

# Informing Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement *in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan*

## Volume A: Overview



**Informing Durable Solutions  
for Internal Displacement  
*in Nigeria, Somalia, South  
Sudan, and Sudan***

Volume A: Overview

# Acknowledgments

This report was led by Utz Johann Pape (TTL; Senior Economist, GPV01) and written together with Ambika Sharma (Consultant, GPV01). Other contributors to the report include Felix Appler (Consultant, GPV01), Syedah Aroob Iqbal (ET Consultant, GED03), Menaal Ebrahim (Consultant, GPV01), Andrea Fitri Woodhouse (Senior Social Development Specialist, GSU03), Lennart Kaplan (Consultant, GPV01), Simon Lange (Jr Professional Officer, GPV01), Sean Lothrop (Consultant, GMTLC), Alexander Meckelburg (Consultant, GPV01), Taies Nezam (Consultant, GPV01), Gonzalo Nunez (Consultant, GPV01), Benjamin Petrini (Consultant, GPV01), Verena Phipps (Senior Social Development Specialist, GSU07), Abril Rios (Consultant, GPV01), Jacob Udo-Udo (Consultant, GPV01), and James Walsh (Consultant, GPVGE).

The team would also like to thank Pierella Paci (Practice Manager, GPV01) as well as the peer reviewers Joanna de Berry (Senior Social Development Specialist, GTFDR), Nandini Krishnan (Senior Economist, GPV06), Nadia Piffaretti (Senior Economist, GTFSA), and Quy-Toan Do (Senior Economist, DECPI) for guidance. The team would also like to thank, for the guidance and support received, Preeti Arora (Country Program Coordinator, AFCTZ), Elsa Araya (Senior Public Sector Specialist, GGOAE), Tom Bundervoet (Senior Economist, GPV01), Giorgia Demarchi (Social Scientist, GPV02), Pablo Fajnzylber (Adviser, GGIVP), Xavier Furtado (Resident Representative, AFMBW), Qaiser Khan (Lead Economist, GSP01), Indira Konjhodzic (Country Program Coordinator, AFCNG), Nicole Klingen (Country Program Coordinator, AFCET), Rebecca Lacroix (Social Development Specialist, GTFOS), Lynne Sherburne-Benz (Director, GSJD1), Varalakshmi Vemuru (Lead Social Development Specialist, GSU07), and Tara Vishwanath (Lead Economist, GPV03).

Data collection was implemented in close collaboration with partners. Therefore, the team would like to thank the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA) in Ethiopia; Altai Consulting; the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Forcier Consulting; IOM Nigeria; the Ministry of Planning; Investment and Economic Development of the Federal Government of Somalia; JIPS; the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics; UNDP Sudan; and Zerihun Associates. The team would like to express their gratitude specifically to Atem Bul, Isaiah Chol, Anne-Elisabeth Costafrolaz, Abdirahman Omar Dahir, Tom Delrue, Abebual Demilew, Matthieu Dillais, Khadra Elmi, Jedediah Fix, Aude Galli, Henry Kwenin, Margaret Labanya, Eva Lescauwaet, Riad Marrow, Kudzani Ndlovu, David Thiang, and Tewodros Zerihun.

Funding for the surveys was received from DFID, the Somalia Knowledge for Results Trust Fund of the Multi-Partner Fund, the UN-World Bank Partnership Trust Fund, Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative (HDPI), and the World Bank's Forced Displacement Trust Fund.

# Table of Contents

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS** ..... ii

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY** .....vi

**RATIONALE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY** ..... 1

**RESULTS ON CROSS-CUTTING POLICY QUESTIONS** ..... 4

**COMPILING COUNTRY-LEVEL TRENDS** ..... 12

**COUNTRY RESULTS’ DEEP DIVE AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POLICY INSIGHTS** ..... 15

    Nigeria..... 15

    Somalia..... 19

    South Sudan..... 25

    Sudan..... 30

**MICRO-DATA IS AN ESSENTIAL INPUT TO INFORM DURABLE SOLUTIONS** ..... 37

**REFERENCES**..... 39

**LIST OF FIGURES**

Figure 1 Main sources of livelihoods for IDPs and host populations per country . . . . . 5

Figure 2 Poverty headcount ratio for agricultural and non-agricultural IDPs . . . . . 6

Figure 3 IDPs’ return intentions . . . . . 6

Figure 4 Population structure for IDPs and host communities, by sex and age. . . . . 15

Figure 5 Poverty headcount ratio and food insecurity categories for IDPs and host communities . . . . . 16

Figure 6 IDP preferences to stay in current residence, return, or move to a new area . . . . . 17

Figure 7 Vulnerable population by status of the household and state . . . . . 18

Figure 8 Visualization of Nigerian IDP distinct groups . . . . . 18

Figure 9 Population structure for refugees, IDPs, and host communities, by sex and age . . . . . 20

Figure 10 Poverty headcount ratio . . . . . 21

Figure 11 Poverty gap . . . . . 21

Figure 12 Main sources of livelihoods for residents, hosts, and IDPs before and after displacement . . . . . 22

Figure 13 Refugee livelihoods before and after displacement . . . . . 22

Figure 14 Employment status of IDPs, refugees, rural and urban residents . . . . . 23

Figure 15 Vulnerable IDP population by pre-war region. . . . . 23

Figure 16 Visualization of Somali IDP distinct profiles . . . . . 24

Figure 17 Population structure for IDPs and host communities, by sex and age. . . . . 26

Figure 18 Poverty headcount ratio for IDPs and residents. . . . . 26

Figure 19 Poverty gap relative to US\$1.90 PPP (2011) per day per capita poverty line for IDPs  
and residents . . . . . 26

Figure 20 Literacy rates, 15 years and above for IDPs, urban, and rural residents . . . . . 27

Figure 21 Adult educational attainment for IDPs, urban, and rural residents, by sex. . . . . 27

Figure 22 Agricultural land and livestock holdings before and after displacement. . . . . 28

Figure 23 Vulnerable IDP population by PoC. . . . . 28

Figure 24 Visualization of IDP distinct profiles . . . . . 29

Figure 25 Population structure of IDPs, hosts, and refugees by sex and age . . . . . 31

Figure 26 Displaced people by violent event and year. . . . . 32

Figure 27 Poverty headcount ratio for IDP and host populations . . . . . 33

Figure 28 Poverty gap relative to US\$1.90 PPP (2011) poverty line for IDP and host populations . . . . . 33

Figure 29 Labor force participation and employment status among working-age population . . . . . 34

Figure 30 Main sources of livelihoods for IDPs, hosts, and refugees. . . . . 34

Figure 31 Vulnerable population by status of the household . . . . . 35

Figure 32 Vulnerable IDP population by camp . . . . . 35

Figure 33 Visualization of IDP distinct profiles . . . . . 36

**LIST OF TABLES**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Table 1 Outcomes of camp-based and non-camp-based IDPs and host communities . . . . .                | 7  |
| Table 2 Links between host community characteristics and host community perceptions . . . . .        | 9  |
| Table 3 Effect of displacement duration and geographic distance from origin on IDP outcomes. . . . . | 11 |

# Executive Summary

## **Critical data gaps must be closed to better understand forced displacement and to design durable solutions.**

**Data gaps can be closed by standardized socioeconomic micro-data collection and analysis as carried out for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan.** Forced displacement has risen worldwide, and efforts have been made to understand and tackle displacement. Standardized frameworks have been created for collecting data to track the status and welfare of IDPs and refugees—but less often to track effects of displaced groups on host communities. While these contributions have produced useful analytical frameworks, several data limitations prevent an accurate assessment of socioeconomic conditions among displaced people and hosts, which hinders efforts to design targeted policy interventions. Key limitations include a lack of clarity in population definitions, the uneven reliability of the data, and a lack of cross-country comparability, as well as security and logistical concerns that inhibit the collection of primary data. By using micro-data collected through household surveys carried out in four countries among the most displacement-affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, this study introduces socioeconomic profiles of displaced people and contributes to filling socioeconomic data gaps by providing inputs for targeted policy interventions for durable solutions for displacement. A durable solution is achieved when displaced people no longer have the need for assistance and protection linked to their displacement. Thus, durable solutions come into place when displacement ends. The durable solutions framework is useful to structure this socioeconomic micro-data analysis, providing actionable recommendations to overcome vulnerabilities among IDPs and to end displacement.


## **Socioeconomic profiles of IDPs reflect their lives in numbers, yet the numbers do not reveal their daily struggles.**

IDPs have been forced to flee their homes, often having experienced harm, violence, and the loss of family members and friends. While socioeconomic challenges for IDPs are reflected in their quantitative profiles, such profiles do not depict the suffering that displaced people go through. In South Sudan and Somalia, the survey application was carried out using tablets, which enabled the recording of IDP testimonials. The Pulse of South Sudan ([thepulseofsouthsudan.com](http://thepulseofsouthsudan.com)) and the Somali Pulse ([thesomalipulse.com](http://thesomalipulse.com)) websites contain hundreds of video testimonials recorded with tablets during fieldwork to capture the voice of the people and give a face to the data.

## **IDPs are young, poorer than resident populations, and face risks differentiated by sex.**

**The majority of internally displaced people in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan are children under the age of 15.** Most refugees from Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan displaced in Ethiopia are also children. Coincidentally, displaced population distribution by age across the four countries resembles that of each countries' population distribution, which has large proportions of children under age 15. High percentages of children reveal large household sizes among the displaced and high dependency rates—especially among female-headed households. Ensuring adequate nutrition, access to health care services, and education for children and the youth are critical to maintain and enhance long-term human capital, which will have a bearing on the future of the nations' productivity, poverty, and workforce.


### Age distribution of IDPs and refugees in Ethiopia



Source: Authors' calculations using IDP Survey Sudan 2018, High Frequency Survey (HFS) South Sudan 2017, Somali HFS 2017-18, Nigeria IDP Survey 2018, Skills Profile Survey (SPS) Ethiopia 2017.

**IDPs and refugees are poorer and more vulnerable than host communities, but rural hosts are nearly as poor as IDPs.** Displaced people based in camps are poorer, face higher barriers when accessing services, and are more aid dependent than host communities and IDPs who are based outside camps. More than 8 out of 10 IDPs in Somalia, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Sudan live below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Poverty is widespread among IDPs and also among residents in rural areas. Specifically, the level of poverty among rural residents is not significantly different from that of Somali IDPs. Similarly, in South Sudan and Nigeria the poverty rate of IDPs is almost the same as that of the rural residents. Comparably, in Sudan, though slightly better off than IDPs, rural residents also face widespread poverty and low living standards. While internally displaced populations are almost as poor as rural residents, refugees from South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia are much poorer (65 percent) than host communities (27 percent) that reside within a 5 km radius of a camp, and are in constant need of food aid to overcome high food insecurity.

### Poverty headcount ratio for IDPs and rural hosts



Source: Authors' calculations using IDP Survey Sudan 2018, HFS South Sudan 2017, Somali HFS 2017-18, Nigeria IDP Survey 2018, SPS Ethiopia 2017.

**Internally displaced people in South Sudan and South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia are mostly women.** In the other Sub-Saharan countries, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria, the proportion of men and women is nearly equal; however, women still face particular risks. The IDP population in South Sudan has fewer men than women. Thus, most woman-headed households have missing male members and/or spouses, which further drives up dependency ratios among woman-headed IDP households. Similarly, more than 9 out of 10 South Sudanese refugee households in



Ethiopia are headed by women. In contrast, Sudan, Somalia, and Nigeria have a similar sex balance in their displaced population. Even if sex proportions differ across these countries, forcibly displaced women in Nigeria, South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan, and refugee women in Ethiopia face gender-specific risks. For instance, displaced women are more food insecure than displaced men (70 percent of IDP women compared to 57 percent of IDP men are highly food insecure). Moreover, IDP women are often tasked to collect water for the household—which involves an increased risk of gender-based violence (GBV) and long waiting times. This results in IDP women missing out on education and labor engagement. In fact, IDP women tend to have worse education and labor outcomes than men. Therefore, policy efforts for this group should consider gender-based vulnerabilities related to domestic work and caring labor, in addition to GBV and discrimination in educational and work environments.

### **Contextual analysis is crucial to inform effective durable solutions. The country cases of Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia provide key insights in finding durable solutions for displacement.**

**In northeast Nigeria, solutions for internal displacement need to prioritize security and better living conditions in host areas.** Nearly 2 million people are currently displaced, primarily due to armed conflict. The Boko Haram insurgency has inflicted a severe human toll, which has led to large-scale displacement mostly in Borno state where IDPs face poverty, food insecurity, and low standards of living. Nearly 9 out of 10 Nigerian IDPs live below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person, per day in 2011 PPP terms. Furthermore, 61 percent of IDPs are highly food insecure, and one in four IDP households live in tents or tukuls (huts made with sticks) and not in houses. Poverty is widespread for IDPs but also for host communities. Hence, any durable solution requires improving the living standards and opportunities for the host communities in order to adequately accommodate IDPs. Coupled with raising hosts' living standards, durable solutions for displacement in Nigeria must prioritize security, both in settlement and return areas, and address the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups: youth and women.

**Durable solutions for displacement in Somalia must prioritize human capital to prevent lifelong gaps in social and economic development.** Clan conflict, violence by armed nonstate actors, and droughts have caused the internal displacement of nearly 2 million people. Most Somali IDPs are young, and face high levels of poverty and low standards of living. The majority of IDPs in Somalia and Somali refugees in Ethiopia are under the age of 15, driving high dependency ratios (larger than 1 in 1) for displaced households. Moreover, displaced Somali children are less likely to attend school than children from host communities and non-IDP urban households. Gaps in educational attainment among IDP children can translate to persistent, lifelong disparities in educational outcomes, employment, and general well-being. Besides having a young population and lower access to education, Somalia's IDPs are poorer than non-host communities—however, host communities are as poor as IDPs. Therefore, durable solutions in Somalia require the improvement of hosts' living conditions. Particularly in urban and peri-urban areas—where most IDPs reside—substantial investment is crucial to strengthen infrastructure and prevent a decline in service and livelihood quality of hosts and IDPs, further preserving positive IDP-host community relations. Equally important, durable solutions for displacement in Somalia must prioritize resilience to drought, support in rural development—to enable IDPs to return or relocate to rural areas—and enhance access to education and employment opportunities, especially for the younger population.

**In South Sudan, durable solutions for displacement need to focus on preserving human capital; however, any solution will depend on the improvement of security conditions in the country.** An estimated 4 million people have been displaced due to conflict in South Sudan. Nearly half of them are IDPs who live in poverty and depend on aid. IDPs also have lower access to education and less employment opportunities than urban residents. More than 90 percent of IDP households live below the poverty threshold of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms. South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia fare slightly better, with 70 percent living below the poverty line. Furthermore, the loss of income-generating assets—mostly land and livestock—has drastically affected the livelihoods of IDPs. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of IDP households (75 percent) and South Sudanese refugee households in Ethiopia (90 percent) now rely on aid as their main source of livelihood. In addition, education and employment opportunities for IDPs are lower than for urban residents. In fact, almost 3 out of 10 young IDPs (under 15 years old) are idle—neither working, nor looking for work, nor studying—while 4 in 10 IDP adults are idle. This trend is more pronounced for both young and adult IDP women than for young and adult IDP men. Combined with high poverty rates, aid dependency, and lower access to education and employment opportunities, IDPs need reliable information about the security and political situation in their original place of residence, as well as in any new re-location area where better living conditions are sought. Therefore, regular and reliable information flows are key for durable solutions that seek permanent (re)settlement of displaced populations. Teamed with the provision of information, durable solutions for IDPs in South Sudan must prioritize and maintain human capital by strengthening food security, and improving living conditions and access to education and employment opportunities for young and adult IDPs.

**Protracted displacement in Sudan needs durable solutions that prioritize security in return areas, reduce gender-based vulnerabilities, and improve living conditions in host and return areas.** Conflict and violence have displaced 2 million people in Sudan where IDPs face poverty and food insecurity, and are in urgent need of income and livelihood opportunities. Sudanese IDPs and host communities are extremely poor. Notably, more than 8 out of 10 IDPs and 6 out of 10 hosts have income levels below the international poverty threshold of US\$1.90 PPP (2011) per day per capita. Similarly, 7 out of 10 Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia live below the poverty line. In addition, food insecurity is considerably higher among IDPs (64 percent) than among hosts (31 percent). In terms of employment and livelihoods, most Sudanese who are currently displaced (95 percent) previously depended on agriculture as their main source of income; however, after being displaced, less than half of IDP households depend on agriculture. Even if IDPs largely generate their own income, it is barely enough. Therefore, business skills development and better access to employment opportunities, mainly for agricultural IDPs, must be part of the interventions for durable solutions in Sudan. Equally important, durable solutions for Sudan need to prioritize security in return areas, which is the primary concern of IDPs when considering whether to return or stay.

**Cross-cutting policies for successful durable solutions must address: employment opportunities, inequality in host communities, security issues in return areas, and sustainable solutions for permanent settlement.**

**Agricultural IDPs displaced into urban areas face difficulties in adjusting to labor markets and higher poverty than non-agricultural IDPs.** Conflict, violence, and environmental hazards often drive IDPs from rural areas to the closest safe locations. IDPs tend to concentrate in urban areas, which often have camps or settlements for the displaced. The rapid, unplanned urbanization in hosting areas puts a strain on jobs, infrastructure, and access to services for both the displaced and the non-displaced. Displaced people from rural areas usually have an agricultural or pastoralist background, and their displacement is often triggered by livestock raiding and the capture of land. Thus, they have lost

key livelihood-generating assets and need to adjust to new labor environments. However, a lack of transferrable skills makes the process of adaptation to urban labor markets especially difficult, which adds to the challenges they face when trying to find alternatives for sustainable livelihoods to escape poverty. Therefore, poverty reduction programs integrated with livelihood opportunities and transferable skills programs can be instrumental in helping agricultural IDPs find a stable exit from poverty in urban areas.

**A high level of income inequality in host communities is linked to a worse perception of IDPs and signals the poor socioeconomic conditions that many members of host communities face.**

The arrival of large numbers of forcibly displaced people represents a local demographic shock that often transforms dynamics within host communities. While some host community groups might gain economically from IDPs presence, other groups—mainly with a lower income and those closest to IDP camps—might have to share the same limited amenities or participate in the same labor market, which could affect them in the immediate term. Consequently, host communities with lower income levels believe more strongly that the arrival of displaced people has worsened job prospects. As a result of the influx of IDPs, lower income host communities can become more concerned about their own job opportunities, which can lead to negative perceptions of IDPs. Comparatively, more prosperous host communities have more favorable perceptions of displaced populations. Wealthier households may not need to compete with IDPs for jobs and could benefit from the influx of IDPs in the labor force. This may help to explain why their relationship with IDPs is generally not as strained and could influence them into perceiving that IDPs do not worsen job prospects for locals. Consequently, by providing aid to the host communities and generating income opportunities to reduce inequality, more successful integration of IDPs can take place. In fact, households receiving aid have more favorable perceptions of IDPs, which argues for the provision of support to host communities as well as the displaced.

**Improving the security situation and increasing economic opportunities in return and host areas for IDPs local integration are crucial elements to develop durable solutions.**

Most IDPs in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, and refugees in Ethiopia report that conflict and violence are the main drivers of displacement. Household-level data highlight that people will decide to move again and again until they find safety. Hence, a security-focused approach must be applied to potential return and settlement areas. In addition to a security-focused approach, durable solutions should also focus on improving economic opportunities in return and host areas. Policy and programming interventions need to reduce dependency on aid, generate income opportunities, and increase self-reliance among the displaced by (a) supporting freedom of movement and the right to work (for refugees in Ethiopia); (b) creating employment opportunities; (c) investing in skills development; and (d) improving access to assets, livestock, and land.

**Policies and programs need to focus on sustainable solutions for permanent settlement of IDPs and refugees.**

Differential policy approaches must be embraced for populations who want to stay and for those who want to return. For those who want to stay in situ, the focus needs to be on: (a) maintaining and building human capital by providing adequate nutrition and access to health services and education, and (b) improving living conditions in terms of housing and sanitation—mainly in camps. On a longer term basis, the focus needs to gradually shift to: (a) providing opportunities for socioeconomic integration outside of camps, including social cohesion programs, skills development, job opportunities, access to land, and livestock; (b) continuing to build human capital by ensuring adequate health and education; (c) reducing humanitarian assistance where possible; and (d) supporting host communities to absorb the displaced by improving their living conditions, making services available and enhancing economic opportunities. For those who want to return, the focus needs to be on: (a) providing opportunities for socioeconomic reintegration through skills development, safety net programs, and asset restoration; (b) continuing to build human capital; (c) providing humanitarian assistance where necessary; and (d) improving host communities living conditions to support the reintegration of returnees.

# Rationale and Scope of the Study

## Data gaps must be closed to allow a targeted response to forced displacement.

**Understanding forced displacement and developing effective solutions require closing several critical gaps in the data.** With forced displacement rising worldwide, the body of work on displacement is growing rapidly. However, multidimensional data limitations prevent an assessment of socioeconomic conditions among displaced populations, hindering efforts to design targeted policy interventions. Key challenges include a lack of clarity in population definitions, the uneven reliability of the data, a lack of cross-country comparability, and security and logistical concerns that inhibit the collection of primary data. Data on internally displaced persons (IDPs) is particularly problematic. The distinction between IDPs and internal migrants is not consistent across countries, and the presence and number of IDPs is generally politicized.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the effects of forcibly displaced groups on local host communities are often omitted from the literature on forced displacement.

**While efforts have been made to create standardized frameworks for collecting quantitative data on forced displacement, important data gaps persist.** The policy and research community—including the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)<sup>2</sup>—has worked to develop a coordinated approach to defining displacement-related challenges and solutions. These efforts have produced analytical frameworks that use high-quality, standardized, comprehensive, and detailed indicators to track the status and welfare of IDPs and refugees. However, the lack of comparable datasets across countries complicates efforts to assess evolving dynamics around forced displacement.

## To close critical data gaps, this study uses standardized micro-data on internal displacement across four countries.

**This study helps close data gaps by using micro-level data to profile IDPs.** The report uses micro-data, defined as individual—and household-level—data that are collected directly through personal interviews. Comprehensive micro-data surveys cover IDP populations in four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Non-displaced populations, including host communities, are also covered for comparison. Identical survey instruments are used for both displaced and non-displaced groups to draw clear comparisons of the two. In addition, refugees from three of these countries (Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan), who are currently residing in camps in Ethiopia, are surveyed.

**The four countries included in this study are among the most displacement affected in Sub-Saharan Africa and globally.** Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, and Somalia ranked fifth, seventh, eighth, and twelfth, respectively, in a global ranking of conflict-induced IDP populations, as of 2017.<sup>3</sup> The four countries have about 2 million IDPs each, which represent some of the highest concentration of IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>4</sup> In 2017 alone, 5.5 million new IDPs

1. IDMC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement."

2. IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee), "IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons."

3. IDMC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement"; IDMC and NRC, "Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018."

4. UNHCR, "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017."

## 2 | Informing Durable Solutions for Internal Displacement in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan

were added in Africa: nearly 1.5 million of them came from the four countries combined. Ethiopia ranks among the top 12 refugee-hosting countries globally and third in Africa. South Sudan, Somalia, and Sudan rank third, fifth, and sixth, respectively, in the top 12 refugee countries of origin.

**The micro-data surveys represent IDPs, refugees, and non-displaced populations.** All four countries surveyed IDP populations. Based on country-level feasibility constraints, host communities and/or non-host resident communities were also surveyed. The Nigeria survey represents IDPs (in camps and in host communities) and host communities in northeastern Nigeria. In Somalia, the survey covers IDPs across the country (inside and outside camps), host communities near the camps, and (non-host) urban and rural populations. The survey in South Sudan covers four of the country's largest IDP camps and the non-displaced urban population. In Sudan, the survey covers two IDP camps and their host community in the city of Al Fashir. In addition, the refugee survey in Ethiopia covers refugees from Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, among other nationalities.

### **The analysis is guided by the durable solutions indicator framework, while the policy insights focus on overcoming displacement-induced vulnerability.**

**The analytical framework for this study is developed around the concept of durable solutions.** A durable solution is achieved when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs linked to their displacement. Thus, durable solutions come into place when internal displacement ends. There are three routes to a durable solution. First, reintegration or voluntary repatriation, when IDPs are able to return to their place of origin. Second, local integration, when IDPs settle in areas where they took refuge after being displaced. Third, resettlement, when IDPs settle in a location other than the origin or the current location of refuge.<sup>5</sup> Durable solutions analysis measures IDPs' progress toward a durable solution and identifies priorities for action. This study informs the analysis of durable solutions by providing and analyzing a comprehensive micro-dataset for displaced populations in selected countries.

**The IASC has developed measurable criteria for a durable solution, which are used to develop IDP profiles.** The IASC has developed a framework that helps measure whether a durable solution has been reached. The core criteria for durable solutions are (a) long-term safety, security, and freedom of movement; (b) an adequate standard of living, including access to adequate food, water, housing, health care, and basic education; (c) access to employment and livelihoods; and (d) access to effective mechanisms that restore housing, land, and property or provide compensation for lost assets.<sup>6</sup> These core criteria are analyzed to draw IDP profiles in the four countries. The core criteria are complemented by measures on social capital, and factors influencing IDPs' return intentions are also analyzed. The Durable Solutions Indicator Framework guides the analysis toward a comprehensive assessment of displacement-related vulnerability, which includes security, living conditions, food security, and poverty.

**While a durable solution is achieved when internal displacement ends, there is much developmental investment to be made in the space preceding a durable solution.** Policy and programs around challenges of inclusion, integration, self-reliance, socioeconomic opportunities, and parity in living conditions and opportunities between hosts and displaced persons are relevant even before an end to displacement is achieved. Developmental responses are thus deployed to address these displacement-related vulnerabilities. The report presents insights for key interventions,

---

5. JIPS (Joint IDP Profiling Service), "Durable Solutions Analysis Guide: A Tool To Measure Progress Toward Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement."

6. IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee), "IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons."

programs, and policy, which can move displaced populations toward better developmental outcomes. The study aims to fill both the data and the knowledge gap on the socioeconomic conditions of displaced populations to contribute to policies that can help overcome displacement-related vulnerabilities and thus be conducive to durable solutions.

### The report draws overall profiles of IDPs and hosts and dives deeper into the differences among IDPs.

**IDP profiles emphasize poverty, living conditions, livelihoods, and return intentions.** The analysis examines the demographic structure of IDP and resident populations and draws on reasons triggering displacement. An evaluation of socioeconomic needs follows, focusing on poverty rates, living standards, and access to key services for health and education. This emphasizes immediate program needs of IDPs as well as avenues for medium-term action. Analysis of employment and livelihood provides a crucial developmental perspective on sustainable income generation and socio-economic integration. Finally, an analysis on social capital and return intentions illustrates the perceptions of IDPs on their current situation and future prospects. Comparisons to non-displaced communities are made at each stage to understand the implications of displacement. Detailed case studies for each country are presented in Volume B of this report.

**Households are also classified based on their ability to generate income.** The potential to earn a livelihood is key to achieving a stable durable solution. Thus, ‘targeting analysis’ for each country classifies households into three groups based on their ability to generate income. The households’ poverty status and ability to work were used to classify them. ‘Support-dependent households’ are the most vulnerable population. This group includes households that either have no working-age adults without disabilities or are women-headed households with only the household head being in the working age and without disabilities. Programs with an emphasis on aid provision would be appropriate for this group of households. Gender-responsive programs to address vulnerabilities that woman-headed households face would also fit such households. ‘Productive but poor households’ are those that have working-age members without disabilities, yet they consume below the standard international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Policy efforts should aim to upgrade the skills of members from these households and support their participation in income-generating activities to raise their living standards. ‘Self-reliant households’ have working-age members that can participate in income-generating activities and are not poor. Self-reliant households require interventions to sustain their living conditions, increase them further, and build resilience to avoid falling into poverty should they experience an income shock. This analysis is presented in the case studies of Volume B of the report.

**Innovative analysis techniques identify the different trajectories among IDPs.** IDP populations are not homogeneous. Differences in the initial circumstances surrounding each household’s displacement can create different needs and solutions, which have policy implications. The study uses multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) to draw different profiles of IDPs based on their past conditions (cause-based indicators), present circumstances (needs-based indicators), and future intentions (solutions-based indicators). MCA aggregates the micro-data to identify which IDP households are more alike and which are more different. Organizing IDPs into groups that share similar characteristics allows for tailored programs that reflect their unique circumstances and helps avoid subjecting households to interventions that are not appropriate to their needs and aspirations. Clusters identified might not always align with ethnic groups, language groups, or locations. Thus, the scope of this analysis is to illustrate the relevance of the full displacement trajectory and explore how this can point to tailored solutions. However, a policy maker would likely need to rely on targeting mechanisms that help identify individual households. Results and policy implications of this analysis are presented in Volume B, while methodology is detailed in Volume C of this report.

# Results on Cross-Cutting Policy Questions


**The timing of the surveys in the different countries can have a bearing on the results.** The surveys for the five countries were each conducted over the course of a few weeks to a few months. Further, they were conducted at different times of the year and in different countries. Thus, seasonal effects were likely captured in several indicators, for example, employment rates. This is an important caveat for the analysis that follows.

## **Agricultural IDPs displaced into urban centers face a starkly different labor market environment and higher poverty.**

**Large numbers of displaced populations with agricultural backgrounds flee from rural areas into urban centers.** Conflict, violence, and cumulative effects of climate phenomena such as drought often drive IDPs from rural areas to the closest safe location. IDPs tend to concentrate in urban areas, which often have camps or settlements for the displaced. The rapid, unplanned urbanization puts a strain on jobs, infrastructure, and urban service delivery for both the displaced and the non-displaced. Displaced populations coming from rural areas often have an agricultural background. Their displacement is often influenced by livestock raiding and the capture of land. Many IDPs who have an agricultural or pastoralist background thus lose out on livelihood-generating assets. A lack of transferrable skills makes adjusting to urban labor markets especially difficult, adding to the challenges of livelihood and asset loss.

**IDPs with an agricultural background can face greater challenges in urban centers.** Among the five countries analyzed, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan have IDPs largely in urban camps. In Nigeria, IDPs are in the northeastern states with the entire state represented, while in Ethiopia the refugees are in border areas close to their country of origin. Comparisons among these cases can lead to insights on the conditions facing agricultural IDPs or refugees. An agricultural IDP or refugee is defined as belonging to a household whose primary source of livelihood at the original residence was in own-account agriculture. IDPs and refugees with any other livelihood background—such as wages and salaries, business, or remittances and aid—are grouped as ‘non-agricultural’.

**IDPs and refugees relied more heavily on agriculture before displacement than their hosts do now.** A large proportion of the displaced population, 42 percent, relied on own-account agriculture as the primary source of household livelihood before displacement. In contrast, 26 percent of hosts currently rely on agriculture. Hosts are more likely to be involved in business, services, or retail than the displaced at origin. Hosts are also twice as likely to be in other miscellaneous jobs (13 percent) than were the displaced (6 percent) (Figure 1). There is a clear shift away from agriculture in the labor-market environment of the displaced. Those who relied on wages or business might find it easier to integrate, as significant proportions of the hosts are employed in these sectors at IDPs’ current locations.

**FIGURE 1** Main sources of livelihoods for IDPs and host populations per country

Source: Authors' calculations using Skills Profile Survey (SPS) Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali High Frequency Survey (HFS) 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.


### **Agricultural IDPs have adjusted to current labor markets in different ways, depending on the country context.**

Across the five countries, agricultural IDPs and refugees continue to be more dependent on agriculture today than the non-agricultural displaced. In South Sudan, a majority of IDPs depend on aid for their livelihoods, but agricultural IDPs are more aid dependent. In Somalia, where remittances are prevalent, only a negligible proportion of agricultural IDPs rely on remittances, compared to 8 percent of non-agricultural IDPs. While this is a low rate, especially compared to hosts (27 percent rely on remittances), it might indicate that agricultural IDPs have even lower access to remittances than hosts or non-agricultural IDPs. Due to their continued dependence on agriculture, agricultural IDPs in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan are still less likely to rely on wages or business sectors than non-agricultural IDPs. Ethiopia is an exception, where agricultural refugees have the same livelihood structure as non-agricultural refugees and have low reliance on agricultural activities. While IDPs still have some access to agricultural means of livelihood, refugees largely turn to aid as a feasible income source.


**Agricultural IDPs are often poorer than non-agricultural IDPs.** While displaced populations face widespread poverty in all the five countries, agricultural IDPs are poorer overall (82 percent compared to 75 percent non-agricultural IDPs). Depending on the country context, agricultural IDPs are either poor or poorer than non-agricultural IDPs (Figure 2). In Somalia and South Sudan, the agricultural IDPs are significantly poorer, while in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan, agricultural and non-agricultural IDPs and refugees have a similar poverty incidence. The high level of poverty of agricultural IDPs might be influenced by lower income than before their displacement. In addition, the lack of transferrable skills in urban environments can make it especially difficult for agricultural IDPs to find sustainable livelihoods to escape poverty. Poverty reduction programs integrated with livelihood opportunities and transferable skills programs can be instrumental in helping agricultural IDPs find a stable exit from this poverty trap.

**Agricultural IDPs are keener to return to their original residence than non-agricultural IDPs.** Overall, about one in three agricultural IDPs want to return to their previous home, compared to one in five among the non-agricultural group (Figure 3). The trend is reflected in each country. In Nigeria, agricultural IDPs are twice as likely to prefer a return to their origin. Even in South Sudan, where the livelihood structures of the urban IDPs and IDPs at origin are similar, agricultural IDPs are keener to return. In Somalia, agricultural IDPs are also keener to return. Though Sudanese IDPs



**FIGURE 2** Poverty headcount ratio for agricultural and non-agricultural IDPs

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali HFS 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.

**FIGURE 3** IDPs' return intentions

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali HFS 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.

experience the starkest shift away from agriculture in their new labor environments, the protracted nature of their displacement might have induced IDPs to gradually adapt their skill sets, smoothing differences among agricultural and non-agricultural IDPs.

### **Agricultural IDPs' stronger preferences for a return might reflect a desire to restore agricultural livelihoods.**

Agricultural IDPs might prefer to return to places where land and livestock are available—a setting for which urban areas are unlikely to be conducive. Rural return programs might be more attractive for agricultural IDPs, while non-agricultural IDPs might be more open to local urban integration programs. Proposed development agendas should provide support to agricultural programs, if feasible, to create opportunities for IDPs with an agricultural background. At the same time, the program mix should include a focus on building transferrable skills that are relevant to urban labor markets, and that also benefit the host communities.

### **IDPs based in camps are poorer, face lower service access, and are more aid dependent than hosts and IDPs outside camps.**

**IDPs and refugees in camps are often believed to receive better services through international humanitarian actors than those available locally through country systems.** If humanitarian actors, particularly the international community, are providing better service access and quality in camps, then shifting to country systems could cause a net loss in welfare. While such service delivery and security in camps are required as an immediate humanitarian response, other approaches have been proposed for a medium- to long-term development. Shifting IDPs and refugees into country systems and markets, and allowing them to benefit from and contribute to socioeconomic systems locally, is likely to be more cost effective and equitable in the medium term.

**Contrary to notions of better service provision in camps, service access is worse for camp-based IDPs.** In four of the five countries, camp-based IDPs face worse access to amenities than non-camp-based IDPs or host communities. Camp-based IDPs in Nigeria have lower enrollment rates of school-age children, are farther away from the

nearest market, and face more prevalent overcrowding than hosts. In Somalia, both camp and non-camp IDPs have lower school enrollment but improved sanitation facilities than hosts, and camp IDPs are additionally farther away from the closest health facility, primary school, and market (Table 1). This contradicts the notion that camps provide proximal access to key amenities. In South Sudan, camp IDPs have lower school enrollment but higher quality of water and sanitation facilities, and greater proximity to key amenities such as the closest primary school, water point, health facility, or market. However, they still face higher poverty. In Sudan, though camp IDPs have better access to improved water, they have lower school enrollment and are farther from health and educational facilities. In Ethiopia, camp-based refugees

**TABLE 1** Outcomes of camp-based and non-camp-based IDPs and host communities

|                                   |                                 | Nigeria (IDPs) |          |      | Somalia (IDPs) |          |      | South Sudan (IDPs) |      | Sudan (IDPs) |      | Ethiopia (refugees) |      |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|----------|------|----------------|----------|------|--------------------|------|--------------|------|---------------------|------|
|                                   |                                 | Camp           | Non-camp | Host | Camp           | Non-camp | Host | Camp               | Host | Camp         | Host | Camp                | Host |
| <i>Poverty and aid dependence</i> | Poor                            | 89.3**         | 87.8     | 81.5 | 75.6           | 72.5     | 64.6 | 91.3***            | 75.4 | 80.7***      | 61.7 | 64.4***             | 28.0 |
|                                   | Aid as primary livelihood       | 8.9***         | 1.6      | 1.2  | 14.3***        | 7.9**    | 0.2  | 75.7***            | 2.3  | 4.1***       | 0.9  | 82.5***             | 2.2  |
| <i>Working-age population</i>     | Employed                        | 58.1           | 67.6     | 60.2 | 45.7           | 43.2     | 52.5 | 42.0***            | 76.1 | 56.9***      | 46.0 | 22.2***             | 61.2 |
|                                   | Unemployed                      | 6.3            | 2.7      | 6.1  | 3.2            | 2.2      | 1.6  | 4.6***             | 1.5  | 3.9          | 4.0  | 6.3***              | 2.1  |
|                                   | Not in labor force nor enrolled | 23.9           | 14.3*    | 17.6 | 43.2           | 42.4     | 36.9 | 32.4***            | 10.4 | 18.6         | 22.0 | 44.4***             | 22.6 |
| <i>Standard of living</i>         | Enrolled, at school age         | 42.1*          | 44.8     | 49.9 | 30.7***        | 42.2**   | 62.3 | 73.0**             | 78.1 | 79.2***      | 90.4 | 79.6                | 75.0 |
|                                   | Improved drinking water         | 92.2           | 90.2     | 83.6 | 78.6           | 76.0     | 64.2 | 99.3***            | 82.4 | 82.8***      | 37.1 | 97.7                | 95.6 |
|                                   | Improved sanitation             | 78.8           | 79.8     | 77.3 | 87.3**         | 62.1***  | 95.1 | 78.4***            | 56.4 | 89.0         | 93.1 | 67.4***             | 48.4 |
|                                   | Near water point                | 95.6           | 95.8     | 96.3 | 91.0           | 89.3     | 89.8 | 98.8***            | 94.3 | 83.7         | 80.5 | 98.3                | 98.9 |
|                                   | Near health facility            | 77.3           | 78.0     | 75.2 | 72.6*          | 76.7     | 85.7 | 95.2***            | 57.2 | 68.1***      | 84.0 | 74.2                | 80.8 |
|                                   | Near primary school             | 84.6           | 87.1     | 91.4 | 78.4**         | 81.4     | 89.3 | 93.1***            | 73.6 | 86.2***      | 92.4 | 75.1***             | 92.8 |
|                                   | Near market                     | 71.7*          | 79.1     | 82.9 | 78.4**         | 79.3     | 90.1 | 94.1***            | 62.4 | 63.8         | 71.3 | 72.2***             | 86.6 |
|                                   | Overcrowded house               | 54.2***        | 46.7***  | 22.9 |                |          |      | 57.6***            | 8.8  | 8.3***       | 16.0 | 58.7***             | 32.4 |
| <i>Perceptions</i>                | Good relations with hosts       | 82.6***        | 93.0     |      | 87.0           | 87.5     |      | 83.1               |      | 98.7         |      | 78.2                |      |
|                                   | Feel safe from violence         | 84.1***        | 96.3     | 97.3 | 96.4           | 90.1*    | 96.6 | 46.8**             | 53.6 |              |      | 78.6***             | 95.3 |
|                                   | Feel safe walking—daytime       | 90.9***        | 98.1     | 98.4 | 83.6           | 88.3     | 88.4 | 67.4***            | 74.6 | 94.6         | 98.0 | 93.0                | 95.5 |
|                                   | Feel safe walking—nighttime     | 71.1**         | 78.1**   | 84.4 | 84.0*          | 84.7     | 93.3 | 22.3***            | 10.6 | 60.2         | 86.9 | 49.1***             | 83.2 |
| <i>Return intentions</i>          | Intend to stay here             | 22.2***        | 72.3     |      | 70.4           | 69.8     |      | 58.1               |      | 54.3         |      | 49.8                |      |
|                                   | Intend to return                | 75.7***        | 26.2     |      | 23.4           | 23.3     |      | 34.5               |      | 44.0         |      | 16.6                |      |

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali HFS 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.

Note: \*, \*\*, and \*\*\* indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Estimates for camp-based IDPs/refugees are compared to estimates for hosts. Where applicable, estimates of non-camp IDPs are compared to hosts. For indicators that are only relevant to IDPs, estimates for camp IDPs are compared to non-camp IDPs where possible. Yellow indicates similar outcomes; red indicates worse outcomes; and green indicates better outcomes, compared to hosts.

only have better sanitation facilities, but worse proximity to the closest market and primary school. The lower school enrollment (four in five countries) and farther access to the nearest market (three in five countries) indicate threats to socioeconomic integration with surrounding communities, in goods markets, labor markets, and future work prospects (through education).

**While labor market outcomes depend heavily on the country context, camp-based displaced are more aid dependent across the board.** Though camp-based IDPs have lower educational enrollment in four countries, labor-market patterns are more contextual. In Somalia and Nigeria, camp IDPs, non-camp IDPs, and hosts all have similar levels of employment and unemployment. In Sudan, the camp IDPs are more likely to be employed than are host communities. However, camp-based IDPs in all three countries depend more on aid as a primary source of livelihood, indicating that despite being employed, camp IDPs find it more difficult to obtain self-reliant, revenue-generating livelihoods. In South Sudan and Ethiopia, the camp-based displaced have lower employment and higher rates of being 'idle' by neither participating in the workforce nor being enrolled in education. These two countries also have the highest rates of aid dependency as a primary source of livelihood (76 percent in South Sudan and 83 percent in Ethiopia). Program responses that work toward ending 'continuing limbo' in camps, by supporting labor force rejoining and integration into country systems, can be key toward facilitating reliance in the medium term.

### **Inequality in host communities is linked to worse perceptions of IDPs and signals the poor socioeconomic conditions that many members of host communities face.**

**IDP presence can alter the socioeconomic fabric of host communities.** The arrival of large numbers of IDPs or refugees represents a local demographic shock for host communities. The influx of IDPs can affect certain parts of the host communities in specific ways. For instance, poorer parts of the host community, or those closest to IDP camps, might find themselves sharing the same resources for water and sanitation, which can put a stress on them in the immediate term. Other parts of the host community, for instance landowners who can rent out the land to IDPs seeking work as farm labor, might benefit from an IDP influx once the labor market adjusts to IDP presence. Groups that gain from IDP presence might diverge in their personal trajectories from groups that lose out. Thus, the 'inflow of the forcibly displaced often transforms dynamics within host communities.'

**Inequality and heterogeneity can affect hosts' perceptions toward IDPs.** Host communities that are more resilient may be better able to accept others. Inequality in income can result in a greater negative effect of IDP influx on lower income groups, for instance, in sharing limited amenities or participating in the same labor market. Individuals who are in the workforce may be affected differently than those who are not. Characteristics of household heads, including sex and education, can further affect the beliefs that household members hold about IDPs. If a community is itself receiving aid, it might not view IDPs as receiving special aid resources. Thus, divergence along several lines, from income to literacy, can affect how readily a host community might be able to absorb IDP influx and presence.

**More unequal host communities believe more strongly that the arrival of the displaced has worsened job prospects.** Local income inequality does not affect relations that hosts have among themselves, overall life satisfaction, or even relations with IDPs or refugees. However, it results in a strong belief that the influx of forcibly displaced groups has worsened job prospects. Higher inequality thus seems to be manifested largely through perceptions about the labor market effect (Table 2). Lower income host households in unequal host communities might be more severely affected by competition for jobs than lower income host households in less unequal communities.

**TABLE 2** Links between host community characteristics and host community perceptions

|  | 1   | 2                   | 3                                       | 4   | 5                             | 6   |
|--|---|---------------------|---|---|-------------------------------|---|
|  | Good relations with neighbors and community | Satisfied with life | Satisfied with employment opportunities | Do not believe that displaced have adversely affected job prospects | Good relations with displaced | Believe that displaced receive strong aid support |
| Standard deviation of household income in area | -1.446                                      | -12.945             | 1.405                                   | -179.615***   | -3.270                        | 3.133   |
| Average household income level in area         | 1.163***                                    | 1.161**             | -0.424                                  | 8.400***  | 1.237***                      | 0.730***  |
| Proportion of woman-headed households in area  | 3.369***                                    | -1.154              | -1.053***                               | -18.483***  | 3.143***                      | 4.467***  |
| Proportion of literate household heads in area | -13.627***                                  | -6.449              | -0.845*                                 | -85.680***  | -14.361***                    | -3.211  |
| Proportion of employed household heads in area | -2.617                                      | -12.264*            | -0.093                                  | -123.905***   | -3.866*                       | 1.196   |
| Proportion of households receiving aid in area | 2.880                                       | 4.946               | 0.229                                   | 58.826***   | 3.472*                        | 1.694   |
| Observations                                   | 4,197                                       | 4,214               | 4,673                                   | 3,200   | 4,199                         | 4,216   |

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali HFS 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.

Note: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . All regressions include country fixed effects and area fixed effects. Green indicates significant and positive results; and red indicates significant and negative results (as in less favorable perceptions of IDPs).

**More prosperous host communities have better relations within the community and more favorable perceptions of displaced populations.** Host households in wealthier areas report better relations with neighbors within the host community, have higher levels of overall satisfaction with their lives, better relations with IDPs or refugees, and are less likely to believe that the influx of the displaced has worsened job prospects. While wealthier host communities believe more keenly that the displaced receive strong aid support, this perception does not seem to manifest as a 'resentment' through worse social relations or negative perceptions.

**Heterogeneity along characteristics other than income also affects the community's perceptions.** Areas with higher proportions of woman-headed households report better social relations but worse perceptions of employment opportunities. Higher literacy of household heads is associated with less favorable social relations and perceptions of employment prospects. Employment of household heads is associated with less favorable employment perceptions and attitudes toward the displaced. Having aid-receiving host households in the area leads to more favorable perceptions of displaced groups.

**Heterogeneity in host communities drives nuanced dynamics with IDPs and warrants greater developmental investment in host community households.** Wealthier households may not compete with IDPs for jobs, and could possibly have livelihoods that are complemented by a labor force influx, explaining their better relations with IDPs and their belief that IDPs do not worsen job prospects for locals. However, poorer households, especially in unequal areas, and individuals who are engaging in the labor market, may be more exposed to IDP presence. Whether through interaction in the job landscape, or due to sharing the same resources such as health, education, and water facilities, poorer households might perceive that IDPs have a greater impact on their socioeconomic outcomes. More literate

host community members might already be dissatisfied with the current job opportunities, which can explain their more favorable perceptions of an IDP influx on jobs. However, by providing aid to the host community areas and developing them further as a developmental objective in their own rights, the integration of IDPs can be bolstered. Households receiving aid have more accommodative perceptions of IDPs, which argues for the provision of support to host communities, as well as to the displaced.

### **IDPs displaced farther from their original residence are more often non-agricultural, have been displaced longer, and prefer to return.**

**IDPs who have been displaced for longer periods of time can have specific needs and opportunities.** IDPs displaced for many years might have faced a prolonged erosion of assets or human capital. Alternatively, they may have had more time to adapt to their current locations, integrate socially, and build relevant skills for local labor markets. Thus, their return intentions might differ from IDPs who are recently displaced.

**Geographical proximity to the original residence can influence IDP outcomes.** Travelling farther can result in a more different ethnic or cultural environment in the new location, influencing social integration as well as economic interaction. Alternatively, IDPs who go far could have been motivated by strong reasons such as family connections or financial means to travel further. They could also have been displaced farther over repeated waves of displacement, which can imply a serious deterioration of physical and human capital.

**IDPs who have been displaced for a longer time have travelled farther from the origin.** Populations internationally displaced (asylum seekers and refugees) have been displaced for longer than internally displaced persons. In contrast, populations displaced outside their state (within the same country), have been living in displacement for longer periods than those displaced within the same state. Similarly, populations displaced outside their county but within their state have been displaced longer than those displaced within their county (Table 3). IDPs who were displaced farther might have faced a more widespread cause of displacement, such as drought that affected a large area, or fast-spreading violence—making it more difficult to return and thus prolonging the state of displacement. IDPs who are located farther from their residence might also have lost contact with networks at the origin or find it costlier and less safe to return along long travel routes.

**Longer displaced IDPs report better social relations with hosts, but this does not translate to higher standards of living.** Longer displaced IDPs are more likely to perceive social relations with host communities as good or very good (Table 3). Having more time to adapt and integrate thus leads to better social cohesion and could also give hosts more space to accommodate IDPs. However, the duration of displacement does not affect living standards on measures such as poverty, school enrollment, or even housing, which might be expected to improve over time as IDPs move from immediate-term shelters into short- or medium-term dwellings.

**IDPs with agricultural backgrounds are often displaced close to the original residence.** IDPs close to their former place of residence are more often agricultural than IDPs displaced farther away (Table 3). Refugees who are in a different country were most rarely agricultural at the place of origin. The geographic trend could be due to a desire to stay close to agricultural land in the hope of an eventual return and resumption of agricultural activities. It could also indicate less resources for travel, thus precluding longer routes and prolonged mobility.

**TABLE 3** Effect of displacement duration and geographic distance from origin on IDP outcomes

|                                   | 1        | 2                | 3                  | 4                 | 5                                 | 6               | 7                 | 8                         | 9                                 | 10                         | 11                                |
|-----------------------------------|----------|------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
|                                   | Poor     | Improved housing | Conflict displaced | Climate displaced | Agricultural livelihood at origin | Prefers to stay | Prefers to return | Good relations with hosts | Duration of displacement in years | Enrolled and of school age | In labor force and of working age |
| Duration of displacement in years | -0.002   | 0.014            | -0.012             | -0.024            | 0.031**                           | -0.017          | 0.009             | 0.032**                   |                                   | 0.003                      | -0.010*                           |
| Same district/LGA/county          | 0.003    | -0.348           | -0.102             | 0.031             | -0.248*                           | -0.254*         | 0.471***          | 0.401***                  | -0.140                            | 0.088                      | -0.030                            |
| Same state/region                 | -0.016   | 0.220            | 0.003              | -0.215            | -0.279***                         | 0.085           | 0.163*            | 0.196*                    | 0.383**                           | 0.116                      | 0.036                             |
| Different state/region            | -0.069*  | -0.346           | -0.190             | -0.635            | -0.563***                         | 0.001           | 0.263*            | -0.241                    | 1.346***                          | 0.123                      | 0.039                             |
| Different country                 | -0.035   | 1.218**          | -0.218             | -4.471***         | -1.143***                         | 0.624*          | -0.722**          | 0.106                     | 2.100*                            | -0.401                     | 0.071                             |
| Household head is literate        | -0.033   | 0.507***         | -0.078             | -0.674***         | -0.424***                         | 0.021           | -0.145*           | 0.163*                    | 0.009                             | 0.125*                     | -0.031                            |
| Household size                    | 0.054*** | -0.023           | -0.038**           | 0.142***          | 0.043***                          | -0.012          | 0.019             | 0.008                     | 0.012                             | 0.016                      | -0.045***                         |
| Household head is a woman         | 0.080*** | -0.200**         | 0.308***           | -0.255            | 0.027                             | 0.167**         | 0.001             | -0.157                    | -0.472***                         | 0.222***                   | 0.025                             |
| Household head is employed        | -0.021   | -0.137           | -0.176*            | 0.476***          | -0.057                            | 0.056           | 0.082             | 0.161*                    | 0.535***                          | 0.020                      | 1.351***                          |
| Observations                      | 7,972    | 9,214            | 9,086              | 9,086             | 9,142                             | 8,835           | 8,835             | 9,208                     | 9,216                             | 20,066                     | 22,241                            |

Source: Authors' calculations using SPS Ethiopia 2017, IDP Survey Nigeria 2018, Somali HFS 2017–18, HFS South Sudan 2017, and IDP Survey Sudan 2018.

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1. All regressions include country fixed effects.

**IDPs who live farther from their origin have a higher preference for return.** The preference for return increases progressively as IDPs move farther away from their original residence, though it drops strongly for refugees who prefer to stay in the country of refuge or seek a new country (Table 3). Despite the desire to return, IDPs displaced farther have better social relations with hosts. Since IDPs who are displaced farther are largely non-agricultural, they may have livelihood backgrounds more similar to hosts, who are largely in urban areas. However, the challenges of being geographically distant from the residence appear to outweigh potential benefits. Having travelled long routes could lead to depletion of physical and human capital, and a loss of connection with social networks. Further, a greater geographic distance could indicate that labor markets and cultural norms are more difficult to integrate into.

# Compiling Country-Level Trends

## **IDPs across the four countries have security concerns and poor living conditions, but their employment patterns differ based on local opportunities.**

**Across the four countries, IDPs are young.** Displacement situations in Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan feature a large presence of children, and so do the countries' societies and refugees in Ethiopia. Children under 15 years of age include 43 percent among IDPs in Sudan, 46 percent among IDPs in South Sudan, 51 percent among IDPs in Somalia, 57 percent among IDPs in northeast Nigeria, and 59 percent among four refugee groups in Ethiopia (Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan). The large proportions of children drive high dependency ratios—especially among women-headed households.

**Most IDPs fled due to armed conflict and violence.** Armed conflict, violence, and insecurity are the main reasons that IDPs fled from their original residence across the four countries, except for 40 percent of Somalis who were displaced due to climate events. The case of Somalis is important as it testifies to the blurred boundaries between conflict- and environmental conditions–induced IDPs: two in five Somali IDPs and one in four Somali refugees in Ethiopia report being displaced due to drought, famine, or flood. In northeast Nigeria, three in four households were displaced due to armed conflict, violence, or communal clashes. Nearly four in five South Sudanese IDPs report having been threatened with a weapon after the start of the conflict in late 2013. In Sudan, more than 9 in 10 IDPs cite armed conflict in their own village as the primary driver of displacement. Consequently, personal security is the greatest priority when displaced people decide where to settle, followed by some group-specific reasons, including access to humanitarian aid and employment opportunities.

**IDPs are displaced close to their original residences.** IDPs tend to be displaced within the same state or region as their original residence, while refugees in Ethiopia tend to cluster in border areas. This indicates that displaced populations avoid being in transit for long distances, which is likely linked to security concerns. In both South Sudan and Somalia, most IDPs (about 70 percent) report being displaced in the same district where they originally lived. In Nigeria, 95 percent of IDPs are displaced within the same state, regardless of whether they are in camps or living among host communities. Similarly, in Sudan, most IDPs did not travel far: 97 percent lived in the same state, North Darfur, before displacement as they do now. The short distance between the place of original residence and the current location is an important dimension for durable solutions. Being close to the original residence may increase the chances for return or family reunification if transit routes are safe, for example.

**IDP populations in the four countries are generally poorer than resident populations.** Most IDPs and refugees are poor (below the poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms), and more so than residents, with the exception of Nigeria where hosts are similarly poor. Poverty rates are 74 percent of IDPs in Somalia (compared with 66 percent of the national population), 82 percent of IDPs in Sudan (compared to 60 percent hosts), 87 percent of Nigerian IDPs (compared with 83 percent hosts), and 91 percent of IDPs in South Sudan (compared with 75 percent of the

urban population). Refugees from Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan who live in camps in Ethiopia have lower poverty rates than IDPs in those countries. However, the gap between refugees and host communities is much starker than that between IDPs and residents/host communities. Resident populations have similar poverty rates to IDPs, as they have been exposed to the same conflicts and droughts that drove displacement.

**IDPs, especially in camps, have access to basic facilities but still face poor living conditions.** IDPs and refugees are also more food insecure than residents. Few IDPs have access to improved housing, apart from the long-displaced IDPs of Sudan. Displaced households often have comparable or marginally better access to basic services—such as water sources, health facilities, schools, and markets—than host communities. While a large share of displaced households use improved sanitation facilities, overcrowding often renders these facilities worse than those used by hosts. Across the four countries, IDPs are significantly more likely to share toilets with multiple other households than are residents. Refugee and IDP children are less likely to be enrolled in school than are children from resident communities, though trends vary at the primary and secondary education levels. About half of all IDPs and refugees are literate, and their literacy rates are comparable to those of their host communities. Across all four countries, there is an urgent need for policy and program interventions to focus on improving living conditions by investing in food security, housing, sanitation, education, and health care.

**IDPs in all four countries have lost their assets, but their current earnings vary with local opportunities.** IDP and refugee populations have significantly lower access to land, livestock, and income-generating assets than they did before displacement. Massive declines in access to productive assets, livestock, and land limits the ability of displaced populations to create employment opportunities and become self-reliant. Displaced persons of working age (15 to 64 years) in South Sudan and Ethiopia are less likely to be employed than residents. Only 32 percent South Sudanese and 22 percent refugees are employed, compared to 48 percent and 61 percent of resident populations, respectively. IDPs are as likely to be employed as residents in Somalia (45 percent) and Nigeria (66 percent). In Sudan, adult IDPs have similar employment rates as hosts (69 percent), but youth IDPs are more likely to be employed and less likely to be in education. More than 75 percent of IDPs in South Sudan and 80 percent of refugees of various nationalities in Ethiopia are highly aid dependent. The IDP populations of Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan are more likely to have a source of income. In Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan, IDPs have shifted their focus from agriculture and salaried jobs to household enterprises. Refugees from these countries in Ethiopia have made a similar shift. In Nigeria the pattern is reversed, with IDPs increasing their focus on agriculture, and hosts renting out agricultural land.

**Social relations between IDPs and residents are bilaterally good, except for the South Sudanese.** IDPs unanimously perceive good relations with the non-displaced communities across Nigeria, Somalia, and Sudan. Host communities' perceptions about relations with the displaced mirror these positive perceptions. Further, in Nigeria, hosts are more likely than IDPs themselves to feel that IDPs do not get sufficient aid. However, South Sudanese IDPs and refugees in Ethiopia experience more challenging social ties. About 45 percent of IDPs in South Sudan and 37 percent South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia report having either bad or very bad relations with host communities. Apart from the South Sudanese, refugee groups in Ethiopia report good relations with host communities. The more recent nature of the South Sudanese displacement, which was triggered in December 2013, might help explain the less integrated social relations. Displacement in Somalia and Sudan has been more continuous and/or protracted, which could have allowed more time for social and economic integration. Income levels are also linked to social perceptions. In South Sudan, approximately 25 percent of IDPs among the poorest income quintile reported good or very good relations as



opposed to nearly 60 percent of the richest quintile. Similarly, in Ethiopia, 67 percent of refugees in the poorest quintile, but 96 percent in the richest quintile, reported positive social relations.

**Most IDPs either want to stay in the current location or return to their origin, with few wanting to resettle in a new location.** Nearly half the IDPs in Sudan, 60 percent in Nigeria, 60 percent in South Sudan, 70 percent in Somalia, and half the refugees in Ethiopia reported wanting to stay in their current locations. Most of the remaining households prefer to return—ranging from 1 in 10 refugees in Ethiopia, 2 in 10 Somali IDPs, 3 in 10 South Sudanese IDPs, and 4 in 10 Nigerian and Sudanese IDPs. Whether IDPs who want to stay or return, they report security as the main factor leading to their decision. This holds even for the Somali IDPs who report being displaced primarily due to drought rather than conflict. The preference to return among Nigerian IDPs is driven by those in camps—76 percent want to return, compared to 28 percent of those who live among host communities. This indicates that IDPs and refugees, apart from the hosted IDPs in Nigeria, feel stuck in their current situation and are unable to plan for their future. In Sudan, the protracted nature of the displacement, with IDPs having stayed in the camps for around 15 years, has led to the camps obtaining the features of more permanent settlements. Across the five countries, durable solutions policies should actively consider the preferences of the displaced populations, while being sensitive to the profound lack of agency that these populations face.

**While program responses depend on country context, all four countries require a shift from encampment toward sustainable solutions for IDPs.** Specific policy responses for IDPs will draw strongly from the country's context. However, IDPs in all four countries require an immediate focus on maintaining and building human capital. Food security, health, sanitary conditions, and children's education are key human capital concerns highlighted in the micro-data. Along with these immediate needs, opportunities for economic integration outside of camps—in the form of skill development, access to land and livestock, and social cohesion with hosts—are essential in building a durable solution. Improving the living conditions of often struggling host communities is essential to lift them out of poverty, and enable them to accommodate the influx of displaced populations.

# Country Results' Deep Dive and Country-Specific Policy Insights

## Nigeria


**In northeastern Nigeria, poverty is widespread among both host communities and IDPs, but the latter are especially vulnerable.**

**Nearly 2 million people are currently displaced in northeastern Nigeria, primarily due to armed conflict.** The Boko Haram insurgency has inflicted a severe human toll and led to large-scale displacement. More than 53,000 deaths from political violence were reported in Nigeria between 2011 and the second quarter of 2018. More than 60 percent of these deaths occurred in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe, with Borno alone accounting for more than 25,000 deaths. As of August 2018, there were an estimated 1.9 million IDPs in Nigeria, up 2 percent from April 2018 and up 5 percent from June 2017. Most IDPs are from the Borno state.

**The micro-data represents IDPs and host communities of northeast Nigeria.** The Nigeria IDP Survey 2018 is a household survey that covered IDP and host community households in six northeastern states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. IDPs were surveyed in two settings: in camps and among host communities. Once IDP households among the host community were selected for an interview, the host community households in their vicinity were also interviewed. The sample for both IDPs and host community households is sufficiently large to produce accurate estimates of the indicators. The results that follow refer to the northeastern IDP and host-community population represented by the survey.

**Most IDPs are children below age 15, both in host communities and in camps.** Almost 6 out of 10 IDPs are children under age 15 while less than 2 percent are elderly people above age 65. About 61 percent of IDPs live in host communities, while 39 percent live in camps (Figure 4). IDPs living among host communities are more largely represented by male children (33.9 percent), while camp-based IDPs are mostly women. In contrast, the host community has a greater proportion of women than IDPs.


**FIGURE 4** Population structure for IDPs and host communities, by sex and age



Source: Authors' calculations using Nigeria IDP Survey, 2018.

**The majority of IDPs are poor, food insecure, and endure a low standard of living.** Almost 9 out of 10 IDPs in northeast Nigeria are below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms, and on average they consume less than one-third of the poverty line threshold. Another 6 in 10 IDP households are highly food insecure (Figure 5). IDPs suffer from overcrowding, both in terms of housing and sanitation. IDP women are less likely than host community women to give birth in a hospital or clinic. IDPs have low school enrollment rates, in fact, many IDP children have not attended school for three years or more—some not since their displacement. Moreover, a significant share of IDPs lost houses that they had owned for many years, and their current housing conditions are much worse. Many IDPs also lost agricultural land owned by their households.

**FIGURE 5** Poverty headcount ratio and food insecurity categories for IDPs and host communities



Source: Authors' calculations using Nigeria IDP Survey, 2018.

**Though slightly better off than IDPs, host communities face widespread poverty and low living standards.**


Host community households are more likely to own homes and agricultural land than are IDPs, though their home ownership rate is only about 50 percent. Host communities also have higher primary and secondary enrollment rates, are more likely to use a doctor or clinic for childbirth, and are less likely to have overcrowded sanitation facilities. Host communities and IDPs have a similar level of access to amenities such as water, sanitation, schools, and markets. However, despite faring better than IDPs on most welfare measures, host communities face significant challenges. About 8 out of 10 host community households live in poverty, consuming on average less than 40 percent of the poverty threshold of US\$1.90 (per person per day in 2011 PPP terms). Almost half of the host community households are highly food insecure, and one in five working-age members do not participate in the labor force.

**IDPs in camps have worse living standards than IDPs living in host communities, and are more likely to want to return.**

While IDPs in camps and in host communities both have similar levels of poverty, living standards tend to be marginally higher among the latter. IDPs in camps face slightly more overcrowding in dwellings, and substantially

more overcrowding in toilets. About one in four IDP households are living in tents or tukuls (huts made with sticks) and not in houses. Camp-based IDP women who are members of men-headed households are also less likely to give birth in a clinic or hospital—possibly due to lack of health services in camps and gendered roles (Figure 6). Camp-based IDP children also are more likely to stay out of school for longer than children in host communities; about half the children in camp settings have been out of school for over 3 years compared to only 16 percent of children living in host communities. The difference in living conditions between camps and host communities appears to influence the desire of IDPs to return home: a majority of camp-based IDPs report that they plan to return home, while most IDPs living among host communities intend to stay.

**FIGURE 6** IDP preferences to stay in current residence, return, or move to a new area




Source: Authors' calculations using Nigeria IDP Survey, 2018.

**IDP and host community women have worse educational and labor outcomes than men, but IDP women also face additional challenges.** Both IDPs and hosts seem to prioritize education of boys over girls. In both groups, primary school enrollment is similar or slightly higher for girls. However, in secondary school, enrollment of girls drops sharply compared to boys. The labor force is also largely dominated by men. Across IDPs and host communities, women are six times more likely to be inactive in the labor force. Additionally, there are specific challenges that more IDP women face. Adult and young women make up about 60 percent of IDPs who are tasked to collect water (compared to 43 percent for host communities). Water collection involves long waiting times, with the opportunity cost of educational or labor force engagement. Water collection chores could also put women at a higher risk of being victims of GBV. Further, more IDP women—than host women—deliver babies at home without the services of a doctor, nurse, or midwife, which greatly increases the risk of maternal mortality.

**From a targeting perspective, IDPs living among host communities and in Borno face the most serious gaps to income generation.** Most IDP households in Nigeria are *productive but poor* (71 percent), followed by *support-dependent* (19 percent), and *self-reliant* (10 percent) (Figure 7). Though host communities have a slightly larger share of *self-reliant* households than IDPs, most households across both groups are *productive but poor*. IDPs living in host communities are more likely to be *support-dependent* than the host community and the camp IDPs. Further, among IDPs, *support-dependent* households are extremely concentrated in Borno state.

**FIGURE 7** Vulnerable population by status of the household and state




Source: Authors' calculations using Nigeria IDP Survey, 2018.

**IDPs in Nigeria have two distinct typology profiles.** Group 1 represents 74 percent of the IDP population and Group 2 around 26 percent (Figure 8). Both groups came from similar places of origin, had similar living standards at the origin, and were displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. However, they differ on a series of key indicators. At the original residence, Group 1 was more engaged in wages or non-farm business, and was more likely to have high dependency ratios or unemployed women as household heads. Meanwhile, Group 2 was more engaged in agriculture, and had larger household sizes.

**The two groups of IDPs can be identified from their location and return intentions.** IDPs of Group 1 have settled among host communities, while Group 2 IDPs have a higher presence in camps. Group 1 reports higher levels of satisfaction with the current situation, and prefers to stay in the current location. Group 2 is more likely to receive

**FIGURE 8** Visualization of Nigerian IDP distinct profiles



Source: Authors' calculations using Nigeria IDP Survey, 2018.

Note: Group 1 is represented by the blue circles and Group 2 by the black triangles.

assistance, reflecting greater access in camps and report lower levels of satisfaction with the current situation than Group 1. Group 2 also feels less safe, more pessimistic about the future, and prefers to return to their origin. These observable differences could prove useful when targeting policy responses to these groups of IDPs in Nigeria.

**Households in Group 1 require more access to safety nets and gender-responsive programs.** IDPs in Group 1 seem to have less access to safety nets because most of them are not located in IDP camps. Nigeria's National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and the State Emergency Management Agencies (SEMA) should support IDPs living in host communities, while policy efforts might be concentrated on IDP camps with structured systems. This is especially relevant for the population in Group 1 as they want to stay in their current location and require better conditions to ultimately bring a durable solution to their displacement. In addition, almost half of the households in Group 1 are headed by women. Policy efforts should address gender-based vulnerabilities as well as GBV and discrimination against women.

**IDPs in Group 2 can benefit from increased access to agricultural land and skill building to diversify their sources of income.** Skill building and protection of human capital are relevant due to the loss of physical capital during displacement, and because economic inactivity makes it more difficult for IDPs to find employment. Before and after displacement, households from Group 2 were more likely to have an agricultural livelihood. Further, their decision to stay or move is guided by access to land, services, and employment. Therefore, policy efforts for IDPs in Group 2 can provide better access to agricultural land, while also building their professional skills to avoid dependency on aid and support an income diversification strategy.

**Substantial investment will be necessary to improve living conditions among host communities and sustain their ability to accommodate disadvantaged and vulnerable IDP groups.** From a targeting perspective, hosts are in extremely dire living conditions themselves, and any durable solution will require building the living standards and opportunities for the hosts so that they can accommodate IDPs. From a sustainable income-generation perspective, IDPs in Borno state are at a larger gap to a durable solution than the other areas. A policy response would need to be three pronged: developing the northeast states, relocating camp IDPs to more permanent locations, and supporting services and income-generation for IDPs in more permanent living arrangements (among hosts or otherwise).

**A durable solution for Nigeria's IDPs must prioritize security and address specific needs of different groups.** Most IDPs have access to water and sanitation facilities, are close to many basic amenities, and have good relations with their host communities. However, rates of poverty and food insecurity among IDPs are alarmingly high, and most face poor housing, education, and health outcomes. Lack of security is a major concern for IDPs, and the ongoing conflict prevents many from returning home. While all IDPs face similar challenges related to insecurity, low school enrollment rates, and overcrowding, IDP women and IDPs living in camps experience additional vulnerabilities and disadvantages. Worse educational outcomes and weaker labor market participation among women, as well as the lower living standards in IDP camps, undermine the prospect of a durable solution.

## Somalia

**The Somali IDP population is extremely young, making human capital essential to prevent lifelong gaps in social and economic development.**


**One in five Somalis have been forcibly displaced.** Of Somalia's total population of 14 million, about 2 million people are internally displaced. In addition, over 877,000 Somali refugees live in neighboring countries—one of the world's

largest refugee populations. Insufficient rainfall over four consecutive rainy seasons, combined with ongoing clan-based conflict and violence by armed nonstate actors, caused a surge in displacement from late 2016 to late 2017. Consequently, Somalia’s forcibly displaced population is a complex mix of IDPs, returnees, and asylum seekers in other countries.

**The micro-data represents IDPs across Somalia, host communities, and the national (non-displaced) population.** The Somali HFS 2017–18 covered the entire Somali population within secure areas. Middle Juba was deemed insecure for enumerators to visit, and thus was excluded. IDPs were sampled in settlements across Somalia. Several households that were originally part of the national rural or urban sample, also self-identified as IDPs, resulted in data on IDPs outside of settlements. Host communities were sampled as urban areas adjacent to IDP settlements. Additionally, (non-host) urban and rural populations are represented in the survey. The Skills Profile Survey of Ethiopia covered refugees of various nationalities, including Somalis. Most Somali refugees covered in the survey are living in camps in the Somali region of Ethiopia and come from different clans and regions within Somalia. Households within a 5 km radius of a camp were classified as host communities and also surveyed.

**IDPs, like the rest of the Somali population, are overwhelmingly young.** Over half of the IDPs are under age 15, and less than 1 percent are above age 64 (Figure 9). The large proportion of children drives high dependency ratios: on average, IDP households have dependency ratios larger than 1, indicating that each working-age member provides for at least one child. Somali refugees in Ethiopia are even younger, with more than 60 percent under age 15. It is critical that development policies and strategies for Somalia address these displacement-related vulnerabilities of the youth.

**FIGURE 9** Population structure for refugees, IDPs, and host communities, by sex and age




Source: Authors’ calculation using Somali HFS 2017–18.

**Somali IDPs face greater poverty and worse living conditions, and have lower levels of human capital than residents.** Poverty rates among host communities and non-IDP urban residents are high at over 60 percent, yet still lower than the rate among IDPs. Over 75 percent of IDPs live on less than US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms (Figure 10 and 11), and more than half of the IDP households are food insecure. IDP settlements are severely overcrowded, which largely negates access to improved drinking water and sanitation. IDP settlements are also located farther from essential facilities—such as primary schools, health centers, and markets—than are host communities. IDP children are


less likely to attend school than are children from host communities or non-IDP urban households, and literacy rates among IDP adults are lower than those of non-IDP adults in urban areas. While Somali refugees in Ethiopia have lower poverty incidence and better health outcomes than IDPs, they have worse access to sanitation and to electricity, and have a lower adult literacy rate than IDPs and urban and rural Somalis. Half the Somali population is under 15 years old,

**FIGURE 10** Poverty headcount ratio



Source: Authors' calculations using Somali HFS 2016–18.

**FIGURE 11** Poverty gap



Source: Authors' calculations using Somali HFS 2016–18.

thus, gaps in educational attainment among IDP children can translate to persistent, lifelong disparities in educational outcomes, employment, and overall well-being.

**Poverty is widespread among IDPs, host communities, and rural residents.** There is no significant difference in the poverty gap when comparing IDPs, host communities, and rural residents; however, host communities are slightly better off than rural residents and IDPs. Fifty-five percent of IDPs face hunger, compared to 43 percent of rural residents, and only 17 percent of urban residents. One in four IDPs have access to improved housing, which is much worse than among the national population, and host and non-host communities, but similar to the share among rural residents (18 percent). IDPs have better access to improved sanitation and health care than rural residents.


**Many IDPs have settled in urban areas and require new skills to adopt urban livelihoods.** Before being displaced, Somali IDPs received wages and salaries, earned small business incomes, and engaged in agriculture. However, salaried labor and aid are now a much larger share of their income (Figure 12). The contrast in livelihoods is even more stark for refugees, who relied overwhelmingly on agriculture before displacement, but depend almost entirely on aid today (Figure 13). Among the climate-displaced IDPs, fewer make a living from agriculture today, and many are now employed in wage labor, indicating an adjustment to a new labor market. Vocational training and livelihoods programs could accelerate this adjustment by bridging skills gaps.

**IDPs receive a relatively small amount of remittances, indicating a lack of safety nets.** Only 7 percent of IDP households rely on remittances as their primary source of income (Figure 12). The average IDP household receives half the remittances of the average non-IDP urban household. The low amounts of remittances indicate that they do not serve as a safety net in case of displacement. Limited social support networks among IDPs, many of whom have lost




homes and faced varying degrees of family and community separation, increase the need for government-provided social protection, especially as a buffer against shocks.

**FIGURE 12** Main sources of livelihoods for residents, hosts, and IDPs before and after displacement



Source: Authors' calculation using Somali HFS 2017–18.

**FIGURE 13** Refugee livelihoods before and after displacement




Source: Authors' calculations using Somali HFS 2016–18.

**Sustainable employment opportunities for IDPs are especially important in a context of changing livelihood structures and weak safety nets.** IDPs are more likely than urban residents to be inactive in the labor force and not enrolled in education (Figure 14). Refugees have an even lower rate of labor force participation, with challenges around legal permission to work under refugee status. For IDPs in Somalia, expanding opportunities for salaried employment—for instance, through public works programs—can help accommodate the influx of new workers into urban labor markets. Approaches that combine the development of cognitive and noncognitive skills with vocational training and/or cash transfers can help address psychosocial challenges such as trauma and depression that may impede IDP participation in the labor market. Moreover, gender-based approaches can address barriers to employment opportunities, such as disadvantageous social norms and a domestic labor burden on women. Interventions focused on expanding economic opportunities among women should include provisions designed to minimize exposure to violence, discrimination and the risk of being a victim of GBV.


**From a targeting perspective, most IDPs are productive but poor, and they concentrate in specific (pre-war) regions.** In Somalia, only a small share of households are classified as *support-dependent* (less than 1 percent). Over 73 percent of IDPs are *productive but poor* and 26 percent *self-reliant* (Figure 15). Host communities have a larger share of *self-reliant* households compared to IDPs. The vulnerability status of households varies markedly by (pre-war) region. Almost all IDPs in lower Juba are *self-reliant*, whereas most households in Banadir, Middle Shabelle, Gedo, Woqooyi Galbeed, and Bay are *poor but productive*. This indicates a need for region-based targeting to improve IDPs' gaps for a durable solution.

**FIGURE 14** Employment status of IDPs, refugees, rural and urban residents




Source: Authors' calculation using Somali HFS 2017–18.

**FIGURE 15** Vulnerable IDP population by pre-war region



Source: Authors' calculation using the Somali HFS 2017–18.

**Somali IDPs have two distinct typology profiles.** Households in Group 1, which include about 40 percent of the sample, tended to derive their livelihoods from agriculture before being displaced. They are more likely to have been displaced by drought than households in Group 2, and their living conditions before being displaced were generally worse than their current living conditions. Group 2 households were less dependent on agriculture and had better housing quality before being displaced, and they are more likely than Group 1 households to have been displaced by armed conflict (Figure 16). Currently, Group 2 households tend to be less poor, less food insecure, and in better housing conditions than households in Group 1.

**FIGURE 16** Visualization of Somali IDP distinct profiles

Source: Authors' calculation using Somali HFS 2017–18.

Note: Group 1 is represented by the black triangles and Group 2 by the blue circles.

**Uncertainty around security dominates return intentions for both groups, outweighing their potentially different tendencies.** Over 70 percent of households in both groups prefer to stay in the current location rather than return to their place of origin or relocate. For both groups, security is the main reason driving their mobility preferences: stay, return, or resettle. Security is also the key support that both groups seek to settle anew. This indicates the nature of the displacement situation, which is still entrenched in uncertainty regarding security. It is possible that in a post-conflict stage, differences among the two groups will become more pronounced. Group 1 had more agricultural livelihoods and continues to have more access to agricultural land today, which could create scope for a move (or a return) to rural locations. Group 2, in contrast, depended more on salaries and businesses, which might allow for integration in an urban setting, whether at the origin or in a new location.

**IDPs should be able to choose freely whether to return, stay, or settle elsewhere.** International standards highlight that durable solutions for displaced populations may entail returning sustainably to places of origin, locally integrating in current communities, or settling in another part of the country; particularly important is the right of displaced populations to choose freely between these options. More specifically, in the context of Somali regions, advancing durable solutions for displacement-affected populations—including IDPs, returning Somali refugees, and host communities—should further reflect three considerations. First, support for return to communities of origin in areas where conflict and climate-related events have abated and where voluntary, safe, and dignified return is feasible. Second, support for local integration for those unwilling to return to areas affected by continuing conflict or climate-related events, or other factors. Third, support as feasible, for those currently displaced in areas of continuing conflict and/or humanitarian emergency or for those interested in return even in the context of ongoing instability.

**Support for rural development and resilience to drought will be key in a durable solution for Somalia.** Overall, socioeconomic and human capital outcomes among Somali IDPs tend to be comparable to, or slightly better than, those of non-IDP rural households, highlighting the severe developmental deficits confronting Somalia's rural population. Improving rural access to services and livelihoods is therefore essential to enable IDPs to return or relocate to rural areas. Initial support to help restore rural livelihoods and approaches of drought-resilient rehabilitation of livelihoods, including investments in agricultural inputs and livestock herds, should be complemented by long-term development

assistance. Key interventions could include cash transfers to support basic consumption, skills development to bolster human capital formation, and land restoration and housing repairs to recover losses from displacement.

**Substantial investment in already strained urban centers—which currently offer suboptimal living conditions to displaced households—is key for the successful local integration of Somalia’s IDPs.** An ongoing process of rapid urbanization, combined with the concentration of IDP settlements in cities and towns, is putting significant stress on Somalia’s urban infrastructure, and investing in the viability and resilience of Somalia’s urban and peri-urban areas is critical. Urban services—such as water, housing, sanitation, education, and infrastructure, for example for roads and telecommunications—are vital to help cities absorb large population inflows. Preventing a decline in service, infrastructure, and livelihood quality in host communities is essential to preserve positive IDP-host community relations.

## South Sudan


**IDPs in four camps in South Sudan have lost productive assets and are among the country’s most aid-dependent populations.**

**The conflict in South Sudan began in December 2013 and displaced an estimated 4 million people.** Fighting between forces aligned with ethnic Dinka and Nuer factions broke out in Juba, igniting a civil war that quickly spread across the country. Greater Upper Nile and parts of Greater Bahr el Ghazal were initially affected by the violence. Eventually, the fighting spread to Greater Equatoria, inciting local rebellions and widespread violence. About 2.1 million South Sudanese became refugees in neighboring Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Another 1.9 million people are IDPs within South Sudan, 15 percent of which are in camps.

**The micro-data represents IDPs from four Protection of Civilian (PoC) camps in South Sudan, and urban populations of South Sudan.** The Crisis Recovery Survey (CRS) was conducted in 2017 in four of the biggest PoC camps with defined boundaries. The camps, all in urban areas, are Bentiu PoC, Bor PoC, Juba PoC, and Wau PoC, located in the pre-war states of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, respectively. Though the CRS covers PoCs, where only 15 percent of South Sudan’s IDPs are located, the detailed micro-data fills important knowledge gaps for IDP-focused programming. The fourth wave of the High Frequency Survey (HFS) South Sudan 2017 allows for comparisons of IDPs to urban residents. The HFS 2017 represents urban areas in 7 of the 10 pre-war states of South Sudan. As the PoC camps covered in the CRS are in urban areas, HFS 2017 allows for comparisons in the outcomes of IDPs and the residents of the areas where IDPs are now located. However, HFS 2017 does not cover two of the pre-war states in which CRS camps are located (Jonglei and Unity). Thus, comparisons are drawn at the overall urban and IDP level rather than for specific camps or pre-war states. Additionally, data on South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia come from the SPS 2017. This survey represents South Sudanese refugees living in camps in the Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz regions of Ethiopia. Most of these refugees originated from the Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei (pre-war) states of South Sudan. The results that follow refer to the survey populations of CRS (four PoC camps), HFS (urban population of seven pre-war states), and SPS (South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopian camps).

**IDPs in South Sudan tend to be younger than residents, driving high dependency ratios.** About 45 percent of IDPs and over 60 percent of South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia are under 15 years old, as opposed to 32 percent of 15-year-old urban residents (Figure 17). Consequently, fewer IDPs and even fewer refugees are of the working age, between 15 and 64 years old. This translates to higher dependency ratios among the displaced populations than among hosts. In IDP households, each working-age member must look after one non-working-age dependent, while in refugee households, each working-age member must look after two non-working-age dependents.

**FIGURE 17** Population structure for IDPs and host communities, by sex and age




Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.

**South Sudanese IDPs have faced a drastic deterioration in living standards, and their current living conditions are significantly worse than those of non-IDP urban residents.** South Sudan has extremely high levels of poverty, and IDPs live in especially dire circumstances. More than 90 percent of IDP households are below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms. Refugees in Ethiopia fare slightly better, with 70 percent below the poverty line. Before the 2013 conflict, more than 4 out of 10 IDP households had improved housing, and 9 out of 10 owned their home. Today, almost all IDPs and refugees live in overcrowded tents or temporary shelters. Severe overcrowding in dwellings and toilet use reduces living standards, contributes to the spread of communicable diseases, and increases the threat of being a victim of GBV.


**Poverty is widespread among IDPs and rural residents.** IDPs and rural residents who are poor live on less than half the income threshold of US\$1.90 PPP (2011) per day per capita (Figure 18). Where poverty is more prevalent, it is also more severe (Figure 19). Bentiu PoC, which has the highest poverty incidence, has the deepest poverty gap (60 percent), while Bor PoC, which has the lowest poverty incidence, has the smallest poverty gap (34 percent).

**FIGURE 18** Poverty headcount ratio for IDPs and residents



Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.


**FIGURE 19** Poverty gap relative to US\$1.90 PPP (2011) per day per capita poverty line for IDPs and residents



Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.


**IDPs have better educational outcomes than rural residents but worse than urban residents, and men are more likely to be literate.** About 53 percent of IDPs above 14 years old are literate, compared with 33 percent of rural and 62 percent of urban residents (Figure 20). Women are much less likely than men to be literate in all three groups, with a disparity of about 35 percent for IDPs and urban residents, and 28 percent for rural residents. Among IDPs, members of households headed by men or in the richest quintile are more literate. While more than half of IDPs are literate, few have studied beyond primary school. About one in four IDPs have a secondary school or university education. This is driven by stark sex differences, with 43 percent men but only 10 percent women having studied beyond primary school. Compared to men, women are more than twice as likely to have had no education (Figure 21).

**FIGURE 20** Literacy rates, 15 years and above for IDPs, urban, and rural residents



Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.

**FIGURE 21** Adult educational attainment for IDPs, urban, and rural residents, by sex




Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.

**IDP youth are more likely to be idle than urban youth, while young women have higher labor participation and lower educational enrollment.** In general, youth have lower labor force participation because most of them are enrolled in education.<sup>7</sup> However, IDP youth have lower labor force participation than urban youth (32 percent and 63 percent, respectively). One in four IDP youth are idle—neither working, nor looking for work, nor studying. Young women have higher labor force participation and lower educational enrollment than young men, suggesting that young men prioritize education over working. Among adults, the labor force participation trends are reversed. Men are more likely to be active in the labor force while women are idle.

**South Sudanese IDPs have lost a large share of their income-generating assets and now rely overwhelmingly on aid.** Agricultural land access for the average IDP household has fallen from 0.8 acres before the conflict to about 0.2 acres today. IDP households also lost almost all their livestock holdings over the course of their displacement, with average holdings falling from 42 livestock units to just 2 livestock units (Figure 22). Refugees also face a drastic loss of access to productive assets, land, and livestock. These losses further limit the ability of displaced populations to create employment opportunities for themselves, weakening their self-reliance. More than 75 percent of IDP households and 90 percent of refugee households now rely on humanitarian aid as their chief source of livelihood.

7. Labor force participation is the sum of working-age individuals who are looking for work (employed or unemployed).


**FIGURE 22** Agricultural land and livestock holdings before and after displacement



Source: Authors' calculations using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.

**From a targeting perspective, 1 in 10 IDP households are support-dependent, and most of them are located in Bor PoC, Juba PoC, and Wau PoC.** Almost 13 percent of IDP households are *support-dependent*, 64 percent *productive but poor*, and 23 percent *self-reliant* (Figure 23). Urban resident and IDP households are equally likely to be *support-dependent*. However, urban households are four times more likely to be *self-reliant* than IDP households. The *support-dependent* IDP population is concentrated in the PoCs of Bor, Juba, and Wau. This exposes the heightened vulnerability of IDP households compared to urban residents. Camp-level policies will help target households with specific needs.

**FIGURE 23** Vulnerable IDP population by PoC




Source: Authors' calculation using HFS 2017 and CRS 2017.

**IDPs in South Sudan have two typology profiles.** The two groups were displaced by armed conflict and have different trajectories. Before displacement, households of Group 1 (40 percent of the sample, Figure 24), derived their income from wages and businesses. Group 2 households were more likely to have agricultural livelihoods, and worse housing quality, than Group 1 households. Differences in the pre-displacement circumstances of the two groups likely drive the

discrepancies in their living standards today. Group 2 households tend to be larger, poorer, more aid dependent, and with higher dependency ratios. They also feel less safe in their current environment, and are more confident of returning or resettling soon. However, Group 1 households are more optimistic about their future. Group 1 households are primarily located in Juba and Bor PoCs, while Group 2 households are concentrated in Bentiu and Wau PoCs.

**FIGURE 24** Visualization of IDP distinct profiles



Source: Authors' calculation using CRS 2017.

Note: Group 1 is represented by the black triangles and Group 2 by the blue circles.

**Group 2 is poorer and has larger dependency ratios.** Group 2 has more children and, as a result, more overcrowded dwellings and larger dependency ratios. This makes the need to ensure regular attendance and schooling quality a higher priority for these households. Further, child-specific vulnerabilities, including child abuse, which involves mostly girls, need to be addressed. Ensuring basic and timely care for young children, particularly infants and those under five years of age, is critical to maintain and enhance long-term human capital, which will have a bearing on the future of the nation's productivity, poverty, and workforce. To address the high dependency ratios, better vocational training targeted toward the working age, and other opportunities to build technical skills and prevent a protracted economic inactivity which could lead to skill erosion, are key avenues for developmental responses.

**Both groups reported information needs.** Regular and reliable information about the security and political situation in origin areas, as well as in potentially new areas is needed, as nearly 4 in 10 households in Group 1 and 5 in 10 households in Group 2 believe that they do not have enough knowledge to inform a decision to return, move, or stay. Reliable information flows to the displaced communities about their original residence and resettlement areas are key for durable solutions that support permanent settlement and will also continue to be relevant in a post-conflict stage when news about security, infrastructure, and reconstruction efforts for towns and cities affected by the conflict will be crucial for mobility decisions.

**It is extremely important to maintain human capital in the face of sharp losses in physical capital, which is precarious given the unpredictable erupting conflict.** Any durable solutions will depend on the improvement of the security situation and the provisions of services following the peace agreement signed in September 2018. Safeguarding IDPs' human capital is crucial. Ensuring basic and timely care for young children, particularly infants and those under five years of age, is critical to maintain and enhance long-term human capital, which will have a bearing on the



future of the nation's productivity, poverty, and workforce. This is especially pertinent because physical capital in the form of housing and assets has largely been lost, and replacing it in the post-conflict stage will need to be accompanied by strong human capital, which can start to be nurtured and built in the current stage through health, education, and skill-based programming.

**Security, services, and humanitarian assistance are vital to durable solutions for IDPs in South Sudan.** While security is the primary cause of displacement, access to services and humanitarian assistance are also important factors in determining return or resettlement. Once security conditions improve sufficiently, the provision of services and humanitarian assistance in places of origin could encourage IDPs to return. About 30 percent of all IDPs want to return home now, with most citing security, services, assets, employment, and livelihood opportunities as their most important reasons. Where security conditions have already improved, the provision of essential services and humanitarian assistance, combined with programs to restore property and assets, can help IDPs return successfully.

**As the security situation continues to stabilize, IDP policies and programs will need to shift from temporary assistance to sustainable development.** For IDPs who want to stay in their host communities, short-term objectives include (a) maintaining and building their human capital by strengthening food security and improving access to health care and education, and (b) improving their living conditions by investing in housing, sanitation, and other forms of infrastructure. In the medium term, focus should gradually shift to (a) providing opportunities for the socioeconomic integration of IDPs by strengthening social cohesion, promoting skills development, and expanding access to employment, land, and livestock; (b) continuing to build their human capital through nutrition, health, and education programs; (c) encouraging self-reliance by scaling back humanitarian assistance where possible; and (d) supporting host communities to absorb IDPs and improve their own living conditions by improving the quality of local services and economic opportunities. For IDPs who want to return, medium-term objectives include (a) promoting the socioeconomic reintegration of returnees by building social cohesion, investing in skills development, expanding access to jobs, and restoring property and assets; (b) continuing to build their human capital through nutrition, health, and education programs; (c) providing humanitarian assistance where necessary; and (d) building the capacity of local communities to absorb returnees and improve their own living conditions by improving the quality of services and economic opportunities.

## Sudan

**In Sudan, camp-based IDPs have been displaced for more than 10 years, yet they remain extremely poor and food insecure.**

**Sudan has seen 15 years of conflict and today has one of the largest number of IDPs in the world.** Complex internal conflicts that started in 2003 led to the separation from South Sudan; internal conflicts continue to be the main driver of forced displacement in Sudan. Although the number has been decreasing since 2016, the most recent available estimates indicate that as many as 2 million individuals, 5 percent of Sudan's population, are internally displaced.<sup>8</sup> Sudan is also a transit country for asylum seekers and a destination country for refugees, most notably from South Sudan and also from Syria, Eritrea, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others.


**The micro-data represents IDPs living in two camps near Al Fashir City, and the host population residing in the city.** The Sudan IDP Profiling Survey 2018 represents IDPs in two camps near Al Fashir. The two camps, Abu Shouk and

8. UNHCR, "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017."

El Salam, are in the sub-urban and peri-urban areas of Al Fashir, which is the capital city of the North Darfur state. The host population, consisting of residents of Al Fashir, is also represented in the survey. Additionally, data on Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia comes from the SPS 2017. This survey represents, among other refugee populations, the Sudanese refugees living in camps in the Benishangul Gumuz region of Ethiopia. Most of the refugees are from the Blue Nile region of Sudan, thus they have a different regional context than IDPs.

**IDPs are young and in equal numbers of men and women; their demographic profile resembles that of non-IDP populations more than that of newly registered IDPs in Sudan.** Both IDP and host populations are young: 43 percent of the IDP population is less than 15 years of age, compared to 40 percent of the host population (Figure 25). However, these protracted IDPs are older than what is typically observed among newly registered IDPs. The IDP population studied here appears to be closer therefore to the host population than to other IDPs in Sudan. Indeed, this group of IDPs is also older than the Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia, where almost three in five are below 14 years of age. The share of women is one in two and is not statistically different between IDPs and hosts in Al Fashir. This again is a slightly lower proportion of women among IDPs than for the newly registered in 2016, where it was 54 percent. However, in one of two IDP households the head is a woman, which is significantly more than among hosts (31 percent) and similar to the refugee population.

**FIGURE 25** Population structure of IDPs, hosts, and refugees by sex and age




Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**Most IDPs in Sudan's surveyed camps were displaced at the height of the Darfur conflict in 2003–04.** Most IDPs in camps around Al Fashir in North Darfur have been displaced for over a decade, and about half want to remain where they are. Four out of five camp households were displaced shortly after the beginning of the conflict in the early 2000s and have lived in the camps since then. Three percent lived outside the North Darfur state before displacement, yet only 30 percent have returned to their previous places of residence. Instead, most working-age IDPs engage in income-generating activities in or around the camps. Many IDPs who wish to remain in the camps cite concerns about security, but IDPs also appreciate the access to health and education services that camps offer. Also, almost one in two IDPs were either not born or below the age of five at displacement and have thus grown up in the camps.

**Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia were displaced significantly later in the conflict and from a different region than IDPs, but can serve as an interesting comparison group in many respects.** Most of the Sudanese refugees in the Ethiopian Beneshangul-Gumuz region were displaced from the neighboring Sudanese Blue Nile state, with the emergence of new rebel groups at the advent of the latest phase of the conflict in 2011–2012 (Figure 26). Their situation is therefore substantially less protracted, and indeed they are significantly younger, and their labor force participation is lower. However, they resemble the internally displaced in that they were originally farmers and owned their homes; yet, given the protracted conflict, about half want to stay in the camps.


**FIGURE 26** Displaced people by violent event and year




Source: Authors' calculations using ACLED (conflict events 2001–2017) and Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**Sudanese IDPs and host communities are extremely poor and in urgent need of employment and livelihood opportunities.** Four out of five IDPs have income levels below the international poverty line of US\$1.90 per person per day in 2011 PPP terms (Figure 27 and Figure 28), yet at 60 percent of the population poverty is almost as widespread among hosts. A recent spike in food prices following the removal of subsidies, compounded by seasonal shortages, may have caused a temporary spike in the poverty rate. However, high levels of severe food insecurity (64 percent) and the general lack of access to productive assets underscore the dire circumstances of Sudanese IDPs. Representing a possible alternative, the refugees in Ethiopia display almost the same levels of poverty (73 percent). IDPs largely generate their own income, yet it is barely enough: IDPs who wish to relocate frequently cite the lack of employment and livelihood opportunities in the camps as their main reason.

**Most IDPs live in permanent structures provided by the humanitarian community, but they do not depend on aid for food or income.** Virtually all IDPs live in traditional structures made of mud, clay, and wood that are largely provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or United Nations (UN) agencies. However, only 6 percent of IDP households depend on aid as their main source of income, and only 20 percent receive any aid at all; in contrast, Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia overwhelmingly live off aid. This independence is generally positive, but it also reflects limitations on aid access. Faced with high poverty rates and few opportunities to generate income, many IDPs, as well as non-displaced groups, may require additional aid in the short term.

**FIGURE 27** Poverty headcount ratio for IDP and host populations

Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**FIGURE 28** Poverty gap relative to US\$1.90 PPP (2011) poverty line for IDP and host populations


Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**While access to many important services in the camps is better than at IDPs' places of origin, supplies of food and electricity are often deficient.** Sudanese IDPs have adequate housing by international humanitarian standards, and overcrowding is rare. In these aspects, they fare better than those displaced over the border to Ethiopia, where overcrowding is much more prevalent. In addition, most IDPs have access to improved sources of drinking water and improved sanitation facilities, as well as health centers, schools, and markets—though, they have lower school enrollment than hosts. Four out of five IDPs with plans to stay in the camps cite the good access to health and education services as a reason. However, three out of five IDPs face high levels of food insecurity, and only 9 percent of IDP households have electricity in their homes.

**Literacy rates among IDPs are similar to those of the host population and lower for IDP women and people in women-headed households, while those displaced to Ethiopia face particularly bad educational prospects.** Adult IDPs have lower levels of educational attainment although they are about as likely to be able to read and write a simple sentence as hosts. The sex-based discrepancy concerning education in the camps is considerable: while 78 percent of men can read and write, this is only the case for 62 percent of the women. Also, people living in a woman-headed household are less likely to be literate as compared to where a man is the household head. The educational prospects are still much better for IDPs than in the refugee camps in Ethiopia, where only 2 percent of eligible children attend secondary school.

**Employment levels are similar for adult IDPs and hosts, IDP women are more likely to work than host women, and IDP youth are more likely to be working than to be in education.** The majority of both displaced and host adults are employed—including informal employment. Compared to 47 percent host women, 58 percent of IDP women are currently working. However, labor force participation among women is significantly lower than among men. About 3 in 10 IDP and host women are neither working, nor unemployed, nor in education. About 44 percent of the IDPs between 15 and 25 are working and 37 percent are in education. Among youth in the host population, on the other hand, only 25 percent are working while 55 percent are in education (Figure 29).


**FIGURE 29** Labor force participation and employment status among working-age population



Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**Both Sudanese IDPs and refugees lived off agriculture at their places of origin, while now only a few have access to land or livestock.** More than 9 in 10 IDP households lived off agriculture before being displaced, while less than one in two IDP households still do. Those who do are in tendency the poorest, so farming does not appear to be a desirable activity under the present circumstances. Only one in three IDP households have access to agricultural area plots, and one in five own livestock (Figure 30). Virtually none of the more recently displaced refugees in Ethiopia live off agriculture. These constraints surely are in part due to the camps being in a more urban setting; yet providing them with basic agricultural possibilities may well empower many in these displaced populations to make a better living for themselves.


**FIGURE 30** Main sources of livelihoods for IDPs, hosts, and refugees



Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.


**IDPs remain economically vulnerable and more so than hosts, despite being productive.** About 70 percent of IDP households are *productive but poor*, having household members who regularly engage in productive activities and are not dependent on aid, yet remain poor. Almost 10 percent are even more vulnerable in that they are *support-dependent*, or entirely depend on external support (Figure 31). These vulnerabilities are similar across the two camps. Only 50 percent of host households are *productive but poor*, and only 4 percent are fully *support-dependent* (Figure 32).

**FIGURE 31** Vulnerable population by status of the household



Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.


**FIGURE 32** Vulnerable IDP population by camp



Source: Authors' calculations using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

**IDPs in Sudan have two distinct typology groups.** Before being displaced, these two groups of IDPs had different sources of income, with Group 1 relying more heavily on agriculture. Households in Group 1 (representing 39 percent of the sample, Figure 33), are more likely to have been displaced in 2003 and 2004. They are more likely to live in a shelter provided by the camp and are therefore closer to services and more likely to have access to an improved water source. However, Group 1 households have a higher poverty rate and a deeper average poverty gap. They are more likely to face food insecurity than Group 2, and to rely on assistance from development partners or NGOs. Most households in Group 1 want to relocate, primarily to obtain better access to employment. By contrast, most households in Group 2 prefer to stay where they are for security reasons.

**The two types of IDPs have different needs to improve their livelihoods, and largely aim for different durable solutions.** Before displacement, households from Group 1 were more likely to live off agriculture and are currently poorer and more likely to rely on assistance for their livelihood and dwelling. Skills and human capital are especially pertinent due to the loss of physical capital during displacement. Most households in Group 1 want to relocate based on employment and other considerations, but do not have a clear timeline, possibly because they need more information to firm their plans. Therefore, households in Group 1 require information about employment prospects in other districts from reliable sources, as well as conditions for them to re-engage successfully in productive activities. Households in Group 2 want to stay in their current settlement, and many have all the information they need to make this decision.

**FIGURE 33** Visualization of IDP distinct profiles

Source: Authors' calculation using Sudan IDP Profiling Survey, 2018.

Note: Group 1 is represented by the black triangles and Group 2 by the blue circles.

**Households in Group 2 require gender-responsive programs, increasing their access to services and better living conditions.** More than half of the households in Group 2 are headed by women. Policy efforts aimed at Group 2 should consider gender-based vulnerabilities related to domestic work and caring labor, in addition to gender-based violence and discrimination against women in accessing income-generating activities. Group 2 also seems to have less access to services and worse housing, perhaps because most of them are located far from the main centers of the camps. Assistance from development partners and NGOs should aim to particularly reach households located at the outskirts of the camps and those headed by women, providing better services such as water and electricity.

**A durable solution for protracted displacement in Al Fashir must improve living conditions for hosts and IDPs in camps that have become a permanent residence for many.** IDP camps are permanent settlements and perceived as such, where relations with the host community are good. Housing in the camps is largely in permanent traditional houses where overcrowding is low, and IDPs are mostly working for their main sources of income. A clear majority describe relations with the host community as good, a view that is also shared by the latter. Therefore, the camps have good potential to become a permanent residence for many. However, the challenges associated with such an integration must be incorporated in a plan for a durable solution. Given the sustained conflict in the region, the situation of the urban Al Fashir population is also dire, which undermines their capabilities to host the displaced.

**Improving the security situation and expanding economic opportunities in return areas are key elements of a durable solution.** Potential returnees often cite security concerns outside the camps as their primary reason to remain, therefore, improving the security situation will be necessary for a successful return process. As most IDPs were engaged in agriculture before being displaced, returnees will require support to restart their farms and rebuild their livestock herds.

# Micro-Data Is an Essential Input to Inform Durable Solutions

**Micro-data analysis of displaced populations can inform more precise, tailored, and durable solutions.**

**The study contributes to the growing field of micro-data collection and analysis, using cutting-edge techniques to examine forced displacement dynamics and inform durable solutions.** This report offers a unique perspective on one of the most challenging issues in international development by comparatively and systematically examining internal displacement at the micro level across four cases (examined in detail in Volume B of the report). Its innovative methodology expands the scope for empirical analysis and evidence-based solutions to priority displacement issues, and it encompasses both displaced and non-displaced groups. The report aims to influence policy decisions and contribute to more effective displacement-related interventions.

**This study contributes to five key areas of the literature on forced displacement, especially on IDPs.** First, it applies micro-data analysis within the durable solutions framework to create a holistic profile of IDPs that links the causes of their displacement with their current needs, assets, and aspirations, enabling policy makers to develop solutions tailored to the household level. Second, it proposes a comparative methodology designed to enable a robust assessment of trends across countries and between displaced and non-displaced communities within each country. Third, it applies complementary analytical methodologies to displaced groups and host communities to inform solutions that are durable for all stakeholders. Fourth, the comparison between IDPs and non-displaced residents provides an evidence base to link displacement factors to specific vulnerabilities. Fifth, a displacement profile using perception data to identify causes of displacement, priorities and needs, and future intentions of displaced people, feeds into policy directions for durable solutions.

**Enhanced data collection and analysis can strengthen the evidence base for durable solutions.** The case studies of selected camps in South Sudan and Sudan, as well as representative samples of IDP populations in Nigeria and Somalia, underscore the importance of obtaining detailed quantitative survey data that can underpin targeted interventions. IDPs are often excluded from national surveys, and mainstreaming micro-data collection in displacement-related policies and programs can help close existing data gaps. While dedicated surveys are the most effective approach in the near term, over time national surveys could be adapted to include displacement-specific questionnaire modules and explicitly stratified to identify displaced populations and host communities. This approach would be especially useful in countries experiencing long-term displacement, such as Sudan, or those which are especially prone to receiving refugee populations from neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia. Additionally, specific challenges involving collecting and analyzing data on forced displacement are discussed in Volume C of this report.



**Video testimonials give voice to one of the world’s least represented and most vulnerable people**

**The quantitative profiles of IDPs capture their lives in abstract numbers, yet they do not reveal their daily struggles.**

IDPs have been forced to flee their homes, often experienced harm and violence, and lost family members and friends, while having to make difficult decisions about their lives. Upon arrival in a more secured area such as an IDP camp, they had to start from scratch—looking for food, water, and shelter; trying to find work; and ensuring that their children can attend a school. While the challenges for IDPs are captured in the profile, the profile does not depict the suffering that people go through to make ends meet. The surveys in South Sudan and Somalia used hand-held devices to collect data. At the end of the quantitative survey, respondents were asked to voluntarily record a quick message.

**The Pulse of South Sudan and the Somali Pulse websites contain hundreds of video testimonials recorded with tablets during fieldwork to capture the voice of the people and give a face to the data.**

The websites present insights from the World Bank’s South Sudan and Somali HFS, as well as video testimonials—with subtitles in English—reflecting the dire situation on the ground and what it is like to live in poverty, often after being displaced. The videos depict the sense of powerlessness, the pain of hunger, the stress of hopelessness, and the feelings of disappointment that express the experiences of the respondents. The opportunity to voice the struggle is a first step to empowerment of the world’s least represented voices, allowing them to tell the world of what their life is like. It is also an inspiration to continue finding innovative ways for helping them and millions like them to find durable solutions. The websites can be found at the following links:

<http://www.thepulseofsouthsudan.com>

<http://www.thesomalipulse.com>



# References

IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee). 2010. "IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons." The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement. <http://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/dms/Documents/IASC%20Framework%20DS%20for%20IDPs.pdf>.

IDMC. "Global Report on Internal Displacement." 2018.

IDMC, and NRC. 2018. "Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018." Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

JIPS (Joint IDP Profiling Service). "Durable Solutions Analysis Guide: A Tool to Measure Progress Toward Durable Solutions to Internal Displacement," Forthcoming.

UNHCR. 2018. "Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017." Geneva: UNHCR.



**WORLD BANK GROUP**

Poverty & Equity