to focus on the most vulnerable groups, both in initial planning of operations and in their subsequent implementation. Initial selections of geographical areas of operation and of target groups within them were based on the situation analyses described in Annex K. During implementation there were moves to target assistance more precisely, partly because of the funding shortages experienced. Thus the PRRO extension for 2012 incorporated a move away from blanket GFD towards needs-based targeting (PRRO 200143 BR1). Under MCHN, preventive activities were dropped in order to concentrate limited resources on MAM treatment, and WFP also advocated (unsuccessfully) for GoSL to adopt a more targeted approach with Thripasha.<sup>50</sup> The "soft" FFA approach was partly justified by its superior ability to target the most vulnerable households (Box 3 below).

91. The bigger challenge was to cover vulnerable groups "adequately". It was understandable, in view of shrinking resources, that WFP resisted GoSL suggestions that MCHN activities should be expanded to areas that had been identified by the 2012 nutrition survey (UNICEF & GoSL, 2012) as having the worst nutrition indicators. On the other hand, WFP did expand the scope of the PRROs beyond Northern Province in some cases: Batticaloa was included in 2012; the PRRO was expanded to 10 additional districts to undertake drought relief projects in 2014 (Box 4 below); and more recently the scope of work with IDPs was extended to Eastern Province. The EMOPs (Table 4 below) also embodied rapid responses to emergency needs.

92. At the same time, WFP resources were spread much thinner than planned. This was reflected in the discontinuation of food for training (FFT), and reduction in GFD and FFA inputs per beneficiary (see the review of humanitarian interventions in section 2.3 below). As noted in the CPE review of the humanitarian principles (¶79ff

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<sup>49</sup> EQ10. To what extent has WFP adequately covered vulnerable groups in its programming?

<sup>50</sup> This reflected a wider concern about the GoSL approach to safety nets. The draft strategy 2014–2017 observed:

The current approach of the Government when dealing with social safety nets is to establish large scale blanket approaches to safety nets instead of a more targeted approach with clear guidelines for graduation. (Devi Neguma, Samurdhi, etc). The vague blanket targeting results in rapid resource depletion, reduced assistance value for the targeted persons/households, reducing the overall impact of the programmes. Furthermore, large inclusion and exclusion errors are seen in these programmes. Therefore, if not reviewed and focused to those who need, it will not be economically sustainable in the long run. Mainly, as it is becoming more costly to implement/administer, than the transfer value received by the targeted population. The high level of politicization of these programmes also results in unwillingness and resistance to review the targeting. (WFP, 2014x)

above), it is extremely difficult for WFP to fulfil the principle that it should seek "to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found". WFP's data on access to its programmes (in terms of beneficiary numbers) is the most consistent element of its monitoring, but it is not matched by systematic analysis of what reduced levels of support per beneficiary imply for the effectiveness of its work.

### **Learning from experience<sup>51</sup>**

93. The record on learning from experience is mixed. No country-specific evaluations of WFP work were conducted. Both PRRO documents stated an intention to conduct a self-evaluation on completion, but there is no record that this occurred. The M&E function within the CO was hard hit by staff cuts, and the "Monitoring & Evaluation Report – 2013" (WFP, 2013m) was the only one of its kind produced. Annex J chronicles persistent efforts to review overall strategy and reformulate the portfolio accordingly, but they had not borne fruit by the end of the evaluation period and the CP 2016–2017 was a bridging operation pending a more thorough strategic review of the portfolio.

94. On the other hand, Annex K demonstrates a commendable body of analytical work that was undertaken, while Annex N shows that there has recently been progress in strengthening gender analysis in line with the revised WFP Gender Policy. There was also significant innovation around CBTs, although (probably reflecting the constraints on M&E staffing) there was not as much use of available data concerning the cash voucher programme as might have been expected considering its pilot status (Annex O). Altogether, as the CO contemplates its forthcoming Country Strategic Plan, there is a substantial body of analytical work to draw on, but use of monitoring data to assess the effectiveness of its programmes as delivered has been weak.

## **2.3 Portfolio Performance and Results**

### **Overview and approach**

95. We consider performance and results in a sequence that follows the logic of the portfolio. We address in turn: humanitarian relief and recovery; adaptation to climate change;<sup>52</sup> school feeding; support to MCHN; and then partnerships and capacity development across the portfolio. In each case we consider the intended programme and its rationale,<sup>53</sup> and then the programme's delivery and results, followed by an assessment against the criteria of relevance, effectiveness,<sup>54</sup> efficiency<sup>55</sup> and sustainability.<sup>56</sup> We then review internal and external synergies for the portfolio as a whole. For all components the CPE reviewed available output and outcome data; the information from SPRs is presented in full in Annex I. In many cases however, the information reported in SPRs is insufficiently granular to be linked directly to the specific components discussed below. Thus, Table 1 below shows the high-level Coping Strategy Index (CSI) and Food Consumption Score (FCS) data reported for the

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<sup>51</sup> EQ12. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners?

<sup>52</sup> Because implementation fell outside the evaluation period, this is mainly covered in Annex M.

<sup>53</sup> Taking account of theories of change as appropriate.

<sup>54</sup> EQ13. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?

<sup>55</sup> EQ14. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?

<sup>56</sup> EQ15. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?

PRROs;<sup>57</sup> these are broadly consistent with a picture of reduced food insecurity in Northern Province, but cannot meaningfully be interpreted as results of specific WFP interventions because they are reported for Northern Province as a whole and do not enable comparison between recipients and non-recipients of WFP assistance; nor do they show recipients' scores before and after their receipt of food assistance.

**Table 1 CSI and FCS reported in PRRO SPRs**


Outcome	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	PRRO 200143		PRRO 200452		
Coping Strategy Index (average)	8.13	12		15	16.34
CSI: percentage of households with a decreased CSI			76	76.3	60
% of households with acceptable FCS	85	94	78.6		
% of households with borderline FCS	14	4.9		0.3	0

Source: SPRs (see Annex I)

*Planned and actual beneficiaries*

96. For an overview of beneficiaries and tonnage by operation see Figure 7 below (see also Annex H, Figure 15 and Table 21).

**Figure 7 Beneficiaries and tonnage by operation**



Source: SPRs. No data for Trust Funds. SO 105390 was non-food operation so not included.

97. The gender breakdown of beneficiaries under each operation is summarised in Table 2 below. The most striking overall pattern is that shortfalls in tonnage are much greater than shortfalls in the number of beneficiaries, implying that the level of assistance per beneficiary was typically less than planned. We discuss below how this played out in different activities.

<sup>57</sup> There were no reports against the National Capacity Index (NCI) indicator.

**Table 2 Male and female beneficiaries 2011–2015 by operation**

Operation	Timeframe	Planned		Actual	
		M	F	M	F
DEV 106070	Jan 2008 – Sept 2013	98,500	137,500	83,669	131,884
		236,000		215,553	
IR EMOP 200233	Jan – Mar 2011	208,320	211,680	219,156	223,584
		420,000		442,740	
PRRO 200143	Jan 2011 – Dec 2012	519,792	533,968	488,628	508,572
		1,053,760		997,200	
EMOP 200239	Feb 2011 – Jan 2012	277,760	282,240	256,898	281,251
		560,000		538,149	
PRRO 200452	Jan 2013 – Dec 2015	547,700	580,500	442,951	476,662
		1,128,200		919,613	
IR-EMOP 200809	Jan – Apr 2015	112,900	125,500	116,810	133,640
		238,400		250,450	

Source: SPRs. Data for the Trust Funds not available. SO 105390 was a non-food operation.

## Humanitarian relief and recovery

### *The intended programme and its rationale*

98. Humanitarian relief and recovery formed a significant component of the portfolio under review. There were two main categories:

- a) support to conflict-related IDPs and returnees from exile, and
- b) emergency support to populations affected by flood, landslides and drought.

99. For both categories, General Food Distribution (GFD) and Food for Assets (FFA) were the main operational mechanisms for the delivery of WFP relief and recovery assistance.

100. **Relief and recovery for IDP and other returnees:** Under both PRROs, WFP targeted IDPs (those in camps and those residing in host communities) and returnees from exile. While concentrating on relief and recovery for IDPs, PRRO 200143 (Jan 2011 – Dec 2012) signified a scaling down of the level of support during the end and the immediate aftermath of the end of the war (2009–2010). There was further reduction in the scale of operation with the closing down of Manik Farm, the main IDP camp, in the third quarter of 2012. By the time that PRRO 200452 (Jan 2013 – Dec 2015) took over, there was a significant increase in refugees returning from India, constituting a major addition to the relief and recovery operations. See Table 3 below for an overview of WFP assistance to IDPs.

**Table 3 Overview of WFP assistance to IDPs**

	<b>PRRO 200143</b>	<b>PRRO 200452</b>
Duration	Jan 2011 – Dec 2012	Jan 2013 – Dec 2015
Target group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Overall: Internally displaced persons in camps and living host communities, and returnees from exile.</li> <li>▪ Vulnerable groups: disabled, widows, PLW, children under 5, female-headed households.</li> </ul>	
Commodities	CSB, canned fish, beans, dried fruit, lentils, rice, split peas, sugar, oil, flour	CSB, canned fish, dried fruits, rice, split peas, oil
Planned beneficiaries (all categories)	1,053,760 (M: 519,792, F: 533,968)	1,128,200 (M: 547,700, F: 580,500)
Actual beneficiaries (all categories)	997,200 (M: 488,628, F: 508,572)	919,613 (M: 442,951, F: 476,662)
Target areas	Northern Province (all 5 Districts) <sup>58</sup>	Northern Province (all 5 Districts) <sup>59</sup>

Source: Project Documents and BRs; SPRs.

101. The priority of the Government was to resettle and reintegrate people displaced by conflict in their places of origin. At the one extreme there were people returning to their land after 20 or more years. At the other extreme were others who were returning after two or three years, having fled from the intensive fighting at the end of the conflict. Whatever their specific circumstances, people have been returning to conditions in which they face an array of radically changed familial, social, communal, economic, environmental and livelihood circumstances. Previous livelihoods were non-existent, and households that had often grown in number and size in their displacement returned with needs that were more complex, diverse and adverse – see Box 2 below for an illustration.

<sup>58</sup> The BR which extended the PRRO for a second year also added Batticaloa in Eastern Province to the assisted districts.

<sup>59</sup> However, a budget revision approved in July 2014 (BR4), taking account of the joint rapid assessment undertaken in April 2014 to assess the effects of drought, added ten additional districts to the operational area of the PRRO, namely: Ampara, Anuradhapura, Batticaloa, Galle, Hambantota, Kurenegala, Moneragala, Polonnaruwa, Puttalam and Trincomalee. See details below in Box 4. BR5, which extended the closing date of the PRRO from December 2014 to December 2015, also reverted to the original focus on Northern Province. However, BR6 (August 2015) re-included both GFD and FFA for resettling IDPs in Eastern as well as Northern Province.

## Box 2 Typical scenario of a resettlement community

In the Odaiveli Kuram area of Vavuniya District, all 390 families were displaced during various phases of the war, and the area was empty of civilians by 2007. In 2010, the number of families returning to the area from Manik Farm, all with immediate family and ancestor connection to the original displaced families, had increased to 415 and included 25 female-headed households (FHH). During the people's absence, the area had become a High Security Zone (HSZ). Some places were occupied by the armed forces, and the latter continue to be present in the area even after the end of HSZ categorisation. Other places had reverted to wilderness areas; farm land was overgrown by forests and encroached by elephants and other wild animals; and tanks and water channels were in disrepair. The challenges of rebuilding livelihoods include: living in close proximity to security forces; re-discovering communal trust; re-demarcating and reclaiming landholdings; rebuilding houses and homesteads; rebuilding community infrastructure and service amenities (such as irrigation tanks and channels, roads, schools and clinics); and people finding their places in the new more market-oriented Sri Lankan and global economy – including employment for young people who had not grown up in primarily agricultural circumstances.

102. WFP assistance to conflict-affected displaced people was based on an initial six-month food package under GFD.<sup>60</sup> Early recovery efforts then focused on restoring the agricultural assets of recently returned households through "soft Food for Assets" (SFFA – see Box 3 below for an explanation of this concept). The priority of FFW/FFA was to help people prepare for the next major harvest by restoring their productive assets and increasing access to irrigation facilities, roads, markets etc. Vulnerable households were then further entitled to enrol in FFA activities. Within the GFD and FFW/FFA programmes care was taken to focus on women and children, and female-headed households (FHHs) were given priority – more than half of beneficiaries of GFD and FFW/FFA were women.

## Box 3 Understanding "Soft FFA"

A key component of WFP's humanitarian relief and recovery assistance was 'Soft' FFA activities.

"Soft" food for assets is a concept developed in Sri Lanka to provide a bridge from vulnerable group feeding (VGF) to early recovery. Under SFFA, vulnerable communities nominate people for work activities, with individual VGF food rations provided as an incentive; SF FA involves simple activities that support livelihoods and enhance food security (WFP, 2010h).

The terminology around SFFA has not found favour elsewhere. In 2011 WFP reformulated its approach to Food for Work and similar activities, with the adoption of Food for Assets as the preferred terminology; this was linked to a new disaster risk reduction and management policy (WFP, 2011k). This reflected emerging lessons from experience, which were consolidated in 2014 in a synthesis report on findings from impact evaluations (WFP, 2014ab), a generally positive management response to the synthesis report's recommendations (WFP, 2014ad), and an updated FFA manual (WFP, 2014ac). From 2011 onwards the first edition of the FFA manual stipulated that the term "Food Assistance for Assets – or 'FFA'" should replace previous terminology such as "food for

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<sup>60</sup> However, by the time of the PRRO 200452 was extended to 2015, planned allocations had diminished to six weeks unconditional voucher transfers [GFD] and four months of conditional cash transfer for asset creation and rebuilding livelihoods (BR6).

work" or "cash for work".<sup>61</sup> This concern for correct terminology was directly linked to the desire to ensure that FFA approaches were more systematic and strategic in building resilience through the creation of high quality assets.

Accordingly, connotations of SFFA suggesting lower quality outputs, and being “quick and dirty” activities were raised as concerns by HQ. In HQ comments on draft project documents, a suggestion was made that low tech, low-risk activities should address specific livelihood profiles that still fall under the FFA implementation modality, and should be referred to as "low technology" rather than "soft". There is one reference to Low Technology FFA (LTFFA) in the PRRO 200452, but the evaluation team found that soft FFA was still the common usage. Reporting on outputs and outcomes did not distinguish between SFFA and other approaches to food for work.

During discussions of programme design, the CO explained the country-specific reasons for maintaining the SFFA terminology and approach. Operationally, SFFA was not subject to the usual approval procedures of traditional FFA where final approval was required from the central government (and very difficult to obtain). Furthermore, since 2009, WFP had not been permitted to sign Field Level Agreements (FLAs), which included for FFA activities. There was therefore an agreement between the CO and the GoSL that simpler activities could be designed and approved at community level through an SFFA project. The distinction in terminology therefore between FFA and SFFA was of critical operational importance, more so than the distinction in the activity itself (WFP, 2012k). The nature of the activities (i.e. light work, low-technical inputs required) also meant, in the CO's view, that there was greater household engagement potential and the relatively light start-up transaction costs made it a flexible and useful tool, particularly in early recovery contexts.

The country context thus inhibited implementation of WFP's preferred approach to FFA in its humanitarian work. However, more recent use of FFA to support climate adaptation has been consistent with WFP's corporate guidance (see Annex M).

**103. Relief and recovery for flood and drought affected people** was provided through three EMOPs, summarised in Table 4 below, together with a budget revision to PRRO 200452 in 2014, which expanded its scope to assist victims of drought (see Box 4 below). In chronological order:

- a) IR-EMOP 200233 (Jan 2011 – Mar 2011) was in response to the floods and landslides that started in December 2010 and reached a crescendo in January 2011. It was a life-saving measure providing GFD assistance to beneficiaries housed in temporary shelters for four days.
- b) EMOP 200239 (Jan 2011 – Jan 2012) was the regular project launched in response to the same emergency. A 10-day food package was provided under GFD. General food distribution stopped in April-May 2011 after those affected by the floods and landslides returned to their homes. This marked the start of the 'soft' FFA (SFFA) modality with flexible norms (cf. Box 3 above), enabling returnees to clean their homesteads and fields as they were assured of food security before the commencement of livelihood activities.
- c) PRRO 200452 was modified in 2014, as described in Box 4 below, to aid victims of drought.

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<sup>61</sup> "Various terms have often been used in the field, creating some confusion and consequently wrong perceptions about the activity implemented. **FFA now supersedes all of the previously used terms:** Food for Work (FFW), Cash for Work (CFW), Food for Work (light/soft), Food for Recovery etc. as there are all definitions that imply the building and rehabilitating of assets through food assistance." (WFP, 2014ac)



d) IR-EMOP 200809 was deployed in response to the flooding and landslide disasters of January 2015. The 'soft' FFA (SFFA) modality was implemented after victims had returned to their homes in April and May. A community-based approach was adopted in selecting beneficiaries in order to reduce the likelihood that vulnerable beneficiaries transitioning from relief were inadvertently excluded from receiving food assistance. Female-headed households and those with elderly and disabled persons were especially targeted to benefit from the SFFA projects.

**Table 4 Emergency Operations for flood and landslide victims**

	<b>IR EMOP 200233</b>	<b>EMOP 200239</b>	<b>IR EMOP 200809</b>
Duration	Jan 2011 – Mar 2011	Jan 2011 – Jan 2012	Jan 2015 – Apr 2015
Target group	Displaced flood victims living with host families	Flood victims in Eastern Sri Lanka	Flood and landslide victims
Commodities	Rice, sugar, split peas, oil	CSB, split peas, rice, sugar, oil	Rice, split peas, oil
Planned beneficiaries	420,000 (M: 208,320, F: 211,680)	560,000 (M: 277,760, F: 282,240)	238,400 (M: 112,900, F: 125,500)
Actual beneficiaries	442,740 (M: 219,156, F: 223,584)	538,149 (M: 256,898 F: 281,251)	250,450 (M: 116,810, F: 133,640)
Target areas	Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee in the Eastern province, Polonnaruwa district in the North-Central Province.	Ampara, Batticaloa, Trincomalee, Polonnaruwa and Anuradapura in the Eastern province	Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee in Eastern Province, Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa in North Central Province, Kurunegala and Puttalam in North-Western Province, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya in Northern Province, Badulla in Uva Province and Matale in Central Province.

Source: Project Documents and BRs; SPRs.

#### **Box 4 Modification of PRRO 200452 to support drought relief.**

A rapid joint needs assessment in April 2014 (GoSL, 2014b), found serious effects from an ongoing drought and recommended immediate, coordinated relief efforts to meet urgent needs and prevent a further collapse in household coping strategies. Of direct relevance to WFP was an identified need for emergency food assistance to the drought-affected food-insecure until the next harvest in September 2014. The proposed response was a two-month intervention to support 189,300 severely food-insecure people with one month of GFD and one month of early recovery interventions (FFA).

In addition to the five districts of Northern Province, the PRRO area of operation was expanded to include Ampara, Anuradhapura, Batticaloa, Galle, Hambantota, Kurenegala, Moneragala, Polonnaruwa, Puttalam and Trincomalee. In the 15 districts, 161 out of 207 Divisional Secretariats were targeted.

Geographical targeting was to be undertaken by Divisional Secretariats focusing on the most food insecure and those with the least coping capacity.

The drought response was to be co-managed by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Disaster Management, and implemented through World Vision, Save the Children, Child Fund and Oxfam, with each of the counterparts implementing the GFD and FFA activities in specific districts using the same set of targeting protocols and criteria. The food modality was to be used in 12 districts, but cash in Vavuniya (Save the Children), Mannar (Oxfam) and Puttalam (World Vision).

Sources: PRRO 200452, Budget Revisions 4 and 5.

104. **Rationale.** Much the same rationale applied to support for IDPs and for victims of weather-related emergencies. In both cases, GFD was seen as an appropriate life-sustaining initial support, to be followed if possible by FFA to help beneficiaries regain viable livelihoods. The "soft FFA" modality (Box 3 above) was a pragmatic adaptation to low levels of resources and the difficulty and delay involved in getting GoSL approval for more sophisticated FFA, with the advantage that it facilitated continued selection of vulnerable groups for support; however, it is implausible that durable assets will be created through SFFA. Crucial assumptions are:

- a) the availability of sufficient resources for a long enough period to enable sustainable livelihoods to be regained;
- b) competent implementing partners: WFP relied on GoSL agencies (and occasionally NGOs) in identifying beneficiaries and delivering GFD/FFA;
- c) complementary inputs from other agencies: a major assumption underlying WFP support is that during and around the time of GFD and FFA interventions, measures are being taken to secure other amenities of life and livelihood for the affected population, for example, physical and psycho security, land ownership, housing, physical and market access, occupational skills, and so forth. The implementation of WFP activities was a typically collaborative effort with a clear division of labour established with GoSL departments and other UN agencies.

#### *Programme delivery and results*

105. **IDPs and other returnees:** The change of Government in January 2015 marked an important change in the attitude and performance of the Government in the settlement and provision of lasting solutions to IDPs and other returnees. By the end of the civil war in May 2009, in addition to IDPs who were living in host

communities, there were as many as 300,000 IDPs in camps in Vavuniya District, with Manik Farm being the largest. By the beginning of the evaluation period in 2011, resettlement activities were winding down. The process was officially completed and all camps, including Manik Farm, were officially closed by September 2012. However, the official removal of camps did not mean that the IDPs' needs had been effectively addressed. In particular, the Government was slow in obtaining approvals for resettlement from the Presidential Task Force (PTF) and in releasing land to potential returnees. Thus while many people were classified as no longer internally displaced, they in reality had nowhere to return to, and because they were not settled in their places of origin or had no access to or titles to property they could not receive assistance. This was the background that faced the new Government in January 2015 with regard to IDPs and other returnees.

106. Although camps have been officially removed, as of April 2015 as many as 13,459 families, accounting for 44,934 persons, were yet to be resettled and houses for them were still under construction. During interviews with the Ministry of Resettlement in July 2016, it was suggested that there are currently still around 14,000 conflict-affected families that need to be resettled. This was the rationale for the extension of PRRO 2000452 to December 2015, but it is apparent that the task of resettlement had not been completed by the end of the evaluation period in December 2015.<sup>62</sup>

107. In terms of GFD beneficiary numbers, the PRROs met and far exceeded expectations as GFD was extended to 175,000 persons, twice as many as planned. There was no compromise on the quality of GFD packages as they still contained enough nutrition for daily recommended intake. However, the period of GFD per family was cut drastically – from 6 months to as little as 45 days. Only 60 percent of planned beneficiaries participated in FFW/FFA activities.

#### *Assessment*

108. **Relevance:** there is little doubt of the relevance of WFP's relief and recovery operations during the evaluation period. In 2011 the country was only two years removed from the 26-year-long civil war that had displaced and destroyed the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of people especially in the Northern and Eastern Districts; it was appropriate to focus on the most conflict-affected areas, and WFP and GoSL were able to draw on systematic needs assessments (described in Annex K) in targeting and designing interventions. A close ongoing relationship between WFP and the Ministry of Disaster Management assisted in the early identification of emergency needs and joint design of responses. At the same time, WFP's EMOPs and drought response showed an ability to deploy GFD and FFA approaches more widely to address emergency needs. WFP's interventions have been relevant to saving lives, rebuilding livelihoods, and promoting reconciliation and harmony.

109. **Effectiveness:** in an overall sense, WFP appears to have implemented the relief and recovery portfolio PRRO and EMOPs competently, and its GFD and FFA activities were broadly effective in providing targeted support to food-insecure communities. Yet effectiveness of the interventions was compromised by spreading resources too thin. The numbers of FFA beneficiaries were also proportionately bigger

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<sup>62</sup> The draft WFP Sri Lanka Country Strategy 2016-2019 and Country Programme Sri Lanka 200866 (2016–2017) do not address these outstanding IDP resettlement issues in explicit terms, but there may be room to address them under the respective Strategic Objectives and Components.

than the actual funding, and thus the benefits of this programme were similarly compromised.

110. The number of beneficiaries covered by GFD and FFA in response to the two flood and landslide disasters in 2011 and 2015 exceeded those that were planned. As with the conflict-related operations, this was achieved by reductions in amount of aid extended to individual beneficiaries, again compromising the effectiveness of the assistance. The consolidated FFA data from SPRs are revealing: Table 5 below shows that FFT activities were negligible in 2013 and ceased thereafter; and despite the fact that virtually all this activity was classified as "FFA" from 2013 onwards, much less asset creation is recorded from 2012 onwards (Table 6 below).

**Table 5 Summary of SPR data on FFA participants**

FFA		FFA participants	FFW participants	FFT participants	Total participants
2011	Planned		61,500	2,000	63,500
	Actual		68,988	1,243	70,231
2012	Planned		47,000	2,000	49,000
	Actual		19,300	61	19,361
2013	Planned	6,000		1,000	7,000
	Actual	3,613		138	3,751
2014	Planned	31,112		1,000	32,112
	Actual	27,572		0	27,572
2015	Planned	23,700		500	24,200
	Actual	1,840		88	1,928

Source: SPRs. Based on the assumption that EMOP200239 and the PRROs target distinct beneficiaries and do not overlap.

**Table 6 Planned and actual outputs of FFA activities**

FFA activities	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
Agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes (ha)	57	55								
Agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes (ha)	770	770			250	155	200	168	24	21
Community woodlots (ha)	230	230	16	2						
Cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only (ha)	469	1147								
Cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques only (ha)	1,163	819								

FFA activities	2011		2012		2013		2014		2015	
	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A	P	A
Land cleared (ha)	351	207			59	59	400	346	1	1
Feeder roads built and maintained (km)	1,397	3,041	131	0	44	44	425	388	21	17
Communities assisted with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks	2,347	1,946			1	1				
Existing nurseries supported	10	10								
Farmers who have adopted fertility management measures in their homestead and cultivated fields	200	200								
Latrines constructed/rehabilitated	786	786	32	32						
Shallow wells constructed	110	95	2	2						
Participants in beneficiary training sessions	1,240	1,243								

Source: SPRs. Based on the assumption that EMOP200239 and the PRROs target distinct beneficiaries and do not overlap. Additional indicators in Annex I.

111. **Efficiency:** while undertaking relief and recovery efforts in conflict-related and natural disaster emergencies, working within government systems may have constrained WFP's flexibility and efficiency, by limiting the agency's ability to target and or/work with specific groups and/or to operate freely in some geographical areas. This was true to some extent during the part of the evaluation prior to January 2015, when the then government had a hostile and sometimes obstructionist attitude towards international organisations and NGOs. The preference for SFFA was partly a response to this context. Relationships with GoSL over IDPs were much smoother after 2015.

112. A more serious constraint to efficiency of relief and recovery programmes and activities in conflict and natural disaster situations was the chronic underfunding of the portfolio. This became even more serious in the face of the reality that there were, in almost all cases, more people seeking relief and recovery assistance from WFP than WFP had planned. WFP mitigated this by spreading the assistance to a greater number of people while reducing the number of days over which assistance was provided. This is a natural response in the short term, but most likely means that efficiency (results per unit of input) as well as effectiveness fell short of what was envisaged. It is notable that the CP 2016–2017 envisages "Targeted communities will receive assistance for the duration of CP 200866 to maximize its benefits. This approach differs from previous food-for-work activities characterized by short-term assistance over a wide area." (WFP, 2015k)

113. **Sustainability:** in terms of *design*, WFP's relief and recovery efforts in Sri Lanka have been strongly oriented towards sustainability. Thus (a) WFP has worked with government agencies (and alongside other partners) in ways that deliberately seek to strengthen the government systems which will be increasingly responsible for managing future responses; (b) the characteristic approach in which GFD is followed

by FFA is intended to help beneficiaries towards regaining sustainable livelihoods. However, there must be serious doubts about the sustainability of the interventions as *delivered*. This is particularly true in the case of IDPs: the duration of WFP's planned support for beneficiaries was reduced in order to spread meagre resources more widely. This in itself compromised sustainability, but beneficiaries' achievement of self-reliance depends on complementary inputs from other partners, which have also typically been insufficient (a problem which was manifest in all the resettlement sites visited by the evaluation team).

114. The G10 International Convention, Oslo 2008, outcome document "10 years of Guiding Principles [on Internal Displacement]" (FMR, 2008) states that "IDPs often receive too little support for too short a period of time to allow them to re-establish their lives in safety and dignity". Evidence from sites visited during the CPE field trip tended to support this contention, though the responsibility for any failings would be collective (donors, UN organisations, NGOs and Government) and not attributable to WFP alone.

### **Adaptation to climate change**

115. WFP secured funding for one climate change project in Sri Lanka during the evaluation period.<sup>63</sup> Because of start-up delays, its implementation does not fall within the 2011–2015 period. However, it is clear from interviews and documentary review that engagement with climate change issues is seen as an important dimension of any future country strategy. The evaluation team met with project implementers and visited both project sites during its field work in Sri Lanka. It therefore seemed useful to put on record the team's tentative observations, and this has been done in Annex M.

### **School feeding**

#### *The intended programme and its rationale*

116. WFP has been continuously involved in school feeding in Sri Lanka since 2003. Prior to 2011 it had run a school meals programme (SMP) in Eastern Province and, earlier, in parts of the south. During the evaluation period, however, the SMP was confined to Northern Province, with about 160,000 children being fed, compared to a peak of about 400,000. The SMP took place against the background of Sri Lanka's high educational standards (including near-universal primary enrolment), and with GoSL itself providing school meals (supplemented by a small school milk programme) across the rest of the country.

117. Table 7 below shows the relative scale of WFP and GoSL programmes in 2015. They run on very different bases. The government cash-based school meals programme operates in over 80 percent of all schools that receive a form of food assistance (Medagama, 2015). GoSL provides schools with funds which are used to procure the delivery of school meals by local providers; the schools do not procure food directly but rather procure a school meal service. The WFP-supported programme in NP operates on a more traditional basis, with most components of the meal (most recently comprising rice, pulses and vegetable oil, supplemented by canned fish) being procured centrally<sup>64</sup> and delivered periodically to schools, where School Development Societies (SDSs) arrange for volunteers or hired cooks to prepare and serve the meals on site. WFP inputs are complemented by a "greenery fund" from GoSL to enable the

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<sup>63</sup> A second climate-related project (mangroves) is included in the CP 2016–17; it is described in Box 17 at the end of Annex M.

<sup>64</sup> Imported commodities procured by the CO and, upon arrival in Colombo, handed over to GoSL for onward distribution.

purchase of fresh vegetables. WFP also provided some non-food support (e.g. for the construction and equipment of school kitchens).

**Table 7 Coverage of WFP and GoSL school meals programmes (2015)**

<b>Programme</b>	<b>Students covered</b>	<b>Schools</b>
<i>School Meal Program for primary children</i>	884,620	6,839
<i>School Milk Program</i>	84,843	352
<i>WFP supported School Meal Program</i>	156,427	958
	<b>1,125,890</b>	<b>8,149</b>

Source: State Ministry of Education (March 2015) – cited in SABER, 2015.

118. As for other activities, the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs (MNPEA) is WFP's primary counterpart for the SMP, but overall responsibility for running Sri Lanka's SMPs rests with the School Nutrition and Health Services Branch under the State Ministry of Education.<sup>65</sup> At operational level, there is a provincial SMP coordinator based in Jaffna, and District Monitoring Units (DMUs) in each of the five districts are responsible for monitoring the programme; they liaise closely with staff of WFP's Area Office and Sub-Offices (see Figure 14 in Annex H) who have an overall monitoring and reporting role.

119. It is widely recognised that school feeding may have many complementary benefits (Bundy et al., 2009) and the rationale for WFP's SMP in Northern Province (NP) draws on most of them. After the war, with considerable administrative disruption in NP, WFP was seen to be better placed than GoSL itself to ensure effective delivery of school meals in a context where there was considerable disruption of logistics and markets. The SMP was seen as an element of social protection – a resource transfer to conflict-affected families, as well as one way of demonstrating the restoration of normal social services after the war. Presumably for that reason, the NP SMP had wider coverage (Grades 1 to 9) than the regular GoSL programmes elsewhere (Grades 1 to 5). The social protection rationale is prominent in many WFP accounts. For example, the PRRO 200143 project document notes "the provision of school meals also serves as a direct value transfer to conflict-affected households as they rebuild their livelihoods", and the draft strategy for 2016–2019 has "provide school meals as a safety net for food insecure households through income transfers". However, in other contexts different justifications for school feeding tend to be more prominent – Box 5 below briefly considers alternative rationales and their plausibility in the Sri Lanka context.

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<sup>65</sup> "The school feeding programme in Sri Lanka is coordinated by a multi-sectoral steering committee and the School Health Promotion Steering Committee. This committee is chaired by the Secretary of State Ministry of Education and has representatives of the State Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Child Development, Ministry of Social Services and Livestock Development and the Ministry of Urban Development, Water supply & Drainage. The committee tends to meet on a quarterly basis." (SABER, 2015)

## **Box 5 Complementary rationales for the WFP SMP in Sri Lanka**

### **Social protection / income transfer**

This justification ("a sturdy safety net") was highlighted in PRRO project documents and draft country strategies, and reflected in the SMP design (Grades 1–9, compared with Grades 1–5 in the rest of the country and unusual for WFP in extending beyond primary grades).

### **Boosting school enrolment/attendance**

This justification has to be approached with care in a country where primary education is compulsory and near-universal. The PRRO 200143 project document refers to: "stabilising school enrolment and attendance, and addressing short-term hunger among children emerging from conflict through a school meals component." The PRRO 200452 has "Promote school attendance and retention of girls and boys", while the draft strategy for 2016–2019 has " Safeguard children's access to education ".

Since there is not much scope to boost school enrolment in Sri Lanka, effects in this dimension are more likely to be on attendance rates.

### **Alleviate short-term hunger / boost concentration**

Both PRRO documents refer to addressing short-term hunger. This is a good in itself, but various international studies have identified this also as a way to improve concentration, and hence potentially learning, among school children.

### **Wider nutritional objectives**

Nutritional objectives are rarely given as a primary justification for school feeding, particularly because of increasing recognition that stunting has to be addressed at pre-school ages. However, there are legitimate ancillary nutritional benefits that may be sought. Thus PRRO 200143 envisaged the SMP as part of an integrated package (in coordination with UNICEF and other partners) to include "de-worming, micro-nutrient supplementation, and water and sanitation programmes, to re-establish a healthy school environment".

The report of the SABER workshop (SABER, 2015) includes the following:

While school feeding as such is not mentioned in the National Nutrition Policy[GoSL, 2010a], as part of the policy objective Ensuring Optimal Nutrition throughout the lifecycle, the mid-day meals programme is further mentioned in the Multi-sector Action Plan for Nutrition [GoSL, 2013d] as a means to address micro-nutrient deficiencies. The main objectives of school feeding are therefore related to improving the nutritional status of school going children. The sectoral responsibility for school feeding lies with both the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health.

### **Local economic benefits**

The ability of school feeding to act as a stimulus to the local economy is often cited as a benefit, e.g. in terms of "Home-Grown School Feeding"(which is usually couched in terms of procurement from nearby producers). Given the in-kind approach to the WFP SMP, this is not cited as a justification for it, but the HGSF arguments have been deployed in relation to the GoSL SMP, and are therefore relevant to consideration of eventual handover.

### **Capacity development**

From the outset there has been a presumption that the NP SMP will be handed over to GoSL in due course, but this has been premised on the adoption of a national school feeding policy or strategy that would facilitate a smooth transition. Dialogue and WFP



support to development of school feeding policy was therefore an important planned input. The project document for PRRO 200452 stated:

WFP-supported SMP will be phased out in the course of PRRO 200452. The government SMP is expected to expand its coverage to the North from 2014 onwards. Students in grades 1–9 will continue to be supported in year one, but PRRO assistance will be reduced to grades 1–5 in year two in line with the WFP policy. Parents and communities will be empowered to nurture a sense of ownership and provide support for SMP in their respective areas using their own local products and resources. Some schools in urban and food secure areas also may graduate from WFP support in the course of this PRRO. To facilitate a smooth transition, WFP will provide capacity building to the Ministry of Education (MoE).

### *Programme delivery and results*

120. Table 8 below provides a summary of data from SPRs. An average per year of 161,000 children in 924 schools received school meals over the review period.<sup>66</sup> This was close to the planned level of 160,000 from 2012 onwards, but it is not clear why actual numbers have tended to fall since 2012 (targets for numbers of schools were reached). Support to cooks ceased after 2012, but secondary-age children – mostly in Grades 6–9 – continued to form a large proportion (around 45 percent) of beneficiaries.

121. From 2013, in-kind contributions of canned fish (Japan) and dates (Saudi Arabia) further diversified the food basket. Alongside the SMP, a school health promotion programme is in place to improve water and sanitary facilities and hygiene practices such as hand-washing before taking a meal, though there are certain shortcomings. The Ministry of Health is providing iron tablets, folic acid and vitamin A in addition to the de-worming treatment.

122. Progress towards handover to GoSL was not as rapid as expected. As noted in Box 5 above, the PRROs expressed definite intentions of progressive handover to GoSL. The Government itself proposed (in a letter from the External Resources Department, 2 October 2013) that "The School Meal Programme (SMP) could also be merged together with the Mahinda Chintana School Feeding Programme which is being implemented by the Ministry of Educational Services." In response, WFP prepared a report "Alignment of WFP-SMP under Mahinda Chintana" (WFP, 2014aa). This focused on the practicalities of switching to a cash modality in the 241 schools in NP which had fewer than 75 students. A questionnaire found considerable support for such a change: 56 percent of respondents supported it, but many more said they would have been in favour if they had more confidence that cash transfers would arrive reliably and on time.

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<sup>66</sup> In 2015 there were 995 functioning schools in Northern Province with a total of 250,360 school children (Northern Province, 2015). The SMP did not include "national" schools (those directly controlled by the central government), and did not feed all grades in the schools assisted.

**Table 8 Summary of planned and actual school feeding outputs**

School feeding		Children receiving school meals	Number of cooks assisted by WFP	Number of primary schools assisted	Number of primary school children*	Number of secondary school children*
2011	Planned	173,000	2,300	837		
	Actual	166,436	2,159	837		
2012	Planned	160,000	2,000	927		
	Actual	170,909	2,133	927		
2013	Planned	160,000		937		
	Actual	162,660		937		
2014	Planned	160,000		968	85,470	74,530
	Actual	153,123		958	83,753	69,370
2015	Planned	160,000		958	85,470	74,530
	Actual	151,560		959	80,965	70,595

Source: SPRs. (The full output and outcome data reported in the SPRs are in Annex I.)

\*Breakdown between primary and secondary school beneficiaries not provided for 2011–2013.

123. During 2014 the CO secured funds from the Government of Canada to run a cash pilot SMP. However, there were delays in undertaking the pilot because of difficulty in agreeing with GoSL the appropriate amount of the cash transfer. This related to a WFP concern that schools handed over should not deliver rations below the standards approved in WFP guidelines.<sup>67</sup> By the time the matter was resolved<sup>68</sup> there was very little time left to utilise the Canadian grant, and so the pilot ran (in 130 schools) for a shorter period in November and December 2014 than would have been preferred. Those who had actually experienced a cash modality were much more positive about it (98 percent) than those who had earlier simply been questioned in principle. See Annex O for further discussion of the school feeding cash pilot.

124. Nonetheless, no schools were handed over during the evaluation period. During discussions of the concept note for the Country Programme, the CO indicated that it would support the use of the Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)<sup>69</sup> to facilitate development of a national school feeding policy and pave the way for systematic handover. A workshop was held in March 2015 (SABER, 2015), and a situation analysis was subsequently prepared in line with one of the workshop

<sup>67</sup> From PRRO 200452 BR4 (July 2014):

WFP has not been able to receive concurrence from the Government on the implementation modalities. The national cash transfer amount and approved menus are nutritionally 25% lower than WFP minimum standards for half-day primary SMPs in terms of calories, protein and Vitamin A. As the cash-based SMP component is designed to be based on the ongoing national cash transfers for school meals, WFP would not be providing the correct entitlement to primary school age children, thus violating the "do no harm" principle.

<sup>68</sup> From PRRO 200452 BR5 (undated):

To meet the WFP standard energy requirement (524 Kcal), WFP agreed to top up with an additional in-kind ration of 30g (111 Kcal) canned fish. Due to this addition the government has since agreed to go ahead with the school meals programme and the pilot cash for school meals was initiated in November 2014.

<sup>69</sup> See <http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm>.

recommendations (Medagama, 2015); other recommendations included development of school feeding policy and testing of school meals models in urban, peri-urban and rural areas so as to identify ways in which school feeding will be most effective. The WFP commitment to school feeding in NP was carried forward under the CP 2016–2017:

WFP is now implementing only the school feeding programme in Northern Province for 160,000 students, which it will hand over after providing technical assistance to overcome limitations such as the absence of a national school feeding policy and the use of untested feeding models.


125. A further initiative was a school feeding Cost Benefit Analysis for Sri Lanka (WFP, 2015n); this was a modelling exercise, intended to support advocacy for school feeding by showing its potential benefits. However, as noted in Annex K, it is important not to confuse hypothetical modelling with empirical research.

126. Another influential study is worth mentioning (linked to Figure 8 below). As reported in the CO's M&E report for 2013 (WFP, 2013m):

WFP jointly with Ministry of Education Services and Ministry of Economic Development conducted an evaluation survey of the School Meal Programme in the Northern Province. The evaluation covered 194 Schools and 2,750 students in all five districts of Northern Province. .... There were two alarming findings from the survey; constant delay in receiving greenery payments and losing 14% of school feeding days due to pipeline breaks.

The SMP evaluation survey conducted in 2013 showed higher or same malnutrition levels from 2006 and it is illustrated in Figure 8 below. The evaluation was an eye opener and which got WFP to re-programme the SMP from addressing short term hunger to increasing nutrition levels of the students.

**Figure 8 School Malnutrition Levels, Northern Province 2006–2012**



Source: SMP Evaluation 2013 June (cited in M&E Report WFP, 2013m)

### Assessment

127. The CPE assessment is based on document review, interviews and field visit observations. The evaluation team's general impressions from its visit to NP in July 2016 are summarised in Box 6 below. Overall, this seems to be a well-run programme, though of course there is scope for operational improvements, as Box 6 indicates. The main focus for the assessment, however, is on the strategic issues concerning the future role of the SMP in NP, and of WFP's role in relation to school feeding in Sri Lanka.

## Box 6 SMP in Northern Province, field visit observations July 2016

- All stakeholders were very positive about the SMP; children appeared to enjoy the meal, their parents and the SDSs valued it, and Principals were convinced that alleviating short-term hunger helped children perform better.
- There is some good collaboration with UN partners: we visited one example where FAO, UNICEF and UNOPS were involved in a pilot funded by KOICA; the UNICEF focus was on child-friendly schools, UNOPS was constructing hostels for teachers to ensure quality of education, and FAO supporting school gardens alongside the WFP SMP.
- Operational issues in some cases included scarcity of firewood for cooking, and unsuitable smoky kitchens. There was a strong preference for local dhal over the imported variety, which was less palatable and took longer to cook. Suitable storage for food was not always available, and in some schools' water supplies were unsatisfactory both for cooking and for hand-washing. It can be problematic to rely on volunteers to do the cooking.
- It is not certain that iodised salt is systematically used, and the dietary diversity supposed to be supported by the greenery allowance is sometimes compromised by delays in receiving the funds and by poor availability of vegetables, especially in the lean season.

128. **Relevance:** a WFP-supported SMP was highly relevant in the post-conflict situation, and it was right to give prominence to the safety-net argument in justifying it. Over time, as the Northern Province recovers, with functioning markets and restored infrastructure, there is a less compelling case for an in-kind modality using mainly imported food, and for applying higher standards of school feeding (in terms of nutritional specification, and in terms of availability to secondary school students) than in the rest of Sri Lanka.

129. **Effectiveness:** the programme reached as many schools and nearly as many students as planned. The achievement is slightly marred by pipeline breaks (which in 2013 were estimated to have cost 14 percent of planned feeding days – see ¶126 above), but the programme appears competently implemented, and has therefore certainly fulfilled its safety net role, by acting as an income transfer which has most significance for poorer families. (The CBA modelling exercise (WFP, 2015n) estimated the annual value transfer at approximately USD 200 per beneficiary; this is an immediate effect, whereas effects via increased attendance, concentration/cognition, educational attainment and lifetime earnings are much longer-term and less certain.)

130. It is less straightforward to assess the programme's effectiveness against the other potential justifications described in Box 5 above:

- As noted, a significant effect on enrolment is unlikely in the Sri Lanka context.<sup>70</sup> An effect in boosting attendance rates is more plausible, but it appears that attendance data have not been collected systematically enough for this proposition to be tested.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Outcome indicators reported in SPRs (see Annex I) are of little assistance in assessing the effectiveness of the SMP. The indicators for PRRO 200143 were the gender ratio in enrolment (little scope for improvement as already near parity), and teachers reporting that school feeding improves concentration. For PRRO 200452 the selected outcome indicators were NERs and retention rates in WFP-assisted schools, but the reported data offer no comparison with other schools.

<sup>71</sup> The evaluation team also saw correspondence which suggested that reported attendance figures may have been biased upwards.

- Similarly, the educational benefits of alleviating short-term hunger, although anecdotally supported,<sup>72</sup> are impossible to demonstrate in a particular case without very sophisticated studies.
- It is also impossible to demonstrate the effectiveness of the nutritional components and accompaniments of the SMP, although there is good global evidence that such interventions as deworming and micronutrient supplementation can be effective, and they are certainly relevant in the light of current evidence in Sri Lanka (including Figure 8 above).

131. At the same time, there is some evidence of NP catching up educationally with the rest of the country since the war. For example, the provincial authorities in Jaffna cited data to show that the percentage of NP students achieving more than 70 percent in the grade 5 scholarship examination had risen from only 56 percent in 2012 to around 70 percent in 2014 and 2015; NP was the top-ranked province in 2015 after being ranked only 8<sup>th</sup> in 2012. It is reasonable to believe that the SMP may have made some contribution to the resurgence of the NP education system.

132. **Efficiency:** the programme generally appears to run smoothly, although it has been affected by some pipeline breaks. WFP has clearly protected the SMP against shortfalls in overall funding for the PRROs, and, at school level, any extra food is used to feed more secondary students. The characteristic delays in receiving greenery payments are a concern. The 2013 survey (cf. ¶126 above) reported that:

The School Meals Programme found it challenging to work with many layers horizontally and vertically from MED to SDC. It was often proven that the Ministry of Economic Development being WFP's main counterpart, Ministry of Education was not willing to take the ownership of the WFP's School Meals Programme which affected the regular programming.

133. **Sustainability:** the lack of progress towards integrating the NP SMP with the national school feeding programme is a major concern. As noted in ¶122–125 above, WFP has made significant efforts to work with GoSL on strengthening school feeding policy and developing a strategy for handover that would maintain the quality of school feeding for primary students in NP, but has not yet reached the point of handing over any schools. The process initiated by the SABER workshop appears to be very important, but may not be easy to follow through, as interviews indicated persistent scepticism within GoSL about the need for a separate school feeding policy and strategy.

## **Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition**

### *The intended programme and its rationale*

134. MCHN was a component of three main operations. The development project 106070 ran from January 2008 to September 2013, with an explicit focus on MCHN in non-PRRO areas. It was implemented in six districts where acute malnutrition was highest, as reported in the 2006/2007 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). An additional three districts located in the former conflict areas were added at the end of 2010 when existing coverage through an earlier PRRO ended. The PRROs (200143 and 200452), which spanned 2011–2015 and focused mainly on Northern Province, both included supplementary feeding for children 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women (PLW) as well as capacity building of health workers and mothers at

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<sup>72</sup> SPRs record 100% of teachers reporting that school feeding improves concentration.

the clinics. The respective MCHN details of these three operations are summarised in Table 9 below.

**Table 9 MCHN project components**

	<b>DEV 10607</b>	<b>PRRO 200143</b>	<b>PRRO 200452</b>
Duration	Jan 2008 – Sep 2013	Jan 2011 – Dec 2012	Jan 2013 – Dec 2014
Target group	Children 6-23 months (blanket) and 24-59 months who are malnourished and PLW. However this changed over a period of time to a targeted supplementary feeding programme (SFP) to address MAM for children 6-59 months.	Malnourished pregnant and lactating women and children 6-59 months	
Commodities	CSB	CSB , oil, sugar	CSB and Supercereal Plus
Planned beneficiaries	236,000 [M: 98,500, F: 137,500],	35,000 children and 14,000 PLW	Children 6-23 months 35,000; 6-59 months 20,000 and PLW 13,000
Actual beneficiaries	215,553 [M: 83,669, F: 131,884]	(see Table 11 below for aggregate MCHN beneficiaries)	
Target areas	Anuradhapura, Badulla, Hambantota, Nuwara Eliya, Ratnapura <sup>73</sup> and Monaragala. With change in the context of Sri Lanka, in 2010 3 additional districts (Mannar, Vavuniya and Batticaloa), were included from PRRO to Dev project.	Northern Province – 5 Districts	Northern Province – 5 Districts.

Source: Project Documents and BRs.

135. WFP sought to help government to tackle the intergenerational cycle of malnutrition. The intended approach had both upstream and downstream elements. WFP planned to work closely with GoSL (the Ministry of Health in particular) to augment MCHN services provided through government clinics and complement GoSL distribution of Thripasha (see Box 7 below). As well as providing technical support to increase the production and quality of Thripasha, WFP would advocate for more effective (targeted) use of supplementary foods in tackling undernutrition.

<sup>73</sup> Ratnapura, initially selected in the project, was unable to participate due to operational constraints and was therefore replaced with Polonnaruwa, based on a request from the MoH (BR 8, DEV 106070).

## Box 7 Thriposha

Thriposha is a ready-to-eat pre-cooked supplementary food produced from heat-treated maize and de-hulled soy beans, whole milk powder, vitamins and minerals. It is manufactured by a state-owned company under the overview of the Ministry of Health.

Thriposha was first introduced in Sri Lanka in 1973 by CARE Canada in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. Since then significant technical and financial investment has been dedicated by GoSL to its development. In addition, WFP has also extended support to strengthen the production capacity.

Thriposha is distributed to children 6–59 months who are underweight, and to all PLW. The current ration is 50g per day per person; this provides 200 kcal, which does not meet the nutritional requirements of a malnourished child or PLW and is not in line with WFP guidelines. The ration was decided based on capacity of Thriposha production, rather than the nutritional requirements. The distribution of Thriposha is very popular despite the doubtful efficacy of the ration provided.

Challenges in increasing the availability of Thriposha include production capacity, availability of raw materials (as these are procured through small farmers), outdated equipment and inadequate factory management.

WFP has commissioned several expert missions since 2000, but the basic issues identified have not yet been successfully addressed. The quality and quantity of Thriposha production and its distribution still remain a challenge.

The latest WFP technical inputs were a food technologist's report in 2016 (Nguyen, 2016) and a joint report on the future development and diversification of Thriposha (WFP & MoH, 2016). Subsequent discussions have led to a request from the Ministry of Health to WFP for further technical assistance in improving the quantity and quality of Thriposha production, including assistance with the development of a new and more suitable product for the treatment of MAM in children under 5 (MoH, 2016).

136. The interventions were based on a clearly defined objective of saving lives and protecting the nutritional status of a population. An implicit theory of change is that supplementary food like CSB, Supercereal and Thriposha, as well as food rations, provided to PLW and children will improve their nutritional status. However, major assumptions of this theory are (a) that the supplementary food is supplied in sufficient quantity to be effective and is consumed by the intended beneficiary; and (b) that other factors, such as health, WASH, psycho-social issues and caring practices, are also being taken care of.

137. All three operations envisaged handover of MCHN activities to GoSL. Thus:

- DEV 106070: initial imports of CSB were to be phased out in favour of Thriposha, once WFP technical support had enabled increased production of the latter. This would "enable WFP to hand over gradually during the five years by eliminating CSB imports and ensuring sufficient national production to supply the Government's programme; as WFP reduces its contribution, the Government will take over the targeted districts and beneficiaries. ... It is expected that by 2013 the Government will have assumed responsibility for the entire food component."
- PRRO 200143: "during implementation the nutrition status of children aged 6–59 months will be monitored, and once wasting rates reach acceptable levels, the nutrition intervention for these children will be integrated into the Government-led programme."

- PRRO 200452: "Handover of the MAM treatment programme to MoH is envisaged as production of fortified blended food (FBF) increases, MoH staff capacity improves, and the service is incorporated as a core health activity."

*Programme delivery and results*

138. There were a number of changes and additions to the nutrition components of the portfolio during the evaluation period. There was difficulty in attracting funding (during the evaluation period, the DEV was only 36 percent funded – see Figure 3 in section 1.3 above), and so the original intention to prevent as well as treat MAM was dropped, and the project became a treatment programme aiming to provide supplementary feeding for children 6–59 months old suffering from moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) (WFP, 2013m).

139. There were also other changes. Under DEV 106070 BRs 2 and 3, WFP was asked to purchase soy to mix with maize to ensure continuation of Thriposha production, rather than providing CSB. However, in January 2012 the GoSL instituted a ban on soy imports to encourage local production. The capacity of Thriposha production was critically affected, and to address the gap WFP imported Supercereal plus to treat MAM. However, there were further problems concerning its import and storage, so that deliveries fell short of plans.<sup>74</sup>

140. Table 10 below shows the (limited) food quantities distributed under DEV 106070, while Table 11 below provides a summary of SPR data on aggregated implementation of MCHN activities. Except for PLW and children aged 24–59 months, actual beneficiaries fell significantly below target, and the targets themselves were substantially reduced over the evaluation period (though less so for children aged 24–59 months than for PLW and infants).

**Table 10 Food distributed under DEV 106070**

	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
Planned	6,264	210	1,754
Actual	573	125	836
actual as % of planned	9.1%	59.5%	47.7%

Source: SPRs

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<sup>74</sup> There were issues as to whether Supercereal met GoSL standards; once that was resolved distribution was held up by shortage of storage space in health facilities.



**Table 11 Summary of planned and actual MCHN outputs**

MCHN		Children 6 to 23 months	Children 24 to 59 months	PLW	No. of cooking demonstrations	Number of health centres/sites assisted	No. of health workers trained in food distribution
2011	Planned	139,000	59,500	68,000	300	1,121	
	Actual	115,221	106,430	73,757	300	1,121	
2012	Planned	41,758	60,242	24,000	35	574	
	Actual	23,469	39,761	17,353	35	574	
2013	Planned	63,500	47,500	13,000	25	1,801	2,800
	Actual	17,554	36,534	4,361	35	1,707	3005
2014	Planned	41,670	13,330	13,000		570	
	Actual	3,322	9,141	11,566		570	
2015	Planned	32,870	57,130	13,000		385	
	Actual	24,197	14,105	0		385	

Source: SPRs. Based on the assumption that DEV106070, EMOP200239 and the PRROs target distinct beneficiaries and do not overlap. Annex I provides the full set of output data recorded in SPRs.

141. Reported upstream work included support to the development of the first multi-sector nutrition plan (GoSL, 2013c), as well as several pieces of analytical work, as detailed in Annex K: WFP was a contributor to UNICEF, 2012, a desk review of nutrition determinants and interventions; undertook a nutritional assessment for Northern Province (UNHCR & WFP, 2012), and commissioned Jayatissa, 2016 as a follow-up to the 2012 nutrition and micronutrient survey (UNICEF & GoSL, 2012).

142. Additional nutrition components were embodied in two trust funds, both focused on upstream work. Under the *Scaling up Nutrition (SUN) Multi-partner Trust Fund (MPTF)*, WFP, as the participating UN agency, partnered with Save the Children to set up and support a ‘civil society alliance in Sri Lanka’ (the SUN People’s Forum – SUN PF) to work closely with the National Nutrition Secretariat (NNS) in the President’s office to realise the national Multi-Sector (Nutrition) Action Plan (MSAP). This project reported a six-month delay in implementation due to delays in signing of the legal agreement between WFP and Save the Children, establishment of the secretariat and registration of SUN PF. It is now in operation with a budget of USD 235,400. Implementation highlights have included: growth in CSO membership from 8 to 284 between August 2014 and November 2015; 16 training programmes targeting nearly 2,000 village leaders of CSOs across 12 districts have taken place; a SUN PF study on reviewing the National Nutrition Policy had an influence on the Government’s review and redraft of the policy.

143. Trust Fund SDG-F 10024563 (*UNDP Sustainable Development Goals Fund, Joint programming FAO and WFP: January 2015 – December 2016*), covers rice

fortification, nutrition surveillance and engagement with the MOH to influence nutrition policies and plans. The total budget is USD 750,000 and as of December 2015, 60 percent of MPTF funds had been spent. The administrator of the joint programme is hosted by the WFP CO. Among other things, the TF has supported work on rice fortification, including the landscape study (RIU, 2016) discussed in Annex K. This project also covers the salary of national staff responsible for nutrition. (Separately, and despite the general downsizing of the CO – see Figure 1 in section 1.3 above – an international nutritionist has for the first time been deployed to the CO.)

144. Although the constraints described made it difficult for WFP to provide satisfactory inputs in the districts already selected, GoSL in January 2015 renewed a request to expand the geographical scope of WFP MCHN activities.<sup>75</sup>

145. The monitoring of the MCHN programme was done by collecting information at the clinics by the MOH staff through measuring children's weight, height and age indicators. In addition, population-based nutrition surveys were conducted periodically in collaboration with the MRI. The results of the survey and clinic data were shared regularly with WFP. In addition, WFP staff made visits to the clinics with standard check lists to observe and seek data on commodities and number of beneficiaries attending the programme by reviewing clinic registers. The surveys were conducted in all districts on a periodic basis.

#### *Assessment*

146. **Relevance:** the stubborn nutrition problems highlighted in successive nutrition surveys (see ¶132–34 in section 1.2 above) clearly require action; WFP's nutrition interventions have been coherent with the current national nutrition policy and national agenda, and it was appropriate to link WFP interventions closely to GoSL programmes and seek to support their strengthening. WFP was right to advocate a targeted approach to supplementary feeding, since this is much more likely to be effective in countering MAM than blanket supplementary feeding. Thus it was also appropriate to shift from a prevention to a treatment focus when it became clear how limited resources were. The upstream approaches supported by the TFs were especially relevant in view of the dubious effectiveness of the main MCHN interventions, discussed next.

147. **Effectiveness:** according to the underlying theory of change (¶136 above), combined WFP and MCHN interventions should have led to reductions in MAM and LBW. However, (a) there has been no specific monitoring that would enable us to detect such a result; (b) trends in general data on such indicators are not positive; and (c) the poor implementation of the interventions (by GoSL as much as WFP) makes it unlikely that significant benefits would have occurred.<sup>76</sup> Effectiveness of MCHN interventions was severely compromised by difficulties in ensuring adequate supplies of FBF, whether as Thripasha or in other forms. Although there were fundamental difficulties in increasing Thripasha production to a level that would have allowed

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<sup>75</sup> Letter from ERD dated 30 January 2015:

"... it is suggested to pay more attention to reduce malnutrition of pregnant, lactating mothers and children not only in the Northern Province but also in other vulnerable areas in the following Districts under the ongoing & upcoming WFP programmes: Trincomalee; Moneragala; Badulla; Nuwara Eliya; Batticaloa; Kandy; Ampara; Polonnaruwa. The priority has been given to the above Districts to reduce malnutrition based on the survey "National Nutrition and Micronutrient 2012" conducted by the Ministry of Health."

<sup>76</sup> Outcome data reported in SPRs are presented in full in Annex I but have little traction in a context of weak programme implementation.

adequate rations for MAM treatment, there was reluctance on GoSL's part to facilitate imports of CSB of Supercereal Plus, which were seen as an imposition.

148. **Efficiency:** what is not effective cannot be efficient. Wide distribution of FBF in portions too small to be effective may be popular, but it is not an efficient way of meeting the needs of those directly affected by undernutrition. Pipeline breaks, issues over the acceptance of CSB and Supercereal plus, and production problems with Thripasha, constituted additional operational inefficiencies.<sup>77</sup>

149. **Sustainability:** as noted, all three operations were premised on achieving handover to GoSL, but this depended on a substantial upgrade in Thripasha production, which has still not been achieved. As a consequence, the CP which followed the evaluation period has persisted with the dual strategy of upstream work to strengthen national nutrition policy and programmes, accompanied by targeted supplementary feeding in selected Districts (see Box 8 below). The current interventions are inherently unsustainable due to the factors highlighted above. However, in 2016 there were signs of movement towards a more appropriately targeted approach in Thripasha production, with WFP technical support requested by the MoH (see Box 7 above).

### **Box 8 Approach to Nutrition in the CP 2016–17**

**Objective:** reduce undernutrition among children under 5 and pregnant and lactating women

**Components:**

- MAM treatment though targeted supplementary feeding in Jaffna, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts in Northern Province; Badulla and Moneragala districts in Uva Province; and Trincomalee district in Eastern Province.
- support government in addressing micronutrient deficiencies
- technical support for the Ministry of Health to guarantee the quality and quantity of *Thripasha*,
- [but meanwhile...] The nutrition-support programme will target districts in Northern, Uva and Central provinces with high rates of wasting. Targeted supplementary feeding will utilize SuperCereal for pregnant and lactating women and Supercereal Plus for treating MAM among children aged 6-59 months.

Source: WFP, 2015k

### **Partnerships and capacity development**

#### *The intended programme and its rationale*

150. Capacity development for partners (and for its own staff) has been a core WFP value since the mid-1990s, reflected in strategic plans, operations and programmes. The shift in the 2008–2013 Strategic Plan from food aid to food assistance led WFP to redefine capacity development (in Strategic Objective 5) as the means by which governments can be facilitated to assume ownership of national hunger solutions in terms of analysis, policy formulation, programme design and implementation and logistics. The 2014–2017 Strategic Plan removed capacity development as a standalone strategic objective and installed it as a cross-cutting component.

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<sup>77</sup> Indeed, the inefficiency of Thripasha production, with the factory chronically operating below capacity, undermines effectiveness, because Thripasha is not available in sufficient quantity to support larger portions for the desired beneficiaries.

151. The links between partnerships and capacity building in the Sri Lankan context are moulded by the Basic Agreement which governs the relationship between WFP and the GoSL, whereby the latter has primary responsibility for implementation of all WFP activities (see Annex H, Box 10). This goes beyond a typical arrangement between WFP and the government of a host country, and, in effect, “hard-wires” the partnership relationship. See Annex L where we have commented on how this agreement can also impinge upon the ‘Operational Independence’ humanitarian principle.

152. More widely, the shift in the needs in Sri Lanka from emergency to development has seen WFP’s role evolving gradually from a pure food assistance agency with direct transfers to a provider of assistance coupled with in-depth technical analysis and support. This was a theme of successive draft strategy documents during the evaluation period, even though none of them was finally adopted (Annex I). WFP is therefore seeking to become a key partner in the design and management of government programmes and priorities. The primary relationship with GoSL is likely to be reinforced by the latter's emergence as a donor to WFP (see section 1.3, ¶57–59).

153. While the counterpart WFP government unit is the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs, WFP has collaborated with a range of ministries and also engages at central, provincial and local levels. The different ministries and government entities include the Ministries of Health, Disaster Management, Education, Agriculture, Forestry and Cooperatives, Finance and Planning, Environment, and Agrarian Services,<sup>78</sup> as well as other Government institutions such as HARTI, Medical Research Institute, Institute of Health Policy, National Nutrition Secretariat.

154. Capacity development has been a key theme throughout the portfolio’s programming documents (see Table 12 below). On the other hand, WFP's recent formative experiences in Sri Lanka (the tsunami and the civil war) mean that the CO has inherited an organisational culture more oriented towards action than advice (cf. ¶44 above).

**Table 12 Capacity development in programming documents**

SO 105390	The SO which was still in operation toward the end of the period existed to supplement the logistical and operational capacity of the government to better deliver the PRROs and EMOPs.
PRRO 200143	Capacity development couched in language of partnership, speaks of training and asset building for national and local government staff as essential to WFP’s handover strategy and specifically, building capacity around monitoring.
DEV 106070	Capacity support to the development of Thriposha with the aim of increasing quality and production capacity.
EMOP 200239	Aim to improve the capacity of the government in early warning, food security and market monitoring systems and to support national contingency planning.

<sup>78</sup> The list indicates the fragmented nature of the Sri Lanka administration, with currently over 40 ministries.

PRRO 200452	Focus on strengthening national capacity around early warning, food security and nutritional assessment systems to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. Build the capacity of the MPCS [Multi-Purpose Cooperative Societies] under the voucher system with development of an e-voucher system. Capacity support to the MoE alongside the handover of the WFP school meals programme.
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### *Programme delivery and results*

155. Many WFP activities incorporated capacity building within partnership activities within Government entities (at central, provincial and local levels) as well as with other stakeholders:

- a) **Joint training programmes** made available to both WFP staff, national counterparts (government and NGOs) in assessments, monitoring and evaluation, logistics and programme implementation across the portfolio's programmatic components (FFA, nutrition, GFD, Vulnerability Assessment and Monitoring (VAM)). This has included M&E training for DMU counterpart staff; voucher modality training for counterparts at local government and village level; WFP and UNICEF joint training of public health staff and caregivers on MAM management and home-based complementary food production.
- b) **Analytical work:** building the capacity of national institutions in analytical work including evaluations, assessment studies and baseline surveys particularly with HARTI, and the MRI. Work has involved: partnering with the MRI to undertake a baseline survey ahead of introducing Supercereal Plus; the development and handover to HARTI of a National Food Security web portal and other technological investments, such as a Cost of Diet monitoring system; and support to the formulation of a National School Feeding Strategy through a Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) workshop. See Annex K for an overview of WFP's analytical work.
- c) WFP's Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) unit undertakes **food security assessments** that provide reliable and key information regarding food security and nutrition in Sri Lanka. The WFP assessments are drawn on by many stakeholders for strategic programme direction and interventions.
- d) **Nutrition:** WFP has provided capacity augmentation for the optimisation and development of Thriposha, particularly working with the government to move from the standard blanket approach to targeted approaches allowing a more efficient and cost effective response (see section 2.3, ¶134ff). WFP is also a recognised and proactive participant in the micronutrient working group ensuring fortification and global standards are adhered to and key issues are properly addressed.

### *Assessment*

156. **Relevance:** In a partnering sense, GoSL is clearly critical. Any future model for WFP in Sri Lanka would need to be built on this relationship and an understanding of services that the Government may wish WFP to continue to provide (e.g. SMP) and be prepared to pay for. Within capacity building, WFP's focus on supporting government institutions in analytical work has been a valuable and pragmatic investment and draws on the particular strengths within the CO (i.e. the VAM unit).

WFP's role in advocacy and technical support to the government in nutrition, and particularly in supporting the development of Thripasha, is also well recognised, and WFP's commitment to their role in this area has been reinforced with the appointment of their first international nutritionist in early 2016.

157. **Effectiveness and sustainability:** WFP can point to some capacity development successes. Its relationship with HARTI has been fruitful, including developing the capacity for regular Cost of Diet reviews. However, there was much less progress than anticipated in the two principal areas of capacity development linked to handover strategies. During 2011–2015 there was little progress in strengthening Thripasha production, or in securing preparation of a national school feeding strategy that would facilitate integration into the national system of the Northern Province SMP. In both cases this meant little progress towards sustainability for the programmes concerned.

### **Internal synergies<sup>79</sup>**

158. There were significant internal synergies across the portfolio, which are likely to have made it more effective as well as more efficient. A predominant focus on conflict-affected areas, and particularly on Northern Province, supported a common set of relationships with local authorities (evident from interviews and the evaluation team's field visits), and drew on common diagnostics (see Annex K), while support to IDPs, MCHN and the SMP were complementary supports to post-war recovery. There were other synergies in applying the same approaches of GFD and FFA to emergency situations, while innovations concerning CBTs migrated across the portfolio (Annex O shows a willingness to consider alternatives to in-kind delivery of support in varying contexts – support to IDPs, emergency relief and school feeding – and interviews confirm that these initiatives were conceptually linked).

### **External synergy<sup>80</sup>**

159. WFP clearly sought to exploit external synergies with elements of the portfolio, but such synergies were not always realised in practice. Support to IDPs was a collective enterprise, but, as described earlier (¶98ff), IDPs often did not receive coherent packages of support that were sufficient to achieve durable solutions. Synergy with GoSL was sought in supplementary feeding (¶134ff) but the combined programme has not been conspicuously effective. The SMP in Northern Province has continued to operate as a separate programme using a different modality from the GoSL SMP elsewhere, with little progress towards convergence (¶116ff). For most of the evaluation period the overall relationship between GoSL and its development partners was not very conducive to the pursuit of synergies; although WFP (and other UN agencies) linked their programmes and the UNDAF to GoSL's available policy documents, the quality of engagement and dialogue was poor.

160. Programme documents show regular collaborations with UN organisations and with UNICEF in particular. While the organizations came together in drafting the 2013–2017 UNDAF, it is not clear to what extent this influenced WFP during the evaluation period. However, especially with contracting budgets impacting all UN organisations, it can be expected that the 2018–2022 UNDAF will present an

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<sup>79</sup> EQ16. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?

<sup>80</sup> EQ17. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?

important opportunity to work jointly to avoid duplication and plan for more efficient delivery of (potentially scaled down) programmes.

### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1 Overall Assessment**

161. There was not an explicit country strategy against which to assess the portfolio. The CO was clearly aware of the need to reorient the portfolio in the light of Sri Lanka's transition from war to peace and the country's rising income status, but the portfolio remained more a collection of inherited activities and continuing obligations than the coherent expression of a proactive strategy.

#### **Alignment and strategic positioning**

162. All the main elements of the portfolio were relevant in terms of addressing specific needs in Sri Lanka, and it was appropriate to focus mainly on the districts that had been hardest hit by the war, as well as responding to emergencies elsewhere. The Basic Agreement, putting GoSL in the forefront of implementation, means that alignment with government systems is "hard-wired" into the portfolio. This could be a problem (in terms of safeguarding WFP's operational independence) during times of conflict, but in the post-war situation it provides a good starting point for dialogue with GoSL about WFP's future role in Sri Lanka. Although WFP systematically linked its operations to national policies as far as possible, the political environment for most of the evaluation period meant that the quality of collaboration was limited. Since 2015 there has been much closer alignment between GoSL and WFP objectives, and this augurs well for the next phase of WFP's engagement in Sri Lanka.

163. Partly for the same contextual reasons, alignment among UN agencies and their collective alignment with government policies was rather shallow during the period under review. The context for joint planning with GoSL is much improved since 2015, but UN agencies will all face similar constraints during the next UNDAF period (commencing in 2018): available aid resources will continue to diminish, and their cost structures will make it hard for them to remain relevant and viable, unless they can progress towards a more streamlined One UN presence.

164. Although the portfolio during 2011–2015 was more the result of ad hoc adjustments than consistent strategy, WFP's main areas of focus (humanitarian relief, nutrition, school feeding, and related analytical work) are all areas where WFP has a relevant mandate and distinctive expertise. The challenge (already recognised in handover strategies that were mostly unfulfilled) is for WFP to move further upstream, with more focus on technical support and capacity development and less direct involvement in service delivery.

#### **Quality of strategic decision-making**

165. The CO had an unenviable task during 2011–2015. It had to cope with shrinking funds and reduced staffing, while trying to adjust to the radically changing context in Sri Lanka and also taking account of policy and organisational changes across WFP. For most of the period, the Government's openness to strategic dialogue was limited. Against this background, it is not surprising that the CO's strategic planning efforts were mostly abortive. However, the strategic choices implicit in the evolution and implementation of the portfolio had a number of positive features. Albeit much more slowly than first envisaged, PRROs have now been succeeded by a Country Programme. The importance of an upstream orientation is reflected in the trust funds linked to nutrition and climate change. WFP has recognised the importance of integrating its nutrition work with GoSL's and of handing over SMP responsibility to



GoSL, though without yet achieving either objective. There was also significant development and innovation in the use of CBTs although they remained a small proportion of the portfolio.

166. Internal M&E was weak (hampered by staff constraints), and there was not enough systematic analysis of data collected, especially in relation to innovations such as the cash voucher programme. Nevertheless, successive strategic planning exercises showed increasing awareness of the strategic challenges WFP faces in Sri Lanka, while a useful body of analytical work was undertaken. There was conscientious attention to gender issues throughout, but at a rather shallow level; there are encouraging signs that the review mechanisms associated with the new Gender Policy are encouraging higher standards of gender analysis, which should lead to stronger implementation and monitoring in future.

167. There were systematic efforts to identify and support the most vulnerable groups, both in initial planning of operations and in subsequent adjustments. But WFP resources were spread much thinner than planned, and this made it difficult to provide adequate levels of support to beneficiaries.

### **Portfolio performance and results**

168. As discussed in detail in section 2.3, all the principal components of the portfolio were **relevant** to Sri Lanka's circumstances at the beginning of the evaluation period. The challenge for WFP was to maintain their relevance in the evolving post-war context. The picture on **effectiveness** is more mixed. Funding constraints meant that resources for support to IDPs were spread ever more thinly, and this, together with shortfalls from agencies supporting other aspects of IDPs' re-establishment, undermined the possibility of achieving durable solutions. School feeding was effectively delivered in Northern Province; it served as a useful element of social protection in the districts most affected by the war, and contributed to the resurgence of the education system there. The combined GoSL and WFP efforts at addressing MAM and LBW through supplementary feeding were not effective, partly because of difficulties in delivering WFP inputs on the scale intended, but more fundamentally because of chronic failure to break the bottlenecks in Thriposha production or to adopt a more effectively targeted approach to the distribution of supplementary foods. The most serious impediment to **efficiency** was the chronic underfunding of the portfolio. Working closely with GoSL helped to make the best use of resources available, as did the trend towards more use of CBTs.<sup>81</sup> The portfolio was strongly oriented towards institutional **sustainability**, as reflected in close cooperation with government agencies, including attention to capacity development and technical support for national policy making. However, there was little progress on the handover strategies envisaged in WFP's project documents.

169. There was conscious attention to **gender** throughout, but Sri Lanka was not exempt from the characteristic weaknesses identified by WFP's gender policy evaluation; there are signs that the new (2015) gender policy is beginning to raise the quality of gender analysis. There were significant **internal synergies** across the portfolio, linked to its geographical focus, common analytical work and cross-learning (including learning about CBTs), and the adaptability of basic GFD and FFA

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<sup>81</sup> Whether CBTs are more efficient than in-kind alternatives is an empirical question, with the answer influenced by context. However, the Omega value analysis in Annex O indicates that the Jaffna "cash voucher" was an efficient option. The project document for the 2016 EMOP (Box 18 in Annex O) argues cogently that cash is the more efficient option in that emergency case.

approaches to different contexts (IDPs, emergency relief and, more recently climate change projects). The pursuit of **external synergies** was less successful: as already noted, there was a collective failure by GoSL and other agencies, to provide sufficient support to IDPs; potential synergies between WFP and GoSL in MCHN were not adequately realised in practice; the SMP in NP has persisted as a distinct programme using a different modality from the rest of the national school feeding programme. The UNDAF programming exercise for 2013–2017 took place in unpromising circumstances, but the improved relationship between GoSL and its aid partners means that the 2018–2022 UNDAF is a crucial opportunity for all the UN agencies, not just WFP.

### **3.2 Key Lessons**

#### *Humanitarian Principles*

170. The exercise of evaluating the application of the humanitarian principles was challenging. It is striking (a) that the principles (together with their underlying "foundations" and "standards") should permeate everything that WFP does; (b) that their implementation is not binary but involves gradations and trade-offs; and (c) that their application in peacetime is a very different proposition from observing them during war. It became clear that a one-country, one-agency assessment cannot get to grips with the wider systemic issues that were so graphically highlighted by the report into UN performance during the height of the Sri Lanka civil war (UNSG, 2012).

171. Moreover, while it would be quite straightforward to identify a gross breach of one of the principles, it is much more difficult to form a judgement about the strength with which they are reflected (their resilience?) in WFP's work when no such breach is obvious.

172. In order to reinforce attention to the humanitarian principles in its work, WFP could consider applying a "marker" system (along the pattern of Gender Markers) to its CSPs (and/or project documents) as a way of checking that potential challenges to the principles in any country portfolio have been identified, along with measures to minimise the risk of breaches and to reinforce the underlying foundations and standards. Any such approach would need to take into account not only the humanitarian principles per se but other closely related UN and WFP policies such as the Human Rights Up Front initiative, policies on protection and accountability, etc. It would also provide an opportunity to consider how the relevant training of WFP staff might be strengthened.

#### *Strategic Adaptation in MICs*

173. Sri Lanka is not the only case where WFP is having to adapt to the country's graduation along the income scale, although the scale of adjustment required has been magnified by the simultaneous transition from conflict to peace. The Sri Lanka CO's continual but incomplete efforts to develop and implement a transition strategy show how difficult it is to adapt proactively in a context of rapid change and diminishing resources, and suggest that COs in this situation need stronger support from the RB and HQ.

#### *Economic Analysis*

174. The CPE review of approaches to CBTs in Sri Lanka found that there are systemic weaknesses in the way WFP approaches modality choices and design, with implications beyond Sri Lanka. Indeed, the use of economic analysis across the

portfolio is weak. There is an uncritical emphasis on maximising beneficiary numbers with insufficient analysis of the implications for effectiveness when resources are thinly spread. WFP analyses of costs focus too narrowly on the costs incurred by WFP (this is particularly inappropriate in Sri Lanka where a large share of costs is systematically borne by the Government).<sup>82</sup> WFP HQ now provides elaborate guidance on ex ante assessment of alternative in-kind/voucher/cash modalities. There is scope to refine the ex-ante assessment of CBTs and their alternatives (for example, non-WFP costs should not be left out of the calculation). But it is even more important for WFP to improve the quality and use of the performance data it collects as CBTs are implemented. Such data are crucial in convincing WFP's financiers of the effectiveness of its work, and would also feed more robust information into future ex ante assessments.

### **3.3 Recommendations**

175. Possible operational improvements have been suggested or implied at various points in the report (see for example, observations on the SMP in Box 6 above). However, the formal recommendations of this CPE have been deliberately pitched at the strategic level. The evaluation makes six recommendations, as set out in the table below. Most of them need to be implemented in collaboration with the Government and/or with other international agencies.

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<sup>82</sup> When undertaking Omega value analysis, the CO pointed out the importance of the warehousing and delivery costs borne by GoSL, but was told to ignore them.

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
1.	Country Strategic Plan	<p>The country strategic planning process is very timely for Sri Lanka: it coincides with preparation of the UNSDF (2018–2022) and the successor to WFP’s current country programme, while the political context in Sri Lanka is more favourable than it has been for many years.</p> <p>The Government needs to be a full and active partner in the exercise, because future demand for WFP’s services will depend mainly on the Government.</p> <p>On the basis of this evaluation, these services are likely to include technical support to nutrition policy formulation, including on the role of specialized foods (Recommendation 4); technical support to school feeding (Recommendation 5); and continued support to nutrition and food security assessments, including emergency assessments and emergency preparedness linked to analysis of the implications of climate change.</p>	<p>Adopt a zero-based approach towards considering what long-term role, if any, WFP should have in Sri Lanka. WFP needs to:</p> <p>c) engage the Government as a full partner and jointly identify areas where WFP can maximize value in the next few years; and</p> <p>d) develop time-bound exit strategies when WFP’s engagement cannot be indefinitely justified, such as the SMP in Northern Province.</p>	<p>This recommendation should be incorporated into preparation of the CSP during 2016 and 2017.</p>	<p>Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters</p> <p>The Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs will coordinate the government agencies that engage with WFP</p>

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
2.	Joint adaptation of United Nations agencies to the new aid landscape in Sri Lanka	<p>UNDAFs have not succeeded in changing the way in which United Nations agencies work. WFP's CSP needs to be based on consideration of the roles of WFP and other United Nations agencies in WFP's areas of engagement. Other United Nations agencies face similar challenges in strategic planning. The UNSDF exercise offers a unique opportunity for United Nations agencies, in consultation with the Government, to rationalize and streamline their operations in Sri Lanka.</p> <p>Country-level coordination of support to food security and nutrition is of particular concern for WFP.</p>	WFP should advocate for preparation of the UNSDF to include a radical and costed review of the roles of all major United Nations agencies working in Sri Lanka.	Roles should be reflected in the UNSDF process during 2017, with equal engagement of the Government and United Nations agencies active in Sri Lanka.	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters, reflecting Headquarters- and regional-level agreements on coordination among United Nations agencies involved in nutrition and food security
3.	Addressing the needs of IDPs	WFP alone cannot resolve all the resettlement challenges faced by IDPs; the situation deserves the urgent attention of the Government, United Nations agencies and other development partners.	WFP should work with other United Nations agencies, international humanitarian agencies and the Government to develop a comprehensive and adequately resourced plan for completing the resettlement of IDPs and returning refugees.	Relevant commitments should be incorporated into the forthcoming UNSDF (Recommendation 2); however the issue is too urgent to be deferred until then.	Country office, with support from the regional bureau and Headquarters in strongly urging joint action by United Nations agencies and the Government

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
4.	Future engagement in nutrition	WFP's significant comparative advantages in, for example, food fortification and specialized foods are highly relevant in middle-income countries and should guide its future "upstream" support to improving nutrition in Sri Lanka.	WFP should maintain in-country nutrition expertise and continue to support and facilitate multi-sector approaches. It should continue to advocate for targeted approaches to supplementary feeding and offer its technical expertise – linked to rigorous economic analysis – on nutritious foods. Coherent support to a national nutrition strategy should be one of the themes of the UNSDF.	During 2017, the country office should work with the Government and United Nations partners to position the nutrition strategy at the centre of the UNSDF and to reflect WFP's important role in the CSP.	WFP, in coordination with other United Nations agencies working in nutrition and food security

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
5.	Managed hand-over of the SMP	The current situation, with a different and more generous SMP operating in Northern Province than elsewhere, is unsustainable. WFP has been understandably reluctant to step aside without assurance that a successor programme will comply with its standards for school feeding, but this concern cannot be allowed to be a decisive consideration. The two school feeding initiatives are bound to converge: WFP can urge but cannot insist that SMPs throughout the country be brought up to the standards in Northern Province. Because school feeding needs to be embedded in Sri Lanka's social protection system, it is important to bring the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Education to the centre of these discussions. As there will inevitably be convergence towards a cash-based system, the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs will need to be involved in overseeing phase-out of the ongoing logistics exercise.	WFP and the Government should jointly develop a time-bound strategy for hand-over of the Northern Province SMP to the Government.	An agreed, time-bound strategy for hand-over should be reflected in the CSP.	Country office, with the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Education

	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Specific actions and timing</b>	<b>Responsible</b>
6.	Strengthening WFP's economic analysis	Review of decision-making on CBTs in Sri Lanka has exposed basic flaws in WFP's analysis of modality choices. Ignoring the costs incurred by the Government introduces an unjustified bias in decision-making. It is wrong to consider the nutrient value score as an outcome indicator and, more seriously, there must be less emphasis on hypothetical comparison of modalities prior to operations and more attention to gathering and using performance data during implementation. Such data are crucial in convincing WFP's donors of the effectiveness of its work and will result in more robust information into future ex ante assessments. Although the collection and analysis of CBT performance data, including gender analysis, should take place at the country office level, it also requires sufficient prioritization and resourcing by Headquarters and regional bureaux.	WFP should strengthen its guidance on the choice and design of modalities – cash, vouchers and in-kind. Cost analyses should include all costs and focus less exclusively on the costs incurred by WFP. It is even more important that WFP improves the quality and use of the performance data it collects during the implementation of CBT programmes.	WFP should review guidelines on CBT analysis and monitoring as part of the roll-out of its new Strategic Plan.	Guidance and support from Headquarters and regional bureaux; data collection and analysis by country offices



## Annexes

### Annex A: Terms of Reference

#### 1. Background

1. The purpose of these Terms of Reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized.

##### 1.1. Introduction

2. The World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) will conduct a country portfolio evaluation (CPE) in Sri Lanka in 2016. CPEs encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. CPEs help Country Offices (CO) in the preparation of Country Strategies and United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) cycles, and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

##### 1.2. Country context

###### *Geography and population*

3. Sri Lanka is a small (65,610 Km<sup>2</sup>) but diverse island nation. Administratively, it has nine provinces, 25 districts, 325 divisional secretariats, and over 14,000 Grama Niladhari divisions, or village clusters, with the capital city of Colombo located in the Western province.

4. As of 2014, the total population of Sri Lanka is estimated at 20.2 million<sup>83</sup>. The majority of the population currently resides in the Western province (29 percent), with approximately 12 percent living in the Central, Southern and North-western provinces and less than 10 percent in each of the other provinces.

###### *Political context*

5. Sri Lanka follows a presidential system of government, where the President is the Head of State and Head of Government. The three levels of government constitute national, provincial and local; each level is elected for a period of five years through the proportional representation system. Though decentralisation through the provincial administration is in place, much of the political authority still rests with the Central Government.

6. Almost three decades of civil conflict between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil separatists ended in May 2009. In February 2002 the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), more commonly known as the Tamil Tigers, formalized a cease-fire. However, violence between the LTTE and government forces intensified

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<sup>83</sup> Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics, 2012 census.

in 2006. The government regained control of LTTE-controlled areas in 2007 and by May 2009 hostilities came to an end. The map in Annex 9 illustrates the areas of conflict and displacement at the end of the war.

7. The Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement, & Hindu Religious Affairs was established to ensure dignified resettlement of all displaced persons, who lost their original places of residence as a result of the conflict. The 2013 Resettlement Policy outlines the administrative, logistical, advisory, humanitarian and other forms of support available to internally displaced persons, returnee refugees of legitimate Sri Lankan origin and resettled communities, clearly recognising that resettlement is a voluntary process.

8. In addition to efforts at reconstructing its economy, the government has resettled the large majority of those civilians displaced during the final phase of the conflict and released most of former LTTE combatants. Resettlement of civil war affected IDPs was organized through the return of land, known as High Security Zones and occupied by the armed forces, to its rightful civilian owners. WFP together with other UN agencies is welcoming this move and providing support to the Government in this endeavour.

9. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) outlook on political stability for 2016 – 2020 despite the positive steps to provide political stability, build peace, calm ethnic tensions and a promise to address Tamil grievances, the government of Sri Lanka will struggle to reconcile the needs and demands of Tamils with those of the Sinhalese majority<sup>84</sup>. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, classified Sri Lanka as category 3 -violent crisis- within a range of 5 (dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war and war) in its 2014 conflict barometer report<sup>85</sup>.

### *Economy and development*

10. The country is now in a process of transitioning from a post-conflict economy to development. Sri Lanka's social indicators are among the best in South Asia, with near universal literacy, and comparatively low levels of poverty. Since the country's civil conflict ended, Sri Lanka has recorded high economic growth with poverty rates dropping significantly<sup>86</sup>. Sri Lanka's economy grew by 4.5 percent in 2014<sup>87</sup>, by 4.4 percent in the first quarter of 2015 and 6.7 percent in the second quarter<sup>88</sup>.

11. According to the EIU outlook, the Sri Lankan economy will expand at a robust pace in 2016-20, but growth will be below potential owing to shortages in skilled labour, poor infrastructure and the government's inability to attract large amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The EIU forecast that the economy will grow by 6 percent in 2016, and by an average of 6.2 percent a year in 2017-20. This expansionary trend will be supported by development efforts in the North and East of the island.

12. The government current strategic vision is laid out in the 2013 document "Mahinda Chintana Vision for the future - A Brighter Future- 2010-2016". The Mahinda Chintana document, identifies three central areas of focus: achieving more

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<sup>84</sup> Sri Lanka Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015

<sup>85</sup> Conflict barometer, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014

<sup>86</sup> Asian Development Bank, <http://www.adb.org/countries/main>

<sup>87</sup> World Bank data, <http://data.worldbank.org/>

<sup>88</sup> GDP growth projections will be revised in line with the changes in the national accounting.

equitable development through accelerated rural development, accelerating growth through increased investment in infrastructure and strengthening public service delivery. The State is to play a critical role in delivering this new agenda – especially in lagging and emerging regions – as well as meeting the other imminent development challenges.

13. The government’s public investment strategy 2014-2016 is laid out in the “Mahinda Chintana - Vision for the future – Unstoppable Sri Lanka 2020”. The strategy highlights several priority areas: raise exports and reduce imports needs, health, education, food security and food inflation. The investment strategy also highlights that while carrying forward Sri Lanka’s development process towards a higher middle income country status, the compliance to environment regulations and standards must be adhered to at all times considering the importance of sustainable development over time.

14. The President of Sri Lanka also launched the 100 day development programme while the long-term strategy was being formulated. Sri Lanka has a major role to play for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a key step forward along a national sustainable development path. As an emerging economy, Sri Lanka should be able to find new sustainable development paths in the 21st century, including:

- Economic: development through enhancing technology, resources, and skills.
- Social: building social and human capital committed to peace, reconciliation, and unity.
- Environmental: activating ancient values and culture that respect nature.

15. Poverty rates have dropped by two thirds in the last decade with gains in both urban and rural poverty. Sri Lanka’s human development record has been historically high because of universal free education and health services since 1948. Sri Lanka ranked 73 out of 188 countries and territories in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014, and is therefore in the “high human development category”. Between 1980 and 2014, Sri Lanka’s HDI value increased by 32.5 percent, an average annual increase of about 0.83 percent.

16. Between 1980 and 2014, Sri Lanka’s life expectancy at birth increased by 6.7 years, gross national income (GNI) per capita increased by about 281.7 percent, mean years of schooling increased by 3.7 years and expected years of schooling increased by 3.7 years.

17. Sri Lanka provides free education to both boys and girls from primary to university levels. The 2012 Sri Lanka Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2012 reveals that among the total child population aged 5 to 14 years in Sri Lanka, 98.7 percent children are currently attending school. The percentage of population aged 5 years or more passing primary is however only 23.6 percent.

18. The National Education Policy is implemented through education programmes. Currently, the main national education programme is the Education Sector Development Framework and Programme (ESDFP), focusing on equity in access, improved quality of education, efficiency and equity in resource allocation, and improved service delivery. Its first phase was planned from 2006 to 2010. A second phase, entitled Transforming School Education as the Foundation of a Knowledge Hub (TSEP), covers the period 2012 to 2016. Its objective is to enhance access to, and the

quality of, primary and secondary education in order to provide a foundation for the knowledge-based economic and social development of the country.

19. The figure on the side shows the contribution of each component index to Sri Lanka's HDI since 1980.

20. However, according to the 2014 UNDP Human Development Report 6.7 percent of the population still lives below the poverty line. The Central, Uva, and Sabaragamuwa provinces share a higher number of poor households as well as a higher poverty incidence.

21. When the HDI value is discounted for inequality, it decreases 11.6 percent due to inequality in the distribution of the HDI dimension indices<sup>89</sup>. Regional disparities are also

highly pronounced, with the Western province being the main engine of growth. Out of nine provinces in the country, the Western province accounts for 44.4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while North Western and Southern province contribute respectively 10 and 11 percent; Northern, Uva, North-central, Eastern and Sabaragamuwa contribute less than 10 percent each.

22. Annex 1 provides information on various indicators relevant to the Sri Lanka portfolio.

### Gender


23. The adult literacy rate for females is 90 percent. Among youth (15-24 years) the rate is 99 percent. Girls outnumber boys in secondary education 50.42 to 49.58 percent (boys). Seventy-three percent of adult women have reached at least a secondary level of education compared to 76.4 percent of their male counterparts.

24. Sri Lanka's excellent record on gender parity in education, has not translated into equality in the workplace or politics. Nearly 6 percent of parliamentary seats are held by women and at the local and provincial levels it is lower.

25. Female participation in the labour market is 35.1 percent compared to 76.3 for men. Women's unemployment rate has been double that of men for more than 3 decades. The quality of employment for women has deteriorated, as the demand is chiefly in casual and low-paying, low-skill jobs in the formal and informal sectors. Unemployment rates were 3.6 percent for men and 7.7 percent for women.

26. The UNDP Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment, and economic activity, and it is a proxy indicator of the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in the three GII dimensions. Sri Lanka ranks it 72 out of 155 countries in the 2014 index.

Figure 1. Trends in Sri Lanka's HDI indices 1980-2014



Source: Sri Lanka briefing note, 2015 HDR - UNDP

<sup>89</sup> Briefing note for countries on the 2015 Human Development Report, UNDP, 2015

## *Livelihoods*

27. Distinct topographic, geographic and climatic characteristics around the country overlap to create a mosaic of agro-ecological areas that then inform livelihood patterns. At the broadest level, three agro-ecological zones (wet, intermediate and dry) are defined by the prevailing climate and rainfall patterns. Altitudinal differences (highland, upland and lowland) serve to further delineate within these major zones, while soil type narrows the areas even further to a total 46 sub-agro-ecological zones<sup>90</sup>.

28. Despite high population density in the urban areas, nearly 80 percent of Sri Lankan population is considered rural. While engaged in diverse activities, livelihoods are nonetheless closely intertwined with agricultural industries, whether as producers, processors, wholesalers, retailers or elsewhere in the market chain. As such, livelihood zones in Sri Lanka are defined in large part by the agricultural activities that dominate the landscape.

## *Food security and nutrition*

29. Despite the economic and social progress, vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity and low resilience to climate variability persist around the country, affecting the poorest households the most. Among the Sri Lankan population, an estimated 2.4 million people are food-insecure<sup>91</sup>. Nationally, the average food energy consumption is 2,094 kilocalories, which falls just above the threshold for low daily energy consumption based on the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) guidelines as well as the Sri Lankan minimum daily dietary energy requirement of 2030 kilocalories.

30. Dietary diversity in the country is also considered to be quite poor<sup>92</sup>. Although not nationally representative, results from a 2009 study on nutrition and food security conducted by the Ministry of Health, UNICEF and WFP found that 64 percent of the surveyed households were estimated to have less than optimal dietary diversity.

31. Chronic food insecurity persists amongst poor households in the up-country tea estate and South-eastern rain-fed paddy farming and other field crops zones. Reliance on wage labour with low wages, limited household production of own food resulting in higher dependence on the market for food, yet faced with poor physical and financial access to food from these markets are the driving factors of chronic food insecurity in the zone. Road access and thereby access to large and diverse markets, education and health facilities is poor in these zones, contributing further to the food insecurity to the poorest households that tend to be the most isolated.

32. Seasonal food insecurity is highest in the Northern zones and areas in the Southern region. In the North, limited water supply for irrigation between May and September, often due to the destruction or damage of tanks during the conflict, restricts year-round production potential. As households work to rebuild livelihoods, taking on loans is common and financial access is further limited by resulting indebtedness.

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<sup>90</sup> Sri Lanka food security atlas, WFP – Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute (HARTI), May 2015

<sup>91</sup> Sri Lanka WFP country brief, December 2015

<sup>92</sup> Sri Lanka food security atlas, WFP – Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute (HARTI), May 2015

33. 4.7 million people, 22 percent of the total population in Sri Lanka, are reported as undernourished<sup>93</sup>. As per WFP's most recent Cost of Diet analysis<sup>94</sup>, almost 6.8 Million people, 33 percent of the total population, cannot afford the minimum cost of a nutritious diet. The findings of the same analysis have found that 15 percent of the total population living in the Northern province cannot afford the minimum cost of daily energy needs. Furthermore, approximately one third of the Northern and Uva population as well as half of the Eastern province population cannot afford the minimum cost of a nutritious diet.

34. Maternal and child undernutrition remain a major challenge in Sri Lanka, particularly in terms of acute malnutrition (wasting) and micronutrient deficiencies. Wasting rates are exceptionally high at 19.6 percent, well above the WHO threshold (serious level > 15 percent) and as compared to other countries in the region, with the highest prevalence found in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

35. By contrast, chronic malnutrition (stunting) is low according to WHO threshold for stunting (acceptable level < 20 percent) and as compared to prevalence rates seen around the region, but still at 13.1 percent. Stunting rates, although low, have shown a little changes over the past decade, fluctuating around 15 percent. The highest prevalence is found in the up-country tea estates (> 20 percent) and is likely due to poor food security, lower education levels and low access to improved water supply. In addition, many households do not spend enough on a diverse diet to achieve the required daily intake of micronutrients. .

36. Micronutrient deficiencies remain a pervasive issue in Sri Lanka affecting both women of reproductive age and children aged 6-59 with 15 percent of children and 26 percent of women suffering from anaemia<sup>95</sup>.

37. Nearly one in five infants, 17.9 percent, in Sri Lanka is born weighing less than 2.5 Kg, the threshold for low birth weight. Low birth weight in Sri Lanka has been closely associated with heavy labour demands on agriculture, particularly among women who work in the plantation sector.

38. Other interesting patterns emerge when the prevalence of stunting and wasting are disaggregated by maternal education. For stunting, as the mother's education level increases, the prevalence of stunting declines. For wasting, by contrast, the prevalence does not decline significantly as maternal education increases. Only when education exceeds 13 years there is a large decline, 12 percent, in the prevalence of wasting<sup>10</sup>.

39. The current National Agricultural Policy aims, among other goals, to increase domestic agricultural production to ensure food and nutrition security, promote agricultural productivity and ensure sustainable growth, maximize benefits and minimize adverse effects of globalization on domestic and export agriculture, adopt productive farming systems and improved agro-technologies, apply environmental friendly techniques in agriculture, promote agro-based industries and increase employment opportunities, and enhance the income and the living standard of farming community. At the time of writing the Ministry of Agriculture was in the process of developing a new National Agricultural Policy.

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<sup>93</sup> Global Food Security Update, FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2015

<sup>94</sup> Sri Lanka - Minimum Cost of Nutritious Diet (October 2013 - September 2014), October 2015

<sup>95</sup> National nutrition and micronutrient survey, Ministry of Health Sri Lanka and UNICEF, 2012

40. A National Nutrition Policy was formulated in 2010 with the main goal of achieving and maintaining the nutritional well-being of all Sri Lankans enabling them to contribute effectively towards national socio-economic growth and development. The nutrition policy outlines the following key objectives: ensure optimal nutrition throughout the life cycle, enhance capacity to deliver effective & appropriate interventions, ensure effective management of adequate nutrition to vulnerable populations, ensure food and nutrition security for all citizens, strengthen advocacy, partnerships and networking and strengthen research, monitoring and evaluation.

### *Climate change*

41. Sri Lanka is prone to climate-related natural hazards and shocks with increasing frequency of occurrence in recent years, which also poses a toll on food security, especially among the most vulnerable. Historical trends suggest that the number of people being affected by climate-related hazards is increasing, from an average of approximately 400,000 people affected every year between 1980 and 1990 to an average of 750,000 affected annually between 2000 and 2013<sup>96</sup>. The majority of the affected population is exposed to drought or flood—both of which are linked to failure or high intensity of the monsoon rains. The increase in exposure is largely due to erratic monsoon patterns resulting in more frequent and intense floods and droughts. Long-term projections predict increasingly erratic rainfall, particularly during the Northeast monsoon period. Coastal hazards such as tsunamis, sea level rise, soil salinization as well as storm hazards present additional climate change-related threats for many livelihood groups and households along Sri Lanka's coastline<sup>97</sup>.

42. These shocks have negatively impacted the resettled communities to capture their livelihoods back to normal. Further, the climate change has reversed years of development gains achieved in different sectors as a result of escalating recovery costs.

43. Climate change in Sri Lanka has also impacted water security (availability) for both human and animal consumption, as well as agricultural and industrial purposes prompting the government to distribute water to selected communities every year with the related budgetary impact of limited resources for more acute disaster response<sup>98</sup>.

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<sup>96</sup> Consolidated Livelihood Approach for Analysing Resilience, GoSL and WFP, 2014

<sup>97</sup> Sri Lanka food security atlas, WFP – Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute (HARTI), May 2015

<sup>98</sup> WFP Sri Lanka Country Strategy, 2016 - 2019

44. The National Council for Disaster Management (NCDM) was established in 2005 and is the highest policy making body in the country on disaster risk reduction. The National Policy on Disaster Management was prepared in February 2013. The document outlines the 3 following main goals: protect lives of the citizens from natural and manmade disasters, create a culture of safety among communities and the implementation of post disaster activities.

45. Table 1<sup>99</sup> shows the main natural disasters in Sri Lanka and an estimation of people affected between 2011 and 2014.

46. Annex 2 shows the main natural disasters in Sri Lanka and an estimation of the affected population between 2006 and 2014.

**Table 1: Main natural disasters in Sri Lanka and estimation of people affected (2006-2014)**

Date	Natural Disaster	Total affected (million)
2014	Drought	1,800
	Flood	1,100
2012	Drought	1,800
	Flood	447
2011	Flood	1,060
2010	Flood	606
2009	Flood	300
2008	Flood	363
	Flood	360
2006	Flood	333

Source: EM-DAT The international disaster database  
(<http://www.emdat.be/database> visited on 1st March 2016)

## 2. Reasons for the evaluation

### 2.1. Rationale

47. Sri Lanka was selected for a CPE on the basis of country-related and WFP-specific criteria.

48. In line with Sri Lanka's transition into a developmental phase, WFP is currently realigning its programme objectives from relief and recovery, to development in support to a policy and capacity development approach.

49. The evaluation is an opportunity for the Country Office to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2011-2015 portfolio of operations in line with WFP's Strategic Plans (2008-2013 and 2014-2017).

### 2.2. Objectives

50. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- Assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate, Country Office strategic positioning and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Sri Lanka; and
- determine the reasons for observed success or failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the Country Office to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Sri Lanka, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible.

<sup>99</sup> Data is based on information collected and disseminated by the Sri Lanka Disaster Information Management System, <http://www.desinventar.lk/>



### 2.3. Stakeholders and users of the evaluation

51. The key intended users of the evaluation findings and recommendations are the Country Office in liaison with the Government of Sri Lanka and other UN and Non-UN partners. The Bangkok Regional Bureau (RB) is expected to use the evaluation findings to strengthen its role in providing strategic guidance and regional integration of operations. Lastly WFP Headquarters (HQ) management will also use the findings for accountability and strategic advocacy.

52. WFP Sri Lanka did not have a Country Strategy in place during the period under review (the current Country Strategy covers the period 2016-2019). A Country Programme (CP) was approved in 2015 for the period 2016-2017 and the current UNDAF was approved in 2012 for the period 2013 – 2017. The timing of this CPE and the evidence provided will feed the Country Office strategic planning for the design of the new UNDAF cycle (2018-2022), the operation that will replace the current CP and any possible mid-term reviews of the Country Strategy. As such, this CPE is weighed more upon the learning objectives of evaluation rather than accountability. In this regard, the CPE and the understanding of how WFP adapted to Sri Lanka transition process will also benefit WFP’s corporate learning.

53. Other stakeholders in the evaluation include the WFP Executive Board (EB), donors and beneficiaries of WFP assistance. The table below provides a preliminary list of stakeholders. A thorough analysis will be done by the evaluation team during the inception phase. More information on the external stakeholders can be found in Annex 3.

**Table 2. Evaluation stakeholders**

<b>Stakeholders</b>	
<b>Executive Board (EB)</b>	As the governing body of the organisation, the EB has a direct interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations and their harmonisation with strategic processes of government and partners.
<b>Beneficiaries: women, men boys and girls</b>	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective.
<b>Government (including partner Ministries)</b>	The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP operations in Sri Lanka are aligned with their priorities and harmonized with other agencies in order to provide the right kind and levels of assistance to the people of Sri Lanka. Amongst other areas of work, this CPE will help to determine WFP's future role in supporting the Government and civil society in emergency preparedness and crisis response. The direct line Ministry for WFP is the Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs. The main GoSL counterparts are the Ministries of Health, Nutrition and Indigenous Medicine; Economic Development; Education; Agriculture; Rural Economic Affairs; Disaster Management; Finance; Trade; Environment and other provincial and district authorities.
<b>Donors</b>	WFP activities are supported by donors’ contributions. They have an interest in knowing to which extent the WFP strategy complement their own strategies and supported-programmes. They also have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent effectively and efficiently.

<b>Stakeholders</b>	
<b>UN agencies and groups, and multilateral institutions</b>	<p>UN agencies have a shared interest with WFP in ensuring that the ensemble of UN support is effective and complementary in support of the population's needs, gender equality and human rights. The main UN partners for WFP's portfolio in Sri Lanka are UNICEF, UNOPS, UNHCR, FAO, IFAD, WHO and UNDP.</p> <p>Over the period under review WFP participated in various UN groups: the United Nations Cluster System (deactivated in July 2013) which supported government efforts in addressing needs during the conflict, post-conflict and early recovery phases, the United Nations inter-agency group that monitored and planned for contingencies under the OCHA leadership and the UN Country Team.</p> <p>WFP also partners with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.</p>
<b>NGO partners and other organizations</b>	<p>NGOs are WFP's partners in programme implementation and design and as such have a stake in the WFP assessment of its portfolio performance as well as an interest in its strategic orientation. WFP worked with various NGOs covering the different activities such as Save the Children, CARE, Caritas, ZOA, World Vision, among others.</p>

### **3. Subject of the evaluation**

#### **3.1. WFP's portfolio in Sri Lanka**

54. WFP has been present in Sri Lanka since 1968. A total of 8 different operations budgeted USD 178,152,106 million and 2 trust funds budgeting USD 8,738,849 have been active over the period under review.

55. Through its various interventions, WFP aims to saving lives, improving food and nutrition security, building resilience to climate shocks and supporting livelihoods in a sustainable manner<sup>100</sup>. WFP's operations aim to be aligned with the Government's social protection policy and the national development plan, help strengthen the Government's capacity to reduce hunger, and promote and develop innovative and tailored food and nutrition responses.

56. In line with the country's transition from recovery to development, WFP is currently realigning its programme objectives from relief and recovery, to development in support to a policy and capacity development approach.

57. WFP's food assistance targets internally displaced people (IDPs) and returnees from India, school children, children under five and pregnant women and lactating mothers.

58. As indicated in the timeline below, over the period under review, WFP has conducted various relief and recovery activities in former conflict-affected areas in the North (PRROs 200143 and 200452), and nutrition activities in areas not covered by the PRROs (DEV 106070 till Sept 2013). A Special Operation (SO) 105390 was launched in 2006 to address operational logistics gaps in the post tsunami recovery period and the conflict situation in Sri Lanka and was extended to the end of 2011. Two IR EMOPs (200809 & 200233) and EMOP 200239 were approved between 2011 and 2015 to provide food assistance to flood victims. A trust fund (10024563) covering 2015 – 2016 was approved in 2015 through the Sustainable Development Goal Fund (SDG-F) to provide technical support and capacity building to Government institutions for 'Scaling Up Nutrition through a Multi-Sector Approach'. Another trust

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<sup>100</sup> WFP Sri Lanka Brief, 2015

fund (10022993), covering 2014-2016 was approved in 2014 to develop household food security and build i) resilient livelihoods for rain-fed farming households and ii) institutional capacity in village, local and regional service delivery.

59. A Country Programme (CP) was approved in 2015 for the period 2016-2017 to improve food and nutrition security and build the resilience of vulnerable communities to climate shocks. The geographical coverage of this new CP includes both the former conflict-affected provinces in the North and other vulnerable areas in the country.

**Table 3. Timeline and funding level of WFP portfolio in Sri Lanka 2011 – 2015**

Operation	Time Frame	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
SO 10539.0	Sep 2006 - Jan 2007 (extended to Dec 2011)	Req: 9,814,908 Rec: 9,715,913 Funded: 99%					
DEV 106070	Jan 2008 - Dec 2012 (extended to Sep 2013)		Req: 13,371,238 Rec: 4,860,717 Funded: 36,4%				
IR EMOP 200233	Jan 2011 - Mar 2011	Req: 496,965 Rec: 381,725 Funded: 76,8%					
PRRO 200143	Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 (extended to Dec 2012)	Req: 69,159,260 Rec: 38,163,491 Funded: 55,2%					
EMOP 200239	Feb 2011 - Aug 2011 (extended to Jan 2012)	Req: 10,754,392 Rec: 6,373,244 Funded: 59,3%					
PRRO 200452	Jan 2013 - Dec 2014 (extended to Dec 2015)				Req: 53,930,956 Rec: 28,673,912 Funded: 53,2%		
IR-EMOP 200809	Jan 2015 - Apr 2015					Req: 919,222 Rec: 815,288 Funded: 88,7%	
CP 200866	2016-2017						Req: 19,705,165 Rec: 5,189,752 Funded: 26%
SDG-F Trust Fund 10024563	Jan 2015 - Dec 2016					Req: 749,122 Rec: 339,398 Funded: 45%	
Trust Fund 10022993	Aug 2014 - Apr 2018					Req: 7,989,727 Rec: 2,801,000 Funded: 35%	
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		29,543	15,834	8,749	10,041	n.a.	n.a.
% Direct Expenses: Sri Lanka vs. WFP World		0.79%	0.40%	0.21%	0.21%	n.a.	n.a.
Food Distributed (MT)		37,358	19,762	8,953	8,549	4,840	n.a.
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		1,793,834	353,252	314,933	448,664	450,365	n.a.
% women beneficiaries (actual)		52.4%	51.2%	51.9%	52.5%	51.9%	n.a.


Source: APR 2014, Project Documents, SPRs 2011-2015 and Resource Situation (WFP The Factory) as of 23 Feb 2016 and PGG Combined Report of Contributions and Forecasts Statistics. Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) are in US\$

60. The two projects in the most needy conflict-affected areas (PRROs 200143 and 200452) received 55.2 percent 53.2 percent of the required funds respectively; while the nutrition activities conducted under the Development project 106070 elsewhere in the country received 36.4 percent of its total requirements. Special operation 10539.0, 99 percent funded, IR EMOP 200233, 76.8 percent, EMOP 200239, 59.3 percent, and IR-EMOP 200809, 88.7 percent, were better funded. Trust Fund 10024563 received 45 percent of requirements, while Trust Fund 10022993 was 35 percent funded. Validation of the above figures and further research on missing information is expected to take place during the field data collection work. The table above provides also an overview of the funding levels of WFP portfolio of operations during the period 2011 – 2015.

61. The figures below show the top 5 donors to the Sri Lanka overall WFP portfolio and by operation over the period under review<sup>101</sup>.

<sup>101</sup> Trust Funds are included under 'Other Donors' in Figure 3 pie chart. Total amounts exclude carry overs from previous operations, miscellaneous incomes and stock transfers.

**Figure 3. Main donors to Sri Lanka portfolio**



Top 5 Donors to the Portfolio (2011- 2015)	
Overall	MULTILATERAL, U.S.A, UN CERF, CANADA, JAPAN
CP 200866	JAPAN, CANADA, SRI LANKA
DEV 106070	MULTILATERAL, PRIVATE DONORS
EMOP 200239	UN CERF, MULTILATERAL, EUR. COMMISSION, CANADA, AUSTRALIA
PRRO 200143	U.S.A, MULTILATERAL, UN CERF, BRAZIL, JAPAN
PRRO 200452	MULTILATERAL,CANADA, JAPAN, SRI LANKA, U.S.A.
SO 10539.0	EUR. COMMISSION,U.S.A.,UN CERF, MULTILATERAL, U.K.

Source: Resource Situation 22 Feb 2016 with forecast & <http://factory.wfp.org> as of 25 Feb 2016

62. Following a smooth and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections conducted in 2015, the formation of unity and democratic government has resulted in testimony of positive support from donors and international community.

63. WFP's portfolio over the review period included provisions designed to improve gender equality; e.g. participation of pregnant and lactating women in health and nutrition education, public health interventions and community activities (DEV 10607.0); specific targeting of widows and female heads of households (PRRO 200452) or participation of women groups in nutrition capacity building activities (Trust Fund 10024563). Further research of these aspects is expected to be conducted by the evaluation team during the evaluation period.

**Table 4. Sri Lanka percentage and total of beneficiaries by activity 2011- 2015**

Activity		School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFA	HIV/AIDS	Cash and Vouchers
DEV 106070 Jan 2008 - Dec 2012 (extended to Sep 2013)	Planned		207,747 100%				
	Actual		369,000 100%				
IR EMOP 200233 Jan 2011 - Mar 2011	Planned			442,740 100%			
	Actual			420,000 100%			
PRRO 200143 Jan 2011 - Dec 2011 (extended to Dec 2012)	Planned	166,436 46%	73,255 20%	86,354 24%	36,201 10%	1,330 0.4%	
	Actual	173,000 35%	119,000 24%	175,000 36%	21,500 4%	1,500 0.3%	
EMOP 200239 Feb 2011 - Aug 2011 (extended to Jan 2012)	Planned		58,305 10%	492,946 84%	34,030 6%		
	Actual		63,500 10%	500,000 83%	42,000 7%		
PRRO 200452 Jan 2013 - Dec 2014 (extended to Dec 2015)	Planned	315,783 57%	34,218 6%	180,187 32%	27,710 5%		81,411 15%
	Actual	320,000 48%	123,000 18%	191,300 29%	33,112 5%		194,397 29%
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		482,219 22%	373,525 17%	1,202,227 56%	97,941 5%	1,330 0.1%	81,411 4%
<b>% women beneficiaries vs total by activity (planned)</b>		50%	62%	52%	56%	39%	53%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		493,000 19%	674,500 26%	1,286,300 50%	96,612 4%	1,500 0.1%	194,397 8%
<b>% women beneficiaries vs total by activity (actual)</b>		50%	56%	50%	51%	50%	51%

Source: Dacota as of 13 Jan 2016. The table covers 2011-2014. Data for the following projects is not available: IR-EMOP 200809, CP 200866 and Trust Fund. SO 10539.0 is non-food operation and is not included here.

64. The table above shows the planned and actual number of beneficiaries by activity and operation. Over the review period, 50 percent of WFP beneficiaries have received General Food Distribution Rations (GFD), 26 percent received assistance through nutrition activities and 19 percent through the school feeding programmes. Annex 5 gives further details on the activities by operation and beneficiaries proportion by activity; and the beneficiaries and tonnage by operation.


65. Annex 4 provides further details regarding the Sri Lanka portfolio: timeframe, funding, activities, food tonnages and number of beneficiaries, costs and objectives.

### 3.2. Scope of the evaluation

66. The scope of the evaluation will cover a five years period from 2011 to 2015. Thus, in summary, the CPE will review and assess the overall performance of the various relief and recovery PPRO activities conducted in the most severely conflict-affected areas in the Northern and Eastern provinces, a development project focused on nutrition elsewhere in the country and the occasional EMOPs implemented to meet the needs of flood-affected victims. The map on the side shows 3 of the core operations during the CPE review period and provides an overview of the portfolio geographical distribution. The geographic scope of this CPE includes all areas covered by the portfolio.

67. In light of the strategic nature of the evaluation, it is not intended to evaluate each operation individually, but to focus broadly on the portfolio as a whole. Following the established approach for WFP CPEs, the evaluation focuses on three main areas detailed in the below key evaluation questions.

**Figure 4. WFP interventions in Sri Lanka 2011 - 2015**



Source: WFP Sri Lanka CO - VAM, 2016

## 4. Evaluation questions, approach and methodology

### 4.1. Evaluation questions

68. The CPE will be addressing the following three key questions, which will be further detailed in a matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. Collectively, the questions aim at highlighting the key lessons from the WFP country presence and performance, which could inform future strategic and operational decisions. It should be noted that question three will constitute the largest part of the inquiry and evaluation report.

- 1. Question one: Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning.** Reflect on the extent to which: i) the portfolio main objectives and related activities have been relevant with Sri Lanka's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities; ii) the objectives have been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies; iii) the objectives have been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also

with, bilateral and NGOs; iv) WFP has been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and has positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference; v) there have been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand; and vi) WFP portfolio has been consistent with the status of the peacebuilding and reconciliation process.

## **2. Question two: Factors and quality of strategic decision-making.**

Reflect on the extent to which WFP: i) has analysed (or used existing analysis) the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Sri Lanka - including gender issues; ii) contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; iii) has generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners; iv) has adequately covered the vulnerable groups in its programming. Analyse how WFP's approach to targeting evolved across the portfolio period. Identify the factors that determined existing choices: perceived comparative advantage, corporate strategies, national political factors, resources, organisational structure and staffing, monitoring information etc., in order to understand these drivers of strategy, and how they were considered and managed.

## **3. Question three: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio.**

Reflect on: i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency, (including the respective cost analyses) and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities and explanations for these results (including factors beyond WFP's control); ii) the level of emergency preparedness, vis-à-vis the effectiveness of the portfolio iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners especially UN partners, but also with, bilateral and NGOs at operational level.

### **4.2. Evaluability**

69. The CPE will benefit from the recently drafted Country Strategy covering the period 2016 – 2019, which fed into the design of the current Country Programme. However, the Country Strategy is not a results-based management document. Thus the primary benchmarks for assessing performance will be a combination of the operation project documents, standard project reports (SPR) as well as qualitative assessment of WFP's work.

70. Each operation has its own logical framework and the formulation of the operations at different points in time refers consequently to different strategic plans. The 2008-2013 Strategic Plan as well as the subsequent 2014-2017 Strategic Plan should be used as main references for the discussion on strategic alignment of the overall portfolio, as well as its related strategic results.

71. No major challenges or restrictions around the timing to conduct the evaluation are expected. The rainy seasons should not, in principle, pose a challenge for travelling to the project sites. Special attention should be paid to plan and allocate sufficient time to meet with the Government partners.

72. Monitoring data is available at the CO and can be complemented with the data available at the Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics. OEV will ensure that an initial e-library list bibliography is made available to the team.

73. The language used to communicate with some national stakeholders (in particular beneficiaries) may be a constraint. All team members will have to communicate in English with national counterparts, and be assisted by local expertise to communicate in Tamil and Sinhala with the beneficiaries.

### 4.3 Methodology

*This evaluation will examine the extent to which gender and equity dimensions are integrated into WFP's policies, systems and processes.*

74. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and connectedness - appropriately linked to the three key evaluation questions.

75. CPEs primarily use a longitudinal design, rely on secondary quantitative data and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country.

76. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report.

77. The methodology should:

- Build on the logic of the portfolio and on the common objectives arising across operations;
- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions presented in 4.1. A model looking at groups of “main activities” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.
- Take into account the budget and timing constraints.
- Develop (reconstruct) a working theory of change for the Sri Lanka portfolio. This should be done during the inception phase in close collaboration with the Country Office.

78. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using a mixed methodological approach (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. The sampling technique to impartially select site visits and stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

79. The evaluation should provide a comparative cost-efficiency<sup>102</sup> and cost-effectiveness<sup>103</sup> analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities, i.e. Cash

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<sup>102</sup> A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

<sup>103</sup> Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the omega value, a ratio between the in-kind Nutrient Value Score (NVS) divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.



Based Transfers (CBT) vs. in-kind interventions in the portfolio. As a mode of example this analysis can be structured as follows:

### **Cost-efficiency**

1. Comparison of in-kind procurement value and logistic costs (transport, storage and handling, quality control and salaries for logistic staff – LTSH) to transport the different commodities to the respective markets with the CBT local market prices at the same point in time. If sufficient data is available a seasonal analysis should also be presented.
2. Same as above including the in-kind operational costs (partners, equipment and supplies, travel etc. – ODOC) with the equivalent CBT operational costs (C&V related costs: C&V delivery and C&V other). Attention must be paid to differentiate the start-up costs and the running costs and include depreciation calculations if necessary.

### **Cost-effectiveness**

3. Omega value and/or other cost-effectiveness indicators, e.g. the in-kind vs CBT costs per percent increase in households with adequate Food Consumption Score (FCS)

## **4.4. Quality assurance**

80. WFP's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) is based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community<sup>104</sup>. It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardised checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, while the OEV Director will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

81. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

## **5. Organization of the evaluation**

### **5.1. Phases and deliverables**

82. The evaluation will proceed through five phases and will be implemented within the following tentative timeframe in 2016. This timeframe is aligned with the Sri Lanka CO planning process and decision-making so it can be as useful as possible.

83. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) the inception phase with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome in April followed by an inception mission in Colombo in May (team leader and evaluation manager), and by the inception report providing details for conducting the evaluation fieldwork. (ii). The fieldwork phase,

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<sup>104</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD – DAC).



with at least 3 weeks in the field, is planned to take place in Sri Lanka in June 2016 involving primary and secondary data collection, and preliminary analysis, followed by an exit debrief with the CO and a subsequent online preliminary findings debrief with the CO, RB and OEV. (iii) The reporting phase concludes with the final evaluation report (a full report and an EB summary report) in September 2016 that is planned to be presented to WFP’s Executive Board in February 2017. A more detailed timeline can be found in Annex 6.

**Table 5: Summary timeline - key evaluation milestones**

Phases	Provisional Timeline	Outputs
<b>Phase 1 (Preparation):</b> Preparation of ToR, stakeholder consultation and identify evaluation team	Jan – Mar 2016	Concept Note ToR Evaluation team selected and contracted
<b>Phase 2 (Inception):</b> Briefing evaluation team at WFP HQ, document review and inception mission in Sri Lanka	Apr – May 2016	Inception Report
<b>Phase 3 (Fieldwork):</b> Evaluation mission and data collection and analysis	Jun – Jul 2016	Exit debriefing Preliminary findings debrief (telecom)
<b>Phase 4 (Reporting):</b> Draft reports, comment and revision	Aug - Oct 2016	Draft report Comments and process reviews In-country learning workshop Final evaluation report (including SER)
<b>Phase 5 (Presentation):</b> Executive Board and Management response	Feb 2017	Summary evaluation report editing Evaluation report formatting Mngmt response and EB presentation

## 5.2. Evaluation team / expertise required

84. An independent evaluation team will implement the evaluation including inception, fieldwork, analysis, internal quality review and reporting. It is expected that the evaluation will be conducted by a gender-balanced, geographically and culturally diverse team with appropriate skills to assess the portfolio gender dimensions.

85. The team leader (TL) will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivering of all evaluation products. The TL should also have a good understanding of the Sri Lankan context, policy analysis and support to government institutions, food security issues, and familiarity with the relevant portfolio issues. He/she will have excellent synthesis and reporting skills in English.

86. The evaluation team will be composed of 4 national and international consultants (including the team leader) and 1 research analyst. Consultants will have knowledge of mixed evaluation methods, synthesis and reporting skills in English, knowledge in Sri Lanka and appropriate skills to assess the portfolio gender dimensions. The team should combine between its various members the following competencies and expertise

- (Team leader) Policy analysis and support to government institutions: role of WFP in the formulation and implementation of national policies (food security and nutrition, food fortification, school feeding, resilience building and safety nets, agricultural development, natural resource management, disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response etc.)
- Food security, nutrition and food fortification.
- Relief and recovery food assistance: natural disasters response, IDPs (return and resettling programs), conditional transfers (F/CFW, F/CFT, income generating and livelihood empowerment), school feeding.
- Market analysis and market based interventions.
- Capacity development in food security monitoring, disaster risk reduction and emergency preparedness and response

### **5.3. Roles and responsibilities**

87. This evaluation is managed by OEV. Diego Fernandez has been appointed as evaluation manager. The Evaluation manager has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. He is responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team; preparing and managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field missions; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and consolidating comments from stakeholders on the various evaluation products. He will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

88. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the programme, its performance and results; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in Sri Lanka; set up meetings and field visits, organise for interpretation if required and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. The CO should nominate a focal point to communicate with the evaluation team. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report. The CO will also organise a learning workshop in Colombo for both internal and external stakeholders with support from the Team Leader and Evaluation Manager.

89. The contracted company will support the evaluation team in providing quality checks to the draft evaluation products being sent to OEV for its feedback. Particularly, the company will review the draft inception and evaluation reports, prior to submission to OEV.

90. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

### **5.4. Communication**

91. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and in HQ will engage with the evaluation process and will be invited to provide feedback on the TOR and the Evaluation Report, which are the two core draft evaluation products.

92. During the last day of the fieldwork there will be an internal exit debrief with the evaluation team and the CO. After the fieldwork, the initial evaluation findings and conclusions will be shared with WFP stakeholders in CO, RB and HQ during a teleconference debriefing session.

93. All evaluation products will be delivered in English.

94. The SER along with the Management Response to the evaluation recommendations is planned to be presented to the WFP Executive Board in February 2017. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website. Refer to the Communication and Learning Plan for the Evaluation in Annex 7.

### **5.5. Budget**

95. The evaluation will be financed from the Office of Evaluation's budget. The total budget covers all expenses related to consultant/company rates and international travels.

### **Annexes to the TOR (not reproduced in this Evaluation Report)**

Annex 1: Key indicators for country context

Annex 2: Natural disasters and affected population in Sri Lanka

Annex 3: External stakeholders matrix

Annex 4: Sri Lanka portfolio overview 2011 – 2015

Annex 5: Beneficiaries and tonnage by operation

Annex 6: Detailed evaluation timeline

Annex 7: Evaluation communication and learning plan

Annex 8: WFP's operations in Sri Lanka since 1964

Annex 9: Areas of conflict and displacement at the end of the war

Annex 10: Factsheet Sri Lanka 2011 – 2015

Annex 11: Sri Lanka CPE E Library 2011-2015

## **Annex B: Methodology**

### **Introduction**

1. The methodology for this CPE was fully set out in the Inception Report (IR) (Lister *et al.*, 2016). This Annex summarises the methodology adopted and comments on the team's experience in conducting the evaluation. The full evaluation matrix is reproduced in Annex C. For a description of the evaluation process, including fieldwork itinerary, see Annex D.

#### *Evaluation guidelines and standards*

2. WFP OEV's EQAS guidelines for country portfolio evaluations provided a strong procedural and methodological framework. Their clear templates for the inception report and evaluation report offered clear guidelines. The OECD DAC and UNEG evaluation standards were adhered to. The evaluation employed the evaluation criteria according to WFP standard practice set out in the OEV Technical Note on the subject (WFP, n.d. c), as well as deploying OEV's guidance on efficiency (WFP, 2013e). All evaluation outputs have undergone quality assurance.

#### *Evaluation Matrix*

3. The evaluation team took the key evaluation questions from the TOR (see 0 above) and broke these down into a more detailed series of evaluation questions (EQs). The evaluation matrix at Table 13 shows these questions and amplifies the points addressed in answering each of them, as well as the analysis and indicators used for this purpose, the main sources of information, and the data collection methods. The detailed EQs and the matrix were designed to ensure balance between the three overarching key EQs as well as an intuitively logical sequence of enquiry. Taken together, the main report above and the thematic annexes below attempt to answer all the detailed EQs and the subquestions that they contain.

4. A Theory of Change (ToC) approach was used to inform the design of the evaluation matrix, though it was not considered appropriate to reconstruct a ToC in full for the portfolio, or for its individual components (see Annex H of the Inception Report, Lister *et al.*, 2016). The evaluation team used recent WFP guidelines and theories of change as reference points, but, to avoid unfair assessment, took careful account of what the available guidance was at the time of programme decision-making and implementation.

### **Methodology and data collection instruments**

#### *Mixed methods*

5. The evaluation used a pragmatic mixed methods approach in addressing the evaluation questions. This section explains the different instruments employed and the approach to triangulating evidence from different sources. As envisaged in the Inception Report:

We will seek both triangulation and complementarity between methods (see Box 9 below). We will also triangulate within methods where appropriate (e.g. comparing the perspectives of different stakeholders interviewed... Moreover, some of the key issues for the evaluation do not easily lend themselves to quantitative assessment.<sup>105</sup> This reinforces the case for careful

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<sup>105</sup> This applies to issues that are intrinsically difficult to quantify (e.g. humanitarian principles, capacity development) and those where causality is very complex, and cannot be rigorously proven over a short time period and with limited data (e.g. the long-term effects of school feeding and MCHN).

combination of methods, linked to an elucidation of the theories of change underlying the different main interventions in which WFP has been involved. By understanding *how* WFP and its partners expected to achieve results, the evaluation team will be able to assess the quality and credibility of the WFP portfolio, drawing on international evidence of what works, and international standards of good practice, to supplement the limited evidence that may be available on direct outputs and outcomes in Sri Lanka.

### **Box 9 Triangulation and Complementarity**

Methods can be combined in different ways:

**‘Triangulation’:** confirming and corroborating results reached by one method with other results reached by another method. For instance, when beneficiaries of a project’s services state that they judge it good (or bad); this can be cross-checked by collecting quantitative data on coverage and accessibility of the service.

**‘Complementarity’:** results obtained by a method help better understand those obtained by another method. In-depth theory-based approaches may help understand reasons why a project led to unexpected results; qualitative methods may help clarify concepts and define variables; and large-scale data sets may be analysed by multivariate and case-based methods.

*Source:* Stern et al, 2012

### *Data collection/instruments*

6. The main instruments for assembling data and stakeholder views were:
  - **Document/literature review.** The bibliography now at Annex R is drawn from a much larger e-library of documents gathered with the support of OEV and the CO.
  - **Review of secondary data.** The e-library includes a comprehensive collection of WFP’s internal data, including SPRs and annual work plans, together with country-level data on performance in the various sectors in which WFP is engaged. During the inception phase, all the information from SPRs was consolidated in a single workbook, which facilitated activity- and theme-wise analysis by team members.
  - **Key informant and stakeholder interviews** were the main form of primary data collection. The range of interview targets was indicated in the stakeholder analysis. By default, interviews were treated as confidential; they were systematically written up by team members using a standard template and shared through a compendium in a confidential section of the e-library. The compendium enabled interview notes to be easily searched by topic, and facilitated triangulation of different interviewee recollections and perspectives. Interviewees were very helpful in indicating additional key documents and data sources. The Country Office was extremely helpful in facilitating interviews. See Annex E for the list of people met.
  - **Stakeholder workshops.** At the start of the main evaluation mission, the team held a round table discussion with key personnel in the CO. This fulfilled its aims of explaining the purpose and nature of the CPE to these key staff, to reconfirm that it was meant to be a proactive and constructive exercise, and to start exploring some of the key issues and data that the evaluation team would need to unearth. This initial discussion was valuable in building a sense of common purpose between the evaluation team and the CO. At the end of the main evaluation mission, an exit debrief for CO staff was given with an informal PowerPoint presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions, and a chance

to seek clarification and validation. In the week following the mission, a more detailed online debriefing with HQ, RB and CO staff was held.

- Separately, the team held key stakeholder workshops at the start and at the end of the main evaluation mission. These workshops were held at the WFP counterpart ministry (the Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs) and were attended by key government personnel and representatives from various UN agencies, including WFP. These sessions facilitated consultation and feedback, as well as promoting CO and GoSL ownership of the evaluation and thus enhancing its utility. Whilst the government preferred to not include NGOs and CSOs in these workshops, they were nevertheless represented through interviews (see Annex E).
- **Field visits.** The evaluation team undertook a week-long field visit to all the main geographic areas of WFP activity, with the aim to give the team a more grounded understanding of WFP's portfolio and to facilitate interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with stakeholders, including beneficiaries, at the local level. These visits enabled the team to interview female and male beneficiaries, partner organisations, WFP field staff, school teachers, schoolchildren and local government officials. See Annex D for the evaluation process.

### **Evaluability of cross-cutting issues**

7. Detailed annexes were drafted to the IR with details on the approach to evaluating the sub-components of the portfolio, including the cross-cutting issues of gender, humanitarian principles and cost analysis.

#### *Evaluating gender*

8. The evaluation was guided by the OEV Technical Note on Integrating Gender in Evaluation and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Guidance Document on Integrating Human Rights and Gender Equality in Evaluation – Towards UNEG Guidance (UNEG, 2011), in addition to the relevant paragraphs on EQAS quality criteria.

9. The Technical Note states that “*Gender equality responsive evaluations add and incorporate into evaluations the important principles of equality, inclusion and non-discrimination*”. This evaluation therefore sought to investigate where and how those principles have been included in both the design and the implementation of programmes, in particular focusing on the roles that men and women, girls and boys, have played in programming and the measures taken to ensure gender issues are considered during implementation of the portfolio, including evidence of dialogue and analysis on inequalities and power relations. The team sought to mainstream a gender-sensitive approach into data collection, for example by holding separate FGDs for women and men wherever this was possible.

#### *Evaluating the humanitarian principles*

10. The TOR makes specific reference to assessing the consistency of WFP's portfolio with the humanitarian principles to which WFP and other UN agencies are committed. This duly formed an important and relevant cross-cutting line of enquiry for the CPE, not least due to the recent joint agency review on "Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation" (UNEG, 2016) that found a lack of good practice guidance.

11. The subject could have supported a full evaluation in its own right, and the CPE sought to be proportionate in its approach. The evaluation mainly relied on written accounts of the war and its aftermath (from WFP and other sources) supported by interviews with participants. The team sought interviews with a wide range of stakeholders across the country; however, given that many international actors are no longer in Sri Lanka, the enquiry could not be comprehensive and findings have been qualified accordingly. Our methodological approach to evaluating the humanitarian principles is discussed in Annex L along with findings and analysis.

### *Evaluating cost analysis*

12. A specific requirement of the TOR was to ‘*provide a comparative cost-efficiency<sup>106</sup> and cost-effectiveness<sup>107</sup> analyses of the different food assistance transfer modalities, i.e. Cash Based Transfers (CBT) vs. in-kind interventions in the portfolio*’. This formed a distinct work stream within the CPE. In order to keep the effort proportionate (this is one topic among many for the evaluation, and cost analysis is known to be potentially time-consuming) the CPE focused primarily on the voucher programme which began in 2012 and, to a lesser extent, the school feeding cash pilot in 2014. This offered an opportunity to check how the quality of cost analysis evolved over the period. See Annex O for a full summary of findings on cost analysis and the wider issues of assessing the merits of alternative transfer modalities and designs.

### **Limitations**

13. As noted in the IR, data availability restrictions pose a notable limitation to the evaluation, particularly to the feasibility of a robust cost analysis. This component of the CPE was limited due to a lack of results data available. Often even the data anticipated in project documents (such as asset scores and coping strategy index data) had at best been sporadically collected, and data series that were available were often of poor quality.

14. Overall there was a general bias toward the present and it was harder to find protagonists from the earlier portfolio years, with recollections of those events more uncertain.

15. As mentioned in the main report, another limitation was the lack of an explicit strategy (or ToC) against which to evaluate the portfolio as a whole. Furthermore, as noted in the IR, there were no previous evaluations of WFP’s portfolio:

There have been no previous evaluations of WFP’s portfolio in Sri Lanka, and no evaluations of individual operations occurred during the evaluation period. Sri Lanka was one of four desk studies for the Cash and Voucher Policy evaluation, along with Ecuador, Ethiopia and Niger (Majewski et al, 2014), but no separate paper was produced. However the report did note that, in the Sri Lankan context, the use of vouchers provided a reliable alternative to food distributions that had been hampered by pipeline breaks.

A Country Evaluation Synthesis (WFP, 2011b) summarises evaluations prior to the evaluation period, but some interesting observations can be noted including WFP’s heavy reliance on partners for programme delivery, the impact of government actions on WFP

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<sup>106</sup> A cost-efficiency analysis measures outputs against inputs in monetary terms and facilitates comparison of alternative transfer modalities in order to use available resources as efficiently as possible.

<sup>107</sup> Cost-effectiveness analysis measures the comparative costs of achieving the desired outcomes. The current WFP cost-effectiveness tool is the omega value, a ratio between the in-kind Nutrient Value Score (NVS) divided by the full cost for the in-kind delivery basket and the CBT NVS divided by the full cost of the full CBT basket.

operations and the need to develop systematic exit strategies with explicit operational contracts including expectations of future government contributions.

16. These limitations were mainly addressed by triangulating across available evidence. Where limitations were serious we have qualified our findings in the main text accordingly.



## **Annex C: Evaluation Matrix**

1. The evaluation matrix shown in Table 13 below was developed drawing on the questions posed in the Terms of Reference. It was used to guide all stages of the evaluation, and the main EQs underpin the structure of the Evaluation Report.

2. Questions were addressed from the perspective of the lines of enquiry identified for the CPE (see IR ¶62):

... the evaluation team will undertake a number of simultaneous lines of enquiry that cut across WFP operations. These comprise:

- *Activities* that recur across different operations, namely:
  - GFD and relief, for IDPs and in response to disasters
  - FFA and similar activities, which have often followed on from initial relief
  - Nutrition / MCHN
  - School feeding
  - Analytical work, including work linked to disaster preparedness, and climate change and joint planning with GoSL and other agencies
- *Cross-cutting issues*, namely:
  - Application of humanitarian principles
  - Country strategy formulation
  - Partnerships and capacity development
  - Gender
  - Choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers (and related cost analysis)

**Table 13 Evaluation Matrix**

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>KEY QUESTION 1: PORTFOLIO ALIGNMENT AND STRATEGIC POSITIONING</b>			
<b>EQ1. What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in Sri Lanka?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Political and institutional context of Sri Lanka</li> <li>▪ Economic and social characteristics and trends (gender disaggregated)</li> <li>▪ Evolving context following the conclusion of the civil war</li> <li>▪ Key elements of Sri Lanka's international relationships, including aid</li> <li>▪ Significant changes in the international context during the evaluation period (including developments concerning nutrition, climate change, humanitarian principles, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Relevant aspects of WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies</li> </ul>	<p>Standard international comparisons on economic, social and governance data, linked to Sri Lanka-specific assessments.</p> <p>Standard international comparisons on food security and nutrition.</p> <p>Historical and international comparisons concerning conflict, peace, reconciliation.</p>	<p>International data sets</p> <p>Secondary material on changes in international context</p> <p>Regular analytical work on Sri Lanka (e.g. by EIU, WB, IMF, AsDB) as well as national data</p> <p>Sri Lanka-specific studies and reports</p> <p>GoSL and partner policy statements and plans</p> <p>WFP policy and strategy documents</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Variety of analytical sources, ensuring a range of stakeholder perspectives. Awareness that opinion in and on Sri Lanka may be polarised. Range of stakeholder interviews.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Sri Lanka's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?</b>			
<p>What are the needs? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What are the needs in terms of food security and nutrition (and what are the characteristics of vulnerability)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Which are the most vulnerable groups and why?</li> <li>○ Which geographical areas are most vulnerable and why?</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ How has the changing context during the evaluation period affected the nature of needs in Sri Lanka?</li> <li>▪ To what extent does the WFP programme/ portfolio assess the real needs of the most vulnerable, including the underlying causes of food insecurity and malnutrition?</li> <li>▪ How are data on needs regularly gathered? I.e. how are needs monitored over time?</li> <li>▪ How is need disaggregated by gender, and what are WFP efforts to address this?</li> <li>▪ What efforts does WFP make to ensure that its interventions are culturally sensitive?</li> </ul>	<p>Nutritional and food security status of population, morbidity and mortality, other relevant social indicators, and policy makers' perceptions.</p> <p>Extent and quality of WFP's analytical work (including food security assessments, emergency assessments, market assessments)</p> <p>Review of treatment of gender in WFP project documents and draft strategy</p> <p>Comparison of programme data and needs data.</p> <p>Check against comparable WFP and partner programme documentation and data.</p>	<p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>Key surveys, by GoSL, WFP and others.</p> <p>GoSL national and sector planning documents.</p> <p>WFP project documents and reporting.</p> <p>Analytical and project documents from other agencies</p> <p>Interviews</p>	<p>Again, note potential polarisation on issues of needs (e.g. the controversy over IDP numbers and others affected by war). Range of stakeholder perspectives and emphasis on evidence-based documentary sources.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?</b>			
<p>In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Alignment with GoSL policies</li> <li>▪ Alignment with GoSL systems</li> </ul> <p>Extent to which GoSL documents have provided a clear and comprehensive framework to align with.</p> <p>Quality of government systems.</p> <p>Mechanisms for mutual accountability.</p>	<p>Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with those set out in GoSL national and sector policy and planning documents, and with government and national systems</p> <p>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</p>	<p>GoSL policy and planning documents, at national and sector level.</p> <p>WFP programme documents.</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1</p> <p>Informant perspectives (especially GoSL, at national and local levels) on alignment.</p>	<p>Triangulate GoSL and non-GoSL perspectives; views of independent observers as well as WFP and GoSL stakeholders; to the extent possible assess whether government priorities vary between central/local government levels and across geographical areas; note that GoSL policy emphasis may have shifted over time; compare current interview evidence with historical documentary record.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?</b>			
<p>How effective are WFP partnerships? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ How well WFP works collaboratively within UN, and with other donors, on a strategic policy level and at an implementation level.</li> <li>▪ How well WFP manages partnerships with other non-government stakeholders.</li> </ul>	<p>To consider whether partnerships have been effective and efficient in practice (cf. EQ13 and EQ14) as well as relevant in principle</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consistency of WFP objectives and strategy with relevant partner strategies and plans and coordination frameworks</li> <li>• Degree of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved between WFP and partners</li> </ul> <p>(to be considered at portfolio level and for thematic components of WFP portfolio)</p>	<p>Planning documents and performance information on WFP interventions, with special attention to joint interventions and assessments.</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>GoSL, other partner and beneficiary perspectives.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and stakeholder interviews.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand</b>			
<p>Extent to which WFP's portfolio and its components in Sri Lanka have adapted to evolving WFP policies and guidelines.</p> <p>Extent to which there have been tensions or trade-offs between WFP corporate policies etc. and alignment with GoSL strategies and systems.</p>	<p>Extent to which WFP has adhered to international standards and WFP corporate standards (including the humanitarian principles).</p> <p>Extent to which adherence to such standards has been constrained by GoSL policies and standards.</p> <p>Extent to which any compromises are identified as such and acknowledged.</p> <p>NB. Judgment on WFP performance to take account of policy guidance and international standards available at the time strategic decisions were made.</p> <p>(To be considered at the level of thematic components and the portfolio as a whole.)</p>	<p>Documentation on WFP corporate strategy and thematic polices and standards.</p> <p>Project documents and performance information on WFP interventions.</p> <p>WFP, UN and other reports on the humanitarian situation and UN performance.(cf. Annex K [of IR])</p> <p>Analysis generated for EQ1.</p> <p>Key informant interviews.</p>	<p>Ensure that documents and stakeholders consulted reflect different time periods as well as different stakeholder groups. HQ vs. RB vs. CO perspectives etc.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?</b>			
<p>Who are the other key players in addressing food insecurity, relief and resilience in Sri Lanka?</p> <p>How has WFP positioned itself vis-à-vis these players, and/or actively collaborated with them?</p> <p>Has WFP (or GoSL) explicitly identified the comparative advantages of different players in analytical work, service delivery, capacity development, and acted accordingly?</p>	<p>Context analysis (EQ1), and analysis of alignment (EQ4,EQ5). (Especially seek conscious statements of WFP's perceived comparative advantage.)</p> <p>Quality of joint UN planning.</p> <p>Operation of joint forums with GoSL and other partners addressing food security, nutrition, disaster preparedness, etc. and WFP's role in these.</p>	<p>Documentation of policy and planning processes in Sri Lanka (e.g. coordinating committees' membership, record of meetings and decision-making, analytical and policy documents resulting).</p> <p>Key informant perceptions of these processes, their quality, and WFP's contributions to them.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and interviews, capturing external as well as internal perspectives on WFP role and performance.</p>
<b>EQ7. To what extent has WFP's portfolio has been consistent with the status of the peacebuilding and reconciliation process?</b>			
<p>Where was Sri Lanka located on the spectrum between peace and conflict at the beginning of the evaluation period?</p> <p>How has this context evolved in terms of progress towards peace, reconciliation and durable solutions for those displaced and otherwise affected by the war?</p>	<p>Extent to which WFP's portfolio has reflected the evolving context in terms of supporting durable solutions for the most vulnerable.</p> <p>Observance of international humanitarian standards.</p>	<p>Documentation of WFP portfolio components and the planning and beneficiary identification processes they involved.</p> <p>Government and non-government commentaries (including UN reports) on peacebuilding and reconciliation.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs with stakeholders and beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Ensure that documents and stakeholders consulted reflect different time periods as well as different stakeholder groups. Recognise that opinions may be polarised. Ensure that interviewees recognise the evaluation team is independent, neutral and will respect confidentiality.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>KEY QUESTION 2: FACTORS AND QUALITY OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING</b>			
<b>EQ8. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Sri Lanka - including gender issues?</b>			
<p>For each of its interventions, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others for strategy formulation, for choice of intervention, and for influencing others.</li> <li>▪ Analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods and gender context, and how this is used for effective targeting.</li> <li>▪ Use of WFP research and monitoring data to inform strategic decision-making.</li> </ul>	<p>Analysis of programme direction against needs set out in food security assessments and other key analytical work</p> <p>Assessment of clarity and thoroughness with which PDs etc. refer to relevant data and analysis</p> <p>Quality of attention to gender issues in analysis planning and monitoring.</p>	<p>Analytical work undertaken directly by WFP or in collaboration with partners.</p> <p>Other relevant analytical work to which WFP had access.</p> <p>PDs and monitoring reports.</p> <p>Key informant interviews.</p>	<p>Stakeholder interviews with those undertaking analysis; independent assessment of quality of analytical documents etc.; extent to which analytical work is reflected in operational documents.</p>
<b>EQ9. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?</b>			
<p>What explicit efforts has WFP made:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ in advocacy on hunger-related issues?</li> <li>○ towards developing national capacity for monitoring, analysis and decision-making (as well as implementation)?</li> </ul> <p>Is there evidence that WFP has</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ influenced GoSL and/or other partners, or public perceptions?</li> <li>○ strengthened national capacity for analysis and decision-making?</li> </ul>	<p>Analysis of documentary record and participant perceptions.</p> <p>Assessment of effectiveness of capacity development efforts (EQ13, EQ14)</p>	<p>Cf. EQ6 above</p> <p>Documents on the evolution of strategy and capacity.</p> <p>WFP records including SPRs</p> <p>Key informant perceptions.</p>	<p>Range of documentary sources and interviews, capturing external as well as internal perspectives on WFP role and performance.</p>



Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ10. To what extent has WFP adequately covered vulnerable groups in its programming?</b>			
<p>What has been WFP's approach to targeting (a) in the selection of its main interventions, and (b) in the design and implementation of targeting within interventions?</p> <p>How well has WFP monitored access to and coverage of its programmes?</p> <p>Has coverage of vulnerable groups been affected by the issues discussed under EQ5?</p>	<p>Deepening of findings under EQ2 with special reference to targeting. (see also EQ13 on effectiveness).</p> <p>Criteria for identification of vulnerable groups (who's considered vulnerable and why?)</p>	<p>Background material on vulnerable groups and their evolution over time (cf. EQ1, EQ2)</p> <p>Programme monitoring reports.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs with stakeholders including beneficiaries.</p>	<p>As for EQ2.</p>
<b>EQ11. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?</b>			
<p>External factors to consider include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Changing economic, budgetary and capacity context in Sri Lanka (EQ1 above)</li> <li>○ Evolution of post-conflict situation (cf. EQ7, EQ5)</li> <li>○ Changing international context for WFP, including its financing environment</li> </ul> <p>Internal factors to consider include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Staffing and capacity of the WFP CO and support from RB and HQ</li> <li>○ Roll-out of WFP strategic, policy and financial reforms, and the extent to which these have (in practice) increased flexibility and scope for strategic decision-making</li> </ul>	<p>Reconstruct the influences at play in WFP's decision-making processes, with particular attention to factors that constrain or enhance the real effective discretion of the CO in determining the what, when, how and where of its component activities.</p> <p>Assess against international good practice on strategic decision-making, including attention to predictability in facilitating strategic approaches.</p>	<p>Documentation of decisions on programme components, their design, implementation and the perceived trade-offs between them.</p> <p>Key informant interviews with participants.</p> <p>International perspectives on strategic decision-making.</p>	<p>Compare documentary record on decision processes and rationale for decisions taken against recollections of participants and independent observers.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ12. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners?</b>			
<p>What (systematic or ad hoc) efforts has WFP made to learn from experience in Sri Lanka, including adaptations to the changing Sri Lanka context (cf.EQ1, EQ7)</p> <p>How has WFP responded to developments in international understanding of food insecurity, resilience, nutrition, school feeding, etc. (including the developing context of WFP;’s global strategy and policies)?</p> <p>Do WFP’s (and GoSL’s) monitoring systems provide feedback loops from beneficiaries (individuals and communities)?</p> <p>To whom is WFP accountable, at portfolio and component level?</p>	<p>Documentary and oral record of WFP decision-making vis-à-vis Sri Lanka.</p> <p>Ways in which this reflects, or fails to reflect, (explicit or implicit) adaptation to lessons learned in Sri Lanka or internationally.</p> <p>WFP’s current guidance on accountability to affected populations as a reference point for analysis.</p>	<p>Findings on needs monitoring under EQ1 above.</p> <p>Key informant interviews within WFP. Perspectives of WFP partners, including GoSL.</p> <p>FGDs on accountabilities.</p>	<p>Stakeholder interviews and documentary record, as for EQ11 above.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>KEY QUESTION 3: PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS OF THE WFP PORTFOLIO</b>			
<b>EQ13. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?</b>			
<p>What outputs and outcomes were planned and what was achieved? To what extent have WFP interventions achieved their intended outcomes?</p> <p>How was effectiveness affected by WFP's (and GoSL's) levels of emergency preparedness?</p> <p>How have outputs attributable to WFP contributed to outcomes and (to the extent data are available) impacts at the levels of joint intervention performance and sector performance?</p> <p>How effective was targeting?</p>	<p>Direct outputs of WFP activities, with attention also to indirect and/or unintended results.</p> <p>Contribution of WFP outputs to desired outcomes (using contribution analysis approach to assess WFP contribution to joint results and sector/national level indicators).</p> <p>Assess plausibility of WFP contribution to impact.</p> <p>Analysis of ex ante and ex post targeting.</p> <p>Assess influence of WFP on policy, practice, capacity building.</p> <p>(to be considered separately for relief (IDPs/disasters), FFA, MCHN, SMP, analytical work and planning)</p> <p>Reasons for effectiveness/ ineffectiveness to be considered in terms of the implicit ToC for different types of intervention (e.g. were any shortfalls due to problems in implementation or problems with the key assumptions linked to the intervention?)</p>	<p>Data and existing analyses/reports on sectors in which WFP is engaged. WFP SPRs and detailed monitoring reports.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs with key informants, including beneficiaries. (Relevant ToC assumptions to be deduced from project documents, together with – as a reference point – recent WFP work on ToCs).</p>	<p>Recorded performance indicators vs. perceptions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ14. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?</b>			
<p>For all main components (taking account of data availability) to consider the following dimensions of efficiency:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• timeliness of interventions and the efficiency of logistics</li> <li>• continuity – effects of underfunding and of pipeline breaks</li> <li>• efficiency in relationships with partners</li> <li>• overhead and administrative costs</li> <li>• any evidence of increased efficiency over time</li> </ul>	<p>(to be considered separately for relief (IDPs/disasters), FFA, MCHN, SMP, analytical work and planning)</p>	<p>WFP project documents and reporting (special attention to available data on programme costs that can be linked to effects at different levels of the results chain). (See more detail in Annex L [of IR].)</p> <p>NB efficiency assessments require prior information on results at each level of the logical framework, so findings against EQ1 above will input to the efficiency analysis.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs for perceptions on efficiency.</p> <p>Interviews with engaged WFP staff to understand the decision-making process at the time, and the quality of subsequent monitoring</p>	<p>Recorded performance indicators vs. perceptions of beneficiaries and other stakeholders.</p>
<p>For planned and implemented CBTs (with special focus on the voucher programme running in Jaffna since 2012):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What was the quality of decision-making in the choice of and design of CBT vs. in-kind transfers?</li> <li>• To what extent do cost analyses justify the choices made</li> </ul>	<p>Analysis of selected unit costs</p> <p>Comparison of cost, quality and timeliness in relation to other actors and/or WFP in other settings.</p> <p>Review of analysis feeding into other elements of the relevant decision tree (see [IR] Annex L, Figure 14).</p>	<p>WFP records from CO and HQ systems.</p> <p>Available comparative data (including market cost information from HARTI's series).</p>	<p>Quantitative analysis of efficiency at output and (if possible) outcome levels. Process analysis of decision-making, drawing on documentary record and stakeholder recollections.</p>

Specific Questions	Analysis/ indicators	Main sources of information	Triangulation approach
<b>EQ15. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?</b>			
<p>To what extent are the benefits of WFP assistance likely to be continuing, in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Enduring benefits for individual beneficiaries?</li> <li>▪ Maintenance of assets created with WFP assistance?</li> <li>▪ Policy changes and capacity development?</li> </ul>	<p>Experience of interventions already completed; design quality (including GoSL and beneficiary ownership of those under way)</p> <p>(to be considered separately for relief (IDPs/disasters), FFA, MCHN, SMP, analytical work and planning)</p>	<p>Project reports and evaluations.</p> <p>Interviews and FGDs (supplemented by site visits)</p>	<p>Documents, range of stakeholder perspectives, including beneficiaries.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Development of partners' (especially GoSL) capacity to operate systems for analysis, decision-making and service delivery? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ How has capacity been conceived and measured?</li> <li>○ How have capacity requirements been identified and addressed?</li> <li>○ How have capacity interventions been coordinated (or not) with other partners, and with what implications for sustainability?</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>Capacity at individual, organisational and institutional levels.</p>	<p>Independent commentary.</p> <p>Interviews.</p>	<p>Documents. Perspectives of those involved and of detached observers.</p>
<b>EQ16. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?</b>			
<p>Degree to which WFP's operations and its other activities (analysis, monitoring, advocacy etc.) have complemented each other</p>	<p>Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ15.</p>	<p>Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.</p>	<p>Documentary record, plus internal and external stakeholder perspectives.</p>
<b>EQ17. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?</b>			
<p>To what extent have WFP's operations (to be considered according to thematic area) and the portfolio as a whole complemented GoSL and other agencies' activities?</p>	<p>Stakeholder perceptions, plus evaluation team findings on EQ1–EQ15.</p>	<p>Interviews, secondary documents, plus findings on previous EQs.</p>	<p>Documentary record, plus internal and external stakeholder perspectives.</p>

## **Annex D: Evaluation Process**

1. The methodology development during the inception phase was linked to extensive work on the country context and on initial analysis of the portfolio. Following a briefing mission to WFP HQ from 4–6 May 2016, an inception mission, comprising the OEV Evaluation Manager, the Team Leader and the Research Coordinator visited Colombo from 15–19 May. During this mission, stakeholder analysis was undertaken, initial contacts and interviews with CO staff and key non-WFP stakeholders took place, and the team planned the main evaluation timetable with the CO. This fed into the Inception Report, which was finalised on 17 June 2016 (Lister et al., 2016).

2. The main evaluation mission took place from 5–21 July, with inputs throughout from Rita Bhatia, Ruwan de Mel and Samm Musoke, led by Stephen Lister. Fran Girling joined the mission for the period 5–18 July. For the week 11–17 July the team were joined by two English-speaking interpreters fluent in both Sinhalese and Tamil: Subramainan Punniaseelan and Shifan Mohamed. Annex E presents a list of people consulted during the briefing, inception and main evaluation missions.

3. The second week of the fieldwork phase, 11–17 July, was spent outside Colombo travelling to various sites relevant to the portfolio activities under review. For this week, the ET split into two sub-teams to ensure a wide selection of sites was visited (including SMP, FFA, MCHN and climate adaption) across the different geographical regions and that a broad range of stakeholders were consulted in each region, from Government Agent (GA) to village level. Table 14 below gives an overview of the sites and beneficiaries visited by type, and Map 1 below shows the districts visited by each sub-team.


4. There were further contacts with the CO after the evaluation mission as the team validated data and sought additional information. A learning workshop to discuss the report's conclusions and recommendations was held on 6 October 2016 in Colombo. This was used as a platform for discussion about the future work of WFP in Sri Lanka, as the CO was initiating preparation of the new CS.

**Table 14 List of sites and beneficiaries visited**

<b>Resettlement site</b>	
Thellipillai village, Jaffna district	Detailed interview with one returnee and the Assistant Director of the GN
Thellipillai village, Jaffna district	Small group of male and female beneficiaries
Krishnapuram, Kilinochchi district	Large group of men and women beneficiaries. Visited a man's house.
Kumarapuram, Mullaitivu district	Approx. 90 people, mixed
Paddikudieruppu, Vavuniya district	2 beneficiaries (M)
Sampur, Trincomalee district	Approx. 40 people, mixed
Sivapuram, Mannar district	15 beneficiaries, mixed
Aluthwewe, Polonnaruwa district	4 (M) farmers and (F) development assistant
<b>WFP school meals programme</b>	
Little Flowers School. Kayts, island zone, Jaffna district	1 F teacher, 1 M teacher. Observation of SMP, spoke to children
Keravil Jindu Maha Vidiyalayam School, Kilinochchi district	Principal and SDS secretary. Observation of SMP, spoke to children
Koddaikadiyakul, Mullaitivu district	Principal (F), 4 teachers and 5 parents
Alagalla, Vavuniya district	Principal (M), 2 teachers and 3 students
Vellankulam School, Mannar district	Principal (F)
Medirigriya, Polonnaruwa district	Principal (M), 3 students and 1 parent
<b>MCHN clinic</b>	
Melinchchimunai, Jaffna district	Staff and mothers
Poonahary, Kilinochchi district	1 Doctor (M), 2 PHM (F), 8 women and 3 children
Koddaikadiyakulam, Mullaitivu district	Staff and mothers
Paddikudieruppu, Vavuniya district	Staff and mothers
Musalia, Mannar district	Dr (M) and 2 PHM (F), 12 women and 8 children
<b>FFA</b>	
Kayts, island zone, Jaffna district. FFW: Tank rehabilitation	Divisional secretary
Tharankandal, Mullaitivu district FFW: Irrigation Channel site	FGD with male (15) and female (25) beneficiaries separately
Silavathai, Mullaitivu district FFT: Palmyrah Handicraft Training Centre	District coordinator and instructor and 30 F beneficiaries
Odaiveli, Vavuniya district FFW: Tank rehabilitation	30-40 beneficiary, equal men and women
Alawathakumara, Moneragala district FFW: Tank rehabilitation	10 men and women farmers

Climate adaption site	
Vidathalthivu, Mannar district Mangrove project site	15 Sudeesa staff and beneficiaries
Medigiriya Division, Pathukwewa tank, Polonnaruwa district	30-40 beneficiaries, mixed
Walapanne, Nuwara Eliya district Mausaela canal rehabilitation	2 FGDs with 20 women and 10 men (separate)
EMOP site	
Vattavan, Trincomalee district (and FFW)	60+ beneficiaries, majority women
Arawa Village, Badulla district (and FFW)	8 men, 4 women beneficiaries
Rathugala, Moneragala district	16 beneficiaries, mixed
Warehouse	
Jaffna	Warehouse staff
Kilinochchi	Warehouse staff
Vavuniya	Manager

**Map 1 Sub-team field work visits**



Source: d-maps.com



## Annex E: People Consulted

The evaluation team interviewed over 200 people connected with the WFP portfolio. Table 15 lists the interviewees by broad institutional group. Table 14 in Annex D above shows the list of WFP sites visited by activity, detailing the beneficiaries spoken to.

**Table 15 List of people consulted**

• Attended introductory stakeholder briefing

◦ Attended stakeholder de-briefing

Name	Role
<b>WFP Sri Lanka</b>	
NguyenDuc Hoang	OIC Director / Deputy Country Director Sri Lanka
Susana Rico	Temporary Country Director
Mohamed Haffe	Senior Logistics Assistant, Sri Lanka CO
Musthafa Nihmath	Government Partnerships Officer <sup>◦</sup>
Laksiri Nanayakkara	VAM Officer
Thushara Keerthiratne	Programme Assistant and C&V focal point
Savvalyogan Arjun	Procurement Associate
Iftikar Razik	Logistics Assistant
Naary Maxella	Pipeline Assistant
Anusara Singhkomarwang	Nutrition Officer
Saman M Kalupahana	National Programme Officer, Nutrition
Sashrika Jayasinghe	SDG-F Joint Programme Officer
Vijendra Paramaswamy	Programme Officer, Climate Change Project
M.H.M. Rahumathullah	M&E / Programme officer
Dhammika Pathirana	Head of Administration Unit
Mohammed Ziyan	Admin assistant
Yaseer Arafath <sup>◦</sup>	Finance Officer
Inoka Joseph	Finance Officer
Ajith Dias	HR Associate
Jeanne Edward	HR officer
Manjula Samarasekera	Head of IT
Sadhana Mohan	Communications Assistant
Nirthanasundaram Muhunthan	IT Operations Assistant
Mohamed Sahed	Head of Kilinochchi AO/Consultant
A.K.Royce	Senior Programme Associate, Kilinochchi AO
R. Sugunakumary	Programme Assistant, Kilinochchi AO
P. Ketheeswaran	Programme Assistant (CBT), Kilinochchi AO
J. Sathanandan	Business Support, Kilinochchi AO
A.R.M. Ziyam	Monitoring Officer, Kilinochchi AO

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
V. Perinpanayagam	Monitoring Officers, Kilinochchi AO
C. Sivaratnam	Logistics, Kilinochchi AO
M.S. Moorthy	Driver, Kilinochchi AO
S.E. Chandrabose	Driver, Kilinochchi AO
T. Dayasena	Driver, Kilinochchi AO
P. Sasitharan	Monitoring Assistant, Moneragala Monitoring-SO
C. Thavapiragasam	OIC and Logistics, Jaffna SO
S. Ugateesan	Monitoring Assistant, Jaffna SO
T. Krishanthan	Monitoring Assistant, Jaffna SO
<b>WFP RB and HQ</b>	
Diego Fernandez	Evaluation Manager, Office of Evaluation
Ramona Desole	Research Analyst, Office of Evaluation
Sally Burrows	Deputy Head, Office of Evaluation
Susanna Sandstrom	Programme Officer, VAM
Oscar Caccavale	Market Analyst, VAM
Mads Lofvall	Former Sri Lanka Country Director
Alix Loriston	Senior Donor Relations Officer
Christopher Hopwood	Short Term Professional, Policy & Programme Division
Hsiaowei Lee	Policy Programme Officer, Policy & Programme Division
Chris Kaye	Director, Performance Management and Monitoring Division
Jane Pearce	Iraq Country Director and incoming Director, Performance Management and Monitoring Division
Britta Schumacher	Policy Officer, Nutrition Division
Getachew Diriba	Head of Country Capacity Strengthening, Technical Assistance & Country Capacity strengthening Service
Veronique Sainte-Luce	Programme Adviser, Gender Office
Paul Howe	Chief, Humanitarian Crisis and Transition
Rebecca Skobyye	Protection Advisor, Humanitarian Crisis and Transition
John McHarris	Senior Programme Adviser (Deputy Chief), VAM
David Ryckembusch	OIC, Safety-nets & Social Protection Unit
Anne Valand	Programme Office, Market Access Programmes
Jean-Noel Gentile	Programme Officer, Asset Creation & Livelihoods Unit
Brenda Barton	Incoming Country Director, Sri Lanka
Thomas Thompson	Chief of Logistics, Bangkok RB
Parvathy Ramaswami	Deputy Regional Director, Regional Bureau for Asia & the Pacific
<b>Government of Sri Lanka</b>	
M.I.M. Rafeek*	Secretary, Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs
K. Mahesan*	Additional Secretary, Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
V. Anushyaathan*	Additional Director, DPMM
Mr T.M.J. Bandara*	Director and WFP Focal Point, National Planning Department
H.P. Somathilake <sup>o</sup>	Director, Ministry of National Policies & Economic Affairs
Sudarshana Peiris* <sup>o</sup>	Department of Project Monitoring
M.D.S.R. Perera	Additional Director General, National Planning Department
Mrs Dharshana Senanayake	Director General, Department of Project Monitoring
Mrs Ayanthi de Silva	Additional Director General, Department of Project Monitoring
S Mudalige	DG, Department of National Planning
D.A. Niharepola <sup>o</sup>	Assistant Director, Department of National Planning
Mr Premarathna	Director, Macro Economics and Education, Department of National Planning
Ajith Abeysekera	Additional Director General, External Resources Department
Ayanthi De Silva <sup>o</sup>	ADG, DPMM
F. Abdul Hassan <sup>o</sup>	Director, DPMM
R.A.C. Prageeth Gunashera*	Assistant Director, Department of External Resources
Lakmini Fernando	Additional Director, National Planning Department
Mr Ruchira Withana	Director (Investment Promotion and Project Director of Climate Change Project), Ministry of Environment
Udaya Seneviaratne	Secretary, Ministry of Environment
S. Amalanathan <sup>o</sup>	Additional Secretary/National Programme Director, Ministry of Disaster Management
Nimal Mithraratne	Project Manager, Ministry of Environment
J. Ranjith Wimalasiri	Project Officer, Ministry of Environment
L. G. N. Dharmasiri <sup>o</sup>	Planning Officer, Central Environmental Authority
V. Sivagnanasothy	Secretary, Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs
M.M. Nayeemudeen	Additional Secretary, Ministry of Prison Reforms, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Hindu Religious Affairs
P. Naamagal <sup>o</sup>	Director, Ministry of Resettlement
E.H.M Ranasinghe <sup>o</sup>	Director, NBD
E.M.N. Edirisinghe <sup>o</sup>	Director, NBD
Mr Anura Jayawickrama	Secretary, Ministry of Health
R.R.M.L.R. Siyambalagoda	Additional Secretary, Ministry of Health
Dr Mr Sapumal Dhanapala	Director, Family Health Bureau - Ministry of Health
Dr K.L.M.D.	Ministry of Health, Nutrition Coordination Division
Dr Senerath Mahamithawa	Director , Estate and Urban Health, Ministry of Health
Ms Renuka Peiris	Director of Education , School Health and Nutrition Branch, Ministry of Health
M.W.N. De Costa <sup>o</sup>	Assistant Director of Education, Ministry of Education
Dr Ms Renuka Jayatissa	Director, Medical Health Institute
Kingsly Fernando	Additional Secretary to the President, National Nutrition

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
Nalaka Kaluwewe	Senior Assistant Secretary to the President, National Nutrition Secretariat
Gaya Adikari	Assistant Secretary to the President, National Nutrition
Shanthi Gunawardana	Consultant Community Physician & Thirposha programme national coordinator, Ministry of Health
Dr H.M.S Heenkenda <sup>o</sup>	Additional Secretary (Agri Technology), Ministry of Agriculture
G.C.D.B. Wijesinghe <sup>o</sup>	Department of Agriculture, Socioeconomics & Planning Centre
Dr (Mrs) Amitha Bentota	Director, Rice Research and Development Institute, Batalagoda
Mrs Chandika V Ethigala	Director, Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources
D.D. Ariyaratne <sup>o</sup>	Additional Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources
S. Mohanarajah <sup>o</sup>	Director of Irrigation, Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Mr R.P.M Dissanayake	Monitoring Officer, Ministry of Irrigation and Water Resources
Ms Emelda Sukumar	Secretary, Ministry of Women and Child Affairs
D.G.S.G. Munasinghe <sup>o</sup>	Additional Director, Department of Census & Statistics
Mrs J. Kanesamoothy <sup>o</sup>	Head of DMU/ADD
Mr Chandrasiri Jayasundara	Additional Director, HARTI
Mr W.H.D. Priyadosun	Head Marketing Division, HARTI
Mr W.H.A. Shantha	Senior Research Officer, HARTI
Ms R.P.V. Vidanapathirana	Senior Research Officer, HARTI
Mr Nalaka Wejsooriya	Research Officer, HARTI
Mr P.A. Jayamini Champika	Research Officer, HARTI
Rev. Sr. B. Sahayanayaki	School principal, Little Flowers School Kayts, Jaffna district
Mr Sioirabhakaran	WFP SMP island zone coordinator, Jaffna district
Mr Baskaran	Deputy-Director Education Islands Zone, Jaffna district
Mrs A. Ahiladas	Deputy-Director Education Management, Jaffna district
N. Vethanayagan	Government Agent, Jaffna district
Y. Tharaparan	Development Assistant, Jaffna district
T. Karitha	Development Assistant, Jaffna district
S. Nicholaspillai	Deputy-Director Planning, Jaffna district
A.J. Sutharsan	Development Assistant, Jaffna district
S. Hairphas	Development Assistant, Jaffna district
R. Mohaneswaran <sup>o</sup>	Director of Planning/Head of DMU, Jaffna district
E. Sayanthan	Store Keeper, Jaffna warehouse
S. Aneesh	Clerk, Jaffna warehouse
Dr S. Kumararel	Medical Officer, MCHN, Jaffna
Mrs S. Mohanathan	Deputy Chief Secretary (Admin), Jaffna district
Dr A. Ketheswaran	Deputy Provincial Director of Health, Jaffna district
Mr S.T. Peiries	Provincial Coordinator – School Meal Programme, Jaffna
V. Papakaran <sup>o</sup>	DMU Head and Assistant District Secretary, Mannar district
Mr M.Y.S. Deshapriya	Mannar District Government Agent

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
Mrs S. Raveendran	Principal, Vellankulam School, Mannar District
Mrs. R. Ketheeswaran	District Secretary, Mullaitivu district
Mr C.A. Mohanras	Addl. District Secretary, Mullaitivu district
Mr M. Jesureginold	Chief Accountant, Mullaitivu district
Mr S. Gunapalan	Divisional secretary (DS) , Mullaitivu district
Y. Anirutham	DS office, Mullaitivu district
J. Pranavanathan	DS office, Mullaitivu district
W.D.N. Sirimanna	DS office, Mullaitivu district
R. Ramash	DS office, Mullaitivu district
I. Prathuban	DS office, Mullaitivu district
S. Nanthaseelam	DS office, Mullaitivu district
B. Rajiparan	CO/PDB, Mullaitivu district
S. Kirusanthan	Agriculture Department, Mullaitivu district
P.S. Shyanthan	DMC, Mullaitivu district
N. Vijaynrumi	Irrigation Department, Mullaitivu district
P. Vikaranam	IE/WIC, Mullaitivu district
S. Akiden	S.K., Mullaitivu district
J. Seathiykem	ASK, Mullaitivu district
R.A. Jude Dolous	DA, Dagu – WFP, Mullaitivu district
G. Thines Kumar	DMU, Mullaitivu district
Ms Krishna Kumar	Principal, Kodaikadiyakul school, Mullaitivu district
Mr. B Rajiparan	District Coordinator, Palmyrah Development Board, Silavathai, Mullaitivu district
Mrs P Sabanesan	Instructor, Palmyrah Development Board, Silavathai, Mullaitivu district
Mr. B R. Pushpakumaran	District Secretary/GA, Vavuniya district
Miss A. Lathanki	Deputy-Director of Education, Vavuniya district
Mr G. Amisthalingam	DEO, Vavuniya district
P.M.A.K. Krimana	ACAD, Vavuniya district
R. Vijaye Kumar	ACAD, Vavuniya district
Mrs R. Sajara	ADP/VCK, Vavuniya district
Mrs K. Manivannan	ADP, Vavuniya district
J. Jayassadan	For RDSSS, Vavuniya district
Mr M. Thillean	DD, Vavuniya district
Mr S. Suresh	DM, Vavuniya district
Mrs V.Kirabasakhan <sup>o</sup>	Head of DMU, Vavuniya district
N. Mimalan	PMA, Vavuniya district
K. Kanesiri	DA, Vavuniya district
D. Jumane	DA, Vavuniya district

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
K.Sewagowmy	MA, Vavuniya district
Mr A.R.S.S Alahakoon	Principal, Alagalla school, Vavuniya
M.M.M. Sharfas <sup>o</sup>	Assistant District Secretary, Moneragala district
S.P. Sumanaratne	District Director of Agriculture, Moneragala district
P.A. Madushanka	Assistant Secretary of Agrarian Development, Moneragala
A.P.C.J. Nandasena	DMU Development Assistant, Moneragala district
Dr D.M.S. Bandara	Medical Health Officer, Bibila, Moneragala district
Upeksha Nayani Kljesinghe	Assistant Divisional Secretary, Bibila, Moneragala district
Mr S. Arumainayaham	Government Agent, Kilinochchi District
S.Sathiyaseelan	Additional Government Agent, Kilinochchi District
K.Abirami	Zonal Director of Education, Kilinochchi District
L. Janakan	SMO Agriculture, Kilinochchi District
A .Ketheeshwaram	Assistant Director, Kilinochchi District
E. Thayarapan	Deputy Commissioner DAD, Kilinochchi District
R. Somakantan	DMU, Kilinochchi District
S. Rarjithamabs	Development Assistant, D, Kilinochchi District MU
Dr K. Thearsharian	Ministry of Health, Kilinochchi District
Dr Delvan	MCHN clinic doctor, Kilinochchi District
M. Selvarahan <sup>o</sup>	DMU Mink?
Mr Iyamppidai Kesavan	Principal, Keravil Jindu Maha Vidiyalayam School, Kilinochchi district
Mr K. Kantharuban	School Development Society Secretary, Keravil Jindu Maha Vidiyalayam School, Kilinochchi district
Sujantha Elcanayal <sup>o</sup>	Additional District Secretary, Polonnaruwa
Mr S. Srithorani	Principal, Medirigriya school, Polonnaruwa
Mr. Tissa	Project Coordinator Pathukwewa Tank, Polonnaruwa District
Mr. Susil Bandara	Grama Niladhari, Medigiriya Division, Polonnaruwa District
Mrs Kusumawathan	Farmer's Organisation Treasurer, Medigiriya Division, Polonnaruwa District
Mr. Raskha Jayasundera	School teacher, Medigiriya Division, Polonnaruwa
S. Arulrasa	Additional Government Agent, Trincomalee District
V. Yoosoff	Divisional Secretary, Trincomalee District
M. Thayaparan	Divisional Secretary, Trincomalee District
K.M. Siraj	Assistant Development Commissioner, Trincomalee District
N. Pretheepan	District Secretariat, Trincomalee District
M. Kuguthasan	District Secretariat, Trincomalee District
Mr Tiuson <sup>o</sup>	Director of Planning, Badulla district
Dr Manjula	Medical officer, Badulla district
W.M Priyanthi	Assistant Director of Planning, Badulla district
T.P Nicloas	A.O., Badulla district

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
D.A.K Wirasinghe	Divisional Secretary, Badulla district
W.M.R Ranjith	Divisional Secretary, Badulla district
Dr Sampath	Medical Officer, MoH zonal office, Ragala, Nurwara Eliya district
<b>Aid agencies/donors</b>	
Nina Brandstrup	FAO Representative in Sri Lanka and the Maldives
Roshi Gunaratne*	FAO, Colombo
Paula Bulancea <sup>o</sup>	Deputy Representative, UNICEF
Nifal Alawdeen	UNICEF, Trincomalee
Tetyana Nikitina*	UNICEF, Colombo
T. Nohifona <sup>o</sup>	M&E Specialist, UNICEF
Deepika Attygalle	Regional Coordinator South-South & Programme Manager CSD, UNICEF
Una McCauley	UN Resident Coordinator (and outgoing UNICEF
M. Patterson	UN-RC, Trincomalee
Nadatajah Thayaharam	Field Coordinator Officer, UN-RC Kilinochchi
Lovita Ramgutte <sup>o</sup>	Deputy Director, UNDP Sri Lanka
N. Schauwa	UNDP, Trincomalee
D. Thanakumar	Regional Project Coordinator, UNDP Kilinochchi
Dimon Geragh	WPC ILO Kilinochchi
O. Keerth	UNDSS Kilinochchi
Igor Ivancic	Senior Protection Officer, UNHCR
Samuel Afeisume*	UNHCR, Colombo
A. George	Admin/Finance Assistance, UNCHR Kilinochchi Office
Madhavan	UNCHR Kilinochchi Office
Sivanathan	UNCHR Kilinochchi Office
Ivan Rasiah	Team Leader, Vulnerable Populations, USAID
Dunstan Fernando	Senior Advisor, Australia High Commission
Mr Davino Sena	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Brazil
Kiichiro Iwase	First Secretary and Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Japan
Masayuki Nakatsukama	Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan
Jennifer Lalonde	Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Canada
Nihal Atapattu	Senior Development Officer, Embassy of Canada
Aejin Han	Deputy Country Director, KOICA
Patrick Vandenbruaene	Senior Coordination Officer, Development Partners secretariat, World Bank
<b>NGOs/other</b>	
Dr Lalith Chandradasa	Former head of President's nutritional Secretariat and SUN Focal point
Dinushika Dissanayake	Managing Director, Law and Society Trust

<b>Name</b>	<b>Role</b>
Dula de Silva	CEO SUN-PF
Mr Julian Chellappoh	SUN-PF Deputy Country director
Chamindi Katuwale	SUN-PF Project Consultant
Anuradha Wickremasinghe	Chairman, Sudeesa
Gamini Hewawasam	DG, Sudeesa
T.C. Dominic	Sudeesa Regional Director
Y. Dinosh	Sudeesa Microfinance
K. Anjana	Sudeesa staff
R. Roshany	Sudeesa staff
K.M. Araljothy	Sudeesa staff
J. Jeevasunitha	Sudeesa staff
Kaushalya Navaratne	Chairperson, Sevalanka
Annet Royce	Deputy Director Projects, Sevalanka
V Sutharsan	Sevalanka, Jaffna District
K Ramanaskanda	Sevalanka, Jaffna District
G Kirubatheesan	JSAC, Jaffna District
R Mithhunarai	Sarvodaya, Jaffna District
Neville Nanayakkara	Director General, Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
Dr N. Ravichandran	Executive Officer, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
A. E. Pragashkumar	World Vision, Trincomalee
A. Jude Nishandhan	World Vision, Mullaitivu district
Jeevan Thiyagarajah	Chairman, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies
Raga Alphonsus	Advisor, ZOA



## Annex F: Chronology

	<b>Sri Lanka contextual events</b>
1948	Sri Lanka achieves independence from the British Empire as the Dominion of Ceylon
	Ceylon citizenship act disenfranchised a million Indian Tamils (around 11% of the population)
1956	Sinhala Only Act replaces English with Sinhalese as the official language
1958	Anti-Tamil riots leave more than 200 people dead. Thousands of Tamils displaced.
1959	Bandaranaike assassinated by a Buddhist monk. Succeeded by widow, Srimavo, who continues nationalisation programme.
1968	WFP operations begin in Sri Lanka . Basic Agreement makes government execution the norm.
1971	Sinhalese Marxist uprising led by students and activists.
1972	Constitutional amendment renames the country as the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
1973	Production of Thripasha begins
1976	LTTE formed as tensions increase in Tamil-dominated areas of north and east.
1981	Sinhala policemen accused of burning the Jaffna Public Library, causing further resentment in Tamil community
1983	13 soldiers killed in LTTE ambush, sparking anti-Tamil riots leading to the deaths of several hundred Tamils. War breaks out
1985	First attempt at peace talks between government and LTTE fails.
1987	Government forces push LTTE back into northern city of Jaffna.
	Government signs accords creating new councils for Tamil areas in north and east (13th amendment to the constitution)
	Government reaches agreement with India on deployment of Indian peace-keeping force.
1988	Left-wing and nationalist Sinhalese JVP begins campaign against Indo-Sri Lankan agreement.
1990	Indian troops leave after getting bogged down in fighting in north. Violence between Sri Lankan army and separatists escalates.
	"Second Eelam War" begins.
	Thousands of Muslims are expelled from northern areas by the LTTE.
1991	LTTE implicated in assassination of Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in southern India.
1993	President Premadasa killed in LTTE bomb attack. Women's Charter launched
1994	President Kumaratunga comes to power pledging to end war. Peace talks opened with LTTE.
1995-2001	War rages across north and east. Tigers bomb Sri Lanka's holiest Buddhist site.
	President Kumaratunga is wounded in a bomb attack.
	Suicide attack on the international airport destroys half the Sri Lankan Airlines fleet.
2002	Ceasefire agreement brokered by Norway - Oslo declaration. First WFP CP launched 2002-07
2003	Peace talks stalled and LTTE officially withdrew from the peace process
	Government grow in strength with support from China and Pakistan
	The worst-ever floods leave more than 200 people dead and drive 4,000 people from their homes.
	Dec: Tsunami hits Sri Lanka sparking major humanitarian crisis

2004	LTTE major split and defeat in East
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	<b>Sri Lanka contextual events</b>	<b>WFP Sri Lanka and general</b>	<b>WFP operations</b>
2005	Election of Mahinda Rajapaksa marks return to full-scale war	First WFP cash and voucher project launched in Sri Lanka as part of the tsunami response	
	National Council for Disaster Management is established		
2006	Violence intensifies. EU declares the LTTE a terrorist organisation		SO 105390 Sept
2007	Government regain control of LTTE areas		
2008	Ceasefire agreement formally ends National Education Policy Sept - government orders all international humanitarian and UN staff (except ICRC) out of LTTE-controlled areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP's first Gender Policy launched</li> <li>• Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies Policy</li> <li>• School Feeding Policy</li> <li>• Cash and vouchers manual launched</li> </ul>	DEV 106070 Jan
2009	International concern over the humanitarian situation of thousands of civilians trapped in the battle zone prompts calls for a temporary cease-fire. This is rejected by the government, which says it is on the verge of destroying the Tamil Tigers, but it offers an amnesty to rebels if they surrender. Key government victories against the LTTE - war formally ends in May 2009 First post-war local elections in north. Governing coalition wins in Jaffna but in Vavuniya voters back candidates who supported Tamil Tigers. Government says 100,000 refugees released from camps.		
2010	Government publish a National Nutrition Policy 2008-18		
	18th amendment: include an abandonment of the two-term limit of presidency presidential powers over independent commissions		
	Sri Lanka graduates to Middle-Income status (lower) in January		
	Nov: Heavy rainfall, the worst in 100 years, causes severe flooding and landslides affecting 1.2 million people		
2011	UN says both sides in the Sri Lankan civil war committed atrocities against civilians and calls for an international investigation into possible war crimes. Sri Lanka says the report is biased.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP School feeding policy updated</li> <li>• Apr: Joint WFP/Government food security assessments</li> <li>• Dec: WFP HQ launch a directive on cash and vouchers</li> </ul>	IR-EMOP 200233 Jan-March PRRO 200143 Jan EMOP 200239 Feb SO 105390 Dec

	<b>Sri Lanka contextual events</b>	<b>WFP Sri Lanka and general</b>	<b>WFP operations</b>
2012	Education Sector Development Framework and Programme II (ESDFP-II) 2012-16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Feb – WFP Nutrition Policy and WFP Humanitarian Protection Policy launched</li> <li>Pilot cash and voucher programme launched in Jaffna District (March)</li> </ul>	EMOP 200239 Jan
	Sri Lanka joins the SUN movement	In January 2012, the government imposed an import ban for soya and maize to stimulate increased local production Late 2012 - WFP allowed to import Super Cereal Plus	
	Severe drought	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Secretary-General’s 2012 Internal Review Panel (IRP)<sup>1</sup> on UN action at the end of the war in Sri Lanka concluded there had been a “systemic failure” in meeting UN responsibilities to prevent and respond to serious violations of human rights – leads to the development of the Human Rights up Front (HRuF) Action Plan.</li> <li>March - launch of WFP's capacity development toolkit</li> </ul>	PRRO 200143 Dec
2013	National Resettlement Policy - outlining support to IDPs and returnees	UNDAF 2013-17	PRRO 200452 Jan
	National Nutrition Secretariat established under the Office of the President and the Multi-Sector Action Plan for nutrition is launched in collaboration with 14 ministries.		
	National Policy on Disaster Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP start using cash and vouchers for IDP and returnees in Jaffna under PRRO 200452</li> <li>Policy on WFP's role in peacebuilding in transition settings published</li> </ul>	
	Mahinda Chintana Vision for the future 2010-16 is published	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cash assistance planned for flood-affected victims cancelled due to funding shortfalls</li> <li>WFP revised school feeding policy launched</li> </ul>	DEV 106070 sept
2014	Government launches the country’s first-ever Multi-sectoral Action Plan to reduce maternal and child malnutrition in the country.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP pilot the cash transfer modality in November 2014 in over 600 schools</li> <li>Update on WFP's peacebuilding policy including risk analysis and update to the WFP Gender Policy and Gender Marker Guide and Evaluation of the Gender Policy</li> </ul>	Trust fund 10022993 Aug PRRO 200452 Dec
	Severe droughts and flooding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cash transfer provided to flood-affected victims July – August</li> <li>WFP Strategic Plan 2014-17</li> <li>Sri Lanka Country Strategy 2016-19</li> <li>Second edition of the Cash and Voucher manual published</li> </ul>	

	<b>Sri Lanka contextual events</b>	<b>WFP Sri Lanka and general</b>	<b>WFP operations</b>
2015	January elections saw Maithripala Sirisena come to power - after Rajapaksa's calls a snap-election that is by his former health minister	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New WFP Gender Policy 2015-2020</li> <li>• WFP Sri Lanka gender assessment report</li> </ul>	IR-EMOP 200809 Jan-Apr
	Constitutional reform within 100-days are pledged; introduces the 19th amendment that reduces presidential powers and establishes independent oversight commissions		SDG-F Trust Fund 10024563 Jan
2016		WFP food technologist undertakes an independent assessment of Thripasha production	SDG-F Trust Fund 10024563 Dec
		Country Strategy 2016-19	CP 200866

## Annex G: Country Data for Sri Lanka

This annex contains additional data to support the background and context analysis in the main text.

**Table 16 Key indicators for country context**

Key Indicators for Country Context - Sri Lanka						
	Indicator	Year	Value		Source	
General	Population (total, millions)	2014	20,639,000		World Bank. WDI.	
		2005	19,644,000			
	Average annual growth (%)	2010/2015	0.8		UNDP HDR 2015	
		2000/2005	1.1			
	Urban Population (% of total)	2014	15.3		UNDP HDR 2015	
Human Development Index	2014	0.757		UNDP HDR 2015		
	Rank	73/188				
Gender	Gender - Inequality index	2014	0.370		UNDP HDR 2015	
		Rank	72			
	Maternal Mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	2013	29		UNDP HDR 2015	
	Seats in national parliament (% female)	2014	5.8		UNDP HDR 2015	
	Population with at least some secondary education, female, male (% ages 25 and older)	2005–2014	M	F		UNDP HDR 2015
			76.4	72.7		
	Births attended by skilled health personnel (% of total)	2007	98.6		World Bank. WDI.	
	Labour force participation rate (% aged 15 and older)	2013	M	F		UNDP HDR 2015
			76.3	35.1		
Employees, agriculture, female (% of female employment)	2014	33.9		World Bank. WDI.		
Net enrolment rate, primary, female (%)	2013	94		World Bank. WDI.		
Economic	Income Gini Coefficient	2005–2013	36.4		UNDP HDR 2015	
	GDP per capita (current US\$)	2014	1,242		World Bank. WDI.	
		2005	3,819			
	Foreign direct investment net inflows (% of GDP)	2014	1.2		World Bank. WDI.	
		2005	1.1			
Net official development assistance received (% of GNI)	2013	0.6		World Bank. WDI.		
Poverty	Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	2012	1.69		World Bank. WDI.	
	Population vulnerable to poverty (%)	n.a	n.a		UNDP HDR 2015	
	Population in severe poverty (%)	n.a	n.a		UNDP HDR 2015	
Nutrition	Number of people undernourished (millions)	2014–16	4.7		The state of food security in the world 2015	
	Weight-for-height (Wasting), prevalence for < 5 (%)	2009-2013	Mod & Sev		UNICEF SOWC 2015	
			21			
		2009-2013	Mod & Sev		UNICEF SOWC 2015	

Key Indicators for Country Context - Sri Lanka					
	Indicator	Year	Value		Source
	Height-for-age (Stunting), prevalence for < 5 (%)		15		
	Weight-for-age (Underweight), prevalence for < 5 (%)	2009-2013	Mod & Sev 26		UNICEF SOWC 2015
	< 5 mortality rate	2013	10		UNICEF SOWC 2015
		2000	16		
	% of children aged 6-59 months with anaemia (Hb<11.0G/dl)	2012	15.1		UNICEF National Nutrition and micronutrient survey 2012
% of children aged 6-59 months with LBW	2012	17.9		UNICEF National Nutrition and micronutrient survey 2012	
<b>Health</b>	Maternal Mortality ratio (Lifetime risk of maternal death: 1 in: )	2013	1,400		UNICEF SOWC 2015
	Life expectancy at birth	2013	74		
	Estimate HIV prevalence - adult (ages 15-49)	2012	<0.1		UNAIDS 2013
		2001	<0.1		
Public expenditures on health (% of GDP)	2013	3.2		UNDP HDR 2015	
<b>Education</b>	Population with at least some secondary education (% ages 25 and older)	2005-2013	74		UNDP HDR 2015
	Youth Literacy Rate (15-24 y) (%)	2009-2013	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			98	99	
	Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (%)	2012	8.8		World Bank. WDI.
	Gross enrolment ratio, primary school (%)	2009-2012	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			98	99	
	Net attendance ratio, primary school (%)	2008-2013	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015
			n.a.	n.a.	
Net attendance ratio, secondary school (%)	2008-2013	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015	
		n.a.	n.a.		
Net enrolment ratio, primary school (%)	2009-2013	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015	
		94	94		
Net enrolment ratio, secondary school (%)	2009-2013	M	F	UNICEF SOWC 2015	
		83	87		


Source: TOR Annex 1

**Table 17 Main natural disasters in Sri Lanka and estimation of people affected (2006–2014)**

Date	Natural Disaster	Total affected
2014	Drought	1,800,000
	Flood	1,100,020
2012	Drought	1,800,000
	Flood	447,021
2011	Flood	1,060,324
2010	Flood	606,072
2009	Flood	300,000
2008	Flood	362,582
	Flood	360,000
2006	Flood	333,002


Source: EM-DAT The international disaster database (<http://www.emdat.be/database> visited on 1st March 2016)

**Figure 9 Sri Lanka Top 10 Natural Disasters [from TOR Annex 2]**



Source: EM-DAT The international disaster database (<http://www.emdat.be/database> visited on 1st March 2016)


**Figure 10 Humanitarian Assistance and other Overseas Development Assistance 2004–2013 [TOR Annex 10 – Factsheet]**



Source: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/sri-Lanka>

Note: The sharp increase in 2004-2005 was due to the tsunami emergency.


**Figure 11 Sri Lanka – aid at-a-glance 2012–2014**



Source: OECD DAC <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats>



**Figure 12 Donor commitments and disbursements 2014**



**Foreign Financing Disbursements in Development Projects in 2014 by Development Partner (million)**


Development Partner/ Lending Agency	Loan		Grant		Total Amount	
	Rs.	USD	Rs.	USD	Rs.	USD
<b>Bilateral</b>	<b>110,387.19</b>	<b>845.80</b>	<b>7,355.84</b>	<b>56.41</b>	<b>117,743.03</b>	<b>902.21</b>
China	40,315.24	308.92			40,315.24	308.92
Japan	31,308.09	239.89	2,179.01	16.68	33,487.10	256.57
India	15,076.92	115.50	3,564.71	27.35	18,641.63	142.85
United Kingdom	7,268.92	55.69			7,268.92	55.69
Netherlands	5,168.49	39.57			5,168.49	39.57
South Korea	2,644.74	20.27			2,644.74	20.27
Hungary	659.18	5.05			659.18	5.05
Sweden	467.22	3.58			467.22	3.58

Development Partner/ Lending Agency	Loan		Grant		Total Amount	
	Rs.	USD	Rs.	USD	Rs.	USD
Spain	1,003.72	7.69			1,003.72	7.69
France	1,374.92	10.54			1,374.92	10.54
Austria	894.08	6.85			894.08	6.85
Belgium	453.29	3.48			453.29	3.48
Denmark	285.53	2.19			285.53	2.19
Germany	194.66	1.49	148.01	1.14	342.67	2.63
Kuwait	193.76	1.48			193.76	1.48
Saudi Fund	1,415.21	10.84			1,415.21	10.84
United States of America	1,463.31	11.23	1,331.48	10.22	2,794.79	21.45
Australia	199.91	1.54			199.91	1.54
Pakistan			132.63	1.02	132.63	1.02
<b>Multilateral</b>	<b>61,155.52</b>	<b>468.73</b>	<b>3,177.56</b>	<b>24.35</b>	<b>64,333.08</b>	<b>493.08</b>
Asian Development Bank	32,225.24	247.07	934.64	7.16	33,159.88	254.23
World Bank - International Development Association (IDA)	21,084.19	161.5	2,011.39	15.42	23,095.58	176.92
World Bank - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)	2,434.92	18.67			2,434.92	18.67
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	683.58	5.24	65.16	0.50	748.74	5.74
OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)	1,973.90	15.14			1,973.90	15.14
European Investment Bank	2,753.69	21.11			2,753.69	21.11
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)			18.40	0.14	18.40	0.14
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)			2.60	0.02	2.60	0.02
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)			17.04	0.13	17.04	0.13
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)			128.33	0.98	128.33	0.98
<b>Total</b>	<b>171,542.71</b>	<b>1,314.53</b>	<b>10,533.40</b>	<b>80.76</b>	<b>182,076.11</b>	<b>1,395.29</b>

**Note:** 1. The conversion rates used for the report were the exchange rates prevailed for different currencies at the date where the disbursement was made  
2. Disbursements of loans obtained by State Owned Enterprises were not included

Source: GoSL External Resources Department 2014 report  
<http://www.erd.gov.lk/files/3.%20Performance%20Report%202014%20English%20Version.pdf>

**Figure 13 Trends of Undernutrition among Children under Five**



Source: National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey, 2012

## **Annex H: Portfolio Analysis for Sri Lanka**

This Annex contains additional data to support the portfolio analysis in the main text.

### **Box 10 Extracts from 1968 Basic Agreement between WFP and the Government**

Article II: Execution of development projects and emergency relief operations

1. The primary responsibility for the execution of development projects and emergency operations shall rest with the Government, which shall provide all personnel, premises, supplies, equipment, services and transportation and defray all expenditure necessary for implementation of any development project or emergency operation.
2. The World Food Programme shall deliver commodities as a grant without payment at the port of entry or the frontier station and shall supervise and provide advisory assistance in the execution of any development project or emergency operation.
3. [Government to designate implementing agencies for each operation; if more than one operation, there will be a central coordinating agency]
4. The Government shall provide facilities to the World Food Programme for observing all stages of implementation of development projects and emergency operations.

[under Article III the Government undertakes to provide WFP with information, including audited accounts etc.]

Source: GoC & WFP, 1968

**Table 18 WFP's operations in Sri Lanka since 1964**

<b>Project Type &amp; Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Approval date</b>	<b>Food budget (USD)</b>	<b>Total WFP budget (USD)</b>
D 174	Voluntary labour (shramadana) development plan	23/06/1964	421,271	560,138
E 821EM	Cyclone victims relief	18/02/1965	131,154	177,765
D 174P1	Voluntary labour (shramadana) development plan	11/12/1966	162,818	258,144
D 291	Unemployed youth resettlement	05/01/1967	414,376	509,915
D 430	Food assist.to agricultural development corps	24/04/1968	138,545	181,745
D 431	Food assistance to colonists	26/09/1968	2,470,818	3,246,882
E 906EM	Flood victims	03/02/1969	103,515	140,696
D 174PX	Voluntary labour (shramadana)dev plan(2nd exp)	13/05/1969	1,219,916	1,780,687
D 453	Devel.of poultry industry and of maize produc.	13/05/1969	694,663	1,671,265
D 748	Rehabilitation of village tanks	04/05/1973	6,654,789	8,191,211
D 2009	Food assistance to cooperative farms	25/03/1975	542,600	739,000
Q 2195QX	Rural works programme in drought-stricken areas	25/03/1975	7,120,634	8,054,978
D 2223	Restoration of the colombo-puttalam canal	05/12/1975	120,062	161,790
E 1054EM	Em.ass.for people in the drought stricken area	04/02/1976	2,499,467	2,959,961
D 2195PX	Rural works in drought-stricken areas	06/05/1976	10,934,003	12,352,563
E 1069EM	Emerg.assist.people drought-stricken areas	08/10/1976	3,676,192	4,164,259
E 1069E1	Food assist.to drought affected people	02/02/1977	1,983,157	2,236,198
D 2360	Assist.to the mahaweli gonga development proj.	27/05/1977	3,764,000	5,138,000
Q 2474QX	Food ass for promot of employ in volunt units	05/10/1978	55,428	64,571
D 0245800	Food assistance to settlement schemes.	31/10/1978	1,797,777	2,665,384
E 1151EM	Food aid to cyclone affected people	15/12/1978	1,285,200	1,676,600
D 2470	Food ass for aided self-help housing programme	13/08/1979	675,800	893,400

<b>Project Type &amp; Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Approval date</b>	<b>Food budget (USD)</b>	<b>Total WFP budget (USD)</b>
D 0258400	Afforestation of water catchments and lands degraded by shifting	31/03/1981	213,284	238,205
D 0258500	Assistance to system of accelerated Mahaweli ganga development programme	20/05/1981	4,511,121	5,636,149
E 1260RF	Food aid to drought affected people	01/06/1981	1,231,500	1,508,133
E 1283RF	Food aid to drought affected people	08/04/1982	2,768,610	3,100,506
D 0263500	WFP assistance to kirindi oya settlement	29/04/1982	2,586,594	3,160,981
D 0262700	Assistance for excavation of monuments and sites in cultural triangle	07/06/1982	1,216,348	1,420,429
D 0263400	Assistance to system b and g of the accelerated Mahaweli ganga dev. Proj	27/05/1983	13,074,975	15,285,821
D 0267100	Assistance for Anuradhapura dry zone agriculture project	27/05/1983	661,924	976,562
E 1347EM	Food assistance to displaced persons	17/08/1983	90,200	155,000
D 0276700	Assistance to national nutrition education programme	28/11/1985	127,856	164,796
D 0262701	Excavation and conservation of monuments and sites in the cult. Triangle	30/05/1986	2,794,307	3,352,954
E 0331400	Emergency food assistance to victims of the kantalai dam disaster	16/03/1987	995,419	1,386,348
E 0335000	Emergency food assistance for drought victims in Sri Lanka	27/05/1987	6,213,016	7,167,155
D 0263501	Assistance to kirindi oya settlement project - phase ii -	02/06/1987	545,440	617,406
E 0331401	Emergency food ass. To victims of the Kantalai dam disaster in Sri Lanka	11/08/1987	1,005,994	1,160,776
E 0347100	Resettlem. of families displ.by ethnic disturb. and terroristic activities	30/10/1987	2,019,400	2,750,013
D 0348000	Asst. To national agric. Diversification and settl. authority project.	12/12/1988	4,214,354	5,097,323
D 0276701	National nutrition education programme	30/04/1991	273,130	407,231
E 0492300	Emergency food assistance for families displaced by civil strife	22/11/1991	1,719,313	2,008,217

<b>Project Type &amp; Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Approval date</b>	<b>Food budget (USD)</b>	<b>Total WFP budget (USD)</b>
D 0263401	Mahaweli system b and c	13/12/1991	3,464,327	4,125,457
E 0492301		29/12/1992	1,385,801	1,600,450
D 0452100	Improvements of minor irrigation schemes in four selected districts	04/06/1993	8,068,318	10,386,494
X 0534600	Assistance to internally displaced persons	09/09/1993	1,890,635	2,340,542
D 0262702	Assist. for excavat. & conservat. of monuments & sites in cultural triangle	02/06/1994	1,217,234	1,458,290
X 0534601	Assistance to displaced persons	29/08/1994	1,886,847	2,320,659
X 0534602	Assistance to displaced persons	17/07/1995	2,781,887	3,239,877
X 0534603	Assistance to Sri Lankan internally displaced persons (IDP)	12/09/1996	2,993,407	3,816,263
X 0534604	Assistance to internally displaced persons	18/12/1997	2,998,813	3,766,604
X 0534605	Relief and recovery asst. internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka	26/03/1999	1,608,736	2,093,582
DEV 04521.1	Rehabilitation of Minor Irrigation Schemes	20/10/1999	4,303,500	6,760,371
DEV 06107.0	Assistance to Settlers in the Uda Walawe Project	30/04/2000	627,080	1,004,255
PRRO 06152.0	Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons	20/10/1999	9,547,395	13,058,633
PRRO 10067.0	Food Assistance to Conflict-Affected People	24/10/2001	14,559,620	26,029,995
PRRO 10067.1	Assistance to Vulnerable Groups for Peace Building in Areas Affected by Conflict and the Tsunami	13/10/2004	110,719,364	173,340,002
DEV 10075.0	Country Programme - Sri Lanka (2002-2006)	24/10/2001	10,254,898	15,872,783
EMOP 10119.0	Food Assistance to Drought Victims	11/10/2001	5,498,004	8,183,796
EMOP 10297.0	Assistance to Disaster-Affected People in Southern Sri Lanka	12/06/2003	168,000	199,983
EMOP 10401.0	Assistance to Victims of Tsunami	27/12/2004	402,980	497,529
EMOP 10405.0	Assistance to Tsunami Victims in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Maldives and other Countries in the Indian Ocean Region	04/01/2005	100,783,823	200,760,745
SO 10406.0	Logistics Augmentation in Support of WFP Indian Ocean Tsunami EMOP 10405.0	03/01/2005		22,413,794
SO 10407.0	WFP Air Support of Humanitarian Relief Operations in response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami	03/01/2005		50,906,104

<b>Project Type &amp; Number</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Approval date</b>	<b>Food budget (USD)</b>	<b>Total WFP budget (USD)</b>
SO 10408.0	Establishment of a UN Joint Logistics Centre including an Air Coordination Center providing Logistics & Movement Coordination and Augmentation to Humanitarian Agencies working in the Indian Ocean Tsunami	03/01/2005		5,649,768
SO 105640	Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in Sri Lanka	17/11/2006		3,546,823
DEV 10607.0	Support to Improve Mother-and-Child Health and Nutrition	26/10/2007	7,863,391	11,336,703
PRRO 107560	Food for Peace Building and Recovery in Conflict Affected Areas	30/09/2008	113,146,341	163,501,984
SO 105390	Augmentation of Logistics Preparedness Capacity	28/08/2006		9,814,908
EMOP 200139	Food Assistance For Flood Affected Population in Sri Lanka	21/05/2010	353,920	476,896
EMOP 200143	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations	11/11/2010	52,392,371	69,159,260
IR - EMOP 200233	Immediate Response Emergency Operation Sri Lanka 200233 (IRA) -Food Assistance for Flood Affected Population in Sri Lanka	05/01/2011	412,545	496,965
EMOP 200239	Food assistance and early recovery for the population affected by the flood in Eastern Sri Lanka	11/02/2011	8,262,379	10,754,392
PRRO 200452	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations	14/11/2012	21,894,456	37,530,507
IR- EMOP 200809	Food Assistance for flood victims in Sri Lanka	01/09/2015	837,408	919,222
CP 200866	Country Programme - Sri Lanka (2016-2017)	15/10/2015	7,882,744	19,705,165
EMOP 200990	Targeted emergency cash assistance to the most vulnerable in support of the Government of Sri Lanka's response to the flood and landslide disaster	15/06/2016		2,277,257
<b>Total</b>	<b>76 Operations</b>		<b>591,335,194</b>	<b>1,002,765,215</b>

Source: WFP Historical database, SPRs.

**D=** Development, **Q=** Quick-Action, **E=** Emergency, **X=** Protracted Refugee and Displaced Person Projects/Operations  
**EMOP:** Emergency Operation; **PRRO:** Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations; **SO:** Special Operations; **CP:** Country Programme.



**Table 19 Sri Lanka Country Office size per year**


2010 Size	2011 Size	2012 Size	2013 Size	2014 Size	2015 Size	2016 Size
Medium	Medium	Large	Medium	Small	Small	Medium

**Table 20 Sri Lanka Country Office staffing per year (2011–2016)**


Location	Staff	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Colombo	National	56	43	31	25	26	29
	International	10	8	4	2	2	
Batticaloa	National	14					
	International	1					
Ampara	National	6					
	International						
Anuradhapura	National	2					
	International						
Polonnaruwa	National	2					
	International						
Trincomalee	National	2					
	International						
Kilinochchi	National	15	23	16	10	10	13
	International	1	1	1	1	1	
Jaffna	National	12	11	10	5	6	6
	International	1	1	1			
Vavuniya	National	13		4	2	2	2
	International	1	1	1			
Mannar	National		3	3	2	2	2
	International						
Moneragala	National						2
	International						
TOTAL	National	142	97	81	62	64	49
	International	14	11	7	3	3	5
TOTAL:		156	108	88	65	67	54

Source: CO Colombo, May 2016.

**Figure 14 WFP Sri Lanka CO organisational structure 2016**



**Figure 15 Percentage of beneficiaries by activity 2011–2015**



Source: SPRs. Data not available for Trust Funds. SO 105390 was non-food operation so not included here.

Note: FFA includes FFW and FFT activities.


**Table 21 Percentage and total beneficiaries by activity 2011–2015**

		School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFA	Cash & Vouchers
DEV 106070	<b>Planned</b>		236,000 100%			
	<b>Actual</b>		215,553 100%			
IR EMOP 200233	<b>Planned</b>			420,000 100%		
	<b>Actual</b>			442,740 100%		
PRRO 200143	<b>Planned</b>	333,000 42%	123,000 15%	286,000 36%	58,500 7%	20,000 2%
	<b>Actual</b>	337,345 41%	139,901 17%	302,146 36%	49,385 6%	15,843 2%
EMOP 200239	<b>Planned</b>		89,500 14%	500,000 78%	54,000 8%	
	<b>Actual</b>		64,436 11%	492,946 82%	40,207 7%	
PRRO 200452	<b>Planned</b>	480,000 44%	226,000 21%	318,500 29%	57,312 5%	249,297 23%
	<b>Actual</b>	467,343 60%	72,520 9%	209,223 27%	29,638 4%	84,687 11%
IR-EMOP 200809	<b>Planned</b>			250,450 100%		
	<b>Actual</b>			238,400 100%		
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		813,000 24%	674,500 20%	1,774,950 52%	169,812 5%	269,297 8%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		804,688 26%	492,410 16%	1,685,455 54%	119,230 4%	100,530 3%


Source: SPRs. No data for Trust Funds. SO 105390 was non-food operation so not included.

Note: FFA includes FFW and FFT activities.

**Figure 16 Top 5 donors and contributions to the portfolio 2011 – 2015 [**



**Figure 17 Timeline and funding level of WFP portfolio in Sri Lanka 2011 – 2016**



Source: APR 2015, Project Documents, SPRs 2011-2015 and Resource Situation (WFP The Factory) as of 23 Feb 2016 and PGG Combined Report of Contributions and Forecasts Statistics. Requirements (Req.) and Contributions Received (Rec.) in US\$

## Annex I: Output and Outcome Data by Operation 2011–2015

The data in this annex are drawn from SPRs, which report operation-wise. For each operation the available output and outcome data are presented. Data are not available in this format for the Trust Funds. The operations shown below all reported outputs; some did not report outcomes during the evaluation period.

### DEV206070

#### Outputs

Output	2011		2012		2013	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
<b>DEV 106070</b>						
Number of cooking demonstrations undertaken for fortified foods, complementary foods and special nutritional products	300	300	35	35	25	35
Number of health centres/sites assisted					1,299	1,215
Number of staff members/community health workers trained on modalities of food distribution					2800	3005
Number of timely food distributions as per planned distribution schedule	12	12				
Local Purchases: Number of farmer groups supported through local purchases	65	65				
Technical Assistance: Number of technical assistance projects conducted by WFP to strengthen the national capacity	1	1				
Trainings: Number of counterpart (government) staff members trained in programme implementation procedures and practices	35	35	74			

#### Outcomes

Outcome	Base value (at start of project or benchmark)	Previous follow-up (penultimate follow-up)	2011	2012	2013
<b>DEV 106070</b>					
Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %)	14.7	19.6			16
Prevalence of stunting among children under 2 (height-for-age as %)	17.3	13.1			
Average length of enrolment in supplementary feeding (days)	365	365	365		

<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Base value</b> (at start of project or benchmark)	<b>Previous follow-up</b> (penultimate follow-up)	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>
Incidence of low birth weight (% of infants < 2500 grams at birth among live births)	16.6 <sup>108</sup>	17	17	16.5	
Prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia (IDA) among children under 5 (% , Hb<110g/L)	<b>25.5</b>	25	24		16.1
Prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia (IDA) among pregnant women (% , Hb<110g/L)		30	19.6		
Hand-over strategy developed and implemented [1=not achieved; 2=partially achieved; 3=achieved]			2		

## EMOP 200239

### Outputs

<b>Output</b>	<b>2011</b>	
	<b>P</b>	<b>A</b>
<b>EMOP 200239</b>		
Number of health centres/sites assisted	611	611
Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted	15,000	12,717
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes	29	29
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes	600	593
Hectares (ha) of community woodlots	12	12
Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only	469	414
Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated with biological stabilization or agro forestry techniques only	484	484
Hectares (ha) of land cleared	15	15
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	1,190	1,168
Number of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance	95	95
Number of existing nurseries supported	10	10
Number of farmers who have adopted fertility management measures in their homestead and cultivated fields	200	200
Number of latrines constructed/rehabilitated	15	15
Number of shallow wells constructed	91	91
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions (livelihood-support/agriculture & farming/IGA)	1,179	1,179

<sup>108</sup> Decreased from 18 in 2012 SPR.

## Outcomes

Outcome	Base value (at start of project or benchmark)	Previous follow-up (penultimate follow-up)	2011
<b>EMOP 200239</b>			
% of households with acceptable FCS			88
% of households with borderline FCS			10
Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %)	28		18.2

## SO 205390

### Outputs

Output	2011	
	P	A
<b>SO 105390</b>		
Number of logistics hubs established	4	2
Number of trucks made available	32	8
Quantity (mt) of cargo transported	2,301	2,301
Total storage space made available (m3)	6,900	6,900

## PRRO 200143

### Outputs

Output	2011		2012	
	P	A	P	A
<b>PRRO 200143</b>				
Number of settlement/resettlement packages distributed	12	12		
Energy content of food distributed (kcal/person/day)	2,098	2,098		
Number of health centres/sites assisted	510	510	574	574
Number of pregnant/lactating women assisted	14,000	14,013	18,000	15,808
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from new irrigation schemes	28	26		
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes	170	170		
Hectares (ha) of community woodlots	218	218	16	2
Hectares (ha) of cultivated land treated and conserved with physical soil and water conservation measures only	679	678		
Hectares (ha) of land cleared	336	335		
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	207	192	131	



Output	2011		2012	
	P	A	P	A
Number of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance	2,252	1,851		
Number of latrines constructed/rehabilitated	771	771	32	32
Number of shallow wells constructed	19	4	2	2
Number of participants in beneficiary training sessions	64	64		
Kcal transferred to school children (kcal/child/day)	510	510	36	36
Number of cooks assisted by WFP	2,300	2,159	2,000	2,133
Number of feeding days as % of actual school days	100	100	100	88
Number of primary schools assisted by WFP	837	837	927	927
Trainings: Number of counterpart (government) staff members trained in programme implementation procedures and practices	450	427		
Trainings: Number of counterpart (non-government) staff members trained in programme implementation procedures and practices	960	1,066		

#### Outcomes

Outcome	Base value (at start of project or benchmark)	Previous follow-up (penultimate follow-up)	2011	2012
<b>PRRO 200143</b>				
Coping Strategy Index (average)		5.58	8.13	12
% of households with acceptable FCS		97	85	94
% of households with borderline FCS		3	14	4.9
Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %)	28	13.6	18.2	19.1
Ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools	0.71	0.97	0.97	1.02
Percentage of teachers reporting improved child ability to concentrate and learn in school as a result of school feeding	100	100	100	100

#### IR-EMOP 200233

##### Outputs

Output	2011	
	P	A
<b>IR-EMOP 200233</b>		
Number of days rations were provided	5	4

## PRRO 200452

### Outputs

Output	2013		2014		2015	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
<b>PRRO 200452</b>						
C&V: Number of men collecting cash or vouchers	5,500	1,964	24,684	22,437	1,981	1,540
C&V: Number of women collecting cash or vouchers	5,625	2,826	25,241	24,713	2,194	1,736
Number of days rations were provided			31	31	45	45
%Proportion of men exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP against proportion planned			13	14	13	8
%Proportion of women exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP against proportion planned			87	86	87	63
Hectares (ha) of agricultural land benefiting from rehabilitated irrigation schemes	250	155	200	168	24	21
Hectares (ha) of land cleared	59	59	400	346	1	1
Kilometres (km) of feeder roads built (FFA) and maintained (self-help)	44	44	425	388	21	17
Number of assisted communities with improved physical infrastructures to mitigate the impact of shocks, in place as a result of project assistance	1	1				
Number of health centres/sites assisted	502	502	570	570	385	385
Number of primary school boys assisted			42,810	41,402	43,610	41,489
Number of primary school girls assisted			42,660	42,351	41,860	39,476
Number of secondary school boys assisted			37,190	35,599	37,190	35,381
Number of secondary school girls assisted			37,340	33,771	37,340	35,214
Number of schools assisted by WFP	937	937	968	958	958	959

Output	2013		2014		2015	
	P	A	P	A	P	A
FFA Number of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	62	66	8	4	300	348
FFA Number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training					900	602
FFA Number of male government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	62	44	10	12	300	254
GFD Number of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	62	66	120	123		
GFD Number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			270	284		
GFD Number of male government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	59	190	150	161		
VAM Number of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	31	28	45	44	15	14
VAM: Number of government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	60	48	90	86	30	24
VAM Number of male government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training	29	20	45	42	15	10

## Outcomes

Outcome	Project end target	Base value	Previous follow-up	2013	2014	2015
<b>PRRO 200452</b>						
Coping Strategy Index (average)	8	12.8			15	16.34
Prevalence of acute malnutrition among children under 5 (weight-for-height as %)	5	22		11	11	19.6
% of households with poor FCS	0.22	1.1	4.3		0.3	0
% of households with poor FCS (female-headed household)	0.8	4			0.5	0
% of households with poor FCS (male-headed household)	0.1	0.5			0.2	0
% of households with acceptable FCS		94		78.6		
Diet diversity score (female-headed household)	6	5			6.4	6.14
Diet diversity score (male-headed household)	6	5			6.5	6.46
Supplementary feeding recovery rate (%)				60		
MAM treatment default rate (%)	15				4.2	40.4
MAM treatment mortality rate (%)	3					0
MAM treatment non-response rate (%)	15				36.8	5.2
MAM treatment recovery rate (%)	75	66			57	54.4
Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage)	50	0	65			76.3
Proportion of target population who participate in an adequate number of distributions	66	0			95	81
CSI: percentage of households with a decreased Coping Strategy Index	65	68		76	76.3	60
CAS: Community Asset Score (average)	80	0			97	93.75
NCI: National Capacity Index	1	0			0	
Net Enrolment Rate (NER) (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools	100	98			98	98
Net Enrolment Rate (NER) (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools	100	98			98	98
Retention rate in WFP-assisted primary schools	70	86.75			89.3	99.68
Retention rate in WFP-assisted secondary schools	70	83.5			86.1	99.68

Outcome	Project end target	Base value	Previous follow-up	2013	2014	2015
Number of people that the national food security/nutrition programmes target		1.6		1.5		
Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food	50	45	49		52	49
Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees	50					60
Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of food, cash, or voucher distribution	60					75
Proportion of assisted people informed about the programme	90*	80			95	93
Proportion of assisted people who do not experience safety problems travelling to/from and at WFP programme sites	90 <sup>109</sup>	85			98	100

## IR-EMOP 200809

### Outputs

Output	2015	
	P	A
<b>IR-EMOP 200809</b>		
Number of days rations were provided	10	9

<sup>109</sup> Project end target changed to 80 in 2015 SPR.

## **Annex J: WFP Sri Lanka Strategy and Strategising**

1. WFP Sri Lanka did not have a formal country strategy in place during the evaluation period but (a) there were various efforts to prepare a formal strategy, and (b) project documents, as well as various strategy drafts, provide an indication of emerging strategic thinking. This annex provides an overview, with successive sections describing:

- WFP's general guidance on country strategies during the evaluation period and more recently;
- the sequence of strategic planning exercises undertaken by the CO and the main themes of successive draft strategy documents;
- links to wider UN programming;
- the implicit strategy embodied in the operations actually undertaken.

2. To provide balance to this analysis, however, it is important to recognise the unusual circumstances of Sri Lanka and the continuous dynamic changes as it emerged from conflict and transitioned economically while also undergoing tremendous political change.

### *WFP general guidance on strategy*

3. During the review period there was in practice no absolute corporate requirement for the CO to produce a country strategy,<sup>110</sup> but there were firm guidelines that concerned the development of operational project documents in different categories (PRRO, EMOP, DEV, CP) and these were expected to reflect WFP's overall strategy, as set out in successive strategic plans (WFP, 2008d, WFP, 2013g) and associated results frameworks. Thus project documents typically indicate which corporate Strategic Objectives (SOs) the project is intended to address, and Standard Project Reports (SPRs) are designed to feed into an organisation-wide results framework.

4. There was also plenty of thematic guidance relevant to the component activities of the Sri Lanka portfolio (such as the nutrition policy, CBT guidelines, gender policy), as well as guidance and discussion regarding the issues of relevance to the portfolio as a whole, for example a concern to develop a MIC (middle income country) strategy and the developments of policies and guidelines related to protection and humanitarian principles. These new policies and guidelines percolated formally through dissemination of new guidance documents, but also through the discourse in Programme Review Committee (PRC) and Strategic Review Committee (SRC) discussions.

5. The situation now is somewhat different; WFP has signalled a move away from a project focus to a more strategic country approach with the design of a 'Country Strategic Plan' (CSP). This will be preceded by a multi-stakeholder strategic review that WFP will facilitate and catalyse but not own. The CSP will cover 2018–2022 and is designed to coincide with the new UNDAF<sup>111</sup> timeframe.

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<sup>110</sup> Although country strategy documents were supposed to be produced by all COs, this intention was not fully implemented.

<sup>111</sup> To be renamed as UN Sustainable Development Framework (UNSDF).


### *Chronology of CO strategising and strategic ideas under discussion*

6. The 2011–2015 period saw a somewhat fragmented approach to strategy formulation. This section reviews successive strategy exercises and notes some of the key issues under discussion during the period.

7. Reference is made in documents to formulation of a Country Strategy covering 2011–2015 (cited in WFP, 2011i). This seems to have been a genuine effort to recognize the country’s changing circumstances and consequently WFP’s changing role to fit within these transitions. However, a more holistic strategy for 2011–2015 did not eventuate, and nor did the vision depicted by Figure 18 below. The evaluation team did not discover a draft of the strategy referred to, but it was described in a contemporary document as follows:

The Country Office is now in the process of finalising its Country Strategy Document for 2011 – 2015 the main intent of which is to make a strategic transition from emergency to recovery/development as Sri Lanka moves from a post conflict situation to one of protracted recovery / development. The strategy envisages a phased approach with WFP moving from its three current operations; EMOP 200233, PRRO 200143 and DEV 10607, to three development projects in 2011/12, and to a country programme planned to start in 2013 to align with the UNDAF as shown in [Figure 18 below]. Emergency preparedness and response will also be a component of this strategic approach (WFP, 2011i).

**Figure 18** Early WFP strategic thinking



Source: Cash and voucher mission report (WFP, 2011i)

8. **Country Strategy 2013–2017:** during 2011 a process was initiated, with a consultant's help, to develop a strategy. This process included external consultations with the government at both central and provincial levels, with the involvement of technical experts and policy makers covering the thematic components of the portfolio. There was a particular focus on the alignment of WFP activities with government policies. This work led to a draft Country Strategy Document covering 2013–2017 (WFP, 2012c). However, it was never formally adopted. An annex to the draft document describes the consultative process as follows:

In order to formulate a Country Strategy for WFP Sri Lanka, consultation meetings were held with the Government in November 2009, at central level and in February 2010, at provincial level. Technical experts and Policy Makers from the Government who deal with specific

thematic areas including agriculture, food security, climate change, Nutrition and Health, and Education were invited for these meetings.

The consultative processes helped define priorities and the role of WFP to support Government policies and priorities. Particular attention has been given to aligning WFP activities with Government policies. Discussions on beneficiary targeting, the causes of food insecurity and poverty, resource availability, gaps in response and WFP's niche were also held.

9. In 2012 the Strategic Review Committee decided that the CO would not proceed with the country strategy document for another two years, and rather focus on the PRRO to cover the early recovery and remaining humanitarian needs:

**2.1 CO introduction:** During the recent Strategic Review Committee, it was decided that the country office (CO) would not pursue with the Country Strategy Document and the country programme for the next two years but, would instead focus on the PRRO to cover the early recovery and remaining humanitarian needs in northern Sri Lanka. In addition, the CO plans to extend the on-going nutrition development project and possibly a climate change project currently under consideration for the adaption funds. (WFP, 2012k – PRC meeting July 2012).

10. According to interviewees, a 2013 discussion paper by the acting Country Director (Lofvall, 2013) was influential in the development of subsequent draft strategies. It highlighted the need for WFP in Sri Lanka to adopt a new business model, reflecting Sri Lanka's MIC status and the associated changes in the funding environment for WFP.

11. **Country Strategy 2014–2017:** from November 2012, WFP engaged in a strategy consultation process that extended through 2013. The consultation included Gap Analysis workshops, engaging multi stakeholders and seeking to understand Government priorities.<sup>112</sup> In total WFP organised two internal workshops and five government workshops at district and national level, in addition to a validation workshop with NGOs and a donor briefing. The outcome was the 'Country Strategy 2014–2017' also entitled 'Supporting the Sri Lankan Government meeting the Zero Hunger challenge' (WFP, 2013i). However, this WFP Strategy was not formally adopted by the RB or HQ. Nevertheless the strategy clearly fed into the development of the 2016–2017 CP. Importantly, this document was still built on alignment with the post-war government's Mahinda Chintana priorities.

12. This draft strategy also showed awareness of the importance of GoSL as a future financing source:

WFP is confident that once it can convince the government of the added value of WFP as a strategic partner a large part of the operation will be funded by the government directly, while specific resources for independent baselines, assessments and evaluations and external technical support missions will have to be resourced from multi-lateral donors for which WFP has been successful to secure resources for similar activities in the past. (WFP, 2013i, section 6.2)

13. As indicated in Table 22 below, there was a considerable reformulation of strategic priorities in the draft strategies/strategy outlines for 2014–2017 and 2016–2019 compared with the earlier draft for 2013–2017. The 2014–2017 document acknowledges the changing strategic context:

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<sup>112</sup> Significantly, only 1 out of the 29 gaps identified in consultation with government stakeholders was partly linked to a direct transfer (cash or kind); all other gaps were linked to 'Operational Services' and or 'Technical Assistance, Partnerships and Advocacy'.



With the shift in the needs in the country from emergency to development, WFP's role is shifting gradually from a pure food assistance agency with direct transfers to a provider of assistance coupled with in depth technical analysis and support.

Sri Lanka has changed dramatically since the end of the armed conflict in 2009. The WFP Sri Lanka country office role and responsibility therefore also underwent a rapid transition from directly providing emergency support and assistance to the current development oriented role, while continuing its advocating role for support of the most vulnerable people through home grown social safety net programmes, nutrition interventions and economic growth. (WFP, 2013i)

**Table 22 Successive draft Strategic Priorities**

	<b>Draft SP 2013–2017</b>	<b>SP 2014–2017</b>	<b>SP 2016–2019</b>
Goal	[Vision] A Sri Lanka free from under-nutrition, where all people have both physical and economic access to nutritious food at all times.	WFP's overarching goal in Sri Lanka is: to be an innovative partner who supports the Sri Lankan Government meeting the ZERO Hunger challenge	WFP's goal is to be an innovative partner which supports the Government of Sri Lanka in meeting the Zero Hunger Challenge
Strategic Priority 1	Reduce undernutrition	Position WFP Sri Lanka as a strategic partner, collaborating with the Government on the elements of the Zero Hunger Challenge	Contribute to the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people in Sri Lanka with an integrated approach at the local level in support of the national food security policy
Strategic Priority 2	Improve food security	Contribute to the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people in Sri Lanka with an integrated approach at local level in support of national food security policy	Increase the capacity of the government to create public-private partnerships to become a global food supplier
Strategic Priority 3	Contribute to emergency preparedness and response	Increase the capacity of the government to create public private partnership to become a global food supplier	Build resilience and mitigate the risks associated with the adverse effects of climate
Strategic Priority 4		Build Resilience and Mitigate the Risks Associated with the Adverse Effects of Climate Change, Natural Disasters and other Shocks	

14. **Country Strategy 2016–2019 and preparation of the Country Programme:** an exercise was undertaken towards preparing a CS for 2016–2019, although this did not lead to a formal strategy (the only version seen by the evaluation team was a PowerPoint summary – WFP, 2014s). According to interviews, however, this exercise was closely linked to the preparation of the 2016–2017 Country Programme. Both the CP document itself and the Concept Note that preceded it (together with notes of their review meetings) provide insights into the strategy process and emerging strategic directions.

15. Thus the minutes of a Strategic Programme Review Process on 30 April 2014 indicate a proactive role by the Regional Bureau:

the RB is seeking to strategically revisit all of its operations across the region. Further, the RB mentioned that PRRO 200452 is nearing completion, and that following the cessation of the conflict, a new post-conflict area has descended on Sri Lanka. Thus, given the MIC context, WFP is proposing to transition from a PRRO to a CP modality, and that the idea is to look beyond direct implementation and focus on a more technical assistance role. In spite of moving into other areas of expertise, the CP will continue to advance good nutrition, school feeding and emergency preparedness and response. The change of direction stipulated under the proposed CP is characterised by a solid collaboration between the RB and the CO.

**3.10 RB Comments:** In line with OSZ, the RB acknowledged that the two-year transitional CP is the most appropriate implementation vehicle in terms of the Sri Lanka MIC context. Across the Asia region, the RB has had solid experience with the Strategic Review process which has ensured the following steps: a stakeholder consultation; and the development of a CSP. Although there was insufficient time to engage in the Strategic Review process in Sri Lanka, along with the fact that Sri Lanka was not selected as a MIC pilot, the RB is keen to engage in a higher strategic level Sri Lanka. The RB aims to carry out a Strategic Review process in Sri Lanka in the beginning of 2016. The RB observed that lessons learned on MIC strategies have been disseminated across the region, and these will be closely taken into account when revising the CN and finalising the proposed CP. The RB would greatly welcome corporate investments enabling the CO to carry out a MIC strategy. (WFP, 2014z)

16. The concepts underlying the Country Programme are described in the same source as follows:

Concept Note (CN) presents the main strategic elements for a proposed Sri Lanka Country Programme (2016-2017), which closely aligns with national plans and the Zero Hunger Challenge.

The CP is hence designed to make a significant contribution to supporting the Government in meeting the Zero Hunger Challenge targets, and is aligned with UNDAF Pillars 1-4. Consequently, the CO is proposing to transition from ongoing PRRO 200452, which ends in 2015, to a CP (2016-2017). The CPs timeframe is in alignment with the UNDAF cycle, while also adhering to WFP's Strategic Objectives 3 and 4. (WFP, 2014z)

17. At the same meeting however, there was concern expressed by the Performance Management and Monitoring Division (RMP) that:

the CN should better explain the intention to transition into a more technical assistance role, while also better articulating the rationale for selecting some of the various key activities. Lastly, in view of dwindling donor support for Sri Lanka, RMP recommended that the CN better articulate WFP's comparative in-country advantages.<sup>143</sup>

18. The CN describes the rationale of the CP as follows:

As a result of the long civil war, Tsunami and climate shocks, WFP has been undertaking emergency interventions and PRROs and hence should now design a Country Programme and align itself with the government development priorities in tackling food insecurity, malnutrition and climate shocks as embedded in government development strategies.

19. Thus the strategic transition (in terms of WFP instruments) that was first envisaged in 2011 (Figure 18 above) was eventually taking effect.

### *Links to UN programming*

20. Generally, the WFP strategy would expect to exist within the framework of the UNDAF cycle which is developed jointly by the UN organisations and Government (and with NGO participation). The UNDAFs that overlap with the CPE period are;

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<sup>143</sup> These points may have been more fully addressed in the final CN and CP.

2008–2012 (UN & GoSL, 2007) and 2013–2017 (UN & GoSL, 2012). WFP was a joint signatory to both.

21. The 2008–2012 UNDAF was organised around four main themes: pro-poor economic growth and social services; development of rights-based governance mechanism; sustainable peace rooted in social justice and reconciliation; and, women’s empowerment. WFP had various areas of inputs, including under food security, health and nutrition, education, social services, disaster management, IDP support and women’s empowerment. The evaluation team did not manage to identify a specific WFP Strategy, linked to the UNDAF 2008–2012 although it indicates a USD 18.3m budget for WFP for the five years (part of the overall USD 365m overall UNDAF budget).

22. The 2013–2017 UNDAF outlined four main areas of cooperation; equitable economic growth, quality social services, social inclusion and protection, and environmental sustainability. There were efforts in subsequent WFP draft strategy documents to show how WFP activities fitted under the different UNDAF pillars, but the UNDAF seems to have remained a collect of project proposals by disparate UN agencies that has not genuinely led to a One UN approach or significantly influenced WFP strategy.

23. It is noted that, as far back as 2010 and 2011, the expectation was for greater alignment with UNDAF and development of a Country Programme, and not successive PRROs (whether through extension or renewal). It is noteworthy that the November 2010 PRRO project submission under the heading ‘Hand-Over Strategy’ anticipated that “WFP-supported districts in the north will eventually transit fully into a development framework and be integrated into the United Nations Development Framework and a country programme” (WFP, 2010h).

### *Strategy in practice*

24. 2011–2015 covered a period in which Sri Lanka transitioned on several levels:

- from relief to recovery;
- from conflict to peace;
- to the fringes of an Upper Middle Income Country (UMIC).<sup>114</sup>

25. This affected WFP’s ability to secure resources and while internal documents acknowledge the major transitions that WFP was subject to, and suggest that a new business model was considered by senior management, there did not appear to be formal acknowledgment through a strategy of the inevitable need to redefine and re-scale WFP operations in Sri Lanka commensurate with the country’s changed circumstances.

26. The strategy followed in practice is therefore mainly characterised by the PRROs and implicit in the operational documents (the PRROs represent the bulk of activity during the evaluation period and therefore are the most important). Other operations (EMOPs and Trust Funds), present opportunistic responses but are nevertheless also relevant as they indicate new strategic aspirations.

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<sup>114</sup> World Bank Atlas method per capita GNI of USD 3800 in 2015. Lower Middle Income band, per capita GNI of USD 1026 to USD 4035.

27. With respect to the early part of the CPE period, the PRRO 200143, which ran from January 2011 to December 2012, essentially reflected the implied WFP strategy (supplemented by other DEV and EMOP programs). In financial terms this PRRO dominates activities for the 2011–2012 period with an eventual requirement of USD 69m, funded to 55 percent. The PRRO 200143 identified the following in its ‘Strategy Outline’:

in a post-conflict transitional period, Sri Lanka is characterized by needs ranging from humanitarian needs in IDP camps to early recovery needs in the north, and medium-term recovery and development needs in the east. The new strategic approach focuses on three parameters: geographic, sectoral and time-bound. PRRO 200143 will cover five districts in the north, expanding to locations in the east if returnees resettle. (WFP, 2010h)

28. PRRO 200452 had been initiated prior to the 2014–2017 strategy coming in to effect and would eventually run for the three years 2013–2015. It continued many of the activities of the previous PRRO. The project documents acknowledged progress, but in justifying a further PRRO noted that “residual humanitarian and early recovery needs are still evident – especially with regard to food, shelter, livelihoods and basic social services” (WFP, 2013h).

29. The PRRO ‘Strategy Outline’ notes that “...WFP will use PRRO 200452 to address food and nutrition security needs in all five districts of the Northern Province for the next two years”. The latter PRRO also makes reference to a handover strategy in the projected documents of WFP activities to the government with a planned phase out of the WFP school meals programme over the operation.

30. The original budget of PRRO 200452 was USD 34m covering 2013–2014. It would subsequently be extended to 2015 and increased to USD 54m. It was eventually funded to 53 percent, although new resources raised for the final year were minimal. Based on 200452 project documents from 2013: “Overall, funding shortfalls led to several pipeline breaks and to the cancellation of cash assistance to 60,000 flood-affected people in 2013. In addition, delayed implementation of activities and limited coverage contributed to the overall low achievements compared to plan in 2013”. The PRRO project document set out a systematic approach to handing over its activities to government (see Box 11 below). Slow progress in accomplishing the strategic shifts envisaged in WFP's portfolio is undoubtedly linked to slow progress in implementing the envisaged handover strategies for WFP's various activities.

### **Box 11 Handover Strategy from PRRO 200452 (2013)**

27. While the Ministry of Economic Development (MoED) is expanding coverage of its social safety net programme (*Samurdhi*) in Northern Province, food insecure groups will be assisted through GFD food and vouchers. In the longer term, this component will be incorporated into the government programme. At the same time, discussions related to the multi-sectoral nutrition plan include strategies to use government resources such as food stores as part of poverty programming and boosting the diets of low-income groups. WFP will continue to participate in these discussions in order to link its work in recovery in the North to government poverty alleviation programmes.

28. During the second year of PRRO 200452 a food security and nutrition assessment will be conducted to assess its effectiveness and also to identify locations still in need of WFP recovery assistance. Handover of the MAM treatment programme to MoH is envisaged as production of fortified blended food (FBF) increases, MoH staff capacity improves, and the service is incorporated as a core health activity.

29. The close collaboration of WFP and MoH with the World Bank project underpins the phase-out of the preventive supplemental food. This project provides the education and resources to make nutritious supplemental foods from local ingredients along with the information on nutrition for pregnancy and infant and young child feeding.

30. WFP-supported SMP will be phased out in the course of PRRO 200452. The government SMP is expected to expand its coverage to the North from 2014 onwards. Students in grades 1–9 will continue to be supported in year one, but PRRO assistance will be reduced to grades 1–5 in year two in line with the WFP policy. Parents and communities will be empowered to nurture a sense of ownership and provide support for SMP in their respective areas using their own local products and resources. Some schools in urban and food secure areas also may graduate from WFP support in the course of this PRRO. To facilitate a smooth transition, WFP will provide capacity building to the Ministry of Education (MoE).

Source: Project document (WFP, 2013h, ¶27-30)

31. During this period, WFP also responded to emergency situations through EMOPs launched in 2011 and 2015, as well as by adapting the PRROs to respond to drought and resettlement opportunities in Eastern Province.

32. The trust funds also represented an opportunistic shift towards more upstream work: the SDG-F Trust Fund 10024563 (2015 to 2016) and Trust Fund 10022993 (2014 to 2018) focused on scaling up nutrition (as did a separate trust fund supporting the establishment of the SUN civil society alliance), and addressing climate change respectively.

33. Overall, however, the picture that emerges is of considerable awareness that strategic challenges would require a reconfiguration of WFP's Sri Lanka portfolio, but only slow progress towards such a reconfiguration, at least partly due to slow progress in handing over WFP activities to GoSL.

## Annex K: Overview of WFP Analytical Work

This Annex gives an overview of analytical work in which WFP was instrumental during the evaluation period (by commissioning, directly undertaking or participating in the work).

For a separate review of analytical work undertaken on the use of cash and vouchers see Annex O.

**Table 23 Key analyses undertaken over the review period**

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
HARTI, 2010: <i>Emergency Food Security Assessment Report Vanni Districts, Sri Lanka</i> . HARTI with WFP, April 2010.	Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research & Training institute (HARTI) in close collaboration with WFP.	Three successive joint rapid food security assessments, following up on earlier assessments: <sup>145</sup> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2010 – Vanni Districts – for emergency response right after the war ended</li> <li>2011 – Northern, Eastern and North Central Provinces – for medium term food security outlook in 8 Districts of N and E most affected by conflict, and in two</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Assessments provide the most basic data and starting point for policy analysis and planning and programming of activities in conflict areas. HARTI, 2011 specifically referenced in PRRO 200452.</li> <li>According to WFP CO, assessments have also been used for planning and programming of response to natural disasters.</li> <li>Assessments also used to draw attention to major short-comings of both Government</li> </ul>
HARTI, 2011: <i>Food Security in Northern, Eastern, North Central Provinces: A Food Security Assessment Report</i> . HARTI with WFP, 2011.			

<sup>145</sup> In 2009, WFP VAM unit carried out emergency food security assessments in Ampara and Batticaloa and food security assessment for resettled households in Trincomalee.

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>HARTI, 2012: <i>Food Security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka: A Comprehensive Food Security Assessment Report</i>. HARTI with WFP, 2012</p>		<p>adjoining Districts (Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2012 – Northern and Eastern Provinces – Addressed need for more in-depth understanding of food security situation in the 8 core conflict-affected Districts of N and E.</li> </ul>	<p>and development partner approaches – for example, highlighting the fact that those who received food aid did not do so regularly, and hence the need for planning and implementation that goes beyond immediate crisis driven initiatives and activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRROs stress that vulnerability analysis and mapping will be central to work with the Government and other partners on improving the collection and analysis of food security and market information, especially price monitoring and analysis.</li> <li>• Assessments used in preparation of PRRO 200452 and the CP.</li> </ul>
<p>MRI, 2010: <i>Nutrition and Food Security Assessment in Sri Lanka 2009</i>. R. Jayatissa &amp; S.M.M. Hossain, Medical Research Institute in collaboration with UNICEF and WFP, March 2010.</p>	<p>Medical Research Institute in collaboration with UNICEF and WFP.</p>	<p>Nutrition and Food Security Assessment report built on 11 separate district assessments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessments done in 2009<sup>116</sup> and report completed in 2010, and has been useful in CPE period – particularly in PRRO 200143 and in preparation of PRRO 200452.</li> </ul>

<sup>116</sup> Separate nutrition and food security assessments carried out in Ampara,, Anuradhapura, Badulla, Batticaloa, Colombo, Hambantota, Jaffna, Kurenegala, Moneragala, Ratnapura, Vavuniya.

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>UNICEF, 2012: <i>Nutritional status in Sri Lanka, determinants and interventions: a desk review – 2006–2011</i>. L.C. Rajapaksa, C. Arambepola, N. Gunawardena for UNICEF.</p>	<p>UNICEF, WFP is identified in the study as one of the main sources of information.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collated all available documents, reports, research and other information on nutritional status, its determinants and evaluation of interventions for the period from January 2006 to April 2011.</li> <li>• Reviewed data with a view to identifying gaps and options to improve nutritional status with particular emphasis on young children.</li> <li>• Mapped available data to the lowest possible geographic unit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Did not include nutrition during emergencies since such situations need special approaches and services. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ In this way left out a main area of WFP concern.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Highlighted several gaps in knowledge: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Prevalence of pockets with high nutrition indicators among populations that are seriously malnourished – how is this possible?</li> <li>○ Socio-cultural beliefs and behaviours, especially during pregnancy and infancy – and their effect on nutritional status.</li> <li>○ Weakness in causal analysis – as most data is cross-sectional and little time series / longitudinal data.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• No indication if or how WFP used information from study.</li> </ul>
<p>UNHCR &amp; WFP, 2012: <i>Assessment of Nutritional Status and Associated Factors in Northern Province</i>. R. Jayatissa, S.M.M. Hossain, L. Nanyakkara, Medical Research Institute in collaboration with UNICEF and WFP</p>	<p>Medical Research Institute in collaboration with UNICEF and WFP</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly focusing on maternal and child health nutrition status and associated factors of the families who reside in the Northern Province.</li> <li>• Northern Province faced special food and nutrition issues at end of the war that needed more detailed analysis than provided under the 2010 Nutrition and Food Assessment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely assessment of years of efforts taken by the government and other organisations to prevent and control nutritional problems in vulnerable age groups in the Northern Province.</li> <li>• Used in PRRO 200452.</li> <li>• Aailed to policy makers and donors in their efforts to understand, develop responses and implement suitable interventions.</li> </ul>



Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>WFP, 2014a: <i>Minimum Cost of Diet. Maha Planting Season (October 2013 – January 2014)</i>, WFP, 2014.</p> <p>WFP, 2014n: <i>Minimum Cost of Nutritious Diet. October 2013 – September 2014</i>. WFP, 2014.</p>	<p>WFP research (including staff training and the development of a software tool).</p>	<p>Model of the cost of a theoretical, simulated diet (food basket)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Model basket satisfies all nutritional requirements of a household of specific composition of interest (e.g. breastfed child, lactating mother, and other members) at the minimal possible cost, based on the availability, price, and nutrient content of local foods.</li> <li>• Any other food basket at the same price will be less nutritious, and any other food basket of the same nutrient value will be more expensive.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Minimum Cost of Diet (COD) is one of the most popular methods used globally to measure the population's affordability for a nutritious diet.</li> <li>• When combined with household income data, COD can be used to estimate the proportion of households that could theoretically afford the modelled nutritious diet.</li> <li>• Hence, the COD tool can be used to calculate the affordability or economic access to a nutritious diet. It thus helps to identify whether malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies are caused by insufficient access to nutritious food.</li> <li>• Intended simultaneously to stimulate demand and supply for this type of analysis, with potential influence on national policy, assessment of effectiveness of social protection programmes.</li> </ul>
<p>Gunaratne, 2011: <i>Assessment of Vulnerability and Adaptation to the Climate Change in the Mahaweli River Basin, Sri Lanka</i>. Agribusiness Centre University of Peradeniya.</p>	<p>Study undertaken at the suggestion of WFP after informal conclusion that climate change was a serious issue in the Mahaweli Valley.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Main objective: assess and establish vulnerability situation in Mahaweli River Basin and identify appropriate adaptation methods at the field level.</li> <li>• Assessed vulnerability to climate change in terms of rainfall and temperature changes, drought risks, landslides etc., based on secondary data.</li> <li>• Identified appropriate adaptation methods at the field level and analyzed the potential benefits arising from the proposed adaptation strategies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Used in preparation of Trust Fund Climate change project.</li> <li>• Rationalised design of Trust Fund Project that emphasizes macro (Ministry of Environment and other national agencies) as well as micro (field and farm level) elements of the project.</li> </ul>

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>GoSL, 2014b: <i>Drought: food security and livelihoods affected by erratic weather</i>. Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Disaster Management &amp; WFP, April, 2014.</p>	<p>Joint report by the Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Disaster Management &amp; WFP.</p> <p>Supported by the Disaster Management Centre, Department of Meteorology, Department of Irrigation, District Secretariats, HARTI, FAO, UNICEF, OCHA, Save the Children, World Vision, SLRCS, the Danish Refugee Council and Child Fund International.</p>	<p>Report based on a survey undertaken in April 2014. The survey targeted households affected by the 2014 <i>maha</i> season drought and included questions on food consumption, impact on livelihoods, coping strategies, market function, and preferred modalities of support.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This analysis informed WFP’s role in drought relief and increasing interest in climate change mitigation.</li> <li>• PRRO 200452 was extended beyond Northern Province to assist drought-affected populations.</li> <li>• Developed at time of development of Trust Fund 10022993 – Climate Change Project and had influence in design and later implementation of the latter.</li> </ul>
<p>WFP &amp; GoSL, 2014: <i>Consolidated Livelihood Approach for Analysing Resilience</i>.</p>	<p>GOSL (Ministry of Economic Development) and WFP collaborative exercise undertaken by Krishna Krishnamurthy, Emily Turano, Laksiri Nanayakkara and R H W A Kumarasiri</p>	<p>Rural livelihoods mapping – zoning and profiling – in rural areas to provide better understanding of broadly similar spatial patterns of livelihood and vulnerability.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Thorough analysis drawing on expert knowledge documented in the livelihood profiles, review of secondary data, and interviews.</li> <li>• Based on these relative rankings, an overall resilience profile by livelihood zone was established.</li> <li>• The results were disseminated to government representatives, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations for further validation and feedback.</li> <li>• Used in development of Climate Change Project and in Project’s implementation plans and activities.</li> </ul>

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>PTF &amp; HCT, 2014: <i>Sri Lanka Joint Needs Assessment Final Report</i>.            Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province (PTF) &amp; Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), 2014.</p>	<p>WFP also provided the data for the Joint Needs Assessment</p>	<p>A rapid overview of humanitarian needs in former conflict affected areas through sampling among the returned and remaining IDPs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assessment improved the availability of quantifiable information on residual humanitarian and development needs.</li> <li>• Assessment used as a baseline for information on resilience, development and durable solutions.</li> <li>• Assessment has played a role in strengthening coordination and partnership between the Government, humanitarian and development partners.</li> <li>• Facilitates mobilisation of resources based on evidence-based request for funding.</li> <li>• Provides basis for more detailed, assessments and studies required in specific sectors and geographic locations.</li> <li>• Assessment has also been criticized for being too general – not always reflecting “situation of the ground” (e.g. IDMC, 2015).</li> </ul>

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
WFP, 2015f: <i>Sri Lanka, Food Security Atlas. Livelihoods, Food Security, and Resilience</i> . WFP, May 2015.	WFP and HARTI – joint undertaking and publication	Food Security Atlas provides an extensive map-based spatial analysis defining livelihood, food and nutrition security and vulnerability.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A main aim of the Atlas is to contribute to a better understanding of the spatial patterns of food security, poverty livelihood, and resilience.</li> <li>• Atlas should provide a solid basis for developing a comprehensive National Food Security Plan to eradicate hunger and extreme poverty in Sri Lanka, and for disaggregation of plan to various social and geographical strata.</li> <li>• Also contributes to development partners' policies and plans.</li> <li>• PRROs stress that vulnerability analysis and mapping will be central to work with the Government and other partners on improving the collection and analysis of food security and market information.</li> </ul>
WFP, 2015n: <i>Sri Lanka's School Feeding. Cost Benefit Analysis</i> . WFP, December 2015.	WFP in partnership with MasterCard. Used the CBA tool developed jointly with WFP and the Boston Consulting Group.	A school feeding Cost Benefit Analysis for Sri Lanka was produced. This is a modelling exercise, which is intended to support advocacy for school feeding by showing its potential benefits. It argued that school feeding can be a strong investment for the whole community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Useful in promoting debate about school feeding and highlighting its potential benefits. However, as pointed out in the independent evaluation of WFP's school feeding policy (Mokoro, 2011, ¶175ff), it is important not to mistake hypothetical modelling for empirical research.<sup>117</sup></li> </ul>

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<sup>117</sup> "There is indeed evidence for each of the links in the chain of causality on which [the CBA model] is based, but the overwhelming weight of evidence is that most of the links in the causality chain are rather fragile; for a low income country to achieve the results portrayed by the model would require a "perfect storm" of complementary inputs. Moreover, a large part of the benefit depicted comes from the "value transfer" component (for which there are other options than school feeding), while the combination of up-front costs and long term benefits means that it takes many years for the benefit/cost ratio to turn positive." (Mokoro, 2011, ¶176)

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>Medagama, 2015: <i>A Situation Analysis to Study the School Feeding Context and Implementation in Sri Lanka</i>. R.S. Medagama, Ministry of Education and WFP, December 2015.</p>	<p>Ministry of Education, study sponsored by WFP.</p>	<p>Objective for the findings of the study to feed into a national policy on school feeding. Analysis of the three SMP modalities used (government cash, WFP in-kind, and government milk programme) with recommendations for future government approach to school feeding.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP has for many years been advocating the development of a national school feeding policy that would facilitate handover of the WFP SMP in Northern Province to GoSL. This situation analysis was one of the recommendations from a SABER (Systems Approach for Better Education Results) workshop held in March 2015 (SABER, 2015).</li> <li>• Remains to be seen whether this report and the SABER initiative will stimulate the desired progress in policy development.</li> </ul>
<p>Nguyen, 2016: <i>Thripasha: Assessment and Product Diversification</i>. V.H. Nguyen, April, 2016.</p>	<p>CO requested the Food Quality Assurance Unit in Rome to provide a food technologist to undertake the assessment.</p>	<p>Thripasha was found not to be in line with WHO recommendations for MAM treatment in children. Areas for improvement identified in the formulation, production, quality control, packaging and storage of Thripasha.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• WFP lead on technical assistance to the GoSL on Thripasha, which forms a component of the CP.</li> <li>• Too soon to know whether the technical recommendations will be effectively followed up.</li> </ul>

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>Seneviratne &amp; Gamage, 2016: <i>Gender Assessment for Sri Lanka Country Programme 2016–2017 World Food Programme</i>, Janakie Seneviratne and Prema Gamage, April 2016.</p>	<p>WFP, undertaken by consultants.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commissioned as part of the CP 2016-17 and a requirement of the WFP corporate gender policy 2015-2020.</li> <li>• Assessment in three districts: Jaffna, Moneragala and Matale</li> <li>• Main three recommendations:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Encourage the FHB to maintain sex disaggregated data of children below 5 years</li> <li>2. With UNICEF and World Vision, transform mother groups to parent groups.</li> <li>3. Build capacity at local government level to integrate gender into the disaster management cycle.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Primarily for the use of the CO to strategise gender mainstreaming in their programming of the CP.</li> <li>• Also intended input to future country strategy.</li> </ul>
<p>Jayatissa, 2016: <i>National Nutrition and Micronutrient Survey of Pregnant and Lactating Women in Sri Lanka</i>, Dr. Renuka Jayatissa, MRI. In collaboration with UNICEF and WFP, 30th June [2016].</p>	<p>Funded by WFP and UNICEF in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Medical Research Institute.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Survey of 7,500 randomly selected women.</li> <li>• Severe anaemia, underweight, iron deficiency – all key issues among PLW.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results of the survey very concerning. Shows the package currently provided to PLW is not fully effective.</li> </ul>

Piece of Work	Parties involved in analysis	Brief description	Evaluation team comments
<p>RIU, 2016: <i>Landscape Analysis on Rice Fortification, Inception Report</i>. Research Intelligence Unit for WFP, 2016.</p>	<p>RIU with the University of Peradeniya, commissioned by WFP.</p> <p>Follow-on from increasing interest from GoSL, after a government consultative workshop on rice fortification and a WFP regional workshop in Bangkok, 2014.</p> <p>RB has a food fortification specialist.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inception report complete. Pilot in two districts in progress.</li> <li>• Analyses the opportunities and challenges for rice fortification; supply chain, cost effectiveness, market analysis to assess potential public-private partnerships etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aim to inform policy makers on the feasibility of introducing a sustainable rice fortification programme to Sri Lanka.</li> <li>• The ‘Scaling up Nutrition through a Multi-Sector Approach’ WFP/FAO SDG-F project has rice fortification as one its three components.</li> <li>• There is a Rice fortification technical advisory group, convened by the MOH.</li> <li>• Draft inception report of low quality.</li> </ul>

## Annex L: Evaluating the Humanitarian Principles

### Humanitarian principles in WFP policies and strategies

1. WFP has committed to the provision of food aid, non-food assistance and technical assistance free of political and economic pressures through adherence to certain humanitarian principles.<sup>118</sup> These include the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence – set out in Box 12 below and further analysed in Box 14 below. Box 15 below details the additional ‘Foundations of Effective Humanitarian Action’ and ‘Standards of Accountability and Professionalism’ adopted by WFP in 2004.

#### Box 12 International Humanitarian Principles<sup>119</sup>

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	
<b>Humanity</b>	WFP will seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food assistance when appropriate. It will provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.
<b>Neutrality</b>	WFP will not take sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Food assistance will not be provided to active combatants.
<b>Impartiality</b>	WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children.
<b>Operational Independence</b>	WFP will provide assistance in a manner that is operationally independent of the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where such assistance is being provided.

2. The CPE period straddles two WFP Corporate Strategic Plans: 2008–2013 (WFP, 2008d) and 2014–2017 (WFP, 2013g). Both reflect a shift of WFP focus from food aid to food assistance delivering ‘hunger solutions’. Integral to the strategic plans are corporate policies that should guide the design of country operations. Relevant to this discussion is the Policy on Humanitarian Principles (WFP, 2004b). However, several other policies, a number of which are relatively new, also have direct humanitarian implications. Of particular relevance is the policy on Humanitarian Protection adopted in 2012 (WFP, 2012b), which is addressed in this annex in Box 16 below.

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<sup>118</sup> WFP Humanitarian Principles WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C (WFP, 2004b).

<sup>119</sup> As quoted in Annex I of the 2014–2017 Strategic Plan (WFP, 2013g), which notes "The humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality were endorsed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182, adopted in 1991. The fourth principle of independence was added in 2004 under Resolution 58/114."



## The legacy of Sri Lanka's civil war and the overall political context

### *Analyses and inquests*

3. In addressing the humanitarian principles, it is important to situate findings by reference to the historical context of the war and the experiences and perceptions of UN organisations and WFP more specifically. Two reports are of particular relevance:

- a) In 2009 WFP held a conference on its role in humanitarian conflict and complex emergencies (WFP, 2009e); one of the papers was a Sri Lanka case study by David Keen entitled "*Compromise or Capitulation: Report on WFP and the Humanitarian Crisis in Sri Lanka*" (Keen, 2009).
- b) Following the end of the conflict, the UN Secretary-General set up an Internal Review Panel (led by Charles Petrie) on United Nations Actions in Sri Lanka (UNSG, 2012). It was highly critical of UN performance and concluded (¶88) "The UN's failure to adequately respond to events like those that occurred in Sri Lanka should not happen again".

4. Keen's paper made only limited use of the terminology of the humanitarian principles. For example (in the context of weighing advocacy and delivery): "Collective concessions on important humanitarian principles may send a signal, both locally and internationally, that emboldens abusive actors to step up their manipulation of aid". However, the terms "impartiality", "humanity" and "operational independence" do not appear as such. "Neutrality" is mentioned in the context of anecdotal evidence that neutrality could be compromised by the UN "backing away from casualty figures". Nevertheless, his substantive discussion is tantamount to an assessment of WFP's adherence (or not) to the humanitarian principles.

5. His paper found that WFP "was seen as having reacted flexibly and with ingenuity in its logistical operations, including on the establishment of logistics hubs, the use of local purchase, the practice of sealing trucks, and the use of ships as an alternative to trucks. In many ways this represents a significant contribution in a context where many agencies were left as virtual bystanders". On the other hand, the Keen paper also raised issues potentially impinging on WFP's independence, impartiality and neutrality – questioning for example whether WFP's relationship with the Government was "too close for comfort". It was noted that "WFP's resources were extremely valuable to the Sri Lankan Government" and that its close relationship "carried important risks". Keen refers to the importance of "exerting early pressure *at an early stage*". Failure to do so, in this case by WFP, may have emboldened the Government. The paper further notes that "In general, WFP and other UN agencies need to be mindful of the dangers in giving the impression that key protection and relief gaps are being met when in reality they remain extremely grave" (a comment which foreshadows the Petrie report findings discussed below).

6. The Petrie report had a much higher profile, and its recommendations led directly the *Human Rights Up Front* initiative which applies to all UN agencies (OCHA, 2015). The report does not use the language of the humanitarian principles at all, but is replete with references to international humanitarian law and to the UN's (protection and) humanitarian mandate. Its focus is on the UN agencies collectively, although it is clear that WFP had a central role in the logistics of humanitarian assistance during the war. It is worth quoting the Petrie findings at some length see Box 13 below – not to reopen the issues it discusses, but to illustrate what a serious failure to live up to the humanitarian principles may look like.

## Box 13 Illustrative findings from the Petrie Report

Relocation (withdrawal of UN presence in Vanni after Sept 2008): the reaction of the UN was a serious failure, it was never questioned that it was the government forces themselves which were the dominant threat to staff and no criticism was raised when they withdrew their security assurances.

In 2011-2012 the UN launched a '**programme criticality**' framework to redefine its management of physical risk; *'Had these principles been in place at the time, the UN could have engaged the Government in a discussion on the continuation of critical operations in the Wanni, rather than limiting the choice to the presence, or not, of international staff.'*

Access: Adequate assistance hinged on knowing the numbers of people in the Wanni – government said 70,000, UN up to 350,000 but used a planning figure of 200,000. 'From September 2008 to May 2009 UN food assistance dropped from an estimated 20 per cent of requirements to almost zero'.

The UN repeatedly lobbied the GoSL and the LTTE for greater access and freedom of movement, but they did not directly confront the government with the fact that 'obstructing assistance was counter to its responsibilities under international law'.

HR and humanitarian law: *Protection defined too broadly and was understood to include a wide range of humanitarian actions.* Use of the term 'political issues' to encompass everything related to the root cause of the conflict; 'Issues appear to have been defined as political not because they had a political aspect but rather because UN action to address them would have provoked criticism from the Government.'

'The UN, in headquarters and in Sri Lanka, did not appear to fully recognize the scope of its responsibility to respond to Government violations and did not realize until very late that its protection actions were largely empty.'

Delay in establishing an adequate monitoring system to collect information on killings. UN largely avoided mentioning government involvement in the atrocities though repeatedly condemned the LTTE for serious international human rights law violations. The UN's statements were greatly weakened by not identifying the GoSL as the perpetrator of individual attacks; 'Throughout the final stages of the conflict, the UN issued just one public statement, through OHCHR, which said that both the Government and the LTTE were reported to be killing civilians and committing crimes. Most senior UN officials opposed the statement's publication, and the Government used dissenting opinions by senior UN staff to discredit the statement, diluting its potential preventive impact.'

'Throughout the final stages, the UN issued many public statements and reports accusing the LTTE of committing human rights and international humanitarian law violations, and mentioning thousands of civilians killed. But, with the above exception, the UN almost completely omitted to explicitly mention Government responsibility for violations of international law. UN officials said they did not want to prejudice humanitarian access by criticizing the Government – and maintained this position even when access within the Wanni was almost non-existent.'

A human rights operation was not established despite a series of UN Special Rapporteurs advocating between 2003–2007 for one.

The RC/UNCT: Insufficient political and conflict experience. Did not get adequate support management from UNHQ and guidance on key aspects (protection, international humanitarian law).

When the UNCT had firm evidence of civilian deaths by shelling, there was 'no established process into which this testimony could usefully be fed'. 'The Government generally

resisted efforts by the UN to establish staffing capacity to respond to the conflict's protection and humanitarian aspects.'

UN Member States (MS): Sri Lanka never formally considered by MS at the UN. UN agenda in Sri Lanka did not have the political will of its MS.

UN failure: Decisions at UNHQ and field level affected by an institutional culture of trade-offs; tendency to see options for action in terms of dilemmas frequently obscured the reality of UN responsibilities.

'There was a continued reluctance among UNCT institutions to stand up for the rights of the people they were mandated to assist. In Colombo, some senior staff did not perceive the prevention of killing of civilians as their responsibility – and agency and department heads at UNHQ were not instructing them otherwise.'

UNHQ engagement with MSs was heavily influenced by what it perceived the MSs wanted to hear. Security Council reluctant to be put a situation on its agenda which was not already the subject of a UN peace-keeping or political mandate. Overall UN action in Sri Lanka was not framed by MS political support.

Source: UNSG, 2012

7. Several things stand out from the Keen and Petrie reports:
  - a) Humanitarian dilemmas are hugely magnified by armed conflict; observing the humanitarian principles during peacetime is a very different proposition.
  - b) The failures identified by Petrie were collective – not simply the joint and several actions of UN agencies on the ground in Sri Lanka, but a lack of appropriate support from agency HQs.
  - c) In turn, the atmosphere in which the UN failed to confront the GoSL with its responsibilities under humanitarian law reflected the unwillingness of Member States to hold the GoSL (in contrast to the LTTE) to account.
8. The question for the UN agencies and Member States in the light of the Petrie report is whether they have put in place global systems that will prevent a repetition of the failures it identifies – a question which is far beyond the scope of an evaluation of one UN agency's portfolio in peacetime in one country.

*Post-war context – humanitarian legacy and relationships between GoSL and international agencies*

9. The tensions arising from the conflict, highlighted by both Petrie and Keen, had abated by the beginning of the period covered by the CPE. Counteracting this to some extent was the tense relationship for much of the period 2011–2015, between, on the one hand, UN organisations and the international and NGO community, and on the other, the Government of President Rajapaksa. As confirmed by several interviewees, this toxic relationship impeded actions by some international NGOs, increased pressure on UN organisations and also acted to dampen the international community's enthusiasm for providing donor funding.
10. The January 2015 elections brought about an unexpected change in leadership with the unseating of President Rajapaksa. The new leader, President Sirisena, and the new Prime Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, reconfirmed following parliamentary elections in August 2015, have heralded many changes, promised a more open and transparent Government and re-established stronger relationships with the international community. A notable consequence of the change of Government was

the hastening of the pace of resettlement through release of previously government-occupied land and, generally, a greater commitment to reconciliation.

11. While acknowledging progress towards post-war reconciliation, there remain risks that tensions within the country between the Tamil and Sinhala communities could be stoked by the pending enquiry into human rights violations during the war and by "13<sup>th</sup> Amendment" proposals to devolve greater powers to the north and east. The present Coalition Government also presents risks, since even within the ranks of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (a Coalition member and the party of the current, as well as former, President) there exist deep rifts with a sizable faction supporting the defeated former President.

12. The evaluation period was thus strongly influenced by its legacy. This is especially so given that the humanitarian response during the period covered by this evaluation related mainly to those impacted by the war – IDPs, returnees and others directly affected by the conflict being the main intended beneficiaries of two PRROs with combined resources of around USD 77 million (and representing the bulk of the funds deployed by WFP in this period).

13. The evaluation period was also characterised by natural disasters in the form of floods and drought which had a recurrent bearing on the humanitarian response required of WFP. WFP responded to the floods in 2011/2012 through an IR-EMOP followed by a substantially larger regular EMOP, and to the floods in 2014 through an IR-EMOP in 2015. It responded to drought in 2014 by adapting the PRRO (see Box 4 in the main text of this report).

14. Finally, as regards context, it is important to recognize the economic growth that the country has achieved. The per capita GNI has advanced from USD 2,430 in 2010 to USD 3,800 by 2015.<sup>120</sup> Within this context, there is a greater expectation that the Government can finance its humanitarian operations and a greater reluctance by international donors to do so, including the funding of WFP.

### **Challenges in evaluating humanitarian principles, how we went about it**

15. The TOR (o) make specific reference to assessing the consistency of WFP's portfolio with the humanitarian principles to which WFP and other UN agencies are committed. The concepts underlying humanitarian principles are complex, open to diverse interpretation (e.g. as regards meaning, hierarchy and overlaps) and influenced by the country context (as discussed above). Assessing the observance of humanitarian principles is therefore complex and subjective. It could support a full evaluation on its own and cannot be comprehensively addressed here especially given the constraints of time. Consequently, the CPE has sought to be proportionate in its approach.

16. Furthermore, an evaluation of humanitarian principles is reliant on accessing sufficient people with first-hand experience of WFP's activities over 2011–2015 including intended beneficiaries. Given the passage of time this has proven difficult since many international and domestic actors were no longer accessible. In these circumstances a comprehensive evaluation is not possible and findings must be considered in this light.

17. The OEV-led joint agency review on "Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation" (UNEG, 2016) found that "there is currently no common understanding

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<sup>120</sup> World Bank Atlas method.

within the sector, and sometimes within agencies, of the Humanitarian Principles, in terms of concepts and implementation". It concludes that good practice in evaluation of humanitarian principles is rare and clear guidance for evaluators is lacking.

18. Against this background, the evaluation approach involved:

- a) Understanding the dynamic and changing political and economic context within Sri Lanka (as described in the previous section) and consequent impact on WFP financing;
- b) Review of written documents, in particular those relating to the main PRRO and EMOP programmes operated during the evaluation period, and understanding the respective humanitarian focus of these;
- c) Conversations with *available* WFP staff and external stakeholders, including from NGOs, international organisations and donors;<sup>121</sup> and
- d) Discussions with groups of beneficiaries to the extent accessible during the country visit.

19. Drawing on these sources, we comment below on each of the core principles and also the underlying principles that formed part of WFP's commitments. A strong caveat, in the light of the discussion in ¶3–8 above, is that a limited one-agency portfolio evaluation is not capable of assessing whether WFP (and others) have in place management systems that are robust enough to ensure adherence to the humanitarian principles in the event of a resurgence of conflict.

## **Findings**

20. Box 14 below addresses the core humanitarian principles, identifying intrinsic issues, any potential conflicts amongst them and findings relating to the application of the principles within the post-war Sri Lankan context. Box 15 below provides a similar commentary on the 'Foundations of Effective Humanitarian Action' and 'Standards of Accountability and Professionalism' which are part of the WFP Humanitarian Principles policy, while Box 16 below provides similar commentary on the humanitarian protection policy.

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<sup>121</sup> Conversations were conducted in confidence and so cannot be directly quoted.

**Box 14      Commentary on the International Humanitarian Principles**

<p><b>CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES</b></p>	<p><b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)</p>	<p><b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)</p>
<p><b>Humanity</b></p> <p>WFP will seek to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it is found and respond with food assistance when appropriate. It will provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity.</p>	<p>This principle, in seeking to address human suffering “wherever it is found”, sets a high bar. In reality food assistance will be constrained by available finances, requiring a prioritisation even amongst those in need.</p>	<p>WFP’s main interventions (in monetary terms) were through two PRROs, 200143 and 200542. Noting that ‘14% of the population are living in poverty, of whom more than half are in the north’, the PRROs focused on five districts that comprise the conflict impacted Northern Province.<sup>122</sup> The main objectives of the PRROs were to reduce hunger, support early recovery, rebuild livelihoods and stabilise or reduce the prevalence of moderate acute malnutrition.</p> <p>The PRROs also progressively moved from GFD to interventions such as FFA and FFT and through this helped rebuild livelihoods and dignity.</p> <p>WFP responded rapidly, through EMOPs, to provide immediate food relief following devastating floods of 2010/11 and 2014, in each case impacting over 1m people.</p> <p>However, partly as a consequence of limited finances, WFP may not have addressed suffering “wherever it is found”, including:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Funding to former IDPs and recent resettlers being curtailed prior to the establishment of sustainable livelihoods (note the ‘Self-reliance’ principle);</li> <li>2. Assistance not being more widely extended to districts beyond the Northern Province, which reported very poor nutrition indicators, despite government requests.</li> </ol>
<p><b>Neutrality</b></p> <p>WFP will not take sides in a conflict and will not engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. Food assistance will not be provided to active combatants.</p>	<p>The demands and potential tensions of this principle are greater in periods of conflict. A potential tension arises if donors and the Government of the land have different priorities with WFP caught in the middle.</p>	<p>There was arguably less applicability of this principle in the evaluation period due to the cessation of war. In identifying beneficiaries WFP adopted neutral and objective criteria. Neutrality was also preserved through working closely with provincial and district authorities and not simply through central Government.</p>

<sup>122</sup> However, during implementation there was some extension to other districts, to address emergency needs, and latterly to respond to IDP needs in Eastern Province.

<b>CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Impartiality</b></p> <p>WFP's assistance will be guided solely by need and will not discriminate in terms of ethnic origin, nationality, political opinion, gender, race or religion. In a country, assistance will be targeted to those most at risk, following a sound assessment that considers the different needs and vulnerabilities of women, men and children.</p>	<p>This principle both overlaps with and complements those of neutrality and humanity.</p>	<p>WFP support was explicitly ‘targeted to those most at risk’ (200143) and would ‘provide food and nutrition assistance to the most vulnerable’ (200452). Assistance was focused on IDPs and those most recently settled, particularly on vulnerable groups within the IDP population. Stating that ‘maternal and child under-nutrition is a major concern’, it included a maternal and child health and nutrition programme, and a school meal programme.</p> <p>In 2012, PRRO 200452 found that ‘socio economic indicators in the Northern Province are among the worst in the country’, and ‘global acute malnutrition in the Northern Province well above emergency levels’. 40% of sampled households were severely or moderately food insecure. 60% of households in Jaffna district did not have access to safe water and sanitation. These assessments shaped the focus of the operations.</p> <p>Through EMOPs, those affected by natural disasters were addressed. In the event of funding constraints vulnerabilities were considered when identifying beneficiaries. In this way WFP’s assistance was directed to those most in need.</p> <p>One possible exception (also referred to above under Humanity) however related to districts outside of the Northern Province, which based on the ‘National Nutrition and Micronutrient’ survey of 2012 (UNICEF &amp; GoSL, 2012) showed high malnutrition vulnerability. Coverage of these districts was requested by the Government but only belatedly addressed in the 2016/17 Country Programme. This decision may have been influenced by the extent of available funds and the preferences of those supplying these funds.</p>

CORE HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES	Intrinsic Issues (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	Application in Sri Lanka (how well has this been reflected – or not– in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Operational Independence</b><sup>123</sup></p> <p>WFP will provide assistance in a manner that is operationally independent of the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where such assistance is being provided.</p>	<p>This principle seeks to ensure that there is no bias or interference in the provision of assistance. The wording of this principle appears to be based on a presumption that political/economic forces will not display goodwill towards those being assisted. This particular principle may be more relevant during times of conflict rather than recovery and peace building. Arguably, strict operational independence may also run counter to principles of coordination (alignment, harmonisation and sustainability) and participation.</p>	<p>Under the 1968 agreement, GoSL has “primary responsibility for execution of development projects and emergency operations”. This immediately calls to question whether strict “operational independence” is possible in the Sri Lankan context. Some interviewees also described the relationship between the GoSL and UN organisations generally (though not specifically WFP) as “toxic” up until the change of Government. However, the Basic Agreement is supplemented by Letters of Understanding (LOUs) for each operation: the LoU for the 2011 PRRO stipulated:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Commodities provided by WFP will be distributed free of charge, without discrimination, and in complete impartiality, regardless of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or gender without linking assistance either directly or indirectly to any religious or political persuasion. (WFP &amp; GoSL, 2011)</p> <p>Moreover, WFP has, working in concert with provincial and district authorities and through independent monitoring, ensured that independence in provision of assistance was not compromised.</p> <p>In addition through a Special Operation 105390, which dates back to 2006, but extended in to 2011, WFP bolstered its “emergency preparedness capabilities to enable WFP to continue its regular activities and increase its capacity to operate within constraints and meet new operational needs”. This too strengthened operational independence, by ensuring that WFP had a logistics fleet under its direct control during the final stages of the war.</p>

<sup>123</sup> Identified in the 2015 WFP ‘Compendium of Policies relating to the Strategic Plan’ as a core principle applicable to 2014–2017 Strategy. WFP/EB.2/2015/4-D.



**Box 15      Commentary on Associated Commitments**

<b>FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not – in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Respect<sup>124</sup></b></p> <p>WFP will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the state in which it is working. WFP will respect local customs and traditions, upholding internationally recognized human rights. WFP will act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and consistent with international humanitarian law and refugee law. WFP will also take into account the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, when applicable.</p>	<p>The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GP) were introduced in 1998, with a second edition in 2004 (OCHA 2004). They are not legally binding, but persuasively embed the principles of human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.</p> <p>There is an implicit tension between GP and the doctrine of national sovereignty, which persists even after the signing of the World Summit outcome in 2005 by more than 190 nations.</p>	<p>In November 2010 there were 50,000 IDPs in camps in Sri Lanka, reducing to 25,000 in January 2011, down to 6038 in February 2012. PRROs 200143 and 200452 targeted 371,000 and 325,000 beneficiaries respectively.</p> <p>WFP’s early objectives (200143) included ‘to ensure that remaining IDPs are adequately cared for until resettlement’. The later PRRO 200452, reflecting increased resettlement, aims ‘to rebuild livelihoods’.</p> <p>The G10 International Convention, Oslo 2008, outcome document ‘10 years of Guiding Principles’ (FMR, 2008) states that ‘IDPs often receive too little support for too short a period of time to allow them to re-establish their lives in safety and dignity’. Evidence from sites visited during the CPE field trip tended to support this contention, though the responsibility for any failings would be collective (donors, UN organisations, NGOs and Government) and not attributable to WFP alone.</p>

<sup>124</sup> Identified in the 2015 WFP ‘Compendium of Policies relating to the Strategic Plan’ as a core principle. WFP/EB.2/2015/4-D (WFP, 2015i).

<b>FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not – in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Self-reliance</b></p> <p>WFP will provide humanitarian assistance with the primary objective of saving lives, in ways that support livelihoods, reduce vulnerability to future food scarcities and support durable solutions. WFP will work to ensure that food aid does not undermine local agricultural production, marketing or coping strategies, or disturb normal migratory patterns or foster dependency. WFP's programmes will be planned and implemented in ways that facilitate the link from relief to development.</p>	<p>The 2008 G10 Oslo document '10 years of Guiding Principles' (FMR, 2008) states 'planning for durable solutions must start soon after displacement so as to facilitate the transition from humanitarian assistance to development'.</p>	<p>WFP PRROs, in their design, recognised the imperative to rebuild lives.</p> <p>PRRO 200143 objectives were 'to reduce hunger, support early recovery, rebuild livelihoods' with a focus on 'strengthening institutional systems and developing livelihoods at the community level to improve self-reliance'. The programme recognised that 'Sixty per cent of recently resettled households ...were involved in farming' (200143). Fishing also targeted.</p> <p>In seeking to rebuild, WFP assistance was aimed at 'increasing access to productive assets or skills through food for assets (FFA), 'soft' food for assets (SFFA) and food for training (FFT)'</p> <p>Through PRRO 200452, to build durable self-reliance, the FFA for Livelihood support and disaster risk reduction and preparedness programme targets an extensive list of community infrastructure assets – development of farmlands, improvement of farm access roads, rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation systems, improved access to markets and water. Disaster risk reduction projects include tree planting at tank catchments and irrigation channels, water harvesting structures, irrigation systems, flood protection and community food storage units.</p> <p>The evaluation team field visit highlighted some concerns about the level of self-reliance being created. In some cases, especially due to funding shortfalls, support to former IDPs was curtailed, arguably before livelihoods could be established. Further, in a trade-off between effectiveness and maximum support to local producers, food aid often contained donated food such as canned fish from Japan.</p> <p>Again, WFP faces a dilemma that spreading resources thinly, so as to assist everyone in need, may run counter to achieving durable solutions for those assisted. It is notable that the CP 2016–2017 envisages: "Targeted communities will receive assistance for the duration of CP 200866 to maximize its benefits. This approach differs from previous food-for-work activities characterized by short-term assistance over a wide area." (WFP, 2015k)</p>

<b>FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not – in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Participation</b></p> <p>WFP will involve women and men beneficiaries wherever possible in all activities and will work closely with governments at the national and local levels to plan and implement assistance.</p>		<p>WFP prides itself on its engagement with stakeholders. As discussed in the main report, it has made consistent efforts to engage with female as well as male beneficiaries. In planning its operations, needs assessments prepared in conjunctions with Government, research institutes (e.g. HARTI) and other stakeholders, play a key role in targeting assistance.<sup>125</sup> Interactions with Government have also extended to local authorities, community groups and NGOs. This is well reflected in the key project documents.</p> <p>It is recognised that for part of this period, the overall relationship between the UN and the GoSL was tense. This will have created an additional hurdle for WFP.</p>
<p><b>Capacity-building</b></p> <p>Within its own capacity and resources, WFP will strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for and respond to humanitarian crises. WFP will ensure participation by women’s organizations and will integrate a gender perspective in capacity-building activities.</p>	<p>This principle again is broad, encompassing many aspects of what WFP does.</p>	<p>WFP on several fronts engaged in capacity building:</p> <p>The nature of its agreement with the Government is such that it effectively works with Government structures in partnership in order to deliver services.</p> <p>Further, its key programmes, through FFA, FFT etc. have had a focus on livelihood and capacity building, and addressing the needs of women and girls. For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PRRO 200143 – ‘WFP’s integrated approach will ensure the protection of women and girls, their equal access to livelihood support, and the full participation of women in decision making processes’. PRRO 200143 quotes 18% of households in resettled communities to be headed by women.</li> <li>• PRRO 200542 refers to the 2011 World Bank and MoH nutrition programme for infant and young children established through a network of mothers’ groups. WFP ‘has supported developing the project and lessons learned will be integrated into programmes to address acute malnutrition.’</li> <li>• The PRRO also refers explicitly to its objective to ‘strengthen national capacities to address acute malnutrition, food insecurity and contribute to disaster preparedness and response capacity.’</li> </ul>

<sup>125</sup> See Annex K for an overview of such work in Sri Lanka.

<b>FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not – in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<p><b>Coordination</b></p> <p>WFP will provide assistance with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by the affected country..... WFP may also provide emergency food aid and associated non-food items and logistics support at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. WFP will work within established United Nations coordination structures at the global and field levels. This will include working with other humanitarian actors such as NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.</p>	<p>During emergencies WFP operates through the humanitarian cluster system.</p>	<p>WFP has been working with GoSL for many years and sees its role as ‘a major early response partner to the government.’ The two PRROs were a response to a continuing need for support by GoSL in post crisis mode. The humanitarian clusters continued to operate for several years after the end of the war, and the UN Resident Coordinator in Sri Lanka maintains a strong role in coordination.</p> <p>The PRRO 200143 says: “The United Nations cluster system supports the Government’s relief and recovery work towards rebuilding the livelihoods of IDPs and returnees. WFP has signed Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations Office for Project Services, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme. These provide the basis for greater integration and coordination of assistance..”</p> <p>The later PRRO 200452 notes: “The United Nations cluster system, of which WFP is a member, has supported government efforts in addressing needs during the conflict, post conflict and recovery phases.”</p> <p>What is not so clear is the extent to which WFP and other UN organisations have used joint processes such as UNDAF to plan, budget and coordinate in an effective manner. It would be expected that as all UN organisations feel resourcing pressures that the need for such coordination will become more apparent.</p>

<b>FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE HUMANITARIAN ACTION</b>	<b>Intrinsic Issues</b> (what the principle implies, possible tensions with other principles, etc.)	<b>Application in Sri Lanka</b> (how well has this been reflected – or not – in the Sri Lanka portfolio?)
<b>STANDARDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM</b>		
<b>Accountability</b> WFP will keep donors, host country governments, beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders informed of its activities and their impact through regular reporting.	This principle is far reaching and may also challenge what is practical. However, efforts to demonstrate the results of WFP interventions have been an increasing concern for WFP in recent years.	Not all interviewees felt WFP had done a good job of publicising itself. Further, many beneficiaries did not seem to comprehend the constraints to provision of food aid, and in many cases were still hoping for resumption of assistance. Greater clarity for beneficiaries, especially for those reliant on aid until livelihoods are re-established, is important.  The logical framework attached to CP 200866 (2016-2017) includes "Protection and accountability to affected populations" as a cross-cutting result (WFP, 2015k, Annex II).
<b>Professionalism</b> WFP will maintain the highest standards of professionalism and integrity among its international and national staff to ensure that its programmes are carried out efficiently, effectively, ethically and safely. All staff will adhere to the <i>Standard Code of Conduct for the International Civil Service</i> and the <i>Secretary-General's Bulletin on Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crises and Other Operations</i> .	In monitoring "professionalism" it is in principle much more straightforward to identify flagrant breaches of behavioural codes than it is to assess the general professional quality of WFP's work.	No breaches of ethical codes were drawn to the attention of the evaluation team.  There have been many new demands on the professionalism of WFP staff. In the CPE period alone new or revised WFP policies for, amongst others, gender, resilience for food security, South-South Cooperation, Corporate Partnership, School Feeding, Safety Nets, humanitarian protection, humanitarian assistance, peace building emerged. It is unclear whether and how WFP staff are trained in these new policies and are able to absorb all the guidance proffered.

Source: WFP, 2004b

**Box 16      Commentary on the Humanitarian Protection Policy**

HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION POLICY	Intrinsic Issues	Application in Sri Lanka
<p>WFP approved its humanitarian protection policy in February 2012 (WFP, 2012b). The organisation does not have a mandate for protection. It has therefore adopted a practical working definition of protection regarding humanitarian assistance: ‘designing and carrying out food assistance activities that do not increase the protection risks faced by crisis affected populations.’ (update – WFP, 2014i )</p>	<p>The policy applies to six areas: (i) staff capacity development (ii) context and protection risk analysis; (iii) integration into programme design and implementation; (iv) incorporation into programme tools; (v) protection information management; and (vi) partnerships.</p>	<p>The PRROs were prepared in 2010 and 2012 respectively and cannot reasonably be held up fully for judgement against the then new policy. However, WFP had a previous awareness of protection as a principle, and through its cooperation with partners that do have a mandate for protection (UNICEF, UNHCR).<sup>126</sup> A three-day training workshop in protection was held in Sri Lanka in May 2010<sup>127</sup> (WFP, 2010d), and protection concerns clearly featured in the planning of the PRROs (for example a study on safe access to firewood and alternative energy sources in northern Sri Lanka– WFP, 2010f).</p> <p>PRRO 200143, dated November 2010, explicitly incorporates ‘a strong protection element to ensure that remaining IDPs are adequately cared for until resettlement.’ This was important since there were 50,000 IDPs in camps at that time.</p> <p>SPRs report on protection measures and have, since 2014, included a specific section on "Protection and accountability to affected populations"</p> <p>The update to the Board in 2014 (WFP, 2015i) identifies 30 country offices that have begun work to integrate protection into their programming and operations. It is notable that Sri Lanka is not amongst these although such work was ongoing, and protection was clearly a lively concern. For example, a PRC discussion in 2012 includes the following note:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Budget: The CO has submitted a revised budget, which has been reduced to a bare minimum. DSC was reduced further by cutting the number of international posts, thanks to well-trained competent national staff who can take on additional responsibilities. <i>Reducing even further DSC costs would lead to limiting further WFP’s presence in the north. This would compromise WFP’s protective role over communities in a province that is heavily militarised. Some donors refer to “protection by presence”.</i> (WFP, 2012m, emphasis added).</p> <p>During discussion in 2010 of the draft PRRO 200143, it had been mentioned that presence of international staff was regarded as an element of protection for national staff (WFP, 2010i).</p>

<sup>126</sup> An organisation-wide "protection project" was under way in 2008 (see WFP, 2008a).

<sup>127</sup> For more detail see Annex N ¶11.

## Conclusions

21. In the design of the main operations (principally the PRROs), humanitarian principles were, on the whole, well reflected. Programmes targeted vulnerable populations with impartial selection of beneficiaries. A majority of available funding in the period under evaluation, approximating USD 77m (or 90 percent of total funds), was targeted towards those most vulnerable following decades of displacement. Emergency responses addressed vulnerable populations following floods in 2010/11 and 2014.

22. It is understood that training sessions were undertaken for staff and other partners in humanitarian and protection issues. While interactions with staff and partners indicates that humanitarian principles are well grounded within the values of the organisation, it is not possible now to assess the extent to which they were fully understood or adhered to in past years, when WFP was a larger and more field-based organisation operating under very different circumstances.

23. While core principles have applicability at all times, sensitivity and potential tensions are less evident in the period covered by the CPE due to the end of the long period of conflict. This is particularly so for the principle of neutrality and also impartiality.

24. WFP in Sri Lanka has a long standing agreement with the GoSL whereby “primary responsibility for execution of development projects and emergency operations” rests with the Government. On the face of it, this runs counter to the principle of ‘Operational Independence’. However, especially in this post-conflict period (and by many accounts even during it), this arrangement appears to have functioned effectively. This was achieved through joint planning with Government institutions (central and local) and by reinforcing this with independent monitoring. The concerns expressed in the Keen report that were relevant during the conflict have not resurfaced during this evaluation.

25. As Sri Lanka’s economy trends towards Upper Middle Income status, access to donor resources will become progressively more difficult. This was already evident in 2015. In this situation, it will be harder for WFP to make a meaningful impact in fulfilling the Humanity principle by ‘alleviating human suffering wherever it is found’. Despite this, sizable proportions of the population still need to be lifted out of poverty. In its next strategy WFP would need to focus on sustainable solutions, advocacy and upstream policy guidance – i.e. helping to ensure that systems are in place which ensure that human need is not overlooked, even when it subsists in a middle income country.

26. Finally, we reiterate that this review has not attempted to assess whether WFP and other UN agencies have successfully addressed the systemic shortcomings identified by the report on United Nations Actions in Sri Lanka (UNSG, 2012).

## Annex M: WFP's Climate Change Interventions

WFP commenced one climate change project in Sri Lanka during the evaluation period. Because of start-up delays, its implementation does not fall within the 2011–2015 evaluation period. However, it is clear from interviews and documentary review that engagement with climate change issues is seen as an important dimension of any future country strategy. The evaluation team met with project implementers and visited both project sites during its field work in Sri Lanka. It therefore seemed useful to put on record the team's tentative observations.

A second climate-related project (mangroves) is included in the CP 2016–17; it is described in Box 17 at the end of this annex.

### *Background*

1. Climate change has been recognised as a major contributing factor to natural disasters in Sri Lanka at least since 1993, the year when Sri Lanka ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The country submitted its Initial National Communication (INC) in 2000 and its Second National Communication (SNC) in 2011. Because Sri Lanka is not considered a least-developed country by the United Nations, the Government did not prepare a National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). However, by 2015, Sri Lanka had implemented 11 climate change mitigation and management projects (worth about USD 34 million) through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) financing mechanism. Over time, WFP's various PRROs and EMOPs have recognised the role of climate change in the occurrence and management of natural disasters, and also how climate change can influence conflict-related disasters and the latter's mitigation and management measures.

2. Two of the five PRROs and EMOPs formulated in the 2011–2015 evaluation period make strong allusions to climate change. IR-EMOP 20039 (Jan 2011 – 2012), specifically pointed out climate change as a major contributing factor in both the increasing severity and frequency of flood- and drought-related disasters in Sri Lanka, and also a major complicating and constraining factor in developing and applying mitigation and management mechanisms for such disasters. IR-EMOP 20039 contains activities for the achievement of an output that is aimed at having disaster mitigation measures in place. PRRO 200452 (Jan 2013 – Dec 2015) points out the need to strengthen national capacities on early warning, food security and nutrition assessment to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. The PRRO alludes to a separate climate change project that has been developed for joint implementation by GoSL, UNDP and WFP, aiming to contribute to building stronger community level resilience to drought and floods.

### *The intended programme and its rationale*

3. Trust Fund 10022993 (Aug 2014 – Apr 2018, USD 7.9 million) “Addressing Climate Change Impacts on Marginalized Agricultural Communities Living in the Mahaweli River Basin of Sri Lanka” is the project referenced in PRRO 200452 above. It is based on the long-held recognition by GoSL, WFP and other partners of the role of climate change in perpetuating food insecurity and malnutrition that is associated with certain types of common natural disasters. In 2011, an informal situation analysis by WFP CO suggested that severe weather changes may have aggravated conditions for farmers particularly in the Mahaweli catchment area. A Vulnerability Assessment that was undertaken in collaboration with Peradeniya University confirmed a link between deteriorating livelihood conditions in the Mahaweli Valley and climate change (Gunaratne, 2011). Encouraged by the possibility



of Trust Fund financing via the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund, it was decided to design a climate change project in the Mahaweli Valley.

4. The project emerged from the strong sense of awareness that has been created in the country about the serious impact of climate change factors on food security and nutrition in the country, and the way that these concerns have been expressed in national policy, strategy and planning and documents and statements, as well as in donor documents and statement like the UNDAF. The project's development has also definitely been a part of rigorous analytical framework that has been facilitated by GoSL, WFP CO and other partners.

5. Once the project is completed it is hoped that the experience and collaboration with the Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy (MERE) will lead to replication of the project in other areas and contribute to the overall adaptation of Sri Lanka to the ongoing climate change and its impacts.

6. The project is planned to be implemented in 3 districts and over 3 years. At the time of the CPE (mid-2016) WFP jointly with MERE was completing the first phase of the project, having held an inception workshop and developed an activity plan by district and year.

7. Beneficiaries: it is planned that the project will encompass 14,039 households and work through 235 farming organisations.

8. Targeting and key features: the main aim of the project is to develop and implement strategies for retaining more water in the Hill Country throughout the year, with target areas in Mahaweli River Basin areas in Polonnaruwa and Nuwara Eliya districts. Suggested strategies to do this include: development of individual participant and community and institutional capacities; development of concrete canals – to transport water downstream; ensuring availability of water for minor farmers / producers; empowerment of women; training farmers and other stakeholders in water retaining activities; and training farmers in enterprise and entrepreneurship development and crop diversification. Half of the project is devoted to infrastructure building – it aims to develop more than 30 small tanks in the area. The other half of the project is devoted to crop diversification, targeting high value crops such as mangoes, sweet peppers, etc.

9. Theory of Change: there is no explicit or implicit statement of a theory of change in the project document. Also neither do organisations like the Inter-government Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or WFP seem to present any explicit ToC on which to base projects that are meant to mitigate the effects of climate change. However, a core concept appears to be the need to influence people's behaviour in order to integrate climate change into their work and livelihood decision-making, so that they adopt appropriate and sustainable strategies, behaviours and actions to mitigate the effects of climate change. Such strategies may include:

- Encouraging: providing incentives and disincentives, such as FFA/FFW to induce climate change response among affected people.
- Enabling: providing the systems and skills to make it easier to take action.
- Exemplifying: demonstrating shared responsibility in climate change mitigation – show that other stakeholders are also acting.
- Engaging: getting people involved and working with others to co-produce integration strategies.

10. All these elements are visible in the WFP-supported project, and in WFP's overall approach to climate change mitigation in Sri Lanka.

### *Programme delivery and results*

11. The project proposal was submitted to the Adaptation Fund in December 2012, with WFP nominated as the multilateral entity for its implementation. The agreement was signed in Dec 2013 and became effective Aug 2014. However, implementation started only in January 2016 and hence lies outside of evaluation period (2011–2016). The delay in starting active implementation of the project was caused by a number of factors that included the considerable amount of time it took for GoSL and WFP to agree on implementation programme components, and the January 2015 elections and subsequent dissolution and reorganisation of Government. It was not possible to recruit staff during the election and post-election transition periods. Then once the political changes were finalised, the entire Ministry changed, in terms of its name, people and function. Moreover, the Ministry had its own upheavals and has had three changes of Minister over the past five years.

12. Implementation is taking place in two locations in Polonnaruwa and Nuwara Eliya Districts. Implementing partners working with the Ministry of Environment include District and Divisional Secretariats, the Department of Agrarian Services, NGOs, contracted companies, farmers' groups and others. During an inception phase that led into full commencement of activities, the Ministry of Environment and its partners prepared results frameworks in collaboration with the community and conducted awareness training and community sensitisation activities. Activities are divided into two categories:

- a) Under the Household Food Security and Livelihoods category, the following activities have been started: irrigation facilities development, water harvesting development, water application training. Other activities that are planned to commence soon include: livelihood support (such as milk cattle, poultry, goats, mushroom, organic vegetables, maize, cowpeas, home garden, bee keeping, etc.); small-scale industries / processing (such as rice mills, chilli mills, coir products; area mapping and agro-forestry).
- b) Under the Institution Capacity Building category, activities for the developing skills of Agrarian Service staff, provision of materials, and identification and mapping of hazardous areas have started and will be expanded.

### *Assessment*

13. Observations in field in July 2016, though tentative, provide some hints for future approach and action. In the Polonnaruwa project area, outstanding progress has been made in rebuilding, rehabilitating and improving the bund of the Pathukwewa Tank in Medigiriya Division. This is more or less the signature activity of the Climate Change project in this area. However, there were three important activities that were not considered or accounted for during the participatory planning process.

- One is the sluice gate for the tank which was not included in the plan and now needs to be allocated budget and other resources in order for the tank to be functional.
- The second is the imperative to remove the jabara plant (an invasive fresh water species of the water hyacinth) from the tank. Without getting rid of the plant the tank is very unlikely to fill up as the plant sucks up a lot of water. Also farmers would not be able to engage in other livelihood activities like fish-farming if the plant is in the tank. Farmers themselves have begun to manually remove the plant, but it is likely that the job cannot be completed without some combination of additional FFA allocations and/or mechanical plant removers.
- The third is the need to build a bridge to allow movement and access to major amenities (school, clinic, market, etc.) for 25 families that are cut off from the main village and area during the rainy season when there is a spill-over of the tank.

14. There are also socio-economic issues in the project area that beneficiaries say they need help with in order to be able to optimise the advantages of the Climate Change Project. One issue is that even with the rehabilitated water tank, low productivity and isolation are forcing people in the village to give up on farming, and yet at the same time other jobs are difficult to find. Another issue is that since people came back to the area in 2010, about 10 women have left the village to go and work abroad in the last 2 to 3 years; these women have left small children behind. The beneficiaries also expressed the concern that there was what they considered to be an epidemic of kidney disease patients in the area and that this needed to be addressed in line with project activities like tank rehabilitation. One woman beneficiary was even of the view that maybe tank rehabilitation was an inappropriate activity since there was general feeling that the outbreak of kidney disease may be related to the quality of the water the people were using for irrigation and for drinking.

15. At the Nuwara Eliya climate change site, work had started in January 2016 on rehabilitation of a 3km canal to irrigate 70 acres of paddy. This would enable the beneficiaries to more than double the rice yields. A more dependable source of water would significantly increase the Maha season yield, and the availability of water in the Yala season would ensure double-cropping of rice and increased production of vegetables. LKR 8 million has been allocated, and as of July 2016 LKR 2 million has been spent to construct 300 metres. The main concern of the beneficiaries in Nuwara Eliya was that there should be a more streamlined process for the release of funds to enable them to undertake construction at a faster rate.

16. In general, the most urgent concern of the beneficiaries, in both Polonnaruwa and Nuwara Eliya was there should be major improvements in the process of participatory planning and implementation. In particular, the beneficiaries would like to make planning and implementation more multi-sectoral (to address all major issues in the area at the same time), and more inclusive (give increased and appropriate weight to local issues and concerns as expressed by the beneficiaries). However, a corollary of their concerns is that the required costs for satisfactory implementation of the project may be substantially higher than what has been budgeted.

17. *Relevance:* there is a growing consensus that climate risks are among the key drivers of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition in Sri Lanka. This underpins the relevance of efforts to mitigate such risks. The improved water management and other innovations proposed under the project appear to be an appropriate mitigation strategy.

18. Concerning the relevance of WFP involvement: WFP has extensive experience in using, developing and translating climate information. WFP's emergency preparedness and support response team collaborates with research and modelling centres like HARTI and the Department of Meteorology to provide the latest immediate and seasonal weather hazard information to support government and humanitarian actors in deciding appropriate action. In addition, WFP's food security analysts can translate climate and weather information into early warnings of drought events and potential production shortfalls. Coupled with detailed analyses of household vulnerability, WFP and partners use this information to assess how droughts or floods will affect people's food security to ensure an early response. With climate change increasing the frequency and intensity of disasters such as floods and droughts, there is an urgency for WFP to support vulnerable areas, sectors and people access to basic climate and weather information, such as reliable forecasts, to properly manage the climate-related risks they face, and measures they could take to safeguard their livelihoods and food security. However, while WFP's potential upstream contribution to climate change analysis is clear, it is less obvious that WFP has a

comparative advantage in the technical design and management of specific projects such as this one.

19. *Effectiveness*: it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the interventions supported under this project. However, there are grounds for concern that the project design may not have included all the necessary components to achieve the desired effects from the engineering works undertaken.

20. *Efficiency*: as noted earlier, there were delays in getting the project started. There have been some teething problems in the areas of participatory identification of local issues to be addressed, as well as some delays in implementation related to the monetary disbursements. These are bound to affect the efficiency of project operations, and need to be addressed in a timely and expeditiously manner. WFP monitoring was planned in the expectation of more activities to review in the same area, and is therefore not yet as efficient as desired.

21. *Sustainability*: the sustainability of the specific interventions included under this project may be compromised if investment funds are too limited to allow full implementation of the required works. More generally, sustainable benefits from the project will also depend on successful learning from the collaboration between WFP and GoSL, so as to strengthen future climate responsiveness.

#### **Box 17 WFP support to Mangrove Conservation**

The CP 2016–2017 has taken WFP’s climate change mitigation activities further through support to a Small Fishers Federation (Sudeesa) project in the Northern Province entitled ‘*Community Resilience Building against climate change induced risk through Mangrove Conservation*’. The project is implemented by Sudeesa and supported jointly by WFP and Seacology (see <https://www.seacology.org/project/sri-lanka-mangrove-conservation-project/>).

During the war, many of the mangrove areas were destroyed or fell into disrepair through poor management and neglect. The mangroves are of ecological importance, providing habitats for a wide variety of wildlife, acting as a coastal carbon sink and offering protection from climatic shocks. Their destruction had an impact not only on livelihood activities, such as shrimp and crab fishing, but also on the long-term protection of the community against the effects of climate change (Sudeesa, n.d.).

The aim of the project is to support community mangrove conservation based on the premise that responsible management of the mangroves will provide economic and ecological benefits to the local community. The project is made up of a mangrove planting and irrigation programme as well as a women-only vocational training and micro-loan scheme to stimulate livelihood activities which do not negatively affect the mangroves. Activities include small retail outlets, the production of crab nets, fish nets and flower pots and training on home gardens and poultry rearing.

WFP provides financial assistance for these micro-loans. Only women who have completed the training course, which includes development of a business plan, can apply for the loan. The credit available increases after repayment, the amount varying from LKR 10,000 up to LKR 500,000 (approximately USD 3,500). As of mid-2016, the WFP-funded component of the project had provided training to 176 women and, in Mannar district, 15,100 mangroves had been planted.

## **Annex N: Evolution of Gender Analysis in the Portfolio**

### *Status of gender in Sri Lanka*

1. As highlighted in the main report, Sri Lanka paints a mixed picture in terms of gender equality. To a great extent the strides made in education and health reflect the gender parity enshrined in the GoSL's long-standing commitment to universal social protection and services. Gender equality is guaranteed under the 1978 constitution and the Government has ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), yet to an extent this is still to be incorporated into national legislation, and many laws and programmes do not contain special measures to ensure women's equal access and participation. Sri Lanka does not have a stand-alone gender policy but the Women's Charter of 1993 is often perceived as such (JICA, 2010). This was formed by the National Committee of Women and seeks to flesh out the CEDAW towards ensuring equity in all areas of life, including access to land and technology and stating that the government will support the work of NGOs and CSOs that help victims of gender-based violence (GoSL, 1993).
2. Despite this, stark inequalities persist in women's political empowerment and economic opportunities. Women are less likely to participate in labour markets than men, and make up just 34 percent of the employed population, a rate that has been declining over the past decade. Beyond social norms and cultural barriers, women also face challenges to gainful employment from legal deterrents that prevent them participating in night-time work or part-time work in the service sector, as well as unfavourable maternity laws and a persistent gender wage gap. Gender inequalities and segregation are particularly prevalent in the tea estates (World Bank, 2015). Economic migration has also steadily grown, with 118,000 women leaving Sri Lanka to work overseas in 2013, 40 percent of the total outflow (GoSL, 2013e). The majority of women are employed as housemaids in Middle East countries; most also leave children behind and are likely to come from low-income families which has an impact on childcare practices (GoSL, 2013f).
3. The 2015 Global Gender Gap Index report found Sri Lanka to be one of only five countries<sup>128</sup> whose gender gap has widened over the last 10 years by more than 1 percent, falling from a rank of 12 in 2008 to 84 in 2015, out of 135 countries. Furthermore, since 2006 Sri Lanka is the region's least improved country and on the political empowerment sub-index, it is the least improved country in the world (World Economic Forum, 2015).
4. Inequalities are emphasised differently across regions, with the Northern and Eastern provinces, Moneragala district and the plantation areas reporting the highest mortality rates for women. Nearly three decades of violent conflict had a greater negative impact on women, with women and children making up 80 percent of those displaced and with 90,000 women widowed (UNFPA, 2015). Women face complex, multi-faceted vulnerabilities that have intractably deepened in the post-war period, not least due to forced displacement, destruction of homes and livelihoods, a breakdown of community support structures, a rise in gender-based violence and psychosocial trauma.
5. Women and children also face a greater risk of food insecurity and low nutritional status than men. In 2016, the government-led nutrition and micronutrient survey in PLW found that anaemia affects 32 percent of pregnant women and 30 percent of households of pregnant women are food insecure, leaving them more vulnerable to iron deficiency, low-birth weight and stunting (Jayatissa, 2016). The majority of Sri Lanka's growing elderly

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<sup>128</sup> The countries that have widened their gender gaps over the past 10 years are; Sri Lanka, Jordan, Mali, the Slovak Republic and Croatia.

population are women who are particularly vulnerable, with inadequate access to health care services (AsDB & GIZ, 2015).

#### *WFP's corporate approach to gender*

6. WFP's 2009 Gender Policy (WFP, 2009c) was in force for the majority of the evaluation review period. This policy sought to mainstream gender into WFP operations through the 2010–2011 Gender Policy Corporate Action Plan (WFP, 2009j) which specified commitment to gender across four dimensions: capacity development, accountability, partnerships, advocacy and research, and operational mainstreaming. While the Gender Policy of 2009 attempted to denote a shift from “commitments to women” to a more comprehensive understanding of gender with an examination of the interacting roles of both men and women, the subsequent Gender Policy Evaluation (WFP, 2014y) found that it failed to develop a clear comprehensive and shared understanding of what gender means within WFP. It found that gender integration in WFP programmes had largely been a bottom-up, country-led process, rather than one influenced by a clear organisation-wide vision. While it found evidence of progress in identifying gender-based needs and priorities in many programme areas, including nutrition, it noted less evidence of WFP contributing to transformative changes in gender relations. Although it found some good examples of gender-sensitive programming, it also found that capacity development of WFP staff in gender had been inadequate and there was no shared definition of what gender means for WFP; there was still a strong focus on enhancing women's engagement in programmes or specifically targeting women, so that while it found strong evidence of increased inclusion of women and girls, this “results mainly from a vulnerability rather than a gender lens”.

7. WFP's latest Gender Policy 2015–2020 (WFP, 2015c) was adopted towards the end of the review period. The new policy addresses previous weaknesses by reinforcing a gender, rather than women-focused, approach to establish four objectives: adapt food assistance to the different needs of men and women, pursue equal participation, empower women and girls in decision-making regarding their food security and nutrition, and ensure the protection of men and women.

8. Both WFP's Strategic Plans, 2008–2013 (WFP, 2008d) and 2014–2017 (WFP, 2013g), also include clear commitments to gender equality. At regional level, an Asia-Pacific Gender Implementation Strategy (WFP, 2016l) has been developed (just outside the evaluation period) which outlines the regional strategy to operationalise the new gender policy within the specificities of the Asia-Pacific context. Gender is also one of four pillars in the Sri Lanka UNDAF 2013–2017 under the overall goal of “sustainable and inclusive economic growth with equitable access to quality social services, strengthened human capabilities and reconciliation for lasting peace” (UN & GoSL, 2012).

#### *Evolution of WFP Sri Lanka's approach to gender*

9. This CPE takes note of the changing (and strengthening) corporate approach to gender over the review period. It is clear (a) that WFP's approach to gender was evolving during the 2011–2015 evaluation period, and (b) that the gender policy in effect for most of the period had significant deficiencies. As noted in the Inception Report, ‘unless Sri Lanka is exceptional amongst WFP programmes, the evaluation can expect to find gender weakly articulated in the programmes under review’ (Lister *et al.*, 2016).

10. The evolving approach at corporate level is certainly reflected in the CO's approach to the portfolio under review. In terms of a strategic approach to gender, there is little developed over the period. The draft 2013–2017 country strategy (WFP, 2012c) has no mention of gender, though the draft 2014–2017 strategy (WFP, 2013i) raises WFP's


comparative advantage in linking food security and gender equality. This supposed strategic advantage is also raised in the project document for the PRRO 200452 (WFP, 2013h).

11. The regional implementation strategy highlights the difficulty in achieving gender parity in country office staff in the region, with Sri Lanka employing only 23 percent female staff. WFP CO staff have received training on gender though there was no evidence of an on-going commitment to gender sensitisation training. In 2010, WFP field staff and government counterparts received training on protection to address specific protection concerns arising from WFP's activities in Sri Lanka, and to raise awareness of the normative and ethical frameworks for protection (WFP, 2010d). The workshop addressed protection issues affecting WFP's beneficiaries after the conflict, and offered a space for frank discussion and reflection on WFP's approach to protection and its performance in upholding the humanitarian principles. Findings were turned into actionable recommendations, one being the need to incorporate beneficiary protection in M&E tools, for example the impact of WFP assistance on gender and on household power relations, and the need to increase staff and partner awareness of sexual exploitation and gender-based violence.

12. Beneficiary data (Figure 19 below) show that WFP managed a broadly balanced record of male-female participation in GFD and FFA activities. (One of the perceived benefits of the "soft FFA" approach – see Box 3 in the main text – was the greater accessibility of such work to women.)

13. Throughout project reporting there has been a consistent nod to gender with gender disaggregated Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM), but a more thoughtful gender-sensitive approach to programming has developed more slowly in the project documents. Table 24 below shows that WFP's post-distribution gender-specific data collection has increased, particularly of output data. The gender-specific outcome data collected under the first PRRO was limited to the ratio of girls to boys enrolled in WFP-assisted schools. More usefully, from 2014, diet diversity score data began to be collected under the PRRO for female- and male-headed houses. The later PRRO also demonstrates further gender-sensitive monitoring, reporting against cross-cutting strategic outcomes such as the proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions in management committees, and the proportion of women given equal decision-making control over household use of vouchers, food or cash. However, reporting was often inconsistent: for example, gender indicators were recorded only for 2012 in the development programme, and gender equality data indicators changed over the PRRO so progress cannot always be tracked. The patchiness of gender data reported in SPRs is illustrated by Table 25 below.

**Figure 19 Female beneficiaries in WFP activities**



Source: SPR data. It should be noted that 2015 GFD beneficiaries are predominantly made up from the EMOP, not the PRRO. Percentages shown are female beneficiaries.

**Table 24 Gender in post-distribution monitoring**

	Gender disaggregated beneficiary data	Gender equality indicators	Gender output data	Gender outcome data
DEV 106070	Yes	✓ ✓		
IR EMOP 200233	Yes			
PRRO 200143	Yes	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓	✓
EMOP 200239	Yes	✓ ✓ ✓		
PRRO 200452	Yes	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓	✓
IR-EMOP 200809	Yes			

Source: SPRs. ✓ equals number of indicators



**Table 25 Summary of SPR data on gender indicators**

Gender indicator	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
GFD issued in women's name	49%	45%	59%		
Women in leadership positions in food management committees	39%	51%			
Women receiving household food rations in GFD	56%				
Female food monitors		17%	18%		
Women collecting C&V		51%	59%	52%	53%
The project has activities to raise awareness of gender equality 1=Yes/0=No		1	0		
The project has initiatives to reduce risk of sexual and gender-based violence 1=Yes/0=No		0	0		
FFA % of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			60%	25%	
GFD % of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			26%	43%	
VAM % of female government/national partner staff receiving technical assistance and training			58%	51%	58%
Proportion of women exposed to nutrition messaging supported by WFP against proportion planned				86%	63%
Training on food distribution includes a solid explanation for gender sensitive provision of food 1=Yes/0=No			1		

Source: SPRs. Based on the assumption that EMOP200239 and the PRROs target distinct beneficiaries and do not overlap.

14. The project documents for CP 200866 (2016–2017) include gender contextual analysis and explicitly mention gender integration and alignment of WFP activities with the Gender Policy. An important component of the CP is further work around asset-creation; this includes support to mangrove planting and a women-only training and micro-finance scheme to create livelihood options outside of activities detrimental to the sustainability of the mangroves (see Box 17 in Annex M above). Preliminary drafts of the CP did not initially meet the HQ requirements in terms of demonstrating a transformative approach to gender. Specifically, greater clarity was needed about the impact of gender inequalities on food insecurity and nutrition, with a gender analysis required to accompany every activity under the portfolio (WFP, 2016m). To feed into this, a 2015 Sri Lanka Gender Assessment (Seneviratne & Gamage, 2016) was commissioned by the CO to ensure the CP was designed through a stronger gender lens. For an overview of the gender assessment and other analytical work undertaken by WFP over the review period, see Annex K.

15. Since 2012, WFP HQ introduced Gender Markers (GMs) which had to be applied to all project documents.<sup>129</sup> The GMs of the operations in this portfolio are summarised in Table 26 below (the majority were applied retrospectively). By nature of the operations, the MCHN development programme positively addressed gender issues. Various elements of the PRROs were designed with a gender-sensitive approach, manifested in the beneficiary feedback call centres, the commodity selection process for the cash voucher programme,

<sup>129</sup> Possible scores range from 0 – 2a. Project documents now have to score 2a in order to be approved. The markers are based on the UN system wide action plan (SWAP) indicators on gender which, since 2012, the entire UN system has agreed upon.

which consulted a higher proportion of women, the emphasis on ration cards being registered in women's names, and the aim to undertake activities within the vicinity of beneficiaries' residences so as to minimise the risk of gender-based violence.

**Table 26 Portfolio Operation Gender Markers**

Region	Country Office	Project Category	Project No	GM Code	year
OMB	Sri Lanka	EMOP	200990	2a	2016
OMB	Sri Lanka	CP	200866	2a	2015
ODB	Sri Lanka	PRRO	200452	1	2012
ODB	Sri Lanka	Country Strategy		0	Before 2012
ODB	Sri Lanka	DEV	106070	2	Before 2012
ODB	Sri Lanka	PRRO	200143	2	Before 2012
ODB	Sri Lanka	EMOP	200239	0	Before 2012

Source: GEN, HQ and Project Documents.

16. While falling just outside the evaluation period, the newly approved EMOP 200990, which was launched in response to the floods and landslides in May 2016, gives a good indication of the continuing evolution of WFP's approach to gender and speaks further to WFP's key role in filling the knowledge gap between food insecurity and gender inequalities. The EMOP has a gender marker of 2a and it goes further than any of the PDs under the evaluation period in explicitly addressing gender:

Gender considerations will remain at the core of the WFP response. During emergencies, food insecurity may expose women, adolescent girls and children to additional risk of gender based violence, and sexual exploitation and abuse as they explore avenues for survival. Women are also the primary caregivers in the households and are in charge of preparing food, as such, play a key role in improving the household's nutritional status. When food is scarce, and women are burdened with this responsibility to provide for their families and may undertake negative coping mechanisms. ...In accordance with WFP Gender Policy, the EMOP will use every possible opportunity to integrate gender equality and women's empowerment into activities, by ensuring equal participation in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of gender-sensitive interventions. Furthermore, where possible, WFP will advocate for the female member of the household to open a bank account in her name. Moreover, this intervention will afford WFP an opportunity to work with Samurdhi to further include gender consideration into their targeting and implementation in the longer term. (WFP, 2016g)

### Conclusion

17. The CPE's gender review suggests that the Sri Lanka portfolio, like many others, was rather weak in its gender analysis and monitoring prior to the adoption of the new WFP Gender Policy in 2015, although there were persistent efforts to take gender issues into account. The review mechanisms associated with the new Gender Policy have clearly had an effect on the standard of gender analysis in project documents, and the recent gender assessment will feed into the preparation of the forthcoming country strategy. It remains to be seen whether this will translate into more consistent gender monitoring and stronger programme performance in gender dimensions. The comparative advantages of WFP in understanding the linkages between gender inequalities and food insecurity are beginning to be understood and should be developed further. The quality of continuing gender training for WFP staff will be crucial, particularly given the ongoing and complex vulnerabilities faced by Sri Lankan women in the post-conflict context.

## Annex O: Cash-Based Transfers and Cost Analysis

### Introduction

1. WFP's portfolio in Sri Lanka has shown an increasing trend towards the use of cash-based transfers (CBTs), and the TOR specifically asked the evaluation team to investigate the cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness of CBTs in Sri Lanka. It was agreed during the inception phase that cost analysis would focus particularly on the "cash voucher" which was used in Jaffna from 2012–2014. However, the CPE also noted the salience of CBTs in other parts of the portfolio, and the scope of this annex therefore extends beyond the Jaffna pilot.

2. Consecutive sections of this annex: note the WFP policy and guidance on cash and vouchers (C&V) that was operational during the evaluation period; provide an overview of CBTs in the Sri Lanka portfolio; describe debate and experiments concerning the use of cash in school meals provision; describe the origins and operation of the Jaffna cash voucher pilot; review the cost analysis associated with the latter; and offer some overall conclusions.

### WFP policy and guidance on CBTs

3. Piloting of CBTs in Sri Lanka pre-dates formal guidelines from WFP HQ. One of the earliest CBTs for WFP was part of the 2005 tsunami response (Majewski et al, 2014, IFPRI, 2006). The first overall guidance on C&V was *Cash and Food Transfers: A Primer* (Gentilini, 2007), although this was qualified as reflecting the author's views, not official WFP opinion. The WFP Board approved a policy document *Vouchers and Cash Transfers as Food Assistance Instruments: Opportunities and Challenges* in October 2008 (WFP, 2008c). The first edition of the Cash and Vouchers Manual was dated December 2009 (WFP, 2009i). Also in 2009 the Evaluation Department published a synthesis of evaluation findings concerning WFP's use of C&V (*Top 10 Lessons*, WFP, 2009f).

4. A *Cash for Change* initiative was launched in November 2010 "to consolidate policy implementation efforts related to learning, leadership and coordination across WFP functions" (Majewski et al, 2014). In 2011 there was a concise Operations Department directive on cash and voucher programming (WFP, 2011f), which stated:

To appropriately integrate the new transfer modalities into WFP programme of work, Regional Directors, Country Directors and Programme Officers are encouraged to give full consideration to the possibility of using cash and vouchers as transfer modalities in all current and new programmes.

5. An update on implementation of the C&V policy in 2011 noted the need to strengthen assessments underpinning C&V usage:

*Ensure programming is based on assessments.* WFP should continue to invest in refining assessments and analyses to ensure that the use of food, cash transfers and vouchers is informed by credible and context-specific evidence. Assessments of needs, markets and delivery mechanisms are important factors for decision-making. The establishment of appropriate monitoring and evaluation systems and contingency plans is an integral part of WFP's evidence-based programming. Basing programming on assessments is crucial to ensure that the right tool is deployed at the right time in the right place. (WFP, 2011d, ¶26)

6. In 2011 an "Omega Value" tool for comparing cash and voucher proposals with in-kind alternatives was formally launched (WFP, 2011j), and its use was described as mandatory, in line with the 2011 Operations Directive cited above.<sup>130</sup> An updated, and considerably expanded, edition of the C&V manual was published in 2014 (WFP, 2014s); the first edition had provided little detailed guidance on cost analysis of C&V modalities, but the

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<sup>130</sup> See Ryckembusch et al., 2013 for an academic account of the Omega Value tool.

manual now included an extensive treatment of cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analysis linked to the Omega value tool.

7. Overall, it should be noted that innovations concerning CBTs in the Sri Lanka portfolio from 2011–2015 took place in a context where WFP guidance was still emerging and not necessarily well disseminated to the CO level.


8. Also in 2014 there was an evaluation of the C&V policy (Majewski et al, 2014) which, among other things, inferred the theory of change supporting the C&V policy and summarised the policy goal as follows: "The use of C&V allows WFP to respond more flexibly and appropriately to identified needs in context-specific situations". The policy evaluation also noted that "The lack of systematic cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness measurement undermines the credibility of the C&V business process concerning transfer modality selection, and places WFP at a disadvantage when analysing operational performance trends and making the case for donor support."

### CBTs in the Sri Lanka Portfolio

9. Over the review period CBTs (including vouchers) have been implemented in both PRROs, and the cash modality is built into the design of the 2016–2017 CP.<sup>131</sup> A cash voucher programme was piloted in Jaffna district for IDPs and returnees in 2012, and was continued in 2013–14. Cash assistance planned for 60,000 flood-affected victims in 2013 had to be cancelled due to funding shortfalls, but in 2014 CBTs were implemented in three districts affected by drought with increased field support from NGO partners, and received positive feedback (see Box 4 in the main text of this report). A cash modality was also trialled under WFP's school meal programme in late 2014 (and is reviewed below, ¶15ff). Annual expenditures on cash and vouchers 2012–2015 are shown in Figure 20 below. C&V were provided to considerably fewer beneficiaries than planned (Figure 21 below), and C&V beneficiaries were a small proportion of total PRRO beneficiaries (Figure 22 below).

10. The move towards the use of cash in Sri Lanka is in line with government programming; the well-established national poverty alleviation programme has provided cash grants since 2012 through the Samurdhi Bank network, and the government school meals programme, which operates in over 80 percent of all schools that receive a form of food assistance, is implemented through a cash payment (Medagama, 2015).

**Figure 20 WFP Sri Lanka Annual Expenditure on Cash and Vouchers 2012–2015 (USD)**




Source: PRRO SPRs.

Note: Vouchers were for the Jaffna pilot; cash was for drought-affected populations in three districts (see main text Box 4).


<sup>131</sup> Also a 2016 EMOP – see Box 21 below.

**Figure 21 Planned and actual C&V beneficiaries 2012–2015**



Source: PRRO SPRs.

**Figure 22 C&V beneficiaries and IDP/returnee beneficiaries as a proportion of total PRRO beneficiaries in 2012–2015**



Source: PRRO SPRs.

11. Links between WFP operations and government systems are further illustrated in the recent EMOP 200990 (WFP, 2016g), commencing mid-June 2016 – see Box 18 below.

**Box 18 Summary of CBT Approach in EMOP 200990 (2016)**

*Approach*

Assistance for 40,000 beneficiaries will be provided using the Government of Sri Lanka’s existing social safety nets system, Samurdhi. The transfer value equals to USD60 per month for an average four member household. The transfer value was determined on the basis of the current market price for an emergency food basket consisting of rice, lentils and oil. It will be provided on top of the regular Samurdhi monthly cash pay-out.

The Samurdhi is Sri Lanka’s largest social protection scheme. The Samurdhi programme is implemented by the Department of Divineguma Development. It currently provides monthly cash transfers ranging between LKR 1,500–3,500 (USD 10–25) to 1.5 million families throughout Sri Lanka. The Samurdhi programme targets the poorest households, with no source of regular income. The recent improvement in using a participatory household selection process for inclusion in the scheme and transparency on households benefiting from the scheme show that the programme has potential to reach the neediest households within disaster affected areas.

WFP will further screen and verify the Samurdhi beneficiary lists and partner with Handicap International to identify additional families who merit inclusion due to the impact of the disaster. Women will equally participate into the decision-making on the final targeting list.

The additional inclusion of vulnerable households will be done by the Samurdhi extension officers, based on the targeting criteria developed by Handicap International using the coping strategy index tool adapted to the context of Sri Lanka. For that purpose they would have to open a Samurdhi bank account, which can be opened by any citizen of Sri Lanka within, on average, a minimum of one day, and is free of charge.

#### *Rationale*

Cash assistance presents a low cost and flexible means of helping families get back on their feet and meet basic food needs for the poorest. Making use of an existing social safety net assistance transfer will circumvent the difficulties it takes to establish new and temporary transfer mechanisms through banks or mobile companies.

WFP has recently conducted a market assessment and as a follow-up to that analysis, consulted with food suppliers and vendors in the affected areas. The findings confirm that markets are functional and supply routes unaffected. Cash transfers received by affected households can be used to purchase necessary food items to meet basic nutrient requirements.

A further rationale for the provision of cash is that the direct cash transfer of a total of USD 1,800,000 translates into approximately 1,980 MT of food supplies. Had food been selected as the transfer modality, a minimum additional cost of USD 71,280 would have to be incurred to cover the distribution cost. This on top of the delay in implementation due to procurement and transport of food commodities. The government has agreed to disburse the cash at zero cost to WFP as well as the beneficiaries.

WFP will independently monitor the programme, through post-distribution monitoring such as beneficiary contact monitoring at banks, and any noted challenges will be discussed with the Government to enhance the Samurdhi social safety net system.

WFP plans to use the current intervention as a learning opportunity to test the viability of the approach and based on lessons learned engage with the Government to enhance the shock-responsiveness of the Samurdhi safety net system.

Source: EMOP 200990 project document (WFP, 2016f).

## **Use of Cash in School Feeding**

### *WFP involvement in school feeding*

12. During the evaluation period, WFP ran the school meals programme (SMP) in Northern Province (NP), while GoSL was responsible for school feeding in the rest of the country. The WFP and GoSL programmes run on very different bases. GoSL provides schools with funds which are used to procure the delivery of school meals by local providers; the schools do not procure food directly but rather procure a school meal service. The WFP-supported programme in NP operates on a more traditional basis, with most components of the meal (most recently comprising rice, pulses and vegetable oil, supplemented by canned fish) being procured centrally<sup>132</sup> and delivered periodically to schools, where School Development Societies (SDSs) arrange for volunteers or hired cooks to prepare and serve the meals on site. WFP inputs are complemented by a "greenery fund" from GoSL to enable the purchase of fresh vegetables.

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<sup>132</sup> Imported commodities procured by the CO and, upon arrival in Colombo, handed over to GoSL for onward distribution.

## Feasibility of aligning with GoSL cash-based system

13. As described in the main text of this report (¶116ff) successive WFP operations envisaged that the SMP in NP would be handed over to GoSL, but the handover has been continually deferred. The Government itself proposed (in a letter from the External Resources Department, 2 October 2013) that "The School Meal Programme (SMP) could also be merged together with the Mahinda Chintana School Feeding Programme which is being implemented by the Ministry of Educational Services." In response, WFP prepared a report "Alignment of WFP–SMP under Mahinda Chintana" (WFP, 2014aa). This focused on the practicalities of switching to a cash modality in the 241 schools in NP which had fewer than 75 students. A questionnaire found considerable support for such a change: 56 percent of respondents supported it, but many more said they would have been in favour if they had more confidence that cash transfers would arrive reliably and on time.

14. Figure 23 below shows the CO's assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a cash-based modality for school feeding. Figure 24 below shows the CO's thinking concerning vouchers or cash as the preferred alternative to an in-kind modality. It is notable that the discussion (especially in Figure 24) focuses narrowly on the benefits and risks as they directly affect the CO, not the wider costs and benefits to society.

**Figure 23 Pros and Cons of C&V in SMP (CO 2014)**

15. Pro & Cons of C&V in SMP			
Aspect	Pro	Con	Risk
Meal diversity	Consist of socially-acceptable foodstuffs that are familiar to children and their families. Local farmers could provide none treated products Could increase consumption	Highly dependent on food availability in the market and price	Inflation and price fluctuations could affect/escalate the overall running cost of the programme
Meal composition nutritionally	As menu's include more vegetables and greens. The menu's are richer in Calcium and Vitamin C	The use of non-fortified oil results in lack of Vitamin A and reduced availability of iron	Micro nutrient content of the menu's shows large variations depending on the vegetables used and will vary from district to district
Food availability at school level	Food at school very much depending on delivery and resupply from the markets	Normally food available for longer period 1 to 2 months if no pipeline breaks or transport issues	Ad hoc running of the programme and delay of meal preparation due to delay food commodity delivery to the schools
Administration	Due to perceived audit aspect of handling C&Vs, strongly governed by government financial regulations it is expected that the programme is implemented in a better manner	Perceived added workload	Due perceived added workload in accountability there is a high risk
Logistics	Smaller storage facilities required due to regular resupply	Transport cost from market to school will have to be covered by the school	In areas with lack of markets some commodities could
Side-effects	Due to increased demand for commodities from local market could increase availability for the village.  Increased opportunity to linked to the creation of local markets.  Additional income opportunities for small scale farmers/fishermen at better trade prices.	Due to increased demand for commodities from local market could increase local price. Price fluctuations and market disruptions could have serious effects on meal composition	Price fluctuations and could also have negative affects for local availability

Source: WFP, 2014aa

**Figure 24 Assessment of Cash vs. Voucher in SMP (CO 2014)**

<b>14. Cash or Voucher approach</b>	
Cash	Voucher
Higher Efficiency (only one payment to Gov. ministry required)	Higher administration to implement since vouchers need to be generated for each student per month.  Need for multiple actors (WFP-CO, MIN, WFP-AO/SP, DMU, ZDE, SDS) to implement.
Cost effectiveness (only reimburse for attendees)	FLA's required for each redemption point (MPCS, private trader, etc...)
Low risk since Gov. Financial Regulations are used once WFP transfer funds to Ministry	
Action can be taken faster to mitigate situations such as seasonal availability, market price volatility, changes in taxes, etc..	Remedial action can take longer

Source: WFP, 2014aa

*The school feeding cash pilot*

15. In November 2014 a cash transfer modality for the school meals programme in NP was piloted in about 600 schools with approximately 88,500 students. The pilot was funded by a Canadian grant that was due to expire in December 2014. To a certain extent, this timing posed a constraint on the lead-up time available. Launching of the pilot was delayed by difficulty in reaching agreement with GoSL on the level of resources to be offered. GoSL wanted to replicate the per capita funding level of its own school feeding programme, while WFP was concerned to maintain WFP minimum nutritional standards.<sup>133</sup> It was eventually agreed that, as under the in-kind programme, the Government would continue to provide a cash top-up for greenery while WFP continued to provide canned fish in kind. The education authorities also provided capacity building training to schools on how to conduct a cash-assisted school feeding programme. The WFP cash contribution amounted to LKR 24 per child per meal. This was lowered from an original proposed allocation of LKR 35 per child in order to align with the national government programme. The total budget was LKR 50,972,146.

<sup>133</sup> From PRRO 200452 BR4 (July 2014):

WFP has not been able to receive concurrence from the Government on the implementation modalities. The national cash transfer amount and approved menus are nutritionally 25% lower than WFP minimum standards for half-day primary SMPs in terms of calories, protein and Vitamin A. As the cash-based SMP component is designed to be based on the ongoing national cash transfers for school meals, WFP would not be providing the correct entitlement to primary school age children, thus violating the "do no harm" principle.



16. The pilot eventually took place between 3 November and 5 December 2014 (postponed from an original start date of 13 October) with a planned duration of 25 school days. During this period, schools were provided with cash (transferred through the Government) and purchased food from producers directly (including parents) and from local retailers. Procurement of commodities was undertaken by the teachers, the school development committees and societies (SDS/SDC) and by parents. The food was prepared at the schools (as per the in-kind school meals programme) by cooks, either paid or unpaid volunteers. The majority of schools had a dedicated teacher assigned to support the cash pilot.

17. An internal report was based on a survey undertaken in April and May 2015, sampling 130 schools that had participated in the pilot. It found that overall the cash-assisted school meals programme delivered greater food diversity than the in-kind equivalent. Key problems were the delay in payment to schools, with only 12 percent of schools receiving the total funds in advance of implementation, difficulty in adhering to the government set menu and insufficient budget per child. Coverage of visits to schools piloting the programme was also found to be weak, with 36 percent never visited by WFP or the government education authority. Those who had actually experienced a cash modality were much more positive about it (98 percent either satisfied or very satisfied) than those who had earlier simply been questioned in principle (WFP, 2015p).

## **The Jaffna Cash Voucher Pilot**

### *Preparations*

18. The Jaffna pilot was the subject of considerable advance planning. In 2011 a joint Government and WFP learning mission to the Philippines took place to observe the implementation of their cash-for-work (CFW) pilot (WFP, 2011h). Prior to this (in November 2010) WFP undertook a market assessment and trader survey (WFP, 2010b) of the Northern Province. In February 2011 there was a "Mission to review potential for introducing cash and/or voucher base programming into WFP operations in Sri Lanka". The key findings of this mission were:<sup>134</sup>

... that the basic market and other contextual preconditions exist for cash and/or voucher based programming in Sri Lanka. Although there are some programmatic and strategic advantages likely to result from voucher based programming, in terms of cost efficiency, under current market conditions, it would be some 18% more costly for WFP to deliver its food basket using cash and/or vouchers in place of in-kind food. ...

If WFP were to take a strategic approach to cash / voucher programming, as opposed to a short term project based approach, valuable opportunities could arise for WFP to engage in capacity building. This could lead to enhanced effectiveness in the longer term for the delivery of food assistance through established Government social welfare systems. The use of cash and vouchers could also link in to capacity building for emergency preparedness and response helping increase the possibilities for the Government and / or WFP to effectively use cash and vouchers as a first line response in future crisis situations. A strategic approach would not only enable WFP to more fully integrate its programmes within established Government systems, and strengthen Government capacity to target and deliver food assistance through its own systems, but also facilitate an eventual handover and exit strategy for WFP. (WFP, 2011i)

19. The pilot began under PRRO 200143 and continued under PRRO 200452. Successive project documents and revisions:

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<sup>134</sup> There was no discussion of whether the 18 percent cost-differential calculated might diminish as WFP gained experience with a new modality and spread its start-up costs over a longer period.

- PRRO 200143 project document included:

Under current conditions, in-kind food distribution is the most suitable instrument for meeting beneficiary needs. However, market conditions are constantly evolving, and following the results of a planned market survey, cash and voucher interventions may be considered as a delivery modality to support economic recovery in some areas.

- BR1 to PRRO 200143 (the one which extended it by a year) provided for:

*(iii) Introduction of voucher transfers:* Building upon the Government's experience with food stamps, the Government's nationwide safety-net programme, and a robust understanding of market conditions, WFP will initially pilot vouchers where Multipurpose Cooperative Societies (MPCS) exist, potentially introducing cash, or a mix of food, cash and vouchers where communities have had some previous experience with such activities and as WFP's capacity develops. WFP expects that this new transfer modality will contribute to increased food security through improved access to food, a more diverse food basket choice, as well as support for the local economy.

- PRRO 200452 project document:

**Transfer Modalities:** Findings of both a 2010 Trader Survey and 2012 Comprehensive Food Security Assessment (CFSA) show that food insecurity in the Northern Province is mostly determined by (economic) access issues – rather than food availability issues – and hence a market-based intervention appears feasible and appropriate. While markets are still recovering, an extensive network of MPCS outlets exists—to be used as voucher redemption points. Compared to private traders, MPCS offer lower sale prices for a given type and quality of food. Introduction of electronic vouchers, most likely through a smart card mechanism, could also be linked eventually to government safety nets as they move in that direction as well.

#### *Previous assistance to IDPs in Jaffna*

20. Prior to the cash voucher programme, WFP provided in-kind support to IDP and returnee populations through a range of activities dependent on the phase of resettlement. Returnees received an initial six-month food package based on a food basket containing cereal, dhal, oil, sugar and salt. This was followed by SFFA and then FFA, with the aim to (re)establish productive community assets and support livelihood creation.

21. Under the GFD programme, WFP-imported food was handed over to the Government at the port in Colombo. The Government handled the transportation, storage and distribution of food items. Food was distributed from the MPCS collection point on a monthly basis. As with all other WFP operations, monitoring took place jointly between WFP and the government District Monitoring Unit (DMU). Table 27 shows the costs borne by each actor.

**Table 27 GFD commodity chain costs**

Cost	WFP	GoSL	Beneficiary
International procurement of food items	✓		
Shipping	✓		
Superintendent quality check and certificate of safe arrival	✓		
Import duty		✓	
Transportation to Colombo warehouse		✓	
In-country transportation		✓	
Commodity tracking	✓		
District warehouse storage and warehouse management		✓	
Local distribution		✓	
Distribution monitoring	✓	✓	
Food collection			✓
Food storage			✓
Preparation of food items			✓
Post-distribution monitoring	✓	✓	

#### *Reasons for choosing Jaffna*

22. Whilst the conflict had severely weakened markets in Jaffna district, they quickly began to reappear in 2009. In Jaffna, unlike in Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi districts, this was partly due to the reduction in displacement towards the end of the war; whilst 64 percent of Jaffna traders were displaced between 1982 and 2010, only 3 percent were displaced in the final two years of conflict (WFP, 2010b). In particular this resulted in a quicker re-establishing of the MPCS commodity chains. Jaffna also had good availability of stock, in comparison with other northern districts, and strong seasonal availability of main commodities.

#### *Implementation of the Pilot*

23. The cash voucher programme began in Jaffna district in March 2012 and eventually continued there until September 2014. Due to insufficient funding, plans to roll out the programme in the four other northern districts were curtailed. Later in the programme, funding for the whole PRRO was squeezed, and the cash voucher programme was wound down in step with reductions in in-kind support to other districts. See Table 28 below for monthly numbers of beneficiaries.


**Table 28 Jaffna Cash Voucher Value (LKR) and Beneficiary Numbers**

Month	Voucher value /LKR	Beneficiaries
Mar-12	1,170	1,478
Apr-12	1,185	1,617
May-12	1,224	1,667
Jun-12	1,165	3,194
Jul-12	1,179	3,421
Aug-12	1,182	5,835
Sep-12	1,130	6,678
Oct-12	1,168	9,259
Nov-12	1,237	10,585
Dec-12	1,281	10,973
Jan-13	1,368	10,759
Feb-13	1,170	10,089
Mar-13	No transfer due to delay in IDP data from Govt	
Apr-13	1,170	5,926
May-13	1,246	6,043
Jun-13	1,370	6,037
Jul-13	1,328	6,100
Aug-13	1,327	3,986
Sep-13	1,155	3,760
Oct-13	1,454	3,264
Nov-13	1,407	2,566
Dec-13	1,533	1,599
Jan-14	1,485	1,856
Feb-14	1,453	693
Mar-14	1,649	637
Apr-14	1,575	604
May-14	1,454	598
Jun-14	1,407	671
Jul-14	1,407	554
Aug-14	1,458	582
Sep-14	1,466	317

Source: WFP CO Colombo (WFP, 2016c)

24. The pilot took place in the context of a steep decline in numbers of WFP-assisted IDPs and in the ratio of IDPs to other beneficiaries (see Figure 25 below).

**Figure 25 IDP beneficiaries and total beneficiaries 2011–2015**



Source: SPRs.

Note: No figure given for IDPs in 2015, though some IDP assistance was continuing.

### *Design of the "cash voucher" as implemented<sup>135</sup>*

25. The design features of the CBT that was adopted were as follows:

- a) CBT modality: a "cash voucher" modality was adopted. Beneficiaries were issued with a voucher with a designated cash value but which could only be redeemed for purchases of specified food items. But as long as they purchased items on the approved list, they were free to buy any items in any combination.<sup>136</sup>
- b) Eligible food basket: a basket of 24 items was chosen jointly by WFP and government, drawn from a list of 36 items that were chosen in consultation with the beneficiary communities. Communities requested milk powder but this was not allowed under government regulations designed to promote breast feeding. The food basket changed slightly, e.g. sugar was taken out of the original 2012 basket due to its lack of nutritional value, and eggs were added. Figure 26 below illustrates the basket.
- c) Voucher redemption: vouchers were redeemable at MPCs. These were the outlets involved in in-kind distribution; they had wide coverage; it was argued that their prices were slightly lower than those of private traders.<sup>137</sup> Each MPCs was required to display a large poster of the eligible food items and their agreed prices (Figure 26 below).

<sup>135</sup> The voucher scheme was no longer running at the time of the CPE; this description is based on interviews as well as the documentary record, but could not be independently verified by the evaluators.

<sup>136</sup> Beneficiaries may have been already familiar with this approach from the Samurdhi scheme; the preparatory mission noted that "The Government already uses the Samurdhi network to deliver food stamps (vouchers) where recipients can select a commodity mix from 8 essential food items" (WFP, 2014i). The CPE was informed that the Government schemes are now cash only.

<sup>137</sup> It was also suggested that beneficiaries preferred their voucher to be restricted to MPCs purchases, because MPCs do not give credit and so there was no question of the retailer seeking to recover debt when the voucher was redeemed.

Figure 26 Eligible food items – as displayed at MPCSS

COMMODITY	உணவுப் பொருட்கள்	UNIT/அளவு	PRICE /லிஸா
Big Onions	பெரிய வெங்காயம்	1kg	
Canned Fish	மீன் மீன்	1pc	
Coconut Oil	தேய்வாய் எண்ணெய்	1 L	
Dhal Red	கைஞ்சல் பருப்பு	1kg	
Green Gram-Pulses	பயறு	1kg	
Egg - Brown	முட்டை	1pc	
Potato	உருளைக்கிழங்கு	1kg	
Garlic	வெள்ளைப்பூண்டு	1kg	
Cowpea-Pulses	கொம்பி	1kg	
Kurakkan Flour	குதர்க்கள் மா	400g	
Chick Peas	கடலை	1kg	
Black Gram	உருந்தூ	1kg	
Coriander	கறிவேலி	1kg	
Rava	ரவை	1kg	
Red Rice	சிவப்பு அரிசி	1kg	
Vegetable Oil	மரக்கறி எண்ணெய்	1L	
Salt	உப்பு	1kg	
Soya Meat (TVP)	சோயா மீன்		
Sprats	செந்தலைக் கருவாறு	1kg	
Urad Dhal	உருந்தல் பருப்பு	1kg	
Red Rice (Raw)	சிவப்பு பச்சை அரிசி	1kg	
Wheat Flour	கொதுவை மா	1kg	
Red Chillies Dried	செந்தல் மிளகாய்	1kg	
Rice Flour (Red)	அரிசி மா (சிவப்பு)	1kg	

If you require assistance please call WFP cash voucher hotline 0213218853 during working days 9:30am to 3:30pm.


தலைவர் உணவுப் பொருட்கள் கிடைக்காத சமயங்களில் தலைவர் 0213218853 என்ற தொலைபேசி எண்ணில் தொடர்பு கொள்ளவும். உணவுப் பொருட்கள் கிடைக்காத சமயங்களில் 9:30 மணி முதல் 3:30 மணி வரை தொலைபேசி மூலம் உதவி பெறலாம்.

Note: actual posters were very large.

- d) Voucher cash value: each month there was a price negotiation process involving the district government and WFP, fixing the value of the voucher based on current market prices submitted by the MPCSSs and verified independently by WFP. Market prices were tracked and the value of the voucher was reviewed on a monthly basis. Table 28 above shows the monthly variations in the voucher's cash value. Typically, a discount of 3-5 percent (against market prices) was negotiated with the MPCSS. To check availability, the day before the new voucher cycle the government and WFP staff visited all the shops to check stocks. There were instances where certain products ran out but stocks were replenished within two days.
- e) Eligibility and registration of beneficiaries: Targeting was determined (on the same basis as the in-kind modality) by the date of return, household income, widowed households, and household assets/living conditions/livelihoods. Identification and registration was undertaken jointly with the government at village level (Grama Niladari). The beneficiary register was independently verified by WFP (a minimum 5 percent household sample).
- f) Voucher specification: Vouchers were personalised for each individual, including their name, ID number, family number, and family member number, address, the reference number of their local MCPS, and the period of redemption (as illustrated

in Figure 27 below). Each member of the family over 6 months got a voucher, all with the same value and access to the same basket. The vouchers for children under 15 were in the care of their parents.

**Figure 27 Specimen Voucher**



- g) Voucher logistics: WFP bore the cost of printing vouchers each month. The printing of the cash voucher was the responsibility of WFP Finance. The sealed vouchers were dispatched from Colombo, along with the distribution register and voucher redemption document, to the counterpart ministry and then on to the District Secretary, the Divisional Secretary and finally to the Grama Niladari for distribution. Figure 28 below shows the operational process of the voucher, from WFP to the beneficiary.
- h) Beneficiary feedback: A WFP hotline was established for beneficiaries and manned by an administrator in the Jaffna Sub-Office.<sup>138</sup> This quick feedback mechanism informed WFP of any problems, for example concerning availability of food items and price inaccuracies.
- i) Monitoring: When the voucher was redeemed, the identity of each beneficiary was verified by an identification register held at the MPCS. A copy of each transaction receipt was sent to WFP to protect beneficiaries against unfair sales and fraud. Once used, vouchers were returned to WFP finance to be retained for a period of six years. A weekly narrative report was prepared linked to an issue tracking system. The cash voucher distribution report process generally was found to be much quicker than with in-kind distribution.<sup>139</sup>
- j) Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) was done after the voucher cycle and could lead to adjustments for the next cycle (e.g. addressing concerns about long waiting times, not enough sales assistants, quality/quantity etc.). The call centre was also a feedback mechanism for beneficiaries which could lead to immediate action. CO staff


<sup>138</sup> Hotline number was included on the poster illustrated in Figure 26.

<sup>139</sup> The CPE was informed that distribution report for in-kind takes 6-9 months to get to WFP, while the voucher report took a week. It was in the interest of the MCPSs to process the documentation quickly in order to receive their payments.



acknowledged that the data from the PDM reports were not analysed fully; they had the tools in Colombo to do so, but there was high staff turnover at the time.

**Figure 28 Cash voucher programme cycle**



### Assessment

26. The Jaffna pilot developed by the CO was a very sophisticated approach to a 'cash voucher' programme, particularly given the apparent lack of corporate guidelines on cash based transfers in 2012. The design was able to build on WFP's pre-existing relationship with the MPCs network, and on Sri Lanka's national registration and ID system.

27. It was regarded as a success by the WFP staff involved, with the following advantages:

- Beneficiaries had access to a greater variety of food products. Under in-kind distribution, beneficiaries received four staple food products from WFP which had been imported and were not necessarily in line with their tastes/cultural traditions (e.g. preference for local red rice rather than imported long-grain white rice). The eligible voucher basket gave more choice as well as matching local preferences.
- In-kind distribution could be up to 2 months delayed resulting in families being given 2-month amount of stock – this posed storage problems, and often led families to sell rations for less than their nominal value. The voucher could be redeemed bit by bit and therefore solved the storage problem.
- Local traders also benefited from procurement of local products rather than imported items, with corresponding support to local farmers. The cash voucher also helped strengthen the MCPS network.



d) As already noted, the voucher allowed quicker verification and monitoring (of what was received by whom and when), and was therefore regarded as more secure than in-kind.

28. Cost comparisons between the voucher scheme and the in-kind alternative are considered in the next section.

29. It was originally intended to roll the cash voucher scheme out to the other four districts in NP, but there were never sufficient funds to do so. The evaluation team heard some references to using the other four districts as a control, but the team was not made aware of any studies or analysis which systematically compared the Jaffna cash voucher experience with the in-kind modality in other districts.

## **Cost-Efficiency and Cost-Effectiveness Calculations**

### *Historical use of cost analysis for the Jaffna cash voucher*

30. **The 2011 review mission** undertook an analysis to compare in-kind costs with potential cash/voucher costs. At the cost-efficiency level an alpha value<sup>140</sup> analysis was conducted, and described as follows:

The cost efficiency part of the overall cost effectiveness analysis compares the relative costs or value of the different transfers at the beneficiary level (in this case a transfer of WFP food compared with the value of the transfer of cash or vouchers needed to purchase the equivalent ration at local market prices). It is assumed that the overheads in terms of general support costs are equal for food, cash, or vouchers. Any costs incurred in the actual delivery of a cash or voucher transfer to the beneficiary are excluded from this calculation slightly biasing the calculation in favour of cash and vouchers. Nevertheless, this analysis (termed the alpha analysis in WFP) is a good indicator of the comparative costs of giving food in kind or making an equivalent transfer in cash or vouchers.

An alpha analysis was made for both PRRO 10756 (for the calendar year 2010 using WFP procurement data and local market data together with budgeted external transport and LTSH costs) and for PRRO 200143 (using project budgets for WFP commodity costs, external transport and LTSH costs, and available local market data for January and February 2011). Both analyses show an **alpha value of 1.18** indicating that it is some 18% more costly to transfer cash or vouchers to beneficiaries in order to purchase the equivalent WFP food basket commodities on the local markets. However, this is not consistently the case for all commodities in the WFP food basket and for rice it is seen to be some 14% cheaper to buy the ration from the local market as it would be for WFP to deliver it in kind. (WFP, 2011i)

31. The fact that local purchase of rice was substantially cheaper appears to be a major qualification of the analysis. The mission went on to argue (a) that it would be impractical to provide cash/vouchers for some commodities and continue to deliver others in kind, and (b) that other factors (although difficult to quantify) could outweigh the alpha value finding; in particular, there would be a strategic benefit in piloting and learning from a CBT, and local purchase could also stimulate the local economy. The mission also used alpha value analysis as part of its arguments for vouchers to be preferred to cash in a FFW context (Box 19 below).

32. The mission mentioned the distinction between cost-efficiency analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis, but restricted its calculations to the former, although, as noted in the preceding paragraph, there were narrative mentions of some effectiveness arguments. The arguments in Box 19 (despite the statement in the first sentence) involve no consideration of cost-effectiveness. The underlying argument appears to be that it is politically infeasible to offer less than the accepted minimum wage when offering cash, but feasible to offer an in-kind (or voucher) recompense of lower value than the minimum wage. The final sentence in

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<sup>140</sup> Alpha values are the local market value of a food-in-kind transfer, expressed in dollars, divided by the total dollar cost to WFP. For a full discussion of their calculation and interpretation, see the Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis, Section F (WFP, 2013e).

Box 19 reflects internal incentives in WFP to report large numbers of beneficiaries; there is no attempt to quantify benefits rather than beneficiaries, and the conclusion that "voucher transfers are preferable to cash transfers for work based activities" is not based on legitimate evidence of cost-effectiveness.

**Box 19 Arguments for vouchers rather than cash in FFW (2011 review mission)**

**Cash for Work / Food for Work** is a project activity for which the cost effectiveness analysis has not just to consider the local costs of an equivalent food basket but also the minimum and actual daily wage rates practiced in the project areas. The detailed cost efficiency analysis for CFW under PRRO 200143 is presented in Annex 3 and shows that the equivalent cost of a daily FFW ration (based on 5 family members) in the local market is approximately LKR 218. This compares to the Government published average daily earnings for constructions workers (adjusted with annual increments of 7% for 2010/11) of LKR 540 and daily wage rates offered by other agencies implementing CFW in the Northern Province of LKR 550 – 650.

In real terms this makes cash transfers for CFW almost three times the value of the food transfer at local market rates. Even allowing that the published average daily wage rates are generally based on an 8+ hour day of physical labour, and that FFW norms in Sri Lanka are based on 6 hour days, the local market value of the FFW food transfer is still significantly lower than the cash earned for daily labour. This may account for a higher number of women traditionally enrolling in FFW projects in Sri Lanka (reportedly at 60-65% participation). Based on this analysis it is apparent that for WFP to shift to cash transfers would result in higher costs to assist the same number of beneficiaries and that voucher transfers are preferable to cash transfers for work based activities.

Source: quoted verbatim from WFP, 2011i, p15.

33. The **Budget Revision for PRRO 200143** obviously drew on the mission's analysis:

While voucher transfers are estimated to be 18 percent more expensive than food transfers, at this stage of the PRRO they offer significant comparative advantages, which include: the Government's extensive experience with implementing food stamps; a potentially smooth integration and hand-over of the voucher-based component to the government's safety net scheme; and a guarantee that beneficiaries use the transfer for food purchases only. (PRRO 200143 BR1, 2011)

34. The **project document of PRRO 200452** goes further and refers to both cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness analyses undertaken by the CO:

A pilot voucher scheme using multi-purpose cooperative societies (MPCS) has been successful in fostering purchase of locally produced rice and other products and in simplifying logistics. *Vouchers were more cost efficient than food in the month of April through May 2012, with an **alpha value** of 0.94. A simplified cost effectiveness analysis produced an **Omega Value** of 1.15, indicating that each dollar invested in a voucher-based assistance had a higher nutritional value for the beneficiaries.* The significant reduction in household's median expenditure on food seems to indicate a greater food access to food insecure households who are below poverty line. The analysis of the commodities (types and quantities) purchased by the cash voucher beneficiaries during 2012 shows that they opted for increased diversification of the food basket. (WFP, 2013h, emphasis added.)

35. Unfortunately, the CPE team did not succeed in obtaining either the actual calculations cited in PRRO 200452 or those linked to the 2011 review mission. It would have been interesting, for example, to see how the more recent analysis dealt with the challenge of comparing prices between different varieties of rice given that local varieties continue to be preferred to the imported variety, and how the "higher nutritional value" mentioned in the PRRO 200452 project document was computed.

### *Omega value analysis for the CPE*

36. The Omega tool has been propagated primarily as an ex ante aid to decision-making. As such, it requires the users to make a large number of assumptions about the likely outcomes of the alternatives being compared. In principle, ex post use of the tool could be more robust, if it were possible to feed in actual results of an intervention that has taken place instead of hypothetical results of one that is planned. As an input to this CPE, the CO kindly undertook an updated cost analysis exercise using the Omega value tool. It was agreed at Inception Report stage (Lister et al., 2016, Annex L) that the Food Consumption Score (FCS) would probably be the most appropriate outcome metric for this purpose (Box 20 below explains why the NVS cannot serve this purpose.)

37. The calculation was undertaken for the period from 1 January 2013 to 30 September 2014. Costs for the in-kind food basket were based on WFP records. Costs of the voucher commodities drew on the monthly market price monitoring undertaken by HARTI at locations across Sri Lanka, including Jaffna. The baseline FCS for returnees was drawn from the CFSVA undertaken in 2012 (HARTI, 2012) and this was compared with the equivalent figure from the 2014 Joint Needs Assessment (PTF & HCT, 2014).<sup>141</sup> The calculation was based on a 10 percent increase in FCS for voucher recipients compared with a 6 percent increase for in-kind recipients.<sup>142</sup>

38. The headline results are shown in Box 21 below, and indicate, prima facie, that the voucher is significantly more cost-effective than the in-kind alternative. However, the confidence that can be placed in this result depends both on the credibility of the Omega tool itself and on the robustness of the data fed into it.

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<sup>141</sup> The comparison showed an increase of 6 percentage points in the proportion of households with an acceptable FCS, as follows:

Year	Average FCS	Poor	Borderline	Acceptable
2012	67	3%	8%	89%
2014	74	0%	5%	95%

<sup>142</sup> This was based on comparing voucher vs. in-kind recipient groups in the 2014 assessment.

**Box 20 Nutrient Value Score (NVS) vs. Food Consumption Score (FCS)**

The Omega tool automatically calculates the NVS for alternative food baskets. The NVS could be relevant as a way of determining rough equivalence between alternative food baskets (e.g. a voucher basket vs. an in-kind basket); the NVS can help in the comparison of baskets whose composition is not identical. However this works at the output level (consumption potential delivered to beneficiaries), whereas the FCS is used as a proxy indicator for the outcomes of food assistance (for explanation and justification of this use of the FCS, see WFP, 2008e and IFPRI, 2009).

There is a degree of arbitrariness in assigning a NVS to a voucher "basket" when it cannot be known ex ante what the beneficiaries will choose from the menu of food items that a voucher allows them to purchase.

Assigning expected (change in) FCS ex ante is also arbitrary (there is as yet little empirical basis for such an estimate). However, the FCS is a credible ex post outcome indicator. It has the advantage, for this case, that using the FCS does not require knowledge of how, exactly, beneficiaries used the voucher. The FCS takes account of all food consumed by a family during the recall period, and therefore in principle is able to capture the difference that the WFP food assistance made. But capturing such a difference does depend on being able to compare treatment and non-treatment groups.

The NVS tells us something about what was delivered to beneficiaries, but nothing about what actually happened to their nutritional status as a result of the delivery. The C&V manual – WFP, 2014r – is accordingly wrong to describe the NVS as an outcome measure.

**Box 21 Omega Value Tool Results 2016**

OMEGA VALUE METRICS		
	In Kind	Voucher
Cost/ben/mo	\$ 9.24	\$ 11.26
NVS	6.19	7.82
Ω Omega	1.00	0.96
FCS	78.42	80.96
FCS % increase	6%	10%
USD / FCS % increase	\$ 145.60	\$ 114.99

Source: Informal CO calculation using Omega tool, Colombo July 2016.

39. The Omega value shown in Box 21 above was calculated automatically by the Omega tool spreadsheet based on the NVS data entered. However, this cannot be regarded as robust, because the ex post NVS scores are arbitrary in the absence of knowledge of what precisely was eaten by voucher beneficiaries as a result of utilising the voucher.<sup>143</sup> FCS data serve as a proxy for recipients' overall food security (based on recall of food consumed from all sources) and are therefore in principle more straightforward to interpret. The results shown in Box 21 indicate that the cash voucher is clearly superior in terms of outcome level

<sup>143</sup> Of course, employing the NVS for an in-kind basket also requires a "leap of faith" in assuming that the in-kind basket is actually consumed by the intended beneficiaries.

efficiency (cost-effectiveness), with each percentage point FCS increase achieved at only 79 percent of the cost of the in-kind alternative.

40. The Omega value model also automatically generates an estimated alpha value (shown on the "dashboard" sheet). The exercise yielded an alpha value of 1.22 for the voucher, indicating that the cash voucher was 22 percent more expensive than the in-kind alternative in terms of purchase and delivery cost for equivalent quantities. In other words, the voucher is less cost-efficient but more cost-effective. As explained in OEV's technical guidance on efficiency, efficiency at outcome level (cost-effectiveness) necessarily trumps efficiency at lower levels in the results hierarchy. WFP should always choose the more cost-effective option – there is no legitimate question of any trade-off between cost-efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

41. Caveats:

- a) At outcome level, it is regrettable that WFP's monitoring has not, apparently, made possible a direct and more granular comparison between Jaffna (vouchers) and other districts (in-kind). It was intended that PDM would enable FCS to be tracked at frequent intervals, district by district, but in practice these data are not available.
- b) In calculating commodity costs, the data are biased by focusing only on costs incurred by WFP. As shown in Table 27 above, it is GoSL which bears all in-country logistic and handling costs (except that commodity tracking and monitoring are shared with WFP). Including a full estimate of these costs, including any losses in transit and storage, would shift the alpha value estimate in favour of the voucher alternative, and, other things equal, would further increase the superiority of the voucher at outcome level.<sup>144</sup>

## Conclusions

42. The restoration of infrastructure and functioning markets after the end of the war made CBTs an increasingly credible alternative to in-kind transfers, while the policy environment in WFP was also increasingly favourable for CBTs. Increasing use of cash in GoSL's social protection system was another reason for the WFP portfolio to shift in a similar direction. The "cash voucher" piloted for Jaffna was a sophisticated, well-managed, popular and apparently highly successful intervention. It responded well to the C&V policy goal (§8 above) that "The use of C&V allows WFP to respond more flexibly and appropriately to identified needs in context-specific situations".

43. The trend towards using CBTs more as the default intervention is reflected in the CP and the EMOP which immediately followed the evaluation period, but the very limited use of CBTs during the evaluation period itself fits into a pattern of rather slow adjustment of WFP's business model to the changing circumstances of Sri Lanka.

44. At the analytical level, others have already commented on the narrow focus of the Omega tool and how cumbersome it is to use in practice.<sup>145</sup> There is scope to refine the ex ante assessment of CBTs and their alternatives (for example, it should not be acceptable that non-WFP costs are left out of the calculation). But it is even more important for WFP to

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<sup>144</sup> The CO pointed out that the Omega spreadsheet has nowhere to include non-WFP costs of delivery, and that this creates a serious distortion in the case of Sri Lanka where the GoSL bears substantial in-country delivery costs, but was informed that WFP practice is to focus only on the costs borne by WFP.

<sup>145</sup> The C&V policy evaluation reported that COs were generally critical of the complexity of the Omega tool and its reliance on a wide range of assumptions, while some partners commented adversely on its "complexity and its focus solely on food/nutrition and efficiency rather than more holistic view of Value for Money taking into account more qualitative factors such as dignity, choice and social aspects of beneficiary connections to markets" (Majewski et al, 2014).

improve the quality and use of the performance data it collects as CBTs are implemented. Such data are crucial in convincing WFP's financiers of the effectiveness of its work, and would also feed more robust information into future ex ante assessments.

## Annex P: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

**Table 29 Recommendations and the CPE text that supports them**

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Recommendation addressed to:</b>	<b>See main text paragraph number(s)</b>	<b>See SER paragraph number(s)</b>
<b>R1.</b> Formulation of the Country Strategic Plan	[WFP and GoSL]	69-72, 85, 158, 159, 162-172, 173	12,-13-18,20,33,36
<b>R2.</b> Joint UN adaptation to the new aid landscape in Sri Lanka	[all UN agencies and GoSL]	24-28, 76-78, 160, 163, 170-172,	15,19,35
<b>R3.</b> Addressing the needs of IDPs	[GoSL and UN agencies]	100-102, 105-106, 113-114, 159-160,	13,23,25,26,32
<b>R4.</b> Future engagement with nutrition in Sri Lanka	[WFP, liaising with other UN agencies and GoSL]	88, 135-149,	28
<b>R5.</b> Hand-over of the SMP	[WFP and GoSL]	88, 116-133, 157, 159,	27
<b>R6.</b> Strengthen economic analysis in modality choice and strategy formulation	[WFP HQ and RB]	87, 94, Annex O	22

**Table 30 Where the CPE responds to each EQ**


<b>Key Question 1: Portfolio alignment and strategic positioning.</b>	<b>Where in main report</b>
EQ1. What has been the strategic context of food security and aid in Sri Lanka?	9-39
EQ2. To what extent have the portfolio's main objectives and related activities been relevant to Sri Lanka's humanitarian and developmental needs (including those of specific groups), priorities and capacities?	73, 108, 128, 146
EQ3. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent with the stated national agenda and policies?	74-75
EQ4. To what extent have WFP's objectives been coherent and harmonised with those of partners especially UN partners, but also with bilateral partners and NGOs?	76-77
EQ5. To what extent have there been trade-offs between aligning with national strategies on one hand and with WFP's mission, strategic plans and corporate policies (including the Humanitarian Principles) on the other hand?	79-82, Annex L
EQ6. To what extent has WFP been strategic in its alignments and partnerships, and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference?	83-84
EQ7. To what extent has WFP's portfolio has been consistent with the status of the peacebuilding and reconciliation process?	78

<b>Key Question 2: Factors and quality of strategic decision-making</b>	
EQ8. To what extent has WFP analysed the hunger challenges, the food security and nutrition situation and the climate change issues in Sri Lanka - including gender issues?	86-89
EQ9. To what extent has WFP contributed to placing these issues on the national agenda, to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?	86-88
EQ10. To what extent has WFP adequately covered vulnerable groups in its programming?	90-92
EQ11. What (external or internal) factors have facilitated and/or constrained WFP's strategic decision-making?	85
EQ12. To what extent has WFP generated and applied its own learning to improve the management of the Country Portfolio and engagement with government and partners?	93-94
<b>Key Question 3: Performance and results of the WFP portfolio.</b>	
EQ13. How effective have the main WFP programme activities been, and what accounts for their effectiveness or lack of effectiveness?	109-110, 129-131, 147, 157
EQ14. How efficient have the main WFP programme activities been? How well has WFP analysed the efficiency of its programmes (especially in choices between in-kind and cash-based transfers)?	111-112, 132, 148
EQ15. How sustainable have WFP programme activities been?	113-114, 133, 149, 157
EQ16. What has been the level of synergy between different elements of the portfolio?	158
EQ17. What has been the level of synergy with partners (government, multilateral, bilateral donors and NGOs) at the operational level?	159-160




## Annex Q: Maps

### Map 2 Provinces and Districts




Source: [www.srilankahistory.page.tl](http://www.srilankahistory.page.tl)

**Map 3 Areas of conflict and displacement at the end of the**




**Map 4 Typical distribution of WFP activities in Sri Lanka 2011–2015**



Source: WFP Sri Lanka CO - VAM, 2016


### Map 5 Sri Lanka Livelihood Analysis as of January 2014



Source: Consolidated Livelihood Exercise for Analysing Resilience (WFP & GoSL, 2014)



**Map 6 Sri Lanka Country Programme 200866 (2016–2017)**



Source: Project Document (WFP, 2016g)

## Annex R: Bibliography

"Location" in the listing below refers to folder and document numbers in the evaluation team's electronic library.

Short ref	Full ref	Location
Aliff, 2015	<i>Reconciliation through the Devolution of Powers in Post-War Sri Lanka: A Special Reference to Debates on 13th Amendment of the Constitution.</i> S M Aliff, in Asian Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 5, No. 6, June 2015, pp82–84.	5.20-1
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AsDB & GIZ, 2015	<i>Country Gender Assessment, Sri Lanka, an Update.</i> Asian Development Bank and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), 2015	5.12.-2
Beck et al., 2016	<i>Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation.</i> Tony Beck, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Belen Diaz and Lara Ressler Horst. Konterra, 8 April 2016.	2.13-2
Bennett, 2013	<i>The Patriotic Struggle of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna: A Reappraisal.</i> Owen Bennett. Bachelor's Thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, 2013.	5.19-2
Betts et al., 2014	<i>Evaluation of WFP's 2009 Gender Policy. This Time Around? Evaluation Report.</i> Julia Betts, Cathy Gaynor, Hope Kabuchu, Francis Watkins. WFP Office of Evaluation, January 2014.	2.4-4
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Bundy et al., 2009	<i>Rethinking School Feeding: Social Safety Nets, Child Development and the Education Sector.</i> Bundy, D., Burbano, C., Grosh, M., Geli, A., Jukes, M., Drake, L. (2009),The World Bank.	
Carter & Pozarny, 2016	<i>National Disaster Management Authorities.</i> GSDRC Helpdesk Research Report 1359. Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2016.	5.22-2
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EIU, 2016	<i>Country Report, Sri Lanka.</i> Economic Intelligence Unit, January 27 <sup>th</sup> 2016.	5.4-1
FAO, 2015a	<i>The State of Food Insecurity in the World. Meeting the 2015 international hunger targets: taking stock of uneven progress.</i> FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2015. Rome, FAO.	5.2-3

Short ref	Full ref	Location
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## **Acronyms**

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ADG	Additional Director General
AGA	Assistant Government Agent (local Government official)
AI	Amnesty International
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AO	Area office
BCE	Before the Common Era (dates)
BR	Budget Revision
C&V	Cash and vouchers
CBA	Cost benefit analysis
CBT	Cash based transfer
CCHA	Consultative Committee on Humanitarian Assistance
CER	cost effectiveness ratio
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CFA	Cease Fire Agreement
CFS	Committee on World Food Security
CFW	Cash for Work
CLEAR	Consolidated Livelihood Exercise for Analysing Resilience
CHA	Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies
CHAP	Consolidated Humanitarian Appeals process
CMAM	Community-based management of acute malnutrition
CMG	Crisis Management Group
CN	Concept Note
CO	Country Office
COG	UN Crisis Operations Group
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System

CP	Country Programme
CPE	Country Portfolio Evaluation
CSB	Corn soy blend
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CTC	Community-based Therapeutic Care
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DCS	Department of Census and Statistics
DEO	District Education Officer
DEV	Development Operation
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
DMU	District Monitoring Unit
DPMM	Department of Project Management and Monitoring
DPS	Development Partners Secretariat
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration
DSC	direct support costs
EB	Executive Board (of WFP)
ED	Executive Director
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EM	Evaluation Manager
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EQ	Evaluation Question
EQAS	Evaluation quality assurance system (of WFP)
ER	Evaluation Report



ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ET	Evaluation Team
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBF	Fortified blended food
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FFA	Food (assistance) for Assets
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FHH	female-headed household
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FNS	Food and Nutrition Security
FSA	Food Security Assessment
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
FSCO	Field Security Coordination Officer
GA	Government Agent (local Government official)
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition
GBV	gender-based violence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEN	WFP Gender Office
GFD	General Food Distribution
GM	Gender Marker
GNC	Global Nutrition Cluster
GNI	Gross National Income
GoC	Government of Ceylon

GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German aid agency)
GNR	Global Nutrition Report
GoSL	Government of Sri Lanka
HARTI	Hector Kobbekaduwa Agrarian Research and Training Institute
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HGSF	Home-Grown School Feeding
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HQ	Headquarters
HRC	Human Rights Council
HRuF	Human Rights up Front
HSZ	High Security Zone
IASC	UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IAWG-SL	Inter-Agency Working Group on Sri Lanka
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICN	International Conference on Nutrition
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International financial institution
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IHL	International humanitarian law
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force

IR	Inception Report
IR EMOP	Immediate Response EMOP
IT	Information Technology
IYCF	infant and young child feeding
JOH	(Government of Sri Lanka) Joint Operations Headquarters
JSAC	Jaffna Social Action Committee
LBW	low birth weight
LIC	Low Income Country
LKR	Sri Lankan Rupee
LLRC	Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Country
LoU	Letter of Understanding
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MAM	moderate acute malnutrition
MCHN	Maternal and Child Health and Nutrition
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MED	Ministry of Economic Development
MIC	middle income country
MNP	Micronutrient Powder
MDM	Ministry of Disaster Management
MERE	Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy
MNPEA	Ministry of National Policies and Economic Affairs
MoE	Ministry of Education
MPCS	Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
MRI	Medical Research Institute

MS	Member States
MSAP	Multi-Sector (Nutrition) Action Plan
MT	Metric ton
NCDM	National Council for Disaster Management
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	Northern Province
NVS	Nutrient Value Score
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODB	Bangkok Regional Bureau
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEV	(WFP) Office of Evaluation
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIC	officer in charge
OLA	UN Office for Legal Affairs
OMB	WFP Bangkok Regional Bureau
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
P4P	Purchase for Progress
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PFs	Pooled Funds
PNG	Persona non grata
PHM	Public Health Midwife
PLW	pregnant and lactating women
PPI	Policy, Programme & Innovation
PPP	purchasing power parity
PRC	Programme Review Committee (of WFP)

PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PTF	Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the North
PTK	Puthukuddurippu (town in the Wanni)
QS	Quality Support
RB	Regional Bureau
RBB	Regional Bureau for East Asia and the Pacific (Bangkok)
RBAP	(UNDP) Regional Bureau for Asia & the Pacific
RC	United Nations Resident Coordinator
RCO	Resident Coordinator's Office
RDHS	(Government) Regional District Health Service
REACH	Renewed Effort Against Child Hunger and Undernutrition – Ending Child Hunger and Undernutrition Partnership (FAO, WHO, UNICEF, WFP)
RIU	Research Intelligence Unit
RMP	Performance Management and Monitoring Division of WFP
RSG-IDPs	Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of Internally Displaced Persons
SABER	Systems Approach for Better Education Results
SAPG	Secretary-General's Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide
SBN	SUN Business Network
SDC	School Development Committee
SDG-F	Sustainable Development Goal Fund
SCn	(UN) Standing Committee on Nutrition
SDS	School Development Society
SER	Summary Evaluation Report
SFFA	Soft Food for Assets
SLA	Sri Lanka Army
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

SLRCS	Sri Lanka Red Cross Society
SMP	School Meals Programme
SNF	Specialised Nutritious Food
SO	Special Operation
SO	Strategic Objective
SO	Sub office
SP	Strategic Plan
SPR	Standard Project Report
SRC	Strategic Review Committee
SRF	Strategic Results Framework
SRSG- CAAC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children Affected by Armed Conflict
Sudeesa	Small Fishers Federation of Sri Lanka
SUN	Scaling Up Nutrition movement
TF	Trust Fund
THA	Tharmapuram (town in the Wanni)
TL	Team Leader
TMVP	Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UMIC	Upper-Middle Income Country
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	The joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDAF	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department for Safety and Security
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group

UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR	High Commission for Refugee
UNHQ	UN Headquarters
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
UN-RC	UN Resident Coordinator
UNSCN	UN Standing Committee on Nutrition
UNSD	UN Sustainable Development Framework
UPR	Universal Periodic Review
USD	United States dollar
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
VC	video conference
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
ZHC	Zero Hunger Challenge

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