



Real Time Evaluation

Humanitarian response



AUGUST 28TH 2022

REAL TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS RESULTING FROM THE WAR IN UKRAINE

July 24th – August 18th, 2022

François Grunewald



Within the framework of the project « Meaning and innovating in front of crises » with the support of:



Acknowledgements and thanks

This mission would not have been possible without the help of the many Ukrainian men and women who helped me make the necessary preparations and also helped immerse me in Ukrainian society. They made me welcome and provided support during a rich, moving experience of Ukraine in wartime. It would be impossible to mention everyone by name, but I should like to thank Nathalie and Diana from the NGO Aide Médicale Caritative France-Ukraine; Vas and Cyril in Lyiv, Elena in Kyiv, Oleski and Anna in Kharkiv, Arten and Natalia in Dnipro, Michel Sergiev and Elena in Odessa, as well as many others.

The international humanitarian actors were very receptive to the idea of this evaluation mission. My thanks to Denise Brown, humanitarian coordinator, and her deputy Sebastian, as well as the OCHA teams in Kyiv, Dnipro and Odessa as well as ECHO's technical staff. Thanks too to colleagues from NGOs I met (ACTED, Solidarités International, PUI, ACF, Caritas, MSF). Finally, thanks to colleagues from ICRC, with whom I had very rich discussions.


*« Reste-t-il encore des oiseaux à contempler
Dans le ciel d'Ukraine,
Y entend-on toujours leur chant ?
Trouvent-ils encore
Des arbres pour les inviter
Des arbres où se cacher ?
Ont-ils encore des nids pour s'abriter
En ce pays détruit ?
Ont-ils toujours le goût d'ouvrir leurs ailes
Pour s'élever dans la gloire des matins ? »*
Jean Lavoué

*« Notre âme ne peut pas mourir,
la liberté ne meurt jamais. »*
Taras Chevtchenko

Extracts from 'Des ailes pour l'Ukraine', published by L'Enfance de l'arbre.¹

¹ Proceeds from sales of this poetry collection go to humanitarian groups helping the people of Ukraine. The collection is available to order from L'Enfance de l'arbre, 3 Place Veille-Ville, 56700 Hennenbort.

Map of the Itinerary of the mission



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Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

list of acronyms

ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
AGUN	Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies
ATO	Anti-Terrorist Operation
CAI	Conflit armé International
CGLU :	Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unnis
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
CICR	Comité International de la Croix-Rouge
CIJ	Cour Internationale de Justice
DDC	Donbass Development Center
DG ECHO	General Directorate on Civile Protection and Humanitarian Aid of the EU
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic
EPL	Environment People Law
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GCA	Government-controlled areas
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoU	Government of Ukraine
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internaly Displaced People
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IP	Implementing partner
JFO	Joint Forces Operation
LPR	Luhansk People's Republic
MESU	Ministère de l'Éducation et des sciences éducatives d'Ukraine
MoSP	Minister for Social Policy (ministère des Affaires sociales)
MPC	Multipurpose Cash Transfert (transferts financiers inconditionnels)
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIAC	Non-international armed conflict
NGCA	Non-government-controlled areas
NGO	Non governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NU	Nations Unies
OHCHR	Bureau du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies sur les Droits de l'Homme
OIM	Organisation internationale pour les migrations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSCE SMM	Special Monitoring Mission de l'OSCE
PCU	Protection civile ukrainienne
PIN	People in Need
PU-AMI	Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale
RC/HC	Resident coordinator of the UN system
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UN CMCoord	United Nations Civil-Military Coordination
UNHCR	High Commissioner United Nations for Refugees
UNHRMMU	United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
UNICEF	UN Funds for Children
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
URSS	Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques
UXO	Munitions non explosées (Unexploded Ordnances)
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

Contents

Table des matières

Acknowledgements and thanks	2
Map of the Itinerary of the mission	3
The author:	3
list of acronyms.....	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
Responses to key questions in the terms of reference	8
Recommendations.....	11
REPORT	13
1. THE CONTEXT OF, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR, THE REAL-TERMS EVALUATION	14
1.1. The genesis of the real-terms evaluation	14
1.2. General objectives of the real-terms evaluation mission	14
2. METHODOLOGY.....	14
2.1 The collection and analysis of information	14
3. UKRAINE 2022: A COMPLEX HISTORICAL CONSTRUCT	16
3.1. A complex history in relation to Russia and the USSR	16
3.2. The Orange Revolution, the Maidan and the Euro-maidan.....	17
3.3. Former experience, Soviet history, strong institutions.....	18
3.4. A digital society.....	18
3.5. The dynamics of the conflict.....	19
3.5.1. The period 2014-2022.....	19
3.5.2. The 2022 war	20
4. MASSIVE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE	23
4.1. An overwhelming response from within Ukraine	23
4.1.1. Response by the central level of the Ukrainian government.....	23
4.1.2. Response by the City Councils	23
4.1.3. Response by Ukrainian civil society: volunteers and NGOs	25
4.2. Unusual scale of resource mobilisation	26
4.2.1. Impressive, but not fully computed, effort by the Ukrainian people	26
4.2.2. International response at unprecedented levels	27
5. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, AND THE RESPONSE	30
5.1. Enabling survival in active conflict zones.....	30
5.1.1. Interventions in zones under bombardment	30
5.1.2. Finding shelter in active conflict zones	31
5.2. Population movements	32
5.2.1. A historical perspective.....	32
5.2.1. Global vision	32
5.2.2. The period February-April 2022.....	33
5.2.3. The period May-June and current challenges.....	35
5.3. Aid in kind and in cash	36
5.3.1. Aid in kind	36
5.3.2. Aid in cash (financial transfers).....	38
5.4. Complex health risks.....	41
5.4.1. A well-established system.....	41
5.4.2. Battlefield medicine and medicine in time of war	42
5.4.3. Health of the elderly	43
5.5. Access to water.....	43

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

5.6.	Protection and human rights	44
5.6.1.	Legal protections and legal support	45
5.6.2.	Human trafficking: protections and risks	45
5.7.	Education	45
5.8.	Preparing for winter	46
5.9.	Environmental risks	47
6.	CHALLENGES FOR THE PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL AID	48
6.1.	Difficulties for international agencies in setting up	48
6.1.1.	Little initial humanitarian presence	48
6.1.2.	The 24 February offensive and its impact on humanitarian actors present	49
6.1.3.	Scaling up	49
6.2.	Coordination in a complex environment	50
6.2.1.	The central role of government in creating an enabling environment for aid	50
6.2.2.	Coordination between volunteer groups, Ukrainian NGOs and municipalities	51
6.2.3.	Coordination between international systems, municipalities and voluntary networks	52
6.2.4.	Using cluster systems	52
6.3.	Major logistical constraints, IT solutions	55
6.4.	Working with new actors	55
6.5.	Humanitarian principles: understanding and preserving neutrality	56
6.5.1.	Operational axes	56
6.5.2.	The political dimension	56
6.6.	Managing insecurity	57
6.7.	Changing dynamics, with a high degree of unpredictability	58
7.	AID IN THE PERIOD POST-ACTIVE CONFLICT	59
7.1.	Peace will arrive sometime	59
7.2.	Reconstructing zones destroyed in the conflict	59
7.3.	Modernising old, damaged or destroyed industrial infrastructure	60
7.4.	Reconstructing Ukraine in the face of major environmental risks	61
8.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	62
8.1.	Planning in turbulent times	62
8.2.	The missing link: “area based coordination”	63
8.2.1.	Better support to City Councils	63
8.2.2.	Establishing effective, accountable methods for working with civil society	64
ANNEXES		66
	Annex N°1 : Termes of Reference	67
	Annex N°2: Itinerary of the mission	70
	Annex N°3 : Useful references	71

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



Destruction in Bucha

Groupe URD conducted a real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the war in Ukraine, in order to record lessons from the initial response, and to inform later decision-making.

Responses to key questions in the terms of reference

Key question 1. Resource mobilisation and needs evaluation: what procedures were used to analyse context, resource mobilisation and needs evaluation?

This war in Europe, arising from flagrant aggression and engendering significant humanitarian needs, calls for a major resource mobilisation effort. Resources were initially mobilised by the Ukrainian population itself, and its diaspora. They collected, sent and distributed considerable quantities of food, basic supplies and medicines. Then civil society in Europe and North America also sent both financial aid and aid in kind. While it is unfortunately difficult to quantify this vast effort at solidarity, it is clear that the effort continues at a significant level, even if it seems to be diminishing. Aid was extremely quick to arrive both to assist people leaving the country for exile, mainly in zones close to the frontiers, and to assist the interior of the country. It came as a response to requests, not linked to any 'needs evaluation'. The international aid that has been mobilised is also very significant, reaching hitherto unprecedented levels. The latest 'flash' appeal raised some \$4.7 billion, based on a needs analysis carried out by the humanitarian clusters, and using the REACH tool. Part of the response to identified needs is still under-funded, particularly those needs which would normally be the responsibility of the municipalities: the repair of essential infrastructure to enable the population to survive. At present, there are very limited financial resources, and few systems, available to support the municipalities.

Key question 2. Flexibility: given the differences between operational realities in different situations, and also their tendency to evolve, what measures have already been taken or are still necessary to adapt to the new working environment?

International aid had difficulty in getting off the ground. It had to deal with a functioning state that was characterised at one and the same time by cumbersome features inherited from the Soviet period, and by an impressive level of modernization, sustained by the strong development of IT underpinning administrative procedures and a large part of society. The difficulty for the international aid sector was accentuated by uncertainty as to how the conflict would develop, by security problems and by the diversity of situations on the ground. The NGOs, however, had access to their own funds, or access to flexible sources of funding and were therefore quickly able to launch 'no regret' initiatives. We observe here a classic phenomenon which we have already described in other contexts, that is the existence of a centre of action where a majority of the humanitarian, or aid, actors are concentrated, where it is relatively easy to respond to critical needs; and peripheral areas where the dangers are more significant and needs not so obviously concentrated in one place. Characteristically, in such areas of Ukraine, for a long time only a limited number of actors were able to function, given the difficulties: ICRC, MSF, and some other NGOs, particularly French ones (ACTED, Solidarités International, PUI, Triangle, etc). Much of the work can be done through interaction with Ukrainian actors or groups of volunteers. There is a continuing process of negotiation with donors, to enlarge the scope for flexibility. This scope for flexibility is very often a key factor when negotiating contracts, and broadly entails agreeing on definitions that are flexible enough to limit the need for frequent contract

amendments, which always take up a great deal of time. A close dialogue with donors is essential, so that they remain aware of needs, and of any changes.

Key question 3. ‘Localisation’: how did Ukrainian NGOs work, including those in the diaspora, and the churches? How did the municipal governments and Ukrainian institutions work? How did the humanitarian organisations identify the capacity of the partners with which they were to work? How did they work with the national Ukrainian structures already in place, as well as with informal systems? What lessons were learned? Were there new ideas which might be useful in developing new approaches to the ‘localization’ of aid?

Ukrainian civil society, including citizen groups, volunteers, NGOs, churches, and also the municipalities, were motivated to respond by drawing on a dynamic of ‘resistance’, on a global scale, combining the ideas of solidarity, humanitarian assistance, citizen responsibility and support for the country's defence effort. Some of the international aid agencies were made extremely uneasy by this combination, being themselves very observant of humanitarian principles. Work is further complicated in a civil society which, while very dynamic, is also very disparate and still not highly organised; and by the international aid agencies’ procedures for scrutinising aid for fear of corruption, or of its being siphoned off by terrorist networks. The difficulties are accentuated by dealings, often inadequate, with the municipalities.

Key question 4. Technical adaptation. Aid agencies face numerous challenges in the specific contexts of Ukraine and countries receiving Ukrainian refugees. The agencies are more used to working in developing countries, and in rural areas. The most recent experiences in contexts similar to Ukraine were in the Balkans, Chechnya and the towns of Syria. How did the humanitarian agencies adapt their knowledge and experience to this crisis?

It continues to be difficult to deliver humanitarian aid in urban contexts, where the supply and delivery



of electricity, water, heat, or the maintenance of telecommunications - issues where classic humanitarian aid is not equipped to respond at scale - are just as important as meeting individual basic needs for food, hygiene, etc. In numerous areas, the complexity of meeting basic needs depends upon complicated equations, balancing what can or must be done by providing financial assistance - unconditional financial transfers - and what depends necessarily on aid in kind.

Collective heating system in Kharkiv

National systems for such transfers (DIAA, Ipo-Pamaga) have been significantly underused. Aid organisations have set up their own mechanisms, which may entail significant transaction costs.

With such parallel systems in place, it became necessary, six months after the invasion, to develop a complicated process to impose coherence on them all. When donations in kind are linked to clearly defined needs, with lists of provisions or medicine - the latter confirmed by the health services - they are very useful. However, an excess of generous gifts that are nonetheless unsuitable, such as out-of-date biomedical material, out-of-date medicines, etc, end up blocking storage facilities, and are costly to destroy or dispose of.

Key question 5. Protection. The war in Ukraine and the consequent displacement of people have led to numerous problems relating to protection: violations of international human rights relating to sexual exploitation; risks for women and their children while leaving Ukraine and when arriving in neighbouring countries. There have also been psychological and social ('psychosocial') problems. How have humanitarian agencies responded to such issues of protection, and what have they learnt?

The international community has faced major risks arising from the widespread non-observance of international human rights in time of war: attacks on civilian areas, the use of urban warfare entailing razing areas to the ground, egregious assaults on the rights of prisoners of war, etc. The ICRC should command total support. Many aid agencies, such as UNICEF and the HCR as well as NGOs, particularly Ukrainian human rights NGOs, have placed a strong focus on dealing with human trafficking and gender-based violence, both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. We should note the significant efforts made by the municipalities, and by NGOs like the DRC and the Ukrainian human rights NGOs, to help people with administrative procedures needed to ensure they have the correct paperwork, including for access to aid and services.



Mass grave in Bucha (photo taken in the photo exhibition in St Andrew Church, Bucha)

Key question 6. Coordination. Coordination is known to save lives, and to guarantee the means of subsistence. How did the complex group of agencies and actors, including different national authorities, UN agencies, donors, etc, work? What are the principal lessons to be drawn from this type of situation?

Significant efforts were made to set up a classic system of coordination, under the aegis of OCHA, relying particularly on the cluster system. There were increasingly numerous meetings which led to the multiplication of working groups and subgroups ('task teams'). Most took place by video link. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian agencies, from both government and civil society, were kept at some distance. This meant that there was very little 'area-based coordination', that is the establishment of coordination mechanisms based in the affected areas. Such local, intersectoral coordination, implemented through municipal structures or integrated into such structures as soon as possible, offers the only means to ensure a flexible systemic response. Flexibility is essential in a complex context where big issues may to some extent be predicted in advance (military action in the East or the South, the question of energy supplies as winter approaches, etc), but in an immediate context of extreme uncertainty (where will attacks be launched, which areas are going to be bombed, etc?) The best, most effective response, to ensure that aid is adapted to sudden changes, is for analysis and decision-making to take place locally, taking all sectors into account.

Recommendations

Recommendation N°1: In a high-intensity conflict situation, given the dangers and difficulties of establishing a humanitarian response, there should be continued efforts to develop:

- a. capacity for strategic reflection and creative anticipation;
- b. operational reflexes enabling work in front-line areas, so that risks may be managed, with continuing efforts to negotiate access lines, or routes, to these areas;
- c. increasingly flexible mechanisms for identifying and using 'windows of opportunity' which may only be open for a short time.

Recommendation N°2: Given the various forms of mobilisation by Ukraine's local institutions and civil society, it will be necessary to:

- d. develop more sophisticated means of dialogue with local institutions and civil society;
- e. ensure that Ukrainian civil society and municipal authorities are represented in coordination mechanisms.

Recommendation N°3: Establish a small roving team to support the implementation of area-based coordination by bringing together municipalities, local civil society representatives and the international agencies.

Recommendation N°4: Explore and test more thoroughly the notion of 'flexible funding for small-scale projects', which seems to be increasingly proposed in different contexts. It is a good approach, but 'the devil is in the details'. Which procedures are to be used to validate local agencies and their proposals? Which tools will be used for checks, and ex-post evaluation?

Recommendation N°5: Establish a flexible support fund for the municipalities (and their mayors). There are cases where NGOs are not capable of meeting identified needs, because they require the involvement of municipal teams: collective heating systems, water and electricity distribution networks, urban sanitation. It might work to set up a special fund with HABITAT or at CGLU (Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis).



REPORT



1. THE CONTEXT OF, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR, THE REAL-TERMS EVALUATION

1.1. The genesis of the real-terms evaluation

The outbreak and evolution of the war in Ukraine have turned upside down the lives of millions of Ukrainians. Some have fled to neighbouring countries. Others have simply moved away from frontline areas. Still others have remained in their hometowns or villages, whether voluntarily or because they were blocked in by the war. URD is well acquainted with areas on the periphery of the former Soviet Union, having carried out a number of missions in Chechnya, Georgia, Abkhazia and Ossetia. We have also followed geopolitical developments in the region. We also have significant experience of urban warfare (Chechnya, Kosovo, Syria) and more generally of humanitarian issues in urban contexts, and the way societies mobilise in the face of crisis. For example, URD has worked on the reception of refugees in France and Europe in the context of acute crises, as in Beirut's Roya Valley after Storm Alex, etc. We carried out a mission to Ukraine in January 2020 on behalf of the DG of OCHA, looking at risk management, particularly technological and environmental risks in urban contexts, and organised a training programme in Sloviansk.

When the war began on 24 February 2022, URD closely followed its development, and the humanitarian response, publishing several documents including one on 'key messages', which summarised key lessons learnt from situations with similar characteristics. We then proposed our services, on the basis of our previous experience, for a real-time evaluation, independent of the humanitarian response to the crisis in Ukraine.

1.2. General objectives of the real-terms evaluation mission

The mission was a means of taking note of the humanitarian response, of progress made and constraints, and to provide for adjustments and lesson-learning in real time.

The mission considered progress made by humanitarian aid in the interior of the country, by analysing

- specific approaches adopted according to how close activity was to the front line, analysing also aid given for survival, particularly in the zones closest to the front line;
- the organisation of aid in areas less directly affected, but which are experiencing, and managing, the flow of displaced people. Medical and social sectors, and issues of protection, were given detailed consideration;
- the roles of local agencies, of the Ukrainian diaspora, of the churches and of citizen networks. The roles of the state and of the municipalities were given particular attention.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 The collection and analysis of information

Tools used were essentially those used in social science. Objectives were to

- establish timelines;
- establish trajectories of individual lives and the lives of institutions;
- conduct question and answer sessions and establish a dialectic, a form of accountability through the spoken word involving agencies and people.

The evaluation adopted an inductive approach, from the realities on the ground to the global level, by collecting information from a variety of sources. It made use of existing data and collected qualitative information by means of interviews and group discussions. The mission worked on the principle of 'a light footprint', and was independent in logistical terms, requiring little support from other agencies. It worked through immersion in networks of the diaspora, seeking out contacts with Ukrainian civil society and systematically making contact with municipal institutions.

The evaluation focused on several key questions:

Key question 1: resource mobilisation and needs evaluation. What procedures were used to analyse context, resource mobilisation and needs evaluation?

Key question 2: flexibility. Given the differences between operational realities in different situations, and also their tendency to evolve, what measures have already been taken or are still necessary to adapt to the new working environment?

Key question 3: localisation. How did Ukrainian NGOs work, including those in the diaspora, and the churches? How did the municipal governments and Ukrainian institutions work? How did the humanitarian organisations identify the capacity of the partners with which they were to work? How did they work with the national Ukrainian structures already in place, as well as with informal systems? What lessons were learned? Were there new ideas which might be useful in developing new approaches to the 'localisation' of aid?

Key question 4: technical adaptation. Aid agencies face numerous challenges in the specific contexts of Ukraine and the countries receiving Ukrainian refugees. The agencies are more used to working in developing countries, and in rural areas. The most recent experience in context similar to Ukraine were in the Balkans, Chechnya and the towns of Syria. How did the humanitarian agencies adapt their knowledge and experience to this crisis?

Key question 5: protection. The war in Ukraine and the consequent displacement of people have led to numerous problems relating to protection: violations of international human rights relating to sexual exploitation; risks for women and their children while leaving Ukraine and when arriving in neighbouring countries. There have also been psychological and social ('psychosocial') hazards and vulnerabilities. How have humanitarian agencies responded to such issues of protection, and what have they learnt?

Key question 6 coordination. Coordination is known to save lives, and to guarantee the means of subsistence. How did a complex group of agencies and actors, including different national authorities, UN agencies, donors, etc, coordinate their work? What are the principal lessons to be drawn from this type of situation?

3. UKRAINE 2022: A COMPLEX HISTORICAL CONSTRUCT

3.1. A complex history in relation to Russia and the USSR

Responding to the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine requires an understanding of the role of history in shaping its people, its institutions, its mechanisms for solidarity and its role in the international environment. Relations between Russia and Ukraine have long been complex, with 'love-hate' dimensions. Ukraine has been at the centre of many major geopolitical events in this part of Eastern Europe.

The present situation requires us to consider the history of Ukraine. Since the time of the Cossacks – specifically the Zaporogues in the Dnipro region - with different alliances between each other, regularly rebelling against the power of the tsar, this area to the west of Moscow has, for centuries, played a fundamental role at the interface between Europe and Russia, indeed of Central Asia. Thus, when Russia's western frontiers were attacked during the Napoleonic wars, and again during the First and Second World wars, it was Ukraine's territory with its black earth that saved it: the earth is highly fertile, but horses or tanks had immense difficulty traversing it during the muddy season. Napoleon's troops became bogged down in it, making their retreat from Russia in late 1812 a nightmare. In 1941, German troops launched Operation Barbarossa. They were able to progress rapidly because Stalin's purges had weakened the Red Army, and Stalin failed to react in a timely way since he did not believe in the hypothesis of a German invasion. The subsequent battle of Kiev in August 1941 was undoubtedly the greatest defeat in Soviet military history. The German army lost more than 200,000 troops – killed, injured or missing - in that battle but the Soviet army lost more than a million men. Ukraine was exhausted by Stalin's repression, and by the memory of the Holodomor, or Great Famine, of the 1920s. This amounted to genocide, with almost 3.9 million deaths caused by Stalin's anti-kulak policies. The kulaks, engaged in mixed farming, on reasonably productive land, had not welcomed Stalin's policy of collectivisation, nor his extortion of grain. The 'law of three ears of corn' was especially egregious, exacting very harsh punishment in return for any attempt to recover harvests that had been extorted by Stalin's regime. At first, therefore, the Ukrainian people was not entirely opposed to the German invaders. However, massacres of unarmed civilians, the systematic execution of prisoners of war and the announced intention of reducing the Slavs into slavery soon transformed the Ukrainians into partisans. Russian and Ukrainian soldiers fought and died side by side. The Wehrmacht's progress was slowed down by the muddy season, preventing tanks and military convoys from making progress until the land froze, which once again allowed them to traverse the black soil of Ukraine. The bitter winter, taking its toll on the troops but allowing the circulation of tanks and transport vehicles, along with the muddy seasons of autumn and spring, meant that on the Eastern Front of the Second World War, and in the present war in Ukraine, the armies are faced with climatic imperatives which mean that vehicles must be brought to a standstill and immobilised, or concentrated along stable, properly-surfaced roads, which makes them vulnerable to activities by members of the resistance.



Ukraine's decades within the Soviet Union shaped its society, the mentality of its population and its institutions. After glasnost and perestroika, and especially after independence in 1991, Ukrainian society began to develop once again. It opened up towards the West and transformed its socialist economy into a market economy in which both corruption and the domination by oligarchs have emerged as significant undercurrents.

Monument for the members of USSR Communist Party, Odessa

The growth of democratic movements and the pursuit of protection against Russia were seen by Putin as mortal threats. Moscow has sought to destabilise Georgia, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia,

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Upper Karabash. In Ukraine it has sought to destabilise the Crimea, and the Donbas region. It has also sought to destabilise Moldova and Transnistria. When, in its new periphery, governments take power wishing to distance themselves from Moscow, the Kremlin quickly instigates independence movements, with the aim of undermining newly-created states, creating 'quasi-states' where it deploys Russian troops described as 'peacekeeping forces'. These quasi-states have for some time been used to blackmail, or pressurise, states formed after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The role of gas and petroleum has also for some time threatened to loom large in future crises.

3.2. The Orange Revolution, the Maidan and the Euro-maidan

Ukraine's social dynamics, the mobilisation of Ukrainian society and the volunteer movements that developed in response to the 2022 war need to be set in the context of the Orange Revolution, and more particularly the Revolution of Dignity, better known as the Maidan Revolution after the name of Kiev's large central square.

The Orange Revolution is named after the orange flags carried during the large-scale protests which took place after the announcement of the result of the second round of the November 2004 presidential election, which many Ukrainians considered fraudulent. The protesters rejected the election of Victor Yanukovich, who was seen as a tool of the Kremlin and who had the support of powerful clans in Donetsk. Protests organised throughout the country by the losing presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko were supported by the West, particularly the US. The Supreme Court eventually declared the election void and a new vote was organised, under the scrutiny of observers from the OSCE. In December 2004 the pro-Kremlin party was defeated, and a Ukrainian civil society began to develop, which was highly committed and dynamic. Ukraine also began to draw closer to NATO and the EU. However, in November 2013 numerous protests, known as the Euromaidan, were organised, in response to President Yanukovich's refusal to sign an agreement between Ukraine and the EU on political association and the free market. This agreement had been ratified by the European Parliament, as an alternative to strengthened links with Russia and Putin's organisation of a Euro-Asiatic Union. The scope of the protests quickly enlarged to target corruption, the oligarchs, etc. They were strongly repressed. The repression of the protests led in January- February 2014 to countrywide mobilisation. Mechanisms were put in place to provide help to the demonstrators of Maidan Square and support to the wounded, and to victims' families. Thus volunteer movements originated.

Intensified repression of protesters in January-February 2014 led to a new phase of mobilisation. In the end President Yanukovich fled. He tried to obtain Kremlin support, but he and his government were overturned. Pro- and anti-Yanukovich sentiment boiled up, leading - particularly in the east of the country - to pro- and anti-Russia rhetoric. An intervention on the part of Russia quickly followed. This had already, in fact, been covertly prepared. The Crimea was occupied and declared independent. The Ukrainian government signed its agreement with the EU and launched what has been called the 'decommunisation and re-Ukrainisation' of the country. The seeds of the 2022 war had been planted.

3.3. Former experience, Soviet history, strong institutions

Ukraine's history has largely determined its institutional characteristics. Periods of exile during the last century, or internal displacements within the Russian empire or the Soviet Union, were managed by local government officials and volunteer organisations, including some created and managed by the displaced people themselves. Herein lies the importance of the current role of the municipalities, and the voluntary movements, which characterises the humanitarian response in Ukraine today, and determines some of the difficulties encountered by the international humanitarian agencies at the beginning of the crisis, and as it has developed.

The difference by comparison with many other crises is that in Ukraine we are working in a legitimate state where the government itself is leading the humanitarian response. Those handling the government response are usually competent, although they rely on methods and procedures which the international aid community did not immediately understand. Having reached a better understanding, humanitarian organisations then considered how to work within the existing framework, and complement the aid provided by the government. The framework is further complicated by the fact that oblast-Civil Military structures are in practice at the centre both of the civil defence effort and of the humanitarian response. The transfer of funds also poses difficulties in this administrative context. Ukraine's social security system, with safety nets and pensions, is well established. It took some time for aid agencies to understand that this system offered opportunities, which it was important to identify and use.



City council building in Kharkiv, partly destroyed

3.4. A digital society

Ukraine very rapidly evolved into a digital society, notably between 2010 and 2020, when this was a key government objective, with a dedicated ministry for digitalisation. Major programmes, e.g., digitalised personal ID programmes, have been launched. Most administrative procedures may now be carried out online. The Diia app has two main functions: a mobile app enabling access to administrative documents; and an administrative portal for private individuals and professionals. The Diia 2.0 app makes it possible for Ukrainians to access nine key documents relating to their daily lives. Ukraine is the first country where digital ID is recognised everywhere. All digitalised documents are legal, with the same status as paper documents. The Diia 2.0 app allows document sharing, settlement of debts and payment of fines.

3.5. The dynamics of the conflict

3.5.1. The period 2014-2022

The war in the Donbas region was part of a progressive attempt by the Kremlin to destabilise Ukraine, relying on a political division between pro-Russians and Ukrainian nationalists at the heart of the Ukrainian elite. This political division was accentuated first by the Orange Revolution then by the Euromaidan revolution and the recall of President Yanukovych. The Donbas, in the east of Ukraine, was a major economic region forming an integral part of the Soviet planned economy, with coal mines and a long industrial history, significant in the history of Soviet workers. The period of Ukraine's independence was difficult for the region. It was already suffering from economic decay: equipment and installations were ageing, unable to adapt to the demands and standards of the contemporary world. Very soon, independence movements, with discreet support from the Russian army (those 'little green men', Russian soldiers without the insignia that might have revealed their connection to the Russian army) and with support also from a population that was nostalgic for past times, waged war against the army of Ukraine. They proclaimed the existence of two entities claiming independence, known as 'non-government-controlled areas' (NGCAs): the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic. The Ukrainian president, Tourtchynov, tried to get the question of an invasion of Ukraine by Russia on to the international agenda. On 11 March 2014, Crimea had declared its independence, having already negotiated some degree of autonomy as part of wider negotiations when Ukraine became independent in 1991. Things moved quickly thereafter: as the result of a referendum held on 16 March 2014, Crimea asked to be integrated into the Russian Federation, along with the city of Sebastopol. The situation was tense, with the possibility of an explosive conflict in Eastern Europe. A first semi-official meeting, called the Normandy Format, or the Normandy Contact Group - taking advantage of the 70th anniversary celebrations of the Normandy landings - was held on 6 June 2014. In attendance were representatives of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany. The outcome was the first Minsk accord, known as the Minsk Protocol, ratified by the four Normandy Format countries, outlining a thirteen-point plan for finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. For a time, the Protocol calmed the situation, but it was never really to succeed in initiating a peace process. The efforts of the OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, deployed on 21 March 2014 at Ukraine's request, came to nothing. It was an unarmed, civilian mission, deployed throughout the Donbas region to observe the situation and facilitate dialogue between the different parties to the conflict. However, the limits of what it could achieve were soon evident.

The thirteen points of the first Minsk accord

Ceasefire from midnight on 15 February
Withdrawal of heavy armaments
Verification of the truce
Dialogue
Pardon and amnesty, by the promulgation of a law
Freedom and exchange of all hostages & other people held illegitimately on the principle "all for all"
Guaranteed secure access to humanitarian aid
Definition of the modalities for full recovery of socio-economic relations
Full control of the state frontier to be re-established by the Ukrainian government throughout the conflict zone
Withdrawal from Ukraine of **all foreign military formations**
Implementation of **constitutional reform** in Ukraine
Discussions on **local elections**
Creation of **working groups**

War broke out again in December 2014. Negotiations continued, nonetheless, enabling the signature in February 2015 of the second Minsk accord, 'Minsk II'. However, this second accord was no more successful than the first in establishing peace: many of its clauses were not adhered to. In a speech to the Russian Duma on 21 February 2022, President Putin announced the recognition by Russia of the two secessionist entities, the Luhansk People's Republic and the Donetsk People's Republic; and the signing of treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. That night, Russian troops deployed to the Donetsk region, and everything was ready for war.

3.5.2. The 2022 war

Despite military manoeuvres in Belarus over the winter of 2021-2022, and an increasing concentration of Russian troops on the Russian frontiers, few thought an attack by Russia was a possibility. This was despite regular warnings by the US Foreign Service, and other well-informed observers, and particularly despite warnings given from 18 February onwards by the Institute for the Study of War in Washington DC. The Russian assault began at 05:00 on 24 February.

A resident of Irpin speaks:



'In the past several years, Covid-19 has made life difficult for all of us, with problems of isolation affecting our families, our church groups, and affecting more broadly our communication and sense of unity with each other. We Ukrainians thought that things couldn't get worse. But we were wrong. On 24 February, a real war broke out in Ukraine. Russian forces attacked us unexpectedly, at 5:30 in the morning. It was early, so we were asleep in our beds. That day, none of us could believe that the roaring noise outside our windows was the sound of Russian missiles. We were shocked that the smoke rising above Kyiv was the result of numerous air-strikes on civilian areas.'

The war is going through different phases, with successive series of specific attacks. Each phase impacts the population differently. The first phase of the war was rapid, taking everyone by surprise.

However, despite massive bombardments from the air and by ground-launched missiles on Ukraine's military infrastructure and logistics, Russia did not manage really to diminish the capacity of the Ukrainian army to react and respond.

However, in a few days, Russian troops were on the outskirts of Kyiv, occupying areas such as Bucha and Irpin, sowing panic and

provoking civilians to flee. There were traffic jams several hours long, small roads through forested areas were clogged up and panic prevailed. An offensive with tanks and ground troops was launched, although this soon became complicated in military terms.



The early spring conditions, with deep mud because of the thaw, meant that traffic could not travel except on main roads. There were snipers, improvised explosive devices, ambushes, even attempts by suicide bombers. These all made it difficult for the Russian troops and their supplies to move, other than slowly, at considerable risk to themselves. In a similar way, in the far east of the country, the Russian land offensive had been halted by a spirited defence on the part of the Ukrainian army on the approach to the large town of Kharkiv, barely thirty-eight kilometres from the Russian border.


After the initial blitz had stalled, urban warfare began progressively to be waged, with typically dramatic consequences from the humanitarian perspective. The first phase - which still continues in the frontline areas of the Donbas and in areas around places such as Kharkiv - depended on tactics designed to make towns uninhabitable and force them to surrender. Soldiers intensified people's fears by pillaging; access to food supplies, and to water, gas and electricity, was cut off. These tactics reached their apogee in the battle for Mariupol, a large industrial city in the Donetsk department, claimed by the Donetsk People's Republic as part of its territory. On the Azov Sea, vital for exporting steel, coal and cereals, Mariupol was strategically critical for both Russia and Ukraine.

Beginning with a heavy artillery attack and an almost total blockade, with reinforcements sent from Chechen special forces to continue the assault, the battle instilled terror in the civilian population. Some were able to escape, while others were blockaded in underground tunnels below factories. Others found the means to continue living in hand-to-mouth fashion in the occupied city.

After the attack on Kyiv failed, from early April onwards, the war took a different turn. Russian troops withdrew from regions to the north of Kyiv. The focus was now on territorial integrity in the east, between Russian, the Donbas and Crimea, and also



Transnistria, with the objective of full control of the Black Sea coast. A classic strategy was adopted, of razing towns and structures to the ground and instilling terror in the population: the strategy was relatively economical in its use of troops. Modern urban warfare uses extensive bombing to ensure that ground troops will not be confronted by guerrillas in the streets, or in buildings left standing. The towns and cities in the east and south of Ukraine were transformed into acres of ruins and rubble, with their terrified inhabitants uncertain whether to flee, or where they might try to hide themselves.



The objective was for Ukraine to withdraw its own soldiers, to avoid its own people being massacred. The Ukrainian army showed its capacity to fight back, and the civilian population found ways of surviving or of getting away, while the Russian army raced to meet its objectives. The strategy and tactics continue even now, with cities such as Kharkiv bombarded night and day. The latest phase of

the conflict appears to be concentrating, and intensifying, in the north of the Donbas, with fighting continuing in Kherson, Sloviansk, Mykolaiv, etc.

Compared with the earliest phase of the war, when mobility – of troops, artillery and logistical support – was key, and depended on the condition of the ground and the ability of the Ukrainian army to engage in close combat, at the present time (August 2022) the mobilisation of long-range missiles has changed the equation. It is now possible to strike Ukraine’s civil and military infrastructure in Mariupol, Mykolaiv and Odessa in the south; Lviv, Kyiv, Vinnytsia and Chernihiv in the north; Dnipro, Kramator and Kharkiv in the east. After the horror of Mariupol, where 20,000 people died, the Ukrainian government has elected to protect the population, requesting that they evacuate from the Donbas to avoid further exposure to the war and its ravages.



Flags for the soldiers killed on the front, Place Maidan, Kyiv

4. MASSIVE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

4.1. An overwhelming response from within Ukraine

4.1.1. Response by the central level of the Ukrainian government

From the outset of the crisis, the remarkable resilience of Ukraine's central government and President Zelensky made possible both military resistance and the continued operation of the country's administration. Guidance, instructions and orders were transmitted throughout the country, strengthening the role of the governors of the oblasts, the geographical units into which the country is divided for administrative purposes. This proved crucial in the process of aid resource allocation, and also for internal coordination - within Ukraine - and coordination with international agencies. Key functional ministries - health, education, social affairs - gradually became essential interlocutors for the international agencies. This did not happen at once, however, and was not at first seen as a priority.

4.1.2. Response by the City Councils

Ukraine's municipalities were strengthened first by the decentralisation law which gave local government significant control over local taxation; and second by the 2020 municipal elections, which consolidated local government authority (entailing some tension with central government). Ukraine is, in fact, a fairly decentralised country, and local authorities played an essential role in providing aid. This role is often played by local authorities in times of crisis, but was particularly noticeable in Ukraine, because of the residual Soviet organisational structure, and because of the mobilisation on a



national scale in response to the Russian invasion. The municipalities were responsible for strategies concerning the provision of shelter and the organisation of aid distribution, and especially for strategies in domains which properly belong to their sphere of activity: starting up or closing down public transport, using municipal budgets to finance the repair of water, gas and electricity distribution networks, etc. These latter are all vital in modern cities, in a cold country.

Administrative building in Kharkiv

Municipalities have considerable budgetary autonomy. This meant that in some cases local governments such as that of Kharkiv were able to lower the rate of local taxation, so that businesses were not totally drained of resources. Such tax concessions, along with the cost of repairing public services, is a heavy burden on the resources and capacities of many municipalities, whose finances are already under threat as a result of reduced economic activity. This is not so much of a problem in cities such as Dnipro, Kyiv or Lviv, whose economies either never came to a halt, or picked up again relatively quickly, in June and July this year.

In areas near the front line, oblasts and municipalities also played a fundamental role in evacuating people, in providing shelter for people who had been evacuated and also in despatching basic items to people who stayed in place, as well as to troops on the front line.

In some cases, City Council personnel and the staff of the governors of the oblasts worked in very precarious conditions, e.g., in Kharkiv, where the city hall was largely destroyed. Personnel was also reduced in number. Municipal staff who remained in post often arranged for their families to evacuate, so they would be further away from frontline areas.

In areas further from the frontline, taking in refugees seeking to settle there or in transit, municipalities had three key functions, relating to providing shelter for displaced people:

- Finding short term accommodation for people planning to leave Ukraine or to move on to other regions or cities.
- Making arrangements for people planning to stay for the longer term, perhaps even until the end of the war, or at least until their cities or regions of origin were no longer under enemy control.
- Ensuring, as far as possible, continuity of services for those of their own citizens who planned to stay, and who in some cases were providing shelter for displaced persons.

Municipal staff needed first to register displaced people on arrival and then to provide them with accommodation. They very rapidly set up local websites detailing municipal or private accommodation available. Schools and nurseries typically have fewer bathrooms and showers than are needed for the numbers of people who take up temporary, full-time accommodation there.



Preparation of food box for distributions

Municipal staff had to supply food, sanitary products and even clothes for the displaced people for whom they provided accommodation. They provide assistance to those looking for employment. They provide school and nursery places for children, and access to health services. While the role of the municipalities was crucial, in the first weeks the assistance provided also depended on networks of volunteers, working alongside municipal staff.

The evaluation mission observed that there was still temporary accommodation for displaced people available in Lviv, although much less than previously. University halls of residence, which are not at present being used by university students, are full of displaced people who have taken up residence.

As rooms are freed up by people moving on, they are assigned to others, according to a waiting list compiled by the municipality. It is now, however, time to consider the start of the new academic year in the early autumn.



Collective center set up by Lviv City Council



Children playing in a collective center in Dnipor

In a city such as Dnipro, temporary accommodation which was originally occupied by the workers of a Turkish company extending the city's metro line is home to more than 400 displaced people, living in reasonably decent conditions.

Collective center



4.1.3. Response by Ukrainian civil society: volunteers and NGOs

The international aid community was very impressed by the scale and speed of the response to the crisis by Ukraine's civil society. Civil society was already well developed, was highly 'digitally literate' and had the capacity to adopt new approaches which did not necessarily conform to the standards and procedures normally associated with the international aid agencies, or match their concerns about security risks, as well as reputational and fiduciary risks, when responding to crises. The report by Humanitarian Outcomes 'Enabling the local response: Emerging humanitarian priorities in Ukraine, March-May 2022' came as a shock, identifying problems that had already been partly recognised, but not part of the public debate on humanitarian aid coordination in Ukraine.

Some Ukrainian NGOs have been around for some time, dating back to soon after the break-up of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's independence. For example, the foundation 'The Way Home', or the Alliance for Public Health, have existed for at least twenty years, working on health issues, and providing support to orphans and women who are victims of violence.

These established NGOs are well connected to international networks, and to external funding sources. This has been an advantage in the present crisis: established NGOs have already put in place arrangements with donors for financial management, and for reporting, both narrative reporting and accounting. However, it is more complicated as they seek new sources of funds e.g., from the international humanitarian NGOs, since these NGOs themselves rely on mechanisms agreed with their own donors.

Notwithstanding, six months into the crisis the majority of assistance has been and continues to be provided by voluntary networks. These may be individuals setting up networks of friends, or colleagues, making use of the social media extensively used in Ukraine: Telegram, Vespa, WhatsApp, Facebook.

In the early days of the war, the majority of assistance was collected locally by Ukrainian solidarity networks and distributed by means of these same citizen networks and movements, sometimes with help from afar, provided by the Ukrainian diaspora, or NGOs linked to networks of friends, or others linked to churches of different persuasions: Orthodox, Baptist or Catholic e.g., Caritas worked through the network of Catholic dioceses. There were also links to international agencies. Reception centres and shelters, as well as arrangements for the collection and distribution of assistance provided in kind, were rapidly set up. All this made for a highly effective response to people's needs, both in more peaceful areas in the west of Ukraine, near the borders with Poland, Romania and Moldova and also in areas close to the front line. Aid agencies should feel humbled by those engaged in this response: they often took serious risks to provide aid to civilians, and indeed are still doing so.

Official procedures for recording and acknowledging the work of these networks have improved, particularly at the level of local authorities in Ukraine, but also



among the international aid community. However, the Ukrainian NGOs continued to be disadvantaged by the fundamental difficulties that the aid sector has in working with them.



A key actor for the preparation of hot meals

4.2. Unusual scale of resource mobilisation

4.2.1. Impressive, but not fully computed, effort by the Ukrainian people

In 2014-15, during the fighting in the Donbas, the need for humanitarian aid was restricted to a well-defined strip of territory, about 200 kilometres long and 30-40 kilometres wide. It encompassed small industrial towns, with economies suffering from decaying factories, as well as rural areas largely populated by the elderly. Ukrainian networks were set up to provide aid to the region, on both sides of the frontline. Needs since 24 February 2022 are on a totally different scale: fully half of Ukraine is directly affected i.e., between 15 and 20 million people. The entire population is at the very least indirectly affected this time, which it was not in 2014-15. From the very outset of the war, Ukrainian civil society, as well as civil society in Europe and North America, mobilised and showed quite exceptional generosity. The churches and their networks did the same: resources collected by the different religious groupings of Ukraine, and their sister churches overseas, have been, and continue to be, significant. It was recognised in the course of visits made by the evaluation mission, including meetings with priests and pastors, just how significant in terms of the humanitarian response these resources were, but they are not normally included when computing aid flows to Ukraine.

Thousands of Ukrainians collected basic supplies. Ukrainian businesses sent their entire stocks to areas



where they were needed: transit areas, reception areas for displaced people and conflict areas. Throughout Europe, food, clothes and medicine were collected. A little later, when people began to return to their homes in areas that had been liberated by the Ukrainian army, collections were organised of kitchen equipment, electrical goods, building materials, etc. Foremost among those organising collections were members of the Ukrainian diaspora, and the Ukrainian churches ... but there were very many organisations involved.

Collection of in kind aid for Ukraine in Paris (24/7)

Everything that had been collected was transported to Ukraine and neighbouring countries by companies which offered the use of their trucks, and other logistical support, at no charge. Other types of equipment, often essential, such as ambulances and stretchers, were also despatched.


It would be very difficult to estimate the value of all the donations made, and also the value of the contribution represented by the work of thousands of collectors, transporters, packers, distributors, stock-takers, as well as those who made lists of those who were in need, or who benefitted. The flow of assistance in kind, and also in cash, has significantly reduced since July, but nonetheless remains one of the key elements of the response to the crisis.

4.2.2. International response at unprecedented levels

The international aid provided in more classic format is easier to identify and analyse. During the 2014-15 conflict, a small number of agencies - ICRC and the UN - attempted to work on both sides of the front line, including in territories which were not controlled by the Ukrainian government. Some NGOs provided assistance to the local population, particularly on the Ukrainian side.


In the current conflict, the international response must take account of the very high number of those in need of aid, and of the diversity of their needs. The response had some difficulty in getting under way, and it only slowly gathered in intensity. The diagram below, extracted from the UN's August Flash Appeal for Ukraine, would no doubt look very different if we included all the resources mobilised in the first months of the war by Ukraine's government and civil society and by all those in Europe and North America who contributed, in a spirit of solidarity.

Evolution of people reached



Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

According to OCHA’s budget-tracking system, appeals to donors had been barely half-financed by mid-August. However, given the scale of the amounts requested, contributions had already, in the six months since the invasion, reached unprecedented levels.



Although the level of contributions in relation to the amounts called for by the UN agencies - OCHA and HCR - for Ukraine is only a little higher than in the majority of crises (as illustrated in the diagram below) the difference can be seen by looking not at the percentage contributed, but at the figures themselves.

Source : <https://fts.unocha.org/emergencies/951/summary/2022>

The amount called for, and the amount contributed, have never previously been so high. A revised appeal issued in April 2022 called for twice the level of funds compared with the appeal issued in March: \$741 million for the OCHA and HCR Flash Appeal. The figure had gone up again by early August, with the funds called for now standing at \$4.282 billion.

In fact, while in percentage terms the funding levels for UN appeals (OCHA and UNHCR) for Ukraine are just a little higher than for most crises (see chart below), the thinking changes when we look no longer in percentage of call response but in actual amounts. The call and response figures then reach unprecedented levels. The revised appeal in April 2022 had already seen the request for funds double compared to the appeals of early March (741 million for the OCHA Flash appeal and that of the UNHCR). The one launched at the beginning of August still shows a significant increase in the sums requested, which reach a total of 4.282 billion US\$.

5. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS, AND THE RESPONSE

5.1. Enabling survival in active conflict zones

5.1.1. Interventions in zones under bombardment

In active conflict zones and zones under bombardment, with buildings collapsing, with the dead and injured to be evacuated, Ukraine's Civil Protection (CP) has played a crucial role. The CP is generally well equipped and well prepared. They used to train regularly alongside their Russian opposite numbers from EMERCOM, taking part in simulations and other training exercises together. They serve as firemen and are also specialists in urban search and rescue. In the crisis in Ukraine, the CP - rather like France's fireman who mobilise to deal with storms or major fires and were also deployed after the Haiti earthquakes as well as in Syria alongside the White Helmets - combine courage and consummate professionalism in dealing with the effects of bombardment.



Ukrainian Civil Protection and Fire brigades : forefront in the response

Volunteer emergency response teams from Ukraine's Red Cross are on alert at all times in zones under bombardment, to assist the local population and provide medical support to the CP's first responders. Numerous countries have sent these specialist teams significant quantities of equipment, including ambulances. Donations were also sent by fellow civil protection teams and Red Cross teams from across Europe. Two years before the outbreak of the current war, a programme of support for the CP was already under way and continues to be implemented. ACTED is the key partner. The programme provides training, as well as making protective equipment available for use when dealing with fire or hazardous materials. The programme assists in the implementation of alert systems, including sirens and megaphones. Protective structures, similar to anti-bomb shelters, have also been provided.



Ambulance given by Marseille (France) to Odessa

5.1.2. Finding shelter in active conflict zones

News reports showed pictures of people under bombardment hiding in metro stations, bunkers, caves and in corners of their own apartments out of reach of missiles, away from the windows. Food and drink, light and the means of rapidly communicating with others were needed for survival but access to all these entailed serious risk, with waiting lines and food markets being bombarded. The municipalities and teams of volunteers made a priority of addressing the need for survival. In Kharkiv, right after the start of the war, for example, the municipality gave orders for traffic on the metro lines



to be halted so that kilometres of tunnel could be used as anti-bomb shelters. More than 20,000 people spent a very large number of nights in these tunnels. Restaurants provided hot food and distributed it in the bunkers. One of Kharkiv's current priorities is to increase the capacity of bomb shelters, including strengthening their basic infrastructure: sanitary arrangements, electric power, organisation of beds, etc.

Buildings in Kharkiv after shelling

in the most seriously affected areas, the few international NGOs with a presence on the ground often helped out by delivering aid to people hiding in bunkers or metros. Sometimes their personnel spent several days in the metro stations with the local population, as in Kharkiv, developing health and general assistance programmes. Distribution of food and sanitary products was essential, since at the time the economy had come to a full stop.

While the international age community did relatively little in the first weeks after the outbreak of war, and still only conducts limited activities in the frontline areas, considerable efforts have been made since the month of June. The new UN Flash Appeal of 4 August is clearly more oriented towards conflict zones, with the provision of humanitarian assistance via the 'contact line' which separates Ukraine from the occupied areas. It remains very difficult to work in these areas. Neither the Russians, nor the autonomous entities of the occupied areas, accept the presence of the humanitarian agencies, preferring that aid reach them through Russia.



Destroyed areas in Bucha

5.2. Population movements


5.2.1. A historical perspective

Population displacement in the current war in Ukraine continues a long history of such displacements, over several centuries, in the context of the troubled relations of Ukraine with its eastern and western neighbours. Large-scale displacements took place during the First World War; during the Russian Revolution; at the time of the Holodomor (see section 3 above); and as a result of tensions between Ukraine of the Soviet era, Poland and Ukrainian nationalists before during and after the Second World War. Millions of Ukrainians fled, leading to a diaspora across numerous countries. They have been active in disseminating Ukrainian culture worldwide. We may recall the large-scale expulsion of the Tatars from Crimea and their resettlement in Central Asia in May 1944, on account of their alleged treason. This is the perspective in which to consider the displacement of people in response to the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia.

5.2.1. Global vision

Ukraine has seen one of the world's largest population displacements for many decades, perhaps only comparable to the displacements on the Indian subcontinent in 1971, when between eight and ten million people became displaced persons and refugees. The diagram below shows the levels of displacement in Ukraine at intervals over the last six months. It does not reflect a phenomenon which remains difficult to quantify, i.e., the considerable numbers of people returning to Ukraine, often travelling by private transport, and therefore not recorded in the statistics.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS



Displacements of population following the Russian Intervention of February 2022 (source : OCHA)

The support and solidarity shown by the Ukrainian people to one another in the course of these major displacements have been splendid, a reminder of how important mutual help and support is in time of war. There was similar support and solidarity shown to Ukrainians arriving in other countries. Ukraine's immediate neighbours, Poland, Moldova and Lithuania opened their borders, set up reception centres, organised the distribution of basic supplies and provided provisional accommodation in public buildings such as gyms and schools. Families opened their homes to take in refugees. In Ukraine and also in neighbouring countries, the municipalities and the volunteer networks, were central to the response, first organising evacuations using innumerable buses of various sizes and private vehicles, arranging departures and meeting-up places, designating vehicles to travel to different destinations.

Even before people arrived, considerable effort was put into preparing reception areas. Stadiums were used, storage facilities, libraries, university dormitories (e.g., in a small town near Odessa), or social centres used before the war to accommodate vulnerable groups, now transformed into a reception centre, both for refugees themselves and also for the storage of provisions sent to assist them. All this was done well before the traditional aid agencies arrived on the scene. It took just a few days for reception centres and support to be organised, including places for refugees to register, distribution centres and informal systems enabling refugees to travel on to other areas, whether in a neighbouring country or a different destination in Ukraine. In those few days, voluntary organisations, as well as Polish, Romanian and Moldovan NGOs mobilised, collecting items to assist the refugees, and organising their distribution in towns close to Ukraine's borders with its neighbours. Thousands of families and communities, all over Europe, offered a roof to sleep under, and friendship, to Ukrainian families in distress. We may regret that this kind of solidarity and support is not always offered to refugees, but when judging human generosity, every success must be counted for what it is. Social media played a key role in resource mobilisation, and in the organisation of displacements on a vast scale, as well as in the despatch and distribution of aid. Social media were full of messages which illustrated the generous response elicited by the crisis. HCR has particular responsibility managing such population movements, as do several European governments, including France. However, once again, it was the civil society groups, whether formal structures or groups mobilised by volunteer citizens, as well as the institutions that form part of Ukraine's decentralised structure, that were first off the mark. The EU and the UK rapidly adopted measures to allow Ukrainians temporary access to their territories. Ukrainians continue to go into exile, but by now there are better established mechanisms in place, both within Ukraine, and among the volunteer groups, the NGOs and the international agencies. The movement of refugees is taking on new dimensions, particularly with people leaving zones of active conflict, or deciding to leave now because of the risk of finding themselves left totally without resources when the bitter winter arrives.

5.2.2. The period February-April 2022

Between February and April 2022, approximately ten million people, or a quarter of Ukraine's population, took flight. Escape from major cities by road or train often caused chaos, which was mitigated by the decisions and actions of those in charge of the railways, the municipalities, the customs and border agencies and yet again many thousands of volunteers, both in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. Refugees gave their details to networks of volunteers, who welcomed them at railway stations, or manned telephones or helped run websites, organising:


- the reception of refugees in transit towns, where they might spend anything from a few hours to a few days;
- the organisation of routes to the border, which refugees would cross on foot before being taken into the care of other networks which would ensure they were registered with the correct papers, and put their names on lists of buses leaving for other countries, such as Germany, France, the UK, Ireland, etc.

Helping to Leave is a 24/7 hotline, set up on 24 February 2022, which facilitates evacuations by Ukrainians within Ukraine or to other countries. Its English language website, describing its mission and functions, is at <https://helpingtoleave.org/en>.]

The exodus largely consisted of women and children. Ukraine's martial law, promulgated on 24 February, to last until 24 August, forbade men between 18 and 60 years old from leaving the country, since they were to take part in the war effort.

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

According to UNHCR, some 3.4 million Ukrainians had left their country by mid-March, while something over 6 million more had moved out of the conflict zones. Departures from Ukraine to other countries were organised both by official institutions such as local governments or France's OFPRA (a




government body responsible for the protection of refugees and their rights); or by citizen networks. In both cases, preparatory work was needed, ensuring that the taking in of refugees by other countries met legal requirements, that there was adequate accommodation available, as well as arrangements for children to attend school, and for access to medical and, if necessary, counselling services. Numerous countries made different arrangements to take in refugees.

(See <https://www.migrationdataportal.org/ukraine>.)

The EU undertook as early as 3 March to meet refugees' needs promptly, and with a minimum of procedural bureaucracy. Immediate protection, lasting up to three years, would be given to Ukrainian refugees in the EU. Between 24 February and 25 May, almost 6.7 million refugees fled Ukraine for neighbouring countries, according to UNHCR.

The EU also launched an initiative to provide financial support for those fleeing Ukraine. On 8 March, the European Commission adopted a programme to support refugees in Europe, consisting of emergency aid to be used in the event of major new influxes of refugees, covering temporary accommodation, food, medical care and water. These same funds were also available for EU member states to implement policies to support the long-term integration of Ukrainian refugees. On 23 March, the European Commission presented an action programme to meet the needs of Ukrainian refugees, with a particular focus on child protection, access to education, access to health care, access to employment and access to accommodation.


But a majority of Ukrainians stayed in Ukraine, sheltering in towns and cities in the country's centre,



and close to its borders with Poland, Romania, Moldova and Slovakia. The logic that determines where they end up is simply to go as far as possible from conflict zones, or zones where conflict seems likely. The map below shows the concentration in different areas of Ukraine of internally displaced persons.

5.2.3. The period May-June and current challenges

There are some complex aspects to population movements towards the west of Ukraine and to other countries:



- The wave of population displacements at the start of the war has gradually reduced in scale, and may even have gone into reverse, as people return to 'liberated' areas, especially the Kyiv suburbs;
- There is, however, a new wave of population displacement, consisting of people fleeing Mariupol and more recently Kherson and Mykolaiv.

They reach Lviv, where volunteer networks are on hand at railway stations to meet them and guide them onwards. The Mayor of Lviv, with help from Poland, has created a reception site, with prefabricated housing, to reduce the strain on existing accommodation capacity, and to

ensure that schools and universities will be available to resume their usual functions at the start of the academic year;

- Current population movements in response to renewed military activity around Sloviansk, Severodonetz, Kramator, and Kharkiv are heading to Dnipro and Kyiv, rather than to other countries;
- President Zelensky called for the local population to evacuate very dangerous zones near or on the frontline, especially around Zaporizhzhia - where a nuclear threat is developing - and Kherson, where fighting is intense. Trains and buses were made available to transport these people to towns such as Dnipro, where the municipality looks after them, but also the volunteer networks, whether they wish to remain or to continue towards the west of Ukraine.

5.3. Aid in kind and in cash

5.3.1. Aid in kind

In both the 2014 conflict, and in the first weeks of the 2022 war, aid began by taking very diverse forms, basically the supply of food, sanitary products, clothes, etc, which had to be transported to the zones affected by the war. The greater part of this aid was initially collected locally by Ukrainian solidarity networks or by private business, and distributed by citizen groups, which sometimes received long



distance help from the Ukrainian diaspora or Ukrainian NGOs or church networks. Sometimes there was support from international NGOs.

Aid in kind being conditioned

In many areas near the front line, shops closed - and in some cases remain closed - while banks barely function. Many of these areas were previously economically productive, forming one of the major industrial zones of the former Soviet Union. However, they have long been in economic crisis, with superannuated plant and

equipment, and production methods still based on the socialist model, poorly adapted to technological evolution. The impoverishment of these areas, with their ageing populations, had been ongoing for some time. The population had few financial reserves. In other zones people stayed for a long time in the underground tunnels and corridors of the metro and it there is neither shop no easy access cash in these condition.

In such a situation, aid in kind is greatly appreciated. The supply chain to deliver this aid, created at the start of the conflict, worked well, and continues to work well in some zones.

Loaded up with packages coming from outside Ukraine, or from private business or other Ukrainian enterprises, trucks arrive at distribution centres and are unloaded. Goods are sorted out into bags or small boxes and taken off for distribution. Everything is carefully recorded in stock control databases, with consignment numbers, and photographs.

In many cities the World Food Programme (WFP) arranges supplies to an increasing number of bakeries, which are contracted to produce bread for distribution by the volunteer networks. The WFP also supplies volunteer groups and Ukrainian NGOs with significant quantities of sugar, oil, flour, etc. Since the start of the war, the WFP has provided food aid to 3.4 million displaced persons in the



interior of the country, in different forms: bread, or family boxes containing spaghetti, oil, tinned food, sugar, etc. They have provided this aid even in areas which are militarily surrounded or semi-surrounded, and therefore difficult to access. The aim is to reach 6 million people by the end of 2022. Many international NGOs, alongside the UN agencies - UNICEF, HCR, UNFPA, IOM - supply the same networks with various sanitary products, and thus play a part in these significant flows of aid in kind. The Ukrainians have noted that it is important to find ways of buying Ukrainian products, to strengthen the country's economic resilience.

Stocks of donated food aid

Distribution processes work reasonably well on the basis of lists drawn up by the municipalities or by volunteer groups, or on the basis of self-selection. There will always be a certain amount of aid syphoned off, but this is limited because the Ukrainians take pride in preventing it. There are some

innovative food distribution programmes e.g., the American NGO World Central Kitchen in Lviv, Irpin, Kharkiv and Dnipro provides hot food for canteens and also for voluntary groups. They set up in restaurants which have reasonably large kitchens, where their teams produce thousands of full hot meals daily, to be eaten by displaced persons who come to eat them in designated sites or take them back to where they are currently living. It should be noted that containers continuing to arrive with clothes, food or even toys, which were very useful during the early weeks of the war, are now beginning to become problematic. In the countries which neighbour Ukraine, and in a large part of Ukraine itself, most things can readily be bought in markets and shops, and banks are functioning normally. Aid organisations now have greater need of cash than of aid in kind, which can be difficult and expensive to manage. Cash assistance would also make it possible to support volunteers, many of whom have given everything and continue working without even a minimum income. Some volunteer groups would like to be provided with the financial means to rent storage capacity or distribution sites. They would also find it helpful if transport costs could be paid for, for the delivery of goods to storage, or for distribution to end-users. Some end-users prefer to have aid delivered directly to them, fearing the dangers of going outside, and also in some cases because they have mobility problems. This applies particularly to the elderly.

Some NGOs have decided, in consultation with OCHA, to provide aid in kind to people who are less than 70 kilometres from their centres of operations. People more than 70 kilometres away should preferably be provided with cash, provided there are functioning markets where they will be able to buy goods.



Hygiene products to be distributed

5.3.2. Aid in cash (financial transfers)

In most contexts, a humanitarian aid response requires the use of cash programmes, in the absence of formal systems for transferring resources to local people. However, Ukraine already has a fairly sophisticated social safety net system, and a pensions system, which date from the Soviet era but have been improved as a result of Ukraine's rapid digitalisation policy. Large scale financial transfers are feasible. This system operates on three levels:

- 1. The first level is based on principles of solidarity and subsidy. It dates from the Soviet era. Pensions are allocated to men at 60 and women at 58.5 years. Pensions are also allocated to the disabled, or to compensate for the loss of family support. They are financed by contributions from employees and employers, via the Ukrainian pension fund. This system is elderly and relatively inefficient, and it is also threatened by a dramatic drop in contributions linked to the economic crisis arising from the war.
- 2. The second level takes the form of an obligatory cumulative insurance scheme. It was established by a 2004 law which allowed for contributors to benefit from personal accrual of capital, managed on their behalf by national pension funds.
- 3. The third level is voluntary. Any employer can decide to pay into a non-governmental pension fund. These funds are set up under non-governmental retirement schemes, which have a recognised legal status in Ukrainian law.

During the COVID-19 crisis, with its negative economic impact, the Ukrainian government created a new platform for allocating cash support, called IPo Pamaga. It is linked to the Diia app (see above).

In response to the war, the Ukrainian government quickly put in place a system of financial transfers to help people who had been displaced. The Diia app referred to earlier enabled displaced persons to be registered, and to receive humanitarian aid from the government. Aid was also specifically directed to economic actors and agencies in areas affected by the war. While Diia enables registration online, it is also possible for displaced persons to register on paper with local authorities. After registering, displaced persons may receive 2000 hryvnia (about 50 euros) per person per month (adults), or 3,000 hryvnia (about 75 euros) per person per month (children). These sums are automatically paid into personal bank accounts. Thus, a family of two adults and two children receives 250 euros per month: not a negligible sum in a country where the minimal monthly salary in 2022 was the equivalent of 178.8 euros. However, local populations remaining in areas affected by the war, and not displaced, do not have access to this financial assistance, even if their situation and their way of life may often be very precarious.

In this context, as in many others, the international agencies find that there are many advantages in setting up cash systems, but that this means setting up complex registration arrangements for beneficiaries, as well as arrangements for tracking the allocation of funds. Some NGOs make use of the platform RedRose. Others, e.g., ACF, use platforms that they created themselves (Up-Cohesia). The WFP uses its own systems and tools. 'Deduplication' platforms, e.g., Buildingblocks, were developed, to trace people who had registered with multiple cash-distribution entities. The NGOs and OCHA, on the one hand, make the case for unconditional cash (multi-purpose cash or MPC), while the WFP prefers a system of cash as an alternative to food aid. It remains a challenge to find a way of harmonising these two approaches. The international community did not immediately recognise the advantages of the existing Ukrainian system, which already enabled financial transfers. International agencies tended to arrive with their own classic 'toolboxes', which they had developed for use elsewhere, which they were already in the habit of using.

The vagaries and uncertainty of the conflict mean that financial transfers may run into difficulties at different times in different areas of Ukraine. There is no sense in regularly updating cash payment systems in areas where the local population is trapped for days at a time in bunkers, or where the banking sector is not working properly. Similarly, there is no sense in distributing aid in kind in areas where markets are working, and shops are well stocked. The agencies set up a Cash Working Group with the objective of coordinating the different approaches of the WFP, UNICEF, the FAO and the NGOs, etc. A key question was how to integrate the international agencies' emergency cash transfers (ECTs) into existing Ukrainian social safety net systems. Article 14 of the donors' common declaration on cash transfers, pledging to liaise and coordinate with Ukrainian social systems, sums up the aim of the integration of financial transfers by the international agencies with Ukraine's own systems. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/ukraine-common-donor-messaging-humanitarian-cash-programs-30-june-2022>.

The international community's approach to cash transfers has evolved in several ways:

- Instead of blanket coverage of internally displaced persons, an effort is now made to reach the most vulnerable;
- Cash programmes are being redirected away from their current focus on western Ukraine, where displaced persons are in relatively peaceful areas, to the more difficult areas in the east and south of the country.
- Given the devaluation of the hryvnia, and the rise in inflation, the level of cash allocations needs to be reviewed. The standard basket of goods and services used as the basis of calculation in May - June this year does not take account of the additional costs that the winter will impose, because of the cold and also because of supply chain problems.
- There is more concerted effort to coordinate with Ukraine's national financial allocation systems. Discussions are ongoing with the Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ministry of Social Affairs. UN agencies e.g., UNICEF, UNHCR, the WFP and the IOM, as well as the ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross Society are working with the Ministry of Social Affairs to support the most vulnerable affected by the war.

Evolution of the cash transfers processes




PEOPLE ASSISTED BY OBLAST



PEOPLE BEING ASSISTED TREND



TREND OF PEOPLE BEING ASSISTED



5.4. Complex health risks

5.4.1. A well-established system

Ukraine's health system, developed in the Soviet period, is robust. Staff are often well trained. Infrastructure is extensive, even though it is ageing, with little recent investment. The system has three basic pillars: walk-in centres, which are health centres which carry out routine public health work, without hospitalisation; hospitals where surgery is carried out, which admit patients in need of more serious treatment, necessitating hospitalisation; and, more recently, a city system relying on private doctors. Although the system provides free healthcare, it has long suffered from corruption, out of date medical protocols, and falsified or substandard medication. A major reform was carried out in 2017 but has yet to make an impact. Alongside governmental health provision, some health care is made available by Ukrainian NGOs, e.g., the Alliance for People's Health, which was set up in 2000 with the aim of offering preventive care in a number of key areas, particularly HIV AIDS, TB, drug abuse and, more recently, COVID-19.

In this current war, Ukraine's health sector has benefited from the collection and dispatch of medicines and medical supplies by neighbouring countries. European hospitals sent ambulances full of supplies needed to tend to the seriously wounded. While these gifts of supplies were welcome, they sometimes included expired medicines, medicines without instructions on how to use them, out of date material, and material lacking spare parts or without instruction manuals. It remains a priority to respond to the Ukrainian health sector's own clear, properly authenticated requests.

Different geographical areas of Ukraine have different demands for assistance in the health sector:

- In cities and towns near the front line, the arrival of the wounded entails a process of triage: which patients can be stabilised immediately? How will others be evacuated, and to what type of medical centre - civilian or military – to ensure that adequate resources for treatment will be available? In the same areas, there is a continuing need for regular care to be provided to the chronically sick, especially the elderly, who may be suffering from e.g., diabetes or heart problems, necessitating specific medicines which may suddenly become unavailable. Organisations such as First Aid International make use of mobile teams. A team typically includes a doctor, a nurse, a psychotherapist and a specialist in protection issues. These teams provide routine healthcare services and ensure that the chronically ill continue to receive treatment.
- In cities and towns where large numbers of displaced persons are arriving, existing health structures are overwhelmed. Those arriving may not have with them records of their current health status or details of their treatment. The effect of population displacement on Ukraine's health sector has been a particularly marked consequence of the war. Several international agencies have focused on this issue.
- Working with Ukraine's Red Cross Society, other national Red Cross Societies e.g., in Finland, alongside the ICRC, have opened temporary health centres in a number of towns e.g., Uzhhorod, on the Polish border. In some cases, interventions were inappropriate: e.g., one NGO flew in a 58-bed hospital with emergency room, intensive care unit and two operating theatres, which was transported to a site near Lviv, only for it to be very little used. More effective are little health outposts established in strategic places such as railway stations, transit centres, bus stations, etc. They are able to provide immediate health services to those arriving as part of large-scale displacements.

Future support to Ukraine's health system will need to cover:

Battlefield medicine: the seriously wounded, blood supply management, multiple wounds, follow-up treatment of patients operated on in precarious conditions in siege situations, victims requiring complex surgery.

Interventions adapted to Ukraine's epidemiological profile, addressing health issues arising from urbanisation, the needs of an increasingly ageing population and dietary habits that lead to obesity, diabetes or vascular disease. Treatment of such chronic conditions risks being interrupted in conflict areas, particularly in the Donbas, because of the difficulties of supplying appropriate medication in frontline areas, or across lines of combat.

Regular healthcare: minor surgery, vaccinations, etc. Where hospitalisation is required e.g., for giving birth, the situation is very difficult. The problem has been accentuated by the departure of some medical staff, who were dismayed to see hospitals become the targets of Russian bombardment. Access to pharmacies is another key concern.

5.4.2. Battlefield medicine and medicine in time of war

Managing the wounded: the Ministry of Defence has primary responsibility for this sensitive area. Large numbers of Ukraine's health sector staff have signed on to support the armed forces. A very effective system has been set up to treat military personnel wounded in battle, and civilians wounded under bombardment. The system includes the means of stabilising the wounded on the battlefield and arrangements for evacuating them to military hospitals, or even for evacuating them, if very seriously wounded, to neighbouring countries. Civilian victims of bombardment are usually admitted to civilian hospitals. Medical aid collected and provided by Ukrainian networks, and a significant proportion of international aid to the health sector, has been specifically directed towards battlefield medicine or medicine for civilian victims of the war.

The need for blood and blood products has been kept under regular review. There is a need for support for the collection of blood and blood products. A number of agencies have supplied test kits to facilitate blood donations.

Managing the dead: media reports from towns such as Bucha focused on the fact that the dead often remained lying in the streets, or were buried in communal graves, in the absence of proper burial arrangements. During winter and early spring, the freezing cold nights were enough to prevent dead bodies from decaying. However, when temperatures began to rise, the situation quickly changed. Fortunately, at the instigation of the municipalities, electrical power was restored everywhere. Some NGOs belonging to the Ukrainian diaspora provided stretchers for the disposal of corpses, at the request of some parts of the health sector. In many parts of Ukraine, the number of cemeteries increased, and in some towns funeral bells tolled daily. A considerable effort has been made to document deaths and their causes, ready for the eventuality of legal proceedings in the context of trials for war crimes or crimes against humanity, but above all to enable families to mourn their dead, and also so they have access to financial compensation, which is often essential.

Psychological issues, including managing trauma, the sight of death and the loss of loved ones: the dreadful situations which people have had to face, including the death of others and exile, causes psychological trauma over both the short and the long term. Dealing with this is likely to be a major challenge. There is a very shaky mental health sector in Ukraine, inherited from the Soviet era; psychological and psychiatric care have in any case suffered decades of neglect. Depression and other illnesses, including psychological trauma, were stigmatised under the communist regime.

We must also remember that at the time the war started, many mental health workers, like their colleagues elsewhere in the health sector, were exhausted by the work required of them during the Covid-19 pandemic. Anxiety and depression caused by the pandemic had become a serious public health issue. Many people need, and will need in future, specialist help to deal with the impact the current crisis is having on them, including in some cases PTSD. People who have experienced combat, or witnessed atrocities, or simply spent days and nights living in bunkers with sirens and explosions continually going off around them, will be badly in need of professional psychological help.



Gift of a hearse to Kharkiv City hall by a Ukrainian Diaspora organization

5.4.3. Health of the elderly

In Ukraine, the health problems of the elderly place a large burden on the health system. Yet the question of specific help for the elderly does not appear in any of the Health Cluster's documents. It is well known, however, that elderly people, with reduced mobility, are often the first to lose access to health structures and may rapidly become 'invisible'. This is an issue on which, once again, voluntary Ukrainian associations have taken the lead, ensuring the provision of needs, including psychological support, and help in transporting the elderly to walk-in health centres or hospitals, where many of them often remain.

5.5. Access to water

Water is normally provided by VodaKanal². Its local affiliates treat water at source and organise distribution. Despite the war, their operations continue.

- When Russian troops withdrew from areas such as Bucha and Irpin, and access to them was possible again, it was clear that water networks had suffered serious damage. The ICRC provided immediate assistance to VodaKanal in Kiev, enabling the restoration of the water supply to populations that had been without water for weeks. Bulldozers were needed, and demining teams, to prepare the ground before work could be done on the water networks.

² <https://www.devex.com/organizations/vodokanal>

- In areas close to the sea, e.g., the Mykolaiv region, some parts of the water distribution network had been destroyed, and supply from the Kherson pumping station had been cut off: this made for a particularly difficult situation. Often, the only answer was to pump water from the water-table, or from rivers and lakes. This was salt water, and in some areas contained sulphur, making it unsuitable for human consumption. Municipalities issued instructions not to drink this water, and in some places, voluntary organisations provided huge quantities of bottled water. Since July, NGOs such as Solidarités International transport water by truck, setting up distribution ramps which enable local people to come and fill up their water



reserves. Although this remains essential, it is expensive and is likely to become difficult in winter, which is not far off. Other alternatives should be explored. Water Mission, for example, is experimenting with reverse osmosis units, fed by small wells.

The issue of water quality varies in degree from area to area in Ukraine. In some areas highly polluted water, carrying toxic waste, is all that is available in some areas. This creates various problems, including for heating systems: the water's corrosive properties increase at higher temperatures, incapacitating heating systems. Again, when winter arrives, this will be a major problem.

Water distribution in Mykolaiev by Solidarités International

5.6. Protection and human rights

This is a high-intensity international war, with prisoners being taken on both sides and civilian populations exposed to the conflict, and at risk. We recall the importance of full respect for international human rights law, and note how far, unfortunately, it is from being observed in the present context: civilian structures such as schools, hospitals, residential areas, railway stations and shopping areas are regularly bombed. Military operations are carried out in the streets and residential areas of towns and cities, so that life for civilians becomes a nightmare, with fewer opportunities for escaping elsewhere. In such situations, negotiations aim at the creation of humanitarian corridors by which people may be evacuated, and food and first aid equipment may be delivered. However, in Ukraine, such corridors have never really become operational, and may be said in general to have failed. Proposals for corridors leading to Russia or Belarus were, obviously, unacceptable to the Ukrainians. When corridors were agreed on elsewhere, they were frequently subject to enemy attacks. It was very difficult to organise evacuations from Mariupol before it fell. Attempts to organise evacuations from Kherson, Mykolaiv and Sloviansk are also very difficult, with no covering agreement having been reached in the case of Sloviansk. More than once, groups of people attempting to flee were forced by the Russians to leave the buses they had boarded for departure. The buses left empty. Other major challenges to the Geneva Convention include the procedures for returning the bodies of fallen soldiers of either side, the establishment of a Red Cross messaging system, the reuniting of families and - for the future - the treatment of missing persons, when mass graves have been used or human remains have been destroyed in explosions.

In the war in Ukraine, the ICRC is attempting to fulfil the hard core of its mandate, which is extremely difficult to implement, and also difficult to explain to the Ukrainians themselves, for whom neutrality and impartiality are characterised as ‘complicity with the enemy’. The polemic surrounding Amnesty International’s recent report on Ukraine, *Ukrainian fighting tactics endanger civilians*,³ indicates the sensitivity of these issues. In this context, the ICRC needs more than ever the ability to educate people, and it also needs unwavering international support.

5.6.1. Legal protections and legal support

Many refugees fleeing within or out of Ukraine needed living accommodation immediately. Many had lost key documents, and procedures for checking identity were complicated by the fact that migration service files were not available for consultation. Those who had lost documents needed help recovering their legal identity, which was normally done via an online registration process.

- Services at municipal level worked to enable certificates of internal displacement to be issued, which were proof of the legal status of internally displaced persons, and enabled them to qualify for payment of governmental benefits.
- NGOs such as the Danish Refugee Council, highly experienced in matters of legal aid, provided support in navigating the administrative steps required to recover legal identity, and thus to acquire access to benefits payments, and humanitarian aid.
- Several Ukrainian NGOs, some of them established years ago, were also active in the domain of legal aid, e.g., Right-to-Protection,⁴ ROKADA,⁵ the International Foundation for the Protection of Health and the Environment in the Carpathian Region (NEEKA),⁶ and Desyate Kvitna.⁷

5.6.2. Human trafficking: protections and risks

Extreme vigilance was required in the area of human trafficking. Whether real or imaginary, from the beginning of the war fears developed that human traffickers preyed on Ukrainian people in distress, uprooted from their homes and traumatised as they often were. Child traffickers, organisers of prostitution rings, etc, were - it was assumed - ready to go to any lengths to exploit the misery of the Ukrainian people. In Lviv, a hostel for pregnant single women was opened, to ensure that these women had a place to stay and were protected. In several places, UNICEF funds Child-friendly Spaces, where children can play in the care of trained staff.

5.7. Education

Among tactics used in the war are attacks on educational infrastructure: schools are regularly damaged or destroyed. The Education Cluster estimates that 2,129 Buildings with an educational purpose had been damaged and 216 totally destroyed, as of 21 July 2022. The mission observed examples of such destruction in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv.

Many schools, training centres and university buildings have been used to provide shelter for displaced persons, often becoming collective centres set up for the duration of the war. As a result, many children have found themselves cut off from their schools.

³ <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/08/ukraine-ukrainian-fighting-tactics-endanger-civilians/>


⁴ <https://r2p.org.ua/asylum-seekers/?lang=en>

⁵ <https://rokada.org.ua/>

⁶ <http://new.neeka.org/>

⁷ <https://www.dk.od.ua/>

Distance learning was already available before 2020 and developed considerably in the context of the pandemic. This made it possible for learning programmes to be resumed, to some extent, despite the war. Teachers have been able to use the summer vacation to prepare courses for the start of the new academic year. Many courses will be hybrid in nature, depending on the balance of students attending in person, students no longer in the area but still in Ukraine and students now living abroad. There



have been intense discussions between the Ministry of Education (MESU), the municipalities, the teachers and also parent-teacher associations. Of major concern for MESU are the future prospects of thousands of Ukrainian young people who are currently living as refugees abroad, who are likely to have difficulties in staying connected to the Ukrainian national education system. Discussions are additionally under way on the idea of increasing the winter holiday from two weeks to five, to take account of the length of time the war has lasted, the likely severity of the coming winter, and the problems of providing heating in schools and other educational buildings. The distance learning or hybrid solutions under discussion will be adapted to different situations and contingencies.

UNICEF's Child Friendly Space

5.8. Preparing for winter

Ukrainian winters can be very severe. From experience with 'winterisation' programmes, tried out in similar situations e.g., the Balkans, Chechnya, Abkhazia, Ossetia and Karabash, international aid always arrives too late, and in insufficient quantity. For now, the humanitarian agencies with which the evaluation mission discussed the question of winter are focused on minimal basic repairs e.g., of windows, doors and roofs; on attempts to ensure one warm room in every house; and on the provision of blankets and warm clothing.

Destroyed building difficult to heat during winter months

The priority for some urban municipalities, such as Kharkiv, is to repair central heating systems in apartment buildings that have suffered from bombardment, which often require Soviet-era techniques. Such repairs will require access to technical knowledge and spare parts which the humanitarian agencies do not normally have access to. Elsewhere, if there is electricity, individual electric heating systems will be possible. At present, in rural areas and on the outskirts of towns and cities, there is a major woodcutting programme underway, to ensure that enough wood will be available to last the winter. In Kharkiv, the municipality and volunteer groups are making plans to designate the city metro as a mega-shelter, not simply an anti-bombardment bunker.



OCHA's most recent revised Flash Appeal, in early August, includes a specific focus on this question of



the forthcoming winter. The Ukrainian authorities have asked oblasts and municipalities to prepare by the beginning of September 'heating action plans', accompanied by lists of needs. 'Winterisation' is a key preoccupation not only for the Ukrainian population, but also for aid agencies and their staff.

Preparation for winter in rural areas

5.9. Environmental risks

The response to the war in Ukraine has been unusual in that the environmental risks have been considered from the outset. Among agencies focused on environmental questions are Ukrainian environmental NGOs such as Environment People Law, teams from Ukraine's universities, and government ministries; and others at international level, or from other countries, e.g., Kennesaw State University in Atlanta, Georgia which published as early as March this year in the nuclear science journal *The Bulletin* an article on environmental risks in the context of war.⁸ An interagency coordination group was set up with joint support from OCHA and UNEP, forming the Joint Environmental Unit (JEP). This group meets monthly to discuss issues such as mapping the environmental impact of the war, improving education programmes on the effects of demining and decontamination programmes in conflict areas, and ways of mitigating or reducing these effects. The Conflict and Environment Observatory produced a study on the impact of the war on agricultural land, working with the Ukrainian agricultural university of Sumy; and, working with a British university, a think-piece on the combined impact of the war, climate change and Ukraine's past agricultural practices on the management of Ukraine's water resources, etc. Among other issues discussed is the environmental impact of the war on the health of the population, including nuclear risks associated with military action near the nuclear power stations at Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl.

⁸ <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/grappling-with-environmental-risks-in-the-fog-of-war/>

6. CHALLENGES FOR THE PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL AID

6.1. Difficulties for international agencies in setting up

6.1.1. Little initial humanitarian presence

International representation in Ukraine before the 2014 Donbas crisis was essentially political. The aim was to put pressure on the very corrupt Yanukovich regime, to prevent Ukraine being drawn closer into the embrace of the Kremlin and thus providing a sort of revolving door for Russian and Ukrainian mafia organisations. Following the Euromaidan, the 'de-sovietisation' of Ukrainian society and particularly the conflict in the Donbas, Ukraine attracted greater international interest and became more open to the international community. The UN system in Ukraine, which had become partially dormant, as well as NGOs, and international development foundations, returned to the country. At the same time new opportunities opened up for cooperation within the economic sector. Twinning arrangements with other entities abroad were renewed or set up. More than twenty French towns and cities were twinned with Ukrainian towns and cities. In some cases, the arrangement dated back to the 1970s, for example the twinning of Lille and Kharkiv, which was agreed in 1978 when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union, then renewed in June 1998 after Ukrainian independence. Twinning arrangements were a way of underscoring an interest in opening up towards Eastern Europe, and particularly involved relationships between universities. They were heavily implicated in international mobilisation to help Ukraine from the beginning of the war, both sending aid and offering shelter to Ukrainian refugees. The twenty French cities with Ukrainian twinning arrangements had hitherto engaged chiefly in reciprocal visits, exchanges at university level and, since Ukrainian independence, research in the domain of economic relations.

French cities twinned with Ukrainian cities <https://www.annuaire-mairie.fr/jumelage-ukraine.html>

Avion (62)	»	Thorezgrad	Belfort (90)	»	Zaparoje
Brive-la-Gaillarde (19)	»	Melitopol	Cassis (13)	»	Alouchta
Château-sur-Loing (45)	»	Dnieprovski	Clichy (92)	»	Ivano Frankivsk
Dignac (16)	»	Klichkovtsy	Fontenay-sous-Bois (94)	»	Brovary
La Seyne-sur-Mer (83)	»	Berdiansk	Le Roulier (88)	»	Strilky
Lille (59)	»	Kharkov	Limoges (87)	»	Grodno
Malakoff (92)	»	Izmaïl	Marseille (13)	»	Odessa
Nice (06)	»	Yalta	Romainville (93)	»	Darnitsa
Romilly-sur-Seine (10)	»	Ouman	Saché (37)	»	Verkhivnia
Saint-Étienne (42)	»	Lougansk	Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray (76)	»	Novaia Kakhovka
Sallaumines (62)	»	Thorezgrad	Senlis (60)	»	Petchersk
Sens (89)	»	Vyshgorod	Toulouse (31)	»	Kiev

Following the conflict in the Donbas in 2014, a first wave of humanitarian agencies arrived in Ukraine, including OCHA and the UN's humanitarian bodies, several large- and medium-sized international NGOs and of course the ICRC. Some human rights NGOs, such as CIVIC, are working on the conditions needed to promote peace, as well as on the challenges of developing Ukrainian civil society towards the democratic standards compatible with Ukraine's 'rapprochement' with the EU. The humanitarian presence was reduced again, as humanitarian funding decreased, and because of the growing difficulties of working in Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR), including because of Ukrainian suspicions directed at international agencies who, in the Ukrainian view, did not strongly enough condemn the annexation by Russia of the Donbas.

One of the larger programmes still supported by DG ECHO deals with reinforcing Ukraine's risk management capacity, especially managing the risks of technological and industrial disasters in areas near the front lines of the war.

6.1.2. The 24 February offensive and its impact on humanitarian actors present

The 24 February Russian offensive took almost everyone by surprise. The first reflex of the few humanitarian aid agencies still in Ukraine was to move their own teams to shelter. Their approach may have been over-focused on expatriates, although they also took care to ensure the evacuation of Ukrainian colleagues who wanted help with this. Some NGOs set up reception centres for their Ukrainian teams well away from the areas of conflict.

All those involved found the provision of humanitarian aid in Ukraine extremely complicated from the outset of the war, for many reasons. First, for many agencies, this was a new context, entailing many risks and unknown factors. In the early weeks, the priority was to provide reception and welcome facilities along Ukraine's borders, to help people who were escaping from the conflict. Mapping humanitarian assistance in the subsequent period indicates that while the majority of assistance remained concentrated in the western areas of Ukraine, at the same time agencies previously active in the east began to return there, and other agencies, with flexible operating methods, engaged in activities near the front lines of the conflict. Once again, the pattern is on classic lines, as observed in many contexts: Haiti after the earthquake, where the centre for action was in Port-au-Prince, with other satellite focuses of activity such as Martissant; or the exodus of displaced persons in eastern Chad, with the majority of aid concentrated on Goz-Beida-Abeche and other action focused in areas near the borders with Sudan, etc. The main centre for action is typically found where needs are most intense, and where there is also a level of security. In these centres, agencies with larger budgets tend to concentrate. In the satellite focal areas, the agencies most likely to be active are the ICRC, MSF and a small number of other NGOs, many of them French. These latter find it easier to operate in contexts where flexibility is essential, as is the capacity to take risks in order to reach populations in need.

6.1.3. Scaling up

From mid-May to early June, activity gradually expanded towards the east and south. The UN agencies opened offices in Dnipro in June, and Odessa in early July. International aid began to be scaled up, four months after the outset of the war. If it is to be sustainable, scaling up requires certain conditions to be met, given that the front line extends along more than 1200 kilometres, with millions of Ukrainians now displaced.

- The Ukrainian government needs more consistent, and stronger, capacity to play its part. It has already made unbelievable efforts, but Ukraine's current economic crisis, with the fall in GDP and the drain on national resources represented by the war effort, makes its role increasingly difficult. It needs budgetary support.
- More scope is needed for dialogue, consultation and coordination, at all levels. This is essential in order to ensure that aid is coherent, to avoid duplication and gaps. Without coordination, it will be difficult to scale up when resources available are likely to diminish.
- Areas where action is needed must be prioritised. The comparative advantages of different agencies, and categories of actors, must be clearly identified. Sometimes, volunteer groups will be more successful than international agencies. There are other key areas of activity where the international aid community has an essential part to play. Complementarities between agencies need to be maximised.

Some international NGOs took significant risks early on in the war, in order to identify and work with agencies as rapidly as possible. Those with their own funds, or with flexible donors, (especially the private foundations such as the Fondation de France), or those who received large donations in kind for immediate distribution were able to set up 'no regret' assistance and distribution channels without too many problems. In such situations, even without detailed knowledge of working partners, it is possible to get to work provided it is clear that there is good logistical capacity, strong volunteer networks, available storage spaces and the means of distribution. This was how it worked in the early weeks. It was relatively easy in the countries bordering Ukraine, with Poland, Romania and Moldova providing support. It was, however, more complicated - although feasible - within Ukraine itself, because the entire country was on a war footing.

It is more complicated to work with established institutions. Working with informal volunteer groups is very different from trying to work through antiterrorist screening mechanisms, which is likely to be impossible. Donors backing NGOs all have their different administrative requirements and NGOs fear criticism for spending money through mechanisms that do not meet these requirements, making their contributions 'ineligible'. They cannot afford to take risks. Approaches which slowed down NGO responses, or made them less effective, need to be reviewed and strategically revised.

6.2. Coordination in a complex environment

6.2.1. The central role of government in creating an enabling environment for aid

The Ukrainian government mobilised to facilitate humanitarian assistance as rapidly as it had mobilised in response to the invasion. It published decree 202, which suspended accountability and reporting requirements for the provision of humanitarian aid. It gave humanitarian agencies priority access to fuel needed for aid distribution. By resolution 174, it simplified customs procedures as applied to imports of humanitarian aid. By decree 224, it clarified which products might be imported as humanitarian aid. It speeded up visas for non-Ukrainians entering the country as employees of international medical and humanitarian agencies. On 22 March 2022, it published a resolution modifying the rules for bringing in humanitarian aid from other countries, so that declarations giving source, destination or merchandise detail were no longer required for goods to pass the frontier. Beneficiaries might be the civil military administration at oblast level, a ministry or a specific community. Fourteen European countries agreed to allow the transit without specific authorization of humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In addition, the government set up a website, recording current needs and aid received.

Two difficulties have yet to be resolved at central government level:

- visas for staff of humanitarian organisations: at present visas are issued for no longer than three months, with an obligation to leave Ukraine for several weeks at the end of that period before being allowed to return. As a result, there is discontinuity in agency presence in the field, with gaps in the personnel needed to maintain services, despite the fact that agencies also have Ukrainian teams of high calibre. Steps have been taken to resolve this issue with the Ukrainian government at different levels, and with the embassies of donor countries concerned.
- staff registration: the staff of international NGOs need to register in order to settle in Ukraine in accordance with rules on the import of emergency goods, conditions of employment, banking and taxation arrangements. At present, these procedures are lengthy and incur considerable costs.

Coordination between central government and different levels of local government, including oblasts, regions, municipalities, etc is not always as effective as it might be. This is a countrywide difficulty. In the context of the war, with massive population displacements, and the need for the regular supply of goods and services with winter approaching, lack of coordination may have serious consequences. The evaluation mission noted particular problems in the support provided to reception centres, the organisation of employment opportunities for displaced persons, etc. Regular meetings between senior Ukrainians and the UN's resident representative and humanitarian coordinator are important.

6.2.2. Coordination between volunteer groups, Ukrainian NGOs and municipalities

Coordination between voluntary groups, Ukrainian NGOs and municipalities varies in intensity and coverage, often depending on the experience of civil society volunteers, and the relationships they have with state organisations. It is not necessarily easy for the classic humanitarian NGOs to work with the citizen networks which have emerged in Ukraine in the course of the war, or to organise effective mechanisms for coordination. There are several reasons for this:

- There are fears of aid being syphoned off, or of difficulties in tracking and accountability. Local groups and agencies, which tend to be highly digitally aware, and also aware of the need for accountability, have often set up systems to register the flow of goods, or of populations that benefit, etc, using online platforms, taking photographs systematically of arriving goods, or individuals receiving aid, etc. It seems, in fact, that this fear of corruption or of aid being syphoned off is based on Ukraine's wider reputation, and is not entirely credible, while nonetheless operating as a constraint on cooperation between Ukrainian networks and international aid agencies.
- Informal citizen networks are not always neutral, independent and impartial. This gives rise to problems of coherence, both internally and with other agencies. Some of these networks were born out of the dreadful conditions of the war, to respond to needs on a large scale.
- Informal networks are involved on the one hand in supporting civilian populations, whether displaced persons or populations that have stayed in areas of conflict, and on the other hand in providing support to the army: the production of camouflage nets, uniform, kit, food, medicine and first aid kits, etc.

In an attempt to resolve this relatively chaotic situation, ad-hoc volunteer coordination centres were set up to link municipalities, oblasts and civil society organisations, on the basis of different geographical areas or different competences. These coordination centres are often invited to daily online meetings with municipal councils, to discuss key issues, and to plan ahead. This has been the case in Lviv, Kharkiv and Dnipro and has helped to ensure a rapid response to requirements and needs.

Cooperation is focused on the following key areas:

- Provision of information to displaced populations, normally the job of voluntary groups stationed at nodes of arrival for example railway stations or bus stations.
- Taking delivery of, and packing, humanitarian assistance and basic supplies.
- Arranging and equipping shelters and keeping them clean and in order.
- Providing for food distribution.
- Organising telephone contacts and consultations for displaced persons and those in charge of supporting them.
- Organising transport of goods and people.

It has been challenging both for civil society and for the municipalities. Sometimes there has been reluctance to work together. There is relatively little experience of doing so. In some cases, municipalities prefer to rely on certain voluntary groups, which creates dissatisfaction or tension among the others. However, the fact of being in crisis mode, with an awareness of the need for urgent action, has generally made it possible to reduce or overcome such tension.



Reception center for IDP in Lviv train station

6.2.3. Coordination between international systems, municipalities and voluntary networks

Cooperation between international organisations and Ukrainian structures, whether volunteer structures or local, decentralised institutions, was difficult from the start, and is still broadly unsatisfactory. Humanitarian aid agencies and agencies in charge of dispatching displaced persons overseas or distributing food supplies are not used to coordinating with local authorities and municipalities and have only rarely worked in the past with informal civil society groupings. The 'developmental' methods and approaches of some NGOs, particularly human rights NGOs, have been shown to be poorly adapted to wartime conditions under martial law, when priority is given to problems other than those associated with the normal functioning of democracy.

6.2.4. Using cluster systems

The cluster system was used in Ukraine in the humanitarian response to the 2014 Donbas conflict. It was still theoretically in place when war broke out in February 2022. The system was strengthened so that it covered the whole of Ukraine.

There have been questions raised about the nutrition cluster, given that Ukraine is a highly productive agricultural country, where markets and shops are still largely well supplied. In practise, a rolling list of clusters has been drawn up, with nutrition featuring on the list because of the likelihood of a large-scale increase in poverty in the coming months, particularly in areas near the front line, in the NGCAs and cities and towns with a large population of unemployed displaced persons. In addition, there are likely to be nutrition problems associated with water quality issues. It will be interesting to see how far expected scenarios come to pass. It is a subject of central concern to UNICEF and presupposes that children in Ukraine will be particularly vulnerable to malnutrition. The evaluation mission concluded from meetings and discussions that the elderly may also be of concern in this context, since they will find it more difficult to go out and get supplies during the bitter winter months; and they tend to have problems with the assimilation of nutrients, as well as other specific health issues.

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

There are 10 Clusters, 3 Sub-Clusters and several Working Group operational in Ukraine.

Clusters


- 1-Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster led by UNHCR (newly activated in March 2022)
- 2- Education Cluster co-led by UNICEF and Save the Children
- 3-Emergency Telecommunications Cluster led by WFP (newly activated in February 2022)
- 4-Food Security and Livelihoods Cluster co-led by FAO and WFP
- 5-Health Cluster led by WHO
- 6-Logistics Cluster led by WFP (newly activated in February 2022)
- 7-Nutrition Cluster led by UNICEF (newly activated in March 2022)
- 8-Protection Cluster led by UNHCR
- 9-Shelter and Non-Food Items Cluster led by UNHCR
- 10-Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) led by UNICEF

Sub-clusters

- 1-Child Protection Sub-Cluster led by UNICEF
- 2-Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster led by UNFPA
- 3-Mine Actions Sub-Cluster led by UNDP

Working Group

- 1-Cash Working Group co-led by ACTED and OCHA
- 2-Environment Working group



Humanitarian aid is coordinated from hubs: Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv, Vinnytsia. The implementation of the cluster system on the ground, particularly the implementation of integrated mechanisms under the aegis of municipalities (area-based coordination), has not yet begun.


Local authorities are often invited to meetings of different clusters, and sometimes participate in them. But there are so many clusters, task teams and working groups that

municipalities and oblasts cannot make staff available to take part, nor do they have staff with the necessary language abilities. There are numerous systems and arrangements for translation, and translators and interpreters are regularly used. Nonetheless, language continues to be a limiting factor when it comes to the inclusion of local representatives in coordination mechanisms, which are additionally very time-consuming. There was no advance planning for an arrangement in which international agencies play a role within existing Ukrainian structures, with translation therefore being needed from Ukrainian into English.


Significant efforts have nevertheless been made since the beginning of July under the aegis of the United Nations Resident Coordinator to improve all the coordination mechanisms with the Ukrainian State, but also, via the United Nations Moscow office, both on the issue of tripartite agreements (more directly involving the Secretary General of the United Nations) on the resumption of trade in agricultural products from the port of Odessa and for humanitarian action in conflict zones.

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine



NUMBER OF PARTNERS



113* PARTNERS WITH PLANNED, ONGOING AND COMPLETED PROJECTS



COORDINATION & COMMON SERVICES



*In the 3rd round of data collection the Health and FSL cluster partially anonymized some partner names. As a result, we were not able to calculate the distinct number of partner organizations and maintained the number from prior round of 3W.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Creation date: 24 Mar 2022 Sources: Humanitarian partners Feedback: www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int

421

partners with planned, ongoing, and completed activities*




249 Completed
253 Ongoing
136 Planned



Number of Partners



Partners By Cluster



*Health and FSL clusters partially anonymized some partner names, which are excluded from the count of partners and breakdown per type.

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Creation date: 05 August 2022 Sources: Humanitarian partners Feedback: www.unocha.org www.reliefweb.int

6.3. Major logistical constraints, IT solutions

Not for decades has humanitarian aid in a large country been organised without using aeroplanes and relying so heavily on online communication systems. Wartime protocols in Ukraine mean that flying is forbidden, even in civilian aircraft. Any kind of transport depends on trains or road traffic.

Ukraine's railway network is impressive, with affordable prices and many night trains. Ukrainian agencies, and some international aid agencies, make extensive use of it. Others avoid it because some parts of the railway network may be enemy targets. They prefer to use roads, which are largely in acceptable condition but entail very long travel times.

Ukraine is now a highly digitalised society. Drawing on experience gained during the Covid-19 pandemic, the war has seen the widespread use of online communication and online functions more generally.

- formally organised meetings using Zoom, Teams, Webex, etc;
- more informal, more flexible meetings and communications using WhatsApp groups;
- passive information dissemination and exchange using Facebook groups, Telegram, Instagram, Viber.

For better or worse, these new working methods are bedding down in Ukraine, with less human interaction but plenty of interactivity. Whether or not this will make for better-targeted, more effective and efficient humanitarian aid remains a moot point. Information flow and exchange is certainly improved, but many agencies and others complain of the lack of human contact, and also the lack of shared points of reference or common understanding in the field, which inevitably results from relying on e-communication.

6.4. Working with new actors

It is not easy for the traditional humanitarian NGOs and in general for international agencies, to



support the citizen networks which have emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war; these networks are very diverse, take many different forms and do not use the type of systems within which the aid organisations are used to working, e.g., international aid agencies have long been used to working with large national NGOs.

A way Home, an Ukrainian NGO in Odessa

These networks, however, indisputably work effectively, and seem to be indispensable to meet needs within the Ukrainian population. The aid agencies should approach these local networks with humility, given the huge risks they have often taken

to provide assistance.

- Coordination with the many, varied Ukrainian citizen networks, and with Ukrainian authorities responsible for aid, including ministries and municipalities, as well as with other international agencies and actors - including the donors and the NGOs - and the multiplication of new initiatives, add up to a challenge for the international aid community if it is to achieve results.
- The failure of donors to coordinate among themselves has created difficulties in the field. Donors often have different procedures for resource allocation, different implementation

criteria and different reporting arrangements. Donor coordination mechanisms should be put in place.

France's Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs launched an initiative to coordinate assistance to Ukraine by local authorities, civil society and NGOs. The organisation Cities Unies France also set up a special fund for Ukraine, coordinating contributions.

6.5. Humanitarian principles: understanding and preserving neutrality

During the 2014 conflict in the Donbas, and especially since the February 2022 invasion, there are a number of challenges facing the international aid agencies relating to the application, or operationalisation, of humanitarian principles.

6.5.1. Operational axes

Several key questions on the operationalization of humanitarian principles arise for actors in the field:

- How may sustainable access be organised to Ukrainian citizens resident in temporarily occupied territory, areas of active engagement or occupied areas? These citizens are not registered as displaced persons and have difficulty in accessing aid. The Ukrainian government passed a resolution (457 of 16 April 2022) to facilitate the payment of pensions to people living in the Donbas, including those on either side of the front line. However, access to the NGCAs remains almost impossible, although some agencies or groups do their best, despite the constraints, to supply a little aid.
- The position of the front line of hostilities may change. People currently accessible for the supply of aid may no longer be accessible in the future, but will still be in need, arguably even greater need, no longer having access to banks, suffering electricity cuts, with shops finding themselves suddenly on the far side of the front line, etc. People in this situation are often the elderly, with limited mobility. How can humanitarian aid be provided?
- It is important to ensure that non-respect of principles does not tarnish the provision of humanitarian aid in other contexts, given the power of social networks to spread disinformation and 'fake news' (a new way of waging war).
- The alternative is to evacuate the populations of areas that have become too dangerous, where military operations are under way. Some areas may also be too difficult to keep warm. Some people, especially the elderly, may not be willing to evacuate from villages and small towns. The Ukrainian government and the municipalities regularly offer opportunities to local populations to evacuate from dangerous areas, but international human rights law forbids forced displacement.

6.5.2. The political dimension

During the current highly political crisis, there has been a rich debate about humanitarian principles.

Ukrainians are often uncomfortable with this debate, which seems to them to assign equal responsibility to the aggressors and the victims of aggression. So, for example, the very idea of allowing humanitarian aid to transit via Russia is considered unacceptable. From the outset, it has been difficult to explain that dialogue with 'the other side' is indispensable in order to access to prisoners to be allowed, for dead bodies to be recovered, etc.

Events such as the bombardment of the Olenivka prison, killing dozens of Ukrainian prisoners, makes the dialogue extremely difficult.

Countries that give Ukraine military, political or economic support during this war remain bound by their commitments in respect of international human rights: Article 1, common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, recalls the obligation 'to respect international human rights and to ensure that they are respected'. The fact that a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and a major nuclear power, is a party to the conflict makes it even harder to appeal for international human rights to be respected.

6.6. Managing insecurity

So far, there has been no direct attack in this war on humanitarian actors. The main danger comes from bombardments. While some bombardments appear to be carefully targeted, the majority appear to be random. Others result from errors, or from malfunctioning equipment. Humanitarian aid workers are exposed to the same risks as the general population. To try to counter these, procedures have been drawn up for travel, and for nights. Most humanitarian workers elect to live and work in areas where there are anti-air raid shelters.

While nights in Kyiv, Dnipro and Lviv are now relatively quiet, the situation remains unpredictable and sirens go off regularly, eliciting varying reactions from the local populations and humanitarian workers, who have become all too used to hearing sirens. In other areas, e.g., Kharkiv or Mykolaiv, sirens wake the populations regularly at night. They often spend their nights in anti-bomb shelters.

There are plenty of security experts in Ukraine from other countries alongside those from Ukraine's own national and local services. The International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO) has been in the country since June this year. Access to difficult or dangerous areas is possible, but often depends on chance, requiring very flexible programming to avoid being targeted by enemy fire.

The issue of nuclear security has recently become pressing, in view of the heightened military activity around Zaporizhzhia, Europe's largest nuclear power station, with many reactors. Some NGOs keep very modest stocks of iodine tablets, and some have a few HAZMAT suits, but this is not really adequate provision against nuclear risks. There are very few procedures in place to be followed by the international agencies if there should be a nuclear alert, although the Ukrainians themselves are better informed about what to do in such a situation: they are making preparations for lockdown areas, and also establishing evacuation procedures to be followed, depending on information on the direction being taken by radio-active clouds. OCHA has a pilot project for a support mission to assist with security planning for the humanitarian sector, providing guidance and recommendations for humanitarian staff.



Cities remain "war prepared"

6.7. Changing dynamics, with a high degree of unpredictability

This war's characteristics can be resumed in two words: predictability and uncertainty, which clearly makes it very complicated to plan humanitarian interventions. Many interviews built up a picture of a conflict in which

- the ultimate objective of Russia's military invasion is unknown, other than the 'denazification' rhetoric. However, there are many rumours and hypotheses about the objective. The aim of controlling strategic territory along the Azov and Black Seas seems increasingly convincing, not least because of the economic and demographic consequences i.e., the 'russification' of areas controlled by Russia to ensure that their occupation is irreversible;
- it is difficult to understand changing tactics, and factors relating to terrain, e.g., climate factors, and how these relate to the mobilisation of different types of weapon: ground, air, ground-air, naval, etc. Better understanding is needed to prepare for the likely humanitarian impact;
- the conduct of hostilities seems to be established on the classic pattern of urban warfare, flattening structures by bombardment, and also making use of disinformation campaigns (psy-ops).

The only possible life-lines in such a dynamic, dangerous context consist of anticipating possible scenarios for the conflict and their humanitarian consequences; seeking out well informed interlocutors; and keeping abreast of the multitude of sources of information.

In such a situation aid must be highly flexible. Strict logical frameworks and lengthy procedures for redrafting projects to secure contract amendments slow down aid delivery and may make it less effective in a rapidly changing context. Donors should enable an institutional and financial environment which speeds up the delivery of aid in changeable, dangerous situations. While there is still scope for improvement, the NGOs recognise that donors have already made helpful progress on this. It is crucial to build in, from the first stages of project development, plenty of scope for flexibility to avoid the lengthy procedures entailed in rewriting and renegotiating contract amendments. 'Light touch' procedures, with telephone calls and e-mail exchanges to confirm any necessary project amendments or adaptations, are less costly and have been adopted in a fair number of cases.



Sloviansk train station

7. AID IN THE PERIOD POST-ACTIVE CONFLICT

7.1. Peace will arrive sometime

There will eventually be peace. The quality of that piece will be crucial, determining future decades. It will be a ‘peace of the brave’ if negotiations secure justice for the victims of aggression; an ‘unfair peace’ if it entails surrendering simply to end the bloodbath; or a peace ‘imposed’ by the international community when or if public opinion can no longer accept the images of death and destruction. At some point, especially if economic sanctions cause pain in Russia, pressure to conclude a peace will succeed. The Ukrainian population will then have the ‘choice’ of returning home, where they will find that conditions are horribly precarious. If the peace is unfair, people will no doubt be tempted to choose exile and it is unlikely that reconstruction funds will be on a large scale. In other scenarios, aid for the reconstruction of Ukraine will certainly be large-scale, but there will be intense competition among donors. The Ukrainian government will need considerable capacity to coordinate the inputs that reconstruction will require.

The Lugano conference organised by the Swiss government was unable to make much progress, given the uncertainties about the way the situation will evolve. However, it set out some general principles for the reconstruction of Ukraine, among which rooting out corruption and institutional reform were central. These are likely to be conditions for any funds committed by the major donors. There will be a huge Marshall Plan to implement. Coordination between the Ukrainian government, donor countries, territorial administrations and multilateral agencies and organisations will be key to the success of this effort.

7.2. Reconstructing zones destroyed in the conflict

Experience shows that risks and dangers are likely to continue well after the end of the war, with unexploded munitions and mines, etc, among the ruins, which will make decontamination dangerous and costly. The Ukrainian army has a high level of competence in this area and has already begun demining as well marking out mined areas as part of a strategy of prevention. They have also begun decontaminating urban districts which became battlefields, where access to these districts is possible. Thus, entire residential districts of Irpin and Bucha have been partially decontaminated. There is much work still to do in rural and wooded areas around these towns.



Irpin bridge, destroyed at the beginning of the war

Some NGOs are working in this sector. They need specialist staff and specific technology. It will be important to strengthen their coordination with the Ukrainian army and its demining teams, and make full use of the mapping strategies which have been developed by several specialist bodies, NGOs, investigative journalists (e.g., Bellingcat) and organisations which specialise in analysing conflicts and war crimes. Proper mapping enables demining work to be as effective as possible, and enables risks to be identified, both for the deminers and for the populations in the affected areas. Education and outreach warning of the



dangers of mines and unexploded munitions will be essential, given that their presence in areas where the conflict was centred is likely to be part of daily life in the future. [Mine awareness, Irpin](#)

7.3. Modernising old, damaged or destroyed industrial infrastructure

In 2020, URD organised a training programme on the management of the risks of technological and environmental accidents in the frontline areas of the Donbas. Such accidents might arise from explosions in areas where there are potentially dangerous sites such as oil storage depots, chemical storage depots, etc. During the training programme, we observed that Ukraine's industrial infrastructure is ageing, to the point of being dangerous. With so much infrastructure destroyed or seriously damaged in the course of the war, the issue of 'damages and repair' will no doubt be part of future negotiations.

The war provides the opportunity to rebuild Ukraine's infrastructure in ways that are better adapted to climate change and its challenges. The new Ukraine can be a 'greener' Ukraine, with greater energy efficiency.



Old factories in Donetsk

Thousands of men and women of all ages have died as a result of the war. Many people have left for other countries. These are mainly women and children, given that martial law

forbade men to leave Ukraine. The deaths and the brain drain, which had in fact already begun right after Ukraine's independence in 1991, will be felt when reconstruction begins. Encouraging people to return to Ukraine will be essential to the reconstruction process. In addition, accelerated training programmes may be made available to help fill the gaps left by those who have departed.

7.4. Reconstructing Ukraine in the face of major environmental risks

Post-war Ukraine will confront major environmental problems: millions of tonnes of debris and rubble



will need to be managed, much of it mixed up at random, with highly diverse characteristics, often toxic e.g., contaminated by lead; there will be thousands of hectares of land directly contaminated by chemicals left by military operations; there will be physical damage and destruction caused by the passage of heavy military equipment; there will also be indirect contamination by chemical products in areas that were bombarded. All this will only add to the difficulties caused by the already visible effects of climate change, which in turn has added to the devastating damage caused by the Soviet and post-Soviet agricultural model. One characteristic of this model was the destruction of wetlands, the redirection of water courses and the removal of hedges as part of the development of a vast, standardised socialist agriculture system, which clashes with the capitalist approach to agriculture.

Building in Kyiv underlining the important of environmental issues

Ukraine experiences glacial cold in winter and intense heat in summer. Air conditioning, insulation and temperature management should be envisaged for the future. When houses and districts are reconstructed after the war, this should be taken into account. It is already on the agenda of Ukrainian ministries and environmental NGOs. They will need support when building sites become operational, with powerful interests at stake. The evaluation mission observed in many areas major wind and solar electricity generation systems.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1. Planning in turbulent times

We do not know how long the war will last, or where it is taking Ukraine, along with the international community. Nor do we know the direction that will be taken by Ukraine's complex civil society, which has developed exponentially in the course of the crisis, having been involved in its every aspect.

Aid agencies face several key questions:

- How should they anticipate, and prepare for, possible future scenarios, such as the three following:
 - o Continued prosecution of the war, on an increased scale or across additional territory (a scenario guaranteeing widespread destruction);
 - o The war becomes a sort of long-term 'cold war', similar to the situation in the Donbas region after 2014 (an equally alarming scenario);
 - o The war is concluded (in this scenario, everything will depend on the terms of any peace agreement).
- Under these scenarios, will there be an increased flow of millions of Ukrainians to the country's western regions, further from the conflict, or to other countries? Since the end of June and early July this year, there has been a trend towards Ukrainians returning from other countries, and also returning from the West of the country towards the east. Will this trend continue, or will it be reversed, and, if so, how fast might it be reversed? What humanitarian assistance is likely to be needed? The restoration of areas to which populations return, or the upgrading of new reception centres, will be important, given that much of the capacity that existed before the outbreak of war is now full to saturation.
- Until now, no security incident has specifically targeted international aid agencies. How long will this remain true, given the Ukrainians' frustration, the unpredictability of those fighting on the other side, and the tendency to blind acts of violence which are part of the DNA of war? Might violence be used against aid agencies as a weapon in conducting hostilities, and to further the political agenda of different parties to the conflict?
- How should the question of energy resources be addressed, in a country which is modern and highly urbanised, and experiences extremes of temperature? Is there a Plan B to deal with the fallout of the diversion of power produced by the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which is itself already in a state of deterioration, or the fallout of attacks on the infrastructure which is essential for the distribution of energy and water?

Recommendation 1. In a high-intensity conflict situation, given the dangers and difficulties of establishing a humanitarian response, there should be continued efforts to develop:

- a. capacity for strategic reflection and creative anticipation;
- b. operational reflexes enabling work in front-line areas, so that risks may be managed, with continuing efforts to negotiate access lines to these areas;
- c. increasingly flexible mechanisms for identifying and using 'windows of opportunity' which may only be open for a short time;
- d. development of more sophisticated means of dialogue with local institutions and civil society.

8.2. The missing link: “area based coordination”

Despite the considerable efforts they have made, UN agencies and NGOs are not finding it easy to increase their ‘footprint’ in the field. The situation is complicated by the long distances involved, and the diversity of decision-making centres, with security issues further exacerbating operational difficulties. Area-based coordination systems that are strongly tied into local authorities would enable significant progress to be made in providing appropriate aid to the population.

Recommendation 2: Establish a small roving team to support the implementation of area-based coordination by bringing together municipalities, local civil society representatives and the international agencies.

8.2.1. Better support to City Councils

Groupe URD favours an approach that entails engagement with actors and agencies at local level, including decentralised authorities: municipalities and municipal services, citizen networks or groups of professionals established locally. This is known as ‘localisation’, which is a form of devolution from the international aid agencies to local level, to ensure that available aid resources are fairly divided up or shared out. Although many NGOs claim to be in contact with municipal agencies and actors, in practice this may go no further than formalities, such as being registered with the municipalities, or very basic, such as the collection of lists of people living in inaccessible areas. There may be very little strategic dialogue about the area itself, its needs, and any risks. There is no robust relationship or building of trust. Serious efforts have been made to set up a classic coordination system under the aegis of OCHA, using the cluster system. There is an increasing number of meetings, most of them by video link, as more and more groups and subgroups (task teams) are created. Unfortunately, they remain very distant from Ukrainian agencies and actors.

As we regularly observe in many situations, and as we reported more than ten years ago in our evaluation of ‘Cluster 2’, so in the current Ukrainian situation No more than preliminary steps have been taken towards ‘area-based coordination’ i.e., coordination mechanisms based in the areas they serve or for which they are responsible. Local coordination, intersectoral and closely engaged with agencies at municipal level, or preferably integrated into these agencies, is the only arrangement flexible enough to meet the requirements of the present complex situation, which is beset by uncertainty. Local-level analysis and decision making is most likely to be effective in meeting needs.

In many places, national level systems and municipal systems are set up alongside mechanisms for delivering humanitarian aid, often each with their different points of contact. Distinctions between their roles are complex at national level, but at local, operational level it makes no sense to insist upon these distinctions. That may be a lack of trust between those working in different systems. It is difficult to expect strong, accountable collaboration between them.

Recommendation 3. Try establishing a flexible support fund for the municipalities (and their mayors). There are cases where NGOs are not capable of meeting identified needs, because they require the involvement of municipal teams: collective heating systems, water and electricity distribution networks, urban sanitation. It might work to set up a special fund with HABITAT or CGLU (Cités et Gouvernements Locaux Unis).

8.2.2. Establishing effective, accountable methods for working with civil society

The involvement of local actors in the coordination mechanisms turns out to be a very important issue both at the operational level, but also at the level of understanding and dialogue.

Recommendation n°4 - Faced with the multifaceted mobilization of Ukrainian civil society and local institutions, it will be a question of developing:

a- Ever finer forms of dialogue with actors from Ukrainian institutions and civil society;

b- Presence of actors from Ukrainian civil society and municipal authorities in the coordination mechanisms.

The Humanitarian Outcomes report referred to earlier led to the exploration of new ways of working together at local level, but the situation remains unsatisfactory. The UN is currently providing significant levels of resources for working with Ukrainian NGOs, including a fund for 'localisation'. The procedures to be followed have not yet, however, been established.

Recommendation 5. Explore and test more thoroughly the notion of 'flexible funding for small-scale projects', which seems to be increasingly proposed in different contexts. It is a good approach, but 'the devil is in the details'. Which procedures are to be used to validate local agencies and their proposals? Which tools will be used for checks, and ex post evaluation?

ANNEXES



Aid distribution in Odessa

Annex N°1 : Termes of Reference

Context and justification

Following the outbreak of war in Ukraine and its evolution, millions of Ukrainians saw their lives turned upside down. Some fled to neighboring countries, others simply moved away from active front areas. Others finally remained in their towns or villages, voluntarily or blocked by the conflicts. Groupe URD has a good knowledge of the outskirts of the former USSR for numerous missions in Georgia/Abkhazia/Osetia and its monitoring of the geopolitics of the area. In addition, he also has a good experience of urban wars (Chechnya, Kosovo, Syria) and more generally of humanitarian problems in urban contexts and the mobilization of societies in the face of crises (work in Roya, Paris, Beirut). Following the outbreak of war on February 24, 2022, Groupe URD closely followed the evolution of the conflict and the humanitarian response. This has led to several publications including a 'key messages' document to recall some of the key lessons learned from situations with similar characteristics. It is in this context that, on the basis of its long experience of real-time evaluations, Groupe URD proposes to launch an independent real-time evaluation (ETR) on the humanitarian response to the Ukrainian crisis.

Specific experiences of Groupe URD

The objective of this paragraph is to demonstrate how Groupe URD meets the criteria set out by DEC for the choice of the evaluation team of the "Ukraine RTE"

- **Previous experience undertaking real-time evaluations of similar humanitarian programs (supporting refugees, IDPs and host populations), including methodologies for engaging with crisis-affected people in a fast-changing context, remotely if necessary;**

Groupe URD has been pioneering in Real Time Evaluation and as carried out similar assignments in Afghanistan (2001 to 2004), in the Horn of African (2005-2006), in the South East Asia Tsunami affected areas(from 205 to 2007), in Haiti after the earthquake 2010, Matthew hurricane and recent 2021 earthquakes, in Sahel (Mali, Lake Chad, Niger, Burkina) and Central Africa (CAR, DRC). (<https://www.urd.org/en/activity/evaluations/>)

The groupe has also developed extensive experience in evaluating humanitarian action in urban settings with case studies in Afghanistan, Chechenya, Syria, Somalia (Mogadishu), Philippines (after several cyclones), etc. Several key papers have been published on the subject(<https://www.urd.org/en/theme/urban-questions/>). Over the years, Groupe URD has been involved in several major processes related to displacements (<https://www.urd.org/en/theme/population-displacement/>) including on massive cross country situations for the Start Network (from Greece to Germany), for ECHO in relation to the Syrian conflict (displacements to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and Kurdish Irak), for the Expertise-France in relation the East Africa (Sudan, Kenya, Djibouti). As part of the evolution of the world (growing insecurity in some areas reducing access and the CIVID1 pandemic); Groupe URD developed a sophisticated approach to remote management of evaluation processes. This was done for the DEC COVID appeal, for many evaluations in Mali and the Lake Chad areas.

- **A sound understanding of the context in Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Moldova and Hungary;**

Groupe URD has been involved in research and evaluation in the former USSR zones frequently over the last years: evaluations in Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Chechnya, research in Nagorno Karabakh and Moldavia/Transnistria, training sessions in Ukraine (2020) on the risk of technological disaster in the frontline. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Groupe URD produced thorough analysis of the conflict (<https://defishumanitaires.com/2022/03/30/tribune-libre/>) and aid related issues (<https://www.urd.org/en/publication/key-messages-for-the-delivery-of-aid-in-ukraine/>)

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

Support to learning is part of the DNA of Groupe URD since its creating 29 years ago. It developed the concept of the learning cycle



In that context, Groupe URD has developed a large experience in different ways to share and collectively learn. This involved different types of presential and virtual tools, different formats of reports and videos. Groupe URD website presents all these tools

- Previous experience of undertaking reviews and promoting learning across organisations.

General Objectives of the mission :

This ETR mission must make it possible to take stock of the response, its progress, its constraints, and allow readjustments and learning in real time. Specific objectives of the mission; This will include looking at the progress

- Reception in the countries around Ukraine (medical and psychosocial care, food support and reception conditions, role of national and local actors, formal and informal. Particular attention will be given to the role of municipal institutions , red crosses and national civil protection The analysis of “aid in kind/cash” practices will also be carried out in detail.
- Aid inside the country with specific approaches depending on proximity to the front lines (analysis of survival and aid to the latter in areas more at the front, analysis of the organization of aid in areas less directly affected but which must manage the flow of displaced persons. The medical, social and protection sectors will be analyzed in detail. Here again, the roles of local actors will be analyzed in detail, in particular that of the services of the State, municipal and citizen networks will be analyzed in detail.

Key evaluation questions

The RTE will adopt an **inductive** approach from field realities to global level, collecting information from a variety of sources. It will rely on already existing data and collect **qualitative** information through interviews and focus group discussion framed around three main key questions:

- **Key Question 1: Resource mobilization and need assessment:** What have been the processes in context analysis, resource mobilization and needs assessments set up by the aid system?
- **Key Question 2: Agility** In view of the differences between the different operational realities and their fast changing nature, what are the measures already taken or still needed to adapt to the new working environment?
- **Key Question 3: Localisation:** How did aid agencies managed in each country to identify capacities and partners and in working with national and Ukrainian established structures (municipalities and local organisations) and unformal systems (Diasoras, churches, volunteer groups, etc.). What are the lessons learnt and innovative ideas that can benefit for the development of new approaches to aid localisatipn ?
- **Key Question 4: Technical adaptation.** The very specific contexts of Ukraine and refugee receiving countries brings a lot of technical challenges for the aid agencies, more used to work in developing world and rural areas (last experiences in contexts similar to Ukraine were in the Balkans, Chechenya and Syrian cities). How did aid agencies adapted their know-how to the Ukrainian crisis ?
- **Key Question 5: Protection.** The war in Ukraine and the displacements it triggered have been the source of many protection concerns; from breaches of IHL to sexual exploitation and risks for women and children during the exodus and the reception in neighbouring countries, psycho traumas, etc. How have aid agencies responded to these protection issues ? What did they learnt ?

Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian response in Ukraine

- **Key question 6: Coordination.** Coordination is supposed to save life and livelihoods, but apparently is was a complicated set with different mechanisms (Ukrainian, international), with national authorities, UN agencies, donors, etc. How did aid agencies coordinated their operations through the Ukrainian systems, aid system and in the countries operations ? What are the key lessons to be learnt in that type of situation?

5.1. The process

The process will be structured in four different phases

- **Inception phase.** It will comprise a fist review of the existing information (documentation, initial interviews) and a fist light visit in order to establish evaluation partnerships in the field and to present the process to the field teams
- **Evaluation phase;** the teams will be deployed to the different operations in the field; The will be collecting information on the different subjects of interest of the evaluation. In the field, the team will collect images
 - ➔ **Output:** debriefing with aid agencies (national and international)
- **Reporting phase.** Upon return, the teams will engage in a serie of w lesson learning workshop to share their findings and shape the report.
 - ➔ **Output:** Final report
 - ➔ **Output:** A small video

5.2. Information collection and treatment

The team will collect relevant information through:

- Desk reviews of relevant literature, evaluations and data sources gathered at country and global levels⁹;
- Global-level interviews with key stakeholders;
- Country- and field-level interviews with relevant stakeholders including UN and other international agencies, national and local governments, field staff, local partners, etc.
- Discussions with affected populations; through individual interviews with local Key Informants (mayors, local institutions, organized and non organized solidarity mechanisms, etc.), focus group meetings (organized in a way that gender disaggregated information can be collected).
- Direct observation of programmes activities;
- Survey of relevant stakeholders at the global / headquarter level.

After an analysis of each contexts (political, conflict, situation of the economy, capacities of the national institutions, level of decentralisation, etc.), which is essential to contextualise both the programmes, the constraints affecting them and their possible impacts, the analysis will focus on the programmes and the lessons to extract from them,

Annex N°2: Itinerary of the mission

Date	Locations	Structures visited
24-July	Paris	Départ de France
25-july	Lviv	ONG , Volontaire
26-july	Lviv	OCHA, ONG, Volontaires
27-july	Lviv	Mairie, déplacés de Marioupol, Volontaires
28-july	Kyiv	Volontaires, site d'accueil de PDI
29-july	Kyiv	JEU, OCHA,
30-july	Irpin	Volontaires,
31-july	Bucha	Volontaires, mairie, Église
01-August	Kyiv	Volontaires, mairie, Église
02- August	Kyiv	ONG Environnement
03- August	Kharkiv	PUI, Trajet Kyiv-Kharkiv
04- August	Kharkiv	Maire, Direction de la santé, entreprise de chauffage
05-August	Kharkiv	Volontaires, mairie
06-August	Kharkiv	MSF, Volontaires, Trajet vers Dnipro
07-August	Dnipro	temps d'écriture et de préparation logistique
08-August	Dnipro	Solidarités, Volontaires, Mairie, Collective centers
09-August	Dnipro	PUI, OCHA, Volontaires, Services de la Marie
10-August	Dnipro	Solidarités, ACTED, Groupes de volontaires
11-August	Dnipro	Groupes de volontaires,
12-August	Dnipro	Groupes de volontaires, Trajet pour Odessa
13-August	Odessa	Groupes de volontaires
14-August	Odessa	Solidarités, groupes de volontaires
15-August	Odessa	UNICEF, ONG I, groupes de volontaires, collective centers
16-August	Mykolaïv	Solidarités, mairie, Trajet pour Kyiv
17-August	Kyiv	PUI, UN, CICR, ACTED
18-August	Lviv	Retour en France

Annex N°3 : Useful references

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