

GISSE

$$Y_{ITR} = \sum_{\text{Survey}}^{\text{Sondage}} \pi_i^{-1} y_i$$

Final Evaluation of the Mali Peacebuilding, Stabilization and Reconciliation Program

Study Report



APPROVED

July 2023

1. INTRODUCTION	12
1.1. Background and Rationale.....	12
1.2 Objectives of the Study.....	13
2. METHODOLOGY	14
2.1 Survey Targets	14
2.2 Sample Size.....	14
2.3 Adjustment Coefficients	15
2.4 Challenges in the Field	16
2.5 Survey Area	17
3. FINDINGS I: RAISING AWARENESS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE CURRENT TRANSITION	18
3.1 Opinion on the Importance of Respecting the Transition Timetable.....	18
3.2 Confidence that the transition will lead to a democratic system of good governance.....	19
3.3 Voting intentions for general elections	19
4. FINDINGS II: OPINIONS AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AND CIVIC ACTIONS	20
4.1 Opinions on the fairness of public services between ethnic groups.....	20
4.2 Opinions on the quality-of-service provision in terms of efficiency and regularity in your commune.....	21
4.3 Level of participation in community activities	21
4.4 Opinions on the ability to influence decisions.....	24
4.5 Opinions on the ability to present ideas and express opinions to community leaders	24
4.6 Equal opportunity to participate in the political life of the commune.....	25
5. FINDINGS III: CONFLICT RESOLUTION	25
5.1 Effectiveness of conflict management efforts.....	25
5.2 Participation in conflict management activities.....	26
5.3 Opinions on the importance of conflict management mechanisms taught by Mali PSR in reducing violence.....	27
5.4 Actors chosen for conflict resolution	28
6. FINDINGS IV: KNOWLEDGE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT	28
6.1 Raising awareness of the Algiers Agreement.....	28
6.2 Opinion on the implementation of the Algiers agreement	28
6.3 Level of knowledge of the Algiers Agreement.....	29
6.4 Opinion on the rereading of the Algiers Agreement	29
7. FINDINGS V: ACCEPTANCE OF REINTEGRATION	30
7.1 Opinion on the reintegration of displaced persons into the community	30
7.2 Opinion on the reintegration of veterans	31
7.3 Level of fear that ex-combatants will create violence in communities	31
7.4 Assessment of community efforts to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants and the integration of displaced persons.....	31

8. FINDINGS VI: TOLERANCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES.....	32
8.1 Opinion on the use of violence against the government.....	32
8.2 Opinion on participation in civil disobedience actions.....	32
8.3 Opinion on the justification of violence for reasons of revenge.....	32
8.4 Justification for joining a radical group in order to earn an income	32
8.5 Opinion on the justification for using violence to take justice into one's own hands	33
8.6 Opinion on the justification for joining a radical group in order to gain the respect of the community	33
8.7 Opinion on the justification for joining a radical group to defend one's religion	33
9. FINDINGS VII: COMMUNITY COHESION.....	33
9.1 Appreciation of understanding between different ethnic groups in the community	33
9.2 Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors.....	34
9.3 Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together	34
9.4 Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups.....	35
9.5 Acceptance of sharing income-generating activities with different ethnic groups.....	35
9.6 Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups	35
9.7 Opinion on the unification of communities by local elected representatives	36
9.8 Opinion on the involvement of local elected representatives in the needs and perspectives of citizens and civil society.....	36
9.9 Level of trust in local elected officials to keep society's interests at heart.....	37
10. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT	38
10.1 Scope of program activities	38
10.2 Impacts on Beneficiaries	40
11. CONCLUSION	41
12. APPENDICES	44

TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS

GRAPHS

Figure 1: Opinion on the importance of respecting the transition timetable..... 18
 Figure 2: Factors blocking intention to vote in the next general election. 20
 Figure 3: Appreciation of the fairness of public services between ethnic groups 21
 Figure 4: Participation in community activities between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries 23
 Figure 5: Assessment of the effectiveness of conflict management efforts 26
 Figure 6: Level of awareness of the Algiers Agreement..... 28
 Figure 7: Opinions on the review and revision of the Algiers Accord..... 30
 Figure 8: Reasons for rejecting the reintegration of displaced persons into the community 30
 Figure 9: Opinion on the integration of veterans into the community 31
 Figure 10: Opinion on community unification by local elected officials..... 36
 Figure 11: Awareness of Mali PSR program by region 38
 Figure 12: Acceptance of COVID-19 vaccine by region..... 39
 Figure 13: Reasons for non-acceptance of COVID-19 vaccine by region..... 40

TABLES

Table 1: Number of people planned and surveyed by region 14
 Table 2: Age distribution of the population in Mali and according to the survey 16
 Table 3: Confidence that the transition will lead to a democratic system of good governance..... 19
 Table 4: Voting intentions for general elections 19
 Table 5: Participation in community activities..... 22
 Table 6: Opinion on ability to influence decisions at local level 24
 Table 7: Opinions on the ability to present ideas and express opinions to community leaders 25
 Table 8: Participation in conflict management activities 26
 Table 9: Importance of conflict management mechanisms taught by Mali PSR in reducing violence.... 27
 Table 10: Level of knowledge of the peace and reconciliation agreement 29
 Table 11: Assessment of community efforts to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants 32
 Table 12: Opinion on understanding between ethnic groups 34
 Table 13: Having different ethnic groups as neighbors 34
 Table 14: Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together..... 35
 Table 15: Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups 35
 Table 16: Opinion on the involvement of citizens and civil society needs and perspectives by local elected officials..... 37
 Table 17: Trust in local elected officials to keep society's interests at heart 37
 Table 18: Beneficiaries' assessment of the match between Mali PSR activities and safety needs 40
 Table 19: Assessment of the quality of Mali PSR activities..... 41

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: % COVID-19 vaccination by level of education (%)..... 44
 Appendix 2: Reasons for non-vaccination against COVID-19 by region (%)..... 44
 Appendix 3: Participation in Mali PSR program activities..... 44
 Appendix 4: Type of Mali PSR activity..... 44
 Appendix 5: Themes addressed in program activities..... 45
 Appendix 6: Lessons learned from participation in Mali PSR activities..... 45
 Appendix 7: Effectiveness of conflict management efforts by region 45
 Appendix 8: Effectiveness of conflict management efforts by beneficiary and non-beneficiary status.. 45
 Appendix 9: Participation in conflict management activities..... 46
 Appendix 10: Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors, by level of education 46

Appendix 11: Acceptance of sharing income-generating activities with different ethnic groups.....	46
Appendix 12: Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups	46
Appendix 13: Confidence in local elected officials in your commune to keep the company's interests at heart	46
Appendix 14: Opinions on integrating veterans into the community	47
Appendix 15: Level of fear that veterans will create violence by returning to communities	47
Appendix 16: Preferred actors for conflict resolution.....	47
Appendix 17: Opinion on the implementation of the Algiers Agreement.....	47
Appendix 18: Reasons for rejecting the peace and reconciliation agreement	48
Appendix 19: Level of knowledge of the content of the Algiers Agreement.....	48
Appendix 20: Agreement points known to the public.....	48
Appendix 21: Opinions on the quality of service provision in terms of efficiency and regularity in your commune.....	49
Appendix 22: Level of participation in community activities by non-beneficiaries	49
Appendix 23: Level of beneficiary participation in community activities	49
Appendix 24: Level of beneficiary participation in community activities (Total).....	49
Appendix 25: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about the Importance of Respecting the Transition Timetable	50
Appendix 26: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Voting intentions for general elections	50
Appendix 27: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about ability to influence decisions at local level	50
Appendix 28: <i>Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about reintegration of displaced persons into the community</i>	51
Appendix 29: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about reintegrating ex-combatants.....	51
Appendix 30: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Using violence against the government	51
Appendix 31: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Joining actions of civil disobedience.....	51
Appendix 32: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To get revenge on others who have committed a crime against them	52
Appendix 33: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group to ensure a secure income for their household in case they don't have work	52
Appendix 34: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To get justice when the government is weak or absent.....	52
Appendix 35: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To gain respect in their community.....	52
Appendix 36: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To defend their religion against enemies.....	53
Appendix 37: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about understanding between ethnic groups.....	53
Appendix 38: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors	53
Appendix 39: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together.....	53
Appendix 40: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups	54
Appendix 41: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups	54

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Mali PSR program is a peacebuilding, stabilization and reconciliation program implemented since 2018 by Creative Associates International with local partners Association Malien pour la Survie au Sahel and Think Peace. This research aims to assess the impact of activities on beneficiaries as well as the achievement of the program's objectives.

The study comprised a survey of a sample of 2,433 people representative of the intervention area (quantitative data collection) and 48 Focus Group Discussions/KIIs (qualitative data collection). The sample was drawn from the 43 communes in which Mali PSR operates.

The data show positive trends in people's behavior and attitudes in the program's areas of intervention. Key findings include the following:

About support for the transition, the study shows that over three quarters (77.4%) of the population is optimistic that the transition in Mali will lead to a democratic system and good governance. However, this opinion is less popular in the Kidal (6%) and Taoudéni (18%) regions. The majority (88.6%) of the population interviewed say they will vote in the next elections. This decision is less widespread in Kidal (0.3%) than in the other regions.

In terms of community involvement, more than half the population (55%) agree that their opinion can influence local government decision-making. This indicator is relatively lower in Taoudéni (16%), Kidal (24.3%) and Ménaka (23.4%). Similarly, the majority of the population (78.4%) believe they have the ability to present their ideas and express their opinions to leaders.

On the subject of peacebuilding, slightly more than three out of five people (61.4%) recognize the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms put in place by communities, and 17.8% say they have already taken part in conflict management activities. Almost all (97.3%) of the population are in favor of integrating displaced people into their communities, and (68.1%) accept the integration of ex-combatants.

On the question of the use of violence, the majority of the population sees no justification for violence against the government (90.1%), nor for participation in civil disobedience (78.9%), nor for revenge (85%).

The majority agree that one should never join a radical group (86%) even to seek income, nor to seek justice (85%), nor even to defend one's religion (78.6%).

When it comes to the understanding between the different ethnic groups in the community, the majority of the population (85.5%) affirm that there is understanding between the different ethnic groups. Similarly, the majority of the population say they accept different ethnic groups as neighbors (84.2%), guests (87%) and as a spouse (76%).

While the attribution of impact to the program's activities is still unclear for many variables, and mixed for others, a comparison of indicator values between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries shows that the program has had a positive impact.

In terms of Objective 1 (Strengthening community resilience to violence and conflict), program beneficiaries were more likely than non-beneficiaries to note the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms (71.8% vs. 58%). By far more beneficiaries (72%) were involved in conflict management than non-beneficiaries (5%).

As for questions on the second Objective (Strengthen inclusive governance and civic engagement in conflict-affected communities), program beneficiaries were more likely to perceive equity in public service delivery between ethnic groups (67%) than non-beneficiaries (59%). However, beneficiaries (73.9%) perceived the quality of public services in almost the same proportions as non-beneficiaries (69.8%).

With regard to community mobilization and civic engagement, positive differences appear in the attitudes of beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries. Indeed, 80% of beneficiaries claim to have taken part in public meetings, compared with 52% of non-beneficiaries. We also note that 82% of beneficiaries believe they have the ability to present and express their ideas to leaders, compared with 78% of non-beneficiaries.

With regard to Objective 3 (Empowering young people and strengthening their resilience to violent extremism), the study did not allow us to draw conclusions about significant differences related to impact between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Indeed, there are limited differences related to opinions on the use of violence against the government, on participation in civil disobedience actions, and on the justification of violence for reasons of revenge.

With regard to Objective 4 (Support for democratic transition, mitigating the impact of COVID-19), there was a notable difference in behavior and attitudes around COVID-19 between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, with regard to support for the transition and mobilization for the forthcoming elections, the results remain broadly the same between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

BASELINE & ENDLINE COMPARISON

The comparison between baseline and endline shows a significant increase in almost all project indicators.

- ✓ **% of citizens in target communities expressing favorable opinions of other identity groups:** 89.90% (Baseline) vs. 96.70% (Endline), an increase of over 6 points. The difference is more pronounced for women than for men (10 points difference for women and 3 points for men).
- ✓ **% of citizens in target communes expressing opinions favorable to the reintegration of displaced people into society:** 89.20% (Baseline) vs. 97.30% (Endline), an increase of more than 8 points. For this indicator, the difference is more pronounced for men than for women (9 points difference for men and 6.8 points for women).
- ✓ **% of citizens exposed to civic education messages who say they participate in civic activities:** 57.70% (Baseline) vs. 70.40% (Endline), an increase of more than 12 points. The gap is 10 points for men and 16 points for women.
- ✓ **% of citizens expressing greater confidence in local or regional authorities or institutions:** 45.10% (Baseline) vs. 58.40% (Endline), an increase of over 13 points. For both men and women, the difference is over 12 points (12.2 points for men and 14.7 points for women).
- ✓ **% of targeted youth who reject violent extremist rhetoric and activities:** 80.10% (Baseline) vs. 92.10% (Endline), an increase of more than 12 points. For this indicator, the difference is more pronounced for women than for men (14.5 points difference for women and 8.8 points for men).

SUMMARY OF INDICATORS

Indicator Name	Baseline value	Midline value	Endline value	TARGET
3. % of citizens in target communes who express favorable views towards other identity groups following CMM strengthening (Impact, Custom)	89,90%	95,70%	96,70%	98%
DISAGGREGATE				
Region				
SEGOU	97,50%	97,80%	99,40%	
MOPTI	86,90%	92,90%	93,40%	
TOMBOUCTOU	92,10%	95,80%	99,20%	
GAO	85,30%	97,20%	97,50%	
KIDAL	94,20%	93,10%	87,60%	
MENAKA	100,00%	94,80%	94,90%	
TAOUDENI	100,00%	100,00%	97,90%	
Gender				
Male	93,80%	96,30%	96,90%	
Female	86,00%	95,20%	96,40%	
15. % of citizens in target communes who express favourable views towards reintegration of displaced persons in society (Outcome, Custom)	89,20%	94,00%	97,30%	98%
DISAGGREGATE				
Region				
SEGOU	83,90%	95,10%	98,40%	
MOPTI	84,90%	89,10%	95,50%	
TOMBOUCTOU	96,20%	97,70%	97,80%	
GAO	96,40%	95,70%	97,80%	
KIDAL	96,40%	98,70%	96,40%	
MENAKA	96,80%	98,50%	100,00%	
TAOUDENI	100,00%	98,80%	90,70%	
Gender				
Male	88,40%	94,80%	97,50%	
Female	90,20%	93,10%	97,00%	
16. % of citizens exposed to civic education messages who report participating in civic activities (Impact, Custom)	57,70%	62,00%	70,40%	75%
DISAGGREGATE				
Region				

	SEGOU	88,30%	67,50%	73,80%	
	MOPTI	40,10%	64,90%	78,70%	
	TOMBOUCTOU	48,40%	72,10%	83,40%	
	GAO	39,70%	49,70%	53,70%	
	KIDAL	7,10%	62,00%	39,20%	
	MENAKA	100%	23,50%	46,90%	
	TAOUDENI	65%	34,00%	34,20%	
Gender					
	Male	63,10%	67,80%	73,30%	
	Female	51,30%	56,10%	67,60%	
21. % of citizens who express increased confidence in local or regional authorities or institutions (Outcome, Custom)		45,10%	51,40%	58,40%	65%
DISAGGREGATE					
Region					
	SEGOU	49,60%	59,50%	63,70%	
	MOPTI	43,50%	52,60%	60,20%	
	TOMBOUCTOU	16,40%	35,50%	50,10%	
	GAO	63,10%	44,50%	56,00%	
	KIDAL	3,60%	56,00%	36,20%	
	MENAKA	52,40%	59,80%	52,30%	
	TAOUDENI	27,50%	71,30%	84,20%	
Gender					
	Male	46,00%	49,50%	58,20%	
	Female	44,00%	53,40%	58,70%	
32. % of targeted youth who reject violent extremism rhetoric and activities (Impact, Custom)		80,10%	94,50%	92,10%	98%
DISAGGREGATE					
Region					
	SEGOU	52,30%	98,90%	99,30%	
	MOPTI	92,50%	94,20%	92,20%	
	TOMBOUCTOU	100%	99,50%	100,00%	
	GAO	79,10%	92,50%	83,00%	
	KIDAL	100%	78,20%	88,10%	
	MENAKA	75%	65,30%	96,20%	
	TAOUDENI	100%	81,40%	81,00%	
Gender					
	Male	83,70%	93,60%	92,50%	

Female	77,40%	95,40%	91,90%
22. % of citizens in target communes who are aware of government stabilization and development plans	49,90%	83,60%	77,60%
DISAGGREGATE			
Region			
SEGOU	52%	76,0%	81,3%
MOPTI	30%	87,4%	78,0%
TOMBOUCTOU	62%	96,5%	55,3%
GAO	66%	78,1%	78,1%
KIDAL	11%	100,0%	99,9%
MENAKA	83%	92,1%	100,0%
TAOUDENI	88%	100,0%	86,7%
Gender			
Male	54%	90,6%	82,2%
Female	46%	76,5%	73,0%

I. INTRODUCTION

I.1. Background and Rationale

The Mali Peacebuilding, Stabilization and Reconciliation (Mali PSR) program is a five-year (April 2018-July 2023) USAID contract in the amount of \$19.9 million, with a crisis modifier of \$4.9 million. The crisis modifier was activated on June 2, 2020 to address the global COVID-19 pandemic and its first- and second-order impacts in Mali, and then to support the political transition following a coup d'état in August 2020. The program is being implemented by Creative Associates International with local partners Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (AMSS), which is facilitating implementation in northern Mali, and Think Peace, which is facilitating implementation in central Mali.

The aim of the program is to improve the prospects for long-term peace, security and reconciliation by building trust between conflict-affected communities and their governments; strengthening the capacity of communities to mitigate and manage conflict, and to prioritize and implement community actions around their most pressing development needs; training and empowering marginalized youth as agents of change; addressing the immediate and secondary impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic; and supporting political transition.

Mali PSR works in 43 conflict-affected communes in central and northern Mali, covering seven regions: Ségou, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, Ménaka and Taoudéni, with grants to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic in Sikasso, Kayes, Koulikoro and the district of Bamako.

The aim of Mali PSR is to contribute to measurable improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness and capacity of local communities to be more resilient to conflict and violent extremism, and to cope with the immediate and long-term effects of COVID-19 and political transition. Promoting stability in the targeted regions is not just an end in itself, but a necessary precondition for the full implementation of the Peace Agreement resulting from the Algiers process and the Malian government's regional development plans, which in turn will create the conditions for a more lasting peace. Mali PSR's activities are integrated into the following four objectives that support this broader program goal:

- **Objective 1:** Strengthen community resilience to violence and conflict.
- **Objective 2:** Strengthen inclusive governance and civic engagement in conflict-affected communities.
- **Objective 3:** Empower young people and strengthen their resilience to violent extremism.
- **Objective 4:** Support democratic transition, mitigate the impact of COVID-19 and other crises on Malian communities.

1.2 Objectives of the Study

This final evaluation of the Mali PSR program aimed to assess program progress (and challenges) at the outcome level, measuring achievements and show to what extent outputs have influenced outcomes .

It consisted of a literature review, a qualitative study and a quantitative survey.

The quantitative survey covered the population aged 16 and over in the 43 communes, while the qualitative interviews involved key stakeholders and a sample of beneficiaries.

The evaluation made it possible to assess progress towards the targets of the various indicators, which include:

- Percentage of citizens in target communes expressing favorable opinions towards other identity groups following the CMM reinforcement.
- Percentage of citizens in target communes expressing a favorable opinion of the reintegration of displaced people into society.
- Percentage of citizens exposed to civic education messages who report taking part in civic activities.
- Percentage of citizens expressing increased confidence in local or regional authorities or institutions
- Percentage of citizens in target communes who are aware of government stabilization and development plans.
- Percentage of targeted youth who reject the rhetoric and activities of violent extremism.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Survey Targets

This survey concerns the 43 communes of the program and targets the entire population aged 16 and over. Four of the 43 communes were totally inaccessible at the time of the survey (Alata, Tessit, Anderamboukane, Tarkint) due to conflict. The sample from these communes was divided between the other communes, while maintaining representativeness.

The sample size was set at 2,200 individuals in the terms of reference for this study. These 2,200 were distributed among the communes concerned, with a minimum of 40 respondents for communes with small populations. The table below shows the number of people surveyed by region.

Table 1: Number of people planned and surveyed by region

Region	Expected number	Number done in the field	Men done in the field	Women done in the field	Beneficiary	Non Beneficiary
Mopti	590	654	322	332	86	507
Ségou	560	593	301	292	179	475
Gao	420	455	231	224	104	184
Tombouctou	280	288	148	140	46	409
Kidal	160	163	82	81	2	161
Ménaka	120	159	82	77	90	69
Taoudéni	120	121	60	61	44	77
TOTAL	2250	2433	1226	1207	551**	1882

** Some 22.6% of respondents are direct beneficiaries of the project. A comparison can therefore be made between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, this comparison is not feasible at regional level due to the low number of beneficiaries in certain regions.

2.2 Sample Size

According to the terms of reference, the sample size was set at 2,200 individuals. A total of 2,433 people were surveyed. In each commune, villages/neighborhoods were selected in proportion to their size. It was decided to select 10 individuals in each village/quartier.


Household Selection

Households were selected using the starting point, day code method.

- ✓ When arriving in the village/neighborhood, the interviewer should aim for a certain geographical representativeness of the village. The 10 households surveyed should not be concentrated in the same area of the village. To achieve this, the village is divided into two zones. In each zone, five households will be surveyed.

- ✓ Two terms are used to select the first household: the starting point and the day code. The starting point is a point known to almost everyone: the village school, the market, the health center, the mosque, the big tree, the soccer field, etc. The code is obtained by summing the numbers that make up the day's date. For example, if today is the 24th day of the month, the day code is $2+4=6$; if the date is the 13th, the day code is $1+3=4$.
- ✓ For a given area, the interviewer chooses a starting point, then walks in any direction, skipping a number of households equal to the day code before entering the first household. This is the choice of the first household. For example, if we're on day 13 then the day code is four and the interviewer skips four households, entering the fifth household. Once the first household has been chosen, there are four households left out of the five. To choose these four households, we apply fixed-step skips. A two-step skip is applied in rural areas (in the case of small villages) and a four-step skip in urban areas.

Explanatory diagram :



Survey Respondent Selection

In each village/neighborhood, five men and five women should be interviewed. The interviewer should alternate between male and female interviewers.

Once in the household, the interviewer will draw up a list of eligible persons (surname and first name of those aged 16 or over; male or female). One person will be randomly selected from this list. As the survey was carried out on a tablet, we set up a computer program to do this drawing.

During the fieldwork phase, some selected households may be empty, or the person selected for the household may be absent. The interviewer should make at least two returns before replacing a person who is not at home or a household that is empty. This information has been programmed into the tablet.

2.3 Adjustment Coefficients

In order to take into account the small sample size in small communes, we over-sampled these communes, giving them a sample size of 40 individuals surveyed. Adjustment is therefore necessary to give each zone its true weight.

Formula for calculating the adjustment coefficient: if we consider a zone i, the adjustment coefficient for this zone is calculated by the formula:

$$\pi_i = \mu_i / \alpha_i$$

π_i is the adjustment coefficient calculated for zone i;

μ_i is the size that should be applied in the case of proportional distribution; and

α_i is the size that was applied in the reasoned distribution.

A First Adjustment Coefficient taking population into account has thus been calculated (see variable: Coeff "Adjustment Coefficient (POP)").

The second coefficient is due to the fact that we found that young people under 29 were under-represented in the survey sample. The following table gives the distribution of the population by age in Mali in 2018 and according to the surveyed sample.

Table 2: Age distribution of the population in Mali and according to the survey


AGE GROUP	2018 MALI WEIGHT	WEIGHT IN SURVEY
16 – 24	34,40%	14,31%
25 – 34	25,54%	25,57%
35 – 44	17,91%	25,62%
45 – 54	10,87%	17,90%
55 +	11,28%	16,60%

We have therefore calculated a second adjustment coefficient, this time taking into account population and age. See variable (Coeff2 "Coeff2. Adjustment coefficient (POP AND AGE)").

2.4 Challenges in the Field

The main difficulty encountered was related to insecurity. This was partially alleviated by the fact that the interviewers came from the different areas targeted by the survey. Even with recruitment from the localities, we were obliged to replace certain villages. At least 15 villages were replaced because of insecurity. In addition, our collection agents were arrested by the police in Labbezanga. Also, armed groups between Tenenkou and Mopti stopped the car used by one of our collection agents. All these agents have been released unharmed. Finally, with the onset of winter, some roads were not passable.

2.5 Survey Area




3. FINDINGS I: RAISING AWARENESS OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND THE CURRENT TRANSITION

3.1 Opinion on the Importance of Respecting the Transition Timetable

In the study area as a whole, more than 2 in 5 (40.5%) people think it is important to respect the transition timetable, and 55% think the opposite. In the regions of Mopti (75.6%) and Ségou (57%), more than half the population believes that respecting the transition timetable is not the preferred option in Mali. There are no differences¹ of opinion between beneficiaries (42%) and non-beneficiaries (40%) on this question.

Figure I: Opinion on the importance of respecting the transition timetable



The main reason given by those who consider it important to respect the transition timetable is that the country needs a democratically elected president (45%). Nearly one in five (18.2%) of these people demand a return to constitutional order, and 16% argue that the uncertainty of the transition must end.

For those who answered that it was not important to respect the transition timetable, the overriding argument was that time should be allowed to fight insecurity (60%). A quarter (26%) said that it was necessary to take the time needed to become fully independent from colonizing countries.

¹ Refer to Appendix n°25

3.2 Confidence that the transition will lead to a democratic system of good governance.

The survey shows that over three quarters (77.4%) of the population are optimistic that Mali's transition will lead to a democratic system of good governance.

This opinion is popular in all regions except Kidal (6%) and Taoudéni (18%), where the majority of the population does not see the outcome of the transition leading to a democratic system and good governance.

Mali PSR beneficiaries (82%) are slightly more confident than non-beneficiaries (76%) about the outcome of this transition.

Table 3: Confidence that the transition will lead to a democratic system of good governance

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
No confidence at all	7,4	1,5	1,8	2,3	56,6	0,6	5,6	5,1
Little confidence	4,0	7,4	8,8	26,7	32,8	20,0	43,3	11,7
Enough confidence	24,7	33,4	34,7	45,6	5,6	33,8	15,2	32,5
A lot of confidence	59,6	50,1	42,3	24,4		40,5	2,9	44,9
It depends on the transition team	2,8	4,1	0%	0,3	1,8	1,9	7,3	2,3
Don't know	1,5	3,5	12,5	0,6	3,2	3,3	25,7	3,5

3.3 Voting intentions for general elections

On the question of voting in the next elections, the majority (88.6%) of the population say they will vote in the next elections. This opinion is less widespread in Kidal (0.3%) than in the other regions. While 88.6% of the population declare they will vote (certainly or probably), 26.3% are certain and 62.3% say they will vote anyway.

Table 4: Voting intentions for general elections


	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Not at all (I don't vote)	1,8	3,0	2,3	6,0	65,9	12,1	13,0	5,3
No, maybe I won't vote	4,0	4,4	3,4	2,4	27,4	12,7	15,0	4,7
Yes, I intend to vote	76,1	43,7	68,5	74,6	0,3	67,7	28,8	62,3
Yes, I will definitely vote	17,7	47,9	23,5	15,6		6,5	16,6	26,3
Don't know	0,4	0,9	2,3	1,4	6,4	1,1	26,6	1,3

In addition, there are no major differences (Appendix 26) between the mobilization intentions of beneficiaries (91%) and non-beneficiaries (88%). We also note that there is slightly more intention to mobilize for the general elections in rural areas (90%) than in urban areas (86%).

As for the factors that prevent people from voting, they include lack of confidence in the transparency of the elections (30.8%), lack of confidence in future candidates (27%) and lack of confidence in politicians (30%).

More men (44%) than women (21%) say they won't vote because the elections will be rigged. More men (35%) don't believe politicians' promises than women (26%).

Figure 2: Factors blocking intention to vote in the next general election.




4. FINDINGS II: OPINIONS AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL AND CIVIC ACTIONS

4.1 Opinions on the fairness of public services between ethnic groups

More than 3 out of 5 people (60.6%) said that public services were equitable between the different ethnic groups in the villages. However, this opinion is not shared in all regions. In Kidal, 72.3% of the population claim that services are not equitable between ethnic groups. The majority of the population of Ménaka (62.5%) share this opinion. In Taoudéni, a large proportion (21.8%) had no opinion on the matter.

The groups benefiting from the program (67%) perceive more equity in public services between ethnic groups than the non-beneficiaries (59%). Also, the rural population (65.2%) perceives more equity in the sharing of public services than the urban population (54.3%).

Figure 3: Appreciation of the fairness of public services between ethnic groups



4.2 Opinions on the quality-of-service provision in terms of efficiency and regularity in your commune

Similarly to opinions on the fairness of public services, the majority (71.7%) of the population perceive the quality of public services in terms of efficiency and regularity (See, appendix 21). In Kidal, however, the majority of the population (61.9%) say the opposite.

Beneficiaries (73.9%) perceive the quality of public services in the same proportions as non-beneficiaries (69.8%). People with some educational attainment are more likely to perceive the quality of public services to be efficient and regular than those with no level of education. Indeed, 69% of people with no level of education perceive the quality of public services to be good, compared with 79% of people with some educational attainment.

4.3 Level of participation in community activities

One of the targets of Objective 2 of Mali PSR is civic engagement in the communities affected by the conflict, through the involvement of community members in political and social life. According to the following table, more than half the population has already taken part in a meeting (57.9%) and a sanitation event (62%) in the commune. However, only 11.9% of the population have signed a petition and 14.9% have expressed their opinions on social media on issues of community interest.


In addition, around a third of the population had already contacted or visited a community leader or state official (34.2%), participated in a demonstration (30.3%) or encouraged community members to contact other communities (29.8%). This testimony bears further witness to the participation of beneficiaries in community activities thanks to the program's intervention: "Yes the lessons learned have enabled us to take action, for example the creation of the coordination of village chiefs in the commune. This is largely due to the activities of Mali PSR. There are also the conflict management committees that have come into being."

Table 5: Participation in community activities

	Participated in a meeting	Participated in sanitation events in your community	Contacted or visited a community leader or a state official	Attended a meeting or rally organized by a political party/candidate	Participated in a local event	Sign a petition	Writing on social media like Facebook or Twitter	Encouraged the community, young people and women to make contact with other communities
Over the past six months	40,7	42,6	24,2	17,1	16,2	5,6	11,4	17,3
For a longer time	17,2	19,8	10,0	28,8	14,1	6,3	3,5	12,5
Could do	36,2	29,2	55,8	38,1	40,8	54,4	39,5	53,5
Will never do	3,2	5,7	5,7	11,8	23,6	26,5	37,9	12,7
Don't know	2,7	2,7	4,4	4,1	5,2	7,2	7,6	4,0

In addition, the following graph shows positive differences in these indicators between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Indeed, 80% of beneficiaries say they have taken part in meetings, compared with 52% of non-beneficiaries. Similarly, 77% of program participants were involved in sanitation activities, compared with 59% of non-beneficiaries. Also, 44% of beneficiaries claim to have encouraged their communities to make contact with other communities, compared with 26% of non-beneficiaries.

Figure 4: Participation in community activities between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries



These statements corroborate the participation of beneficiaries in civic engagement activities and meetings organized by Mali PSR:

"Personally, I attended a meeting in Bamako on behalf of the Bandiagara mayor's office, where we were supposed to talk about crisis prevention in general at CICB level. Just recently, we took part in a meeting to evaluate the activities carried out by Mali PSR in Sevaré. We were invited to take part."²

"We are responsible and we take on all the tasks that concern us. We have a gender-neutral savings bank and sanitation days that involve the whole of society... As Cissé said, there are sanitation days and other decisions for the development of the commune, such as involving women in decision-making and their participation in conflict management."³

"We have benefited from capacity-building training. We organized a caravan to fight the coronavirus pandemic throughout the town. We distributed masks to the population. We placed health kits on the main roads and in places where people gather (health centers, mosques)."⁴

"This has also brought about the involvement of different strata in all the activities of the communal council and has brought about trust between the authorities and the communities. For example, when the communal council prepares its administrative account, it calls on all the

² Extract from an interview with the Mayor of Bandiagara. Conducted on June 22, 2023 in Bandiagara.

³ Testimony of a participant in the women's focus group, commune of Diré, cercle de Diré, Timbuktu region. Interview conducted on July 01, 2023

⁴ Extract from an interview with a woman leader from Bandiagara, conducted on June 24, 2023 in Bandiagara.

entities to attend the activity. When the PDESC was revised on Mali PSR's initiative, the participation of all levels of society further strengthened the bond of trust between the authorities and the communities.⁵

4.4 Opinions on the ability to influence decisions.

More than half the population (55%) agree that their opinion can influence local government decision-making. This indicator is 24.3% in Kidal, 23.4% in Ménaka and 16% in Taoudéni, against over 50% in the other regions. This statistic is estimated at 55% for non-beneficiaries versus 56% for beneficiaries (See **Appendix 27**).

Moreover, as might be expected, men (59%) feel more able to influence decisions at local level than women (52%).

Table 6:Opinion on ability to influence decisions at local level

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Strongly Disagree	14,3	11,1	12,7	15,1	42,3	30,4	12,2	14,6
Disagree	24,5	25,5	22,5	30,4	31,5	44,7	45,0	26,7
Somewhat agree	29,7	43,5	48,7	35,9	10,5	19,2	12,7	36,5
Completely agree	29,5	17,1	4,3	15,9	13,8	4,2	3,3	18,5
Don't know	2,0	2,8	11,9	2,7	1,8	1,5	26,8	3,7

Note the slight difference between the percentages of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on this question, estimated at 55% for non-beneficiaries versus 56% for beneficiaries. However, this testimony notes an improvement in relations between the population and local elected officials.

"Yes, there is a good understanding between us and our communal elected representatives, they are often present when we need them, we help each other, and we listen to each other. We work well together."⁶

4.5 Opinions on the ability to present ideas and express opinions to community leaders

More than three-quarters (78.4%) of the population responded positively to the question of their ability to present their ideas and express their opinions to community leaders. This sentiment is higher among beneficiaries (82%) than non-beneficiaries (78%).

⁵ Testimony of a participant in the Gao youth focus group.

⁶ Testimony of a participant in the men's focus group, commune of Diré, cercle of Diré, Timbuktu region. Interview conducted on July 01, 2023.

Table 7: Opinions on the ability to present ideas and express opinions to community leaders

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Strongly Disagree	4,7	5,6	5,4	6,5	18,6	22,9	6,6	6,4
Disagree	8,6	9,1	12,1	22,7	48,8	22,4	32,5	13,7
Somewhat agree	43,1	49,8	56,6	47,6	16,1	37,5	28,4	46,7
Completely agree	42,1	34,4	22,7	22,6	15,6	17,2	6,4	31,7
Don't know	1,5	1,1	3,3	0,5	0,9		26,2	1,4

The ability to present ideas and express opinions is higher among beneficiaries (82%) than non-beneficiaries (78%). This testimony further corroborates this conclusion: "We used to be marginalized, we had no say in decision-making. Today, we defend our ideals wherever we go and in front of whoever is entitled to do so... Thanks to the program's activities, we know our rights and duties better, and we have the intelligence to ensure that our decisions are taken into account. And our strength is union and solidarity."⁷

4.6 Equal opportunity to participate in the political life of the commune

As for participation in political life, almost four out of five people (78.5%) claim to have the same opportunities to participate in the commune's political life as others. This sentiment is most widespread in Ségou and Mopti. This opinion is less widespread among women (76%) than men (81%).

5. FINDINGS III: CONFLICT RESOLUTION

5.1 Effectiveness of conflict management efforts


More than three out of five people (61.4%) perceive the mechanisms put in place by communities to manage conflict to be effective. People living in rural areas (62.6%) are more likely than those living in urban areas (59.3%) to see the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms.

The table in Appendix 7 shows disparities of opinion by region on this question: While around 70% of people in Mopti, Tombouctou and Ségou perceive the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms, only 13% in Kidal, 29% in Gao and 43% in Ménaka are of this opinion.

More program beneficiaries (71.8%) than non-beneficiaries (58%) affirm the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms.

⁷ Testimony of a participant in the women's focus group, commune of Diré, cercle de Diré, Timbuktu region. Interview conducted on July 01, 2023

Figure 5: Assessment of the effectiveness of conflict management efforts



Note: program beneficiaries (71.8%) are more likely than non-beneficiaries (58%) to affirm the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms.

This is further illustrated by the following testimony: "Personally, I carry out reconciliation activities between couples or individuals in conflict in my neighborhood. As soon as I see that there is a conflict between people in my neighborhood, I mobilize my elements to intervene in order to calm things down... There was a conflict between the Dogons and the Peuls in our neighborhood, but thanks to the awareness-raising activities, tensions have dropped considerably, and the people have stayed put."⁸

5.2 Participation in conflict management activities

Nearly one in five people (17.8%) has already taken part in conflict management activities. Participation in conflict management is more widespread in Ménaka (43%), Taoudéni (38%), Tombouctou (26%) and Mopti (26%). By far, more beneficiaries (72%) claim to have participated in conflict management than non-beneficiaries (3.4%)⁹.

Table 8: Participation in conflict management activities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Yes	11,0	25,8	26,4	8,4	3,0	43,1	37,8	17,8
No	89,0	74,2	73,6	91,6	97,0	56,9	62,2	82,2

This testimony further confirms this situation: "Before these awareness-raising activities, there were women who thought that women shouldn't get involved in conflict resolution activities, or that they shouldn't play a public role in the community. It was through the program's training activities that they realized the importance of women's involvement in conflict resolution. They learned about their rights and that they could find the things they needed to work. Through the

⁸ Extract from the focus group with men from the Bandiagara commune, interview conducted on July 06, 2023.
⁹ This can be explained, in part, by the fact that non-beneficiaries do not know what is expected by participation in conflict management mechanisms. They may therefore participate without mentioning it here.

program's training courses, the women understood that they had the possibility of finding land to practice market gardening."¹⁰

5.3 Opinions on the importance of conflict management mechanisms taught by Mali PSR in reducing violence

More than 2 in 5 (42%) believe that the conflict management mechanisms taught by Mali PSRs make a major contribution to reducing violence in the community. This opinion is more widespread in Ségou (70%) and Timbuktu (52%). This opinion is also more popular among program beneficiaries (43.5%) than non-beneficiaries (34.3%).

Table 9: Importance of conflict management mechanisms taught by Mali PSR in reducing violence

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ENS
Strong contributor	70,0	32,9	52,0	17,7		35,1	32,2	42,1
Contributed a little	25,7	64,5	46,7	71,4	100,0	61,2	67,8	54,4
Did not contribute		1,6	0,6	3,1		1,4		1,2
Did not contribute at all	3,9	0,5				2,3		1,1
Don't know	0,5	0,6	0,7	7,8				1,2

It is worth noting that project beneficiaries (43.5%) feel that the conflict management mechanisms promoted by Mali PSR are more important than non-beneficiaries (34.3%). This trend was confirmed in several group interviews.

"The program's activities have contributed to conflict management, as tensions have been greatly reduced within the community. Program activities have greatly improved people's knowledge of conflict management. For example, people avoid making certain hateful comments or rejecting others in public... We heard a lot of testimonials from participants during the program training. People give accounts of what they have experienced in conflict, and when a person holds a grudge because of the situation they have suffered, if they hear a more serious case from another person, they will come to their senses and become more tolerant. The aim of the training was to encourage the population to move towards forgiveness rather than revenge towards the people who have wronged them."

"The sensitizations have contributed a great deal to calming the climate of peace in the Dire cercle. It has also reduced banditry and the consumption of narcotics... The program's activities have diminished accusations between communities and reduced the population's sense of fear."¹¹

¹⁰ Extract from an interview with women leaders in the Bandiagara commune, conducted on June 24, 2023.

¹¹ Testimony of a participant in the men's focus group, Diré commune, Diré cercle, Timbuktu region. Interview conducted on July 01, 2023

5.4 Actors chosen for conflict resolution

The actors best indicated by the population to resolve conflicts are traditional leaders - village chiefs (89%), imams (78%) and mayors (60%). Others will turn to the nearest armed group (7.5%) to resolve the conflict. Appendix 16 shows that there are no major differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on this question.

"For example: Before the arrival of Mali PSR, our conflicts were settled in Gao either by the police or the gendarmerie, but now, thanks to the sensitization campaigns, all our conflicts are handled by the village chief or the mayor."¹²


6. FINDINGS IV: KNOWLEDGE OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

6.1 Raising awareness of the Algiers Agreement

The Algiers peace and reconciliation agreement has been in the news in Mali since it was signed in 2015. Thus, in the program intervention area, almost 9 out of 10 people (88.5%) have heard of this pact between the authorities and armed groups. The following graph shows that almost all people in Kidal, Ménaka and Taoudéni have heard of this document.

However, the rural population (84%) were less likely to have heard about the agreement than the urban population (94%). Similarly, women (83%) were less likely to have heard than men (95%). Furthermore, 87% of non-beneficiaries said they had heard of the agreement, compared with 93% of beneficiaries.

Figure 6: Level of awareness of the Algiers Agreement



6.2 Opinion on the implementation of the Algiers agreement

Just over a quarter of the population (26%) is in favor of implementing the Algiers Agreement. Appendix 17 shows that there are major differences of opinion from one region to another on the implementation of the peace agreement. Whereas in the southern regions (Ségou and Mopti), only one in 10 people is in favor of its implementation, almost all the populations of Kidal (97%)

¹² Extract from the Gao youth focus group.

and Taoudéni (89%) have stated this option. In Timbuktu (36%) and Gao (44%), over a third of the population is also in favor of implementing the agreement.

Nevertheless, there are no differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the question of implementing the Algiers Agreement.

The arguments put forward by those who are against implementation are "The agreement favors the division of the country" (55%), "The agreement was signed under duress" (39%) and "Mali will lose its wealth in the north (oil, gas, gold, etc.) by implementing this agreement" (30%). (Cf. Appendix 18).

6.3 Level of knowledge of the Algiers Agreement

On the question of knowledge of the peace and reconciliation agreement, more than 3 out of 10 people (61.6%) claim to have a good knowledge of the peace and reconciliation agreement. It is the populations of the Ménaka (97.2%), Kidal (92%) and Taoudéni (77.3%) regions who claim to have the most knowledge of the Algiers agreement. Furthermore, the table in appendix 19 shows that beneficiaries (68.1%) claim more knowledge of the agreement than non-beneficiaries (59.8%).

Table 10: Level of knowledge of the peace and reconciliation agreement

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
No knowledge	47,5	29,1	36,5	48,2	8,1	1,7	21,0	38,1
Little knowledge	42,9	61,6	57,2	49,8	79,4	64,0	62,6	53,3
Good knowledge	9,2	9,3	6,3	1,8	12,4	33,2	14,7	8,3
Very good knowledge	0,5			0,1		1,1		0,2
Refuse to answer							1,7	0,0

The points of the agreement most cited by those who claim to have knowledge of it are the DDR (62%), the organization of the referendum (33%), regionalization (17%) and the creation of a Senate (18%).

6.4 Opinion on the rereading of the Algiers Agreement

Half of the population is in favor of revising the peace and reconciliation agreement. However, a third of the population has no clear-cut opinion on this question, and 16% prefers the agreement to remain as it is. The latter opinion comes mainly from Kidal (89%), Taoudéni (74%) and Ménaka (49%).

Men (57%) are more likely than women (42%) to opt for rereading and modifying the agreement. This is also the opinion most stated by those with education, compared to those with no education at all.

Figure 7: Opinions on the review and revision of the Algiers Accord




7. FINDINGS V: ACCEPTANCE OF REINTEGRATION

7.1 Opinion on the reintegration of displaced persons into the community

Almost all (97.3%) of the population are in favor of reintegrating displaced people into their communities. In fact, 62.6% of the population are very much in favor, compared with 34.7% who are in favor. In Ménaka, where there is a high number of displaced people, 83% were very much in favor of integrating the displaced. Moreover, the population is in favor of integrating the displaced, regardless of their level of education, place of residence, gender, age or even whether or not they are beneficiaries (See **Appendix 28**) of the program .

For the few who are against the reintegration of the displaced, they argue that the displaced are sympathetic to extremist ideas (28.6%) and therefore may be at the root of the emergence of extremist groups in the community. Another group stated that they were against the integration of the displaced, as they were complicit with armed groups (31.4%). Also, according to 46.8% of those opposed to the integration of the displaced, such integration could create tensions within the community. This last opinion comes mainly from the Kidal and Taoudéni regions.

Figure 8: Reasons for rejecting the reintegration of displaced persons into the community ¹³




¹³ Please note, the figures in this graph are based on the 3% of the population who are not in favor of reintegrating the displaced.

7.2 Opinion on the reintegration of ex-combatants

Almost 7 out of 10 people (68.1%) are in favor of reintegrating ex-combatants; 33% are very much in favor. Analysis by region (Cf. Appendix 14) shows that the population is most reluctant to integrate ex-combatants are in Mopti (57%) and, to a lesser extent, Kidal (61.9%).

In addition, the following graph shows that the higher the level of education, the more the integration of ex-combatants is accepted. Men (71%) are more likely to accept the integration of ex-combatants than women (65%). However, there are no significant (See **Appendix 29**) differences between the opinions of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on this question.

Figure 9:Opinion on the integration of veterans into the community



7.3 Level of fear that ex-combatants will create violence in communities

In line with the previous analysis, more than half (57%) do not fear that the return of ex-combatants will cause real violence in their communities. According to Appendix 14, it is only in Mopti (37.7%) that the majority of the population is of the opposite opinion. In Kidal, over 80% of the population believes that the return of ex-combatants will not lead to major violence.

The fear that the return of ex-combatants could cause violence is more widespread in rural than in urban areas. Indeed, 60% of the urban population believe that the return of ex-combatants will not lead to violence, compared with 54% of people living in rural areas.

7.4 Assessment of community efforts to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants and the integration of displaced persons

Around 4 out of 5 people (79.6%) believe that their communities have made efforts to reintegrate displaced people and ex-combatants. However, 33.9% of the population feel that their communities are making a lot of effort, compared with 47.7% who feel they are doing very little.

Those who have benefited from Mali PSR (84.6%) perceive the communities' efforts to reintegrate displaced persons and ex-combatants to be greater than those who have not (78.3%).

Table 11: Assessment of community efforts to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ENS
A lot of effort	49,2	26,7	25,0	30,2	22,4	22,4	48,7	33,9
A little effort	33,8	52,5	41,4	53,7	64,6	46,7	33,1	45,7
No effort at all	6,7	11,9	8,6	7,6	7,6	13,8	5,6	8,9
No effort at all	2,2	4,7	5,5	2,4	0,4	16,0	0,7	3,8
Don't know	8,1	4,2	19,5	6,2	5,1	1,1	11,8	7,7

8. FINDINGS VI: TOLERANCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE OBJECTIVES

This section seeks to assess some of the target indicators for Objective 1, i.e. strengthening community resilience to violence and conflict.

8.1 Opinion on the use of violence against the government

The population was asked about the use of violence against the government. More than 9 out of 10 people (90.1%) think that violence should not be used against the government to any extent. In Taoudéni (66.2%), Gao (78.2%) and to a lesser extent Mopti (86.4%) relatively fewer people are against violence against the government. There are no significant differences (See **Appendix 30**) on this question between the opinions of non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries.

8.2 Opinion on participation in civil disobedience actions

As in the previous question, 78.9% of the population think that it is not justifiable to join civil disobedience actions for any reason. However, almost one in five hold the opposite view. The latter opinion is more widespread in Gao (38%) and Taoudéni (21%). There are no significant differences (See **Appendix 31**) in this perception between the opinions of non-beneficiaries and beneficiaries.

8.3 Opinion on the justification of violence for reasons of revenge

The majority (85%) of the population believes that revenge against those who have committed crimes is not justifiable. However, 26% of the population in Kidal; 24% in Taoudéni; 20% in Ménaka and Gao think that it is sometimes justifiable to use violence to take revenge on others. There are no differences (See **Appendix 32**) of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on this point.

8.4 Justification for joining a radical group in order to earn an income

According to the majority (86%) of the study population, it is not justifiable to join a radical group in order to secure a secure income for one's household. This opinion stands at 44% in Taoudéni

and 76% in Kidal, against over 85% in the other regions. More¹⁴ beneficiaries (89%) than non-beneficiaries (85%) agree that joining a radical group to secure an income for one's family is not justifiable.

8.5 Opinion on the justification for using violence to take justice into one's own hands

According to 85% of the population, it is never justified to use violence to take justice into one's own hands. This question shows different trends based on region. In the regions of Ségou (96%) and Timbuktu (93%), the population is unanimous on the non-justification of using violence to take justice into one's own hands. In Kidal (65%), Taoudenni (43%) and Ménaka (78%), more than one person in five is of the opposite opinion.

Non-beneficiaries (84%) are relatively less reluctant to use violence to obtain justice than beneficiaries (88%). But this difference is not significant according appendix 34

8.6 Opinion on the justification for joining a radical group in order to gain the respect of the community

As with the other questions, 84% of the population think that joining a radical group in order to gain respect of the community is never justifiable. This opinion is more widespread¹⁵ among beneficiaries (88%) than non-beneficiaries (83%). There is no significant difference either between men (84%) and women (83%).

8.7 Opinion on the justification for joining a radical group to defend one's religion

Opinions on this question are more mixed. Indeed, 78.6% of the population believes that it is not justified to join a radical group to defend one's religion. This opinion is only 38% in Taoudenni and 59% in Gao, and 70% in Gao and Ménaka. This opinion is held by more than three quarters of the population in the other regions (Ségou, Mopti and Tombouctou). However, there is no great difference (**see appendix 36**) between the opinions of beneficiaries (80%) and non-beneficiaries (78%) on this question. **No significant difference between men (78.7%) and women (78.6%).**

9. FINDINGS VII: COMMUNITY COHESION

A set of indicators has been designed to measure the level of cohesion within the community, based on acceptance of one's fellow man regardless of origin, and trust between the population and its leaders.

9.1 Appreciation of understanding between different ethnic groups in the community

The majority of the population (85.5%) affirm that there is understanding between the different ethnic groups. This is the most prevalent opinion in all regions, with the exception of Kidal and Ménaka, where around half the population feels the opposite. Urban areas are more likely than

¹⁴ See appendix 33

¹⁵ See appendix 35

rural areas to perceive this understanding between ethnic groups. There were no significant differences (see appendix 37) between beneficiaries (85%) and non-beneficiaries (86%) in their assessment of understanding between ethnic groups.

Table 12: Opinion on understanding between ethnic groups

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Get along very badly	0,5	2,3	0,3	1,0	3,7	7,0		1,4
Get along badly	4,8	12,7	7,0	13,2	48,2	39,9	1,5	11,5
Get along well	51,1	58,3	78,3	70,5	31,9	51,5	73,4	60,1
Get along very well	43,2	23,9	13,0	13,9	13,9	1,6	23,7	25,4
Don't know	0,4	2,8	1,4	1,5	2,4		1,3	1,5

9.2 Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors

On the question of neighbors from different ethnic groups, the majority of the population (84.2%) stated that they appreciated having neighbors of a different ethnic group, and 10% stated their indifference. There were no significant differences (see appendix 38) between the opinions of beneficiaries (84.8%) and non-beneficiaries (84%) on this question. However, those with a high level of education are more accepting of other ethnic groups as neighbors than those with no education (See Appendix 10). Moreover, this proportion of people who accept other ethnic groups as neighbors is relatively lower in Kidal (60%) and Gao (74%) than in the other program regions.

Table 13: Having different ethnic groups as neighbors

	Non-Beneficiary	Beneficiary	ALL
I don't like it at all	0,6	1,5	0,8
I don't like it	4,3	3,8	4,2
I am indifferent	10,9	9,9	10,7
I like it	52,3	50,3	51,9
I like it a lot	31,7	34,5	32,3
Don't know	0,1		0,1

9.3 Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together

As in the previous case about neighbors, the majority (87%) of the population likes to have different ethnic groups as guests for a meal. This is relatively less widespread in Timbuktu (62%) and Gao (77%). There is no significant difference (see appendix 39) between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on this question.

Table 14: Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
I don't like it at all		2,7	0,4		0,3	1,2	0,7	0,9
I don't like it	0,6	5,0	0,8	4,8	35,9	3,3	1,6	3,9
I am indifferent	2,7	6,7	10,1	17,7	1,8	5,5	0,7	7,9
I like it	43,5	51,5	55,3	61,2	34,9	77,8	73,0	51,9
I like it a lot	53,2	34,1	32,4	15,8	27,1	12,2	22,0	35,1
Don't know			1,0	0,5			2,1	0,2

9.4 Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups

On the question of acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups, 80% of the population answered in the affirmative. This opinion is less shared in Kidal (54%). As in previous questions, there were no significant (see appendix 39) differences between beneficiaries (80.8%) and non-beneficiaries (79.7%).

Table 15: Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
I don't like it at all	0,3	4,4		1,1	0,3	3,9	0,7	1,8
I don't like it	0,5	10,2	2,4	8,7	40,7	6,7	2,3	6,7
I am indifferent	6,4	10,2	10,0	18,3	4,6	9,7	0,7	10,4
I like it	41,5	43,8	56,5	55,1	31,2	59,6	64,9	47,2
I like it a lot	51,2	31,0	27,1	16,1	23,2	10,1	23,4	32,8
Don't know		0,4	4,0	0,7		10,0	8,0	1,1

9.5 Acceptance of sharing income-generating activities with different ethnic groups

The study also shows that the majority (80%) of the population is in favor of sharing income-generating activities with people from a different ethnic group. On this question, there are no significant differences between beneficiaries (80.7%) and non-beneficiaries (80.5%).

9.6 Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups

On the question of marriage with different ethnic groups, three quarters of the population (76%) are in favor. This opinion is less popular among people with no education (71%) compared with those with higher education (90%). This indicator is relatively higher (79%) in urban areas than in rural areas (74%).

Furthermore, appendix 12 shows a relatively low proportion of the population accepting marriage with other ethnic groups in Kidal (46%) and Ménaka (56%), and to a lesser extent in Gao (68%) and Mopti (69%), compared with the other regions.

We also note that program beneficiaries are no more (see appendix 41) in favor of inter-ethnic marriage than non-program beneficiaries.


9.7 Opinion on the unification of communities by local elected representatives

The opinion on the role of local elected representatives in uniting communities is generally positive according to the majority (71.2%) of the population. However, in Ménaka (46%) and Kidal (53%), relatively fewer people see local elected representatives as unifying.

Local elected representatives are perceived as more divisive in urban areas (30%) than in rural areas (16%). This perception comes more from people with no formal education than from those who have higher education.

Analysis by gender shows that men (25%) consider leaders to be slightly more divisive than women (20%). As for leaders' perception of community unity, it is more widespread among beneficiaries (80%) than non-beneficiaries (70%).

Figure 10: Opinion on community unification by local elected officials



9.8 Opinion on the involvement of local elected representatives in the needs and perspectives of citizens and civil society

More than three out of five people (61.8%) are of the opinion that local elected officials partially (45.1%) or fully (16.7%) involve the needs and perspectives of citizens and civil society in their decisions and in community projects. This perception is higher in Taoudéni (82%) and Mopti (70%). Rural citizens are more positive (64%) on this question than urban citizens (59%). Also, beneficiaries (68%) see more inclusion of citizens' needs by local elected officials than non-beneficiaries (60%).

Table 16: Opinion on the involvement of citizens and civil society needs and perspectives by local elected officials

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Completely unaware	12,7	7,6	11,3	15,1	7,0	23,8	3,1	11,6
Partially unaware	22,4	17,5	22,3	19,0	62,1	26,3	4,0	21,4
Partially involved	41,7	52,9	42,4	44,9	12,4	43,9	39,5	45,1
Completely involved	16,8	17,5	15,0	17,3	18,0	6,0	42,4	16,7
Don't know	6,4	4,4	9,0	3,7	0,5		11,1	5,2

9.9 Level of trust in local elected officials to keep society's interests at heart

In line with the previous question, more than half (58.4%) of the population trust local elected officials to keep their interests at heart. This proportion is 36% in Kidal, versus over 50% in the other regions. It is also higher in rural areas (67%) than in urban areas (47%).

Similarly, the higher the level of education, the lower the proportion of people who trust local elected officials to keep their interests at heart. Beneficiaries (65.3%) are more optimistic that local elected officials will keep their interests at heart than non-beneficiaries (56.6%).

Table 17: Trust in local elected officials to keep society's interests at heart

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Not at all confident	11,9	9,2	10,1	10,1	9,8	19,4		10,6
Low confidence	21,8	29,6	32,4	32,8	54,0	27,2	5,5	28,8
Some confidence	46,8	44,2	32,2	39,9	19,6	45,8	47,9	42,0
Very confident	16,9	16,0	18,8	16,0	16,6	6,5	36,3	16,4
Don't know	2,6	0,9	6,5	1,2		1,1	10,3	2,2

We note that Mali PSR beneficiaries develop a certain proximity and trust towards local elected officials (compared to non-beneficiaries). The following testimonies are quite illustrative:

"I can testify that today, thanks to Mali PSR, young people have become aware that the activities of the mayor's office concern them directly. Young people come to us for advice before they take action, and after they've taken action they report back to us. They don't do anything in parallel with the town hall. The young people have been able to develop a sense of accountability within themselves, and I think that's very important".¹⁶

"Before, there was no trust between citizens and the authorities, but with Mali PSR, each component of the population knows its role in society (the authorities, young people, women and other citizens) and the components have understood the need for synergy of action between all

¹⁶ Extract from an interview with the Mayor of Bandiagara. Conducted on June 22, 2023 in Bandiagara

the components of society. This has created a climate of trust between the components of society, including between communities and elected representatives".¹⁷

10. IMPACT OF THE PROJECT


10.1 Scope of program activities

10.1.1 Knowledge of Mali PSR activities

The Mali PSR program was launched five years ago and has carried out a number of activities, including awareness-raising campaigns on various themes (social cohesion, stabilization, COVID-19, institutional reforms, electoral process, etc.). As a result, 43.8% of the population in the intervention zone claims to be aware of the program's intervention. The program is best known in Ménaka (61%), Tombouctou (55.5%) and Mopti (50%).

Awareness of Mali PSR is higher in rural areas (48.6%) than in urban areas (37.4%). Men (47%) are more aware of Mali PSR program than women (40%).

Figure 11: Awareness of Mali PSR program by region



10.1.2 Participation in Mali PSR activities

Regarding participation in program activities, 47.3%¹⁸ of people informed about the program have participated at least once in a Mali PSR activity. 20.7% of the total population. 11.6% of activity participants took part once in a Mali PSR activity and 9.1% took part several times. Ménaka (57%), Tombouctou (38%) and Taoudéni (39%) had the highest participation rates in Mali PSR activities.

Project beneficiaries mainly took part in awareness-raising activities (60%) and training (40%) on program themes (see Appendix 4). These activities were mainly concerned with conflict

¹⁷ Testimony of a participant in the men's focus group, commune of Diré, cercle of Diré, Timbuktu region. Interview conducted on July 01, 2023.

¹⁸ This rate is calculated on the basis of the proportion of people who are aware of Mali PSR project activities. To obtain the actual rate of participation in Mali PSR activities, it must be multiplied by the number of these people. Thus, the % of people having participated in Mali PSR project activities is 20.7%.

prevention (52%), violent extremism (15%), early warning (15%), reconciliation (14%) and participatory governance (14%) (see Appendix 5).


10.1.3 Vaccine against COVID-19

After the appearance of COVID-19, the program's activities turned to raising awareness and informing the population about the means of combating the disease. These activities were readapted to the context of vaccine availability and the population's mistrust of these vaccines. The study shows that half the population (50.4%) has been vaccinated against COVID-19.

The following graph shows that the population in Timbuktu (63.9%), Gao (61.5%) and Mopti (50.4%) were the most likely to have been vaccinated against COVID-19. However, in Kidal (38.2%) and especially Taoudéni (11.2%), fewer people accepted the COVID-19 vaccine.

This lack of mobilization for the COVID-19 vaccine is more prevalent in urban areas, where more than half (54%) of the population are unvaccinated, compared with 46% in rural areas. On the other hand, the table in Appendix 1 shows that the level of education has no significant impact on mobilization for the COVID-19 vaccine. Similarly, we find practically the same trends on this question among men and women, as well as among age groups. In addition, more people who have benefited from Mali PSR activities (62%) accept the COVID19 vaccine than non-beneficiaries (47%).

Figure 12: Acceptance of COVID-19 vaccine by region




According to one respondent: "The Mali PSR made us aware of COVID-19, i.e. barrier measures, hand washing and the importance of vaccination...since I was vaccinated up to now I haven't had any side effects".

The reasons for non-vaccination against COVID-19 are mainly linked to the population's distrust of the vaccine. Indeed, over half (53%) of the population not vaccinated against COVID-19 say they have no confidence¹⁹ in the vaccine. This figure is 66.5% in urban areas, compared with 41.6% in rural areas.

¹⁹ This includes fear of the vaccine's effects, lack of confidence in the vaccine's efficacy and usefulness, and fear that there are other objectives behind the vaccine.

Nevertheless, other people (18%) say they were unable to be vaccinated against COVID-19 because the vaccine was unavailable. This argument is more prevalent in rural areas (28%) than in urban areas (6.5%).

Figure 13: Reasons for non-acceptance of COVID19 vaccine by region



10.2 Impacts on Beneficiaries

10.2.1 Correspondence of activities with the needs of the population

Almost all the beneficiaries are of the opinion that the activities carried out under Mali PSR correspond to the needs of the population. This opinion is unanimous among beneficiaries in all program intervention regions.

Table 18: Beneficiaries' assessment of the match between Mali PSR activities and safety needs

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudénit	ENS
No match at all		0,4	2,6	1,3				0,8
Does not match		0,2	3,6	9,1		2,2	4,1	2,0
Partially matches	37,5	61,3	66,0	64,6	100,0	40,8	43,8	56,1
Totally matches	61,5	37,3	25,8	15,6		57,0	50,0	39,2
Don't know	1,0	0,7	2,1	9,4			2,1	1,9

10.2.2 Beneficiaries' assessment of activity quality

The majority of the population (69.3%) affirm that the activities carried out by Mali PSRs are of good quality, while 20% consider the quality to be fair. This opinion is more widespread in Gao (42%), Timbuktu (36%) and Taoudéni (30%).

Table 19: Assessment of the quality of Mali PSR activities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudénit	ENS
Very low	9,5	1,5	3,0				2,1	3,2
Low		5,4	12,5	13,0		1,9	6,9	6,3
Fair	6,8	11,8	36,2	41,5	7,9	27,3	29,8	20,4
Good	51,6	59,4	42,2	32,7	92,1	61,3	52,1	51,6
Very good	32,2	21,9	6,1	5,4		9,5	2,6	17,7
Don't know				7,4			6,7	0,8

10.2.3 Lessons learned from Mali PSR

As for the main lessons (Cf. Appendix 6) learned from Mali PSR, the ones most cited by beneficiaries were related to coexistence (45%), conflict management (20%), leadership (7%) and the importance of peace (7%). In addition, over 80% of beneficiaries affirm that their knowledge of the themes covered by Mali PSR has improved thanks to their participation in Mali PSR activities. In addition, 64% of beneficiaries say they apply the skills learned from Mali PSR, against approximately a third who claim the opposite.

11. CONCLUSION

All in all, the study shows that Mali PSR's activities have been carried out effectively, at least in part. In the program intervention zone, over 20% of the population took part in a community mobilization or awareness-raising activity on one of the program's themes (social cohesion, combating the use of violence, good governance, civic engagement, combating COVID-19, etc.).

The data show positive trends in people's behavior and attitudes in the program's areas of intervention. Indeed, more than half the population has been vaccinated against COVID-19, and the majority rejects the use of violence and is in favor of cohesion with other communities, regardless of ethnicity. Also, more than half the population perceives the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms and has already mobilized for civic and community actions. The majority intend to participate in the electoral process and mobilize for the next general elections. In addition, the indicator table shows that the indicator targets are relatively well met, despite the difficult conditions in the study area.

The impact attribution analysis shows rather good results for many indicators, and mixed results for others. In the analysis of each indicator, we looked at the difference in value between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In some cases, there are large differences, in other cases small differences, and in some cases no differences at all.

🚩 Objective 1: Strengthening community resilience to violence and conflict

In terms of the themes covered by this objective, program beneficiaries (71.8%) were more likely than non-beneficiaries (58%) to note the effectiveness of conflict management mechanisms, and far more (72%) were involved in conflict management than non-beneficiaries (5%). The people who have participated (43.5%) in program activities see the importance of conflict management mechanisms more than non-beneficiaries (34%). These people also have more information on the Algiers Agreement than non-beneficiaries.

However, there are no differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the implementation of the Algiers Agreement. These two population groups have similar opinions on the reintegration of displaced persons and ex-combatants. Also, there is no significant difference between the beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups on questions of acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors, guests, spouses, etc.

🚩 Objective 2: Strengthen inclusive governance and civic engagement in conflict-affected communities

As for questions on the second objective, program beneficiary groups (67%) perceive more equity in public services between ethnic groups than non-beneficiaries (59%). However, beneficiaries (73.9%) perceived the quality of public services in almost the same proportions as non-beneficiaries (69.8%).

Nevertheless, when it comes to community and civic mobilization, positive differences appear in the attitudes of beneficiaries compared with non-beneficiaries. Indeed, 80% of beneficiaries claim to have taken part in meetings, compared with 52% of non-beneficiaries. Similarly, 77% of program participants were involved in sanitation activities, compared with 59% of non-beneficiaries. We also note that 82% of beneficiaries believe they have the ability to present and express their ideas to leaders, compared with 78% of non-beneficiaries.

🚩 Objective 3: Empower young people and strengthen their resilience to violent extremism

In terms of resilience to violent extremism, the study does not allow us to conclude on the differences that could really seal the impact of this objective. Indeed, there are no significant differences of opinion on the use of violence against the government, nor on participation in civil disobedience actions, nor on the justification of violence for reasons of revenge.

However, 89% of beneficiaries and 85% of non-beneficiaries feel that joining radical groups to earn an income is an option to be ruled out. Also, 84% of non-beneficiaries are reluctant to use violence to take justice into their own hands, compared with 88% of beneficiaries.

On the question of joining a radical group to defend one's religion, there were no major differences between the opinions of beneficiaries (80%) and non-beneficiaries (78%).

✚ **Objective 4:** Support for democratic transition, mitigation of the impact of COVID-19 and other crises on Malian communities

On this fourth objective of the program, there is a visible impact on behavior and attitudes towards COVID-19 between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. However, in terms of support for the transition and mobilization for the forthcoming elections, the results remain broadly the same between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.

Lessons Learned

The testimonies of beneficiaries and the statistical differences found between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on many variables prove the relevance of the program. We believe that the absence of significant differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries for certain indicators can be explained by:

- **Evaluation design:** The definition of certain concepts, such as beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and the design of indicators can be a source of estimation bias if they are not consistent with program activities. A non-beneficiary of Mali PSR may be a beneficiary of several other programs similar to Mali PSR. In addition, we need to contextualize the thematic questions and classify the beneficiaries. If, for example, the program carried out sensitizations on COVID-19 between 2020 and 2021, we need to focus on the beneficiaries of sensitizations on COVID-19 during this period. Otherwise, we could end up with more non-beneficiaries of the program who have received this awareness-raising from other organizations, and this would wrongly reduce the impact.
- **Implementation schedule:** Given that this is a five-year awareness-raising program, if there has been no awareness-raising on certain themes for a long time, the impact of other similar programs and the memory effect on beneficiaries can explain the difference between program beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.
- **Execution of activities:** The lack of impact may be linked to insufficient or non-execution of certain activities. This should be documented in the ongoing monitoring of program activities.
- **Project design:** The Mali PSR program is designed to be flexible with its Objective 4. This may result in the team concentrating on activities linked to current events (COVID-19, Transition) and therefore deemphasizing the other objectives.

12. APPENDICES

Appendix 1: % COVID-19 vaccination by level of education (%)

	None	Primary	Secondary	Supérieur	ALL
No	49,5	49,4	50,3	49,5	49,6
Yes	50,5	50,6	49,7	50,5	50,4

Appendix 2: Reasons for non-vaccination against COVID-19 by region (%)

	Ségou	Mopti	Tbouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
I don't trust vaccines	50,8	48,2	55,9	61,7	77,6	54,4	54,1	53,3
Unavailability of vaccine/ no access	24,3	22,3	10,3	3,4	9,5	5,9	18,0	17,9
Didn't have time	12,8	12,9	19,2	19,4	3,1	7,2	4,6	13,9
Refusal from parents/friends/relatives	0,7	7,2	2,6	4,5	0,7	19,4	9,1	4,1
Fear of injections	6,3	4,3	3,7	8,1	6,0	12,1	9,7	5,9
Incompatible with my state of health	3,9	3,2	8,2	2,8	3,2	1,0	1,9	3,8
It's prohibited							2,6	0,0
I didn't have any information	1,3	1,8						1,0

Appendix 3: Participation in Mali PSR program activities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
No	31,6	23,4	19,8	13,5	32,6	4,5	2,3	23,1
Yes, once	6,2	17,9	14,2	7,0	1,7	30,3	24,9	11,6
Yes, several times	7,5	8,7	21,4	3,2	0,0	26,3	10,9	9,1
Not aware of the program	54,7	50,0	44,5	76,3	65,7	38,8	61,8	56,2

Appendix 4: Type of Mali PSR activity

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Awareness session	82,8	41,1	78,8	67,5	100,0	39,3	91,1	60,6
Training	45,0	34,4	41,2	48,0		85,7	19,5	43,5
Exchange meeting (workshop)	17,1	8,8	15,6	13,3		17,7	8,4	13,1
Public debate	4,6	5,7	15,0	6,5		1,7		7,1
Intergenerational dialogue	7,3	6,6	5,7			14,8		6,5
Multi-stakeholder dialogue	2,8	0,9		3,7			1,9	1,3
Cultural event	0,9	6,5	3,8	3,6				3,9
Participatory theater (with audience participation)		4,2	1,6	1,6				2,1
Conference		1,5	2,4					1,1
Caravan	0,9	13,2	1,4					5,6
Sports competition (soccer match, traditional wrestling, etc.)	1,9	8,7	1,6	7,8		1,1		5,0

Appendix 5: Themes addressed in program activities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Early warning	26,6	6,3	12,9	35,6		9,9	4,6	15,0
Participatory governance / PDSEC review / Access to information from town hall	18,7	10,9	14,3	23,1		6,7		14,0
Conflict prevention, negotiation and dispute resolution	56,0	51,1	52,8	47,4		58,2	63,0	52,6
Youth asset mapping	2,9	3,7	1,2	13,4		5,6		4,1
Violent extremism	2,5	18,2	8,9	18,8		46,0	1,9	15,3
Effective communication techniques and negotiations	9,6	7,8	2,7	3,6		16,5	3,9	7,3
Various community problems	12,4	7,7	11,3			4,5	2,0	8,3
Herders and farmers	15,2	6,9	9,9	2,3		0,9	4,8	8,2
Return of displaced persons	5,7	2,4	12,6				4,3	4,8
Reconciliation and reintegration	18,8	11,3	22,8			11,7		14,1

Appendix 6: Lessons learned from participation in Mali PSR activities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ENS
living together	31,1	56,7	37,0	48,9	92,1	43,1	6,3	45,2
Conflict management	33,2	10,9	25,8	23,5		9,4	67,2	20,0
Leadership training	6,2	4,6	5,3	3,0		30,3		7,0
Importance of peace	13,8	9,5			7,9	5,4		7,0
Welcoming displaced persons		1,8	9,8	11,7		1,7		4,1
Citizenship	13,7	5,6	0,6	6,5		7,4		6,4
IGA	2,0	2,0	0,8	2,3				1,6
Women's place in society		2,7	5,6			2,8		2,5
Prevention COVID		6,2	15,1	4,1			26,4	6,2

Appendix 7: Effectiveness of conflict management efforts by region

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Not at all effective	2,7	5,4	4,6	20,6	1,2	18,7		7,5
Weakly effective	21,1	23,1	23,5	50,0	85,2	38,0	17,2	29,3
Somewhat effective	45,0	48,4	64,2	24,6	13,6	36,8	56,5	44,1
Very effective	29,0	20,6	6,5	4,5		5,8	22,3	17,3
Don't know	2,3	2,5	1,1	0,3		0,7	4,1	1,9

Appendix 8: Effectiveness of conflict management efforts by beneficiary and non-beneficiary status

	No bénéficiaire	Bénéficiaire	ALL
Not at all effective	8,6	3,9	7,5
Weakly effective	30,8	24,3	29,3
Somewhat effective	42,7	48,4	44,1
Very effective	15,4	23,4	17,3
Don't know	2,4		1,9

Appendix 9: Participation in conflict management activities

	Non bénéficiary	Bénéficiary	ALL
Yes	3,4	72,6	17,8
No	96,6	27,4	82,2

Appendix 10: Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors, by level of education

	None	Primary	Secondary	Superior	ALL
I don't like it at all	1,3	0,3	0,7		0,8
I don't like it	6,0	2,6	3,5	0,5	4,2
I am indifferent	11,9	8,4	14,1	5,7	10,7
I like it	52,8	52,9	51,1	44,1	51,9
I like it	27,9	35,5	30,7	49,7	32,3
Don't know	0,1	0,3			0,1

Appendix 11: Acceptance of sharing income-generating activities with different ethnic groups

	No bénéficiary	Bénéficiary	ALL
I don't like it at all	2,0	2,4	2,1
I don't like it	5,7	3,6	5,2
I am indifferent	11,1	13,2	11,6
I like it	48,9	44,9	48,1
I like it	31,8	35,6	32,6
Don't know	0,5	0,2	0,4

Appendix 12: Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
I don't like it at all	1,5	8,4	1,4	1,6	5,6	3,0	0,8	3,8
I don't like it	2,1	7,6	3,6	8,3	34,3	9,7	4,0	6,4
I am indifferent	6,0	14,8	11,9	21,2	14,5	16,9	2,2	13,0
I like it	34,6	37,3	44,7	49,6	21,1	37,6	54,7	39,4
I like it	55,8	31,9	37,1	18,9	24,6	18,4	26,2	36,6
Don't know			1,4	0,4		14,3	12,1	0,7

Appendix 13: Confidence in local elected officials in your commune to keep the company's interests at heart

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudénit	ALL
Not at all confident	11,9	9,2	10,1	10,1	9,8	19,4		10,6
Low confidence	21,8	29,6	32,4	32,8	54,0	27,2	5,5	28,8
Some confidence	46,8	44,2	32,2	39,9	19,6	45,8	47,9	42,0
Very confident	16,9	16,0	18,8	16,0	16,6	6,5	36,3	16,4
Don't know	2,6	0,9	6,5	1,2		1,1	10,3	2,2

Appendix 14: Opinions on integrating veterans into the community

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Very favourable	40,5	28,3	17,5	34,7	35,9	55,4	43,2	33,1
Favorable	30,0	29,2	53,5	41,5	26,0	31,3	38,6	35,0
Not very favourable	17,5	19,3	21,9	12,3	32,3	8,4	11,9	17,7
Very unfavorable	11,6	22,3	6,8	11,3	5,9	4,9		13,8
Don't know	0,3	0,9	0,4	0,2			6,3	0,5
Respondent base	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Appendix 15: Level of fear that veterans will create violence by returning to communities

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
No worries at all	34,5	13,2	37,8	44,1	34,3	63,2	68,1	31,4
Somewhat concerned	20,4	24,4	28,6	30,3	46,5	24,9	22,6	25,6
Quite a lot	23,4	23,9	17,7	11,5	12,5	5,8	1,6	19,5
A lot of worries	21,1	37,8	13,5	12,8	6,7	6,1		22,6
Don't know	0,6	0,6	2,4	1,3			7,8	0,9

Appendix 16: Preferred actors for conflict resolution

	Non bénéficiary	Bénéficiary	ALL
Village chief	88,8	89,1	88,9
Village Imam	78,7	75,0	77,9
Mayor	59,4	62,2	60,0
Griot	13,3	11,1	12,9
Nearest armed group	7,5	7,4	7,5
Youth president	6,5	5,0	6,2
Family heads/elders	4,2	12,4	5,9
Village chief's advisor	4,0	5,3	4,3
Gendarmerie	3,9	3,4	3,8
Don't know	3,6	1,7	3,2
Commander	1,9	1,2	1,8
Governor	1,0		0,8
Justice	0,6	0,8	0,6
Closest jihadist group	0,6	0,7	0,6
Pastor/priest	0,3	0,5	0,3
MP	0,3		0,2
Female leader/CAFO	0,1	0,3	0,2
Hunter leader	0,0		0,0

Appendix 17: Opinion on the implementation of the Algiers Agreement

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Favorable	11,3	10,9	35,7	44,4	96,6	65,3	89,3	26,1
Neutral/No opinion	40,4	29,7	23,4	28,9	3,1	6,8	3,4	30,4

Unfavourable	44,2	57,4	32,7	21,3		26,1		39,5
Don't know	4,2	2,0	8,1	5,4	0,3	1,8	7,4	4,1

Appendix 18: Reasons for rejecting the peace and reconciliation agreement

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Ménaka	ENS
Implementing the agreement means dividing the country	71,3	52,0	33,5	31,4	75,4	55,3
The agreement was signed under duress	42,9	23,2	65,4	54,6	46,0	38,7
Mali will lose the mineral wealth of the North (oil, gold, gas, uranium, etc.)	32,9	38,5	11,1	4,0	24,0	29,5
Implementing the agreement means rewarding those who took up arms	33,6	23,5	24,5	11,1	44,3	26,4
The agreement was signed in a foreign country	26,8	24,1	20,7	28,6	17,0	25,1
This will lead to conflict	12,6	28,2	14,2	14,7	28,3	19,7
Terrorists will settle permanently in the north	21,2	18,4	13,2	4,4	43,6	17,9

Appendix 19: Level of knowledge of the content of the Algiers Agreement

	Non bénéficiaire	Bénéficiaire	ALL
No knowledge	39,9	31,6	38,1
Little knowledge	53,2	53,8	53,3
Good knowledge	6,6	14,3	8,3
Very good knowledge	0,2	0,2	0,2
Refuse to answer	0,0	0,0	0,0

Appendix 20: Agreement points known to the public

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudénit	ENS
DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration)	44	59,2	74,5	66,8	84,6	94,2	84,1	61,7
Organization of the constitutional referendum	27,6	22,1	32,5	53,3	35,3	55,3	24,6	32,7
No	33,2	23,6	21,4	17,6		2,2	6,2	22,4
Creation of a development zone for the North Creation of a Senate for the North	18,8	19,3	21,5	10,9	13,6	19	14,7	17,7
Regionalization (giving more power to the regions)	15,7	19,4	16,6	12,1	22,1	21,7	8,8	17
Autonomy in budgeting, taxation and management of basic social services	24,2	5,4	1,8	2,5	2,5	4,2	13	9,4
Direct election by universal suffrage of regional presidents/governors	9,7	4,7	9	8,8	5,4	4,3	1,2	7,3
Creation of a territorial police force under the authority of the president of the local executive	6,2	4,6	2,7	5,8	1,9	11,5	11,8	5,3
Reform of the justice system, integrating traditional and customary mechanisms	5,5	3,5	3,6	0,8	0,7	14	3,9	4

Appendix 21: Opinions on the quality of service provision in terms of efficiency and regularity in your commune

	Ségou	Mopti	Tombouctou	Gao	Kidal	Ménaka	Taoudéni	ALL
Very poor quality	3,5	2,0	0,9	13,4	14,0	2,1		5,0
Poor quality	15,4	14,5	22,5	28,3	57,9	11,4	10,6	19,7
Acceptable quality	47,3	57,3	62,0	41,7	10,3	56,0	52,2	50,2
Good quality	29,4	25,7	9,9	13,4	16,3	7,2	8,5	21,5
Don't know	4,4	0,6	4,7	3,2	1,5	23,4	28,7	3,7

Appendix 22: Level of participation in community activities by non-beneficiaries

	Participated in a meeting	Participated in sanitation events in your community	Contacted or visited a community leader or state official	Attended a meeting or rally organized by a political party/candidate	Participated in a local event	Sign a petition	Writing on social media like Facebook or Twitter	Encourage your community, young people and women to make contact with the other community
For the past six months	36,0	39,0	21,4	14,9	14,6	5,2	10,7	15,0
For longer	16,0	19,6	8,8	28,9	11,9	5,8	3,4	11,1
Could do	41,3	32,1	58,5	38,9	43,0	53,8	40,9	56,0
Will never do	3,7	6,3	6,9	12,6	24,7	28,1	38,3	13,7
Don't know	3,0	2,9	4,4	4,6	5,8	7,1	6,7	4,2

Appendix 23: Level of beneficiary participation in community activities

	Participated in a meeting	Participated in sanitation events in your community	Contacted or visited a community leader or state official	Attended a meeting or rally organized by a political party/candidate	Participated in a local event	Sign a petition	Writing on social media like Facebook or Twitter	Encourage your community, young people and women to make contact with the other community
For the past six months	58,7	56,2	34,8	25,2	22,3	6,9	14,2	25,8
For longer	21,6	20,7	14,6	28,5	22,7	8,3	3,8	17,9
Could do	16,8	18,1	45,5	35,1	32,6	56,9	34,5	44,2
Will never do	1,2	3,2	1,0	8,9	19,6	20,3	36,4	8,7
Don't know	1,7	1,8	4,2	2,3	2,8	7,6	11,1	3,4

Appendix 24: Level of beneficiary participation in community activities (Total)

	Non beneficiary	beneficiary	All
Encourage your community, young people and women to make contact with the other community	504	220	724

Writing on social media like Facebook or Twitter	272	91	363
Sign a petition	212	77	289
Participated in a local event	511	227	738
Attended a meeting or rally organized by a political party/candidate	846	271	1117
Contacted or visited a community leader or state official	583	249	832
Participated in sanitation events in your community	1131	388	1519
Participated in a meeting	1004	405	1408

Appendix 25: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about the Importance of Respecting the Transition Timetable

	non beneficiaries	beneficiaries	All
Very important	22,2% ^{oa}	21,6% ^{oa}	22,1%
Important	17,8% ^{oa}	20,7% ^{oa}	18,4%
Not important	29,2% ^{oa}	34,0% ^{ob}	30,2%
Not important to all	25,6% ^{oa}	21,7% ^{oa}	24,8%
Do not Know	5,2% ^{oa}	2,1% ^{ob}	4,6%

a=no differences

Appendix 26: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Voting intentions for general elections

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Not at all (I don't vote)	5,4% ^a	5,2% ^a	5,3%
No, maybe I won't vote	5,1% ^a	3,4% ^a	4,7%
Yes, I intend to vote	63,5% ^a	58,0% ^{ob}	62,3%
Yes, I will definitely vote	24,7% ^a	32,7% ^{ob}	26,3%
Don't know	1,4% ^a	0,7% ^a	1,3%

a=no differences

Appendix 27: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about ability to influence decisions at local level

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Strongly Disagree	15,5% ^a	11,0% ^b	14,6%
Disagree	26,0% ^a	29,3% ^a	26,7%
Somewhat agree	36,3% ^a	37,3% ^a	36,5%
Completely agree	18,4% ^a	18,9% ^a	18,5%

Don't know	3,8% _a	3,5% _a	3,7%
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Appendix 28: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about reintegration of displaced persons into the community

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Very favourable	63,6% _a	58,7% _{ob}	62,6%
Favorable	33,7% _a	38,6% _{ob}	34,7%
Not very favourable	1,6% _a	2,0% _a	1,6%
Very unfavorable	1,0% _a	0,6% _a	,9%
Don't know	0,2% _a	0,1% _a	,2%

Appendix 29: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about reintegrating ex-combatants

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Very favorable	33,3% _a	32,2% _a	33,1%
Favorable	35,6% _a	32,5% _a	35,0%
Not very favorable	17,1% _a	19,9% _a	17,7%
Very unfavourable	13,4% _a	15,2% _a	13,8%
Don't know	0,6% _a	0,2% _a	,5%

Appendix 30: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Using violence against the government

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Disagree at all	63,1% _a	64,6% _a	63,4%
Disagree	26,7% _a	26,4% _a	26,7%
Tend to agree	7,5% _a	5,5% _a	7,1%
Completely agree	1,7% _a	2,1% _a	1,8%
Don't know	0,9% _a	1,3% _a	1,0%

Appendix 31: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Joining actions of civil disobedience

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Disagree at all	54,4% _a	55,1% _a	54,6%
Disagree	24,3% _a	24,3% _a	24,3%
Tend to agree	15,4% _a	15,3% _a	15,4%
Completely agree	4,9% _a	4,6% _a	4,8%
Don't know	1,0% _a	0,7% _a	,9%

Appendix 32: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To get revenge on others who have committed a crime against them

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Never justifiable	84,5% ^{oa}	86,5% ^{oa}	84,9%
Sometimes justifiable	12,7% ^{oa}	12,2% ^{oa}	12,6%
Always justifiable	1,5% ^{oa}	0,7% ^{oa}	1,3%
Don't know	1,3% ^{oa}	0,7% ^{oa}	1,2%

Appendix 33: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group to ensure a secure income for their household in case they don't have work

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Never justifiable	85,3% ^{oa}	89,3% ^b	86,1%
Sometimes justifiable	12,2% ^{oa}	8,6% ^b	11,5%
Always justifiable	1,3% ^{oa}	1,4% ^{oa}	1,3%
Don't know	1,2% ^{oa}	0,7% ^{oa}	1,1%

Appendix 34: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To get justice when the government is weak or absent

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Never justifiable	84,3% ^{oa}	87,6% ^{oa}	85,0%
Sometimes justifiable	12,3% ^{oa}	8,5% ^b	11,5%
Always justifiable	2,3% ^{oa}	2,7% ^{oa}	2,4%
Don't know	1,0% ^{oa}	1,3% ^{oa}	1,1%

Appendix 35: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To gain respect in their community

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Never justifiable	83,0% ^{oa}	87,9% ^b	84,0%
Sometimes justifiable	14,5% ^{oa}	9,2% ^b	13,4%
Always justifiable	1,5% ^{oa}	2,2% ^{oa}	1,6%

Don't know	1,0% ^a	0,7% ^a	1,0%
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Appendix 36: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about justification for joining a radical group To defend their religion against enemies

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Never justifiable	78,2% ^a	80,4% ^a	78,6%
Sometimes justifiable	13,6% ^a	12,1% ^a	13,3%
Always justifiable	7,6% ^a	6,9% ^a	7,5%
Don't know	0,6% ^a	0,6% ^a	,6%

Appendix 37: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about understanding between ethnic groups

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
I get along very badly	0,7% ^a	2,1% ^b	1,0%
I don't get along well	2,3% ^a	1,6% ^a	2,2%
I get along well	51,2% ^a	51,6% ^a	51,3%
I get along very well	44,5% ^a	43,4% ^a	44,2%
It depends on the group	1,1% ^a	1,3% ^a	1,1%
Don't know	0,2% ^a		,2%

Appendix 38: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of different ethnic groups as neighbors

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
I don't like it at all	0,6% ^a	1,5% ^b	,8%
I don't like it	4,3% ^a	3,8% ^a	4,2%
I am indifferent	10,9% ^a	9,9% ^a	10,7%
I love him	52,3% ^a	50,3% ^a	51,9%
I like it	31,7% ^a	34,5% ^a	32,3%
Don't know	0,1% ^a		,1%

Appendix 39: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of different ethnic groups as guests for a meal together

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
I don't like it at all	0,7% ^a	1,6% ^b	,9%
I don't like it	4,0% ^a	3,8% ^a	3,9%
I am indifferent	7,8% ^a	8,5% ^a	7,9%
I love him	52,9% ^a	48,1% ^a	51,9%

I like it	34,4% ^{0a}	38,0% ^{0a}	35,1%
Don't know	0,3% ^{0a}		,2%

Appendix 40: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of sharing a cultivable field with different ethnic groups

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
I don't like it at all	1,6% ^{0a}	2,7% ^{0a}	1,8%
I don't like it	7,0% ^{0a}	5,5% ^{0a}	6,7%
I am indifferent	10,6% ^{0a}	9,8% ^{0a}	10,4%
I love him	47,8% ^{0a}	44,6% ^{0a}	47,2%
I like it	31,9% ^{0a}	36,2% ^{0a}	32,8%
Don't know	1,1% ^{0a}	1,2% ^{0a}	1,1%

Appendix 41: Differences of opinion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries about Acceptance of marriage with different ethnic groups

	no Beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
I don't like it at all	3,8% ^{0a}	3,5% ^{0a}	3,8%
I don't like it	6,2% ^{0a}	7,1% ^{0a}	6,4%
I am indifferent	12,9% ^{0a}	13,7% ^{0a}	13,0%
I love him	41,0% ^{0a}	33,4% ^{0b}	39,4%
I like it	35,6% ^{0a}	40,6% ^{0b}	36,6%
Don't know	0,5% ^{0a}	1,7% ^{0b}	,7%