

Youth Employment in Kenya

Literature Review

October 2017

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List of Abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
BPO	Business Process Outsourcing
DFID	Department for International Development
EG	Egypt
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IILS	International Institute for Labour Studies
ILO	International Labour Organization
IN	India
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
KEN	Kenya
KEPSA	Kenya Private Sector Alliance
KIBHS	Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
MSF	Medecins sans Frontieres
SSA	Sub-Sahara Africa
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TZ	Tanzania
UG	Uganda
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZA	South Africa

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Executive Summary

With its youth population of nearly 10 million, more than 20 per cent of its overall population, Kenya is currently experiencing a so-called ‘youth bulge’ (defined as a situation when at least 20 per cent of a country’s population is between the age of 15 to 24). In other contexts, this situation has proven to be a major asset for national economies, when these young people were able to find appropriately paying employment, or other ways of gaining personal economic independence. The large number of young Kenyans thus offers the potential to be a force for a positive economic future of the country, both collectively and as individual agents of progress and change.

The term ‘demographic dividend’ provides a strategic lens to conceptualise the potential (economic) future of the country: if Kenya is able to provide the appropriate education and jobs to its growing youth population, this could allow it to experience a boost in economic growth resulting from the ‘dividend’ of a well-equipped and economically independent youth. This scenario is by no means guaranteed; it is contingent on a decrease in the number of ‘dependents’ in the country which would require two major shifts, namely 1) a further decrease in Kenya’s birth rate (currently at 3.9 children per woman) and 2) higher employment numbers for its young generation. The latter is the focus of this report.

Kenya’s economy has presented volatile yet comparably high growth rates in the last two decades. However, this generally positive macro-economic development has not translated into benefits for its youth. While annual GDP growth of more than 5 per cent has been regularly recorded, Kenya’s youth unemployment rate has shown little to no positive development, and stands at a staggering 22 per cent for 2016 (according to ILO estimates). In addition, underemployment appears to be a rampant phenomenon for young Kenyans. The danger of a ‘lost generation’ is running high in Kenya; and most countries in Africa record significantly lower youth unemployment rates than this relatively strong economy.

With 500,000 to 800,000 young Kenyans entering the job market each year, its economy has not been able to provide the necessary amount of employment opportunities – formal and informal alike. Economic progress has primarily benefitted the older generation; young females in rural locations constitute the largest share of unemployed Kenyan youth (in absolute numbers), while their counterparts in urban areas are most likely to be unemployed (in relative terms). Gender and living location are defining factors, but youth unemployment is rampant throughout Kenya.

Education is regularly considered a key element for better employment opportunities, and Kenya has made progress in recent years with enrolment numbers for primary education now officially at 100 per cent. In contrast, however, with only 3.3 per cent of women and 4.7 per cent of men enrolled in tertiary education, Kenya is falling behind many other African nations and the education provided/obtained often lacks the necessary skillsets the job market actually requires. Relevant technical skills could be taught in TVET programmes and colleges, but these have seen a comparably slow increase in enrolment numbers due to the focus on basic education by governmental and

international actors. Despite recent efforts and initiatives in this regard, TVET and labour-market-adapted university education still leave major room for improvement to appropriately equip Kenya's youth, especially young women. Little or misdirected preparedness for the labour market is one of the major complaints from employers.

Faced with few opportunities, much competition and in some cases additional personal vulnerabilities (for example, impoverished backgrounds and poor health conditions), most of Kenya's young generation relies on the possibilities the informal sector offers, employment and self-employment alike. Kenya's dual, but intertwined, economy is characterised by an informal sector that provides 83 per cent of all current employment opportunities – formal and comparably well-paid wage employment is only available for very few of Kenya's youth. Instead, informal employment and self-employment in the following sectors create the major job market 'pools':

- **Agriculture:** rural youth in Kenya primarily earn their living in informal jobs within the agriculture sector, including pastoralism. Despite a lack of precise data, (informal) work in various agricultural activities is considered the largest 'employer' of Kenyan youth. However, currently the sector is not of key concern for governmental actors in terms of growth, investment and innovation strategies, and it is defined by high vulnerability to natural impacts (eg droughts).
- **Service Sector:** as an umbrella term, the service sector not only combines various activities but is also the second most important area for young Kenyans to earn a living. Especially in urban areas – such as Nairobi, Mombasa and many secondary towns across the country – labour activities in the food industry, in markets, in the transport sector and in waste management are highly common forms of income for young Kenyans. In addition, but highly dependent on the location, jobs in the growing ICT and creative industries (especially in Nairobi and often formal) and in tourism (e.g. on the Kenyan coast) provide some other service sector opportunities.

While they remain niche phenomena, the reality of criminal activities and prostitution as forms of income generation for male and female youth alike in Kenya cannot be denied. Reliable numbers do not exist, but Kenyan youth do not seem to focus livelihood strategies. In contrast, young Kenyans throughout the country – especially in urban centres – are often tech-savvy and tech-literate individuals. Hence, with Kenya a country with comparably good mobile internet coverage and high individual internet use (in comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries), this creates the foundation for the country's growing ICT scene. Particularly for educated youth, jobs in software and app development, in business-process outsourcing and in creative/editorial tasks become more and more attractive and available. However, such job opportunities are rarely available to the rural majority of Kenya's young generation. Accordingly, bridging the gap between technology and the agricultural sector could not only create new jobs, but could also increase the attractiveness of the sector for Kenyan youth.

Although the ICT sector is one of the six economic sectors of growth in the government's Kenya Vision 2030 (along with Energy, Finance, Tourism, Manufacturing, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises), it cannot and will not be able to solve the country's current 'youth employment challenge' by itself. Instead, job creation and interventions for such need to be more diverse,

including other sectors such as agriculture – currently and in the future the most important job market. The mix of unemployment, underemployment, inactivity, and poor-quality jobs (informal, unskilled, and low-paid) continues to disproportionately affect 15-24-year-old youth more than the rest of the working-age population of Kenya – and will continue to do so, unless the Kenyan governments initiates systemic reforms.


By 2030, Kenya will need to solve a difficult equation: on the one hand, a working-age population at approximately 60 per cent; on the other, high levels of informal jobs, unemployment, and underemployment. In spite of the very positive image of the modern services sector (finance, ICT), it only accounts for a minor percentage of employment among youth. It is therefore urgent to promote a transformational agenda, for instance, by optimising the fiscal revenues from the emerging oil industry, by investing in and promoting technical education such as TVET programmes, and by including low-income but work-intense sectors into development strategies (eg certain agricultural sub-sectors). In addition, any interventions and support programmes should not only be concerned with the macro-economic lens of harnessing a ‘demographic dividend’, but must be focused on the individual capacity, ingenuity and agency of young Kenyans.

For the tasks of positively engaging with its current ‘youth employment challenge’, from individual to national level, Kenya can learn from other countries, but it must adapt programmes and ideas to its own realities. Being able to do so depends on reliable and up-to-date data on youth employment in Kenya and in its 47 counties. Unfortunately, such data is currently lacking: neither large scale survey data nor sufficient sector assessments and case studies are available. Accordingly, the following future research efforts are recommended:

- **Employment statistics:** Reliable youth (un)employment data at the county and sectoral level is necessary for any future evidence-based interventions and programming.
- **Labour market and skills assessments:** A national labour market assessment and skills inventory is needed to better understand the skills mismatch, and to allow for the development of policies to address this.
- **Sectoral case studies and assessments:** These will allow of the measurement of the real potential for youth employment in certain sectors (such as ICT, agriculture, tourism, the transport industry and others) and better understand the specificities of situations at the individual level.
- **Gender-sensitive assessments:** Gender-specific research regarding the vulnerabilities faced by male and female you are necessary to support the design of gender-sensitive approaches.

Despite current limitations in terms of precise data, analysing current literature and available information still allows for identifying key aspects of potential interventions. Actors engaged in youth employment issues in Kenya should focus their future efforts on the following areas:

- **Curricular revision of secondary, tertiary and technical level education,** to allow young Kenyans to become a readily employable, skilled workforce.
- **Promoting supervised internships and apprenticeships** across all sectors and education levels.

- 
- **Supporting young people in creating their own (formal or informal) employment opportunities**, by teaching entrepreneurial skills, values and personal attributes such as communication, finance, leadership, strategic thinking, navigating conflict, and the ability to recognise one's own potential and capacity.
 - **Holistic programming for Kenya's 'youth employment challenge' with unbiased approaches**, supporting the creativity and resilience of existing sectors and individuals, rather than focusing on the formal or informal.

1. The Next Generation Project in Kenya

A. Introduction

The British Council's Next Generation research series focuses on the role of young people as active, engaged citizens, and on how evidence-based research can ensure they are best supported in this role. In prioritising young people's voices and views around employment, education, ways of life, and their opportunities and challenges, the Next Generation series plays a key role in informing programme and policy research. In each country, the research element of the series includes a literature review with three main objectives:

1. To **systematically and critically analyse existing findings** on country specific youth issues to develop a framework for further research;
2. To **identify where gaps in knowledge appear** in the existing literature, and present further questions raised;
3. To **use the synthesised analysis of literature, knowledge gaps, and questions to make recommendations** for future areas of research, and thus lay the groundwork for the subsequent empirical research component of the Next Generation projects.

This review specifically addresses youth employment in Kenya, examining both the challenges and opportunities faced by its young people aged 15 to 24. Kenya is currently experiencing a 'youth bulge', with over 20 per cent of its population falling into that category. The absolute number of youth in Kenya is steadily increasing (currently at an estimated 9.5 million). With a large child population as well, this trend is set to continue for generations to come. This 'youth bulge' has the potential to elevate Kenya's socio-economic status, if sufficient jobs and employment are available to youth who have the potential to actively contribute to the labour force. However, if the youth population continues to experience the very high levels of unemployment it currently faces, it could result in economic stagnation through a "lost generation" of workers. To address this most effectively, taking into account the aspirations and agency of these youth is crucial.

The research presents a detailed literature review of existing studies and literature related to the topic. It underlines gaps in existing research and raises key questions on the reliability of existing data. Most studies draw their conclusions from the same small pool of primary research, including the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, which was conducted in 2005/2006, and the Kenya Population and Housing Census, which was conducted in 2009. Therefore, the analysis in this literature review can only be a comment on general trends and patterns, rather than absolutes.

The key sections of this report will be as follows:


- Literature review results and limitations;
- Economic development and the potential for a demographic dividend;

- Labour market integration and the readiness of Kenyan youth: individual and systemic barriers and opportunities;
- Sectoral and locational differences in employment amongst Kenyan youth;
- The future of youth employment in Kenya; and finally
- A summary of key findings followed by policy and research recommendations.

B. Demographic background and context

The Republic of Kenya in the year 2017 is a ‘young’ country, with an estimated 61 per cent of its population being either children – age 0 to 14 – or youth – age 15 to 24 (UN 2017). Based on latest UN estimates, the country’s youth population is made up of over 9.5 million people, more than 20 per cent of all Kenyans. This youthful population is not unique in the African continent, home to 226 million youth aged 15-24 in 2015 (UN 2015). Such a youth share in population statistics echoes the demographic realities of Kenya’s neighbouring countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, in general (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Youth Population (per cent) - based on UN estimates for 2015 (UN 2017)




As is the case for many other developing countries, especially on the African continent, **Kenya’s overall population saw high growth rates** in the second half of the 20th century, and “high fertility, combined with declining child mortality, gave Kenya one of the world’s fastest population growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s” (Thuku et al 2013). While fertility rates in Kenya declined significantly in the 1980s, they have stalled since the mid-1990s at approximately 3.9 births per women (for 2014; UNFPA & AFIDEP 2015: 12). Kenya’s population growth thus remains significant, across all counties. Given current numbers of children and youth, this trend will continue “for several generations even after reaching replacement level fertility (about 2.1 children per woman) because

there are many young people who are likely to start their own families” (Muiya 2014). Hence, based on past and present population dynamics, UNFPA has classified Kenya as a ‘Group 3’ country in Africa, characterised by a (still) elevated fertility but decreased (child) mortality rates (UNFPA & AFIDEP 2015).

Like most of these countries, Kenya is currently faced with the opportunity and challenge of a so-called ‘youth bulge’. Following the official UN definition, this phenomenon “occurs when more than 20 per cent of a country’s population is composed of young people”, which can be “a valuable asset for both present and future generations” but, at the same time, “a risk to development if social and economic conditions are not suitable” (UNDP 2013). Considering the 20 per cent benchmark, Kenya has been experiencing a ‘youth bulge’ since the mid-1990s, with a peak in in the mid-2000s when nearly 22 per cent of all Kenyans were between the ages of 15 and 24 (see Figure 2 below). The latest numbers on the country’s population, however, showcase that – in relative terms – this ‘youth bulge’ is undergoing a slow decline (only 20 per cent youth in 2015). However, the absolute number of youth in Kenya continues to increase, from 6.8 million in 2000 to 9.5 million in 2015 (see Figure 2). This simply means that “the growth rate of this population cohort is now smaller than the adult working-age cohort” (UNDP 2013).

Figure 2: Kenya's population since 1960 with a focus on 2000-2015 (absolute numbers in 1,000) - based on UN estimates for 2015 (UN 2017)



The Republic of Kenya is likely currently experiencing its ‘youth bulge’ peak, “which could either be a demographic dividend, or a disaster” (Chatterjee & Ronneberg 2017): either Kenya will be able to utilize and support its young, aspiring citizens in achieving appropriate education and jobs, which should lead to a prosperous socio-economic future for everyone, or – if this chance is missed – economic stagnation and a neglected ‘lost generation’ will likely jeopardize such future. The rapid


increase of the overall population, and especially of the youth population, in past decades, has provided Kenya, its socio-political structure and its economy with various opportunities, stemming from an increased number of potential consumers and workers, but also increasing stress. Other 'mega-trends' are intertwined with this phenomenon, for example:

- **Migration:** Including rural-urban migration, as “many of the young people have moved to cities as a way to escape poverty and to seek opportunities” (Kararach et al 2011), and out-of-country-migration – “in the face of the increasing discontent and the poor employment prospects, out-migration of young people has remained an important issue in Kenya” (ILO & ILS 2013).
- **Urbanisation:** Fuelled by rural-urban migration and the general population growth, Kenya’s cities are growing in an often rather uncontrolled fashion, which can be observed for the county’s major agglomerations (Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu) but increasingly also for smaller and secondary towns, such as Nakuru, Eldoret, Kikuyu, Ruiru, Kangundo-Tala, Thika and Machakos (Bousquet 2008; UN Habitat 2015).
- **Environmental degradation:** The increase in population can lead to environmental strain as the demand for water, for example, increases (Sivi Njonjo 2011).
- **Insufficient infrastructure:** “With more young people comes an increased demand for education, health care and sanitation infrastructure” (Ibid.).
- **Hardening socio-economic inequality:** Kenya’s Gini Coefficient is of 47.7, which is higher than many neighbouring countries (Odero et al 2017), while one third of Kenya’s population is experiencing ‘multidimensional poverty’.¹ However, on this front Kenya remains better off than its neighbours as the prevalence of ‘multidimensional poverty’ is significantly higher in other East African countries, such as Tanzania (66 per cent), Uganda (70 per cent) and Ethiopia (88 per cent) (UNDP 2016).
- **High (youth) unemployment rates:** “Youth unemployment rates are high, and youth represent, by far, the bulk of unemployed people. The unemployment problem in Kenya is to a large degree, thus, a youth problem” (UNDP 2013).

This study will focus on economic and labour market concerns that are either connected to or (at least partially) caused by Kenya’s youth population. In this regard, the overall economic development in Kenya since 2000 provides the basis for the contextualisation of the realities of current youth (un)employment and their economic activities presented subsequently. While it is important to understand the macro-economic contexts and conceptual frameworks, such as the ‘demographic dividend’ (see Chapter 3), understanding youth as actors and framing discussions accordingly is necessary to allow equity based approaches to supporting young people. Considering the agency of youth in achieving a prosperous Kenyan future, and acknowledging their needs and aspirations to fulfil their potential, is crucial for academic tasks such as this report but particularly to design and implement interventions appropriately at the operational, advocacy and policy levels.

¹ “The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) [...] complements monetary measures of poverty by considering overlapping deprivations suffered by individuals at the same time. The index identifies deprivations across the same three dimensions as the HDI [namely, health, education and standard of living] and shows the number of people who are multidimensionally poor (suffering deprivations in 33% or more of the weighted indicators) and the number of weighted deprivations with which poor households typically contend with.” (UNDP 2016)

Figure 3: Youth Population (15-24 years) by County in 2009, absolute numbers (left) and percentages (right); the three counties with the highest numbers in each category are highlighted – own calculations based on Kenya Population Census 2009 (KNBS 2009)




2. Literature review results & limitations

A. Methodology & Process

A detailed methodology is available in Annex 1. Samuel Hall used a systematic and iterative approach to conducting this literature review with three key steps (see Figure 4 below), using an iterative approach that progressively refines the literature review to ensure all credible data sources have been investigated, and relevant portions incorporated.

Figure 4: Iterative review process



An initial literature search was conducted by reviewing key academic studies and reports by bilateral and multilateral organisations, focusing on those working on the area of youth employment in Kenya, including, but not limited to, those recommended by the British Council such as:

- DFID East Africa Research Hub
- British Council Higher Education Graduate Employability research
- International Labour Organisation
- World Bank
- Aga Khan East Africa Institute
- Afrobarometer
- Global Competitiveness Report

Key search terms were developed in order to conduct a broader literature sweep of reports (published and unpublished), journal articles, dissertations, press releases, and newspaper or magazine articles relevant to the topic. Google Scholar was used as the search engine, as it includes results from major research engines such as Research Gate or Refseek, and runs its own operators to ensure synonyms and truncations are used. Whereas the general Google search engine results are open to a user's location or prior search history, Google Scholar allows for a more systematic and replicable approach.

Due to the relatively broad nature of the research questions, and the need to keep the literature review as systematic as possible, the search terms were designed to ensure a particular focus on youth, and Kenya. In order to gauge a more complete picture, however, studies on global youth (un)employment were also included.

Literature was prioritised according to relevance, with particular interest paid to studies where youth played a role either in the design or research specifically. However, it was found that despite an enormous amount of literature on youth employment and a global acknowledgement of the increasing numbers of youth attempting to enter a constricting labour force, recent and accurate data focusing on youth in Kenya is lacking. Many studies used the same outdated data, and so in answering the research questions it was possible only to understand general trends and patterns.

In addition to the systematic search, an iterative approach was used, particularly in cases where information was scarce. In these instances, further broader searches were conducted, using the bibliographies of identified studies to snowball off of, in order to ensure important information was not being left out of the discussion.

B. Results and Overview of the Literature Search

Of the 324 documents initially identified, 42 were chosen for inclusion based on the appropriateness and inclusion criteria detailed above. Documents that were not open access, or were academic submissions below PhD level, were immediately excluded.² Articles with little relevance to the Kenyan context were also excluded. These 42 documents were then read fully and assessed using DFID "assessing the strength of evidence" guidelines. After this process, a further 7 documents were excluded from the study. This search selected documents that were mostly expert reports, peer-reviewed journal articles, and dissertations, which pass the strength of evidence criteria.

In addition to the initial document identification, an iterative search process took place, where additional documents were sourced based on key stakeholder research, the bibliographies of documents already identified, and further literature search to address data gap. These were similarly assessed along strength of evidence criteria. Documents failing these (such as newspaper articles) were only included (with a caveat) should there be a lack of any other data on the topic.

² In cases where abstracts were available in open access format, these abstracts were considered to see if the paper would add to the information already gathered from other documents; this did not lead to the identification of documents likely to answer data gaps.

Figure 5: Document/literature Identification and Screening Process




Table 1: Included references by type of publication/document

Type	Number
Report	48
Journal Article / Research Paper	30
Online Sources	20
Data / Survey	14
Newspaper/Magazine Article	11
Book / Book Chapter	9
Other	11
Total	143

Table 2: Included references by year of publication

Year	Number
n.d	9
2000	0
2001	0
2002	1
2003	1
2004	1
2005	1
2006	0
2007	1
2008	2
2009	5
2010	4
2011	5
2012	10
2013	15
2014	8
2015	21
2016	32
2017	27

C. Data Reliability and Study Limitations

The general reliability and accuracy of information on youth (un)employment, their economic (in)activity and even general population numbers for Kenya must be questioned. While a few studies in recent years have provided their own primary data collection – such as the *The Kenya Youth Survey*

Report by Aga Khan University (executive summary: Awitit & Scott 2016) and *The Nature, Challenges and Consequences of Urban Youth Unemployment* by Bernard Muniya (2014) – the clear majority of numbers, statistics and secondary analyses are primarily based on the following three major surveys:

- The 2005/2006 *Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey* (KIBHS) by the KNBS – funded and supported by DFID and USAID (KNBS 2012)
- The 2009 *Kenya Population and Housing Census* by the KNBS (see: www.knbs.or.ke/publications)
- The annual and national *Economic Surveys* by the KNBS, which do not feature youth specific data (see: www.knbs.or.ke/publications)

No more recent reliable labour force surveys have been conducted in Kenya (World Bank 2016b); even the extensive 2009 *Kenya Population and Housing Census* has raised concerns about its reliability, with for example, the data on population for the North Eastern Province controversial (UNFPA 2015). The information gathered and analysed within this desk review study must therefore be looked at critically. This includes even the numbers and statistics from reports and databases which are released by organisations such as the World Bank, ILO and several UN bodies. For example, ILO unemployment estimates (see Figure 6) are based on the official numbers of the KNBS, UN estimates for Kenya’s population (see Figure 2) are based on models that are fed by past *Kenya Population and Housing Censuses* (with the last one from 2009), and the oft-cited discussion paper *Kenya’s Youth Employment Challenge* (UNDP 2013) draws its numbers and conclusions from the 2005/2006 KIBHS.

While the general trends and overviews from such documents and statistics can allow for a broad analysis of the current landscape of youth (un)employment in Kenya, they do not allow for an in-depth and definitive assessment. Thus, while the issues and trends identified in this desk review are based on sound scientific research and valid secondary information, one of the key challenges for future efforts regarding youth employment in Kenya is the lack of data – to overcome this problem, further research and support for major surveys are necessary.


3. Economic development and the potential of the demographic dividend

This section considers the recent and current trends in the Kenyan economy, as well as the shifting portion of the population made up by youth, in order to understand the potential for a demographic dividend in Kenya. While Kenya’s economy continues to grow, to date this growth has not been sufficient to keep up with the “youth bulge” placing demographic pressure on it. Kenya’s relatively low dependency ratio and economic boom do offer the potential for a demographic dividend; the country currently lacks the means to facilitate and exploit this at the national and individual levels.

A. Contextualising youth employment in Kenya


After significant economic volatility in the 1980s and 1990s, Kenya’s economy started growing consistently with average GDP growth rates of 2.5 per cent per year between 2003 and 2014 (World Bank 2016b). For the last two years, the country’s GDP growth has been oscillating between 5.6 and 6.5 per cent annually. These are impressive numbers in global comparison, but not unique in the East African region, one of the current powerhouses of economic growth in the world (Odero et al 2017; UNECA 2017). While growth in the region is high, it is coming from a lower point than much of the developed world; the question of unemployment is thus more relevant as the country cannot rely on continued growth.

Figure 6: Unemployment rates (per cent) in Kenya from 2000 to 2017 - based on ILO estimates (ILO 2016a)



For Kenya, “construction, manufacturing, finance and insurance, information and communication technology (ICT), and wholesale and retail trade” are considered the main drivers behind this trend (Odero et al 2017). However, **this positive economic development is not reflected in the employment rates of Kenya’s population**, and especially of its youth. As Figure 6 shows, unemployment rates in Kenya – namely, the number of persons who are unemployed as a per cent of the total number of employed and unemployed persons (age 15 and older) – first increased until 2009, before plateauing through 2012/2013 and have, since then, only shown moderate rates of decline. While these trends are valid for all age groups, it is, in particular, Kenya’s young generation that has been left behind – despite all macro-economic advancements. In comparison with whole SSA, the combination of macro-economic progress (based on DGP growth) and high youth unemployment rates in Kenya becomes even more distinct: although GDP growth in both Kenya and SSA has been significant since 2000, Kenya’s youth unemployment rate is now 42 per cent higher than in 2000, while the youth unemployment rate for overall SSA has decreased by 9 per cent (see Figure 7).

Figure 7: Comparative change in GDP and Youth Unemployment Rates in Kenya and SSA from 2000 to 2016; the respective numbers for 2000 have been levelled at 100 – based on ILO estimates and World Bank Data (ILO 2016a; World Bank 2017f)



The gap between economic progress and increasing youth unemployment is a distinct feature of Kenya’s current socio-economic situation. The reasons for this phenomenon are manifold, but Jacob Omolo generalizes the situation as follows:

“[E]ven though the Kenyan economy may have realised net employment creation (after taking into account the new jobs and job churning) over time, the rate at which the net jobs were created was almost the same as the rate of labour force growth. This effectively meant that more job seekers, both the new labour market entrants and


those out of employment through the various labour separation mechanisms, ordinarily remained out of employment for a longer period hence swelling the ranks of the discouraged job seekers.” (Omolo 2012)

While Kenya’s economy grew, so did employment rates, by 4.5 per cent per year between 2006 and 2013. However, this steady increase in available jobs (including formal and informal forms of employment) has not been sufficient to accommodate concurrently 500,000 to 800,000 young Kenyans that enter the working age population – and the labour market – each year (Nebe & Mang’eni 2016; Sikenyi 2017; World Bank 2016a). Data on the exact numbers entering the labour market is lacking; hence the wide spread between these figures. Accordingly, the country’s young labour force has not been put into productive use, hurting the general growth potential of its economy and limiting the opportunities of many of Kenya’s young citizens, who possess the potential to creatively and significantly contribute to the positive development of the nation (UNDP 2010; World Bank 2016b).

Several interconnected reasons explain the fact that Kenya’s economic growth has not been reflected in the employment rates and economic opportunities for its youth:

- 1) **The sheer size and growth of its young population** – despite most recently plateauing as a share of the population (see Figure 2) – **is hard to compensate for**, even if continuous and strong economic growth leads to more employment opportunities, in the present and near future (UNDP 2013).
- 2) **Employment growth in the last few years has largely benefitted the older segments of the labour force**, who have more experience and contacts (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013).
- 3) **The skill-sets and aspirations of Kenya’s young generation are often disconnected from the realities and demands of the actual labour market** (Ndayambaje et al 2016; Odero et al 2017; Sikenyi 2017) – for example, only 11 per cent of youth aspire to work in agriculture despite the sector’s huge capacity for employment (Awiti & Scott 2016).
- 4) Kenya’s relatively low employment-to-population rates for youth – namely, the proportion of its youth population that is employed (see Figure 8; NB that figures considering unemployed and employed numbers come to 50 per cent, while the specific activities of the rest are not specified, these could include youth in education, or in un-recorded economic activity/ inactivity) – might be affected by the positive fact that **secondary school enrolment has been increasing**. However, this would only account for the age group between 15 and 19 (and over-19s repeating years of school). Indications of an increasing ‘elitisation’ of academic education suggests that this cannot fully explain the phenomenon (ILO & ILS 2013; Sivi Njonjo 2011 / see also Section 4).

Figure 8: Per cent of population employed, for the age group between 15 and 24 in 2017 - based on ILO estimates (ILO 2016b)



These challenges for Kenya’s future are faced by the entire country, for all genders and counties, in both urban and rural areas. The only available in-depth and nation-wide analysis of youth employment – based on data from the 2005/2006 KIHBS (*Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey*) – allows for a more nuanced look at the situation. The key take-aways for this often-referenced UNDP (2013) study are that:

- Youth unemployment is rampant throughout all of the former provinces of Kenya,³ and everywhere it is significantly higher than adult unemployment rates (while the magnitude of this difference varies).⁴
- Unemployment is particularly affecting the age group of 18-to-25-year olds.
- While the youth unemployment rate is higher in urban areas (ranging from 35 to 60 per cent, vs. 20 to 25 per cent in rural areas; UNDP 2013), the absolute number of unemployed youth is higher in rural areas.
- Young women are more affected by unemployment or economic inactivity than young men, with a difference of more than 10 per cent (UNDP 2013).
- As a simple rule, in Kenya, of youth, female urban youth have the highest (percentage) rates of unemployment (ranging from approximately 50 to 65 per cent depending on age), and rural males the lowest (at approximately 20 per cent; UNDP 2013).

³ The 2005/2006 KIHBS, that provides the underlying data, had been conducted before Kenya’s administrative system was changed, following the promulgation of the country’s newest constitution in 2010 and its goal of political-administrative devolution. The former 8 provinces of Kenya have been replaced by 47 counties in 2013.

⁴ Based on data from the 2005/2006 KIHBS, the most significant gap between youth and adult unemployment rates was observed for Nyanza Province in Western Kenya, with youth unemployment being six times higher than for adults. The highest rate of youth unemployment, however, was recorded for North Eastern Province with more than 60% (UNDP 2013) – recent data on county level is not available.

The problem with these findings, as with many other information for this study, is the outdated nature of the data on which they are based (see also Section 2). However, numerous authors and organisations are certain about the general challenge and threat to Kenya's socio-economic future that arises from its current demographics and its inability to provide sufficient economic opportunities: "Although official statistics are not available, unemployment and underemployment are rampant, especially among the youth" (World Bank 2016b).

In this regard, the *underemployment* of Kenyan youth is a highly neglected yet serious issue, neither accounted for in official statistics of the KNBS or ILO, nor reliably and thoroughly addressed by academic literature. Underemployment can be defined as "overstaffing or a situation whereby one's job does not permit total use of his/her skills, abilities or productive capacity" or as "working on part-time, working under unsatisfactory working conditions to the worker or working on a full-time job on which the candidate over qualifies" (Ndayambaje et al 2016). According to either of these definitions, and despite a lack of accurate data on the issues, a few studies (for example, Vuluku et al 2013), as well as reports by organisations and the media, indicate that underemployment is a crucial problem that leaves affected youth behind as dependents, despite their actual economic activity. This seems to be the case for youth in rural areas, as an "estimation from the 2009 population census points to pervasive underemployment —hidden unemployment— which is transposed into a high share of labor in subsistence agriculture" (World Bank 2016b). It also affects educated and/or urban youth, as a recent story in the Financial Times highlights:

"When Oliver Kigalu enrolled for his engineering degree seven years ago, he never thought he would end up working as a construction labourer. But that is how the 26-year-old now makes his living. 'When you leave college so many people are looking for jobs but it's very hard to get a decent one,' he says, as he queues for work outside a half-built factory in Ruaraka in northern Nairobi. 'I'm not using my qualification at all, but the important thing is to make money and get food.'" (Aglionby 2017)

Cases like this shine a light on the struggle of even educated youth to find appropriate employment; they also showcase the individual challenges of Kenyan youth in becoming active agents of change and progress in their country. While youth unemployment and, especially, underemployment are by no means fully explored in existing literature on the Kenyan context, and not at all at the county level, a general situational analysis exposes a country on the edge – between a prosperous socio-economic future made possible by productively utilising its current 'youth bulge' or a gambled away 'demographic dividend'. The complete absence of data on *underemployment* in Kenya, not just youth related, highlights another crucial challenges (youth) labour market focused interventions in Kenya and many other African nations:

"One of Africa's biggest challenges has been lack of statistical information to inform public policy, and initiatives that governments and partners pursue to address the challenge of unemployment, underemployment and informality. [...] The larger problem is that, if you cannot measure it, then you cannot monitor progress. You can't tell your story yet even when you make progress you do not know it because you don't have the figures to demonstrate trends." (Aeneas Chuma, ILO Regional Director for Africa, quoted in: Banzi 2017)

B. 'Demographic dividend or disaster'

The conceptual framing of engaging with the economic and employment realities of youth and of national economies by addressing the potential and risks of a 'demographic dividend' has gained significant momentum on the African continent in recent years: "Over the last ten years, it has become evident that a demographic dividend lens offers a strategic basis for focusing and prioritizing investments in people in general and the youth in particular" (African Union n.d.).

The economic-demographic phenomenon called 'demographic dividend' has, for example, occurred in several East Asian countries – such as Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand – between 1970 and 2000, and contributed a quarter to a third of the economic growth in this period (UNFPA & AFIDEP 2015). It explains an accelerated economic output when the ratio of working-age adults significantly increases relative to dependents, for example children and unemployed persons, and when more women join the workforce due to reduced child rearing responsibilities. Simply and relatively speaking, more (young) people, especially women, enter the working age population than leave it, and they are put to productive use. After this initial phase, a second phase of the 'demographic dividend' can occur "by the enhanced human capital investments per child, and increased savings and investments that households and governments make as a result of increased incomes and reduced costs of taking care of children" (UNFPA & AFIDEP 2015). However, this is not a process that will just happen naturally but it is highly dependent on the economic utilisation of a country's young population:

"The demographic dividend concept describes the boost in economic growth that society can experience when a well-equipped demographic — in this case young people — has the education and jobs. If you have the same number of young people, but lots of dependents and big families, that is not going to lead to the boost that we are describing. Typically, countries will benefit when they are equipping young people [with education and skills] and they are also making a transition from having lots of dependents to better family planning. The dependency ratio is a key element of the demographic dividend." (Natalia Kanem, UNFPA Acting Executive Director, in: Lieberman 2017)

These requirements – a well-equipped demographic with education and jobs as well as a reduced percentage of dependents (discussed later in this report) – are exactly what Kenya has been struggling with:

- **Regarding education**, while there have been significant advancements in primary and secondary education, enrolment in tertiary education remains relatively low with 2009 rates at 4 per cent, compared to 6.8 per cent for SSA in 2010 and 30.6 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa for the same. This has been noted as potentially contributing to the relatively high inactive portion of youth, for whom participation in tertiary education cannot explain lack of employment (ILO & ILS 2013).

- **Regarding jobs**, as previously shown, Kenya's economy has not been able to provide its young generation with sufficient jobs, hence "the majority of the youth in Kenya are still under- or unemployed, and vulnerable" (Sikenyi 2017).

While estimations by the World Bank and by the National Transfer Accounts indicate the potential for a decrease of the percentage of dependents in Kenya by 2030: "For example, the youth dependency ratio is projected to fall to 0.6 by 2030," from 1.0 in 2010 – this is not guaranteed – "if the youth unemployment rate remains high, Kenya's effective youth dependency rate will go down only to 0.7" (World Bank 2016b: 67). In general, an impactful decline in dependency ratios is highly dependent on two factors: 1) a further decline in fertility rates with a more significant pace than since the 1990s and 2) adequate labour income for its young generation. (NTA 2013; World Bank 2016b). In sum, Kenya still has the opportunity to harness its potential 'demographic dividend' in the coming years and decades, but only if, simultaneously, birth rates decline and its young generations rely less on their families in the future – the latter requires a growing number of well-paying jobs, especially in agriculture and the informal sector: "labor income is critical if Kenya is to achieve a robust demographic dividend" (NTA 2013: 3). To support such positive development on the continent, the African Union has recently prepared a road map, providing general guidelines for key activities in four pillars - namely: Employment and Entrepreneurship; Education and Skills Development; Health and Wellbeing; and Rights, Governance and Youth Empowerment (African Union n.d.).

While the roadmap can provide ideas for a programmatic engagement with an 'demographic dividend', its successful utilization in the Kenyan context is far from guaranteed. Past examples from South Africa have shown that countries are often unable to provide an appropriate policy landscape and/or to attract necessary investment in relevant sectors, education and such like (Drummond et al 2014). Positive examples have happened in vastly different contexts and it is not easily possible to replicate interventions that led to a positive use of the 'demographic dividend' (see Chapter 6).

Kenya, despite its current economic boom and long-standing geopolitical role in (East) Africa, also struggles with corruption, political tension and increasing inequality, among other challenges. While this also calls for Kenya's young generation to take their present and future into their hands, government, civil society, economic actors and more have the duty to ensure that these youth have the right tools and opportunities at hand to do so in a productive and peaceful fashion. How the current realities and coping mechanisms within the ongoing 'youth employment challenge' and its larger context in Kenya are lived and experienced will be explored in-depth over the course of this report.

4. Labour market integration and readiness of Kenyan youth: individual and systemic barriers and opportunities

While Kenya prioritises education at the primary level, offering free and universal access to it across the country, both quality and access to higher levels of education are limited, posing clear challenges to the preparedness of Kenyan youth for the employment market and their attractiveness to employers. Fewer than 5 per cent of Kenyan youth enrol at university, while TVET courses – which could link up well to the existing labour market – are perceived as less prestigious and suffer from outdated curricula and limited resources.

Despite similar enrolment rates, gender appears as a key differentiator in employment rates, with young women significantly less likely to be employed. Both choices in types of courses followed and cultural and social explanations have been offered for this. Additional barriers to youth employment identified include: a skills mismatch between youth and what employers are looking for; a labour market not prepared to incorporate youth; finally, individual vulnerabilities such as poverty and ill health.

A. Primary and secondary education in Kenya

Although there is free and universal access to primary education in Kenya, enrolment significantly declines after this level for several reasons, including prohibitive costs and pervasive poverty levels, particularly in rural areas (Balwanz 2012; Maronga et al 2015). Because comparative and reliable data is difficult to come by – the official figures of over 100 per cent primary enrolment rate in 2015 are difficult to credit, and secondary enrolment rates of 50 per cent only available from 2009 (World Bank Data 2017a) – it is difficult to form an accurate picture of education trends in Kenya. The 2009 rate of 50 per cent does suggest a substantial drop-off between primary and secondary enrolment. The free access to primary education policy has contributed to an 87 per cent literacy rate for those between 15 and 24 years of age in Kenya (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; UIS n.d.), while the overall Kenyan population of 15 years and older has a lower literacy rate of 79 per cent as of 2014 (UIS n.d.).

Taken from 2015 UNESCO statistics, primary school enrolment rate in Kenya is at 108.9 per cent (World Bank Data 2017a). However, this does not necessarily give an accurate picture of the proportion of the population attending primary school. Firstly, the rate is over 100 per cent as it can include over-aged and under-aged students in the number. As Kenya has high rates of late entry into school (Wanzala 2016), it is likely that this percentage includes the enrolment of older students. The enrolment percentage also does not reflect attendance rates, which are significantly lower than the enrolment rate (fhi 360 n.d.; UNESCO 2012; UNICEF 2015) – between 25 and 30 per cent of Kenyan primary school aged children are out of school based on attendance (2008 data; UNICEF, 2015) – and drop-out rates, which are high (UNICEF 2015), with both of these phenomena being particularly high in poorer regions such as Kenya's North East (Wanzala 2016). One ILO report focusing on

Garissa in the North East shows primary enrolment rates at only 26 per cent (ILO n.d.). This makes it very difficult to form an accurate picture of education trends in Kenya.

Comparable primary and secondary school enrolment data is hard to come by, but the 2009 secondary enrolment rate of 50 per cent (World Bank Data 2017a), suggests a substantial difference between primary and secondary enrolment. As a point of comparison, the UNICEF ESAR OOSC Study, although somewhat out of date (data from 2001 to 2009) notes transition rates between primary and lower secondary ranging from just over 10 per cent in Burundi to close to 95 per cent in Ethiopia (UNICEF 2015).⁵

Current enrolment data suggests this primary education does reach both males and females successfully across the country (World Bank Data 2017b), but that the quality of this education differs. This basic level of education alone does not equip young people with the skills and knowledge they need for employers to deem them employable (AfDB 2015).

B. Tertiary and vocational education

There is very limited access to university education in Kenya, and enrolment is low (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013). This can be attributed to several facts. University fees are far out of reach for the majority of the population, particularly those from rural or marginalised communities (Havergal 2015). University education requirements are similarly out of reach for the vast majority of students who have dropped out of school after primary level.

- Only 3.3 per cent of women and 4.7 per cent of men are enrolled in tertiary education in Kenya (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013), compared to 6 per cent total enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa and 26 per cent globally in 2015 (The Africa-America Institute 2015).
- For those who have graduated from universities, there is a large gap in understanding how university education is impacting young people's ability to find work (Gitonga 2014; British Council 2016). There are indications of high unemployment rates among tertiary educated youths (up to about 25 per cent; UNDP 2013), although this may, to some extent be voluntary, due to the undesirable low wages and insecurity in the informal sector – where the majority of available jobs are – and their preference to wait for private and public-sector employment (AfDB 2015).
- Finally, university graduates may not be acquiring appropriate skills for the labour market, or acquiring them to the required level, due to low engagement between employers and universities and decreasing state funding amidst increasing enrolment figures (British Council 2016); see Chapter 4 for further discussion.

⁵ NB this survey also notes high transition rates for Kenya (about 90%) posing some questions about the data usage.

An alternative option for those having completed primary school is Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) (Nyerere 2009). In Kenya, TVET can be attained through various means, including Youth Polytechnics, Technical Training Institutes, Institutes of Technology, National Polytechnics, as well as government owned National Industrial Vocational Centres, various government ministries, universities offering TVET diplomas, some secondary schools including TVET skills in their curriculums, the private sector and the informal sector (Simiyu 2009; Nyerere 2009; Hope 2012; Maronga et al 2015; KEPSA n.d.).


Despite the inarguable importance of TVET in Kenya's strategy to combat youth unemployment, some issues persist (Simiyu 2009):

- Although there has been an increase in numbers of youth enrolled in TVET institutions (KNBS 2017), accurate recent data is lacking. The MasterCard Foundation (2017) estimates that 92 per cent of Kenyan youth (defined here as those aged 15-35) have had no vocational or professional training.
- There are no national standard examinations (Ngure 2015).
- TVET programmes are generally more affordable than formal schooling programmes, but may not currently improve graduates' access to employment due to skills mismatches (Hope 2012).
- Public opinion of the institutions can be low, owing to parental expectations of their children's careers, TVET institutes being perceived as a 'last resort' (Simiyu 2009). Indeed, while public university enrolment has grown significantly recently (see Figure 8), public TVET course enrolment has stayed relatively static.

There is strong agreement amongst academics, researchers, and the Kenyan Government, that education and training in Kenya, particularly that imparted through TVET institutes, falls short in providing youth with the appropriate and relevant skills needed to succeed in the labour market (AfDB 2015; Ngure 2015):

- Curricula are outdated, are not derived from local labour market demands, and are not flexible enough to respond to evolving challenges globally (Simiyu 2009; Ngure 2015).
- Some argue that the skills learned through TVET institutions, including interpersonal skills, critical analysis, teamwork, and the ability to analyse numerical data, are "below what is required in the job market", and that new policies need to have an ever-evolving curriculum to ensure that training "coincided with the needs and opportunities...in the labour market" (Murgor 2013).

Figure 9: Student Enrolment in Public TVET Institutions and in Public Universities in Kenya from 2012 to 2015 – based on official numbers from KNBS (KNBS 2017)⁶



Too few places exist in private sector internship, apprenticeship and entrepreneurial training programmes, considering the numbers applying (Hope 2012). Private sector inclusion criteria mean internships are available to urban youth only (KEPSA n.d.), excluding the vast numbers of unemployed rural youth. Although there are various community level micro-loans opportunities such as Harambee or Chama (Ochanda 2013; KWFT Bank 2017), government loans for micro and small enterprises are only available to those who have been selected by a constituency-level committee, leaving the system open to corruption (Hope 2012).

Kenya's previous focused campaign to improve access to primary education for all has resulted in the majority of international funding in the country for education being funnelled into basic education provision, including funding from DFID, USAID and the World Bank, leaving little for TVET institutions (Nyerere 2009). The informal sector of TVET, that is to say, education and training provided on-the-job within the informal sector of the economy, absorbs a vast quantity of students, but is unacknowledged and unaccredited, and is therefore often overlooked for funding (Nyerere 2009).

C. The impact of gender on education and labour market integration

Male and female tertiary education rates do not differ significantly, with females taking up a 49.1 per cent share in TVET enrolment and similar rates in university enrolment (Murgor 2013; ILO & IILS

⁶ Information or data on enrolled students in private institutions (TVET and universities) in Kenya is not available.

2013). However, unemployment, underemployment and inactivity of females is estimated to be double that than of males (KEPSA n.d.). This suggests that although there have been factors encouraging female access to education, young females are still far less prepared for the labour market than males – or less prepared for sectors with higher employment rates (such as construction). Several explanations have been proposed for this:

- Some researchers theorise that this may be because of the types of skills taught in female dominated subjects differ to those taught in male dominated areas. Murgor (2013) suggests that women have lower skills in science and technology areas, which are in high labour demand. He also found that numeracy, leadership, and self-confidence are less likely to be fostered in female dominated subjects, and that curricula are perpetuating traditional stereotypes rather than meaningfully challenging them (Murgor 2013).
- Another suggestion is that females drop out of further education and training at a higher rate than males, due to factors such as pressure to get married, discrimination by teachers, and family preference to educate male children first (AfDB 2015).
- At the university level, Gitonga (2014) found that males and females tend to seek work in different sectors, and follow different strategies for seeking employment. It was discovered that male graduates preferred to work in the for-profit sector, and that they marketed their skills directly to companies, whereas females preferred to work in the non-profit sector, and relied on their social networks to secure employment opportunities (Gitonga 2014). This data is limited to a very small sample, however, and there is room for more in-depth studies on university graduates.

Despite the marked difference in female and male employment rates, it is widely recognised that female involvement in the labour market is fundamental to Kenya’s economic growth. It increases the direct contributions to household welfare, increases female participation in shaping and making decisions, broadens the country’s tax base, and improves opportunities for the following generation (Anyanwu 2016). Steps have been taken to increase female participation in the labour force include advocating for an increase in TVET funding to be in line with that of universities, and to waive tuition fees altogether for females enrolled in engineering and science courses (Ngure 2015).

Although youth participation in the labour market is low across genders, female participation has been under 30 per cent for the past decade, with female youth participation rates in 2013 at 29.5 per cent compared with male participation at 36 per cent (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; Wamuthenya 2010; Omolo 2012; Owino et al 2016). While there is not sufficient empirical evidence on why young females are so much more vulnerable to unemployment than young males, particularly in the formal sector (Owino et al 2016), several educational, political, social and cultural factors are at play (ILO & ILS 2013; UNDP 2013):

- **Education**, discussed previously, creates a barrier for females in that education up to the tertiary level is considered important for employment in the formal sector – while enrolment rates of men and women are similar, their different choice of courses impacts their employability (Keya & Lubanga 2016; Wamuthenya 2010; Owino et al 2016).
- **Politically**, despite gains in legislation and policies which address gender discrimination in the labour force, implementation and enforcement of these policies remains weak and ineffective (Keya & Lubanga 2016; Njambi & Misiani 2016).
- Some **policies**, although positive for gender empowerment, and designed to protect women and their rights, may inadvertently lead to a negative reaction from potential employers. For example, four months paid maternity leave is mandatory for new mothers, which protects women’s right to actively participate in the labour force, but may lead to employers hesitating before hiring women of child-bearing age (Keya & Lubanga 2016).
- **Social and cultural norms**, including domestic duties expected of women, and low access to financial credit or owning land, significantly impede young women’s ability to find employment (Njambi & Misiani 2016; ILO & ILS 2013). Domestic duties including washing, cooking, cleaning and childcare, are all culturally expected of women. These duties are considered a voluntary contribution to the household, and there is very little consideration for how these intensely time-consuming activities exclude young women from formal employment (Njambi & Misiani 2016).
- The **patriarchal culture in Kenya** has resulted in women traditionally having very little right to own or inherit land, and limited access to traditional means of financial credit relative to males (Njambi & Misiani 2016; ILO & ILS 2013). This creates a significant barrier in young women’s ability to engage in entrepreneurial activities or self-employment, as they are less likely to have such resources on which to draw.

D. From employers’ perspective: a widespread mismatch between “supply” and “demand” among youth

The widespread mismatch in skills and inappropriate curricula means that Kenyan employers are finding graduates, male and female alike, are not sufficiently prepared for the workplace, and that industry is advancing faster technologically than the institutions training graduates (AfDB 2015; Nyerere 2009). Employers feel outdated instructional methods, unmaintained equipment, trainers not undergoing continual learning, inflexible curricula, and low life skills training contribute to this (Nyerere 2009). Another issue is that despite the opportunity for graduates to apply for mid-level jobs in other countries, either by emigrating or working remotely, the local curricula are not incorporating global labour demands (Ngure 2015). Higher education nonetheless does improve

employability – but not necessarily from a content perspective: the access of those students who have attained university level education to social and professional networks, invaluable for entrance to the labour market, is significantly higher than those who do not (Gitonga 2014).

Despite these fairly negative perceptions, employers perceive education, particularly TVET, as being important in preparing young people for the labour market, and improvements must therefore be made to meet to demands (Ngure 2015). Currently, the *Global Competitiveness Report* notes Kenya as ranked 97/138 for higher education and training, dragged down by its secondary and tertiary education rates. For those who are in school, the picture is somewhat more positive, with Kenya 68/138 on quality of math and science education, and 45/138 on the quality of management schools (World Economic Forum 2017); these scores are based on the perception of employers. The lack of preparedness of the workforce is reported as a lower priority problem than structural issues such as lack of infrastructure and corruption (World Economic Forum 2017). Other reports do note that employers have positive perceptions of graduates possessing good communication skills, professionalism, safety consciousness and openness to innovation (Ngure 2015), which are amongst the transferrable skills highly valued by industry (MasterCard Foundation 2017).

E. Additional barriers to youth employment

The mismatch between the skills taught to young people through various education systems and the skills demanded by the labour sector, has resulted in the youth population being underprepared for the labour market. The other side of the coin is that the labour market is not quite ready for the ever-growing youth population.

Competition. Readiness to integrate youth into the labour market cannot be discussed without first acknowledging that one of the largest barriers for young people is the amount of competition. Due to the continuously growing numbers of young people joining the labour market (as noted earlier, estimated to be between 500,000 and 800,000), and, despite economic growth, the relatively stagnant growth in job creation, there simply are not enough new jobs for young people. Economic growth has largely been generated through high GDP-creating sectors such as the mining and extractive sectors, which are not labour intensive and do not create a high number of new jobs (Kararach et al 2011). Sectors such as agriculture, which are capable of enveloping large numbers of young people are, for various reasons, unattractive to youth and are possibly not receiving enough state support due to their more limited ability to generate GDP (Irungu et al 2015; Afande et al 2015, Ramisch 2015). This element will be discussed in detail in Section 5.

Individual vulnerabilities. Although the various individual vulnerabilities affecting youth in Kenya logically seem to create barriers to their integration into the labour force, there is little actual empirical evidence supporting this logic. Scholarly articles are scarce, and the organisations which work to address the various individual vulnerabilities in Kenya such as MSF, ActionAid or Handicap International, do not have a direct focus on their impact on youth employment (MSF 2017; ActionAid 2017; Handicap International 2017). Many of the factors appear to be cyclical in nature. For example, conflict leads to loss of income and resources, which can lead to loss of employment, and in turn increase a sense of social injustice and risk of conflict. The majority of research seems to

focus on these vulnerabilities as a consequence of unemployment, rather than a potential cause or barrier:

- **Poverty** is one vulnerability that would logically seem to have an impact on unemployment, in that it inhibits access to education. This has been identified as the main barrier to youth employment. It also negatively impacts on health and human development, and therefore individuals' ability to work productively (ILO & ILS 2013). Poverty in a household can also lead to under- or unemployment amongst other household members. Having no one else in the family with whom to foster professional networks decreases an individual's ability to find employment by over 10 per cent (ILO & ILS 2013; AfDB 2015). Finally, the cost of searching for jobs can be prohibitive to those experiencing poverty (AfDB 2015).
- **Poor health** in an individual, or their caregivers, has a negative impact on their level of education, productivity and labour force participation (AfDB 2015). One study found that amongst HIV positive respondents, only 9 per cent were employed (ActionAid International Kenya 2009). Although it suggests the impact of stigma attached to the illness, there is little information available detailing to what extent poor health influences an individual's ability to participate in the labour force, which focuses on youth in Kenya. Globally, employment participation in amongst those with a disability is very low (Handicap International, 2016), with some estimates placing it in the Kenyan context at below 1 per cent (Mwaura 2016). This could be due to physical barriers in the workplace as well as discrimination, a lack of social support and low enforcement of legislation and policies (Tanui 2015; Handicap International 2016).
- **Conflict as a cause of unemployment** amongst youth in Kenya is under researched. Generally, research suggests conflict leads to loss of employment, decreased social relationships and networks, and closing of education facilities and enterprises such as market places (Njambi & Misiani 2016; Odhiambo 2012; Schilling et al 2012).

5. Sectoral and locational differences in employment amongst Kenyan youth

The majority of job opportunities available to youth – or which can be created by youth – in Kenya are informal. In the rural parts of the country, these are dominated by agriculture-related jobs, which are not easily classified. In urban parts of the country, the services sector, both formal and informal, has been gaining ground. ICT in particular offers potential for job development, although perhaps not to the extent hoped by some, given connectivity challenges in much of the country.

A. Rural vs. urban contexts

The rural / urban divide in Kenya is a fluid one. The majority of youth live in rural areas, with estimates at around 75 per cent (Balwanz 2012). However, many young people attempt to diversify their incomes by becoming multi-locational, moving back and forth between urban and rural areas depending on the season or which sector they may be finding more profitable at the time (Ramisch 2015).

Youth in rural contexts are more likely to work in agriculture, and thus suffer more from vulnerable employment and underemployment. The jobs they hold generally do not pay well or provide much (or anything) in the way of social or legal protection (Afande et al 2015). On the other hand, youth in urban contexts have a higher chance of being unemployed, as there are fewer jobs, and greater competition for those that are available (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; AfDB 2015). Unemployment rates for urban youth range from 35 to 60 per cent, vs. 20 to 25 per cent in rural areas (UNDP 2013). From a policy perspective, improving employment conditions and profitability in rural areas could potentially ease the pressure on urban areas, as well as address underemployment in rural areas to some degree. It should also be noted that in discussions on rural/urban differences, urban literature overwhelmingly focuses on Nairobi; potentially leaving alternative contexts out of the discussion.

B. Key sectors of employment for youth

Employment in Kenya is classified using mutually overlapping stratifications of sectors. These include, for example, the formal and informal sectors, as detailed above, as well as public and private sectors. The Government of Kenya has further identified six economic sectors of growth in its Kenya Vision 2030, namely Energy, Finance, Tourism, Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), Manufacturing, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (Hope 2012). Problematically, the sectors more amenable to job creation do not necessarily overlap with those attracting youth.

The **agricultural sector**, for example, while the largest employer of youth in Kenya has not been identified as a target area of growth by the Government. As the agricultural sector is largely informal, reliable data on exact numbers for youth employment in it does not exist. It is composed of largely

informal employment and self-employment, with formal employment making up only 10 per cent of the sector (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013).

It is interesting that the agricultural sector is not identified by the government as an area of growth in Kenya Vision 2030, considering its position as the largest employer of youth in Kenya (AfDB 2015). This could be because it is also the sector with the lowest wages, and therefore is undesirable to the youth and is not considered sufficiently significant for economic growth to receive substantial investment (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013).

The agricultural sector also suffers from the perception that it is for those who have not been successful in finding employment elsewhere. Therefore, young people with secondary education or higher prefer to seek employment in other sectors (Afande et al 2015; Irungu et al 2015). In addition, earning a living through agriculture is vulnerable to climate change, declining crop productivity, seasonal weather changes, and land scarcity (Irungu et al 2015; Ramisch 2015; Afande et al 2015). Youth in particular are not finding agriculture profitable because they are in vulnerable employment positions, have little access to credit or social capital, and are unlikely to own the land on which they are working (Afande et al 2015; Ramisch 2015). However, as youth are considered to be highly open to innovation and the use of ICT, there is potential for the agricultural sector to become more appealing if investment is made in developing methods to decrease risk, and increase productivity and market growth (Irungu et al 2015; Afande et al 2015).

Whilst the clear majority of youth are employed in agriculture, **the services sector is the second highest employer of youth** (AfDB 2015). There is little data reflecting actual numbers of youth that are employed in the services sector. However, there are still some valid observations to be highlighted:

- Both the ICT sector (see below) and the finance sector are significant for economic growth in Kenya, and employ mostly educated, urban youth (Wamuthenya 2010). Both have the potential to increase the productivity of other sectors, which may in turn be responsible for further job growth (Khanna et al 2016).
- The transport sector is significant in that it employs youth both formally and informally (Khanna et al. 2016; Sana 2016; Njoroge 2016), and increases productivity of other sectors. It also allows trade and services to be opened up between rural and urban areas which may in turn be increasing service-related employment particularly in rural areas, but again data is lacking (Njoroge 2016; Sana 2016).
- Food, cleaning, and solid waste management have also been noted as employing large numbers of urban youth, notably in the informal sector where youth may be less educated and more impoverished than their formally employed, educated peers (Njoroge 2016; Sana 2016).
- Tourism has the potential to create many jobs within suppliers, both informally and formally (Khanna et al 2016). However, the tourism industry in Kenya has suffered in recent years, largely due to a perception of lowered security in the region and

particularly in coastal areas which would have had a strong tourism industry otherwise (Botha 2014).

C. Kenyan Youth and the ‘Silicon Savannah’: Opportunities and Limitations of ICT

Kenya’s internet usage has been steadily increasing, and with a population of over 48 million people in 2016, 26 per cent of the population was using the internet in 2016, up from 21 per cent in 2015 and 16.5 per cent in 2014 (ITU 2017). In comparison to other countries in the region, in 2016 Ethiopia had a 15 per cent internet usage rate, Tanzania 13 per cent, and Uganda 22 per cent (ITU 2017), as can be seen in Figure 10. The country has installed four international fibre optic cables, and in 2015, mobile penetration was already at 88 per cent (Miroro 2016). It is rapidly emerging as a hub of digital innovation in the region and Africa as a whole, and is having significant impact on entrepreneurial ventures (Khanna et al. 2016; AfDB 2015). However, as Figure 11 shows, this statement must be nuanced: while mobile penetration is high, mobile connectivity remains limited in much of the country, in particular the northern parts, and is largely focused around urban hubs.

Figure 10: Percentage of Individuals using the Internet in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 2000 to 2016 (ITU 2017)





Figure 11: Mobile Network Coverage in Kenya – based on FSP Maps (FSP Maps 2016)



The ICT sector can transform economies and has been recognised by Kenya Vision 2030 as an area for economic growth in the future, as well as job creation for youth (Gathege & Moraa 2013; Rori et al 2011). Jobs created in the ICT sector are acknowledged to be ‘quality work’, which includes a decent wage, opportunities for career development, and interesting work (International Youth Foundation 2013; Miroro 2016). Kenya has four times the amount of research staff in technology of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda combined (The LBJ School of Public Affairs 2015).

Several specific areas for growth within the ICT sector directed towards youth have been identified:

- Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) has been earmarked as having particularly high potential for job creation among qualified youth (International Youth Foundation 2013; Khanna et al 2016). BPO is currently providing jobs, although in a more limited fashion than initially hoped due to challenging economics and the 2008 financial crisis (Khanna et al 2016).
- The development of mobile applications and related software not only creates jobs (although, to date, not a significant number compared to the population of youth), but has the potential to significantly increase productivity and profitability of other jobs (Miroro 2016; International Youth Foundation 2013).
- Blogging and internet design are increasing in popularity (Miroro 2016; International Youth Foundation 2013), and innovation hubs and incubators are receiving increased

attention and support (Gathege & Moraa, 2013). These incubator hubs are entrepreneurial ventures themselves, as physical spaces that require management and promotion (Gathege & Moraa 2013; Irungu et al 2015). They play an important role in providing training and mentoring to young entrepreneurs, providing a physical, digitally connected working space, advocating for funding for new ventures, and coordinating networking events (Gathege & Moraa 2013).

Key stakeholders in the ICT sector include private sector multinational firms with their regional offices in Nairobi, including Google, IBM, Nokia, Microsoft, and many others (Miroro 2016; Gathege & Moraa 2013; The LBJ School of Public Affairs 2015). Other stakeholders are prominent incubators such as iHub and NaiLab, academic institutions such as Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology and the University of Nairobi, investors such as the African Development Bank and DFID, and the Kenyan government (The LBJ School of Public Affairs 2015).

Investment into the growth of the ICT sector is important for inclusive development, as it can broaden employment access and economic growth to urban and rural areas, and reach otherwise marginalised communities (Miroro 2016; Gathege & Moraa 2013). Despite it being an economically productive sector, the ICT sector cannot solve Kenya's current 'youth employment challenge' on its own, with job creation needing to be more diverse (Miroro 2016).

ICT developments and entrepreneurship ventures do have the potential for a reach beyond the ICT sector itself, with the hopes that it will allow goods and services in other sectors to be produced faster, to a higher quality, and distributed more broadly (Rori et al 2011; AfDB 2015). Manufacturing, creative, and agriculture industries can particularly benefit from innovations in ICT, due to their ability to absorb large amounts of youth labour, and their informal nature leaving significant room for ICT-enabled growth. Currently, the relationship between the creative economy and ICTs in East Africa is being underutilised (Kovaks 2008), but creative industries have been recognised for their value in contributing to sustainable and inclusive economic growth, creating jobs, and raising living standards (Joffe 2013).

To date, Kenya has produced world-class actors, actresses, artists, sportsmen, and writers and poets, amongst other creatives (Okumu 2016). But, the sector remains challenged by mismanagement, poorly functioning guilds and associations, and low levels of successful entrepreneurship, as well as ineffective cooperation with government institutions. Funding aimed at addressing some of these issues has been criticised for creating dependence rather than encouraging entrepreneurship (Hivos 2016). Several approaches to address this have been proposed; improving financial literacy and entrepreneurial skills, developing a revenue producing business model, and opening the sector up to rural and smaller urban centres as well as Nairobi, would go some way to increasing the success of the creative economy (Hivos 2016; Fleming 2013; Heva 2017; Njogu et al 2015). Digital technology platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Pinterest, YouTube, and Soundcloud can increase audience base both locally and internationally, but piracy is rife in the region, and the lack of a profitable business model for creative youth is impeding the creative economy's potential to contribute significantly to economic growth (Hivos 2016).

Bringing together ICT and Agriculture


Researchers agree that there needs to be a “rebranding” of agriculture in order to attract digitally-savvy youth (Njenga et al n.d.; Lohento & Ajilore 2015; Proctor & Lucchesi 2012; Irungu et al 2015). Young Kenyans have little interest in subsistence farming, and do not wish to continue a rural, marginalised lifestyle (Irungu et al 2015; Ramisch 2015), instead “a majority of Kenyan youth (48%) would like to go into business”, while “26% per cent wish to pursue careers such as engineering, law, medicine, and teaching” (Awiti & Scott 2016). Yet, subsistence farming is the face of agriculture in Kenya, especially as land productivity decreases with climate change, low access to fertilisers, low investment, and low government prioritisation (Lohento & Ajilore 2015).

Agriculture actually represents a new “frontier” for inclusive growth and opportunity (Njenga et al n.d.). By facilitating even further access to technology,⁷ investing in the capacity of youth to utilise technology, and encouraging private sector support, benefits can be reaped, such as higher quality jobs in the agricultural sector, improved productivity and profitability, broader and more reliable markets, as well as greater respect for youth in agriculture (Proctor & Lucchesi 2012; Lohento & Ajilore 2015; Irungu et al 2015).

This has already begun among Kenya’s youth with youth in Western Kenya already trying to increase the use of ICT in agriculture (Irungu et al 2015). They recognise opportunities to set up hubs near markets and agricultural centres, that would increase access to other farmers, and create training opportunities and information access points (Irungu et al 2015). They also recognise opportunities use their phones and internet access to read up on new farming methods and trends, to find information on their crops and livestock, to set up platforms such as Facebook accounts, websites and blogs where they can interact with other farmers, advertise their produce and services, and connect with customers (Irungu et al 2015; Lohento & Ajilore 2015).

⁷ While mobile connectivity, especially regarding appropriate mobile online access, can still be challenging in rural and, thus, agricultural contexts, access to and provision of ICT services can also be ensured by creating text-based application. M-Pesa, Kenya’s highly popular mobile money transfer system (by Safaricom), is an example for such text-based systems.

Figure 12: Main areas of Agricultural Production vs Mobile Network Coverage in Kenya – based on FSP Maps and LANDSAT TM images (FSP Maps 2016; FAO 2003)



As Figure 12 highlights, Kenya’s agricultural heartland is comparatively well-connected. Use of the internet can broaden their markets, so that they are covered in times when the local market is limited, and they can use global positioning system (GPS) technology to study weather forecasts, and post their location (Irungu et al 2015; Lohento & Ajilore 2015). While this positive engagement with technology in agriculture might be able increase the attractiveness of the sector for youth, it remains one of the least favoured sectors for them (see above) – even with ICT-interaction, agriculture still requires physical work and can hardly compete with the imagined opportunities in aspired sectors, such as ‘business’ and ‘engineering’ (see above).

Further developing ICT for Kenya’s youth


While there are still many challenges facing ICT innovation in entrepreneurial ventures, including a lack of funding and interest and low skills training, ample opportunities exist to develop ICT in Kenya, both as a sector in and of itself and as an enabling aspect to other sectors (Gathege & Moraa 2013; Irungu et al 2015). Increasing entrepreneurial skills in TVET education (Kikechi 2013; Lohento & Ajilore 2015), nurturing public-private partnership and investment (Gathege & Moraa 2013; The LBJ School of Public Affairs 2015), and meaningfully including the voice and aspirations of young people in government policy development (Proctor & Lucchesi 2012; Rori et al 2011), will be instrumental in

tapping into the potential of digital technology and innovation in young people’s income generating strategies. However, with growing digital innovation both locally and internationally, comes a greater need to develop policies and innovations, such as the Digital Learning Programme⁸ (ICT Authority 2016), that ensure equal access, as well as digital literacy, is viable for communities throughout Kenya, or already marginalised and disadvantaged youth could be further left behind.

D. Between the formal and the informal

Kenya can be viewed as having a dual economy; a large and rapidly growing informal economy, and a small, relatively stagnant formal economy (Were 2017; Wamuthenya 2010; Balwanz 2012). The literature agrees that the informal sector is the fastest growing in Kenya, creates the most new jobs, and that the clear majority of young people are employed in this sector (UNDP 2013; Escudero & López Mourelo; Were 2017; Balwanz 2012) – rendering linkages to sectors of growth which rely primarily on the formal, such as ICT – more challenging.

Figure 13: Employment numbers (in thousands) in the formal and informal sector in Kenya, 1980 to 2010 - based on annual economic surveys from the Kenyan Government (adapted from: Omolo 2012)




The most recent KNBS Economics Survey estimates that the informal sector accounts for 83.1 per cent of employed people in Kenya (KNBS 2017). This is true of rural and urban contexts, and across all age groups. It is particularly true for the youth population, and even more so for rural youth, with 90 per cent of employed youth in Kenya working either in the agricultural sector (which is largely

⁸ The Digital Learning Programme “is targeted at learners in all public primary schools and is aimed at integrating the use of digital technologies in learning.” (ICT Authority 2016). It will equip primary schools with necessary ICT infrastructure and ensure instructure capacity in using these, amongst other goals (ICT Authority 2016).

informal), or the non-agricultural informal sector (Balwanz 2012). Indeed, **the informal sector** accounts for the majority of job creation for youth in Kenya (Hope 2012; Irungu et al 2015; Afande et al 2015), with Kenya having the second highest rate of informal employment outside the agricultural sector after India (see Figure 9). Estimates of the informality of the agricultural sector can vary from 56 per cent informal to 82 per cent informal (UNDP 2013b; Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; Balwanz 2012; Bunei et al 2013). Based on the 2005/2006 KIHBS data, overall young workers (15-34) are 47 per cent in farm-related work and 38 per cent in other informal sectors (Balwanz 2012 citing World Bank 2012).

Figure 14: Share of informal employment in non-agricultural employment for India, Kenya, Uganda, Egypt and South Africa in 2010 - based on ILO calculations (ILO & ILS 2013)



Much of the existing literature generally associates the informal sector with self-employment and the formal sector with wage employment – and in the Kenyan context as well this is the trend (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; Sana 2014; Wamuthenya 2010). Figures showing young people working in the informal sector are recognised to likely to be an underestimate, and that the informal sector, including, inter alia, services, transport, manufacturing, construction, and waste management in urban areas, and agriculture, pastoralism, and services in rural areas, does not comprise the entire informal economy. Including those informally employed in the formal sector, such as those working part-time or non-contractually, would reflect even higher numbers (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013). The growing ‘informality’ of the formal sector demonstrates how it is very difficult to definitively separate the two economies, particularly for statistical purposes. Not only do those working in the informal sector, such as in transport, food, or waste management services allow the formal sector to function, but employers in the formal sector are increasingly employing young people through informal contracts, even for positions that traditionally would have been formal contracts (Bocquier 2005).

The substantial difference in the balance of formal and informal economies in Kenya has several complementary explanations:

- **Institutional factors** perpetuate the growth of the informal sector, with bureaucratic costs often being prohibitively high for small business owners and self-employed individuals with few resources (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013).
- **Individually, education, age and gender play a significant role** in keeping the status quo when it comes to a dominant informal sector. Young women are often excluded from the formal sector because of constraints on time such as childcare and housework, and therefore make the constrained choice for informal employment (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013). Young people who have little experience and bargaining power may also “choose” to work in the informal sector (Njoroge 2016), and those without a university degree are unlikely to find wage employment within the formal sector (Sana 2014). Although access to the formal sector increases with a university degree, it is by no means guaranteed, as the formal sector is growing so slowly in relation to the number of young people entering the labour market, resulting in a young, and cheap, labour force to sustain the informal sector (UNDP 2013b).

The general perception is that young people work in the informal sector out of necessity rather than choice (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013). Income is usually lower than that in the formal sector, the hours can be very long, and there is little to no social protection (Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; Were 2017). The two economies also seem to run in parallel worlds, particularly within the urban context, with the formal sector operating in modern, well-serviced and upper income zones, and those in the informal sector working through the day and night, seemingly underground, in ways that allow the formal sector to prosper (Njoroge 2016).

With the informal sector in Kenya taking up by far the largest share in employment and new job creation, particularly for youth, there is a great deal of interest in how to navigate the best interests of those working in the sector. However, detailed quantitative data reflecting numbers of youth working in sub-sectors of the informal economy is hard to come by, due to the sector’s largely unrecorded and variable nature. Additionally, although most Kenyans, including youth, work and live in rural areas, the bulk of research into the informal sector seems to focus on urban areas.

The informal sector in rural areas

Discussions on informal employment do not focus on rural areas, despite the fact that most young people live in rural settings, work largely in agriculture, and that much agricultural work is informal. Additionally, some authors note the existence of non-wage family work, a lack of land ownership amongst youth, that there are few opportunities beyond working hourly rates, and that these contexts are particularly populated by young women (Afande et al 2015; Muteti 2016). The implication is that opportunities for labour exploitation and abuse exist, but little evidence exists.

Another aspect of rural informal employment that attracts little attention in discussions of informal employment is pastoralism. This nomadic practice of shepherding livestock is particularly prevalent in the arid and semi-arid lands which constitute much of the land in Kenya, where agriculture is not

sustainable, unemployment rates are the highest in the country,⁹ and illiteracy rates can be as high as 93 per cent (Bunei et al 2013; Botha 2014; Enns & Bersaglio 2015). The studies that have focused on pastoralism, particularly in Turkana, portray an image of a vulnerable and marginalised community, attempting to make ends meet in a context of very few resources and few opportunities (Enns & Bersaglio 2015). Pastoralism is often carried out in conjunction with other activities such as seasonal subsistence agriculture, or those which require circular migration to and from urban areas. They are under threat from climate change, livestock rustling and conflict over land (Ramisch 2015). However, pastoralists have used creative, flexible approaches to survive in vulnerable circumstances, which are important characteristics in thriving in the informal sector (Enns & Bersaglio 2015).

The informal sector in urban areas

The majority of studies on urban young people working in the informal sector focus on Nairobi, with very little mention of other towns and cities. It is noted that there are two intertwined and interdependent aspects to Nairobi life; the modern high-rise buildings, multinational corporations, and affluent neighbourhoods where the 'face' of the formal sector thrives, and the poorly serviced, disadvantaged neighbourhoods, where the majority of the city's population lives and works, often in an informal capacity that keeps the wheels of the formal sector turning (Njoroge 2016). The urban disadvantaged estates and neighbourhoods, including so-called 'slums', are home to youth that have been born and raised there, who frequently have lower levels of education, and more educated university graduates who have been unable to find well-paying jobs in the formal sector immediately after graduation, and who rely on the cheaper accommodation available in the poorer neighbourhoods. Some of these youths financially rely on their parents, who may be landlords or have established businesses, and others may rely on remittances sent from relatives living in developed countries such as the USA or in Europe (Sana 2014).

Young people working in the informal sector in urban areas cluster in several sectors:

- **The food industry** offers an income to the majority of young people making a living in the informal economy in urban areas. This includes cooking and selling popular street food, setting up kiosks, and delivering food (Sana 2014). These are profitable, but require long work hours. Most of these kiosks operate without government permits and without paying taxes, and therefore keep costs low (Sana 2014).
- The thriving informal food industry increases demand for **other services**, such as butchers, grocers, fruit and vegetable kiosks, and coffee servers (Sana 2014). This links to the informal urban market sector, where young people can sell new and second-hand clothes as well as fresh produce (Njoroge 2016).

⁹ Data from the 2005/2006 KHIBS indicates that youth employment is particularly rampant in Kenya's former North Eastern Province (see Section 3), one of the most arid areas of the country.

- **Markets** also offer a platform for those working in the jua kali¹⁰ artisanal sector, where young people hand produce goods such as iron ware, carpentry, masonry, and welding (Sana 2014; Njoroge 2016). These products can also be sold by hawkers, both in the more impoverished residential neighbourhoods and in urban city centres. However, they face competition from imported Asian goods, and hawkers in the city centres face frequent, and sometimes violent, harassment from security guards and police (Njoroge 2016).
- Recent improvements to the national road network have resulted in far greater movement of people and goods, and therefore greater opportunity for young people to make a living in the **transport sector**, both through wage employment and self-employment (Njoroge 2016). These jobs include drivers for the public transport vehicles (matatus), as well as matatu conductors, route planners and ushers. The drivers and conductors are responsible for earning a pre-arranged amount, which must be returned to the vehicle owner each day. Profit made above that is then divided between the drivers and conductors, with the ushers making a commission on fares (Sana, 2014; Njoroge 2016).
- Other jobs available in **the informal transport industry** include boda boda drivers; usually young people who have saved enough money to buy a bicycle or motorcycle, and drive passengers around the disadvantaged and poorer neighbourhoods and city centres (Sana, 2014; Njoroge 2016). Porters use wheelbarrows or carts to transport goods, including merchandise for businessmen, household goods at month-end when relocation is common, and jerry cans of water (Sana 2014).
- **Solid waste management** offers opportunities in both transporting waste and in finding recyclable materials, such as plastic, glass, metals, electronics, or even hair weaves, which can either be sold on, or made into other products (Sana 2014; Njoroge 2016). These services both pick up the slack for public services in underprovided areas, and promote recycling amongst the youth. However, they can expose young people to health issues, such as contamination from dump sites, and can lead to open burning of waste in non-demarcated areas (Njoroge 2016).

Other youth can also find low-skilled wage employment with construction companies, such as mixing concrete and road construction, or create self-employment opportunities from high demand services such as barber shops or salons (Sana 2014). Theatre, music and sports are also slowly developing as a creative economy in the urban centre, as discussed previously in this chapter. However, all urban informal sector employment opportunities are vulnerable to high levels of crime, mixed with low police surveillance. This in turn creates opportunity for young people to sell their services as private security guards, protecting urban businesses from burglars, arsonists, and intruders (Sana 2014).

¹⁰ While no direct translation fully captures the meaning of jua kali, it can be loosely understood to mean ‘small-scale craft or artisanal work’ (Oxford Living Dictionary)

The informal sector includes also the **illicit**, as crime in some cases can be a strategy employed by young people unable to make a legitimate living. Organised gangs operate prolifically and with impunity in impoverished, poorly serviced neighbourhoods and 'slums'. As well as theft and mugging, these gangs conduct land evictions, control transport routes, extort businesses for protection money, and sell drugs and alcohol (Sana 2014). In addition, some operate as a kind of mercenary militia, where gang leaders need to be paid for political parties to campaign in the area, and young members can be hired to incite violence and intimidate the opposition (Sana 2014; Balwanz 2012 Escudero & López Mourelo 2013; Hope 2012). Even though urban youth use politically related violence as an income generating strategy, there is very little evidence to support the idea that young under- and unemployed people may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Young people involved in radicalised groups such as the MRC or Al-Shabaab may be otherwise unemployed, but research shows that this is not a motivating factor in their decision to join the group. Rather religion, marginalisation, and a feeling of social injustice, drive their decision to join (Botha 2014; Muteti 2016; MercyCorps n.d.; AfDB 2015).

E. Gendered work strategies

In the limited existing research, the concept of gender is often ignored. There is evidence to suggest that one strategy employed mostly by women is that of domestic work, with many women working in upmarket estates (Sana 2014). Almost half of the adult domestic workers in Kenya are youth, aged 18 -25 (IDAY 2015), but there is a general lack of understanding of the subsector. It has been noted, however, that domestic employment, particularly in young females, sometimes progresses to prostitution (Siringi 2002). Whilst some researchers note that it is mostly young urban women from poor and disadvantaged neighbourhoods who work as street prostitutes or in brothels (Sana 2014; Keya & Lubanga 2016), and others note prostitution as an alternative livelihood strategy or a coping mechanism for food insecurity (Owino et al. 2013; Masese & Muia 2016; Soles 2016), there is little mention of prostitution and its deployment as a livelihood strategy amongst youth in other informal sector studies. However, male prostitution (heterosexual and homosexual) has been identified as a "reservoir of hidden unemployment" in coastal tourism areas in the past (Kibicho 2004: 140) – still, no specific numbers on prostitution, female and male alike, are available to provide details on context and extent of such practices in Kenya.

Although the informal economy leaves young people vulnerable to long hours, poor wages, low job satisfaction, and is highly vulnerable to changes within the macro-economic climate, it also offers the potential for significant growth, with informality being "about stretching ingenuity to its elastic limit" (Njoroge 2016). The informal sector has been a significant part of Kenya's economy since the 1970s (Dombia-Henry 2010; Sana 2014; Balwanz 2012).


6. The Future of Youth Employment in Kenya

Kenya's capacity to harness its potential demographic dividend – and support its youth in a role as agents of change and progress in the country's future – is uncertain. The current economic structure of the country is not ready for this. Too much depends on the informal sector, with limited potential to contribute to governmental revenues. Structural reforms are thus necessary to harness the full potential of the youth bulge, promoting sustainable and formal employment. Lessons learned from other countries, including Egypt, Senegal and Finland, considered here, can be applied in the Kenyan context as well.

A. Looking towards 2030

This section seeks to provide more historical context for the analysis of today and tomorrow's Kenyan youth employment challenge, with a 2030 horizon. To do so, it is necessary to both look at ongoing and future demographic trends in the country *and* assess the links between trends in gross domestic product (GDP) and formal and informal employment. Since the early 2000s and despite significant growth volatility, the economic performance of the Kenyan economy has been remarkable with rising growth rates, as discussed in Section 1: from USD 12,705 billion in 2001, the GDP at purchaser's prices is expected to reach 74,408 in 2017 (World Bank, 2017e). In a context of global slowdown (since 2008), high fuel prices (2002 and beyond), drought (2007 and 2009), and post-election violence (2008), it is worth highlighting the resilience of the Kenyan economy and its ability to absorb and recover from economic shocks.

Figure 15: Annual GDP Growth in Kenya 2001-2020 (Source: World Bank 2017)




However, the country may not attain the Vision 2030 (*Ruwaza ya Kenya 2030*) objectives defined in 2008 to transform the country into a “newly industrializing, middle-income (income exceeding World’s average currently at US\$10000) country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment” (Government of Kenya, 2008). According to the World Bank (2016b), the most notable impediments to growth and job creation include, compared to peer countries:

- Political risks and corruption;
- Economic over-regulation, informality, and protectionism;
- Sub-optimal decentralization program (Devolution process);
- Uncoordinated and overlapping governmental agencies;
- Non-favourable business environment (starting a business, getting electricity, registration, taxes, cross-border trading, contracts, insolvency);¹¹
- High inflation rates (regularly over 10 per cent), low and declining domestic and public savings, poor exchange reserve position, as well as slow activities in the money market;
- Stagnating manufacturing and agriculture productivity;
- Energy and transport sector bottlenecks; and
- Poor higher education system.

In this environment, East Africa’s largest economy may not transform its economy on the short- to medium-run and become a middle-income country, able to benefit from the dividends of its youth.

¹¹ Even if in Kenya’s latest *Doing Business report*, the country’s 2016 rank improved an impressive 21 places, from 129 to 108.

Figure 16: GDP Growth per capita (2003-2014) for Kenya, Sub Saharan Africa economies, and other middle-income countries – levelled at 100 for 2003 numbers, selection of countries by World Bank (Source: World Bank Development Indicators & KNBS)¹²




Impact of the changing demographic structure on the labour market (2030)

As shown in the graph below, the share of youth within the working-age population stopped growing around 2000 and has been declining since then: in 2010, the 15 to 34-year old population (youth) growth rate was for the first time lower than the growth rate of the 35 to 64-year old (adult) population of working age, which constitutes an important milestone in the Kenyan demographic and economic transition. Nonetheless the existing youth bulge does offer, as discussed earlier, a potential ‘demographic dividend’ characterised by a low dependency ratio and leading to increased savings and investments towards improved economic growth and modernisation (Mason, 2008; Gribble, 2012).

In the Kenyan context, youth will continue to exert a significant pressure on labour markets, and the share of the working-age population will keep rising accordingly: from 47 per cent in 1990 to 56 per cent in 2014, and an expected 62 per cent by 2050, according to the World Bank (2016b). The question for 2030 and beyond is naturally whether Kenya will be able to reap the benefits of the youth bulge and increasing share of working-age population by creating productive jobs. According to the World Bank and the Kenya Population Census (2009), and confirmed by this literature review, the mix of unemployment, underemployment, inactivity, and poor quality jobs (informal, unskilled, and low-paid) still predominantly affects 15-24-year-old youth compared to the rest of the working age group – and will continue to do so, unless the Kenyan governments initiates systemic reforms.

¹² The 5 SSA economies were chosen by the World Bank on the basis of their economic **potential** to become middle-income countries on the medium to long run; these are visualized on an 100 index which allows for the focus to be on the different growth rates of these economies.

Figure 17: Kenyan youth's share in total working-age population (per cent)




Youth employment and unemployment rates (2030)

According to the Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Secretariat, during the first medium-term plan (MTP 2008-2012) an annual average of 511,000 jobs were created against a target of 740,000 jobs – of which about 80 per cent were in the informal sector. During the second medium-term plan, the government was expected to create more than one million new jobs annually (70 per cent informal) to progressively address youth unemployment and improve skills training. While it is difficult to obtain accurate data on the actual achievement of the second MTP, interviewed stakeholders from the WB, UNDP, and the ILO generally agree on the fact that labour productivity is only growing in sectors that either employ few workers and/or offer formal jobs (mining, utilities, financial services, education, etc.): according the KNBS, the four sectors with the highest productivity growth account for only 7 per cent of total employment. In this context, scenarios for 2030 do not lead to a great deal of optimism. Assuming comparable trends:

- Under the *medium variant*, the Kenyan population should attain 67.8 million in 2030 (UNDESA/PD, 2011). Assuming a 60 per cent working-age population, the working-age group should represent 40.7 million people;
- Assuming a 60 per cent youth's share in the total working-age population, the 15-34 age group should represent 24.4 million individuals – who may have entered the job market between 2010 and 2030; the broader age category has been included here to fully represent the competition faced by youth, and take into account the delays in accessing the job market to date.
- Assuming, in line with the outcomes of the first MTP, that 80 per cent of the working age population entering the job market find a formal or informal job, the total number of unemployed youth would amount to approximately 5 million individuals;

- Assuming that 90 per cent of the jobs are *actually* created by the informal economy, less than two million youth would benefit from formal wage jobs, with 17.6 million youth ending up in low-productivity, informal activities, or underemployment.

Figure 18: Formal employment (Kenya's demographic trends, millions - Source: World Bank & Kenya National Bureau of Statistics)



The predominant informal sector (90 per cent of the job market) is dynamic, with a remarkable absorption capacity for unskilled youth entering the labour market, in both urban and rural contexts. However, informal establishments typically stay small (auto-entrepreneurial model) and do not create additional jobs once established (World Bank, 2016b). Most informal auto-entrepreneurs realise the potential benefits attached to formality but are reluctant, in practice, to pay taxes and face cumbersome registration procedures (World Bank, 2016c). Likewise, while formal jobs are in high-growth and high-productivity sectors, the job-creating potential of these sectors is relatively low, so most job seekers end up in low-productivity, informal activities. Finally, and even if the informal economy is (and will remain) the largest employer in Kenya, its long-term impact on structural adjustments, unemployment rates and national growth is reduced, as it does not contribute directly to fiscal revenues.

Opportunities for youth employment (2030)

The main lesson learned from the economic and labour market analysis in Kenya is that jobs, in the short- to medium-term (2030), can only be created for youth on the condition that a *systemic approach* is promoted: beyond short-term employment schemes promoting young entrepreneurs and informal jobs, only structural reforms can generate lasting impact on youth employment.

- **Promoting youth employability for sustainable and formal youth employment:** A conducive business environment, quality of skills and education, and fairer labour

regulations are key pillars for the creation of formal jobs. In this regard, and according to the World Bank (2016a), the main priorities for improving the employability of youth are (i) better evaluation of existing programs that would inform policy; (ii) better coordination of youth policies; (iii) improved access to vocational training, particularly for the poor; (iv) better targeted support to entrepreneurship; and (v) improved design of training programs to meet employers' needs.

However, achieving shared prosperity and generating enough employment for the Kenyan youth will require significant efforts on multiple fronts. Promoting youth employment, in other words and as highlighted by the World Bank (2016a), necessitates coordinated and structural adjustments: not only enactment of legislation, but also its enforcement; more public investment and better execution of capital projects; greater political and economic stability; and improved governance.

- **Promoting structural reforms and optimising the fiscal contribution of resource extraction (oil):** Like other emerging countries, Kenya may be exposed to the *Dutch disease*¹³ if it cannot optimise and reap the benefits from the recent oil discoveries; by contrast, it may also use the direct contribution of the fiscal revenues of natural resource exploitation to initiate longer-term structural reforms, raise public investment, human capital, and productivity.

By 2030, Kenya will need to solve the difficult equation: on the one hand, a working-age population at approximately 60 per cent; on the other, informal jobs, unemployment, and underemployment will remain rampant. In spite of the very positive image of the modern services sector (finance, communications, IT), it only accounts for a minor percentage of employment among youth. It is therefore urgent to promote a *transformational* agenda – as described in Chapter 7 below – by optimising, for instance, the fiscal revenues from the emerging oil industry.

B. Lessons learned from other countries: (Dis)similarities and relevance

Few countries with a history of success in harnessing the demographic dividend to date present a profile very comparable to Kenya. For example, South Korea's past youth unemployment problem was largely addressed through "family-controlled conglomerates" (Estrin 2015), such as Samsung. These privately-owned, multinational corporations have thrived, and overwhelmingly dominate the South Korean economy. This is simply not the case in Kenya. Other countries, such as Thailand, are still struggling with youth unemployment and measures that have had short-term impact such as large-scale industrialisation, have long-term concerns for the traditional agriculture economy (Fuller 2012).

¹³ Broadly, the term *Dutch disease* refers "to the harmful consequences of large increases in a country's income" (Ebrahimzadeh 2017). Coined by *The Economist* in 1977, it initially described the Netherlands' problem of increasing unemployment contrary to its macro-economic progress catalysed by the discovers of large gas reserves off its coast. Due to the influx of foreign investments, the value of the Dutch Guilder increased significantly, making other sectors less competitive in the global economy, which then led to increased unemployment (The Economist 2014).

The AU roadmap on harnessing the demographic dividend offers general recommendations on employment and entrepreneurship, including:

- Creating strategies for reducing the proportion of unemployed youth by “at least a quarter by 2024”
 - Improving credit access for youth and establishing “Youth Funds”
 - Establishing cooperation with the private sector to create internships, apprenticeships, and on-the-job training
 - Establishing a conducive environment for Corporate Social Responsibility programmes to encourage entrepreneurship
 - Fostering relationships with the private sector and philanthropists to build the capacity and skills of entrepreneurs
 - Increasing youth’s access to government procurement and finance facilities
 - Investing in high-labour sectors such as ICT, agriculture, and manufacturing
 - Establishing youth development funds
 - Promoting volunteering and Junior Professional Programmes to increase youth people’s access to regional and international organisations
- (African Union, n.d.)

Egypt does present an interesting point of comparison. While it is in a different region, like Kenya it is struggling to overcome political volatility and is experiencing large cohorts of youth entering the labour market, while having a low rate of job creation. It therefore has high levels of youth unemployment and underemployment, particularly for women, and a growing number of long-term unemployed people. In addition, Egypt has a high demand for informal, but low-quality employment, with most youth working informally. The increase in the number of unemployed graduates in Egypt (van Rooij & Agune 2015) underlines that education in itself will not solve the youth unemployment crisis, it needs to be the right kind of education that matches skills with labour market demand.

Interventions are being implemented which, if proven successful, could provide models to apply to the Kenyan context. A recent survey of youth unemployment in Egypt conducted by the ILO underlined significant mismatch in the skills and aspirations of young people wanting to enter the labour market, and the types of employment opportunities employed youth were able to obtain. The survey determined that in order for Egypt to address this mismatch, education and training would need to change to provide skills demanded by the labour market. Projects have been put in place with a focus on TVET programmes, and establishing apprenticeship and on-the-job training mechanisms. As the country is still experiencing very high levels of youth unemployment, (Ghafar 2016; World Bank 2017d), it is possibly too early to tell whether the interventions being implemented will have significant effect.

In African contexts, TVET suffers from poor perception of it being a “last resort” for those unable to attain other modes of education, as well as colonial-induced negative attitudes towards it as an inferior education model designed to limit African people’s opportunities. Still, TVET has the potential to address the skills mismatch, as well as provide faster training-to-work transition.

In a different context, **Finland** has been particularly successful in changing negative attitudes towards TVET, with its TVET programmes now being more competitive than general education. Lessons learned from this are to:


- Adapt legislature to allow TVET students to be able to advance to further education, such as universities;
- Funnel the same level of funding and development into TVET as general education institutions. In the developing context, this means there needs to be more funding so that TVET is not in competing with primary, secondary, or university education funding;
- Restructure TVET curricula so that it includes the national core curriculum, as well as effective on-the-job training programmes;
- Strongly promote TVET to parents;
- Improve teaching quality by raising the qualification requirement, enforcing mandatory pedagogical training, and raising teacher salaries; and
- Establish relationships with labour market stakeholders in curriculum design and planning, and training and mentoring programmes.

(Subrahmanyam 2014)

Senegal offers an African example that has been particularly successful in reforming its TVET programmes, by developing their curricula, improving staff training, ensuring students are trained according to socio-economic circumstances, and providing training in wage and self-employment paths, networking skills, and where and how to source funding for entrepreneurship activities. It has also established a funding system for new micro-enterprises, and increased young people's understanding of how to create enterprises. It has formed a national 'Start and Improve Your Business' (SIYB) network, and has fostered business relationships to support new entrepreneurs (ILO 2011). The SIYB is an ILO tool, described as follows: "The SIYB programme is an easy-to-use business management skills training programme that strengthens the capacity of local business development services (BDS) providers to effectively and independently implement business start-up and management training for small-scale entrepreneurs. SIYB is based on a series of management training tools and has a unique quality assurance system that relies on its network" (ILO, 2011:5).

Egypt has also implemented projects to address the need for career guidance and counselling based on the aforementioned ILO study. One of these projects was a career guidance programme, which aimed at upgrading existing public employment agencies and addressing the skills mismatch, by training counsellors with to ILO toolkits, in how to receive job hunters, how to provide information on the training required for careers available in the labour market, where to get this training, and how to successfully make a career shift if required (van Rooij & Agune 2015). Although Kenya has the National Employment Bureau, it was set up 1988 and seems to have received little focused attention since then, offering only very broad employment seeking advice, and no direct recruitment assistance (Kenya Department of Labour 2016). In the African context, South Africa has recently set up the Employment Services of South Africa, through which job seekers can upload profiles and CVs, and search for positions (South Africa Department of Labour 2014; Nhlabathi & Stone 2015).

In order to truly benefit from these lessons, it is a clear an enormous investment will need to be



made in youth and their employment. Vague, tentative policy reform is unlikely to see results without tangible, focused change through heavy investment into projects similar to those set out above.

7. Final Discussion

A. Summary of key findings

In preparation for the British Council's Next Generation project in Kenya, this literature review brings together information on one of its key areas. It addresses youth employment in Kenya, examining the realities, challenges and opportunities that its young citizens aged 15 to 24, who make up over 20 per cent of the population, face. However, the lack of recent, reliable evidence,¹⁴ limits the ability to present specific statistics around many of these trends, and calls for further investigation to enable better evidence-based programming by actors in the sector.

The report notes in particular the following key findings:

- **From an educational and training perspective, the current system is insufficient** in preparing Kenyan youth for the employment market, leaving them with little opportunities to become active agents of change and progress:
 - While free primary and secondary education provide, in theory, the basics of education to most young people, this does not prepare them adequately for the labour market. A limited supply of and access to higher education opportunities means that few Kenyans graduate from **tertiary education**; their level of preparedness for employment after this is questioned by employers.
 - **TVET**, which could potentially present an opportunity for young Kenyans, is underfunded and regarded as a poor second choice by many. While the Kenyan government and international actors are currently moving forward in expanding the quantity and quality of TVET opportunities, there is still demand for further interventions, offering better adapted courses from both a technical and subject based perspective (e.g. ensuring materials are up-to-date, ensuring courses offered are in line with the labour market's needs).
 - **Gender** appears as a key differentiator in employment, as while women attend university and TVET at similar rates to men, they are far less likely to be formally employed despite policies to encourage this.
- **From an employment opportunities perspective, the available** (informal and especially formal) job opportunities have not kept pace with the increasing youth population, despite the countries' economic growth:
 - Recent employment growth has largely **benefitted the older population**.
 - More **investment is funnelled into high GDP creating sectors** which may not be labour intensive, whereas those sectors which could be better able to absorb

¹⁴ Most studies draw their conclusions from the same small pool of primary research, including the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey, which was conducted in 2005/2006, and the Kenya Population and Housing Census, which was conducted in 2009.

- large numbers of youth, such as agriculture, are not given sufficient support, resulting in poor working conditions.
 - **Females** face discrimination in the workplace, and traditional and cultural factors limit their access to credit, and impose non-economic activities and responsibilities - such as childcare and domestic duties - on their time.
 - **Individual vulnerabilities** such as poverty, poor health, disability and living in areas affected by conflict, all create further barriers for young people attempting to enter the labour market.
- **From a labour market perspective, the informal sector employs by far the highest numbers of youth, both in rural and urban areas**, and no industry will be able to address Kenya's 'youth employment challenge alone:
 - Within the **informal sector**, high numbers of youth are employed in agriculture, pastoralism, trade, and services, including the transport, food, and waste management industries.
 - With regards to the **formal sector**, employers noted a mismatch between the skills and aspirations of young people and their qualifications; young people are often pushed to the informal sector, or end up underemployed.
 - This problem of "**hidden unemployment**" is particularly prevalent among youth in Kenya's rural populations, but also significantly affects education urban youth.
 - **Self-employment and entrepreneurship** are particularly important strategies utilised by young people in the low formal employment context in Kenya.
 - While **Kenya's aspiring ICT-scene** could provide opportunities for educated and urban youth, and may, thus contribute to address the country's current 'youth employment challenge', the sector will not be able to provide the necessary employment chances to the vast majority of the Kenyan youth.
- **Looking to the future (2030):**
 - A systemic approach, with structural reforms, is crucial to promoting sustainable job creation; short-term employment schemes will not be sufficient.

B. Policy and research recommendations

The findings of the report – and the lack of evidence on certain topics – suggest the following specific areas for policy involvement and future, in depth research to support these. Both efforts can contribute strongly to the positive development of Kenya's socio-economic situation, and help it reap the potential benefits of its current 'demographic dividend', which is dependent on increased and well-paying employment opportunities for the country's youth. To mitigate or harness these challenges and opportunities, interventions from a wide range of stakeholders – governmental, civil society, international, private sector, research, and more – are necessary, and youth themselves

should play a pivotal role in conducting future research and in the design and implementation of any interventions targeted at them.

The literature review suggests the following as key research and policy priorities.

From a research perspective

- **Employment statistics.** No reliable, up-to-date information exists on youth unemployment and underemployment. Indeed, underemployment is not recognised in official statistics. While currently the next version of the KIHBS is in progress,¹⁵ reliable and progressively available youth (un)employment data on county and sectoral level would create the groundwork for any future evidence-based interventions and programming. Such surveys should also accommodate gender and rural/urban as key dimensions.
- **Labour market and skills assessments.** Existing labour market assessments are either out-of-date, or targeted to a specific sub-sector or region. A national labour market assessment, and skills inventory is needed to better understand the skills mismatch described by researchers and employers, to allow for the development of policies to address this. In this regard, the gap between aspirations and actual labour market opportunities deserves particular attention, to provide youth with programmes that cater to their interests to at least some extent.
- **Sectoral case studies and assessments.** The ICT sector has been flagged as a high potential sector, both in and of itself and as a potential multiplier for other sectors. Further research is required to measure the real impact ICT is having on young entrepreneurs, and how to increase this impact, particularly among marginalised communities such as poor rural youth. In this regard, also Kenya's uprising (non-tech) creative scene should receive further attention, as creative jobs, eg in advertisement and in the cultural sector, become more and more attractive and lucrative. Additional case studies into the current realities and future opportunities for youth employment within sectors such as agriculture, tourism, the transport industry and the services industry more broadly, which have been flagged in this report as of particular relevance to youth.
- **Gender-sensitive assessments.** The specific understanding of the vulnerabilities faced by young women in the employment market in Kenya is limited. Further research addressing vulnerabilities faced by young people should take into account the role of gender. In addition, the vulnerabilities of and challenges faced by male youth should be considered and further investigated as well, to allow for the design of gender-sensitive approaches.

¹⁵ According to official information from the KNBS the 2015/2016 KIHBS was supposed to finalise its fieldwork in August 2016 (KNBS 2015). Since then, no further announcements about the dissemination of the results has been published. In July 2017, highly informal reports on social media indicated that the survey results will come out "soon" (<https://twitter.com/Shiundu/status/880076665648332800>).

From a policy perspective

- **Education at the secondary, tertiary and technical level needs a curricular revision** to create a readily employable, skilled workforce. Such revisions must be on several fronts: 1/ to ensure that courses are up to date in terms of materials and techniques; 2/ to improve the quality of courses being offered; and 3/ to ensure that courses relevant to current and expected employment opportunities are being offered.
- To increase employer perception of young people's preparedness for the labour market, quality, **supervised internships and apprenticeships should be included across all curricula**. A British Council study (2016) shows that employers value experience as an invaluable aspect of university level education, with graduates with some experience such as voluntary work, deemed more employable (British Council 2016).
- Yet, the current state of formal and informal employment suggests that no significant growth of jobs within existing sectors will appear at this point in time without further investment. Thus, **supporting young people in creating their own (formal or informal) employment opportunities** is a necessary short-term (if not long-term) need. This has implications for education training curriculums, as entrepreneurial skills, values and personal attributes such as communication, finance, leadership, strategic thinking, navigating conflict, and the ability to recognise one's own potential and capacity, can all be taught and nurtured at this level (Nyerere 2009; AfDB 2015).
- The interconnected dual economy of Kenya means that activities targeted simply towards the formal or informal sectors may be not be fulfilling their potential: many formal sector activities will come with associated informal sector follow-ups and vice-versa. **Holistic programming for Kenya's 'youth employment challenge' require unbiased approaches** that support the creativity and resilience of existing sectors and individuals, rather than focusing on solely the formal or informal.

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Annex 1 - Detailed Methodology

Search locations

An initial literature search was conducted by reviewing key academic studies and reports by bilateral and multilateral organisations, focusing on those working on the area of youth employment in Kenya, including those recommended by the British Council such as:

- DFID East Africa Research Hub
- British Council Higher Education Graduate Employability research
- International Labour Organisation
- World Bank
- Aga Khan East Africa Institute
- Afrobarometer
- Global Competitiveness Report

Snowballing off the bibliographies of these key studies, using the search terms as an initial guide to relevance, further important studies were assessed, analysed, and synthesised into the review.

In order to ensure no key information has been missed, the search terms were then used to run a further literature sweep on search engines such as: Research Gate, Refseek, Microsoft Academic and Google Scholar as commonly identified sources of academic reports and documents. This search confirmed that key documents had already been identified, and ensured a review of documents that had not been published elsewhere.


Literature Review as an Iterative Process

To generate a comprehensive literature review on youth employment in Kenya that addresses the research questions, Samuel Hall utilised a systematic and iterative approach with three key steps. The Samuel Hall research team did:

1. **Review** existing literature and data, selecting appropriate ones to include in the results;
2. **Assess** the data presented and its relevance to research objectives; and finally
3. **Identify** knowledge gaps where additional research is required in the future.

The literature review drew on academic studies as well as reports by bilateral and multilateral institutions and other research organisations (including DFID's East Africa Research Hub, the British Council's Higher Education Graduate Employability research, ILO, World Bank, Aga Khan East Africa Institute, Afrobarometer, Global Competitiveness Report among others). In additions, successful case studies of efforts by other countries to promote young people's employment were included.

The figure below details the iterative process which was taken to conduct this literature review.



STEP 1: REVIEW

Identification of appropriate documentation for incorporation

High quality information on youth employment in Kenya is essential to produce recommendations for improved policies and to give a voice to young people. However, the data available is often disconnected from each other and does not necessarily meet the highest academic standards. In order to provide a systematic and critical review of the literature available, the research team first reviewed documents for potential incorporation. The research team conducted a thorough review of documents pertaining to policies, processes and documentation (including datasets) available for this literature review on youth employment in Kenya. This review followed a three-step screening process, namely:

1. **Identification** of potential documents to incorporation;
2. **Examination** of relevance and credibility of the documents; and
3. **Final selection** of documentation.

As suggested by the Overseas Development Institute’s guidance note, *How to do a rigorous, evidence-focused literature review in international development* (Hagen-Zanker and Mallett), literature retrieval was based on the agreed upon search strings and limits, and followed three tracks: (I) an academic literature search, (II) snowballing which examines the reference lists of relevant publications identified in the academic literature search, and (III) an additional grey literature capture to ensure that relevant documents were not overlooked during the initial search.

For step 2, the 7 criteria in Table A below was considered, and then the document was rated as noted in Table B.

Table A - Description of each scoring category

Principle of strength of evidence	Description of category
Conceptual framing	Does the study acknowledge existing research? Does the study construct a conceptual framework? Does the study pose a research question or outline a hypothesis?
Transparency	Does the study present or link to the raw data it analyses? What is the geography/context in which the study was conducted? Does the study declare sources of support/funding?
Appropriateness	Does the study identify a research design? Does the study identify a research method? Does the study demonstrate why the chosen design and method are
Cultural sensitivity	Does the study explicitly consider any context-specific cultural factors
Validity	To what extent does the study demonstrate measurement validity? To what extent is the study internally valid? To what extent is the study externally valid?
Reliability	To what extent are the measures used in the study stable? To what extent are the measures used in the study internally reliable? To what extent are the findings likely to be sensitive/changeable
Cogency	Does the author ‘signpost’ the reader throughout? To what extent does the author consider the study’s limitations and/or Are the conclusions clearly based on the study’s results?

Based on these criteria an overall strength of evidence score was provided from 1 to 5 where; 1-2 = low (**where only one or zero of the above qualities are met**), 3 = medium (**two to three of the qualities are met**) and 4-5 = high (**where four or more of the qualities are met**).]

Table B - Definition of study strength of evidence

Study strength of evidence	Abbreviation	Definition
High	↑	Comprehensively addresses multiple principles of strength of evidence
Medium	→	Some deficiencies in attention to principles of strength of evidence
Low	↓	Major deficiencies in attention to principles of strength of evidence.

Based on the analytical framework of ‘review, assess, identify’, the research questions (see below) were systematically addressed using an iterative approach that progressively refined the desk review to ensure all credible data sources had been investigated, and relevant portions incorporated. The next step was therefore as follows:

STEP 2: ASSESS

Inclusion of relevant data to answer research questions.

In order to focus the dataset search and literature review to address the research questions for each thematic objective, four analytical questions were used:

1. Are the datasets and literature relating to the thematic objectives the most current available?
2. In answering the research questions what gaps are there in the information?
3. What events have happened since the last data collection to suggest data may be different today?
4. Is more information likely to be found and if not can the question be more adequately addressed through future data collection?

A secondary literature review was conducted to confirm identified gaps in the literature.

STEP 3: IDENTIFY

Finalisation of review and remaining gaps in literature.

At this point remaining literature gaps and questions raised have been incorporated into the literature review document. These questions were used to refine the recommendations for future data collection, analysis and desk review in order to uncover the necessary information.

Research Questions

In order to establish a coherent and systematic flow to the literature review, the initial research questions (see initial ToR) were regrouped to demonstrate:

- a) The current data showing a numerical picture of youth employment in Kenya today,
- b) The current social factors influencing youth employment in Kenya, including drivers, opportunities and challenges, as well as indicators and trends demonstrating how the situation could progress in the future, and

- c) Recommendations and potential lessons learned from other regions, on how to positively influence the future of youth employment in Kenya.

Where appropriate, sub-questions were phrased with the intention of focusing the literature search and assessment, and ensuring that the review was formed in a logical and cohesive manner.

Current Data

- What is the share of young people (aged 15-24) in Kenya's current population structure, and how is that projected to evolve over time?
 - *How has the youth population (in relation to overall population and economic progress) developed since 2000?*
 - *What are the implications of this youthful population?*
- How have employment and unemployment rates among young people in Kenya (aged 15-24) evolved since 2000?
- How great a problem is under-employment, and how reliable are the data in this area?
 - *Linking with current data on unemployment amongst youth from previous question and moving on discussion on problem of under-employment and the implications thereof*
- How reliable are the data in these areas?

Current Social Situation

- How well equipped are young people for the demands of the labour market (including business perceptions of this)?
 - *What role does education and vocational training play in equipping young people?*
 - *How affordable and accessible are these programmes?*
 - *Do businesses place higher value on certain degrees, qualifications or modes of study?*
 - *What differences exist in how males and females are prepared for the labour market (including data on differing employment rates between the genders)*
- How ready is the labour market to integrate young people? What are the barriers to integration?
 - *How positive or negative are the underlying attitudes to integrating young people into the labour market? Are youth being welcomed and fairly remunerated or is there hesitation to "share" the market?*
 - *Is there a difference in the readiness of the labour market to integrate males and females?*
 - *What different barriers exist between teenagers and young adults within the youth population?*

- *What individual vulnerabilities (conflict, poverty, illness, disability etc) create barriers to integration?*
- Which sectors do young Kenyans work in (public vs private, agriculture vs industry vs services etc)?
 - *How do Kenya's regions and rural-urban differences affect youth employment?*
- What is the balance between formal and informal employment, and employed and self-employed employment?
- Which strategies do young people deploy to make ends meet in a context of low formal employment?
 - *What roles do the ICT sector and creative economy play for youth employment today and in the future?*
 - *What role is entrepreneurship playing in young people's economic strategies and is this affected by new technologies?*
- How are youth employment and unemployment rates projected to evolve between now and 2030?
 - *Are there trends (sectors, quality of employment) for the future to be identified?*
- How will the changing demographic structure affect the labour market? For example, how many jobs will Kenya need to create to accommodate its increasing numbers of young people?

Recommendations and Lessons Learned

- How can youth employment be increased in Kenya? Are there lessons from other countries on how to move from high to low youth un- and under-employment?

Annex 2 - Results of the Literature Search: Detailed Overview

Title	Author	Date	Type	Conceptual Framing Score	Transparency Score	Appropriateness Score	Cultural Sensitivity Score	Validity Score	Reliability Score	Cogency Score	DFID Strength of Evidence
Extent and Impact of Stigma and discrimination on women and children infected and affected by HIV and aids	ActionAid International Kenya	2009	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Kenya - ActionAid	ActionAid International Kenya	2017	Website								<i>added later for contextual information</i>
youth engagement in agriculture in Kenya: challenges and prospects	Afande, Maina, Maina	2015	Journal Article	5	5	5	3	5	5	4	high
growth, poverty, and inequality nexus: overcoming barriers to sustainable development; chaoter 5 africa;s youth in the labour market	African Development Bank	2015	Report	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Joblessness is an existential threat to Kenya's future	Aglionby	2017	Newspaper article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Milers required to sell maize flour Sh90 a packet in govt subsidy deak	Andae	2017	Newspaper article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
analysis of gender equality in youth employment in Africa	Anyanwu	2016	Chapter	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	high
AU Roadmap on harnessing the demographic dividend through investments in youth	AU	n.d	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
the kenya youth survey report	Awiti, Scott	2016	Report	2	3	3	4	n/a	n/a	4	medium
The complete anatomy of the French employment agency	Bahati	2016	Blog entry	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
youth skills development, informal employment, and the enabling environment in Kenya: trends and tensions	Balwanz	2012	Journal Article	5	4	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	4	high
Chuma: Africa needs value addition, new jobs skill sets and infrastructure	Banzi	2017	Newspaper article								<i>added later for contextual information</i>

informal sector vs informal contract in Nairobi, Kenya	Bocquier	2005	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
radicalisation in Kenya: recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council	Botha	2014	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
urban development in Kenya: towards inclusive cities	Bousquet	2008	Journal Article									<i>added later for contextual information</i>
universities, employability and inclusive development: repositioning higher education in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa; Chapter 3 - Divergent narratives on graduate employability in Kenya: dysfunctional institutions or dysfunctional labour markets?	British Council	2016	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	4	high	
Factors influencing farm crime in Kenya: opinions and experiences of farmers	Bunei, Rono, Chessa	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high	
Africa's demographic transition: dividend or disaster?	Canning, Raja, Yzabeck	2015	Book	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	4	high	
Kenya must create a million new jobs annually	Chatterjee, Ronneberg	2017	Newspaper article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
How jobcentre plus can help your career	Cheary	n.d	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Extending the scope of application of labour laws to the informal economy	Doumbia-Henry	2010	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Africa Rising: Harnessing the Demographic Dividend	Drummond, Thakoor, Yu	2014	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high	
Dutch Disease: Wealth Managed Unwisely	Ebrahimzadeh	2017	Newspaper article									<i>added later for contextual information</i>
Pastoralism in the time of oil: youth perspectives on the oil industry and the future of pastoralism in Turkana, Kenya: the extractive industries and society	Enns, Bersaglio	2016	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Understanding the drivers of the youth labour market in Kenya	Escudero, Mourelo	2013	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Samsung and the South Korean Success Story	Estrin	2015	Blog entry	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Mkulima Young	Facebook	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Thematic Agriculture Aggregation for Kenya – AFRICOVER.	FAO	2003	Data									<i>added later for contextual information</i>

Kenya Out of School Children Profile	fhi 360	n.d.	Report (summary)	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Scoping the creative economy in East Africa	Fleming	2013	Report	3	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Kenya - Mobile network coverage	FSP Maps	2016	Map	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Thai youth seek a fortune away from the farm	Fuller	2012	Newspaper Article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Draft report on comparative study on innovation hubs across Africa	Gathege, Moraa	2013	Report	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	high
Educated but Unemployed: The Challenge Facing Egypt's Youth	Ghafar	2016	Policy Briefing	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Navigating the transition from college to work: a study of baccalaureate graduates of a private university in Kenya	Gitonga	2014	Dissertation	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Pole emploi	Gov of France	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Situation of wage employment of people with disabilities - ten developing countries in focus	Handicap International	2016	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Kenya	Handicap International	2017	Website								<i>added later for contextual information</i>
Cost of Kenyan university education 'turns millions into paupers'	Havergal	2015	Blog entry	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Highlights from the creative finance symposium	HEVA	2017	Press release	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
The status of the creative economy in East Africa	Hivos	2016	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Engaging the youth in Kenya: empowerment, education, and employment	Hope	2012	Journal Article	4	4	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Digital literacy programme progress	ICT Authority	2016	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Domestic work in Kenya: a summary report of a baseline survey of domestic work in 15 counties	IDAY	2015	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Realising a new era of social justice through decent work: success stories from Africa	ILO	2011	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Employment to population ratio	ILO	2016	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Unemployment rate ILO modelled estimates	ILO	2016	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Youth Employment	ILO	n.d.	Report	3	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium

for Sustainable Development (YESD) success stories from garissa county												
Kenya - making quality employment the driver of development; studies on growth and equity	ILO ad IILS	2013	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Analysis of ICT-enabled youth employment on Ghana, Kenya and South Africa	International Youth Foundation	2013	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high	
Africa internet users, population and facebook statistics	Internet world stats	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Information and communication technologies attract youth into profitable agriculture in Kenya	Irungu, Mbugua and Muia	2015	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Individuals using the internet 2000 - 2016	ITU	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
What is JobCentre Plus?	Job Centre Guide	n.d	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
The cultural and creative economy in Africa: challenges and innovations	Joffe	2013	Report								<i>added later for contextual information</i>	
Regional integration policies to support job creation for Africa's burgeoning youth population	Kararach, Hanson, Leautier	2011	Journal Article	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	4	high	
National Employment Authority	Kenya Department of Labour	2016	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Kenya youth empowerment project impact evaluation survey	KEPSA	n.d	Survey	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Youth employment - the plight of female youths	Keya, Lubanga	2016	Chapter	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium	
The role of services in economic transformation - with an application to Kenya	Khanna, Papadavid, Tyson, te Velde	2016	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high	
Tourism and the Sex Trade: Roles male Sex Workers play in Malindi, Kenya	Kibicho	2004	Journal Article								<i>added later for contextual information</i>	
Do entrepreneurial skills acquired from technical subjects help secondary school graduates in self-employment in Kenya	Kikechi, Owano, Ayodo, Ejakait	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high	
Kenya Population and Housing Census 2009 - Single and Grouped Ages in Years by County and District	KNBS	2009	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	
Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey	KNBS	2012	Survey								<i>added later for contextual information</i>	

Economic Survey	KNBS	2017	Survey	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Creative economy and overtly eradication in Africa: principles and realities	Kovaks	2008	Chapter	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Kenya women microfinance bank - tujijunge Chama account	KWFT Bank	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Q&A UNFPA chief on why it pays to have healthy youth	Lieberman	2017	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Africa agriculture status report	Lohento, Ajilore	2015	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
A critical survey on enrollment in youth polytechnics in Kisii Central District, Kenya	Maronga, Maroria, Nyikal	2015	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Coping with Food Insecurity in Mathare Valley Slum in Nairobi, Kenya	Masese, Muia	2016	Journal Article								<i>added later for contextual information</i>
Skills at scale: transferrable skills in secondary and vocational education in Africa	MasterCard Foundation	2017	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Youth and consequences: unemployment, injustice and violence	MercyCorps	n.d	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Information and communication technologies and job creation in Kenya	Miroro	2016	One-pager	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kenya	MSF	2017	Website								<i>added later for contextual information</i>
The nature, challenges and consequences of urban youth unemployment: a case of Nairobi City, Kenya	Muiya	2014	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
A comparison of technical and vocational acquired skills differences based on gender in TVET institutions	Murgor	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Opportunities and challenges for the youth in the jua kali sector	Muteti	2016	Chapter	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Inclusion of persons with disabilities in employment	Mwaura	2016	Chapter	5	4	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Ethnic and diversity audit of the county public service	National Cohesion and Integration Committee	2016	Audit	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
National youth council act	National council for law reporting	2009	Government publication	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
The constitution of Kenya	National council for law reporting	2010	Government publication	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Usefulness of problem tree, objective tree, and logical framework matrix to fix challenges of unemployment and underemployment of higher education graduates in Rwanda, Kenya, and Ghana	Ndayambaje, Ntawiha, Ngigi, Ampofo	2016	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
The youth question - creativity as a driving force for development	Nebe, Mangeni	2016	Chapter	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
An empirical evaluation of technical, vocational, education and training processes in Kenya	Ngure	2015	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
State creates job agency	Nhlabathi, Stone	2015	Newspaper Article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cross-border conflict and gendered implications for local communities: the case of the Kenya-Ethiopia border	Njambi, Misiani	2016	Report	5	5	3	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Youth and women empowerment through agriculture in Kenya	Njenga, Mugo, Opiyo	n.d	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Creative economy	Njogu, Ndi, Mbogo, Hirst, Owuor	2015	Journal Article	3	3	n/a	3	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Trapped in the informal economy - is there any hope for the youth?	Njoroge	2016	Chapter	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Country brief: Kenya - boosting Kenya's demographic dividend.	NTA	2013	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Stakeholders' involvement in strategic planning: a survey of public TVET institutions in Kisii County, Kenya	Nyareki, Mobegi, Ondiba, Kelly, and Monari	2016	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
TVET Sector Mapping in Kenya	Nyerere	2009	Report	5	5	3	4	n/a	n/a	3	high
Socio-economic empowerment of communities by grassroots organisations: the case of the Harambee self help groups in Kenya	Ochanda	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
African Economic Outlook	Odero, Reeves, Chokerah	2017	Briefing note	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Impact of conflict on pastoral communities' resilience in the Horn of Africa	Odhiambo	2012	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	n/a
breaking in and staying in: Kenya's creative industry	Okumu	2016	Magazine article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Youth employment in Kenya: analysis of labour market and policy interventions	Omolo	2012	Journal Article	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
When the global crisis and youth bulge collide - double the trouble for youth	Oritz, Cummins	2012	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
The coping strategies adapted by urban poor to food insecurity in Ekdoret Municipality	Owino, Cheserek, Saina, Murgor	2013	Journal Article	5	5	3	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Social barriers to female youth employment in the private sector in Kenya	Owino, Owino and Odundo	2016	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	high
Educating out of poverty? A synthesis report on Ghana, India, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and South Africa	Palmer, Wedgwood, Hayman, King and Thin	2007	Report	5	5	3	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Small-scale farming and youth in an era of rapid rural change	Proctor, Lucchesi	2012	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
"We will not farm like our parents": rural-urban linkages, livelihoods, and food security in Kenya	Ramisch	2015	Unpublished report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Revitalising youth entrepreneurship in Kenya: a deliberate training curriculum	Rori, Bunei, Mwenzwa	2011	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Youth initiatives in response to the unemployment in Nairobi slums	Sana	2016	Chapter	5	3	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	3	medium
Raiding pastoral livelihoods: motives and effects of violent conflict in north-western Kenya	Schilling, Opiyo, Scheffran	2012	Report	5	5	4	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Informal employment among youth: evidence from 20 school-to-work transition surveys	Shehu, Nilsson	2014	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Does Kenya's youth enterprise development fund serve young people?	Sikenyi	2017	Journal Article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Revitalising a technical training institute in Kenya	Simiyu	2009	Report								<i>added later for contextual information</i>
East Africa to tackle high rates of child prostitution	Siringi	2002	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Kenya's looming youth bulge: infinite possibility or definite disaster?	Sivi Njonjo	2011	Research Paper	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Sex workers in Nairobi, between secrecy and stigma	Soles	2016	Blog entry	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Employment Services of South Africa	South African Department of Labour	2014	Website	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Vocational education: why the Finns do it best	Subrahmanyam	2014	Newspaper Article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Community-based rehabilitation supports for social inclusion and work participation of young adults with visual impairment in Kenya	Tanui	2015	Dissertation	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
State of education in Africa Report	The Africa-America institute	2015	Report	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
What Dutch disease is, and why it's bad	The Economist	2014	Newspaper Article									<i>added later for contextual information</i>
Technology Entrepreneurship in Indonesia and Kenya	The LBJ School of Public Affairs	2015	Report									<i>added later for contextual information</i>
The impact of population change on economic growth	Thuku, Paul, Almadi	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Kenya: Education and Literacy	UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics)	n.d.	Data									<i>added later for contextual information</i>
Youth population trends and sustainable development	UN	2015	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
World population prospects	UN	2017	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kenya national human development report	UNDP	2010	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	5	high
Kenya's youth employment challenge	UNDP	2013	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	5	high
economic report on Africa	UNECA	2017	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	5	high
Education for all global monitoring report: education in Kenya	UNESCO	2012	Factsheet	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Evaluation of UNFPA support to population and housing census data to inform decision-making and policy formulation	UNFPA	2015	Report	5	5	5	5	n/a	n/a	5	5	high
Synthesis report on the demographic dividend in Africa	UNFPA and AFIDEP	2015	Report	5	5	n/a	5	n/a	n/a	5	5	high
Global initiative on out-of-school children: ESAR regional report	UNICEF	2015	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
SKILLS MISMATCH AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT HOW TO BOOST EMPLOYABILITY OF YOUNG WOMEN AND MEN IN EGYPT	van Rooij and Agune	2015	Report	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Unemployment and underemployment in Kenya: a gender gap analysis	Vuluku, Wambugu, Moyi	2013	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high

Determinants of employment in the formal and informal sectors of the urban areas of Kenya	Wamuthenya	2010	Research Paper	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	high
Garissa, Mandera, Nairobi with most children out of school: report	Wanzala	2016	Newspaper Article	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Effect of social economic development on youth employment in the informal and formal sectors in Nairobi	Were	2017	Journal Article	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	high
Statement from the World Bank on Kenya Youth Empowerment Project	World Bank	2011	Press release	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Kenya - country economic memorandum	World Bank	2016	Report	5	4	2	5	n/a	n/a	5	high
Kenya - jobs for youth	World Bank	2016	Report	4	4	5	5	3	3	2	medium
Egyptian Youth Speak their Minds in Essays: We Need Better Skills for More Jobs	World Bank	2017	Blog entry	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Net enrolment rate, secondary, both sexes	World Bank	2017	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Population, total	World Bank	2017	Data	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
GDP (current US\$)	World Bank	2017	Data								<i>added later for contextual information</i>

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