

Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Project Portfolio In Somalia

Evaluation Report

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Executive Summary

Country Context and Peacebuilding Fund Support

1. Somalia has made important strides on its peacebuilding and state-building agenda. After 25 years of civil war, the country carried out an indirect election and established the Federal government in 2012. This development in combination with other military and political transitions created an opportunity for a new political agreement in the country.¹ In 2013, the country signed the New Deal Compact² as an agreement among all levels of the Somali government and the international community for inclusive political dialogue, reconciliation and rehabilitation of Somalia. The Compact focused on imperative political and socio-economic priorities: building inclusive politics, security, justice, the country's economic foundations, revenue collection and the provision of services.³

2. According to a study done by the Overseas Development Institute (2017), the New Deal Compact has contributed to key results such as the re-engagement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and supporting the process of obtaining debt relief.⁴ With the introduction of the New Deal Compact, the Federal and regional governments have taken increased ownership of assistance-related decision-making and a larger share of international resources have been channeled through national systems.⁵ The Compact's principles have served as a foundation for the establishment of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), a centerpiece for the partnership between the Somalia government and the international community.⁶ Additional barriers still exist for peacebuilding and state-building efforts in the country including historical clan-grievances, the presence of extremist groups, absence of a functioning justice system, limited resources, climate shocks and ongoing lack of economic opportunities especially for women and youth.

3. The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) made its first investment in Somalia in 2009, and by 2019 the total amount of PBF funding approved for the country reached US\$55.64 million for 29 projects. From its launch in Somalia in 2009 to date, PBF has supported projects implemented by 15 Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs) in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States, and civil society.⁷ The PBF investment is comparatively modest among pooled funds in the country; however, the PBF asserts having added value in demonstrating and piloting new models and thus strategically positioning itself in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

4. The current cycle of the PBF portfolio in Somalia (Starting from 2015) can be classified in three phases: the "First Phase" is comprised of Immediate Response Facility (IRF) projects developed in 2015/2016, the "Second Phase" consists of Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) projects (and associated IRFs) organized around the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) (2016/2017), and the "Third Phase" consists of PRFs complemented by Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) IRF projects developed in 2018/2019. In the First Phase, a series of IRFs were developed that tended to focus on emergent needs and covered interventions targeting a mix of levels or beneficiaries including National level engagement (such as women's participation in political representation or improving federal administrative capacity), State levels (such as establishing functional rule of law), or District levels (such as the reformation of District Councils and development of Community-Based Action Plans (CAPs) in newly liberated Districts). The first project implemented under this

¹OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview - 2019

²The New Deal Compact for Somalia consists of the five New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), and subsets of three to four priorities per goal. The five PSGs are: (1) legitimate and inclusive politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services.

³EU. 2013. *The Somali Compact*

⁴ODI, 2017. *The New Deal in Somalia: An independent review of the Somali Compact, 2014-2016*

⁵PBF. 2016. *Peacebuilding Priority Plan*

⁶UNDP. 2017. *Operations Manual for SDRF Funding Windows*

⁷PBF. 2019. *Renewal of Somalia's UN Peacebuilding Fund Eligibility*

PBF cycle was the District level-oriented IRF-116 Support to Stabilization Project (S2S). The IRF-116 S2S supported the deployment and reestablishment of caretaker administrations in newly liberated Districts within four States (the South West States (SWS), Jubbaland, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle). Additional IRF projects were also developed in 2015 and 2016 to respond to emergent strategic needs not covered by other funds. In 2016, a three-year PPP was developed with the Government of Somalia and the United Nations to serve as an overarching framework for the PBF portfolio of support to Somalia for the 2016-2019 period. This PPP component had a specific focus on implementation in the newly established SWS and Jubbaland. The PPP was intended to provide the framework for guiding the PRF project conceptualizations, selection, and management as well as to track progress of the PBF portfolio of support against articulated strategic objectives.⁸ The PPP outcomes were aligned with the four PBF Priority Areas and the Peace and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) laid out in the 2013 New Deal Compact for Somalia. In particular, the PBF portfolio of support – as articulated by the PPP – was aligned with PSGs 3 (Justice), 4 (Economic Foundations), and 5 (Revenues and Services) in newly recovered areas and contribute to the 2017-2019 National Development Plan. The PBF Portfolio of support – as articulated in the PPP – aimed to address four primary pillars: i) Building the legitimacy of the state; ii) Supporting local reconciliation processes; iii) Inclusive economic and social growth; and, iv) Building the capacity of the government at local and Federal level. The following Table profiles the projects from the first two Phases. These are the projects under review in this evaluation.

Table ES1: PBF Portfolio Projects under review (2015-2018)

Phase	Projects and Implementation Period
First Phase (approved in 2015/2016)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support (31/08/2015-31/08/2016) 2. PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women’s role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia (13/07/2015-31/12/2016) 3. PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences (15/09/2015-30/04/2017) 4. PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S) (13/05/2015-31/12/2017) 5. PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF) (17/08/2015-28/02/2018)
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia (14/12/2016-31/08/2019) 2. PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) -Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States (14/12/2016-31/08/2019) 3. PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (19/01/2017-31/12/2018) 4. PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations (National Window) (20/05/2016-30/06/2017) 5. PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia (19/09/2016-30/06/2018)

Evaluation Scope and Methodology

5. The purpose of this evaluation is to understand and assess the achievements of the PBF’s support in this cycle and its overall added value to peacebuilding in Somalia. This is the first comprehensive evaluation of the PBF portfolio in the country and is intended to be a summative evaluation for the period of 2015-2019. The evaluation will be used to concurrently distil learning from and strengthen the peacebuilding apparatus, as well as

⁸ IRF modalities can still be employed within the PPP framework as well.

contribute to the PBF upcoming “eligibility-renewal” process in Somalia. The objectives of the evaluation exercise are:

- a) Assess to what extent PBF's support has had a concrete and sustained impact in terms of sustaining peace in Somalia;
- b) Assess how relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable PBF's support to Somalia has been;
- c) Determine the catalytic effects of PBF's support to Somalia and assess fundraising strategies by implementing partners and the PBF;
- d) Assess where the critical remaining peacebuilding gaps in Somalia are;
- e) Assess whether the peacebuilding interventions funded by the PBF successfully contributed to promoting the women's, peace and security agendas as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325;
- f) Provide lessons for future PBF support in terms of programme design, implementation modalities and partnerships;
- g) Assess the overall monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approach of the portfolio, identify lessons and make recommendations for the M&E design of any future portfolio.

6. One additional consideration for the evaluation objectives is that all of the specific projects supported within the PBF portfolio were expected to carry out their own individual project evaluations. The SOM D-1 Midnimo and SOM D-2) Daldhis projects – the two cornerstone projects for the portfolio of support – did not implement specific individual project evaluations as per agreement that the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) would manage their evaluations. Consequently, while this PBF evaluation mandate is to assess the collective entirety of the PBF portfolio of support, special attention was given to the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM D-2 Daldhis projects as part of this review.

7. The evaluation drew on both qualitative and quantitative measures. The quantitative measures were obtained from pre-existing documentation including project reports and evaluations and are associated with the individual project logframe indicators. Qualitative data was collected during the evaluation inception and field mission. The evaluation team conducted key informant interviews (KIIs) or group interviews. Due to security constraints, the bulk of engagement was limited to the national level stakeholders in Mogadishu. However, field visits were carried out to the two United Nations sub-offices in the targeted states (Baidoa in SWS and Kismayo in Jubbaland) and additional district level stakeholders and citizens were interviewed by the national Somali team member (see Figure 2 on page 13). Additional virtual interviews were also carried out when stakeholders could not be accessed due to security considerations. In total, 86 persons (26 percent female) were interviewed either individually or in groups.

Findings

Relevance, Results and Contributions

8. **Relevance.** One of the important emergent themes from the patterns of responses related to relevance that has larger implications for PBF programming is how to shape relevance of a portfolio and strategic coherence: *Is the PBF instrument intended to fund the implementation of a programme or is it intended to fund gaps in someone else's programme?* The PBF documentation globally emphasizes the complementary nature of the fund application - to fill gaps and address risks that other donor sources are not able to fulfil and to be a short-term measure until other larger funds can provide support to the proof of concept, or the risk has been mitigated in some manner or the gap addressed. However, one of the challenges for a “filling the gaps” approach is that the collection of projects that are filling gaps when taken out of their context and viewed in isolation will give the appearance of lacking strategic coherence even when they are appropriate and strategic for the context.

9. In Somalia, significant expansive peacebuilding frameworks already exist to guide the greater peacebuilding investment in the country – these include the National Stabilization

Strategy (2018), the Wadajir framework for Local Governance (2016) and the National Development Plan (2017). In Somalia, the PBF portfolio is a relatively small proportion of all peacebuilding funding aligned with these frameworks. The overall annual investment for peacebuilding in Somalia varied between US\$243 million- US\$271 million annually throughout the current PBF cycle.⁹ Annually, the PBF portfolio represents roughly 5 percent of peacebuilding funding in any given year; reportedly ranking 17th among all the donors in Somalia during a donor review in 2018. Due to the relatively small “footprint” of the PBF portfolio in the country and due to the existence of highly elaborated peacebuilding frameworks with articulated conflict drivers already present, the PBF portfolio has, with the exception of the SOM-D2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo projects, taken a “gap-oriented” approach to the support of peacebuilding projects; identifying opportunities to support a diverse range of projects that address gaps in the support provided by the larger donors and investments to peacebuilding in the country. When overlaid against the backdrop of the larger strategic frameworks, the gap-oriented approach is appropriate and strategic for the context.

10. Collectively, the portfolio of projects supported by the PBF are aligned with the aspirations described in the New Deal Compact and the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance.¹⁰ Many of the programmes supported under the portfolio targeted multiple dimensions for change. All the projects do have components that contribute to the larger frameworks used in the country and which prioritize extension of State authority, empowering citizens to demand services, strengthening state- citizen links. All the project designs respond to the changing peacebuilding context in Somalia, making their interventions relevant to address the identified drivers of conflict. However, because of the gap-oriented approach of the portfolio, each project tended to address a range of specific drivers rather than the collection of projects addressing one or two drivers and targeted a range of geographic regions or different government levels across the portfolio. Although the larger frameworks and the individual project conflict drivers are detailed in more elaborate form, the responses to the drivers can be clustered into six general categories: i) systems for handling inter-clan grievances and dispute resolution; ii) provision of basic organizational infrastructure and capacity for delivery of services by Government; iii) Improve inter-Governmental collaborations (Federal, State, District) through resolution of administrative and financial blockages; and iv) Community empowerment for addressing development priorities in collaboration with State authority.

11. Identifying the relevance of the conflict drivers supported or the relevance of the areas targeted is dependent to some extent on an understanding of the larger peacebuilding landscape within which these drivers were operating. The identified drivers are abstracted from existing frameworks. In the project documents, the projects do cite the connection to the larger frameworks and the rationale for their inclusion. Some projects such as IRF-116 Support to Stabilization, IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s Role and Participation in Peacebuilding reference specific drivers of conflict from situation analysis or similar documents from 20013/2014. Others, such as the SOM-D-2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo reference the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance. The use of existing evidence and larger frameworks contributes to the identified conflict drivers being relevant for the portfolio. In triangulation, Government respondents noted that the needs and priorities were identified by the Federal Government of Somalia and partners states and that these were integrated into the programme. They noted that all sectors of the community were involved, and the needs were selected according to the most urgent and which would have the most potential with regards to peace. They also felt that this consultation was done in a spirit of consensus building leading to increased relevance.

12. As an orientation framework, it would have been helpful for the entire portfolio to have developed a gap-analysis document with drivers to allow for a more articulated

⁹ PBSO analysis of OECD DAC Data.

¹⁰ The Framework outlines a community-led process for the formation of representative administrations in districts and consists of four components: social healing, peace dividends, civic dialogues and local governance.

connection between the larger investment environment and the specificities of the portfolio gaps targeted. In terms of relevance for gender or youth programming, the primary orientation of the portfolio has been towards the extension of State Authority and the creation of citizen demand for Governance. These approaches are not, in and of themselves, gender or youth oriented. Three projects did contain explicit gender or youth language (IRF-119, SOM D-2, IRF-152; however for the most part, conflict drivers oriented around gender or youth have not been prominent in the portfolio except as cross-cutting themes to be considered during implementation – such as ensuring substantive participation of women in activities or the formation of youth committees. Part of this lack of emphasis is that significant other peacebuilding investment is targeting gender and youth. For example, the relatively small project for strengthening women’s role in political participation (IRF-122) in the PBF portfolio has been superseded by substantive investment from DFID for supporting the Ministry of Women. The areas where the PBF tends to focus are on those particular gaps that other donors perceive to be higher risk – such as whether from certain benchmarks not yet met in newly liberated districts or because of the lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms.

13. **Results and Contributions:** The consensus from all levels and categories of respondents has been that the PBF portfolio did indeed contribute to peacebuilding outcomes and for creating peacebuilding impact and catalytic effects. The most significant contributions have been in : i) mitigation of inter-clan disputes, negotiations, and representation; ii) developing appropriate administrative and financial systems to the delivery of services; iii) supporting the creation of basic Governance infrastructure and capacity for the delivery of services; and iv) increasing community engagement and organization for connection to state authority.

14. Implicit and explicit indicators of success cited by respondents fell into the fields of governance, community mobilization, resolving land disputes, and economic empowerment. Recurring themes included building social cohesion, the provision of basic services, and the elaboration of Community Action Plans (CAPs). These are referencing components from a range of the portfolio supported projects. The extension of state authority and the successful establishment of state structures was seen as having made positive progress, especially given the difficulties of implementation of these efforts within the newly established States. The establishment of dispute mechanisms and economic development opportunities for youth were also cited as well as facilitating better administrative and political connections between the newly established states and the federal Government. Frequently cited successes were connected to the development of the CAPs under the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme and the construction of improved social cohesion – especially between IDPs and refugee returnees and host populations through the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme and the IRF-152 Kenya Somalia Cross Border Pilot. The CAPs “ were cited as being the foundation for future development and an important guide for coordinating donor investment at the community level.

15. Often in the Government interviews, the positive effects cited had less to do with the products of the programmes but rather the mechanism of *how* they were implemented. The PBF supported projects emphasized the importance of Government led and Government included programming. For example, the IRF-141 National Window project field tested the ability of the Federal Government to deliver infrastructure funds to State and local entities. Priorities were linked to, and developed with, Government stakeholders and Government stakeholders at all levels were seen as the primary implementer of these programmes. Within a context where significant resources are channeled for stabilization and recovery efforts outside of Government management – even if in consultation – projects such as the IRF-141 National Window were highly appreciated and valued by Government stakeholders. The work through the Government was cited by field respondents as improving the visibility of the Government in supplying basic services and increasing trust of the citizens towards the State.

16. Contributions to systemic changes – the integration of community participation into decision-making processes – helped re-establish the trust in the State. The local infrastructure projects, even if they were small, were seen as increasing the visibility of the State and improved community stakeholder satisfaction by addressing their needs and creating improved perceptions of resilience. The CAPs helped improve the harmony and alignment between Ministries at the field level.

17. Among the collection of all of the portfolio, six major dimensions of impact were cited from programme documentation or stakeholder interviews: i) increased capacity for delivery of basic services by Government, ii) increased community engagement and mobilization for interaction with state, iii) increased social cohesion – both between clans and between host communities and IDPs; iv) increased collaboration between Federal and State levels in the transfer of funds and coordination; v) increased economic opportunities for marginalized populations; and vi) increased formal and informal mechanisms for rule of law including opportunities for the settlement of long-standing grievances. The following table summarizes which projects supported in the portfolio contributed to which collective impact dimension.

Table ES2: Project Contributions to Impact

Project	Delivery of Basic Services	Community Mobilization	Social Cohesion	Federal, State, District Connection	Economic Opportunities	Mechanisms for Rule of Law and Grievances
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law						
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role						
PBF/IRF-122 Somalia Reconciliation Conferences						
PBF/IRF-116 (S2S)						
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management						
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis						
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo						
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia Cross-Border Pilot						
PBF/IRF-141 National Window						
PBF/IRF-143: Pilot Studies						

18. Within the qualitative interviews, the most frequently cited of these contributions related to the delivery of basic services and the construction of social cohesion. Both of these elements were achieved through different activities or actions. For example, delivery of basic services, while apparently straightforward, requires the construction of a wide array of social and political infrastructure in order for this to occur including: i) physical infrastructure development; ii) capacity strengthening of Government authorities in technical skills; iii) clarifying respective roles and responsibilities within government systems; and iv) setting up appropriate accountability frameworks. Mechanisms for building social cohesion varied among the projects but included: i) community events or recreational activities, ii) the development of informal mechanisms for dispute resolution; iii) infrastructure development

that connected separated communities; and, iv) the formation of local committees with diverse representation for oversight, monitoring or project steering.

19. For youth, the supported projects have been positive in their inclusion of youth into community processes (SOM-D1 Midnimo); peacebuilding and dispute resolution skills (IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross border); and in access to economic opportunities (SOM-D1 Midnimo, IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross border, SOM D2 Daldhis). However, the number of youths that were affected by the programming is a relatively small proportion of the total youth population. For gender outcome, there has been observed increases in women's participation as a result of the projects, but less progress in women's representation in decision making bodies or Governance. For example, women may participate in community processes such as serving on local community dispute resolution committees or engaging in community planning processes. Women will also participate in the economic development opportunities or vocational training opportunities as provided by the projects in the PBF portfolio. However, women are still under-represented at higher level decision making with low levels of representation on District, State, or Federal Governance structures. This may be a future element for consideration in the PBF portfolio depending on the findings from any gap analysis in terms of other peacebuilding funding towards women's empowerment.

20. Different stakeholders – United Nations, Government, or Citizens – tended to identify different indicators for success and they tended to express varying degrees of enthusiasm for impact level changes. District and State level stakeholders expressed a high degree of optimism and saw progress in the legitimacy of the State, and they could point to very concrete examples of success. The Government level stakeholders cited examples of success that illustrated what might be called “indirect effects or results” – the examples related to how the implementation was supported rather than the specifics of the projects or programmes themselves. The most common example referred to the principle of including Government stakeholders in the design of the projects and promoting the implementation of by Government stakeholders. In the context of Somalia, due to the relatively emergent capacities of Governance at all levels and the volatility of the conflict still in the country, the vast majority of interventions are managed outside of Government structures and process. The implementation of funding transfers, administration, and implementation through Government structures in PBF supported projects was seen as a fundamental contribution of the portfolio in the larger framework.

21. Respondents from the higher levels of the United Nations system also tended to be more measured in terms of their perceptions of the impact of the portfolio. The differences in enthusiasm may have been influenced by relatively higher aspirations of United Nations stakeholders and by some particular coordination challenges within one of the PBF supported programmes. Government and field level respondents perceived the PBF portfolio of support to have had a significant contribution to peacebuilding in the newly established States of the SWS and Jubbaland, particularly with respect to the establishment of CAPs and the solidification of community structures to intersect with Government for development and peacebuilding.

22. Catalytic Effects. Contributions to the generation of catalytic and indirect effects were also profound. In spite of its small size, the portfolio is perceived to be highly impactful for generating positive consequences because of its emphasis on innovation and risk taking. The PBF portfolio was seen as supporting the engagement in newly emerging States with relatively weak institutions and a volatile social context through the SOM/D-2 Daldhis and SOM/D-1 Midnimo Projects to allow for UN Agencies to engage earlier than would have been possible with traditional donors. At the Federal level, the relationship and connection between Federal and State Governments was seen as very weak and a significant impediment to the extension of State Authority in Somalia. Even relatively basic mechanisms such as channeling funds through national Government to local levels for infrastructure development were not established. Thus, relying on national structures for the delivery of basic services was seen as a high risk by donors due the lack of administrative and financial controls which would allow even basic transfers of funds with sufficient accountability to ensure compliance

and appropriate application. The IRF-120 Risk Management Unit and the IRF-141 National Window project supported by the PBF portfolio were seen as instrumental for establishing sufficient accountability mechanisms in administration and financial controls for successful transference from national to local levels for infrastructure which increased donor confidence about being more willing to channel funds through the Federal Government after observing the success of the IRF-141 National Window. The budget allocation through the IRF-141 National Window increased by more than three times from the advent of the project.

23. A core logic articulated for the use of PBF funding in Somalia was to test “**proof of concept**” as another catalytic effect where an innovation was “tested” within the frame of a small project for a limited period and then if deemed successful, would be scaled up through other sources of funding. The SOM/D-1 Midnimo programme of UN Habitat and IOM contains multiple examples of this proof of concept. The next cycle of SOM-D1 Midnimo is now being supported by additional donors to be implemented in other States outside of the original SWS and Jubbaland including Hirshabelle, Galmudug and Puntland. The CAP processes within the SOM/D-1 Midnimo programme are now being integrated into other programming from other donors.

24. UN Agency representatives also appreciated the emphasis of the portfolio on **flexibility**. The **promotion of a multi-stakeholder approach** is seen through the emphasis on supporting **joint programming** within the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), and through the multi-layered engagement of stakeholders within a single project/programme in the portfolio (SOM/D-1 Midnimo, SOM/D-2 Daldhis, IRF-141 National Window, IRF-116 Support to Stabilization (S2S) among others). Joint programming practices are already a significant part of UN Somalia programming. One UNDP noted that around 80 percent of its portfolio in Somalia are joint programmes (compared to about eight percent globally). Even so, respondents frequently mentioned that the PBF encouraged agencies, and even internal departments within agencies, to coordinate and work together through the PBF portfolio and to be intentional about seeking out new collaboration opportunities that would foment the **crossing of expertise**. UN Agencies routinely cited convening together in collective brainstorming sessions to identify possible conflict drivers and mutual collaborations for points of entry. For example, the SOM/D-2 Daldhis programme created opportunities for UNDP, UNIDO, ILO, UN Habitat, UNICEF, to combine forces within a single programme.

25. Projects that were seen as **unblocking processes**, that had created barriers to promoting peace. The primary examples cited for unblocking processes related to the blockages in coordination and connections between Federal, State and District level governance. The IRF-120 Risk Management Unit and the IRF-141 contributed to unblocking the processes through targeting Financial and Administrative Processes between levels while the IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences supported substantive clan-based negotiations that led to balanced political representation at State levels. Another significant block related to the backlog of clan grievances from 30 years of war. These grievances were traditionally handled through the informal courts systems, but the backlog of 30 years of grievances had created a point where clan negotiations on new settlements could no longer continue until the old grievances had been addressed. The support to the Rule of Law programming through IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme, and SOM-D2 Daldhis, and the SOM-D1 Midnimo contributed to reducing this backlog of grievances by re-establishing the mechanisms for these issues to be addressed. The SOM-D1 Midnimo was cited for the **creation of networks** at the community levels that later served as platforms for facilitating other peacebuilding work. The CAPs developed through the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme were later used by the communities to solicit and direct additional donor funding for peacebuilding. The peace committees formed by the programme were used to continue to support redress of grievances and to facilitate substance based negotiations. The formation of the women’s committees was used by the Ministry of Women to promote increased women’s representation in local and national governance structures.

26. Perhaps the one catalytic effect that was not frequently mentioned pertained to **timely responsiveness** to emergent political opportunities, or rather, this was perceived differently by different stakeholders. The emergence of the newly established States of SWS and Jubbaland and the subsequent area based intervention logic was reflective of a timely response to an emerging political opportunity and was the point of focus for the Second Phase projects under the PPP. However, many UN Agency respondents – especially those at the higher levels in the United Nations – considered the processes of the PBF to be relatively slow to be able to respond to other political opportunities (as opposed to development opportunities created by political decisions). In the Somalia context, the political agreements and negotiations are constant and volatile as clan-based interests are negotiated within the existing political structure. Blockages would emerge in the establishment of political structures due to underlying clan dynamics. Opportunities would emerge where a targeted form of support could provide timely contribution to the establishment of political and governance structures. However, the pace of PBF approval processes were seen as being more appropriate to a development-oriented time scale rather than the more volatile governance and political environment.

27. There were a few projects that if only examining their project documentation would not seemed to be aligned with the **innovation** criteria, particularly with respect to the pre-existing programmes that had received additional funding from the PBF. The IRF-116 S2S, the IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law, and the three programmes located under the SOM-D2 Daldhis umbrella (Rule of Law, Local Governance, and Youth Empowerment¹¹) were all examples of pre-existing programmes that had received “top up” funding from the PBF. However, in each of these contexts, there were innovation or risk taking considerations leading to these funding decisions. The three SOM-D2 Daldhis joint programmes were funded under the innovation of promoting area based interventions in newly established States. The IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law funding was to facilitate **rapid implementation** of a programme that had its normal funding delayed and the IRF-116 S2S programme was to also attract implementation to those regions that were considered more **high risk** for other donors because of insufficient accountability structures required before donors would disburse funding.

28. Another important catalytic or cascade effect was the construction of **synergies** among and within the projects supported by the portfolio. The area-based interventions under the PPP (SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis) were seen as providing an opportunity for **synergy** among field level UN actors and provided improved operational coordination of interventions and allowing for **crossing expertise** within a single programme building on the strengths of different United Nations Agencies. Finally, there appeared to be **synergies** built from combining different “soft” and “hard” approaches within a single programme. The establishment of committees, strengthening the capacities of individuals for governance, and facilitating systems of management and administration were also combined with the delivery of infrastructure and visible physical products to good effect. The catalytic effects related to **increasing stakeholder commitment** to peacebuilding or extending **stakeholder participation in the peacebuilding agenda** are present, but not quite as relevant to a context such as Somalia where there is not really a strong need for convincing stakeholders of the importance of peacebuilding work and where almost all actors within UNCT could be considered to be contributing to peacebuilding in some manner.

Management and Coordination

29. Efficiency. Efficiency in the implementation of individual projects is usually assessed through a comparison of the output level indicators achieved in the projects against planned targets and in cost efficiency through a comparison of budget to expenditure. The efficiency of individual projects is relatively high given the operating context in Somalia. At least 80 percent of the portfolio output level indicators met expected targets and 71 percent of the

¹¹ This is referencing the Youth Empowerment component of Daldhis, there is another Youth Empowerment project in the Third Phase of the portfolio, but this is not considered within this evaluation

funds allocated through the portfolio were recorded as being spent in line with their budget forecasts. Only three projects reported achieving fewer than 90 percent of their targeted outputs (SOM-D2 Daldhis, IRF-143 Coordination Support, and IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law (2015)).

30. The main exception to efficiency is the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme and the three pre-existing programmes within the project. Although a successful programme in terms of impact, the management and coordination of the programme was a source of frustration. The rationale for inclusion of pre-existing programmes within a PBF portfolio is through the experimentation of the area-based intervention logic and the risk of early entry of these programmes into the newly established States. The pre-existing individual joint programmes under SOM-D2 Daldhis already had their own individual steering committees and these joint programmes covered geographic regions beyond the SWS and Jubbaland. The PBF's own requirement for a steering committee and separate reporting requirements for the SOM-D2 Daldhis project created some overlapping and potentially contradictory mandates and required significant additional efforts of time and energy to manage a "joint programme of joint programmes". Combining the three joint programmes also had implications for delivery of funding and led to some tensions among the United Nations Agencies involved.

31. In terms of strategic responsiveness, all respondents noted that the PBF coordination and constant consultation and integration with the UNCT and the political mission provided a good opportunity for the fund to be applied as opportunities emerged. The presence of a coordinator of the fund based in Mogadishu was also seen as helping with the identification of potential points of interventions for the fund within a rapidly changing context.

32. With the exception of SOM-D2 Daldhis, development stakeholders (those United Nations personnel from Agencies, Funds, and Programmes who were implementing projects) perceived the PBF as sufficiently timely within acceptable parameters. The programmatic level development respondents were more critical, but this criticism was mostly located among the respondents from the various SOM-D2 Daldhis sub-programmes and is more likely related to particularities of that specific programme rather than the PBF as an instrument. However, the most vocal criticisms of timeliness came from stakeholders in the political dimension of the mission (those United Nations personnel from the political offices such as the Special representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Deputy SRSG, and others oriented towards political negotiations and agreements). These stakeholders saw the potential of the Fund to increase support to the Mission's engagement in the political arena itself. The PBF modalities as currently implemented were not seen as sufficiently agile by the political mission stakeholders to be able respond to the political opportunities even if they can align with the development opportunities.

33. Effectiveness. The portfolio is perceived to be effective in contributing to higher level outcomes. For example, the PBF portfolio of support allowed for significant contributions to peacebuilding to occur sooner than would have been the case with traditional donors in the newly established States of the South-West State and of Jubbaland, particularly with respect to the establishment of CAPs and the solidification of community structures to intersect with Government for development and peacebuilding as well as the establishment of mechanisms for channeling funds through Federal Government to State and District Governments.

34. Factors that supported programmatic effectiveness included the integrated coordination of the PBF portfolio within the broader coordination bodies in the Mission (the UNCT, the Programme Management Team (PMT), and so forth). This coordination was seen as an important factor for allowing the portfolio to contribute to achieving the broader strategic objectives of the United Nations during this cycle. Respondents described processes of substantive consultation organized by the PBF to identify possible interventions and to promote joint programming collaborations to respond to these areas of intervention. Multiple iterations of conversation and analysis were carried out with programme-level Agency representative as well as with the more strategic level UNCT representatives and Government to fine tune the concepts even before presentation for approval through the formal approval processes. The ET would consider this to be a positive and beneficial process

to ensure good delivery and coherence of the fund. There are challenges with strategic oversight of the fund itself through this mechanism.

35. Strategic level respondents are able to verbally articulate the strategic coherence of the individual gap-oriented projects and are able to articulate their linkage to the larger strategic frameworks present in the context. However, this conceptualization of a gap-oriented portfolio is not well captured in existing documentation. Project reports on individual projects and evaluations of individual projects are the responsibilities of the Agencies receiving funds. This can provide insights into the performance and impact of a specific project supported by the PBF, but the collection of multiple individual evaluations of distinct projects cannot capture collective impact in a gap-oriented portfolio. The existing PBSO programme documentation, and the associated PBF monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, cannot sufficiently capture the coherence, logic or contributions to impact of the collective portfolio – especially when the portfolio is a gap-oriented portfolio embedded within a larger suite of support to peacebuilding and a larger peacebuilding framework. This can present challenges both for supporting institutional memory during transitions but also for demonstrating “value for money” to donors of the collective gap-oriented portfolio. The existing PBF process cycle management tools need to be adapted to better align with a gap-oriented, niche-oriented, pre-existing frameworks.

36. The context of Somalia presents so many opportunities for peacebuilding given its very emergent nature that some of the logics and approaches do not fit as easily into current PBF procedures as others. Discerning which logics to emphasize and how to adapt the PBF instrument has management and coordination implications for the instrument and leads to two important questions: “*what should be the role of the PBF coordinator (in this type of gap-oriented approach)?*” and “*Who should be the most appropriate body for providing strategic oversight of a gap-oriented approach?*”

37. The ET finds that effectiveness of the PBF management and coordination has been enhanced through the physical presence of a full-time PBF coordinator in Mogadishu. However, there does not appear to be a shared understanding of what role the PBF coordinator should play. Agency stakeholders cited a wide range of potential roles for the coordinator including: i) political analyst, ii) diplomat, iii) facilitator and convener, iv) programme manager, v) resource mobilization champion for Agencies, vi) donor desk officer, vii) report writer. The wide range of respective roles suggest that a single coordinator may not be sufficient to respond to all the current needs and that it may actually require a PBF team to adequately fill the expected roles in a context such as Somalia. There is already movement in this direction as the PBF has recently contracted an M&E specialist to work in collaboration with the PBF coordinator.

38. A related question that emerged from the interviews involved which body or entity is providing strategic oversight on the overall portfolio or making decisions about the portfolio directions and projects to support. A high level Joint Steering Committee (JSC) comprised of Government and UNCT stakeholders is normally considered to be the strategic body that is providing oversight on the portfolio. However, in the context of Somalia, this body has been limited in its oversight of the PBF due to access and security conditions. As such, the approach has been to attempt to integrate PBF oversight into pre-existing coordination spaces. Respondents cited many different bodies when answering who is providing the strategic oversight of the PBF including the Joint Steering Committee, a PBF Secretariat, a PBF Reference Group, the UNCT, the Programme Management Team (PMT), and the Integrated Office. The logic of integrating PBF oversight into pre-existing bodies does have the strength of minimizing duplication and embedding PBF discussions into larger platforms for better strategic alignment. However, the ET believes that there is also the risk that there is no one body paying sufficient attention to the PBF per se as a standalone portfolio.

39. Sustainability. Discussing sustainability within the context of Somalia is somewhat aspirational. There has been significant progress observed in peacebuilding, but after nearly 30 years of war and the almost complete collapse of a central Government and the disappearance of even the idea of a central Government during the interim period, the

starting point for peacebuilding interventions is from a very basic foundation. Considerably more investment and support are required before sustainability becomes a realistic topic of analysis. Sustainability can be inferred from an assessment of the following: i) level of participation in, and ownership of, processes by stakeholders; ii) degree to which systems and processes have been systematized or institutionalized; iii) the degree of political will to support or prioritize ongoing processes; and iv) availability of resourcing for continued actions.

40. The interventions are seen as having had the strong commitment of Government and other stakeholders. The principles of working through Government, seeking to unblock processes and strengthen the linkages from Federal to State to District are positively cited. Processes at all levels from the formation of CAPs and District Councils to Federal systems have begun to be systematized. Their application has not yet covered the entire country and there is considerably more room for growth in strengthening the linkages between the levels of Government and procedures and processes for resource sharing such as begun with the IRF-141 National Window. In terms of resourcing, there are significant amounts of resources being invested by donors into the peacebuilding agenda. Because the peacebuilding investment in Somalia already dwarfs the amounts that could be provided through the PBF, the portfolio is not needed to serve as a seed fund to leverage investment from a perspective of scarcity. However, there are significant gaps in peacebuilding investments and the PBF is seen as important for playing a role in filling these gaps. The primary funding gaps appear to be less thematically oriented and more due to perceptions of high risk. For example, donors were more reluctant to intervene earlier in newly liberated districts or to channel funding through Government systems because of the lack of accountability benchmarks. PBF support to these areas and systems was seen as crucial. The portfolio has been able to leverage other funds for the targeted sectors of support. While project reporting on leveraging other funds is not tracked consistently, and is likely under-reported, at least seven of the 10 projects under the evaluation do cite leveraging other funding after closure of PBF project – whether for the continuation of the programme or for the sector itself. Additional funds were also obtained during implementation as a result of PBF support. End of project reports cited a cumulative additional US\$28 million leveraged for additional programming from the portfolio projects. Table ES3 summarizes the available information on post-portfolio resourcing.

Table ES3: Leveraged Funds by Project

Project	Additional Funding
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme	Yes. Funding was stop gap until other sources could be mobilized. Final project report in 2016 notes received budget of US\$7 million. Ongoing programme with additional funding since then.
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding	Yes – to Ministry of Women, but not through Agencies. DFID Grant for 5.6 million
PBF/IRF-122 Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	During implementation, the project attracted donors with additional funding from World Bank, and International NGOs. After project closure, no reported leveraged funds directly, but a Third Phase project includes discretionary funds for negotiations
PBF/IRF-116 (S2S)	Yes, through PBF. Donors such as USAID, UK and SSF support components of the Wadajir framework related to S2S project, but not ready to fund S2S per se – leading to PBF to finance Second Phase.
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management	Ongoing. Final report notes that Donor contribution to MPTF has doubled but does not state values
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis	Yes. For each of the individual joint programmes but not for Daldhis. Daldhis has receiving additional funding during implementation to support ongoing infrastructure projects and has built synergies with donors such as USAID, EU, and Finnish church Aid to support aspects of District Council formation. Each of the sub-components of Daldhis has also reported receiving new funding for continued programme implementation (estimated from conversation: JPLG –

	US\$6 million, Youth – US\$2 million, Rule of Law – US\$5 million)
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity)	Yes. During implementation, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) co-funded for priority community-based projects from CAPs. Additional funding post-Midnimo also secured for scale up of the Midnimo to new geographic locations. Further funding from EU-IOM and Japan Supplementary Budget also providing resources to support prioritized public works outside of Midnimo scope. Numbers not reported. Project reports only note “additional funding has been secured for scale up” and lists co-funding from different sources – but no figures. PBSO contributing additional US\$500.000.
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia Cross Border	No. Donors potentially interested in funding other cross-border programmes, but no funding received yet
PBF/IRF-141 National Window	World Bank to Government but not through Agencies. total budget allocation to National Window has tripled. Additional US\$2.8 million
PBF/IRF-143: Pilot Studies	No

41. The two most commonly cited sustainability challenges from both the United Nations and Government sides is related to personnel transitions and subsequent institutional memory loss at the Federal, State, and District levels and within United Nations programme teams. Challenges in the dissemination of information from programmes to Federal through the other levels was also cited as a challenge for sustainability and institutional memory.

42. In terms of lessons learned from individual project reviews, some key lessons learned regarding implementation were common across multiple projects. These included the importance of Government leadership in implementation, emphasizing community-based mobilization, and building social cohesion. In terms of implementation, integrated programming leads to positive outcomes, but requires carefully planned additional coordination to be successful. Most of the projects developed were overly aspirational given the conditions of the context, leading to a tendency to target higher level outcomes before the requisite basic foundations had been built. The relatively short time spans of the IRF/PRF funding combined with inevitable delays due to security and other context factors meant that most of the project implementers would have preferred a longer period of support to allow for slower developing achievements to bear fruit.

Conclusions and Recommendations

43. Conclusions. The portfolio has contributed to the achievement of peacebuilding strategic outcomes described in the larger peacebuilding framework for Somalia such as the extension of State Authority and Rule of Law. The six major contributions of the collective portfolio have been to: i) delivery of basic services; ii) improved social cohesion; iii) increased Federal/State/District cohesion; iv) enhanced community and District mobilization for development; v) improved mechanisms for Rule of Law and settlement of grievances; and vi) improved economic opportunities

44. Due to the logic of using the portfolio to address strategic gaps in the larger pre-existing frameworks and to respond to emergent priorities, the measurement of these results is based mostly on qualitative assessments. The contributions have been distributed across a wide range of potential themes given the diversity of the projects under review. The SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2Daldhis are both seen to have contributed important strategic outcomes in the SWS and Jubbaland states. SOM-D1 Midnimo is seen as the more successful of the two projects for primarily two reasons – a) the response time to see changes at community levels are much faster than for enacting changes in Government processes; and b) the integration of portions of three separate national level joint programmes into a more localized SWS and Jubbaland context in SOM-D2 Daldhis under-estimated the degree of steering and coordination contradictions and complexities.

45. A wide variety of catalytic effects have been generated by the PBF support. The gap-oriented approach for innovation and flexible adaptation to support joint programming approaches generated many positive catalytic effects – unblocking processes, promoting multi-stakeholder programming, leveraging funding from other donors, and scaling up of concepts and approaches were among the most commonly cited effects. The elements of risk taking, and innovation are so embedded in the principles of the PBF that they appeared in all interviews with United Nations respondents.

46. The deep integration of the portfolio into the larger peacebuilding frameworks has led to good relevance on addressing the drivers of conflict. The PBF project cycle management requirements fit best in countries that have limited peacebuilding work and assume that the PBF will require the development of a dedicated conflict analysis, priority plan and programme of support. But for a gap-oriented, proof-of-concept approach as pursued in Somalia, these PBF parameters fit less well and run the risk of duplication of other processes and concepts already developed. A “gap analysis” highlighting sectors, regions, or conflict drivers with insufficient donor funding support would be a useful addition to the portfolio to allow for monitoring of progress. This may need to be updated throughout the course of the portfolio cycle.

47. Efficiency of the individual projects is generally good for the context with the exception of the SOM-D2 Daldhis project due to the aforementioned joint programming coordination challenges and the difficulties in the establishment of the District Councils. The efficiency of the management of the portfolio was perceived differently by different stakeholders. The development-oriented stakeholders rated the timeliness of PBF processes as typical for donor timelines (SOM-D2 Daldhis stakeholders also were negative on efficiency, but because of the cumbersome coordination requirements). The more political oriented stakeholders perceived the PBF processes as too slow. Adapting the PBF approaches to align with the more rapidly evolving and emergent political engagement needs should be an area of experimentation in the next cycle.

48. The financial resources of the portfolio are perceived to be relatively small against the backdrop of other donor investments for peacebuilding and statebuilding in the context. Respondents always preferred more funding, but for a gap-oriented and proof of concept approach, the existing level of the portfolio are probably sufficient. Overall, the PBF investments are seen overall as providing value for money through the generation of multiple catalytic effects, their contribution to filling gaps, and their development of proof-of-concepts for subsequent scale up. The existing M&E and performance results frameworks at both the individual project level and for the entire portfolio cannot capture well the successes of the portfolio investment. Further adaptation of existing tools should better reflect these gains in this type of programming context.

49. The role of the PBF coordinator as a physical presence in the country has served well for improving efficiency and effectiveness of the programming and to ascertain the most impactful areas for PBF support. The wide range of expectations from United Nations stakeholders regarding the role of the PBF coordinator suggests that there are also gaps that need to be filled in terms of roles to maximize effectiveness with this type of flexible and gap-oriented fund. The highly integrated nature of the PBF within the larger UNCT discussions allows for better strategic coherence, but it does raise the risk that there is no one body paying specific attention to the management and coordination of the portfolio itself. The role of the integrated office has the potential to play a larger influence on facilitating the implementation of projects or of the fund and may further contribute to unblocking processes if employed strategically.

50. Considerations of sustainability of gains in a context such as Somalia may be overly aspirational. Progress in peacebuilding and state formation has been achieved, but there is still significant work that would need to be done before gains could be seen as sustainable. One positive factor is that the nature of the collaboration for implementation through Government has led to a high degree of ownership and political will for the approaches

supported by the PBF. Ongoing capacity strengthening support is required given the particularities of the Somali context.

51. **Recommendations.** The evaluation would recommend another cycle of PBF support. The recommendation would be to continue to pursue the same strategy of a gap-oriented approach integrating smaller ‘proof of concept’ activities and constant adjustments for identifying emergent political opportunities. Piloting or experimenting with the adaptation of current PBSO tools (conflict analysis, PRFs, logframes) to better align with this type of approach outside of a PPP programme orientation would add value globally. The following recommendations are presented with these over-arching principles in mind.

52. **Recommendation 1 - Strategic Alignment:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat should – in collaboration with the UNCT and Government counterparts – base programming actions on the existing national development frameworks for peacebuilding and use a gap-orientation to support projects that are: i) filling gaps in the conceptual framework, ii) are innovations or proofs of concept; and, iii) integrate joint programming principles (preferably that combine political and Agency representation).

53. **Recommendation 2 - Community Action Plans:** The community-based approaches articulated in SOM-D1 Midnimo have been significantly positive. The PBF portfolio as a whole should assume a gap-oriented approach and consider how to build a “mini PPP” around the support and promotion of SOM-D1 Midnimo-oriented programming. This mini-PPP should serve as a mechanism for orientation of a sub-set of portfolio projects. Even though there is ongoing funding to allow for scale up of this approach, the PBF Secretariat – in collaboration with the UNCT – should consider, when reviewing new project concepts, promoting the inclusion of concepts and techniques in other projects that were first developed under SOM-D1 Midnimo. This might include geographic expansion of the entire community action plan process to new regions but could also include thematic expansion in terms of the elements integrated into the programme such as the various citizen committees or gender considerations.

54. **Recommendation 3 - Government Joint Programming:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat, with collaboration from the UNCT – should consider – when reviewing proposed new project concepts – the inclusion of elements that provide equivalent “joint programming” opportunities among Government Ministries or levels of Government (Federal, State, etc). These considerations are present in some projects but should be expanded to foment Government-equivalent joint programming opportunities. This could include, but not be limited to, joint monitoring of programmes or joint coordination of operational aspects.

55. **Recommendation 4 - Turnover and Institutional Memory:** Currently, within the ongoing capacity support to Government, there is significant input into capacity strengthening, but less follow up when transitions occur. Knowledge management for sharing of best practices, success stories and cataloguing lessons learned is often lost in these transitions. The PBF portfolio should consider – when reviewing proposed new project concepts – the inclusion of elements such as the integration or development of systems for orientation and re-training of new Government personnel to address turnover challenges in programming. As part of the coordination support project, the PBF should also develop systems for orientation of new United Nations Personnel to their ongoing PBF projects and the portfolio as a whole. The coordination project should also develop a plan for knowledge sharing exchanges and best practices both to support among Government officials as well as among United Nations personnel.

56. **Recommendation 5 - Political Responsiveness:** For the next cycle, PBSO should consider piloting adaptations to existing modalities that might allow for better fit to the political agenda in terms of responsiveness and timeframe. This could be either an adaptation of the IRF or the elaboration of a third modality (perhaps titled the FRF – flexible response fund) that would have reduced project concept requirements, operate within a shorter time span (perhaps less than 6 months) and be more immediately responsive

(approvals within days). Implications for disbursement of funds, accountability, and reporting would need to be modified, hence the pilot nature.

57. **Recommendation 6 - Portfolio M&E Strengthening:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat – in collaboration with the PBSO in New York – should consider piloting the adaptation of existing project cycle management tools (conflict analysis, performance results framework, indicators) to better track portfolio level contributions within a gap-oriented approach. This could include (but not be limited to): i) modifying the conflict analysis to a “gap” analysis; ii) articulating a gap-oriented Peacebuilding Priority Plan that locates the disparate potential projects within the gaps of the larger frameworks; iii) developing portfolio level indicators based on catalytic effects as outcome level objectives.

58. **Recommendation 7 - Strategic Reflection:** The current oversight management (via UNCT, PMT, a JSC and an informal consultation group) does provide a multiplicity of inputs for guidance and alignment of the PBF. However, to provide more systematic and frequent oversight of the PBF portfolio as a unit, the integrated office – with support from the PBF coordinator – should set up a smaller formal oversight body consisting of five or six United Nations personnel comprising a mix of political and development positions, as well as a mix between strategic, programmatic and operational levels. This body should meet quarterly at a minimum to focus on strategic and implementation issues as well as new opportunities within the portfolio.

59. **Recommendation 8 - United Nations Joint Programming:** The principles of joint programming should underly the PBF portfolio criteria for support. However, in the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat should avoid combining pre-existing joint programmes under a single project umbrella. If supporting a collection of pre-existing joint programmes, the PBF should develop individual projects supporting individual joint programmes – even if this looks like “top-up funding”.

1 Introduction

1.1 Country Context

1. Somalia has made important strides on its peacebuilding and state-building agenda. After 25 years of civil war, the country carried out an indirect election and establishment of the Federal government in 2012. This development in combination with other military and political transitions created an opportunity for a new political agreement in the country.¹² In 2013, the country signed the New Deal Compact¹³ as an agreement among all levels of the Somali government and the international community for inclusive political dialogue, reconciliation and rehabilitation of Somalia. The Compact focused on imperative political and socio-economic priorities: building inclusive politics, security, justice, the country's economic foundations, revenue collection and the provision of services.¹⁴

2. Somalia is strategically situated in the Horn of Africa - which hosts important trade channels between Africa and the Gulf. However, the lack of proper economic infrastructure and rule of law have limited foreign investment and commerce with consequences for national development. According to the Human Development Index (HDI), Somalia ranks 165 out of 170 in the HDI.¹⁵ Furthermore, a 2018 World Bank document reports that 70 percent of Somalis are living on below US\$2 a day with limited government safety nets – relying on support of family-clans and remittances from the diaspora.¹⁶ Somalia's main economic sectors of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, are susceptible to protracted conflicts, underdevelopment and severe climate shocks. The prolonged drought in 2017 resulted in 50 percent of the Somali population as being rated “food insecure” among which 4.4 million people were left in need of emergency water and sanitation.¹⁷ Cross-border tensions and security concerns have led to restrictions on regional trade and mobility, affecting in particular the livelihoods of border communities.¹⁸ The formalization of newly liberated states has been one of the most significant advances in the country in the past decade.

3. An estimated 34 percent of the 12.3 million population is in need of humanitarian assistance according to a 2019 UNOCHA needs assessment report¹⁹ and 2.6 million Somalis have been internally displaced because of the armed conflict or the drought.²⁰ Internal displacement, compounded by the repatriation of former refugees, has significantly increased the burden on urban areas. The displacement has exacerbated land disputes and clan clashes, further increasing risk and vulnerabilities especially among women and youth.²¹

4. What is considered youth age ranges can vary from context to context. In Somalia, 80 percent of the population is under the age of 35, while 38 percent are under 25.²² Youth in Somalia face a dearth of economic (63 percent unemployment²³) or educational opportunities with the subsequent potential for increasing youth unrest and emigration. This combined with the declining influence of traditional courts among youth has led to increased instability and potential for unrest further increasing the potential for social conflict and fragmentation, insecurity and political instability. Similarly, women tend to be isolated from political life and decision-making despite their historical role and importance in community dialogue and peacebuilding.²⁴ Women and girls also face economic and educational exclusion. Less than

¹²OCHA Humanitarian Needs Overview - 2019

¹³The New Deal Compact for Somalia consists of the five New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), and subsets of three to four priorities per goal. The five PSGs are: (1) legitimate and inclusive politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services.

¹⁴EU. 2013. *The Somali Compact*

¹⁵FGS. 2016. *National Development 2017-2019*

¹⁶World Bank, 2018. *FY19-F22 Country Partnership Framework for the Federal Republic of Somalia*

¹⁷World Bank. 2017. *Somali Poverty Profile*

¹⁸PBF. 2016. *Peacebuilding Priority Plan*

¹⁹UNOCHA .2019.*Somalia: Humanitarian Needs Assessment*

²⁰UNOCHA .2019.*Somalia: Humanitarian Needs Assessment*

²¹Menkhaus, K. 2017. *Somalia Conflict and Situation Analysis*

²²UNFPA, 2014. Population estimation survey

²³World Bank.2018. *FY19-F22 Country Partnership Framework for the Federal Republic of Somalia*

²⁴UNDP, UN Women, and UNSOM. 2015. *IRF Project Document*

23 percent of all girls in Somalia attend primary education and 87 percent of girls and women are illiterate. These factors are exacerbated among internally displaced women and children who are often subjected to gender-based violence and abuse and a high presence of unaccompanied minors.²⁵ The country is preparing for universal suffrage elections in 2020/21, the first since a military coup in 1969. The election has the potential to contribute to consolidating peace gains.²⁶

5. According to a study done by the Overseas Development Institute (2017), the New Deal Compact has contributed to key results such as the re-engagement of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and supporting the process of obtaining debt relief.²⁷ With the introduction of the New Deal Compact, the Federal and regional governments have taken increased ownership of assistance-related decision-making and a larger share of international resources have been channeled through national systems.²⁸ The Compact's principles have served as a foundation for the establishment of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF), a centerpiece for the partnership between the Somalia government and the international community.²⁹ Additional barriers still exist for peacebuilding and state-building efforts in the country including historical clan-grievances, the presence of extremist groups, absence of a functioning justice system, limited resources, climate shocks and ongoing lack of economic opportunities especially for women and youth.

1.2 PBF Overview and History in Somalia

PBF Overview

6. The United Nations Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is the organization's financial instrument of first resort to sustain peace in countries or situations at risk or affected by violent conflict. The Fund may invest with United Nations entities, governments, regional organizations, multilateral banks, national multi-donor trust funds or civil society organizations. It is part of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture created in 2006 at the request of the General Assembly (Resolution 60/180) and the Security Council (Resolution 1645). The PBF became operational in 2007. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is responsible for the overall management of the PBF under the authority of the Secretary-General; the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) is the Fund's Administrative Agent.

7. The United Nations general approach to peacebuilding has evolved in recent years. On 27 April 2016, the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council adopted identical resolutions on the architectures of peacebuilding and peacekeeping. The Sustaining Peace Resolutions (GA70 / 262 and SC 2282) encouraged the Organization to pay greater attention to the preventive means of dealing with the causes of conflict, the idea being to reduce the need for the international community to cope with the consequences of armed violence. More specifically, the resolutions acknowledged that peacebuilding is an inherently political process that requires an integrated, strategic and coherent approach of all partners, with a commitment to the strengthening of the rule of law at the international and national levels, which involves national ownership but must also acknowledge civil society's role in promoting sustainable peace.

8. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace are a major priority for the current Secretary-General who has also highlighted the central role of the PBF: "The Peacebuilding Fund, as a timely, catalytic and risk tolerant instrument, is a critical vehicle as the United Nations steps up its efforts to build resilience and drive, at a greater scale, integrated United Nations action for prevention." The Fund is set up to support "national partners and United Nations country teams in responding strategically to peacebuilding needs, aiding transitions from mission to

²⁵Human Rights Watch Report. 2019. *Somalia: Events of 2018*.

²⁶ PBF. 2018. Annual strategic country report

²⁷ ODI, 2017. *The New Deal in Somalia: An independent review of the Somali Compact, 2014-2016*

²⁸ PBF. 2016. *Peacebuilding Priority Plan*

²⁹ UNDP. 2017. *Operations Manual for SDRF Funding Windows*

non-mission settings and facilitating alignment with international financial institutions and other partners.”³⁰

9. The PBF provides funding through two mechanisms, namely, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF). The IRF is the project-based financing mechanism created to address critical and urgent peacebuilding needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict or because of a dramatic change in the country situation. Up to US\$3.000.000 can be approved by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support on behalf of the Secretary-General without a formal eligibility process for the country. The PRF is the programme-based financing mechanism created to provide medium-term financing for countries declared eligible for PBF funding by the Secretary-General. To be eligible, countries must have national government commitment towards sustainable and inclusive peace. PRF funding at the time was based on an elaboration of a strategic plan for peacebuilding, which supports national efforts at peacebuilding – the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP).³¹ Both the IRF and the PRF mechanisms are present in the Somalia Portfolio.

10. When considering the eligibility of a country for funding, the PBF gives priority to a) Government leadership and commitment towards sustaining peace through agreements, clear policies or publicly communicated priorities and peace champions; b) Country/situation is high on the United Nations’ agenda, including as part of Executive Committee discussions, Senior Peacebuilding Group discussions, Regional Monthly Reviews, deployment of Peacekeeping or Special Political Missions, or is the subject of an Inter-Agency Task Force; c) United Nations leadership on peacebuilding and positioning in the country for sustaining peace, including mandate, capacity, previous role and Government and development partner expectations; d) Size/scope of the country’s overall peacebuilding needs and gaps, and the likelihood of achieving tangible and/or catalytic results and influencing change through PBF; e) Significance of current circumstances in the country’s sustaining peace context, including transition or high-risk moments and specific opportunities to effect change; f) Size of a country’s own financial resources, and readily available funds from other sources; g) Likelihood of PBF fully and effectively utilizing its niche/added value in the country, including results from any previous PBF support to the country/situation; h) PBF’s current portfolio of countries and its overall global financial position.³²

11. The PBF has positioned itself as a funding mechanism that is responsive, relevant, catalytic and promotes greater coordination between United Nations actors. The PBF is intended to meet needs in volatile environments, piloting new modalities of operation in peacebuilding that are “high risk/high reward”, which traditional donors are often disinclined to support. For instance, through the designation of a risk marker system and comprehensive policies in risk management, the PBF was able to capitalize on the political gains made in Somalia through the recovery of various previously seized areas to support the Federal Government’s stabilization strategy and extension of state authority in the newly recovered areas.³³ According to the PBF Strategic Plan 2017-2019, the key global PBF priorities areas are as follows:

1. **Implementing Peace Agreements:** Responding to imminent threats to peace, support for the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue
2. **Dialogue and Coexistence:** Building and/or strengthening national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict
3. **Peace Dividends:** Supporting efforts to revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends for the population at large
4. **(Re-)establishing Basic Services:** Establishing or re-establishing essential administrative services and related human and technical capacities

³⁰ <https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/fund>

³¹ As of the 2018 PBF Guidelines update, PPPs are no longer require for PRF funding

³² 2018 PBF Guidelines.

³³ The Secretary-General’s Peacebuilding Fund Leveraging the UN to Prevent the Lapse and Relapse into Conflict-
<http://www.unpbf.org/wp-content/uploads/PBF-Brochure-Niche-with-examples-final-May-2016.pdf>

12. The PBF made its first investment in Somalia in 2009, and by 2019 the total amount of PBF funding approved for the country reached US\$ 55.6 million for 29 projects. From its launch in Somalia in 2009 to date, the PBF has supported projects implemented by 15 Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs) in partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States, and civil society.³⁴ The PBF investment is comparatively modest among pooled funds in the country; however, the PBF asserts having added value in demonstrating and piloting new models and thus strategically positioning itself in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

1.3 PBF Portfolio of Support Response in Somalia: 2015-2019

13. The current cycle of the PBF portfolio in Somalia (Starting from 2015) can be classified in three phases: the “First Phase” is comprised of Immediate Response Facility (IRF) projects developed in 2015/2016, the “Second Phase” consists of Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) projects (and associated IRFs) organized around the Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) (2016/2017), and the “Third Phase” consists of PRFs complemented by Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI) IRF projects developed in 2018/2019. In the First Phase, a series of IRFs were developed beginning with the Support to Stabilization Project (S2S) (IRF 116). The IRF116 S2S supported the deployment and reestablishment of caretaker administrations appointed by the Federal Government to be Government representatives in newly liberated Districts within Jubbaland State, South West State (SWS), Galmudug State, and HirShabelle State. Additional IRF projects were also developed in 2015 and 2016 to respond to emergent needs not covered by other funds in a timely manner such as women’s inclusion in political processes or facilitating reconciliation conferences. The projects targeted different levels and different geographic regions and were not connected by any specific thematic framework beyond responding to emergent opportunities.

14. In 2016, a three-year Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP) was developed with the Government of Somalia and the United Nations to serve as an overarching framework for the PBF portfolio of support to Somalia for the 2016-2019 period in the newly established Federal Member States of SWS and Jubbaland. The focus on these two States was based on the fact that up until 2016, there had not been a functional State governance structure and the peacebuilding focus had been towards either the national Government in Mogadishu or to the District level caretaker administrations being established after Districts were liberated. The establishment of a State level governance authority as part of the Federal Member State/Federal Government structure only emerged as the PPP was being finalized. The PPP was intended to provide the framework for guiding PRF project conceptualizations, selection, and management as well as to track progress of the PBF portfolio of support against articulated strategic objectives in supporting these two States or strengthening their connection to the Federal Government structure.³⁵ The PPP outcomes were aligned with the four PBF Priority Areas and the Peace and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) laid out in the 2013 New Deal Compact for Somalia. In particular, the PBF portfolio of support – as articulated by the PPP – was aligned with PSGs 3 (Justice), 4 (Economic Foundations), and 5 (Revenues and Services) in newly recovered areas and contribute to the 2017-2019 National Development Plan. The PBF portfolio of support – as articulated in the PPP – aimed to address four primary pillars:

- **Building the legitimacy of the State-** Decades of conflict have degraded Government infrastructure, especially in rural regions, leading to an almost complete absence of any national Government infrastructure in many areas. The subsequent weakened Government created a cycle of reduced trust among communities towards the State or its ability to perform its duties in meeting the basic needs of its citizens. Building the legitimacy of the State through increasing the regional Governments’

³⁴PBF. 2019. Renewal of Somalia’s UN Peacebuilding Fund Eligibility.

³⁵ IRF modalities can still be employed within the PPP framework as well

role and strengthening the linkages between it and its citizens is critical for the peacebuilding process in the country.

- **Supporting local reconciliation processes-** The absence of a functional justice system and undermined customary mechanisms for dispute resolution such as *Sharia*'a court or traditional courts, and customary laws – *Xeer*– contributed to a disruption of the reconciliation component of the peace process. The second pillar of the PPP emphasized supporting the strengthening of both formal and traditional justice systems to strengthen local reconciliation processes through a multi-stage process prioritizing the inclusion of all citizen stakeholder groups.
- **Inclusive economic and social growth-** Somalia has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world, which has exacerbated vulnerabilities, especially among youth (and women). One factor for increased feelings of disenfranchisement and unrest among youth is considered to be the lack of economic development and opportunities. This can lead to engagement in non-legal alternatives or to increased radicalization. Economic development and social growth were considered important within the PPP to mitigate potential conflict drivers and increase resilience to economic and natural shocks. Women face additional barriers to economic and political inclusions ranging from cultural norms to lack of education access and property rights.
- **Building the capacity of the Government at local and Federal levels -**The years of continuous war, poverty and corruption have undermined statesmanship in Somalia. Thus, capacity building is a critical component in strengthening the Government and its increasing role as the main service provider.

15. The PPP elaborated a Theory of Change (ToC), presented in Annex 3, describing the interlinkages of these four main pillars and their operationalization. A total of US\$13 million was allocated towards the PBF portfolio of support in Somalia, to support key priorities such as increasing the governmental capacities at Federal and local levels, strengthening the linkage between citizens and the authorities, local conflict resolutions, durable solutions and youth and women's empowerment. The PBF emphasized a geographic focus in the recently emerging States of Jubbaland and SWS and prioritized the support of interventions within this geographic context. Table 1³⁶ below describes the key outcomes and funding amounts.³⁷

Table 1: PPP Key Outcomes

Outcome Area	Amount in US\$
Outcome 1: Government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able to respond to the various needs of the population in South and Central Somalia.	6,000,000
Outcome 2: Communities in South and Central Somalia generate the demand for, and benefit from, local governance, security, justice, social and economic solutions.	6,500,000
Secretariat	500,000
Total	13,000,000

16. A high-level PBF Coordination Committee is responsible for providing strategic guidance and oversight of the PBF portfolio of support in Somalia. The Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation (MoIFAR), and the DSRSG/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator co-chair the PBF Coordination Committee. This

³⁶ The standard outcome promotes coordination and effective management of the project. This outcome is found among the PBF projects that are based on the PPP

³⁷ Subsequent development of the National Development Framework and the UN Development Assistance Framework later resulted in the PPP being subordinated to the national Government frameworks and project selection and prioritization were aligned with PBF Strategic Plan priority areas to support the National Government development and peacebuilding frameworks.

committee is responsible for providing overall strategic guidance and coordination between the Government, the United Nations in Somalia and the PBSO.

PBF Portfolio Theories of Change

17. The PPP developed in 2016 aimed to “establish strong state-citizen links, based on community resilience and recovery efforts that are supported by responsive state institutions, to achieve the dual aim of providing peace dividends and strengthen trust in the political transition”.³⁸To achieve this goal, the PPP elaborated an overarching ToC to serve as a guiding framework. All the projects under the PBF portfolio of support have their own ToC, which contribute directly to the PBF global priorities. The PPP ToC was to orient the programming for projects under the PRF facility. The ToC narratives for each outcome are described as elaborated in the PPP ToC document below. A visualization of the ToC is found in Annex 3.

18. **Outcome 1 ToC:** Lack of Government capacity and transparency, limited presence of the transitional Government outside Mogadishu, as well as rampant corruption at all levels of the Government, have minimized its influence and legitimacy across Somalia. Furthermore, the fragmentation of Somali society along ethnic lines, and the over-centralization of Government policies and interventions, have widened the division and disjoint between the Federal Government and local level administration. The initial step to addressing lapsed governance is to target building capacity of Government officials at local, regional and national levels. Principal areas of focus are: coordination, assessment planning and implementation and monitoring, as well as strengthening links between Federal and local level interventions. Moreover, it is paramount to institute channels where citizens, particularly women and youth, can express their voice, participate and influence processes that affect them, and also hold the Government accountable.

19. **Outcome 2 ToC:** Triggers to violence in Somalia include: an unstable economy further impaired by external shocks, such as drought or other natural disasters, and inflation; lack of access to basic services, especially in rural areas; clan grievances and retaliatory interactions; restricted access to areas seized by extremist groups; marginalized youth lacking economic opportunities and whose disillusionment provide fertile minds for extremist groups and gangs to propagandize. In order to curtail these triggers, it is essential that the Government supports local reconciliation processes and mechanisms, improves access to basic services in the rural areas, and increases employment, especially among youth. This will curb the socio-economic drivers of conflict and in turn, increase people’s trust in the Government and its role in the stabilization and state-building process.

20. All respondents felt that the ToCs as described in the PPP were the right ToCs. If articulated in an actual ToC logic, then the PPP proposes that: if the Government capacity at all levels is strengthened to foster an enabling environment for citizens to thrive in, and if the supply and demand can meet the needs of communities as per their aspirations and needs, then citizens will have increased trust in the Government and increased buy-in to the peace and stabilization process. Outcome 1 focuses on the establishment of the district councils and the peace dividends implemented in post-district council development. Outcome 2 is oriented towards the grassroots mobilization and the community-led construction of the Community Action Plans (CAPs). The third standard Outcome is to promote inter-institutional coordination for implementing CAPs, the district councils, and the peace dividend development projects. The main issues – described later in the relevance section – had to do with the perception that the PPP exercise was duplicating on a smaller scale an exercise already developed as part of the Wadajir framework.


1.4 PBF Portfolio Operationalization and Stakeholders

21. The portfolio emphasized a number of criteria for determining the selection of projects to support including: the ability of the project to expand existing joint programmes,

³⁸PBF. 2016. Peacebuilding Priority Plan, p.16

community engagement, presenting an effective model of operation that brought practical solutions, security and access and others. Each Recipient United Nations Organization (RUNO) either jointly or individual would develop the idea for a project or programme and then present a project concept paper. The justification for the concept was linked to one of the four global PBF Strategic Priority areas. During the period covered by this evaluation, the PBF portfolio of support was operationalized through 17 projects. Eight IRF projects concluded within the evaluation period and are included in the evaluation. The two PRF projects, SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis³⁹, have recently been completed (in August 2019) and are included in the scope of the evaluation. Additional projects which commenced in 2018 or later are not included in the evaluation. The following Table 2 lists the 10 projects included in this evaluation⁴⁰ and Figure 1 depicts their chronology within this period of support.⁴¹

Figure 1: Chronology of Projects under Review



22. The following Table 2 provides a summary of the project by phase, title, and intended purpose as described in project design document or ProDoc.

³⁹Midnimo and Dhaldhis projects focus on strengthening the regional and local government structures to deliver social services and peace resolution channels for communities. Both projects operate in the same locations, mainly Kismayo, Garbahaarrey, Afmadow and Dollow (Jubbaland) and Baidoa and Afgoye districts (South West State). While Midnimo was identified during the inception interview period as a success, Dhaldhis was highlighted as a project which presented many challenges. Thus, an analysis of both projects, determining the reasons as to why one worked while the other encountered many roadblocks can generate relevant learning.

⁴⁰ Project alignment with PBF Global Priorities and RUNO descriptions are found in Annex 2.

⁴¹ The management project to support the coordination committee and PBF Secretariat is included in this table as well.

⁴² Extension until September 2018

Table 2: Overview PBF Portfolio Projects in Evaluation (2015-2018)

Phase	Projects and Implementation Period	Project Purpose ⁴³
First Phase approved in (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support (31/08/2015-31/08/2016)	The Somalia Joint Rule of Law Program aimed to enhance the capacity of the rule of law system through targeted support for the justice and correction institutions to ensure that areas components to cater to the needs of all, especially the most vulnerable groups. This included enhancing the capacity of the justice system stakeholders and institutions to effectively deliver on their mandate, increase the capacity of the correction system to uphold the rights of the detainees, and improve access to justice and legal education especially among at risk you and vulnerable groups.
First Phase approved in (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia (13/07/2015-31/12/2016)	The project aimed at strengthening women's role and agency for the advancement of their political empowerment and directly supports the gender equality commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia in the framework of the Somali New Deal Compact through support to Somali women civil society leaders to advocate for integration of gender concerns and increased representation of women in the emerging political, peacebuilding and state building processes and structures of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)
First Phase approved in (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences (15/09/2015-30/04/2017)	The project intended to provide primarily immediate and short-term assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its endeavour to form interim regional administrations (IRAs), as precursors to full-fledged federal member states (FMS), through inclusive processes and consistent with the Provisional Constitution. These reconciliation conferences assisted in ensuring that the state formation process is inclusive and considers views of all, including clans, minorities, women and youth in order to facilitate the formation of viable interim regional administrations in Somalia that will in the future likely evolve into federal member states.
First Phase approved in (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S) (13/05/2015-31/12/2017)	The project supported stabilization efforts, in line with the Government Stabilization Strategy and the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance and its four components (social reconciliation, peace dividends, civic engagement and local governance/district government formation) in the newly recovered areas of Somalia through capacity building and direct support to local administrations. It worked to establish local district governance structures in areas of South Central Somalia and establish/strengthen community-representative bodies.
First Phase approved in (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF) (17/08/2015-28/02/2018)	The Project provided technical capacity to the government at all levels and various stakeholders how to implement the Risk Management strategy developed for the SDF Trust Fund. This will enable the government, UN and all stakeholders to successfully implement the National Development Plan. It also sought to increase the capacity of government and relevant stakeholders how to implement Risk Management strategies in the long term planning and programming and increase the safeguards of the

⁴³ Description abstracted from Project design document or signed ProDoc agreement with Government

		government funds and foreign aid that comes in the country through promoting fiduciary accountability, conflict sensitivity and informed decision making for portfolio management and capacity development.
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubaland and South West State of Somalia (14/12/2016-31/08/2019)	This project aimed to present a renewed commitment to working with local community leaders, elders, formal and informal justice services and newly selected local governments, in collaboration with state ministries, to entrench stability and peace, enhance social service delivery, provide economic opportunities for young men and women and provide an accessible system for resolution of people dispute and determination of their rights. The project's strategy combined three existing joint programmes: Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery, the Joint Programme for Rule of Law, and the Youth Employment for Somalia. This expansion will be done through an area-based approach, through which the three components of this project will deliver tangible services to the population in a sequenced manner.
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States (14/12/2016-31/08/2019)	This proposed programme aimed to enhance local leadership capacities to facilitate the sustainable return, recovery, social integration and peaceful co-existence of displacement affected, returnee, other migrant groups and host communities in Jubaland and South West State. The project is Government-led and community-driven to ensure a bottom up approach to drive transition and recovery processes in displacement affected communities. The Midnimo project is intended to promote stability in fragile and displacement affected areas of Somalia, as well as the attainment of durable solutions to internal displacement.
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (19/01/2017-31/12/2018)	The pilot project aimed to enable a prospective group of Somali returnees in Dadaab, Kenya, to return specifically to Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia. Through the project, volunteer returnees were supported to enable them to play a constructive and effective role in sustaining their return and reintegration, with good prospects for livelihoods and support measures to build resilience according to the principles of co-existence. The pilot project was designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia's strategic priorities for stabilization and delivery of direct peace dividends, including commitments to reconciliation and investing in job creation.
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations (National Window) (20/05/2016-30/06/2017)	The project enabled the Federal Government of Somalia to independently deliver services to its citizens by developing its capacity to conduct community consultations, design, manage, and implement small scale infrastructure projects. The core objective of this project is to test the use of national systems to channel funds in order to build the capacity of FGS to effectively manage funds and pave the way for other donors to use the system.
Second Phase (approved in 2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia (19/09/2016-30/06/2018)	The project provides technical capacity to government, the UN, and other partners to design, implement, and monitor projects to ensure they contribute to achieve the objectives of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. The project also helps to transfer the conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming knowledge to national counterparts for use in long term planning. This project also builds capacity to gauge Somali public response to ongoing peacebuilding and statebuilding processes without security risk exposure to UN personnel.

23. First Phase: IRFs developed in 2015/2016. These IRF projects were built outside and before the frame of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, tend to be oriented to either national level processes or implementation in multiple States, and are focused on supporting gaps in the other peacebuilding frameworks. For the purposes of reference throughout the narrative, this collection of projects is referred to as “First Phase” projects. The logic of these projects is more “gap oriented” – the projects are developed opportunistically to respond to specific emergent needs such as the inclusion of women’s participation in the political process during an upcoming election or to support the establishment of caretaker administrations immediately after a District had been liberated but before other donors could be mobilized. They are not necessarily intended to connect with each other under an overarching logic such as might be found in a programme oriented set of projects.

24. Projects in this First Phase tended to draw on an assortment of logics for why they were supported. The PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme was a pre-existing programme design that had not received the expected funding from a donor in time to begin implementation, and the PBF IRF provided funding to allow for immediate implementation. The PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s role in participation and peacebuilding was a national level project focusing on capacity strengthening the Ministry of Women (MoW) and promoting greater female representation in the newly forming power-sharing national Government and established State Governments. The PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences was established to facilitate agreements among the different levels of Government (Federal, State, District) and to mobilize to respond to substance-based negotiations to unblock processes between different interests and clans or among the different levels. The PBF/IRF-116 Support Stabilization programme in newly recovered areas (S2S) focused on strengthening District level governance while the PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support sought to strengthen Federal Government processes.

25. Second Phase: PRFs (and associated IRFs) organized around the PPP (2016/2017). These projects have more of a collective programme focus because of their orientation to the PPP ToC. Throughout the narrative these are described as “Second Phase” projects. The PPP was a requisite to access the PRF modality (although no longer the case). Their logic of implementation is to support “Area Based Interventions” within the newly liberated States of SWS and Jubbaland and facilitate linkages between these emerging States to the Federal Government.⁴⁴

26. The SOM-D2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo projects⁴⁵ were the central “flagship” projects of the PPP in this second collection of projects. SOM-D2 Daldhis was a joint programme which attracted three separate pre-existing national-level joint programmes to carry out implementation in the SWS and Jubbaland States: Rule of Law, Local Governance, and Youth Economic Empowerment. The three existing joint programmes were envisioned as the mechanisms to operationalize Outcome Area 1 – strengthening Government institutions and structured at multiple levels to be able to provide better delivery of basic services. These pre-existing programmes had already been implemented previously in more established States in the north. The logic, and specific innovation of the PPP, was to provide additional funding to these pre-existing programmes to allow them to operate in the newly established States in the South. These programmes would not otherwise have been able to begin implementation so early in the South under their operational parameters due to the lack of certain benchmarks in these emergent States. Even though the three programmes already existed, had their own steering and management processes, the PBF parameters for funding PRFs required that the portions of each national programme which were implemented in the SWS/Jubbaland needed to be combined into a single programme with its own separate indicators and steering, management and reporting processes.

⁴⁴ In the narrative, these may be referenced as “Baidoa” (SWS) and “Kismayo” (Jubbaland) as these are the capital cities of the two States and respondents tended to refer to these cities when referencing the States.

⁴⁵ Both Daldhis and Midnimo are technically programmes – an interconnected set of discrete projects organized under a single framework with sections implemented by different Agencies. However, for the purposes of this narrative, to ease confusion over nomenclature, these will be referred to as projects even though they are programmes.

27. The SOM-D1 Midnimo programme was designed as a new programme focusing on implementation in the two newly established States. The SOM-D1 Midnimo operationalized Outcome 2 of the PPP – building community-based structures and processes. The core of the SOM-D1 Midnimo project was the Community Action Plan (CAP), which was the culmination of an extended sequence of engagement along multiple streams within the programme. These plans served as the basis for subsequent development and peacebuilding interventions and guide donor investment (described in more detail in the impact section).

28. Within the PPP logic, the formation of the District Councils⁴⁶ was an important fulcrum of the PPP intended to link the SOM-D2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo programmes. Additional PBF supported projects in the Second Phase surrounding these two major programmes provided complementary support by: i) strengthening the relationship between the Federal Government and Federal Member states (IRF-141 National Window), ii) providing data to promote more coordinated alignment with existing national frameworks (IRF-143 Coordination Support), or iii) to address specific issues that emerged within the SWS and Jubbaland after the PPP development (IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross-border pilot).

29. Third Phase: PRFs and IRFs developed in 2018/2019. These IRFs are not included in the evaluation scope because of their more recent elaboration. However, the process of design and conceptualization of Third Phase projects provides opportunities for comparison points with the earlier phases. In contrast to the more programme oriented logic behind the Second Phase projects, projects in the Third Phase are more “gap-oriented” - developed with the intention to address specific gaps within the larger peacebuilding frameworks already present in the country and in use by the UNCT and the Government. Although similar in logic to the First Phase projects, one key difference is that the Third Phase projects are responding to national frameworks – such as the National Development Plan – that had not yet been finalized during the First Phase.

30. It should be emphasized that the usage of the term *phases* employed in the evaluation report is for ease of reference only. This terminology is not a formal designation within the PBF portfolio documentation. Respondents informally referred to certain projects as being part of different cohorts, but this was not a formal designation in the PBF documentation. The projects associated with each of the first two Phases are described in the findings section. The Third Phase projects are only referenced collectively since they are not covered in the evaluation scope.

2 Evaluation Features

2.1 Evaluation Scope and Key Questions

31. The purpose of this evaluation is to understand and assess the achievements of the PBF’s support in this cycle and its overall added value to peacebuilding in Somalia. This is the first comprehensive evaluation of the PBF fund in the country and is intended to be a summative evaluation for the period of 2015-2019. The evaluation will be used to concurrently distil learning from and strengthen the peacebuilding apparatus, as well as contribute to the PBF “eligibility-renewal” process in Somalia. The objectives of this evaluation are based on the Statement of Work (SoW)⁴⁷ and cover both programmatic and management related elements of the PBF portfolio in Somalia:

1. Assess to what extent PBF's support has had a concrete and sustained impact in terms of sustaining peace in Somalia;
2. Assess how relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable PBF's support to Somalia has been;

⁴⁶ As mentioned earlier, the District Administrators were appointed as caretakers after liberation. The District Councils were to be the next phase in local governance by establishing a representative body to replace the appointed administrators.

⁴⁷ Annex 1

3. Determine the catalytic effects of PBF's support to Somalia and assess fundraising strategies by implementing partners and the PBF;
4. Assess where the critical remaining peacebuilding gaps in Somalia are;
5. Assess whether the peacebuilding interventions funded by the PBF successfully contributed to promoting the women's, peace and security agendas as set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325;
6. Provide lessons for future PBF support in terms of programme design, implementation modalities and partnerships;
7. Assess the overall monitoring and evaluation (M&E) approach of the portfolio, identify lessons and make recommendations for the M&E design of any future portfolio.

32. All of the specific projects supported within the PBF portfolio carried out their own individual project evaluations. The SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects – the two cornerstone projects for the portfolio of support – did not implement specific individual project evaluations as per agreement that the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) would manage their evaluations. Consequently, while this PBF evaluation mandate is to assess the collective entirety of the PBF portfolio of support, special attention should be given to the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects as part of this review. This included additional interviews with key project stakeholders as well as integrating beneficiary visits and group interviews for those participants in the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects during the field phase. The SoW questions also have added additional questions specific to the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects beyond the PBF portfolio of support questions.

33. The evaluation process comprised multiple steps beginning with an inception phase during which the evaluation team (ET) conducts an extensive desk review on existing PPP and individual project documentation provided by the PBF Secretariat. The inception phase is to contribute to the development of the design of the data collection processes and tools. Key informant interviews (KIIs) to inform the design were conducted during the period of 06 August- 04 September 2019 with a number of essential PBF staff at the country level and Headquarters in New York (please refer to **Error! Reference source not found.** in Annex 6). The information from these interviews contributed to the development of the Inception Report – a combination of a summary of pre-existing documentation and description of the data collection design and tools. The field phase period encompassed the time during which the ET obtained qualitative data through a mix of KIIs and FGDs with a broad range of stakeholders as feasible within the existing time constraints. The field phase lasted two weeks (05 October- 21 October) and was carried out by a team of three experts – two international and one national. A final phase includes the data analysis and writing phase –the evaluation Team Lead shared preliminary findings with key PBF stakeholders (as determined by the country office) at the end of the field mission for their input and feedback. A draft of the evaluation report is to be shared with PBSO in New York, PBF Secretariat and the Reference Group by 20 November for their review and comment on the draft report, before its finalization. After a series of revisions, a final evaluation report will be shared by the Team Lead by 23 December.

34. The post-field phase included the more detailed data analysis and report writing process as findings, conclusions, and recommendations are triangulated and finalized. After presentation of the draft report, the PBF stakeholders in Somalia and NYC will provide feedback comments and suggestions via a matrix and these comments will be used in the finalization of the evaluation reports. Once the reports are completed and approved, the PBF Secretariat will prepare the management response.

35. The SoW for the evaluation articulated a series of evaluation questions and categories for analysis clustered under six general objectives (Annex 1). Based on these SoW questions, the ET developed an evaluation matrix (Annex 4) organized into two categories: Results and Contributions of the collective portfolio (to include Relevance, Results and Contributions questions); and PBF management and coordination considerations (to include, Efficiency,

Effectiveness, and Sustainability questions).⁴⁸ The findings in the following sections are presented according to these two general categories

36. **Category 1: Strategic and Political Contributions.** This category profiles the direct contributions of the PBF portfolio of support, as well as these second order indirect effects. The dimensions of relevance and sustainability are also included here because of the importance of the ToC and its alignment with peacebuilding needs, and the significance of political and strategic alignment of the PBF portfolio of support to key strategic documents such as the National Development Plan (NDP), United Nations Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability (CRESTA/A), and other priorities. The key guiding questions include:

- To what extent has the PBF envelope of support made concrete and sustained impact in terms of building and consolidating peace in Somalia?
- What have been some of the indirect effects to the peacebuilding context of the PBF support portfolio through the implementation processes?
- What are important peacebuilding gaps to be further addressed?
- To what extent have the PBF portfolio of support collectively, and individual project theories of change been relevant for addressing peacebuilding needs in Somalia?

37. **Category 2: PBF Process Considerations.** This category focuses on the processes integrated into the PBF portfolio of support. This includes the development of the PBF portfolio criteria (usually the PPP but may be other instruments), the operationalization process, as well as the PBF portfolio of support implementation processes. Of particular interest are the management functions of the various support bodies (PBSO, RUNO, PBF Secretariat) for achievement of the strategic and political contributions. The evaluation dimensions exploring relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and the integration of peacebuilding principles (gender sensitivity and Do No Harm for example) into the management and implementation of the PBF projects would be integrated into this category. The key guiding questions include:

- How efficient, effective, and gender sensitive was the PBF support and management to the Somalia context?
- To what extent were inclusive decision-making, ownership and engagement and overall timeliness and responsiveness integrated into the PBF portfolio management systems in the 2016-2019 operational period?

38. **Catalytic Effects and Indirect Impact.** PBF prioritizes targeting approaches in such a way as to generate catalytic effects. Although commonly defined as conditions that promote further peacebuilding efforts, the exact elements that comprise catalytic effects are understood differently among stakeholders. Based on interviews during the inception phase, the ET composed a list of catalytic effects that would be searched for during the evaluation:

1. Unblocking processes that had created barriers to promoting peace.
2. Catalysing funding opportunities for further peacebuilding efforts.
3. Increasing coordination between the Federal Government, Federal Member States, and other actors
4. Increasing stakeholder ownership in, and promotion of, a multi-stakeholder unified approach to peacebuilding.
5. The creation of networks that later served as platforms for facilitating *other* peacebuilding work.
6. The promotion of innovative and risk-taking forms of peacebuilding action.
7. Timely responsiveness to emergent political opportunities.
8. Promoting extended stakeholder participation and inclusiveness in the peacebuilding agenda
9. Crossing areas of expertise and promoting multi-stakeholder approaches for greater impact

⁴⁸ Youth and Gender considerations are found in both sections

10. Facilitating cascade effects where indirect impacts have a multiplier effect from PBF support.

39. The evaluation matrix in **Error! Reference source not found.** describes in detail these categories, key questions, the judgment criteria, data collection methods and analysis methods. The matrix is intended to serve as the foundation of the evaluation process and dictated the structure in the final report, including conclusions and recommendations. All other inquiry tools, such as interview guides (Semi-Structured Guides in Annex 5), are oriented towards it. Cumulatively, the evidence available against each question/performance indicator should enable a response to the relevant evaluation question.

2.2 Evaluation Methodology

40. The evaluation matrix is linked to the PPP logic model, specifically through its judgement criteria, which were elaborated based on the intended results, organizational processes and expected social change. The evaluation drew on both qualitative and quantitative measures. The quantitative measures were obtained from pre-existing documentation including project reports and evaluations and are associated with the individual project logframe indicators. Qualitative data was collected during the evaluation inception and field mission. The ET conducted key informant interviews (KIIs) or group interviews.⁴⁹ Interview notes were compiled from all interviews in a Dropbox folder using a standard matrix, which was structured to respond to the evaluation matrix categories and questions.

41. Due to security constraints, the bulk of engagement was limited to the national level stakeholders in Mogadishu. However, field visits were carried out to the two United Nations sub-offices in the targeted states (Baidoa and Kismayo) and additional district level stakeholders and citizens were interviewed by the national Somali team member (see Figure 4). Additional virtual interviews were also carried out when stakeholders could not be accessed due to security considerations. In total, 82 persons (26 percent female) were interviewed either individually or in groups. Annex 5 describes the overall field mission calendar and Annex 6 lists all persons interviewed in the process. These included stakeholders from:

1. Government of Somalia and state agencies at national, provincial, district and local levels (25 interviews, 8 percent female)
2. United Nations Personnel in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo (30 interviews, 42 percent female)
3. Implementing partners and project participants from civil society at the Federal, State, District, and Local levels (27 interviews, 26 percent female)

⁴⁹ Tools are profiled in Annex 9.

Figure 2: Field Visit Locations – Evaluation Team⁵⁰



42. **Data Analysis:** The ET reviewed together the range of responses from stakeholders for each element in the matrix and employed a standard qualitative approach of an iterative analysis of emergent themes.⁵¹ Key thought units were identified in interviews. These were then clustered into categories and emergent themes from each category were identified for further analysis and re-categorization to identify key patterns.

43. Evidence for conclusions was built via triangulation analysis. Themes or patterns were examined to determine if they were coming from multiple stakeholder levels and multiple stakeholder categories. Observations or comments that were only coming from a single source or a single category of stakeholder were given less conceptual weight during the building of the analysis. Findings highlighted in the report were those emerging from multiple actors and across multiple levels with different types of stakeholders.

2.3 Evaluation Limitations

44. Possible limitations and constraints to the evaluation were identified in the inception phase with proposed mitigation measures. During field missions, limitations tend to fall into three categories: i) availability of data prior to the field visits, ii) availability of key stakeholders during field missions; and iii) logistical or cultural constraints during the field visit. Overall the field mission went smoothly, and wide variety of stakeholders were able to be interviewed – although with some adjustments were carried out due to data, stakeholder and security considerations.

45. Data availability: There is significant data available at the level of the projects implemented under the PPP. The primary data limitation is the lack of measurement of the

⁵⁰ Blue arrows represent Districts and Cities visited by the ET

⁵¹ Patton, Michael Quinn. 2010. *Qualitative Research and Evaluation*. Sage Publication. San Francisco, California.

PPP outcome level indicators that had been elaborated at the time of the design and the absence of other reliable outcome indicators whose values could be attributed to the PBF portfolio of support (described further in the findings section). Neither the SOM-D2 Daldhis nor the SOM-D1 Midnimo project reports attempted to measure the PPP indicators and the ET was not expected to measure these indicators as part of the evaluation process through quantitative means, although the general orientation of the indicators was considered as part of the evaluation interviews.

46. Availability of key stakeholders during field missions. A large number of individuals were interviewed during the field phase, but stakeholder availability of Government and United Nations personnel – especially at the national level – was a factor due to the relatively small calendar window within which the evaluation was carried out. This was particularly relevant for accessing Government and United Nations stakeholders at the higher levels as these persons have multiple demands on their time. Significant Government and United Nations personnel turnover also limited the institutional memory regarding earlier projects within the PBF portfolio of support.

47. Logistical constraints. Security limitations were present during the field phase data collection. Overall security constraints limited the options for project site visits and also prevented some access to national level stakeholders. One planned ET visit to the Kismayo office had to be cancelled and one District level visit in the same region had to be curtailed due to election security concerns. Scheduled interviews were still carried out, but virtually rather than in person. A mortar attack on the United Nations compound in Mogadishu during the field mission also created some distractions.

3 Evaluation Findings

48. Stakeholder Response Patterns: As an introductory note, there are several key categories of respondents that are referred to in the narrative (Table 3). Patterns of responses varied among the stakeholders and have implications for conclusions and recommendations. On the United Nations side, this included the political mission and the Agencies, Funds, and Programmes engaged in implementing development and humanitarian programming.⁵² Within both divisions, there are Operational level stakeholders (engaged in the direct implementation of activities), Programmatic stakeholders (engaged in the management or reporting of the activities) and the Strategic stakeholders (engaged in assessing the collective contribution of programming towards higher level objectives). On the Somalia side, key stakeholder categories included Government authorities at the Federal Government level, State Governments, and District Government, NGOs and citizens. The primary differences in patterns of responses are associated with the operational, programmatic and strategic levels as well as between the political mission and the programming Agencies. On the Somali stakeholder side, the patterns of responses tended to be more uniform in terms of patterns in responses.

Table 3: Stakeholder Categories in Analysis

United Nations	Somalia
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political (Mission) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strategic ○ Programmatic ○ Operational • Programme (Agencies) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Strategic ○ Programmatic ○ Operational 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Federal ○ State ○ District • Civil Society <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ NGOs ○ Citizens

⁵² These will be referred to as the Political and the Programme stakeholders throughout the narrative

3.1 Relevance, Results and Contributions

3.1.1 Relevance

49. Relevance addressed the question of whether the targeted projects are pertinent to the needs of the stakeholders and the context. The Statement of Work for the evaluation elaborated a series of specific questions for exploring the potential relevance of the PBF Portfolio of support (Table 4).

Table 4: Relevance SoW Questions

<p>Relevance (To assess alignment of the programme interventions to existing strategies)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Design: What was the relevance of the proposed theory of change for the total portfolio and the different outcome areas? 2. How relevant was the portfolio to the needs of the parties including youth, women and marginalized communities and groups? 3. To what extent did the portfolio of support address the drivers and causes identified in the conflict analysis? 4. How relevant were the priorities underlying the PBF Portfolio of support for contributing to achieving peacebuilding in Somalia? 5. (Daldhis and Midnimo only): What was the relevance of the two flagship projects Daldhis and Midnimo for contributing to peacebuilding in Somalia during the 2015-2019 period? 6. To what extent did the PBF and the PBF portfolio of support respond to urgent funding needs and/or peacebuilding relevant gaps? 7. Policy: To what extent was the elaboration of the PBF portfolio of support informed by contextual changes, joint conflict analysis, and lessons learned following PBF's pre-2015 investments in Somalia? 8. To what extent did the collection of projects within the portfolio have strategic coherence? <p>Gender Relevance</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout PBF's support to Somalia? 2. To what extent did the PBF promote gender equality and the empowerment of women? 3. To what extent did the PBF support gender-responsive peacebuilding? <p>Youth Relevance</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To what extent were youth considerations mainstreamed throughout PBF's support to Somalia? 2. To what extent did the PBF promote youth empowerment and meaningful participation in peacebuilding efforts in Somalia?
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50. Programmes vs. Gaps: One of the important emergent themes from the patterns of responses related to relevance that has larger implications for PBF programming is how to shape relevance of a portfolio and strategic coherence: *Is the PBF instrument intended to fund the implementation of a programme or is it intended to fund gaps in someone else's programme?* A fundamental limitation in the SOW questions regarding relevance is that they are predicated on the assumption that the PBF ToC would be a standalone and internally coherent framework to guide a collective set of projects to achieve strategic outcomes. There is also an implicit assumption in these SOW questions that the peacebuilding programming in a country would be a relatively small segment of which the PBF would be the most significant peacebuilding actor.

51. In Somalia, significant expansive peacebuilding frameworks already exist to guide the greater peacebuilding investment in the country – these include the National Stabilization Strategy (2018), the Wadajir framework for Local Governance (2016) and the National Development Plan (2017). In Somalia, the PBF portfolio is a relatively small proportion of all peacebuilding funding aligned with these frameworks. The overall annual investment for peacebuilding in Somalia varied between US\$243 million- US\$271 million annually

throughout the current PBF cycle.⁵³ Annually, the PBF portfolio represents roughly 5 percent of peacebuilding funding in any given year; reportedly ranking 17th among all the donors in Somalia during a donor review in 2018. Due to the relatively small “footprint” of the PBF portfolio in the country and due to the existence of highly elaborated peacebuilding frameworks with articulated conflict drivers already present, the PBF portfolio has, with the exception of the SOM-D2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo PRF projects, taken a “gap-oriented” approach to the support of peacebuilding projects; identifying opportunities to support a diverse range of projects that address gaps in the support provided by the larger donors and investments to peacebuilding in the country. Even though there is considerable peacebuilding investment, the need still outweighs the available funding in specific arenas and the PBF can play an important role in targeting these specific dimensions. When overlaid against the backdrop of the larger strategic frameworks, the gap-oriented approach is appropriate and strategic for the context

52. One of the implications of a gap-oriented approach is that the exercises of identifying a theory of change in a PPP or exercises for identifying conflict drivers generated valid and relevant drivers and ToCs– but they were to a certain extent redundant because they were exercises that were duplicating drivers and ToCs already identified in much larger existing conceptual frameworks. The intent to develop a standalone conceptual framework for internal coherence of portfolio support does also not fit well with a gap-oriented portfolio logic wherein the portfolio would be a small piece of a larger conceptual puzzle. As an orientation framework, it would have been helpful for the entire portfolio to have developed a gap-analysis document with drivers to allow for a more articulated connection between the larger investment environment and the specificities of the portfolio gaps targeted.

53. Evidence Base: Identifying the relevance of the conflict drivers supported or the relevance of the areas targeted is dependent to some extent on an understanding of the larger peacebuilding landscape within which these drivers were operating. The conflict analysis carried out in 2015 was never ratified by the Joint Steering Committee or UNCT and therefore did not play a prominent role in orienting project proposals to the PBF instrument. However, the elaboration of the PBF portfolio appears to have been heavily embedded in the analysis of the context carried out by the UNCT or United Nations Agencies and operationalized through extensive discussions and consultations with key stakeholders in both Government and the United Nations. All projects claim in the project documents that they are influenced, build upon, or are designed to respond to the changing context in Somalia identified through consultations and learning. In the project documents, the projects do cite the connection to the larger frameworks and the rationale for their inclusion. Some projects such as IRF-116 Support to Stabilization, IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s Role and Participation in Peacebuilding reference specific drivers of conflict from situation analysis or similar documents from 20013/2014. Others, such as the SOM-D-2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo reference the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance. The use of existing evidence and larger frameworks contributes to the identified conflict drivers being relevant for the portfolio. In triangulation, Government respondents noted that the needs and priorities were identified by the Federal Government of Somalia and partners states and that these were integrated into the programme. They noted that all sectors of the community were involved, and the needs were selected according to the most urgent and which would have the most potential with regards to peace. They also felt that this consultation was done in a spirit of consensus building leading to increased relevance.

54. Because of the gap-oriented approach of the portfolio, each project tended to address a range of specific drivers rather than the collection of projects addressing one or two drivers and targeted a range of geographic regions or different government levels across the portfolio. One dynamic that may be driven by the gap-oriented approach is that respondents tended to give more priority to explaining the relevance of their project to the PBF portfolio through identifying functional logics for the inclusion of the project within the PBF portfolio

⁵³ PBSO analysis of OECD DAC Data

of support – such as the area based intervention logic, or that it was an innovative project, or that it was a joint programme experiment between two Agencies that had not worked together previously rather than to the conflict driver or ToC itself that was in use.

55. PPP ToC and Conflict Drivers: The PBF documentation emphasizes the complementary nature of the fund application - to fill gaps and address risks that other donor sources are not able to fulfil and to be a short-term measure until other larger funds can provide support to the proof of concept, or the risk has been mitigated in some manner or the gap addressed. United Nations respondents were familiar with these parameters of the fund and could articulate them in interviews. At the same time, the PBF programming contains procedures that would be more focused on the development of a programme-centric portfolio of support in the PRF processes. The PPP is expected to elaborate a framework that identifies its own set of conflict drivers and describes a theory of change that contributes to this framework and then to fund projects that operationalize this framework. The PPP is part of the package of requirements for eligibility of increased funding and the use of the PRFs for developing more medium- and long-term interventions (with higher funding levels for more years).

56. Within Somalia, mechanisms for managing clan disputes and facilitating substantive inter-clan negotiations is seen as a fundamental pre-requisite for the extension of state authority and a functional Federal, State, and District Governance system. One evolution in nuance between the First, Second, and Third Phases has been in not only identifying the absence of dispute mechanisms as a key driver of conflict, but further identifying factors which create disputes in the first place. An illustrative example to highlight this difference are the efforts to build social cohesion between IDP and host communities. Projects in the First and Second Phases included creating dialogue committees, joint programming for collaborations, or economic empowerment opportunities. Respondents emphasized that these were considered successful at strengthening social cohesion. In the Third Phase cohort, one of the primary underlying factors driving conflict between IDPs and host communities was identified as the issue of land rights and land titles. The land used by IDPs was owned or controlled previously and when that land had been developed as a result of IDP investment, the land became more valuable. The controlling clan or owner would then want to take back the land and dispossess the IDPs in order to increase the resale value. A Third Phase project recently developed is focused on land rights and developing national land legislation – an underlying issue which fuelled the IDP/host situation.

57. The PPP framework as described in the documentation is well articulated, elegant and comprises an integrated set of possible programming responses to address drivers of conflict. It is interesting therefore that in the qualitative interviews, respondents tended to describe the PPP in terms of only peripheral relevance to their work. In the context of Somalia, where the peacebuilding agenda is predominant and where the PBF comprises a relatively small percentage of overall programming, the PBF management has emphasized the gap-filling nature of the portfolio with respondents far more frequently citing the PBF instrument as important for filling *gaps* not covered by other donors within the frameworks and for encouraging innovation. They did not perceive the PBF as needing to provide an integrated programme, and therefore even though the PPP is conceptually elegant, it was seen as somewhat superfluous by respondents for shaping peacebuilding. It created the appearance that the PBF instrument is intended to fund a standalone programme rather than *gaps* in pre-existing frameworks.

58. Because of the existence of the larger peacebuilding frameworks, while respondents during the field mission interviews were universal in their assessment that the portfolio supported projects were relevant to the peacebuilding needs of the context, the majority of the PBF projects referenced previously developed theories of change and previously identified conflict drivers – such as those found in pre-existing programmes (such as UNDP's previously developed Local Governance, and Rule of Law, or UNIDO's Youth Empowerment components that were integrated into SOM-D2 Daldhis) – or the ToCs and drivers referenced other frameworks such as the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance for their

alignment. This does not imply that the PPP ToC was divergent or irrelevant - the concepts articulated in the various frameworks from the individual project ToCs do align with the core concepts of the PPP ToC, and the PPP ToC is aligned in a general logic to the existing frameworks. Therefore, although the PPP ToC was and is relevant and valid to the context, it does not appear to have been central to the project conceptualization that emerged during the proposal stages.

59. One of the challenges for a “filling the gaps” approach is that the collection of projects that are filling gaps when taken out of their context and viewed in isolation will give the appearance of lacking strategic coherence. The coherence comes from observing the individual projects overlaid on to the larger strategic framework. In contrast, a “programme” approach can give the appearance of an internal cohesion but may be viewed as disconnected by stakeholders if there are already pre-existing and larger frameworks that are in use in the context. Ironically, what may appear coherent in documentation is then seen as disconnected by stakeholders and what appears to be disconnected in the documentation, may be perceived as strategic by the respondents.

60. Documentation processes within the PBF do not easily allow for a description of the gap-oriented strategic approach even though it is fundamental in the language of the PBSO instrument. It may be helpful for knowledge management in future cycles to consider how a gap-oriented approach could be made more coherent in documentation without resorting to the development of a separate PPP framework if similar peacebuilding frameworks already exist in the context, although it is important to acknowledge that as of 2018 the PPP framework is no longer required for PRF funding and eligibility.

61. Gender and Youth Relevance. Additional SoW questions aim to assess the extent to which gender and youth considerations were mainstreamed within the PBF’s portfolio. The primary orientation of the PPP is towards the extension of state authority and the creation of citizen demand for governance. These elements are not, in and of themselves, gender or youth oriented. Three projects did contain explicit gender or youth language (IRF-119, SOM D-2, IRF-152); however for the most part, conflict drivers oriented around gender or youth have not been prominent in the portfolio. The SOM D-2 Daldhis integrated one Youth Economic Empowerment joint programme. The IRF-152 Kenya-Somali cross border pilot also had a significant youth empowerment component. The SOM-D1 Midnimo programme included both women’s councils and youth councils in the community mobilization component and promoted the participation of women in the peace committees. The IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s Role in Peacebuilding project is a more visible gender-oriented project from the First Phase. One factor possibly influencing the relatively low consideration of gender or youth ToCs in the portfolio has been that the portfolio has emphasized supporting actions perceived as high risk. In the context of Somalia, this has been primarily supporting projects in newly liberated regions or because of the lack of appropriate accountability mechanisms. In contrast, support to gender and youth is not perceived to be as high risk and therefore likely receives more funding from the much larger peacebuilding investment in the country. For example, DFID has made substantive bi-lateral funding investments directly to support the Ministry of Women and gender equity work since the IRF-119 PBF support project.

62. This is not to imply that gender and youth received no consideration within the portfolio. The collection of the projects with a gender or youth programming focus represented about 55 percent of total PBF portfolio budget. Furthermore, the PBF Coordination report at the end of 2018 notes that 15 percent of funding is clearly linked to support women’s and girls’ empowerment. However, gender and youth considerations appear to be more systematically addressed as part of gender and youth *sensitive* programming rather than gender and youth *focused* programming.

63. There is a stronger consideration for gender and youth programming sensitivity at the operational levels than is noted in documentation or higher-level interviews. More senior United Nations and Government respondents in Mogadishu tended to emphasize the state authority and the CAPs orientation of the PPP or the state-building importance in the

National Development Plan. However, at the operational level and within the operational documents, more descriptions could be found of actions oriented towards gender and youth sensitivity in programming. This included the formation of women’s committees and youth committees within the SOM D-1 Midnimo processes, the development of youth skills training and youth empowerment for economic development and ensuring women and youth representation on project steering committees and councils. Field level respondents also highlighted the importance of ensuring broad women and youth participation in community level activities or on other governance committees or councils. External interviews with non-UN personnel reflected the same practical consideration of women and youth components in programming, triangulating the observations from the UN personnel.

3.1.2 Results and Contributions

Evaluation Questions

64. There are three questions within the effectiveness dimension that explore the contribution of the PBF portfolio to higher level results and one related to the creation of catalytic effects (Table 5)

Table 5: Impact Related SoW Questions

<p>Impact (<i>evaluating the extent the collective portfolio has contributed to peacebuilding and immediate developmental changes as well as to fomenting of catalytic effects</i>)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Results: To what extent did the PBF portfolio from 2015-2019 achieve higher-level results? 2. Strategic: How strategic was the PBF portfolio of support at seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact and creating catalytic effects? 3. To what extent did the PBF projects contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in the PPP and the strategic objectives of the UN in the country during the implementation period? 4. What, if any, catalytic effects did the PBF support in Somalia generate during this implementation period?
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65. The contributions of the individual projects supported by the PBF instrument to peacebuilding in Somalia can be assessed through individual project evaluations or reviews. Individual project briefs profiling impact and lessons learned from the individual project evaluations carried out by the implementing agencies are presented as one-page summaries in Annex 2. Assessing the *collective* impact of the entire portfolio requires an additional layer of review through two different dimensions. The first is through identifying the collective changes in the social and political context that occurred through the implementation of the projects supported by the PBF – both the intended effects on the social context and the unintended effects. The second dimension may be termed the *operational* impact of the PBF portfolio – the catalytic effects for United Nations or Government entities that occurred as a result of supporting the projects within the portfolio.

Data Sources and Limitations

66. Identifying social and political context changes can be done through three mechanisms:

- i. Collective review: Assessing the changes in outcome level indicators through summative measures of social change (such as the social change indicators of the PPP);
- ii. Individual Review and Synthesis: Compiling and assessing the outcome level indicators from individual projects to build a collective assessment, and;
- iii. Qualitative perceptions review: Abstracting qualitative data from key informant interviews related to perceptions regarding impact. In this evaluation, there is information available for the first two mechanisms, but with some limitations for generalizability and much of this assessment of impact will need to rely on the perceptions elicited from the qualitative interviews.

67. **Mechanism 1: Collective Review.** To identify and measure collective impact, the PBF can identify specific portfolio level indicators and measure them at baseline and endline

with the expectation that these will be able to track the contributions of the collective portfolio. A PPP normally has collective indicators to measure the collection of projects under the portfolio. The second approach could be for the PBF to identify pre-existing social context indicators that are measured by other processes that can serve as proxy measures for identifying the collective impact of the portfolio of projects. Both of these approaches have their challenges in this portfolio.

68. The first approach assumes that the PBF – or supporting Agencies – will carry out the baseline and endline of these PPP indicators at the inception and completion of the portfolio cycle and are measured only within the areas where projects supported by the portfolio were implemented. The first approach’s primary limitations are that they required extra M&E investment from the Agencies or the PBF and they will not be applicable to IRFs developed outside of the frame of the PPP. The PPP did develop outcome level indicators (Annex 3) but these were not measured as baseline or endline.

69. The second approach relies on pre-existing social change indicators measured by other mechanisms. These have the advantage of not requiring additional M&E investment by the PBF or Agencies to measure. However, they are often measured in areas with multiple projects implemented or may include areas in the indicator measurement where the projects did not focus. The CRESTA-A and Fragility Index and Maturation Model (FIMM) could be used for assessing PBF portfolio contributions but suffer from both the “multiple projects in one place” and “measuring areas where projects didn’t work” limitations. The FIMM Final Report (September 2019) measured four dimensions relevant to the PBF portfolio: Community recovery, Social Cohesion, Security and Rule of Law, and Local Governance.

70. **Mechanism 2: Synthesis of Individual Project Indicators.** It is theoretically possible to develop some estimations of collective impact by abstracting outcome level indicators from individual project logframes and compile them together. In the case of the PBF in Somalia, there are limitations to how much can be induced from the available data – both from a coherence perspective as well as a technical M&E perspective. Regarding the coherence, the outcome level indicators for the First Phase projects do not overlay with the indicators developed in Second Phase projects in terms of either thematic focus or geographic location.⁵⁴ Context changes in the targeted States such as ‘social cohesion’ or ‘extension of State authority’ are only indirectly referenced, and the disparate geographic foci and organizational logic among all of the projects means that the compiled indicators cannot be organized into a consolidated measure of peacebuilding contribution for any one location – the positive contributions are dispersed across a wide range of themes, audiences, and geographies.

71. Furthermore, the flexible nature of the PBF support – while positive – meant that there were also changes in individual project approaches that were not reflected in changes in the logframe indicators. In some cases, indicators present in the design were not reported on at the end of the project, and project narratives reflected other results than those in the logframes. Limiting further the degree to which these indicators can provide a synthesis of impact. For example, the outcome indicators in the IRF-141 National Window are in alignment with the PPP outcome indicators, but then in the final project reporting, these have been simplified and reported on differently from the PPP Outcome indicators so cannot be integrated into a collective assessment of the portfolio.

72. **Mechanism 3 - Qualitative perceptions data:** A fundamental challenge of assessing a gap-oriented portfolio is that there are few – if any – portfolio level quantitative indicators that can track outcome level changes but still parse out the relatively small contributions of gaps. Reports such as the FIMM and the CRESTA-A reports can show outcome level changes in the country – but these changes will be due to far more than just the gap oriented projects supported by the PBF. How much credit for a national level change that can be allocated to a specific project is not yet possible to determine within the frame of

⁵⁴ Outcome and Goal level indicators should measure visible behaviour or social change in a context

the existing quantitative or qualitative data. Given these challenges for measuring collective impact, the most useful mechanism available for assessing impact will be the qualitative data from field interviews where respondents should be able to parse out the contributions of programmes and projects to overall systemic changes.⁵⁵

Results Findings

73. **Collective Impact – Community Recovery and Social Cohesion.** The FIMM report presents the highest level observations regarding changes in the context. This cannot be directly linked to the PBF portfolio for the reasons cited in the previous section. However, the FIMM report does show positive changes in the desired directions. Community Recovery and Social Cohesion are the highest scoring dimensions for the SWS and Jubbaland States and the District of Hudur – one of the Districts included in the PPP implementation and which was among the highest of all reviewed Districts in the FIMM for community recovery and local governance. These are positive results that do triangulate with the qualitative respondent perceptions. However, the FIMM cannot serve as a reliable measure of contributions of PBF projects to impact because the FIMM measurements were only carried out in selected Districts and of these, most were not involved in PBF implementation. Furthermore, the FIMM data does not directly review projects or programmes in the districts, so it would be difficult to isolate and establish contributions between the indicators of progress and the many other programmes funded by donors in these areas. However, it is a good point of triangulation with observations that are linked to the qualitative interviews

74. **Project Contributions.** The following table 7 briefly describes the targeted conflict driver and key achievements and challenges for the individual projects. More details on achievements and lessons learned are summarized in the project fiches in Annex 2. Annex 2 also contains summarized tables describing the outcome level indicators associated with each of the projects with First and Second Phases abstracted from the evaluation reports and end of project evaluations and updated with additional observations from the field mission.

⁵⁵ .The quantitative data can still be used to provide supplementary or triangulations of patterns.

75. A compiled analysis from all of the individual projects does not fully capture the contributions of the projects to higher level results even though the output and outcome indicators do show positive progress. Based on the data tables in Annex 2, some 81 percent of the compiled outcome indicators are meet or exceed expected targets (74 percent of PPP project indicators and 88 percent of pre-PPP IRF project indicators). The primary exception to achievement is with SOM-D2 Daldhis- for the indicators focusing on District council formation and strengthening in the Local Governance component of the programme. Even in the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme, the outcome indicators for the youth employment and for rule of law programmes exceed targets. The overall percentage of positive change in the indicators is reflective of a portfolio that has achieved positive peacebuilding contributions in the context. Due to the data limitations described in the sources section, from a technical perspective, these indicators, while suggesting success in terms of meeting programme objectives, are not necessarily able to be synthesized to the collective impact of the PBF Portfolio of support.

76. The summarized key achievements and the more detailed achievements discussions in Annex 2 for the individual projects can illustrate additional collective contributions to mitigation of conflict drivers and achievements of social change in results. The most significant contributions have been in: i) mitigation of inter-clan disputes, negotiations, and representation; ii) development of appropriate administrative and financial systems to the delivery of services; iii) support to the creation of basic governance infrastructure and capacity for the delivery of services; and iv) increasing community engagement and organization for connection to state authority. There has been an evolution among the portfolio in how these drivers are addressed. For example, the initial Rule of Law project – IRF-121 – developed in 2015 had a significant emphasis on the criminal justice systems. However, evaluation recommendations noting the greater need for strengthened civil law legal system and strengthening the informal grievance system to handle inter-clan disputes were adopted into the subsequent rule of law component under the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme. In another example, the IRF-122 Reconciliation Conferences served as an important mechanism for clan and stakeholder representation in newly established states and in turn, supporting these emergent State structures were integrated into the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis programmes with additional support to the establishment of the District Councils as well. Finally, the initial IRF-120 Risk Management project supported the subsequent IRF-141 National Window project for increased administrative and financial systems that promoted enhanced linkages among the Federal, State, and District levels.

77. Among the collection of all of the portfolio, six major dimensions of social outcomes were cited from programme documentation or stakeholder interviews: i) increased capacity for delivery of basic services by Government, ii) increased community engagement and mobilization for interaction with state, iii) increased social cohesion – both between clans and between host communities and IDPs; iv) increased collaboration between Federal and State levels – especially in the transfer of funds and coordination; v) increased economic opportunities for marginalized populations; and vi) increased formal and informal mechanisms for rule of law including opportunities for the settlement of long-standing grievances. Table 6 describes the contributions to social changes by projects supported in the portfolio.

Table 6: Project Contributions to Impact

Project	Delivery of Basic Services	Community Mobilization	Social Cohesion	Federal, State, District Connection	Economic Opportunities	Mechanisms for Rule of Law and Grievances
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law						
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role						
PBF/IRF-122 Somalia						

Reconciliation Conferences						
PBF/IRF-116 S2S						
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management						
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis						
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo						
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia Cross-Border Pilot						
PBF/IRF-141 National Window						
PBF/IRF-143: Pilot Studies						

78. Women and Youth Considerations: The Relevance section (3.1.1) has noted that the gender and youth components have been more integrated as cross-cutting themes for sensitivity in implementation rather than as specific project objectives or explicit conflict drivers. This has to some extent limited the degree of social change that can be observed on women and youth. For youth, the supported projects have been positive in their inclusion of youth into community processes (SOM-D1 Midnimo); peacebuilding and dispute resolution skills (IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross border); and in access to economic opportunities (SOM-D1 Midnimo, IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross border, SOM D2 Daldhis). However, the number of youths that were affected by the programming is a relatively small proportion of the total youth population. In the SOM-D2 Daldhis, about 1000 youth were trained as part of the youth economic empowerment component. In the IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia pilot, project reports cite about 600 youth receiving conflict resolution training with an additional 800 receiving vocational skills training and 640 benefiting from short term economic opportunities. Youth integration and opportunity is recognized in the ToCs as an important element for peacebuilding in the country and the country contains a substantive youth population (about 60% of the population). While the effect of these projects on the youth involved is positive, it may be important to consider macro level approaches for youth integration that can scale up positive results to larger percentages of the youth population.

79. Only the 2015 IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s role and participation in peacebuilding project specifically has a gender equity objective among the portfolio. However, gender sensitivity is seen throughout almost all of the projects with examples cited earlier in 3.1.1. Outcome level changes in gender are still limited. A recent report by the World Economic Forum⁵⁶ notes that Somalia is among the lowest ranking countries in terms of gender gap and that gender inequality remains a concern. Within the PBF portfolio projects, there has been observed increases in women’s participation as a result of the projects, but less progress in women’s representation in decision making bodies or governance. For example, women may participate in community processes such as serving on local community dispute resolution committees or engaging in community planning processes. Women will also participate in the economic development opportunities or vocational training opportunities as provided by the projects in the PBF portfolio. However, women are still under-represented at higher level decision making. The SOM D-2 Daldhis report notes that only 22 percent of the representation on the District-level Peace and Stability Committees are women. The organization of Somalia Women Parliamentarians notes that only 24 percent of parliamentary seats are filled with women – even though the quote is 30 percent. Further, only 1 member of the Permanent Committee of the Federal

⁵⁶ <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/gender-gap-report-gender-parity-how-to-speed-up-progress/>

Parliament is a woman.⁵⁷ Although there has been more funding and investment in narrowing the gender gap, the positions and findings from the IRF-119 Women’s Political Participation project which ended in 2016 are still the same positions put forward by the Somalia Women Parliamentarians in 2019, including:⁵⁸

1. Increasing women’s representation to 30 percent of Parliamentary seats
2. Mainstreaming Gender Responsive Budgeting
3. Promotion of women to refrain from engaging in clan-based conflicts
4. Increasing Women’s representation in national and regional decision making forums⁵⁹
5. Approving existing proposed legislation related to women’s rights
6. Development of implementation protocols to operationalize women’s legislation by the Executive and Judiciary branches.

80. The similarity of these calls in 2019 to the 2016 IRF-119 project suggests that there is considerably more work that could be done in gender equity issues in the country. In the SOM-D2 Daldhis final report, it was observed that more attention is needed on bridging the gap between women’s *participation* in processes and women’s *representation* in legislature and the executive of governance. This may be a future element for consideration in the PBF portfolio depending on the findings from any gap analysis in terms of other peacebuilding funding towards women’s empowerment. In addition, the actual *implementation* of legislation through the development of technical and implementation guidances may be an important additional area for exploration in PBF support as this component is often under-financed in donor programmes.

81. **Qualitative Triangulation – Collective Impact.** In the qualitative data sources, the vast majority of respondents were positive about the PBF portfolio’s contribution to peacebuilding. Stakeholders from all levels were able to point to a wide range of changes they observed in the context as indicators of success of the collective portfolio of support and the PBF was seen as supporting the creation of an enabling environment for the application of these programmes in newly established States.

82. Implicit and explicit indicators of success cited by respondents fell into the fields of governance, community mobilization, resolving land disputes, and economic empowerment. Recurring themes included building social cohesion, the provision of basic services, and the elaboration of CAPs. These are referencing components from a range of the portfolio supported projects. The extension of state authority and the successful establishment of state structures was seen as having made positive progress, especially given the difficulties of implementation of these efforts within the newly established States. The establishment of dispute mechanisms and economic development opportunities for youth were also cited as well as facilitating better administrative and political connections between the newly established states and the federal Government. The ability of the States to be seen as providing basic services was seen as a crucial component for building trust or the idea of the state. To appreciate the potential contributions of these types of programmes, it is important to recognize just how long these newly established areas had been operating without Government (See text box).

83. Respondents in field level interviews with District stakeholders or local citizens tended to express a high degree of optimism regarding the future – possibly as a result of how limited these institutions were before – “*we can feel that things are happening*” or “*These programmes have injected a new lease on life in into the pipeline*” – or “*these programmes have resuscitated peacebuilding in the region*”. Again, respondents tended to point towards very concrete and specific examples to illustrate their optimism towards the re-establishment of the institution of Government (See text box).

⁵⁷ Capacity Development in Action. UNDP Communique. December 2019.

⁵⁸ Capacity Development in Action. UNDP Communique. December 2019.

⁵⁹ This would include the District Councils supported by SOM-D2 Daldhis and the committees supported by SOM-D1 Midnimo programmes

84. The community-based contribution was an important dimension consistently cited by all levels of stakeholders. The most frequently cited successes were connected to the development of the CAPs under the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme and the construction of improved social cohesion – especially between IDPs and refugee returnees and host populations through the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme and the IRF-152 Kenya Somalia Cross Border Pilot. The CAPs – referred to as the CAP “book” – were cited as being the foundation for future development and an important guide for coordinating donor investment at the community level. The PBF was seen as contributing to this through supporting an environment that enhanced community stakeholder decision-making ability and allowing community and District authorities to work together.

85. Often in the Government interviews, the positive effects cited had less to do with the products of the programmes but rather the mechanism of *how* they were implemented. The PBF supported projects emphasized the importance of Government led and Government included programming. For example, the IRF-141 National Window project field tested the ability of the Federal Government to deliver infrastructure funds to State and local entities. Priorities were linked to, and developed with, Government stakeholders and Government stakeholders at all levels were seen as the primary implementer of these programmes. Within a context where significant resources are channeled for stabilization and recovery efforts outside of Government management – even if in consultation – projects such as the IRF-141 National Window were highly appreciated and valued by Government stakeholders. The work through the Government was cited by field respondents as improving the visibility of the Government in supplying basic services and increasing trust of the citizens towards the State.

86. **Qualitative Patterns – Contribution and Success.** Two important patterns can be elicited from this collection of responses. First, the three levels of stakeholders – United Nations, Government, and citizens - point to different indicators of success, and they tended to express different degrees of enthusiasm for the impact level changes. Stakeholders interviewed in the Districts and States expressed a high degree of optimism and saw progress in the legitimacy of the State and they would point to very concrete examples of success as seen in the text box descriptions. The Government level stakeholders cited examples of success that illustrated what might be called “indirect effects” – the examples related to how the implementation was supported rather than the specifics of the projects or programmes themselves. The fact that these programmes were Government led and implemented through Government – not only with Government permission – was seen as extremely important by Government stakeholders for building capacity and for building confidence in themselves “*we know what to do now*”.

I am a trader in Baidoa. Before, I would come to this space <in the market> and do my trading all day, every day. When the sun was hot, I would be out in the sun. There were no facilities nearby and I could not go far away to do my prayers because I needed to keep trading. But see that shade? The Government built that. Now I don't have to be out in the sun anymore. And see those facilities? Now I can go wash and do my prayers and not miss trading opportunities – Project beneficiary

Do you see that building over there? The Government built that. We have a dispute committee to handle trade disputes <in the market>, but the committee would have no place to meet. Now, they have a room I that building and when disputes arise, we can go there to resolve them – Project beneficiary

“I am from <District> and I live in <District>. However, I am now an employee of the Ministry of Interior of the Federal Government. Can you imagine what this is like? It has been 30 years since the Federal Government has been in <District>. Every month, I get my salary delivered to my cell phone from the Central Bank of Somalia. When I open up the message, and I see ‘Central Bank of Somalia’, can you imagine what this is like? It has been 30 years, and now we have a Central Bank again. Just receiving this message is enough to motivate me to keep working – even if there were no money” - Midnimo Liaison Officer

87. In contrast, United Nations respondents tended to describe systems and legislation and processes – the establishment of courts, or District councils – and to emphasize the quality of the inter-relationships between the different levels of Government (Federal, State, District). Respondents from the higher levels of the United Nations system also tended to be more measured in terms of their perceptions of the impact of the portfolio.

88. The IRF-141 National Window project serves as an example of this dichotomy. When higher level United Nations respondents were describing the IRF-141 National Window during interviews, they would often mention the IRF-141 National Window in passing as “*something small*” or “*it was okay, a good first effort, but there are better such initiatives out there*”. In contrast, Government respondents almost always cited the IRF-141 National Window project first in their interviews and were consistent in describing this project as one of the most important contributions of the PBF. Although the amount of the funds delivered through this project were relatively small, Government respondents emphasized that this was the first such action to send money through the Government systems to the field level for infrastructure - “*the PBF trusted us when no one else did*”. Government stakeholders also believed that this exercise had led to other donors now being more willing to channel funding through the Government for implementation.

89. The differences in relative enthusiasm for the portfolio contributions between the Government and United Nations stakeholders may have been influenced by relatively higher aspirations on the part of the United Nations stakeholders in terms of what was hoped to be achieved within the frame of the PBF support. Respondents observed in interviews that at the time of the development of the PPP, the emergence of the newly liberated States and the development of the National Development Plan framework had led to a sense of optimism among the UNCT regarding the possibilities to effect substantial changes in a short period of time. This sense of initial optimism may have set the stage for subsequent perceptions of disappointment with what was able to be accomplished within the span of the portfolio. A second factor influencing how United Nations stakeholders described the higher-level results could be due to the internal coordination challenges among the Agencies (discussed further in the efficiency and effectiveness sections). In particular, the SOM-D2 Daldhis coordination issues affected the perceptions of multiple United Nations stakeholders in the Agencies involved in SOM-D2 Daldhis. This is also covered in more detail in the effectiveness section and represents a good lesson learned for future programming.

90. Contributions to systemic changes – the integration of community participation into decision-making processes – helped re-establish the trust in the State. The local infrastructure projects, even if they were small, were seen as increasing the visibility of the State and improved community stakeholder satisfaction by addressing their needs and creating improved perceptions of resilience. The CAPs helped improve the harmony and alignment between Ministries at the field level. The quantitative data from the FIMM and the individual logframe indicators also triangulates these patterns of a generally positive contribution to peacebuilding in the targeted States.

3.1.3 Catalytic and Cascade Effects

91. United Nations stakeholders cited the catalytic effects of the PBF portfolio much more frequently than collective impact changes of the portfolio. Given the relatively small amounts of funding from the PBF compared to other donor investments, it is likely that United Nations respondents did not perceive the PBF as a major input into context changes, but they did perceive the PBF portfolio as being very important for generating catalytic effects. The PBF portfolio was seen as highly impactful for generating positive consequences because of its emphasis on innovation and risk taking.

92. The two terms – **innovation and risk taking** - were among the most frequent mentions in United Nations interviews. The most commonly cited examples were in supporting the engagement in newly emerging States with relatively weak institutions and a volatile social context by facilitating the entry of local governance and community mobilization programmes into areas that would not have been supported by the traditional

donors.⁶⁰ Establishing mechanisms for channeling funds through national Government to local levels was also seen as high risk by donors but was supported through the IRF-120- Risk Management Support and the IRF-141 National Window projects. The PBF was seen as one of the mechanisms for being able to work within these higher risk situations that were often not available to other donor instruments. Many respondents perceived this work through the PBF/IRF-141 National Window as pioneering – moving into uncharted territory – and appreciated the willingness of the PBF to support these actions. Government respondents also cited that they saw other donors being more willing to channel funds through the Federal Government after observing the success of the IRF-141 National Window. The IRF-119 – Strengthening women’s role in political participation was seen as both innovative (in that this type of programming on women’s political representation had not been done before with the Federal Government) and risk taking (because donors were reluctant to engage in promoting women’s political representation close to election periods) to increase gender inclusion in the political processes and in the construction of the representative bodies at the time.

93. A core logic articulated for the use of PBF funding in Somalia was to test “**proof of concept**” as another catalytic effect related to innovations. A new project or innovative approach would be field tested within a limited frame through the PBF support. Lessons learned from this implementation could then be synthesized and the concept would be scaled up through accessing larger donor support and longer term funding from other sources. Projects cited as fitting this type of catalytic effect included the IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s role and participation in peacebuilding, IRF-141 National Window, SOM/D-1 Midnimo, and the experimental logic of area based interventions through SOM/D-2 Daldhis.⁶¹ Most of these projects, including the SOM/D-1 Midnimo project, the three joint programmes located under SOM/D-2 Daldhis, and the IRF-119 Strengthening Women’s role in peacebuilding also cited being able to leverage funding opportunities for further peacebuilding efforts. Donors mentioned included, but were not limited to, USAID, the European Union, the Norwegian Government and DFID.⁶² In the SOM/D-1: Midnimo project, respondents also noted that private partnerships emerged with local businesses were successfully experimented with for support of the project. After the development of the CAPs, local business leaders were approached to see if they would be willing to fund some of the identified projects. The programme reported that 10 percent of the costs for these additional development actions in the end were supported by local business or wealthy individuals. For example, local businesses supported the installation of streetlights in one area as part of the CAP.

94. Respondents also appreciated the emphasis on **flexibility**. The PBF instrument was highly valued and appreciated for its flexibility and responsiveness to changing conditions. For example, when the humanitarian crisis emerged from IDPs coming to Baidoa, the IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project was mentioned as being flexible for Agencies to shift support from development activities to support humanitarian response. The IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law was an example of the fund being used to allow for immediate start-up of a project when other donors were delayed. These projects could be modified as new situations emerged or funding could be reallocated to address new actions or interventions in light of emerging priorities or implementation difficulties.

95. Another consistently cited catalytic effect pertained to **promoting a multi-stakeholder approach** – this was seen within the UNCT through the emphasis on supporting **joint programming** and externally through the multi-layered engagement of stakeholders within a single project/programme in the portfolio (SOM/D-1: Midnimo, SOM/D-2: Daldhis, IRF-141 National Window, IRF-116 S2S among others). Joint

⁶⁰ Such as the PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S), the PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis, and the PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo

⁶¹ Daldhis did not turn out to be successful from a joint programme management perspective, but it WAS an innovation to combine multiple joint programmes under a single area-based intervention logic.

⁶² As noted earlier, the exact amounts of funding leverage were not cited, but this is not the most relevant question for a context such as Somalia where gaps in peacebuilding funding is more of a priority than amounts of peacebuilding funds available.

programming practices are already a significant part of UN Somalia programming. One UNDP noted that around 80 percent of its portfolio in Somalia are joint programmes (compared to about eight percent globally). Even so, respondents frequently mentioned that the PBF encouraged agencies, and even internal department within agencies, to coordinate and work together through the PBF portfolio and to be intentional about seeking out new collaboration opportunities that would promote the **crossing of expertise** among United Nations Agencies. The coordination mechanism supported by the PBF was seen to help mitigate duplication of effort between the portfolio and other complementary interventions. The area based intervention logic also helped with increasing coordination between similar programmes. One example cited was helping align and facilitate coordinated interventions between the IRF-116 Support to Stabilization programme and the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis programmes which had similar interventions.

96. Projects that were seen as **unblocking processes** that had created barriers to promoting peace included ones that helped facilitate relationships and connections between the different levels of government – Federal, State and District. The establishment of State Authority in Somalia has been a long-term process integrating clan representation into a multi-layered structure with Federal, State and District semi-autonomy. Periodic disputes among clans or tiers (Federal to State or State to District) would often result in delays in delivery of services, establishment of policies or transfer of resources. The IRF-122 Conferences to Support Reconciliation Project IRF-141 National Window, and the SOM/D-1: Midnimo programme were cited as having contributed to unblocking these inter-level disputes through their interventions to facilitate these linkages. The IRF-122 Reconciliation project by providing substantive spaces for negotiating disputes, the SOM/D-1: Midnimo programme through creating coherent community-based action plans for targeting services, and the IRF-141 National Window for facilitating transfers of funds from Federal to District levels of infrastructure and services. In addition, the SOM/D-1: Midnimo project also was cited for the **creation of networks** at the community levels that later served as platforms for facilitating other peacebuilding work. For example, the CAPs developed through the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme were later used by the communities to solicit and direct additional donor funding for peacebuilding. The peace committees formed by the programme were used to continue to support redress of grievances and to facilitate substance based negotiations. The formation of the women’s committees was used by the Ministry of Women to promote increased women’s representation in local and national governance structures. Furthermore, across all of the projects supported by the portfolio, the emphasis on promoting extended stakeholder participation and inclusiveness was affirmed.

97. Perhaps the one catalytic effect that was not frequently mentioned pertained to **timely responsiveness** to emergent political opportunities. The emergence of the newly established States and the subsequent area based intervention logic was reflective of a timely response to an emerging political opportunity – the establishment of two new States. However, many respondents – especially those at the higher levels in the United Nations – considered the processes of the PBF to be relatively slow to be able to respond to other emergent opportunities – such as resolving multi-tiered disputes by providing substantive spaces for negotiation⁶³ or to ensure smooth electoral processes. There were differences between the development and the political stakeholders regarding this perception of timeliness. The development stakeholders were more positive about PBF timeliness compared to the political stakeholders. Factors contributing to this are described in more detail in the efficiency and effectiveness sections below.

98. There were a few projects that did not seem to align with the **innovation** criteria, particularly with respect to the pre-existing programmes that had received additional funding from the PBF. The IRF-116 Support to Stabilization, the IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law, and the three programmes located under the SOM/D-2: Daldhis umbrella (Rule of Law, Local

⁶³ The Reconciliation project ended in 2016.

Governance, and Youth Empowerment⁶⁴) were all examples of pre-existing programmes that had received “top up” funding from the PBF. However, in each of these contexts, there were innovation or risk taking considerations leading to these funding decisions. The three SOM/D-2: Daldhis programmes were funded under the innovation of promoting area based interventions in newly established States. The IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law funding was to facilitate **rapid implementation** of a programme that had its normal funding delayed so as to not lose face with the Somali Government and the IRF-116 Support to Stabilization programme was to also attract implementation to those regions that were considered more **high risk** for other donors.

99. One important catalytic or cascade effect was the construction of **synergies** among and within the projects supported by the portfolio. During the field visits and interviews, respondents cited several layers of synergies. At the PPP level, although the SOM/D-2: Daldhis programme was seen as too complex to coordinate joint programmes within joint programmes, the logic of building extension of State authority while simultaneously working from the grassroots mobilization level appeared to generate additional positive outcomes in terms of building improved social cohesion and facilitating the linkages from Federal to citizen levels.

100. The area-based interventions provided an opportunity for **synergy** among field level United Nations actors and provided improved operational coordination of interventions and allowed for **crossing expertise** within a single programme building on the strengths of different United Nations Agencies. The SOM/D-1: Midnimo programme in particular was cited for its “elegant” synergies among different actors from citizen, to traditional authorities, to State authorities for building positive outcomes. At the local level, the interactions between District councils, youth groups and peace committees created a more cohesive structure at the local levels and allowed for greater inclusion of under-represented groups in development agendas. In addition, promoting dialogue and interactions while developing the capacities of a range of local stakeholders did contribute to building trust within and among community groups, leading to a more collaborative and responsive local government and proactive communities. The Baidoa context work with the IDP and refugee communities and the construction of social cohesion between these groups was frequently cited by respondents as one of these examples of success.

101. Finally, there appeared to be **synergies** built from combining different “soft” and “hard” approaches within a single programme. The establishment of committees, strengthening the capacities of individuals for governance, and facilitating systems of management and administration were also combined with the delivery of infrastructure and visible physical products to good effect. Respondents cited the physical products as proof of the success of the capacity building of the State systems and the extension of state authority. This in turn gave rise to increased confidence in the State and willingness to participate in state processes. For example, constructing a road to connect the IDP communities within the larger urban centers of Baidoa after the establishment of social dialogue actions through the development of the community-based action plans was cited as a positive example of this type of synergy.

102. The catalytic effects related to **increasing stakeholder commitment** to peacebuilding or extending **stakeholder participation in the peacebuilding agenda** are present, but not quite as relevant to a context such as Somalia where almost all of the focus of the UN team could be considered peacebuilding and there are highly elaborated peacebuilding frameworks guiding programming in the context. As summarized in one of the UNDP briefs,⁶⁵ there is a strong convergence on the areas of work that need attention: Security, Reconciliation, State-Formation, State-Building, Social Services Delivery, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Assistance. These areas are all embedded of the PBF

⁶⁴ This is referencing the Youth Empowerment component of Daldhis, there is another Youth Empowerment project in the Third Phase of the portfolio, but this is not considered within this evaluation

⁶⁵ Capacity Development in Action B – Harvard on managing complexity. UNDP. 10/10/2019

portfolio of support⁶⁶ and all of the UNCT Agencies engage in one or another of these elements which are contributing to peacebuilding in the context. The Government stakeholders also use these areas for formulating their National Development Plan and Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance. The stakeholders are already involved in supporting the peacebuilding Agenda through alignment with and engagement in these national level frameworks for peacebuilding in Somalia.

103. What was cited in the interviews and observed during the field mission were examples of increased inclusion of new Agencies in the PBF portfolio and increased inclusion of stakeholders in the processes from citizen level mobilization in SOM-D1 Midnimo through District level authority inclusion in the newly established States, to State authorities and the Federal Government. The engagement of women was a significant point of priority during implementation of all of the projects supported by the PBF portfolio. The integration of IDPs into processes in the SOM-D2 Daldhis, SOM-D1 Midnimo, and IRF-152 Cross-Border projects also illustrated the inclusion of marginalized populations. It was also observed within the more operational level of United Nations stakeholders that the integrated programming approach within the Portfolio – especially in SOM-D2 Daldhis and SOM-D1 Midnimo – allowed them to see how their specific programming actions contributed to an overall peacebuilding objective in ways they may not have been able to appreciate before.

3.2 PBF Portfolio Structure and Management Processes

104. The SoW evaluation questions are organized according to the OECD-DAC evaluation dimensions of relevance, efficiency and effectiveness (as well as gender and youth considerations). These dimensions are linked to the coordination and management processes of the PBF portfolio of support. Factors of particular interest include the development/design of the PBF portfolio (including a review of the ToC for the PPP and its connection and relevance to project level ToCs), the efficiency of implementation of the projects within the portfolio (and timeliness and responsiveness of the PBF instrument), and the coordination and oversight of the portfolio. When appropriate, differences in the patterns of responses among First Phase, Second Phase and Third Phase in terms of management and coordination will be highlighted. When patterns are similar across all three phases, they will be presented without qualifiers.

3.2.1 Efficiency

105. The Efficiency dimension assesses the extent to which planned activities were implemented in a timely manner and within budget (Table 7). Efficiency can be assessed through two different lenses. The first explores the extent to which the individual projects supported by the PBF were efficient. The second lens would assess the efficiency of the management of the PBF as an instrument.

Table 7: Efficiency related SoW Questions

<p>Efficiency (to assess the programme timely and cost-efficient implementation and result based management)</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Timeliness: How fast and responsive has the PBF been to supporting peacebuilding priorities in Somalia? 2. Sufficiency: What role did the PBF Coordination Committee play in ensuring efficient use of PBF’s investments? 3. How efficient was the implementation of the PBF support and how significant were the transaction costs? 4. Overall, did the PBF investments provide value for money? 5. Monitoring and Decision Making: To what extent were the resources programmed in an efficient and strategic manner, including the selection of implementing partners? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Did the PBF-funded projects generate gender- and age-disaggregated data through its M&E approaches to inform new programming? 6. What role did the PBF Secretariat in the RCO play in support of the
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⁶⁶ Security in the sense of rule of law at least, if not active support of military defeat of terrorist movements or violence

	project design and portfolio coordination? 7. (Daldhis and Midnimo only): How timely and cost efficient were the implementation of the Daldhis and Midnimo projects.
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106. Efficiency of Projects. Efficiency in the implementation of individual projects is usually assessed through a comparison of the output level indicators achieved in the projects against planned targets and in cost efficiency through a comparison of budget to expenditure. These two efficiency measures are summarized in the Table 8 below. The data is abstracted from the end of project logframes and reports. Projects often underwent substantial shifts which were not always captured in the logframes and reports. In some cases, the amount of reported expenditures differs among data sources. Table 9 provides additional details on funding and spending and notes when there are discrepancies in funding reporting.

Table 8: PBF Portfolio Efficiency Measures

Project	Percentage of Output Indicators Meeting Targets	Percentage of Funds Spent
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia	62%	78%
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	93%	40%
PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	92%	92%
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	100%	100%
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (SOMALIA)	100%	76%
PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	97%	94%
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	33%	90%
PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations	100%	94%
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	92%	100%
PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia	69%	100%
Total	80%	71%

Table 9: Project Expenditure Rates

Project Title	Duration	Budget Approved (in US\$)	Total Budget Spend (in US\$) ⁶⁷	Percentage Spent ⁶⁸
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia	14/12/2016-31/08/2019	5,300,000	4,112,190 (annual 18)	78%

⁶⁷ Data is from latest annual reports

⁶⁸ Data abstracted from the latest annual or end of project reports. Different values are sometimes reported in the PBF Overview Excel spreadsheet shared with the ET than in the final project reports due to system lag. When values are different, the Excel value is recorded as a footnote.

PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	14/12/2016-31/08/2019	4,500,000	1,787,156.76 (annual report 2018)	40%
PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	13/05/2015-31/12/2017	4,123,420	3,785,811 (final report Jan 2019)	92% ⁶⁹
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (SOMALIA)	19/01/2017-31/12/2018	3,000,000	1,322,803	76% ⁷⁰
PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	15/09/2015-30/04/2017	2,232,061	2,104,320	94%
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	31/08/2015-31/08/2016	2,143,821	1,906,778	90%
PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations	20/05/2016 - 30/06/2017	2,062,083	1,945,731.36 (final report 2018)	94% ⁷¹
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	13/07/2015-31/12/2016	1,000,000	1,000,000 (annual report 15-16)	100% ⁷²
PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia	19/09/2016-30/06/2018	952,889	952,889 (final report 2018)	100% ⁷³
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	17/08/2015-28/02/2018	586,974	586,974 (final report- Dec 18)	100% ⁷⁴

107. Based on the documentation, individual efficiency is relatively high given the operating context in Somalia. At least 80 percent of the portfolio output level indicators met expected targets and 71 percent of the funds allocated through the portfolio were recorded as being spent. Only three projects reported achieving fewer than 90 percent of their targeted outputs (SOM-D2 Daldhis, IRF-143 Coordination Support, and IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law (2015)). Three other projects were recorded as being below 90 percent of expenditures (SOM-D1Midnimo, SOM-D2 Daldhis, and the IRF-152 Kenya Somalia cross border project). In qualitative interview, respondents did not highlight significant concerns with respect to timeliness and expenditures of individual project implementation - besides the normal hazards of operating in Somalia and access and security restrictions impeding the implementation of planned activities.

⁶⁹ 62% (2557238) as per the data in the PBF Overview Excel document.

⁷⁰ According to PBF Overview spreadsheet, the expenditure is 100% although final project report cites 76%.

⁷¹ 50.4% (1038425.47) as per the data in the PBF Overview Excel Document.

⁷² 98.3% (982706.49) as per the data in the PBF Overview Excel Document.

⁷³ 74% (702157.82) as per the data in the PBF Overview Excel Document.

⁷⁴ 87.7% (515194.44) as per the data in the PBF Overview Excel Document.

108. Documentation can be misleading regarding under-reporting of indicators. For example, the IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law received PBF funding to “jump start” implementation on a pre-existing programme which had not received funding in time from the expected donor. The amount allocated from the PBF to jump start was not the full amount of the programme, but the project kept the same indicators for reporting against from the fully funded project. A large number of these activities were listed as “delayed” because they were not to be funded from the PBF, but rather the expectation was to resume these delayed activities once the donor funds became available. In the case of the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects, the expenditures are under-reported because the final project expenditures have not yet been closed and the profiled data is coming from the latest annual reports.

109. The main exception to efficiency is the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme and the three pre-existing programmes within the project. As mentioned earlier, the innovativeness or rationale for inclusion of pre-existing programmes within a PBF portfolio is through the experimentation of the area based intervention logic and the risk of early entry of these programmes into the newly established States. The pre-existing individual joint programmes under SOM-D2 Daldhis already had their own individual steering committees and these joint programmes covered geographic regions beyond the SWS and Jubbaland. The PBF funding supported activities of these joint programmes within the two newly established States only.

110. For the programme managers, the amount coming from PBF was seen as a small subset of their overall funding portfolio for their individual programme. Within this situation, there are two possible areas which could cause efficiency limitations: a) if the context of the newly established States turned out to be too high risk to implement these types of programmes, or b) if the integration of pieces of three pre-existing (and much larger) joint programmes within a single PBF PRF project would create coordination and management challenges and reduce efficiency. Based on the interviews, both dimensions did have some influence on diminished efficiency.

111. The PBF’s own requirement for a steering committee and separate reporting requirements for the SOM-D2 Daldhis project created some overlapping and potentially contradictory mandates and required significant additional efforts of time and energy to manage a “joint programme of joint programmes”. Or more accurately, the challenge was that the joint programmes operated beyond the scope of the PBF funded component, which itself was only a smaller piece of a larger joint programme management. Respondents were almost unanimous in observing that the coordination energy involved in combining these pieces of their individual joint programmes under a single project exceeded the value of the funding. They argued that the integration of the three joint programmes reduced their efficiency. By the end of the SOM-D2 Daldhis project, the individual joint programmes had more or less split off to function and operate independently.

112. Combining the three joint programmes also had implications for delivery of funding. According to the interviews, PBF distributed funds in two tranches with the second tranche coming only after 80 percent of the first tranche activities had been implemented. Within the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme, the Local Governance Joint Programme encountered difficulties in achieving its planned activities – especially those related to the establishment of District Councils. Respondents reported that unexpected delays in establishing District Councils meant that 80 percent of the planned first tranche activities were not completed – but most of these uncompleted activities were within a single sub-programme related to the Local Governance. This delayed the delivery of the second tranche – not only to the Local Governance sub-programme, but also to the Rule of Law and the Youth Empowerment sub-programmes. This created tensions among the United Nations Agencies implementing SOM-D2 Daldhis together who felt that they had completed the required activities but were being “punished” for the delays in another programme. The withholding of the second tranche was reported by respondents as leading to a cascade of delays which limited the efficiency of the implementation of the SOM-D2 Daldhis programme

113. The formation of District Councils was one of the key fulcrums of the Local Governance programme and the programme could not deliver funding for infrastructure rehabilitation until the District Councils had become established. Therefore, significant downstream funding was predicated on the achievement of this first activity. The establishment of the District Councils were not as easy to set up in the newly established States as anticipated. In addition to access and security constraints, the competing political interests among the different Governance levels, and potential challenges to authority that might have occurred if District Councils were established in certain areas, impeded the entire process - especially in the urban centers. Implementation in rural Districts were more successful but limited by access and security. In the end, Hudur and Dollow Districts were the only two Districts that had completed the entire District Council Process – with subsequent limitations on the application of the cascade funding.

114. Efficiency of the PBF Instrument. In terms of strategic responsiveness, all respondents noted that the PBF coordination and constant consultation and integration with the UNCT and the political mission provided a good opportunity for the fund to be applied as opportunities emerged. The presence of a coordinator of the fund based in Mogadishu was also seen as helping with the identification of potential points of intervention for the fund within a rapidly changing context. There were more variations in the pattern of the responses related to perceptions of the efficiency of the approval process rather than the identification process, and much of the variation in respondents' perceptions are related to whether the use of the funds was for programming or for politics.

115. As an aside, theoretically, respondents should perceive there to be a difference between the IRF and the PRF approval processes, although the PBF has changed its rules and Guidelines in this respect in 2017/18. The IRFs were intended to be able to be applied for short term investments and shorter time frames. The PRF approval process requires review by a coordinating committee and the completion of certain benchmarks (such as the development of a PPP). A 2015 review of the funding instruments within the United Nations Secretariat⁷⁵ for Peacebuilding noted at the time that the IRFs were a good mechanism for fast and timely response because of shortened approval processes but that the PRFs were not seen as efficient value for money because of the long time frames involved in the development and approval of projects. The review recommended an increased emphasis on the use of the IRFs because of the timeliness. Based on the 2015 review, any timeliness critiques from respondents should have been more likely to come from stakeholders involved in PRF programmes rather than the IRFs.

116. Whether the PBF instrument was seen as timely and responsive from concept development to approval depended more on the level (operational, programmatic, strategic) and category (Programme or Political) of the respondent than their association with an IRF or a PRF. Operational respondents in the Programme category tended to be most positive regarding the timeliness of the instrument – although with the caveat that these personnel tended to equate the PBF as similar to other donor instruments.

117. Operational respondents appreciated the flexibility of the Fund during implementation for adapting to changes. Even SOM-D2 Daldhis respondents – who were the most energetic regarding the citation of coordination and management challenges of the instrument– agreed that the PBF portion of their funding portfolio was appreciated for its flexibility in adapting between activities or shifting to new events. Respondents in the IRF-152 Kenya-Somalia cross-border pilot also noted the flexibility of the fund that allowed them to shift from the planned activities to respond to a humanitarian crisis with the funding.

118. However, this relatively benign perspective was not as common among the higher level (Programme and Strategic) Programme respondents nor with those associated with the political mission. The more strategic the level of the respondent, especially those located in the political side of the mission, the more critical the respondents were of the instrument –

⁷⁵ Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, General Assembly Sixty-ninth session. A/69/68-S/2015/490

perceiving it as being less responsive and timely – regardless of the modality. *“I don’t see any difference between the PRFs and the IRFs – they both take a long time from proposal to approval”* *“It has taken more than a year to get a project proposal approved, this is causing us to miss the opportunity to engage”* *“I will never apply for another PBF funding”*.

119. Respondents tended to cite four general categories of factors: approval processes, format requirements, changing agreements, and unclear communication. Approval processes refers to perceptions that there were often a long series of delays between the presentation of initial concepts to their approval. Format refers to multiple requests for revisions on the project proposal after approval of initial concept. Changing agreements related to respondents feeling that one agreement had been reached, but then subsequently in the process, this agreement was rescinded or reconsidered. This would sometimes be ascribed to a new person reviewing the documents, but also was referenced when the same person was reviewing multiple versions. Changing agreements would also include examples when new conditions were put on a project that had not been mentioned in earlier iterations. Unclear communication is referencing that respondents reported feeling that actions were taken of which they were not informed until the last minute. One example cited related to the perception that an agreed upon budget had been reduced without advance information.⁷⁶

120. Several respondents hypothesized that they perceived there to have been a “sea change” in the PBSO regarding project cycle management and approvals around late 2017 or 2018. They perceived the requirements and expectations had been increased to provide better project rigor. Other respondents noted that there had been significant turnover in the field and that loss of institutional knowledge may have contributed to some of the timeliness issues as incoming personnel needed to familiarize.

121. The degree of criticism is closely aligned to the respondent category. With the exception of SOM-D2 Daldhis, development stakeholders perceived the PBF as sufficiently timely within acceptable parameters. The programmatic level development respondents were more critical, but this criticism was mostly located among the respondents from the various SOM-D2 Daldhis sub-programmes and is more likely related to particularities of that specific programme than the PBF as an instrument. However, the most vocal criticisms of timeliness came from stakeholders in the political dimension of the mission. These stakeholders saw the potential of the Fund to increase support to the Mission’s engagement in the political arena itself.

122. The development-oriented stakeholders on the Programme side of the mission tended to do implementation within the seven dimensions profiled earlier (security, reconciliation, state-formation, state-building, social service delivery, economic development and humanitarian assistance). With the exception of the last component, these areas require slow and careful construction of programming based on extensive analysis and wide-ranging consultation. The political-oriented stakeholders were focused on understanding and intervening in the complex and dynamic political negotiations to unblock processes, support negotiations, build coalitions, exert influence, and create the conditions and agreements that shaped the socio-political context in which the Programmes operated. This political dimension in Somalia was described as extremely volatile with very fast shifts in coalitions, agreements or positions, which required constant analysis and attention to be able to be ready to respond to shifts. When timely moments were identified for interventions, these were time-bound – responses had to be carried out in the moment, or opportunities would be lost.

123. The pattern of responses suggests that the IRF and PRF processes as currently employed are suitable for the slower paced development-oriented programming but are not seen by UN stakeholders as fast enough to support the political interventions. It is noteworthy that respondents did not really perceive there to be a difference between these

⁷⁶ New York interviews suggested this may have been due to insufficient funds being raised as the PBF operates on annual funding contributions rather than necessarily long term commitments from donors. However, respondents in the field perceived it differently.

two modalities, but it is even more interesting to consider the elaboration of a modality that might be sufficiently responsive to a political orientation. There has been experimentation with building a flexible response fund into existing projects in the Third Phase of the PBF – and there was a similar fund within at least one of the First Phase projects. This pilot approach has potential for addressing some of the responsiveness issues for politics, but this type of flexible response fund within the frame of a project would still require the development of a project framework to align with IRF requirements. Therefore, if properly anticipated, an IRF with a flexible response component provide this support.

3.2.2 Effectiveness

124. Effectiveness assesses the extent to which the activities and outputs contributed to outcomes. Two streams reviewed in this evaluation would include i) the contribution of individual projects towards the changes observed in the country and, ii) the manner within which the coordination and management of the portfolio facilitated strategic contributions to the peacebuilding agenda within the Mission and the Government. The SoW questions for Effectiveness are summarized in Table 10.

Table 10: Effectiveness SoW Questions

<p>Effectiveness <i>(evaluating the extent the programme outputs have contributed to immediate developmental changes and mid-term results at the outcome level)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Did the PBF portfolio of support and the PBF funding mechanism allow PBF to leverage its niche role for maximum effect compared to other funding mechanisms? If so, what characteristics contributed to this success? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Monitoring and Decision Making: To what extent were the resources programmed in an efficient and strategic manner, including the selection of implementing partners? b. What role did the PBF Secretariat in the RCO play in support of the project design and portfolio coordination? 2. (Daldhis and Midnimo only): To what extent did Daldhis and Midnimo, as flagship projects under the PBF portfolio of support, complement each other and have strategic coherence, and how were the inter-linkages between the PRF and IRF projects implemented during 2015-2019? 3. M&E: How was the results framework conceived for the PBF Portfolio of support? What type of monitoring of the PBF portfolio of support took place (in contrast to individual project monitoring by RUNOs)? How effective was the PBF portfolio of support M&E? How were lessons learned used to inform programming choices including within projects and in the overall PBF portfolio of support? 4. Risk Taking: To what extent did the PBF support take risks (and allowed the UN in the country) to achieve peacebuilding objectives, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so? 5. How effectively were risk factors assessed and managed throughout the PBF support to Somalia (both at portfolio-level and individual project-level)?
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125. **Effectiveness Overview.** Most of the factors that contribute to improved effectiveness are the ones that have been covered earlier with respect to the contributions to the achievement of outcomes, generation of catalytic effects, or improved efficiency. To summarize these themes from the earlier sections, the consensus from all levels and categories of respondents has been that the PBF portfolio did indeed contribute to higher level results and that it was strategic for creating peacebuilding impact and catalytic effects. The integrated coordination of the PBF portfolio within the broader coordination bodies in the Mission (the UNCT, the Programme Management Team (PMT), and so forth) was seen as an important factor for allowing the portfolio to contribute to achieving the broader strategic objectives of the United Nations during this cycle. Respondents described processes of substantive consultation organized by the PBF to identify possible interventions and to promote joint programming collaborations to respond to these areas of intervention. Multiple iterations of conversation and analysis were carried out with programme level Agency representative as well as with the more strategic level UNCT representatives and

Government to fine tune the concepts even before presentation for approval through the formal approval processes.

126. Out of these consultations, the PBF funding mechanisms were seen by respondents as therefore having been applied strategically to leverage PBF's role for maximum effect and are appreciated for their flexibility and willingness to engage in risks compared to other donor mechanisms. The consultations with Government and the UNCT also sought to ensure that the funding opportunities did not duplicate other funding opportunities and that the processes employed by the PBF did not duplicate pre-existing processes or approaches.

127. One success factor for effectiveness was the degree to which the projects made use of existing mechanisms and built on these. One of the District level respondents summed it up in the following observation: *"We are Somalis, we are all Somalis, even Al Shabab are Somalis. They are not some people from Mars. As Somalis, we know how to resolve disputes, we have the mechanisms. We know how to negotiate, how to resolve the disagreements. We understand each other. We have the mechanisms, but we run short of facilitation. If you <the United Nations> can help provide us with the support for doing the negotiations, we can work things out"*.

128. A number of projects supported by the PBF were predicated on integrating pre-existing mechanisms for dialogue and dispute resolution. For example, the IRF-121 and SOM-D2 Rule of Law programmes drew on the existing traditional courts for managing clan disputes, the SOM-D1 Midnimo programme supported the local level peace committees built on local clan groups. In those projects that provided this type of support to pre-existing mechanisms, providing these opportunities for facilitated dialogue, there appeared to be exponentially positive results.

129. However, a simple list of success factors for effectiveness would be misleading in terms of potential to maximize the PBF mechanism within the context of Somalia. For example, programme implementation went more smoothly when the programme was developed specifically for PBF funding rather than trying to integrate the steering and management of pre-existing programmes into a single PBF programme as in SOM-D2 Daldhis. However, identifying this as a success factor undervalues the importance of the area-based intervention logic and the impact that even the SOM-D2 Daldhis achieved in the field level according to respondents. The SOM-D1 Midnimo project is seen by respondents as being extra-successful and one factor may be that it was specifically designed for PBF funding. However, the orientation of the SOM-D1 Midnimo towards grassroots mobilization is also an area where it is relatively easier to achieve rapid success compared to working with and through Government processes and procedures.

130. A final example would be that programmes are more effective and run more smoothly when they are operating within a development framework rather than trying to respond to politics. The more measured flow of development response can be easier to link with the current project cycle management expectations within the PBF. However, this would minimize the potential of the PBF to contribute to unblocking processes within the political sphere in Somalia. Given the volatility and emergent nature of the political dimension in Somalia, it would be important for the PBF to determine how to best employ its instrument in a sufficiently responsive manner for political process engagement.

131. Many respondents also noted that an inherent limitation in programming in the Somalia context is that the project cycles are very short – and the rebuilding of all of the State mechanisms and the re-establishment of the idea of the State within Somalia requires longer term engagements and more persistence. Other donor opportunities do not provide this type of support and it could be argued that the PBF portfolio effectiveness could be enhanced by prioritizing longer term, multi-year projects to be able to provide longer accompaniment. However, these longer term project cycles could run against the logic of a "proof of concept" approach whereby projects are elaborated in a more experimental nature with PBF portfolio funding and then later leverage other funds.

132. Strategic level respondents are able to verbally articulate the strategic coherence of the individual gap-oriented projects and are able to articulate their linkage to the larger strategic frameworks present in the context. However, the existing programme documentation, and the associated PBF M&E, does not currently capture the coherence, logic, or contributions to impact sufficiently. This can present challenges both for supporting institutional memory during transitions but also for demonstrating “value for money” to donors. The PBSO should consider possibility for adapting existing project cycle management tools (and funding modalities) to better illustrate the gains and the logics within gap-oriented, niche-oriented, approaches drawing on pre-existing peacebuilding frameworks.

133. **Performance Results Frameworks and M&E:** Measuring and monitoring this effectiveness of the portfolio presents the same challenges as for measuring or monitoring impact: a) gap-filling philosophy; b) emphasizing “proof of concepts and innovation”; and c) constant flexible responsiveness.

134. With the exception of the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects under the PPP, the primary logic guiding PBF application has been as a “gap filling” mechanism – individual projects oriented to address a specific gap in other sources of funding and which do not necessarily have to link coherently with each other as would be the case in a programme approach. The First Phase projects were elaborated more opportunistically as the peacebuilding context evolved, the Third Phase projects are more explicitly tied to filling gaps in the larger peacebuilding and development frameworks that have since been developed. The second logic guiding PBF investment in this cycle is that due to its relatively small size compared to other funds, the projects supported to fill gaps have emphasized being “proof of concepts” or “innovations” with possibilities for subsequent scale up or leveraging other funding after their completion. The flexible responsiveness is important within a volatile context such as Somalia to be able to respond to emergent opportunities in a timely manner. These logics are appropriate for the context but make it difficult to apply standard performance results frameworks or logframes to the portfolio.

135. M&E as a system is the mechanism that can track the progress and contributions of a project. *Has the project been operating in an efficient and effective manner? Has the project contributed to political and social change?* Within the PBF portfolio, the expectation is that the individual Agencies will provide the M&E systems necessary for tracking individual project progress and contributions. As noted earlier, these M&E systems, relying on the individual projects’ own M&E systems, cannot provide insights into impact of the collective portfolio.⁷⁷ There were also some observations from United Nations respondents who questioned whether the existing Agencies’ M&E systems were sufficiently able to truly capture the work that Agencies were doing for peacebuilding – or to identify impact. As one respondent noted “*we (the United Nations) do not have the necessary analytics to know how we can evaluate systemic change. We believe that certain changes have happened, and based on that belief, we make programming decisions, but we don’t know*”. To capture these more systemic oriented changes, it may not be sufficient to only rely on Agency level M&E systems, and it may be worthwhile to consider allocating more PBF resources to allow for portfolio level M&E.⁷⁸

136. Whether the PBF is intended to operate as a programme or to fill gaps, and whether the PBF is intended to support development processes (Programme) or political processes (Politics) present important points for consideration in quantifying the effectiveness of the portfolio contributions. Because of the existence of large peacebuilding conceptual frameworks already developed by the Mission and the Government and because there is significant peacebuilding funding invested in the country through other donors, the PBF portfolio in this cycle has largely adopted a strategy of strategically filling gaps which are not funded by these larger networks and emphasizing supporting emergent opportunities that

⁷⁷ The Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) reporting system compiles information on individual projects and does provide opportunities for identifying catalytic effects in addition to standard project M&E.

⁷⁸ This is currently being done at both the Somalia country level and in the PBSO but was not present during the timeframe under review for the evaluation.

require faster responsiveness or a higher risk appetite than other donor sources. These approaches are logical options given the situation, but present implications M&E – while a programme oriented approach can develop portfolio level indicators, this is substantively more challenging to provide M&E at the portfolio level for a gap-oriented approach.

137. Individual project outcome indicators from gap-projects would not necessarily be able to be compiled individually. Context indicators such as the CRESTA-A and FIMM can be a potential mechanism for identifying even subtle changes in the context but they would capture the effects of the entire set of peacebuilding interventions rather than just the portfolio interventions. The changes observed would be more likely to be the results of the larger peacebuilding framework and programming rather than the specific “gap” projects within that larger framework.

138. Furthermore, smaller proofs of concept or strategic innovations philosophy would further limit the ability of these larger models to see the specific contributions of smaller projects. These data systems have great potential for use in guiding decisions on large scale programming, geographic prioritization, and to assess the results of the entirety of peacebuilding programming in Somalia, but would not be able to disaggregate or differentiate the much smaller – albeit strategic – components supported by the PBF from the much larger investments by other donors. Finally, flexible responsiveness of the modality would present challenges for identifying pre-set context indicators to measure because the actual funding applied may shift depending on needs in the context. All of these factors together mean that a Gap-oriented approach to portfolio management would require the application of the PBF project cycle management tools in a different manner.⁷⁹

139. For example, a conflict analysis is required as part of the PRF process – but given that there have been extensive conflict analyses already developed as part of the elaboration of these larger peacebuilding frameworks, a separate conflict analysis just for the PPP may not provide additional value. A “Gap-oriented” conflict analysis, rather than articulating and describing drivers of conflict, could take the approach to summarize the pre-existing frameworks and their conflict drivers and then to map which drivers are already being addressed, and in which manner, as well as current donor funding to Programmes. The conflict analysis might then serve to articulate the “gaps” among the drivers rather than the drivers themselves – or themes and regions that are not being covered already by other programming.⁸⁰

140. Following on from this, a portfolio performance results framework could then potentially identify gap related indicators to measure. Any context based indicators elaborated do run the risk of becoming irrelevant if political context shifts necessitate the application of the PBF funding in different directions. Portfolio level indicators would, in theory, be developed at the beginning of the portfolio cycle, measured as a baseline, and then re-measured at the end of the funding cycle (3-5 years in the future). The volatility of the context means that it is highly likely that the portfolio funding priorities will shift over the cycle and leading to the pre-established indicators become superfluous (and lacking the pre-existing measurements of the new context indicators that could have been more appropriate).

141. It may be worthwhile to consider a type of Performance Results Framework that is more suitable for a “gap oriented” portfolio - not based on the elaboration and measurement of context indicators - to show impact and effectiveness. One potential option that could be considered would be to use the catalytic effects as the indicators in a portfolio level performance results framework rather than context indicators. Reporting on catalytic effects is embedded in the individual project reporting templates, but these are at the level of the project and the effects are not systematically measured as might be the case if it were a portfolio level results framework.

⁷⁹ which may be why respondents in the context perceived the PPP to be duplicating pre-existing efforts or why the conflict analysis employed was never ratified

⁸⁰ This gap analysis is sometimes part of PBF conflict analyses already but would assume a much greater prominence in the analysis then in more “programme” oriented portfolios.

142. For example, there is already a risk assessment matrix managed by the PBF to assess the riskiness of the project. The portfolio could develop a similar “innovation” portfolio score or a “risk taking” portfolio score to demonstrate the extent to which the projects supported are considered innovative or risk-taking in the context. Another example might be if proof of concept is a portfolio level indicator, then a review of how many proofs of concepts were later scaled up or mainstreamed could be built into the portfolio outcome indicators. There are likely other approaches to adapting the catalytic effect categories to be the outcome level indicators for a gap-oriented programme beyond these simple examples. This type of portfolio Performance Results Framework may be worthwhile to consider piloting such an approach for a gap oriented type of PBF portfolio.

143. **Management and Coordination Implications.** The compilation of these effectiveness arguments and success factors demonstrates that there is significant potential for the PBF instrument to be applied in multiple ways through multiple logics when taking a gap-oriented, flexible response, and proof of concept approach. The context of Somalia presents so many opportunities for peacebuilding given its very emergent nature that Some of the logics and approaches do not fit as easily into current PBF procedures as others. Discerning which logics to emphasize and how to adapt the PBF instrument has management and coordination implications for the instrument. Findings can be clustered according to two questions: “*what the role of the PBF coordinator should be (in this type of gap-oriented approach)?*” and “*What should be the most appropriate body for providing strategic oversight of a gap-oriented approach?*”

144. PBF Coordinator. One success factor that does seem to be very important for the effectiveness of the portfolio is the presence of a full time PBF coordinator based in Mogadishu. An indirect affirmation of this is that when describing the timeliness and efficiency of the PBF processes, respondents tended to reference the challenges of PBSO procedures – locating the challenges in the nexus between the Somalia country team and New York. Respondents did not locate the challenges in the nexus between the respective Agencies and PBF. The physical presence of a full time PBF coordinator in the country reduced or mitigated the challenges that might have arisen normally between the Agencies and the PBF instrument. The country presence allowed the coordinator to be involved in ongoing real time political analyses which allowed for a more responsive identification of potential points of intervention, and allowed for more rapid communication with strategic, programme and operational stakeholders in the UNCT, as well as closer and more frequent consultation with Government stakeholders to better align the PBF portfolio to match peacebuilding needs and gaps.

145. Even though there is evidence that the country presence has contributed to effectiveness, there does not appear to be a shared understanding of what role the PBF coordinator should play. Agency stakeholders cited a wide range of potential roles for the coordinator including: i) political analyst, ii) diplomat, iii) facilitator and convener, iv) programme manager, v) resource mobilization champion for Agencies, vi) donor desk officer, vii) report writer. This list includes both very high-level strategic responsibilities at the same time as more clerical duties (such as writing reports).

146. The point of the discussion may not be simply to decide whether the PBF coordinator should be a diplomat or a clerk, but rather to note that even though the presence of the coordinator does appear to contribute to improved effectiveness and strategic alignment and responsiveness of the portfolio, Agencies and United Nations stakeholders are also identifying a wide range of potential gaps that need to be filled in terms of roles to maximize effectiveness. The wide range of respective roles suggest that a single coordinator may not be sufficient to respond to all the current needs and could require a PBF team to adequately fill the expected roles in a context such as Somalia. There PBF has recently contracted an M&E specialist to work in collaboration with the PBF coordinator.

147. Joint Steering Committee and Management. A related theme involved strategic oversight of the portfolio. A high level Joint Steering Committee (JSC) comprised of Government and UNCT stakeholders is normally considered to be the strategic body that is

providing oversight on the portfolio. However, in the context of Somalia, this body has been limited in its oversight of the PBF oversight due to access and security conditions. It is very difficult and expensive to organize events that bring both Government and United Nations representatives together. There is also a concern that there are already a very large number of coordination meetings already present in the context – for much larger resources. The stakeholders from Government or the United Nations often are the same persons on many of these bodies. Convening extremely busy high level officials for duplicated events has been a concern in Somalia. As such, the approach has been to attempt to integrate PBF oversight into pre-existing coordination spaces. Respondents cited many different bodies when answering who is providing the strategic oversight of the PBF including the Joint Steering Committee, a PBF Secretariat, a PBF Reference Group, the UNCT, the Programme Management Team (PMT), and the Integrated Office.⁸¹ Strategic respondents believed that the PBF portfolio is strategic and no one expressed concerns about the inconsistency in responses.

148. The logic of integrating PBF oversight into pre-existing bodies does have the strength of minimizing duplication and embedding PBF discussions into larger platforms for better strategic alignment. However, there is also the risk that there is no one body paying sufficient attention to the PBF per se as a standalone portfolio. There is an informal group of 12 UNCT persons that are considered part of a PBF reference group. However, this group of persons functions more through bi-lateral consultations from the PBF coordinator rather than as a formal oversight body. It would be necessary to consider how to balance the development of a PBF-specific oversight body that does not create excessive overlap or lose the strategic alignment with other platforms.

149. Higher level Government or United Nations personnel could well articulate the strategic approach of the PBF portfolio. However, programmatic level personnel on both sides were largely only aware of their specific project (or rather their programme) and could not articulate the strategic linkage among the different projects supported by the portfolio – or were even aware which other projects were supported by the PBF. Operational level respondents from both Government and United Nations were generally not aware of even the source of the funding for their projects. It may be helpful to consider mechanisms that allow for more cross-fertilization and strategic discussions among programme or operational level stakeholders regarding the PBF. The value added for this type of understanding is that it should allow programmatic persons to identify potential strategic collaboration opportunities or to facilitate programming in such a way as to further maximize catalytic effects or indirect cascade effects.

150. Related to strategic oversight, another potential opportunity of a body would be to facilitate or foment improved implementation. Unblocking processes is one of the most important catalytic effects within the context of Somalia. Multiple references were made to how the PBF projects were able to provide inputs that unblocked processes and many of these revolved around either negotiations among the various levels of Government or among the political interests operating in a context. The integrated office (DSRSG/RC/HC) has the potential to play a larger strategic and even facilitation role within PBF management and coordination – beyond the PBF coordinator itself. Several respondents noted that for unblocking processes for political engagement or for project implementation, it would have been helpful to have the integrated office become involved in discussions or substance based negotiations with Government, Agencies, or civil society stakeholders.

3.2.3 Portfolio Lessons Learned

151. There are some common patterns among the lessons learned from individual project implementation that can be synthesized from the project reports and evaluation interviews. The following table profiles individual lessons learned for effectiveness abstracted from end of project reports or evaluation reports. There are six key themes that can be abstracted from

⁸¹ The RC/HC/DSRSG triple hatted office in the integrated mission.

this analysis: i) Government ownership; ii) Community-Based Mobilization; iii) Social Cohesion; iv) Integration and Coordination; v) Aspirations and Capacity; and vi) Timeliness.

Table 11: Lessons Learned for Project Effectiveness

Projects	Effectiveness and Lessons Learned ⁸²
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme over-emphasized criminal justice system and needed to invest more in civil legal mechanisms for dispute resolution. • Joint programming lessons learned in terms of coordination among UN Agencies in programme – greater coordination and steering mechanisms required • Ambitious expectations in terms of pace and achievements forecasted didn't take into consideration shifting volatile context and basic capacity issues • A more focused and targeted programme on a few basic mechanisms could have substantive results
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project had overly ambitious outcomes for a short term project. However, the project was successful when revised to focus specifically on one component – enhancing women's political representation at Federal and State Governance • Internal UN coordination processes challenges in practice • Sustainability considerations were not taken into account, but programme support did receive substantive additional funding • More focused definition of potential contribution could enhance impact
PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project had ambitious timelines for volatile context and lack of certainty around state formation and general political landscape in Somalia • Clan interests required substantive negotiation to ensure adequate representation – especially in contexts of mixed clan representation • Election processes will slow down political processes and should be considered in planning
PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greater coordination with other actors doing similar work is important for ensuring that implementation activities are not duplicated • Social reconciliation activities were low cost but had high impact at the District level • Mobile courts and other grievance mechanisms particularly important even though not focus of the project • Direct implementation allowed for rapid deployment but inhibited long term ownership • Detailed database developed for District level programming can be an important reference in future programming at District levels • Security and access key constraints and volatile context required constant political analysis
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collaborative approach underpins effectiveness of project and promoted increased ownership • Government capacity often limited but Government led component is important for success – requiring longer term timelines for activities • Staff turnover significant challenge for sustainability • Integrated programming approach important for efficiency and effectiveness
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Area-based intervention logic is sound and can have synthesis effects. However, combining multiple joint programmes under a single joint programme created complications for steering and management because joint programmes were operating not only in targeted areas, but nationally

⁸² Description abstracted from Project Annual Reports or evaluation reports and field phase Interviews

establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring adequate representation of clan interests in District councils is important for effectiveness • District council formation in major cities impeded by conflicting layers of State and District authority in urban centres. • Roles and responsibilities of respective ministries in a multi-Joint programming approach also important to consider • Integration of vocational and economic projects with infrastructure and delivery of services a possible contribution • Programme objectives overly ambitious and timeline too short for ensuring long-term higher-level results.
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working through and with Government as a Government led programme is important for long term success • Social cohesion can be effectively built through multiple activities such as through inclusive planning processes or through social forms of activities such as arts, crafts, recreation and through infrastructure development for connection and participation • Coordination and management crucial for success of complex planning processes at the community levels. • Informal dispute resolution mechanisms important for decreasing backlog of clan grievances • Building a shared vision of programme among all actors important, but requires considerable initial time • Durable solutions and combination of hard and soft elements into a single programme highly effective • Gender sensitivity in programme activities helpful for increasing women's participation (representation still a work in progress).
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haste in startup resulted in less shared understanding of project objectives among multiple partners and locations involved. • Peacebuilding and conflict mediation skills training important, but second step is to ensure integration of trained individuals into formal or informal dispute resolution mechanisms to be able to better apply these skills • Durable solutions seen as important contribution of project • Group work required much longer timelines than projected by project calendars. Difficult to build group cohesiveness for decision making • Flexibility of PBF important for allowing shift to supporting IDPs as well as returnees in face of humanitarian crisis. • Coordination among UN Agencies and with other actors important
PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations (National Window)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working with and through Government important for catalytic effects and for ownership • Integrated coordination with other projects helpful for ensuring efficiency • Ongoing need for continued clarification of roles and responsibilities at Federal and State levels • Personnel turnover a major barrier to sustainability (in Government) • Project oversight committee composed of multiple stakeholders and community consultations important for effective implementation • Election processes resulted in delay of activities
PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN staff perceive current PBF procedure and oversights to be inefficient and in Joint programming situations, staff perceived the tranche requirements to be unfair to effective actors • Big data component has significant potential but needs to be formally linked to a framework or in-country programme to be effectively used. • PBF Coordinator should have a more strategic role at programme level to overcome challenges, build synergies and share lessons learned

152. Government ownership. The inclusion of Government – preferably multiple levels from Federal through Local authorities – in project design and to take the lead in implementation produces significant positive effects. This had not been the normal practice for most of the external interventions in the context and as noted earlier in the narrative, was a highly valued component of project implementation by Somali stakeholders.

153. Community-Based Mobilization. Much of the programming to support the extension of State authority is perforce moving from higher levels towards communities. However, there is a significant need to balance this top-to-bottom approach with efforts that begin with community-based mobilization and engagement that can interact with these top-down extensions. Projects that included grassroots mobilization components were seen as providing a positive contribution to fill a gap in other donor supported peacebuilding efforts.

154. Social Cohesion. The construction and strengthening of social cohesion were identified as key contributors to peacebuilding when interwoven into the implementation actions of the PBF portfolio supported projects. Social cohesion between internally displaced persons, host communities and returnees or social cohesion between different clans and interests in a single area is an important precursor to peace. Mechanisms for building social cohesion varied among the projects but included: i) community events or recreational activities, ii) the development of informal mechanisms for dispute resolution; iii) infrastructure development that connected separated communities; and, iv) the formation of local committees with diverse representation for oversight, monitoring or project steering.

155. Integration and Coordination. For all of the challenges in management, integrated programming and joint programming is a substantial factor for success in Somalia. The key factor is sufficient coordination and steering to ensure that integrated programming is carried out efficiently.

156. Aspirations and Capacities. Almost every end of project report noted that the objectives of the projects were overly ambitious for the context. Limited capacities of newly established Governments, limited mechanisms for coordination among Government levels, unclear roles in newly established States and local governance, and a volatile context are significant challenges. Agencies in projects were often impatient to move more quickly into targeting higher level results before substantive foundations had been built. Infrastructure development, fund transfer mechanisms, role clarification, and other basic governance practices were the most successful – and highly valued by local stakeholders – elements of projects.

157. Timeliness. All of the projects cited implementation delays due to the context dynamics. Security issues and drawn out election processes were the two most frequently cited from project reports. At the same time, the time frame for PBF support is quite short. Almost all project reports cited the need for longer time to be able to observe expected results.

3.2.4 Sustainability and Future Directions

158. **Sustainability**. Sustainability is the likelihood that gains achieved by a project or programme will continue after the project is completed or that processes that have been developed during a project will be continued. Table 12 summarizes the key sustainability SoW questions. Many of these have already been covered in previous portions of the narrative.

Table 12: Sustainability SoW Questions

Sustainability <i>(to evaluate scalability and capacity of partners to carry on the initiatives)</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How strong is the commitment of the government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of the PBF support and continuing any unfinished activities? 2. Did the intervention support national ownership? 3. (Daldhis and Midnimo only): How sustainable are the gains achieved in the implementation of the Daldhis and Midnimo projects.
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159. At the conclusion of a project, it is challenging to project into the future whether gains will be sustained over time. Sustainability can only be inferred depending on the presence or absence of certain factors. These factors can usually be classified into one of four categories: i) level of participation in, and ownership of, processes by stakeholders; ii) degree to which systems and processes have been systematized or institutionalized; iii) the degree of political will to support or prioritize ongoing processes; and iv) availability of resourcing for continued actions.

160. Discussing sustainability within the context of Somalia is somewhat aspirational. There has been significant progress observed in peacebuilding, but after nearly 30 years of war during which the very idea of a central Government and functional State disappeared, considerably more investment and support are required before sustainability becomes a realistic topic of analysis. It is perhaps indicative that there were few, if any, references to transition or handover plans from among the United Nations or Government stakeholders. Part of this is due to the fact that much of the implementation of the PBF portfolio projects was done through Government, but there is also a recognition that more support is required. However, these categories described above can serve as points of reference for determining the degree to which the portfolio is aligning with sustainability principles.

161. The interventions are seen as having had the strong commitment of Government and other stakeholders. The principles of working through Government, seeking to unblock processes and strengthen the linkages from Federal to State to District are positively cited. These processes and linkages cannot be sustained without further support, but there is strong interest and commitment from the Government for continued work in this sector.

162. Processes at all levels from the formation of CAPs and District Councils to Federal systems have begun to be systematized. Their application has not yet covered the entire country and there is considerably more room for growth in strengthening the linkages between the levels of Government and procedures and processes for resourcing sharing such as begun with the IRF-141 National Window.

163. In terms of resourcing, there are significant resources being invested by donors into the peacebuilding agenda and there are numerous examples of PBF supported funds being able to leverage other inputs after the portfolio support.⁸³ However, there are significant gaps in the funding allocations and the PBF is still seen as necessary for playing a role in filling these gaps and then having these proofs of concept be further resourced by other donors. Of the projects under review, only two did not cite other funding for similar programming – even if not with the same Agencies. The amount of funding leveraged from PBF support is not tracked systematically and is therefore likely to be under-reported. However, the available evidence suggests that the PBF has been successful in leveraging funds. At least seven of the 10 projects under the evaluation do cite leveraging other funding – whether for during the implementation of the PBF project, the continuation of the programme after closure of the PBF project, or for the sector itself. End of project reports cited a cumulative additional US\$28 million leveraged for additional programming – amounts leveraged during actual implementation were not referenced. The following table profiles funding leveraged by project and the rationale or gap the project was targeting.

Table 13: Leveraged Funding by Project

Phase	Project	Rationale or Gap	Additional Funding
First Phase (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	Funding timeliness Gap	Yes. Funding was stop gap until other sources could be mobilized. Final project report in 2016 notes received budget of US\$7 million. Ongoing programme with

⁸³ Respondents reported funding informally in an ad hoc manner, but there is no systematic tracking of funds leveraged

			additional funding since then.
First Phase (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	Gender Gap	Yes – to Ministry of Women, but not through Agencies. DFID Grant for 5.6 million
First Phase (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	Negotiation Spaces	During implementation, the project attracted donors with additional funding from World Bank, and International NGOs. After project closure, no reported leveraged funds directly, but a Third Phase project includes discretionary funds for negotiations
First Phase (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	Rapid Stabilization before Donors ready	Yes, through PBF. Donors such as USAID, UK and SSF support components of the Wadajir framework related to S2S project, but not ready to fund S2S per se – leading to PBF to finance a new project cycle for S2S
First Phase (2015/2016)	PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	Systems for transferring resources	Ongoing. Final report notes that Donor contribution to MPTF has doubled but does not state values
Second Phase (2016/2017)	PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia	Area Based Intervention	Yes. For each of the individual joint programmes but not for Daldhis. Daldhis has receiving additional funding during implementation to support ongoing infrastructure projects and has built synergies with donors such as USAID, EU, and Finnish church Aid to support aspects of District Council formation. Each of the sub-components of Daldhis has also reported receiving new funding for continued programme implementation (estimated from conversation: JPLG – US\$6 million, Youth – US\$2 million, Rule of Law – US\$5 million)
Second Phase (2016/2017)	PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) -Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	Community Based Programming	Yes. During implementation, the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) co-funded for priority community-based projects from CAPs. Additional funding post-Midnimo also secured for scale up of the Midnimo to new geographic locations. Further funding from EU-IOM and Japan Supplementary Budget also providing resources to support prioritized public works outside of Midnimo scope. Numbers not reported. Project reports only note “additional funding has been secured for scale up” and lists co-

			funding from different sources – but no figures. PBSO contributing additional US\$500.000.
Second Phase (2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return	Cross-Border returnees – responding to potential camp closing	No. Donors potentially interested in funding other cross-border programmes, but no funding received yet
Second Phase (2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations (National Window)	Systems for transferring resources	World Bank to Government but not through Agencies. total budget allocation to National Window has tripled. Additional US\$2.8 million
Second Phase (2016/2017)	PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia	Macro-data for decision making	No

164. For the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis programmes, progress has been made, but the same challenges for sustainability are present in terms of the necessity to provide ongoing support to sustain these initiatives. The individual SOM-D2 Daldhis programmes do report that they have acquired additional funding for rule of law, Local Governance and Youth Empowerment work, but there is no contemplation of replicating the SOM-D2 Daldhis model of merging all three programmes into a single PBF framework. The SOM-D1 Midnimo programme is also receiving additional funding and there are plans to apply this model to other States as well as to continue the work in new Districts within the SWS and Jubbaland.

165. The two most commonly cited sustainability challenges from both the United Nations and Government side are related to personnel transitions and subsequent institutional memory loss at the Federal, State, and District levels and among United Nations programme staff. Challenges in the dissemination of information from programmes to Federal through the other levels was also cited as a challenge for sustainability and institutional memory.

166. Most of the non-Mogadishu level stakeholders interviewed appeared to be unsure of what continuity plans were in place. Many State, District or local level stakeholders interviewed felt that the processes had halted at the end of the project and they were unsure what the next steps were to be for ongoing sustainability. Much of this uncertainty may be due to internal and external personnel transitions and subsequent institutional memory loss. However, there also appears to have been incomplete transmission of continuity plans through the levels to reach stakeholders – “*Not many people in the country know about these good practices*” or “*I was not here when the project was carried out, but I read that...*” were very common phrases in almost all Government or United Nations interviews.

167. In a related vein, many of the United Nations personnel noted the importance of joint programming and working together as one of the primary catalytic effects of the PBF portfolio of support – but these were most often cited as internal United Nations cooperation. There did not seem to be an equivalent type of joint programming mandate with Government Ministries and each United Nations RUNO tended to focus on a single relationship with a Government counterpart. The Government counterparts themselves were not often interacting with each other even if the RUNOs were engaged in joint programming. It would be appropriate to consider the elaboration of a piloted joint programming equivalent with

Government - that involves multiple Ministries in collaboration with each other - which should include joint monitoring as well as operational coordination.

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

4.1 Conclusions

168. The portfolio has contributed to the achievement of higher-level results. The most significant results have been related to i) solving inter-clan disputes, negotiations, and grievances; ii) developing administrative and financial systems for accountability and to facilitate inter-level coordination; iii) supporting the creation of basic governance infrastructure for the delivery of services at sub-national levels, and iv) increasing community engagement. The six major contributions of the collective portfolio have been to: i) delivery of basic services; ii) improved social cohesion; iii) increased Federal/State/District cohesion; iv) enhanced community and District mobilization for development; v) improved mechanisms for Rule of Law and settlement of grievances; and vi) improved economic opportunities.

169. Due to the logic of using the portfolio to address strategic gaps in the larger pre-existing frameworks and to respond to emergent priorities, the measurement of these results is based mostly on qualitative assessments. The contributions have been distributed across a wide range of potential themes given the diversity of the projects under review. Although gap-oriented, the PBF portfolio integration into discussions with the UNCT, political Mission and Government has allowed the PBF projects to contribute to the broader strategic objectives of the national development plan by filling gaps in programming. The PPP PRFs SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis are both seen to have contributed important strategic outcomes in the SWS and Jubbaland states. SOM-D1 Midnimo is seen as the more successful of the two projects primarily for two reasons: a) the response time to see changes at community levels are much faster than for enacting changes in Government processes; and b) the integration of portions of three separate national level joint programmes into a more localized SWS and Jubbaland context in SOM-D2 Daldhis underestimated the degree of contradictions and complexities in project steering and coordination.

170. An enormous variety of catalytic effects were cited by respondents – primarily by the United Nations respondents. The gap-oriented approach for innovation and flexible adaptation to support joint programming approaches generated many positive catalytic effects – unblocking processes, promoting multi-stakeholder programming, and leveraging funding from other donors were among the most commonly cited effects. The elements of risk taking, and innovation are so embedded in the principles of the PBF that they appeared in all interviews with United Nations respondents.

171. The deep integration of the portfolio into the larger peacebuilding frameworks has led to good relevance on addressing the drivers of conflict. The PBF project cycle management requirements fit best in countries that have limited peacebuilding work and assume that the PBF will develop its own conflict analysis, priority plan and programme of support although as mentioned earlier in the document since 2018 PPP are no longer a requirement for PRF projects. In a context such as Somalia, which is gap- and proof-of-concept oriented, and seeks to respond emergently, these PBF parameters fit less well and run the risk of duplication with other processes and concepts already developed.

172. The portfolio as a whole, and the PPP ToC for the PRFs, are seen as relevant to the context and to the needs of the parties engaged, including women and youth. Although gender and youth considerations were mainstreamed in the programming, they were more visible at the field and operational levels. Both the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects were highly relevant to their contexts and have contributed to substantive positive changes. The gap-oriented approach taken in the First and Third Phases of cohort support means that while all projects are relevant, the collection of projects can appear ad hoc unless overlaid on to the larger strategic frameworks which they are addressing.

173. Efficiency of the individual projects is generally good for the context, with the exception of the SOM-D2 Daldhis project due to the aforementioned joint programming coordination challenges and the difficulties in the establishment of the District Councils. The efficiency of the portfolio management was perceived differently by different stakeholders. The development-oriented stakeholders rated the timeliness of PBF processes as typical for donor timelines (SOM-D2 Daldhis stakeholders also were negative on efficiency, but because of the cumbersome coordination requirements). The more politically oriented stakeholders perceived the PBF processes as too slow. The PBF portfolio of support has been strategic in seizing important political opportunities for creating peacebuilding impact. The IRF and PRF modalities fit well with programme and development opportunities. However, there IRF and PRF modalities as currently employed are not seen as sufficiently fast to be able to be able to respond to the volatile environment of political opportunities. Adapting the PBF approaches to align with the more rapidly evolving and emergent political engagement needs could be an area of experimentation in the next cycle.

174. The amount of the portfolio is perceived to be relatively small against the backdrop of other donor investments for peacebuilding and statebuilding in Somalia. Respondents always preferred more funding, but for a gap-oriented and proof-of-concept approach, the ET considers that the existing level of the portfolio is sufficient. If the PBF aspires to take on a programmatic approach (not recommended) then the funding levels should be higher. The biggest barriers to sufficiency appeared to be more related to availability than amounts at the moments in time when new opportunities emerged. Overall, the PBF investments are seen as providing value for money through the generation of multiple catalytic effects, their contribution to filling gaps, and their development of proof-of-concepts for subsequent scale up. The relatively small niche of the PBF among the donors is well leveraged and innovation and risk taking are well applied in the context. Even though they were programme oriented rather than gap-oriented, the SOM-D1 Midnimo and SOM-D2 Daldhis projects had strategic coherence and complemented well.

175. The existing M&E and performance results frameworks at both the individual project level and for the entire portfolio cannot adequately capture the successes of the portfolio investment. Further adaptation of existing tools will be necessary to better reflect these gains in this type of programming context.

176. The role of the PBF coordinator as a physical presence in the country has served well for improving efficiency and effectiveness of the programming and to ascertain the most impactful areas for PBF support. The wide range of expectations from United Nations stakeholders regarding the role of the PBF coordinator suggests that additional tasks at country level would maximize the effectiveness of this type of flexible and gap-oriented fund, indicating the need to expand the PBF team to fully support such an engagement.

177. The highly integrated nature of the PBF within the larger UNCT discussions allows for better strategic coherence, but it does raise the risk that there is no one body paying specific attention to the management and coordination of the portfolio itself. The Integrated Office has the potential to play a larger influence on implementation of projects or of the fund and may further contribute to unblocking processes if employed strategically. The implications of an integrated, gap-oriented portfolio are that there will be a need for a more elaborated secretariat with a stronger M&E function with resources for dedicated study and analytics beyond individual project M&E.

178. Considerations of sustainability of gains in a context such as Somalia may be overly aspirational. Progress in peacebuilding and State formation has been achieved, but there is still significant work that has to be done before gains can be seen as sustainable. One positive factor is that the nature of the collaboration for implementation through Government has led to a high degree of ownership and political will for the approaches supported by the PBF. Ongoing capacity strengthening support is required given the particularities of the Somali context.

179. From an implementation perspective, significant challenges are presented due to limited institutional memory and transitions of personnel. Further efforts on knowledge management, knowledge sharing, or stakeholder integration into best practices from the fund could be helpful in future programming.

4.2 Recommendations

180. The ET would recommend another cycle of PBF support. The suggestion would be to continue to pursue the same strategy of a gap-oriented approach integrating smaller “proof-of-concept” activities, and constant adjustments for identifying emergent political opportunities. Piloting or experimenting with the adaptation of current PBSO tools (conflict analysis, PRFs, logframes) to better align with this type of approach outside of a PPP programme orientation would add value globally. Additional considerations or adaptations of the PBF for political responsiveness would also be worthwhile to pilot. The following recommendations are presented with these over-arching principles in mind.

4.2.1 Strategic Directions

181. **Recommendation 1 - Strategic Alignment:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat should – in collaboration with the UNCT and Government counterparts – base programming actions on the existing national development frameworks for peacebuilding and use a gap-orientation to support projects that are: i) filling gaps in the conceptual framework, ii) are innovations or proofs of concept; and, iii) integrate joint programming principles (preferably that combine political and Agency representation).

182. **Recommendation 2 - Community Action Plans:** The community-based approaches articulated in SOM-D1 Midnimo have been significantly positive. The PBF portfolio as a whole should assume a gap-oriented approach and consider how to build a “mini PPP” around the support and promotion of SOM-D1 Midnimo-oriented programming. This mini-PPP should serve as a mechanism for orientation of a sub-set of portfolio projects. Even though there is ongoing funding to allow for scale up of this approach, the PBF Secretariat – in collaboration with the UNCT – should consider, when reviewing new project concepts, promoting the inclusion of concepts and techniques in other projects that were first developed under SOM-D1 Midnimo. This might include geographic expansion of the entire CAP process to new regions but could also include thematic expansion in terms of the elements integrated into the programme such as the various citizen committees or gender considerations.

183. **Recommendation 3 - Government Joint Programming:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat, with collaboration from the UNCT – should consider – when reviewing proposed new project concepts – the inclusion of elements that provide equivalent “joint programming” opportunities among Government Ministries or levels of Government (Federal, State, etc). These considerations are present in some projects but should be expanded to foment Government-equivalent joint programming opportunities. This could include, but not be limited to, joint monitoring of programmes or joint coordination of operational aspects.

184. **Recommendation 4 - Turnover and Institutional Memory:** Currently, within the ongoing capacity support to Government, there is significant input into capacity strengthening, but less follow up when transitions occur. Knowledge management for sharing of best practices, success stories and cataloguing lessons learned is often lost in these transitions. The PBF portfolio should consider – when reviewing proposed new project concepts – the inclusion of elements such as the integration or development of systems for orientation and re-training of new Government personnel to address turnover challenges in programming. As part of the coordination support project, the PBF should also develop systems for orientation of new United Nations Personnel to their ongoing PBF projects and the portfolio as a whole. The coordination project should also develop a plan for knowledge sharing exchanges and best practices both to support among Government officials as well as among United Nations personnel.

4.2.2 PBF Systems, Management and Coordination

185. **Recommendation 5 - Political Responsiveness:** For the next cycle, PBSO should consider piloting adaptations to existing modalities that might allow for better fit to the political agenda in terms of responsiveness and timeframe. This could be either an adaptation of the IRF or the elaboration of a third modality (perhaps titled the FRF – flexible response fund) that would have reduced project concept requirements, operate within a shorter time span (perhaps less than 6 months) and be more immediately responsive (approvals within days). Implications for disbursement of funds, accountability, and reporting would need to be modified, hence the pilot nature.

186. **Recommendation 6 - Portfolio M&E Strengthening:** For the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat – in collaboration with the PBSO in New York – should consider piloting the adaptation of existing project cycle management tools (conflict analysis, performance results framework, indicators) to better track portfolio level contributions within a gap-oriented approach. This could include (but not be limited to): i) modifying the conflict analysis to a “gap” analysis; ii) articulating a gap-oriented Peacebuilding Priority Plan that locates the disparate potential projects within the gaps of the larger frameworks; iii) developing portfolio level indicators based on catalytic effects as outcome level objectives.

187. **Recommendation 7 - Strategic Reflection:** The current oversight management (via UNCT, PMT, a JSC and an informal consultation group) does provide a multiplicity of inputs for guidance and alignment of the PBF. However, to provide more systematic and frequent oversight of the PBF portfolio as a unit, the integrated office – with support from the PBF coordinator – should set up a smaller formal oversight body consisting of five or six United Nations personnel comprising a mix of political and development positions, as well as a mix between strategic, programmatic and operational levels. This body should meet quarterly at a minimum to focus on strategic and implementation issues as well as new opportunities within the portfolio.

188. **Recommendation 8 - United Nations Joint Programming:** The principles of joint programming should underly the PBF portfolio criteria for support. However, in the next cycle, the PBF Secretariat should avoid combining pre-existing joint programmes under a single project umbrella. If supporting a collection of pre-existing joint programmes, the PBF should develop individual projects supporting individual joint programmes – even if this looks like “top-up funding”.

5 Annexes

5.1 Annex 1: Statement of Work

**Statement of Work for
(1) Team Leader/Evaluation Specialist (2) Peacebuilding Specialist and (3)
Country Specialist for
Evaluation of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) Portfolio in Somalia (2015-
2019)⁸⁴**

1. INTRODUCTION

The PBF, established in 2005 through General Assembly resolution 60/180 and Security Council resolution 1645, supports the United Nations' broader peacebuilding objectives in countries emerging out of conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict. It is intended to be a catalytic fund, driven by planning, coordination and monitoring mechanisms tailored to support the peacebuilding strategies of in-country United Nations and Government leadership. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is responsible for the overall management of the PBF under the authority of the Secretary-General; the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP's) Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO) is the Fund's Administrative Agent.

The PBF has been engaged in Somalia since 2009. Since funding its first project, the PBF has steadily increased its investments in the country. As of 2019, the PBF has invested 46 million USD in Somalia through 24 projects implemented by eleven UN agencies in close partnership with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States, and civil society. Since 2016, when Somalia was declared eligible for Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF) funding investments have been guided by the Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Somalia (2016-2019) and aligned with the National Development Plan through the international aid coordination architecture under the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility.

Given the substantial PBF investments in Somalia, a final, independent evaluation of the PBF's investment in Somalia is requested by PBSO management. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess PBF's results achieved from 2015-2019 and analyze the portfolio's overall added value to peacebuilding in the country. The evaluation will focus on 11 projects which comprise approximately \$26 million (see Annex I for list of projects to be evaluated).

This will be the first comprehensive portfolio-level evaluation of the PBF's investments in Somalia and will also contribute to the 'eligibility renewal process' that Somalia will undertake in 2019.

The evaluation will be used for learning and accountability, and to contribute to the PBF's decision-making regarding further engagement in Somalia in 2019 and beyond.

⁸⁴This SOW is presented as originally described. This cannot be modified at this time within the original TOR. Modifications to the methodology have been agreed upon during the inception phase and recorded in the narrative of the IR.

This Statement of Work (SoW) outlines the work to be undertaken by a Team Leader/Evaluation Specialist, Peacebuilding Specialist and Country Specialist for a final evaluation of the Somalia portfolio, including overall progress in achieving higher-level outcomes, progress of project-level outcomes towards higher-level outcomes, institutional arrangements among the implementing agencies as well as Government stakeholders, expenditure rates, and opportunities for learning.

BACKGROUND

Overview of PBF's involvement in Somalia

The PBF provides funding through two mechanisms, namely, the Immediate Response Facility (IRF) and the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF). The IRF is the project-based financing mechanism created to address critical and urgent peacebuilding needs in the immediate aftermath of conflict or because of a dramatic change in the country situation. Up to three million USD can be approved by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support on behalf of the Secretary-General without a formal eligibility process for the country. The PRF is the programme-based financing mechanism created to provide medium-term financing for countries declared eligible for PBF funding by the Secretary-General. To be eligible, countries must have national government commitment towards sustainable and inclusive peace. PRF funding is based on an elaboration of a strategic plan for peacebuilding, which supports national efforts at peacebuilding.

Somalia has had PBF support since 2009, when a first quick impact project was funded under the IRF. The portfolio has since grown significantly, initially with funding under the IRF and from 2016 also with funding under the PRF.

Somalia became eligible for PRF funding in 2016 and its current eligibility period expires at the end of 2019. The Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2016-2019 identified the following drivers of conflict.

1. Poor governance, lack of transparency and accountability

Many Somalis have never experienced a functioning state, one that reflects its concerns and responds to its needs. State provision of social services, economic opportunities and security remains an inchoate aspiration. By and large, elites have been able to capture the greater benefits of international aid by acting as gatekeepers and controlling decision-making.

At the federal level, governments have succeeded each other over the last two decades without, until recently, being able to access areas outside Mogadishu. Lack of capacity, scarce resources and corruption have long eroded governance mechanisms from the national down to the community level. In addition, the state has few means to raise revenue and most of the donor assistance has historically bypassed the state. Government revenue at the federal level, estimated at three percent of GDP, is among the lowest in the world and is insufficient to deliver basic services.

2. Breakdown of traditional conflict resolution and absence of formal justice systems

Political volatility and the on-going armed conflict have weakened the rule of law, whether it be through formal, Sharia or traditional courts, which negatively impacts the lives of the population with repercussions for vulnerable groups, especially women and IDPs. The ability of conflict protagonists to undermine peace efforts and reconciliation processes derives not just from the disintegration of the state apparatus since 1991 but perhaps even more so from the weakening of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.

In Somalia many of the State's regulatory functions are carried out by non-state actors. In rural areas, where there has not been any functioning state justice institution for many years, the absence of formal courts and the challenges of distance has meant that the state's legal and security apparatus has remained largely absent or if present then unaccountable.

3. Lack of economic opportunities and access to basic services

The civil war has had a devastating impact on the economy of Somalia by destroying infrastructure, dismantling the education system, pushing most of its skilled labour force into exile, reducing its ability to adapt to natural shocks, and stifling any large-scale domestic or foreign investment. Most of what little basic service delivery exists notably food supply, health and nutritional care, water, sanitation and hygiene, is provided by the private sector, NGOs, self-help groups, or international aid agencies, often in a disjointed, opportunistic and ad hoc way. This has resulted in significant wealth disparities among the population groups and between rural and urban areas, as well as inequitable access to, and provision of services. These inequalities are an important driver of conflict. This is evidenced through devastatingly low performing social indicators. Somalia ranks third worst globally with neonatal deaths estimated at 40 per 1000 live births and infant mortality at 85 per 1000 births; global acute malnutrition for children under five stands above 15 percent and 50 percent of children are out of school. Over 40 percent of safe water supplies are non-functional, with 25 percent of rural communities and 50 percent of IDP reliant on rainwater.

In addition to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2016-2019, the PBF's investments in Somalia have been guided by the pillars of the National Development Plan (2017-2019), notably the "Consolidating Peace, Inclusive Politics, Security and Rule of Law" pillar, and the UN Strategic Framework (2017-2020), in particular its strategic priority 1 (deepening federalism and state-building, supporting conflict resolution and reconciliation, and preparing for universal elections) and strategic priority 2 (supporting institutions to improve peace, security, justice, rule of law, and safety for Somalis).

As part of the PRF, a total of 19.9 million USD has been allocated to eight projects since 2016, of which six were approved in 2018 and thus not part of this evaluation. The other two PRF projects, Midnimo and Dhaldhis, both end on 31 August 2019 and have been at the centre of the current Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2016-2019.

As part of the IRF, a total of nine projects worth 19.1 million USD have been active during the 2016-2019 period.

Somalia is one of the world's most complex conflict situations. The high cost of doing business is well-documented and access to areas outside the urban centres severely restricted due to prevailing insecurity. As such, most of the projects in the PBF portfolio suffered delays in

implementation as a result of security and political developments and have had to request for extensions.

Strategic role of the PBF in Somalia

The PBF has contributed to positioning the UN at the forefront of peacebuilding and state-building efforts in Somalia. Because of its high tolerance for risk, flexibility and focus on innovative approaches, the PBF has enabled the UN to explore new approaches to peacebuilding and expand programming to areas that have not yet attracted traditional donor funding. With the emphasis on support to the local level and area-based approaches, the PBF has played an important role in extending the reach of the state beyond urban centres in line with the National Stabilisation Strategy and the Wadajir Framework for Local Governance and ensured public participation in the implementation of activities.

Through its emphasis on using national systems for transferring funds under the National Window of the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund and strengthening national ownership, the PBF projects have shown that these systems work and that administrations at the local have the capacity to manage funds directly – something which is becoming increasingly important in light of Somalia’s progress toward debt relief and the potential of budget support from international partners. Furthermore, the PBF has supported the development and implementation of the National Stabilisation Strategy and the state-level stabilisation plans, for which the international community has committed to align its funding and recognised that the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation together with the UN shall coordinate stabilisation efforts in Somalia.

As a funding modality the PBF promotes joint programming and close cooperation between the UN, government authorities and civil society, which is illustrated by the active portfolio. With the support of the PBF, the UN has spearheaded efforts to address protracted challenges in Somalia that cuts across traditional development, humanitarian, or peacebuilding approaches in line with the principles of the New Way of Working and Delivering as One.

Overall guidance and oversight for the PBF portfolio in Somalia is provided by a senior-level coordination committee co-chaired by the Minister of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia, with members representing implementing UN agencies, federal line ministries, the Federal Member States, and civil society.

PURPOSE AND USE OF EVALUATION

As peacebuilding and state-building efforts in Somalia continue to gain ground and show results, the PBF is well-placed to provide flexible and catalytic support through risk-tolerant investments in areas where traditional donor funding is not yet forthcoming. The PBF’s role within the UN’s peace and security architecture is being elevated and peacebuilding and prevention have become central parts of the sustaining peace framework.

The Federal Government of Somalia has expressed its commitment to seek renewed eligibility for PBF-funding and there is a growing interest in seeking PBF funding from UN entities and civil society organisations.

After ten years of PBF support to Somalia and in the final year of implementation of the 2016-2019 Peacebuilding Priority Plan, a final, independent evaluation of the PBF's investments in Somalia is requested by PBSO's Senior Management. This will be the first comprehensive portfolio-level evaluation of the PBF's investments in Somalia, which is a requirement for renewed PBF eligibility. This evaluation is therefore timely, as it presents an excellent opportunity to assess the PBF's achievements and overall added value to peacebuilding in Somalia. It will also contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of the PBF's strategic decision-making, its alignment with national frameworks and the UN's political mandate in Somalia, implementation modalities and partnerships, and finally whether the PBF has successfully leveraged its role as a catalytic, innovative and risk-taking actor in the highly complex environment of Somalia. Moreover, it will contribute to learning and will help inform strategic direction and priorities of any future PBF support to Somalia.

The evaluation will also contribute to greater transparency and accountability for all stakeholders involved.

The purpose of the portfolio evaluation is to:

- assess to what extent PBF's support has had a concrete and sustained impact in terms of sustaining peace in Somalia;
- assess how relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable PBF's support to Somalia has been;
- determine the catalytic effects of PBF's support to Somalia and assess fundraising strategies by implementing partners and the PBF;
- assess where the critical remaining peacebuilding gaps in Somalia are;
- assess whether the peacebuilding interventions supported by the PBF successfully contributed to promoting the women, peace, and security agenda as set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1325;
- provide lessons for future PBF support terms of programme design, implementation modalities and partnerships;
- assess the overall M&E approach of the portfolio, identify lessons and make recommendations for any future portfolio M&E design.

There are three main clients for the evaluation, to whom the recommendations will be addressed:

- Federal Government of Somalia, in particular the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, to inform the request to the Secretary-General for renewed PBF eligibility;
- UN leadership in Somalia, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Resident Coordinator; and
- PBSO/PBF at UN Headquarters in New York.

Additionally, the evaluation's findings and recommendations will be useful for consideration and action by relevant actors, including the PBF Secretariat in Somalia, the MPTFO, and

members of the UN Country Team in Somalia. It will also serve as relevant inputs to the PBF policies and guidance, and other corporate-level reviews.

The evaluation findings and recommendations will be used to inform actions to further strengthen key aspects of the PBF's current and future work. The recommendations should be actionable and on how the PBF and its partners can improve their effectiveness. The final report will be a public document.

SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The evaluation will have a broad scope and will consider the overall performance of the PBF support from 2015 through 2019, including individual projects funded through the PRF and IRF modalities. The number of projects to be evaluated is 11. The projects Midnimo and Dhaldhis are coming to completion in August 2019. They are the flagship projects of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan and have not been yet evaluated. Instead of proceeding with a separate evaluation for these two projects, this evaluation will have a particular focus on these two projects.

The scope of the evaluation can be broken down into the following three components:

Evaluation of impact of the PBF portfolio of support to Somalia since 2015

The evaluation will examine the combined effect of the portfolio of projects funded by the PBF in order to assess the PBF's overall contribution to the building and consolidation of peace in Somalia since 2015.

The broad questions to be answered are based on the evaluation criteria of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) and the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms, which have been adapted to the context at hand. While examples of questions are provided below, the evaluation team should further adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report.⁸⁵

1. Relevance:

- What was the relevance of the proposed theory of change for the total portfolio and the different outcome areas?
 - How relevant was the portfolio to the needs of the parties including different communities and groups?
 - To what extent did the portfolio address the drivers and causes identified in the conflict analysis?
 - How relevant were the priorities included the Peacebuilding Priority Plan in achieving peacebuilding in Somalia?
 - What was the relevance of the Somalia Peacebuilding Priority Plan for the two flagship projects Dhaldhis and Midnimo and for PBF's overall investments in Somalia during the 2015-2019 period?

⁸⁵These should be adapted and further elaborated by the Team Leader in the Inception Report. Moreover, the questions do not need to be answered one by one but used as a basis for the evaluation narrative and conclusions.

- To what extent did the PBF and the Peacebuilding Priority Plan respond to urgent funding needs and/or peacebuilding relevant gaps?
- To what extent was the PPP informed by contextual changes, joint conflict analysis, and lessons learned following PBF's pre-2015 investments in Somalia? To what extent did they have strategic coherence?
-

2.Efficiency:

- How fast and responsive has the PBF been to supporting peacebuilding priorities in Somalia?
- What role did the PBF Coordination Committee play in ensuring efficient use of PBF's investments?
- How efficient was the implementation of the PBF support and how significant were the transaction costs?
- What role did the PBF Secretariat in the RCO play in support of the project design and portfolio coordination?
- Overall, did the PBF investments provide value for money?
- To what extent were the resources programmed in an efficient and strategic manner, including the selection of implementing partners?
- How well did the M&E system work?

3.Effectiveness:

- To what extent did the PBF portfolio from 2015-2019 achieve higher-level results?
- To what extent did the PBF support take risks to achieve peacebuilding objectives, especially in areas where other donors were not ready to do so?
- How strategic was the Peacebuilding Priority Plan at seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact and creating catalytic effects?
- To what extent did the PBF projects contribute to the broader strategic outcomes identified in the Peacebuilding Priority Plan?
- To what extent did Dhaldhis and Midnimo, as flagship projects under the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, complement each other and have strategic coherence and how was the interlinkages between the PRF and IRF projects implemented during the 2015-2019?
- How effectively were risk factors assessed and managed throughout the PBF support to Somalia (both at portfolio-level and individual project-level)?

4.Gender:

- To what extent were gender considerations mainstreamed throughout PBF's support to Somalia?
- To what extent did the PBF promote gender equality and women empowerment?
- To what extent did the PBF support gender-responsive peacebuilding?

5.Youth:

- To what extent were youth considerations mainstreamed throughout PBF's support to Somalia?
- To what extent did the PBF promote youth empowerment and meaningful participation in peacebuilding efforts in Somalia?

6.Sustainability:

- How strong is the commitment of the government and other stakeholders to sustaining the results of the PBF support and continuing any unfinished activities?
- What, if any, catalytic effects did the PBF support in Somalia have (financial and non-financial)?
- Did the PBF-funded projects generate gender- and age-disaggregated data through its M&E approaches to inform new programming?

Following from the overall assessment, the evaluation will assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the PBF's total contribution to Somalia during 2015-2019, including under two outcomes of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. Examples of types of questions to be considered to examine this strategic, substantive contribution are provided below:⁸⁶

- *Outcome 1: Government structures and institutions at federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able to listen and respond to the various needs of populations in the new federal member states of Somalia*
- To what extent have the PBF-funded projects promoted equality before the law and non-discrimination?
- How effectively have the PBF-funded projects helped empower people to demand their rights?
- How effectively did interventions help build the capacity of state institutions to take forward their human rights and justice obligations? To what extent was dialogue on how issues related to justice for past conflicts addressed? If dialogue was fostered, how effective was it in nurturing a shared vision for the future among diverse groups of the population? To what extent were rights-holders empowered to articulate and demand change?
- How well did interventions support the role of youth and women, as well as other marginalized groups such as minorities, in decision-making forums and in equally leading peacebuilding activities?

Outcome 2: Communities in the new federal member states of Somalia generate the demand for, and benefit from, local governance, security, justice, social and economic solutions

- To what extent have the PBF-funded interventions helped to reduce mistrust among community members and foster greater social cohesion?
- How effectively have Local Self-Governing bodies supported conflict resolution, dialogue and mediation to reduce inter-communal tension at the local level? If effective, has their enhanced capacity led to an increase in trust in their offices by diverse groups of community members?
- Have the initiatives led to an increased role for youth, women, minority groups within their local communities?

⁸⁶The Team Leader should adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report.

Evaluation of PBF management and oversight structures in Somalia

The evaluation will examine the management of the PBF support in order to comment on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of arrangements both in-country and between the PBSO/PBF and the UN in Somalia. This should include the funding, programming, coordination and decision-making arrangements between all the actors and the quality and inclusivity of national ownership of the processes. Examples of types of questions to be considered are provided below:⁸⁷

1. Recipient UN agencies, implementing partners and UNCT members:

- What was the implementation capacity of the individual RUNOs/NUNOs and their implementing partners?
- How did different RUNOs/NUNOs work together towards common strategic objectives?
- How effectively did RUNOs/NUNOs partner with key actors to maximize complementarities?
- What was the process for compiling half yearly and annual reviews and reports and what was the quality of those reports?
- How effectively did the RUNOs/NUNOs monitor and report against higher-level outcomes?
- How was gender considered throughout the project, including design, implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- Was adequate gender expertise available in the country team to support the integration of gender within the PBF-supported interventions?
- How were the principles of Do No Harm integrated in day-to-day management and oversight?
- How was gender considered throughout not only project design but also implementation, monitoring and reporting?
- Did the PBF funding provide a catalytic effect in generating continued funding from other sources?

2. Co-chairs of the PBF Coordination Committee:

- How suitable was the Coordination Committee composition to its role and how did it evolve over time?
- To what extent did civil society organizations participate in the Coordination Committee, including women's organizations?
- How strong was the government leadership/ownership of the Coordination Committee?
- How timely was the process of project approval? What were the main factors facilitating or delaying it?
- How strategic was the selection of projects to be supported and of the RUNOs to implement them?
- How strong was the strategic relevance of the PBF's support to national frameworks, including the National Development Plan, National Stabilisation Strategy, etc?

3. Government counterparts:

⁸⁷The Team Leader should adapt and elaborate on these in the Inception Report.

- How efficient was the partnership with Government counterparts in the design and implementation of PBF-funded projects?
- How relevant was PBF's support for achieving national strategic priorities?

To what extent did the PBF projects contribute to overcoming political challenges by bringing different stakeholders closer together?

4. PBSO and PBF Secretariat:

- How effective was the support provided by the PBF/PBSO (including PBSO in New York and the PBF Secretariat) to the Recipient United Nations Organisations (RUNOs) and Non-UN Organisations (NUNOs), the UNCT, UNSOM, coordination mechanisms and other stakeholders throughout the process (approval, design, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation)?
- To what extent was the PBC used as a forum to bring together relevant actors to marshal resources and advise on and propose integrated peacebuilding strategies in Somalia?
- How transparent, effective and efficient was the PBF/PBSO in its decision-making?
- How timely was the process of project approval? What were the main factors facilitating or delaying it?

Key lessons learned and recommendations

The evaluation should provide an overview of key lessons and recommendations based on the assessment of the PBF support to Somalia over the period 2015-2019. These should be addressed to PBSO as well as the UN leadership in Somalia (SRSG and DSRSG/RC/HC) and consider important entry points with key government counterparts. Where possible, lessons should be made general and phrased in a way that can be used to strengthen future PBF programming in Somalia and other countries. The lessons and recommendations should speak to:

- the main programming/implementation factors of success;
- the main programming/implementation challenges;
- the main administration factors of success;
- the main administration challenges; and
- the ways to address the main challenges.

The major lessons and recommendations should come out clearly in the evaluation Executive Summary.

1. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY/APPROACH

The evaluation will be summative, and will employ, to the greatest extent possible, a participatory approach whereby discussions with and surveys of key stakeholders provide and verify the substance of the findings. The evaluation should include a strong mixed method approach to data collection and analysis, clearly noting how various forms of evidence will be employed vis-à-vis each other to triangulate gathered information.

The evaluators will take into consideration an independent conflict analysis which is being carried out to inform the articulation of new peacebuilding priorities for the next five years (2020-2025) as part of Somalia's request for the 'eligibility renewal process'.

Evaluators should review any theories of change that either explicitly or implicitly framed the programming logic of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan and individual projects. The evaluation team should propose, where necessary, suggestions for improving or strengthening existing theories of change, or identifying theories of change where they are absent.

The PBF encourages evaluations teams to employ innovative approaches to data collection and analysis. The methodologies for data collection may include, without limitation:

- Desk review of key documents including: the Peacebuilding Priority Plan, project documents, results frameworks, pertinent correspondence related to the initial allocation decisions and subsequent project design and implementation, project reports, surveys, other information produced by implementing partners with respect to the PBF-funded projects, and any previous evaluations and other reviews. Some of these documents will be supplied by the PBSO and the UNCT (others are available through the MPTFO Gateway website);
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with major stakeholders in New York, including the PBSO, MPTFO, and key UN implementing agencies;
- Systematic review of monitoring data from the implementing agencies and other key sources of data;
- Direction observation through on-site field visits of PBF-funded projects, where possible due to security restrictions;
- Key informant interviews and focus group discussions, as appropriate, with all major stakeholders, partners and beneficiaries in Somalia (implementing agencies, the Government, beneficiary institutions, a sample of individual beneficiaries, other development and peacebuilding partners, etc.). Beneficiaries should represent diverse groups, including women and youth. Proposals should clearly indicate how interview and focus group discussion data will be captured, coded and analysed; and
- Survey of key stakeholders, if relevant.

Other methodologies to consider, as appropriate, include the development of case studies, cluster analysis, statistical analysis, social network analysis, etc. The evaluation team will produce a detailed methodological plan during the inception phase, specifying which methods will be used to answer which key evaluation questions. The plan should include a detailed description of the triangulation strategy and gender analysis. The plan should also describe the methodology that will be used to review the portfolio as a whole and the individual projects.

2. EVALUATION PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS

The evaluation findings will be evidence based and following the evaluation standards from OECD-DAC and UNEG. The PBF will brief the evaluation team on quality standards.

3. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS AND QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS

PBSO will manage and oversee the evaluation process. Day-to-day work of the evaluation team and their logistics will be supported by the PBF Secretariat in Somalia, with assistance UN implementing agencies. While evaluations are fully independent, a PBSO staff may accompany the evaluation team during data collection for quality assurance.

PBSO will approve each of the deliverables by the evaluation team, following internal quality assurance and consultation. The evaluation team is expected to work responsively with PBSO/PBF staff, while still maintaining independence.

The evaluation team will prepare an inception report to further refine the evaluation questions and detail its methodological approach, including data collection instruments. The inception report must be approved by the PBSO prior to commencement of the evaluation team's in-country data collection trip.

In addition, before leaving the field following in-country data collection, the evaluation team will schedule a presentation of preliminary findings with the PBF Coordination Committee and the UNCT with view to their validation. A separate validation exercise will be scheduled with the PBSO prior to the submission of the draft report.

The PBSO will retain the copyright over the evaluation. The evaluation findings will be made public following final approval by the PBSO and incorporating feedback from the country office.

4. EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIREMENTS

While firms should propose team compositions based on their understanding of the needs of the evaluation, at a minimum, the evaluation team should consist of one senior evaluator (ideally with experience in peacebuilding evaluations), one specialist on peacebuilding programming and another specialist on the current political, human rights, governance and reconciliation challenges in Somalia. At least one of the team members should have a background on gender equality and women's empowerment. The Team Leader will be responsible for the evaluation methodology, coordination of other team members, and the overall quality and timely submission of all the deliverables.

The Team Leader should possess the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:

- Master's degree in a relevant area including social sciences, international development, research methods, or evaluation;
- Eight to ten years of evaluation experience, including the use of mixed methods. Ideally some evaluation experience within post-conflict countries and peacebuilding programmes;
- Demonstrated familiarity with the United Nations and its Agencies, Funds and Programmes;
- Demonstrated understanding of gender issues and women and peacebuilding within evaluation;
- Ability to plan effectively, prioritize, complete tasks quickly, and adapt to changing contexts;
- Demonstrated leadership in managing a team;
- Strong analytical skills, including with qualitative and quantitative research methods;
- Excellent written and oral communication skills, including in cross-cultural contexts; and
- Fluency in English.

The Peacebuilding Specialist should possess the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:

- Master’s degree in a relevant area including social sciences, international development, conflict studies, law, or public administration;
- Five to seven years of post-conflict/peacebuilding experience, including experience in peacebuilding programming design and implementation;
- Demonstrated understanding of conflict analysis, conflict drivers and post-conflict recovery;
- Demonstrating understanding of political, human rights, governance and/or reconciliation issues;
- Demonstrated understanding of gender issues and women and peacebuilding;
- Experience in working with government officials, international development community and people recovering from conflict;
- Demonstrated familiarity with the United Nations and its Agencies, Funds and Programmes;
- Excellent written and oral communication skills, including in cross-cultural contexts;
- Strong teamwork skills; and
- Fluency in English, while knowledge of Somali is desirable.

The Somalia Specialist should possess the following skills and expertise, at a minimum:

- University degree in a relevant field, including social sciences, history, conflict studies, etc.;
- Five years to seven years of relevant work experience, including experience working in Somalia;
- Excellent knowledge of Somalia’s cultural, political and socio-economic context with a focus on post-conflict recovery;
- Knowledge of Somalia’s governance institutions and existing contacts in those institutions, facilitating team’s communication and analysis of the stakeholders/beneficiaries of the PBF programme;
- Understanding of past and current state of political, human rights, governance and reconciliation key issues in Somalia;
- Experience in research and analysis of data;
- Strong teamwork skills;
- Strong written and oral communication skills; and
- Fluency in English and Somali.

The schedule of the evaluation is expected to be as follows covering in total approximately four months:

Task	Expected Start	Expected Finish
1. Scoping exercise: preliminary document review, teleconferences/meetings with New York stakeholders (PBF, PBC, MPTFO, other United Nations agencies) and in-country reference group, and write up of inception report for PBSO approval	29 July	6 September
2. Field mission, including travel and interviews with all key stakeholders, beneficiaries and partners, site visits	27 September	11 October

and surveys		
3. Analysis and preparation of draft report and its presentation to PBSO New York and Evaluation Reference Group for validation	Commence during data collection	4 November
4. Finalizing of report following comments	11 November	6 December

5. DELIVERABLES

The Team Leader is responsible for the timely provision and quality of all evaluation deliverables. Their approval will be based on OECD-DAC and UNEG standards for evaluations, tailored for the specific purposes of peacebuilding evaluations. Each deliverable shall be in English.

Deliverable	Content and Audience	Tentative Due Date
Inception Report	<p>The Inception Report will include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the evaluation team's understanding of the ToR, any data or other concerns arising from the provided materials and initial meetings/interviews, and strategies for how to address perceived shortcomings; - key evaluation questions and methodological tools for answering each question; - list of key risks and risk management strategies for the evaluation; - stakeholder analysis; - proposed work plan for the field mission; and - table of contents for the evaluation report <p>The Report will be approved by the PBSO and receive Evaluation Reference Group endorsement prior to consultants' field travel.</p>	6 September
Presentation of preliminary results and aide memoire	<p>The aide memoire will include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a brief summary of the purpose of the evaluation; - an overview of the mission, including activities assessed and stakeholders consulted; - an overview of preliminary findings and lessons; and - an explanation of next steps <p>The aide memoire will be presented to the JSC and the UNCT in the last week of the field mission.</p>	11 October
Draft Report	<p>The Draft Report will include an Executive Summary and annexes. The draft report should include individual project evaluation summaries.</p> <p>The Draft Report will be reviewed by the PBSO and the Evaluation Reference Group. The PBSO will provide a</p>	4 November

Deliverable	Content and Audience	Tentative Due Date
	consolidated matrix of comments which should be formally addressed in the Final Report.	
Final Report	<p>The Final Report will include an Executive Summary and annexes.</p> <p>The Team Leader will be responsible for ensuring that comments from the PBSO and the valuation Reference Group are formally addressed. The Final Report will include all the annexes, including project evaluation summaries. It will also have a five-page Executive Summary that can be used as a stand-alone document outlining key findings on successes and challenges of the PBF support and recommendations. The Final Report will be evidence based and respond to the questions in the Inception Report with clear and succinct lessons learned and targeted recommendations. The PBSO will approve the Final Report, following consultation with the Evaluation Reference Group.</p> <p>Following acceptance of the Final Report, the PBSO will coordinate a management response as a separate document.</p>	6 December

List of projects to be evaluated

	Project ID	Project Title	Duration	Budget in US\$	Link to Project Documents
1	103708	PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	14/12/2016-31/08/2019	4,500,000	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00103708
2	103709	PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubaland and South West State of Somalia	14/12/2016-31/08/2019	5,300,000	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00103709
3	96372	PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	17/08/2015-28/02/2018	586,974	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00096372
4	96491	PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	31/08/2015-31/08/2016	2,143,821	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00096491
5	96601	PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	15/09/2015-30/04/2017	2,232,061	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00096601
6	100610	PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations	20/05/2016-30/06/2017	2,062,083	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00100610
7	102014	PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia	19/09/2016-30/06/2018	952,889	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00102014
8	104073	PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (SOMALIA)	19/01/2017-31/12/2018	3,000,000	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00104073
9	95276	PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	13/05/2015-31/12/2017	4,123,420	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00095276
10	96145	PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	13/07/2015-31/12/2016	1,000,000	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00096145

5.2 Annex 2: Project Summaries

5.2.1 Overall Summary

Name of Project	PBF (Global) Priority Area/ OUTCOMES	RUNOs	Partners	Location	Original Budget Approved	Duration ⁸⁸
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support	Priority 1- Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements and Political Dialogue Focus Area 1.2- Rule of Law	UNDP, UNOPS, UNODC, UNICEF	Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court	Federal Somalia and IRAs, Puntland and Somaliland	\$2,143,821	31/08/2015-31/08/2016
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia	Priority 2- coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict Focus Area 2.1- National Reconciliation	UNDP, UN Women	Government: Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWRHD - Federal) Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs (MoWDAFA - Puntland) CSOs: Somali Women Leadership Initiative (SWLI), others to be determined through competitive bidding. Research institution: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies	Mogadishu (Federal), Puntland, Baidoa, Kismayo, Geddo, newly emerging states and recovered areas	\$1,000,000	13/07/2015-31/12/2016

⁸⁸ The duration of the projects is based on the original ProDocs and the Project Tables in the SoW.

PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences	Priority 2-coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict Focus Area 2.1-National Reconciliation	UNDP	UNSOM, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, Regional Admin of Jubaland State, Interim South West Admin, Galmudug Interim Admin, Banadir, Regional Admin of Hiraaan and Middle Shabelle	Galkayo (Galmudug and Puntland states), Dhusamareeb and Adaado (Galmudug), State of Hirshabelle, Marka, Jowhar	\$2,598,173	15/09/2015-30/04/2017
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) - Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States	Priority 2-coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict Focus Area 2.1-National Reconciliation	UNHABITAT, IOM	Jubaland Refugee and IDP Agency for Jubaland State; Ministry of Planning & International Coordination for South West State	Jubaland Kismayo, Garbarharey, Afmadow and Dollow and for South West State - Baidoa and Afgoye	\$4,500,000	14/12/2016-31/08/2019
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return (SOMALIA)	Priority 3- revitalize economy/peace dividends Focus Area 3.2-Livelihood Opportunities	UNHCR, FAO, ILO, IOM, UNICEF, WFP	NRC, INTERSOS, DRC, Federal Government of Somalia-National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) Somalia, Government of Kenya	Baidoa (Bay region, Somalia), Dadaab (Kenya)	\$3,000,000	19/01/2017-31/12/2018
PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)	Priority 4-administrative services Focus Area 4.2-Public service delivery	UNDP and UNMPTF	Federal Member States and CSOs: Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Interior and Federalism; and State Governments; District Governments; Interim District Administrations; and Civil Society Organizations	Jubaland State, South West State, Galmudug State, HirShabelle State. 14 out of 26 districts identified by MOIFA	\$4,123,420	13/05/2015-31/12/2017

PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations	Priority 4-administrative services Focus Area 4.2- Public service delivery	UNDP, Govt	Ministry of Finance, Federal Government		\$2,062,083	20/05/2016-30/06/2017
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)	Priority 4-administrative services Focus Area 4.3	UNDP	World Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning	Mogadishu (Federal), Puntland, Baidoa, Kismayo, Geddo, newly emerging states and recovered areas	\$586,974	17/08/2015-28/02/2018
PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia	Priority 4-Administrative services Focus area 4.1- Restoring public administration	UNDP	Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister's Office, World Bank, UN Global Pulse	Somalia	\$952,889	19/09/2016-30/06/2018
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia	Priority 4-administrative services Focus Area 4.2- Public service delivery	UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNCDF, UNHABITAT, UNIDO	Federal Government of Somalia: MoIFA, Mo Public Works, Mo Justice, MoF, Federal Member State (Jubbaland/SWS): Mo Interior, Mo Justice, Mo Education, Mo Labour and Employment, Mo Trade and Industry	Kismayo and Garbaharey Dollow, and Afmadow districts in Jubaland State and Hudur, Afogyee and Baidoa in South West State	\$5,300,000	14/12/2016-31/08/2019

5.2.2 Individual Project Briefs⁸⁹

5.2.2.1 PBF/IRF 143: Coordination Support

Project Name	PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia
Project Start date	19/09/2016
Project Duration (end date)	30/06/2018
Implementing Office	UNDP
Implementing Partners	Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister's Office, World Bank, UN Global Pulse RUNOs, UNSOM,
Implementing locations	Somalia
Funding	\$952,889
Direct Beneficiaries	UN, NUNOs, FGS, State line ministries
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1 The Peacebuilding Priority Plan will provide an effective contribution to Somalia's peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities due to effective coordination support in the design and implementation of the PRF projects</p> <p>Output 1.1 PRF project proposals developed Output 1.2 Technical assistance provided Output 1.3 PPP implementation coordinated</p> <p>Outcome 2: Support efforts to remotely monitor Somali Public perceptions and behaviours relevant to the ongoing peacebuilding state building processes</p> <p>Output 2.1 PPP Relevant stakeholder buy-in and proper needs assessment among potential users Output 2.2: Project outcomes achieved as agreed in project plan and memoranda of understanding</p> <p>Overall Project Progress: On Track</p>
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Contribution to PBF Focus Area 4.1- Restoring public administration
Risk Marker	1-medium risk
Catalytic Effect	2- unleashing of processes
Project Description	The project provides technical capacity to government, the UN, and other partners to design, implement, and monitor projects to ensure they contribute to achieve the objectives of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. The project also helps to transfer the conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming knowledge to national counterparts for use in long term planning. This project also builds capacity to gauge Somali public response to ongoing peacebuilding and statebuilding processes without security risk exposure to UN personnel. (Description from ProDoc)
Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is limited use of social media and the coverage of radio stations partly undermined the relevance of the project • It was perceived by UN staff that the PBF the current funding procedures and oversight mechanisms as an inefficient, imposing an unnecessary burden by introducing additional layers • The Joint Program mechanism represented some challenges and some agencies couldn't get the remaining 20% of the funds • The project should have played a stronger role acting as a link between different PBF projects by analysing the various projects, sharing information on gaps, complementarities and generating lessons learned across the projects • the project needs to work on strengthening joint • outcome level monitoring to improve results reporting as an important enabler for achieving the projects' objectives and the overall PPP goals • the Big Data component of the project is not linked to in-country programme, UN frameworks or project and lacks ownership by the UN agencies in the country • The Coordinator role should shift towards a more strategic role at the programme level with the ability to engage early to overcome challenges, build synergies and share lessons learned

⁸⁹ In the Project Briefs – Evaluation findings refers to the findings of the individual project evaluations that were carried out by the implementing Agencies.

<p>Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report, eval etc)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The PBF secretariat, through the coordination fund, has supported the development of two PRF projects, namely Midnimo and Daldhis, and their implementation. The Midnimo project has proven particularly successful in promoting the use of a durable solutions approach to the mass displacement crisis facing Somalia, with more than 2.6 million internally displaced persons. The PBF secretariat has also supported the Daldhis project team in navigating the challenges the project has faced due to its high degree of complexity as a "joint programme of joint programmes" as well as managing the delays faced as a result of the highly politicized nature of the issues the project has addressed. • The PBF secretariat component of the project has contributed to raising the profile of the PBF in Somalia and to develop several new peacebuilding projects for funding. • The PBF secretariat has also acted as a resource for mainstreaming of peacebuilding through other programmes being implemented by the UN in Somalia, civil society, and government,
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5.2.2.2 PBF-SOM D2: Daldhis

Project Name	PBF/SOM/D-2-Daldhis (Build your Country) (00103709)
Project Start date	14/12/2016
Project Duration (end date)	31/08/2019
Implementing Office	UNDP, JPLG (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNCDF, UNHABITAT), UNIDO
Implementing Partners	Federal Government of Somalia: MoIFA, MoPublic Works, MoJustice, MoF, Federal Member State (Jubbaland/SWS): Mo Interior, Mo Justice, MoEducation, Mo Labour and Employment, MoTrade and Industry
Implementing locations	Kismayo and Garbaharey Dollow, and Afmadow districts in Jubaland State and Hudur, Afogye and Baidoa in South West State
Funding	Total: \$5,300,000 (as per ProDoc)
Direct Beneficiaries	Jubbaland and South West State Ministries of Interior, Justice, Labour, Youth, Judiciaries, Health, Education, Airport Authority, Gender, as well as traditional leaders, selected local councillors, local government staff, CBO/CSO, Police, local teachers and health workers. Formation of Mobile Training Units
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able to listen and respond to the various needs of the population of South and Central Somalia.</p> <p><i>Output 1.1:</i> Policy and legislation of the Federal Member States is developed to enable the decentralization of governance and service delivery at the district level</p> <p><i>Output 1.2:</i> Coordination is strengthened in support of decentralization by Federal Member States Administration</p> <p><i>Output 1.3:</i> Strengthened capacity to develop standardized local government systems and structures in Jubaland/South West State</p> <p>Outcome 2: Communities in South and Central Somalia generate the demand for, and benefit from local governance, security, justice, economic and social solutions</p> <p><i>Output 2.1:</i> Strengthened civic engagement and dialogue with local government/authorities</p> <p><i>Output 2.2:</i> Increased access to public and judicial services in Kismayo, Garbaharey, Dollow, and Afmadow districts of Jubaland State / Baidoa and Afogye districts of South West State</p> <p><i>Output 2.3:</i> Strengthened enabling environment through youth engagement/employment/PPP dialogue and Local Economic Development</p>
Contribution to PBF (any PBF indicators included?)	4.2 Extension of state authority/ local administration; Contribution to both outcomes of PPP
Risk Marker	2-high risk
Catalytic Effect	2-unleashing of processes
Project Description	<p>This project aims to present a renewed commitment to working with local community leaders, elders, formal and informal justice services and newly selected local governments, in collaboration with state ministries, to entrench stability and peace, enhance social service delivery, provide economic opportunities for young men and women and provide an accessible system for resolution of people dispute and determination of their rights. In effect, by improving the demand and the offer of governance, this project constitutes the first concerted programmatic effort to translate the Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA) in to practice.</p> <p>The project's strategy combines three existing joint programmes: Joint Programme for Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery, the Joint Programme for Rule of Law, and the Youth Employment for Somalia will be expanding their programming to the newly formed states of Jubaland and South West State and in four target districts in each State. This expansion will be done through an area based approach, through which the three components of this project will deliver tangible services to the population in a sequenced manner.</p>
Evaluation Findings	N/A

<p>Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)</p>	<p>The achievements are very much at activity level, however, below are some of the 'high level' challenges and lessons learnt</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delays in district council formation in new FMS without a coordinated multi state strategy – beyond the principles contained in Wadajir framework - continues to be an impediment in the implementation of capacity building initiatives. The Southwest district council formation is involved with politics and it may cause security implications if not handled with great care and proper consultation. Several activities planned by the ministry including a decentralization forum in Bardhere district were postponed. • District councils established to date have had low levels of female representation; it has been difficult to reach consensus on quotas. • More attention needs to be paid to (innovative) activities to bridge the gap between women demanding accountability and representation of women in the legislature and the executive. • Inadequate staffing at district and FMS levels is delaying capacity-building support and is directly linked to resource shortages and the lack money to pay for basic recurrent expenditure beyond Support to Stabilization (S2S) support. Limited capacities of the federal and local authorities in affected their low level of contribution to programme planning and implementation. • Lack of clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the Regional States' authorities/ministries in the implementation of activities created misunderstanding between the ministries, especially in Jubaland. • The decision of the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) to reduce its 2nd tranche by 63% created difficulty in planning and implementation of activities. The scope of work was subsequently reduced. • Availability of market-oriented skills and proper guidance as well as provision of right quantity and quality of appropriate start-up tools and funds are critical for the young people to be self-employed. • Institutionalization of the activities is crucial for sustainability, ownership and value for money. The Service Providers should not undertake any activities or set up their new facilities in an isolated way, without linking to the existing institutions and locally available resources. Active involvement of local authorities and youth/ residents, including women, in planning and implementation of activities enhances solidarity, collaborative capacity and ownership for the sustainability of activities. • At programme inception, most girls had negative attitudes towards vocational training. Women, due to cultural barriers, had limited opportunities to gain training, knowledge, and skills that could lead to economic advancement. Existing inadequate policy frameworks and inequitable gender norms have often created – and are still creating - barriers to women' economic advancement. • Vocational training courses played a key role in helping girls and women get jobs; those included the development of technical capacity thanks to the implementation of demand-oriented courses built on specific skills tailored to prospective employers' needs. • Advances in District Councils formation, especially in South West, are seen as important progress towards peace and stability through expansion of state authority and setting the initial stage for building social contract through service delivery.
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5.2.2.3 PBF-SOM D1 – Midnimo

Project Name	PBF/SOM/D-1; Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States(00103708)
Project Start date	14/12/2016
Project Duration (end date)	31/08/2019
Implementing Office	IOM, UN-HABITAT
Implementing Partners	Government: -Jubaland Refugee and IDP Agency for Jubaland State; Ministry of Planning & International Coordination for South West State
Implementing locations	Jubaland Kismayo, Garbarharey, Afmadow and Dollow and for South West State - Baidoa and Afgoye
Funding	Original budget: \$4,000,000; Final budget with other additions: US\$ 4,500,000
Target Beneficiaries	Returnees, IDPs and Host Communities. Formation of: Community action groups (CAGs) and community-based monitoring and evaluation committees (CBM&Es), Community-based local dispute resolution committee (CBDC)
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able, to respond to the various needs of the population in Southern and Central Somalia</p> <p><i>Output 1.1:</i> District and/or community level government representatives are trained and capacitated to facilitate durable solutions through participatory inclusive planning, mapping and community driven recovery.</p> <p><i>Output 1.2:</i> Local governments have tools and capacity to lead the coordination and information management of durable solutions interventions in identified areas impacted by displacement and returns (particularly in support of data and analysis derived from the planning and mapping processes).</p> <p><i>Output 1.3:</i> State level / local radio and TV programs are aired and SMS messages disseminated to enhance general public's awareness and understanding of the benefits of working together to achieve a common vision as well as those that promote public understanding about different population groups in mixed settlements.</p> <p><i>Output 1.4:</i> Regional and municipal legislative and executive bodies are supported in the development of toolkits to facilitate management of existing IDP settlements, site selection for creation of new settlements and settlement upgrading.</p> <p><i>Output 1.5:</i> Regional and municipal legislative and executive bodies are supported in the development of toolkits to facilitate management of existing IDP settlements, site selection for creation of new settlements and settlement upgrading.</p> <p><i>Output 1.6:</i> A strategic framework to devise spatial responses dealing with conflict prevention in relation to HLP issues, land use, settlement locations and selection, settlement upgrading, prevention of hazards that may impact on livelihoods is in place and used by relevant duty bearers.</p> <p><i>Output 1.7:</i> Terms of reference for land dispute resolution commissions at regional level are developed</p> <p>Outcome 2: Targeted communities in Southern and Central Somalia are able to define and drive their own recovery, durable solutions and community security.</p> <p><i>Output 2.1:</i> Community defined socio-economic groups are formed, inclusive of all members of the community and participating fully in the community driven planning processes.</p> <p><i>Output 2.2:</i> Drivers of instability and tensions as well as priority projects for conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence as well as durable solutions and recovery (e.g., basic needs and means to sustain a living) are identified through consultative and participatory visioning, planning and prioritization processes, culminating in Community Action Plans.</p> <p><i>Output 2.3:</i> Community action groups (CAGs) and community-based monitoring and evaluation committees (CBM&Es) are formed and functioning to ensure participatory planning, implementation and M&E.</p> <p><i>Output 2.4:</i> Target population and communities have improved access to basic services and means to sustain their living as well as to conflict resolution and community security, through the community driven and defined priority projects for peaceful co-existence, durable solutions and recovery.</p> <p><i>Output 2.5:</i> Selected communities in target locations are supported by technical (community) advisors in the monitoring and selection of community contracts for public works and implementation of cash for work activities.</p> <p><i>Output 2.6:</i> Community-based local dispute resolution committees are trained on land dispute mediation, upgrading and resilience to disasters and local building culture (LBC).</p> <p><i>Output 2.7:</i> Communities reinforce social cohesion and reintegration of displaced and refugee returnees through pilot projects focused on neighbourhood-led settlement upgrading, creation of new settlements (mixed use), improved connectivity and services in target clusters of IDP settlements.</p>
Contribution to PPP and PBF	Direct contribution to PBF focus area 2: Promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflicts (Priority Area 2): (2.1) National reconciliation; (2.1) Democratic Governance; (2.3) Conflict prevention/management; and outcomes 1 & 2 PPP
Risk Marker	2- High risk

Catalytic Effect	1-Financial leverage
Project Description	<p>This proposed programme aimed to enhance local leadership capacities to facilitate the sustainable return, recovery, social integration and peaceful co-existence of displacement affected, returnee, other migrant groups and host communities in Jubaland and South West State.</p> <p>The project is Government-led and community-driven to ensure a bottom up approach to drive transition and recovery processes in displacement affected communities. The Midnimo project is intended to promote stability in fragile and displacement affected areas of Somalia, as well as the attainment of durable solutions to internal displacement. (<i>description from ProDoc</i>)</p>
Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes in geographic scope of project, and increase in funding • Unlike any other project, the Midnimo concept evolved to include federal government, local authorities and federal member states directly into the project to take the lead in implementation. The project is implemented by government, host communities and displaced communities, who prioritize activities, and during the prioritization process, a sense of trust and community cohesion is promoted. • Also, flexible enough to directly respond to the new stabilization initiatives and the influx of returnees from Dadaab to Kismayo and Baidoa • Midnimo project ensured high participation of IDPs, returnees and other vulnerable groups are on a par with those of the host communities, which is encouraging for future participation of these groups, especially in relation to urban planning and land conflict resolution. • Noted as most significant impact: the successful promotion of government-led and government owned projects that ultimately helped in building trust and confidence in government structures and government's ability to support durable solutions • The project created much needed short-term employment opportunities which was said to be high priority especially IDP and returnee youth • Opportunities, community projects rehabilitated or constructed key social and economic infrastructure that benefited everyone
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working with local authorities, the project was successfully expanded from the pilot districts of Kismayo and Baidoa into five additional districts in Jubaland State (Dollow, Afmadow, Garbaharey districts); South West State (Hudur district) and Hirshabelle State (Balcad district). • The project enabled effective representation of different socioeconomic groups through inclusive planning processes as a mechanism for catalyzing social cohesion • IOM provided training to local authorities to improve coordination and information management, particularly in support of data collection and analysis derived from the planning, mapping processes and, progression of IDPs, returnees and host communities towards achieving durable solutions (24 individuals). • UN-Habitat linked the efforts to develop urban profiles as toolkits for local and state decision to unlock additional funding for projects as outlined in the CAP to other relevant development partners as such as World Bank with an upcoming road construction project in Baidoa and Kismayo, and to the Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG). • The project strengthened social cohesion through facilitation of community-wide arts, culture and recreational activities in target districts that stimulated positive social interactions and promoted common identity between IDPs, returnees and host communities across the clan divide • Establishment of Community Dispute Resolution Committees (CDRCs) by the <i>Midnimo</i> project has proven to be an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for citizens that face both a weak and inaccessible formal justice system and inadequate means of resolving local disputes, particularly those related to land and clannism. • Strategies and legislative processes: the project has made considerable progress in Baidoa and Kismayo. <u>In Baidoa, the project supported the drafting of the land law in conjunction with the government to regulate land administration, regional and town planning as well as land conflict resolution;</u> the law is yet to be approved through parliament, but stakeholders are hopeful that it will be approved. <u>In Kismayo, the trainings for government officials positively shaped the establishment of the land commission to directly address issues of conflict and displacement,</u> showing the strong commitment by the government in supporting durable solutions for displaced communities. <p>Challenges</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Logistical challenges in Hudur and Dollow as there are no regular and reliable flights. • UN Habitat internal procurement procedures are delaying the implementation of missions and sometimes activities • Delay on implementation of community-based public works due to limited staff capacity. <p>Lessons Learnt:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government, UN agencies, donors, communities and other humanitarian actors need to develop a shared, integrated and transformative vision and collectively leverage and pool resources to address IDPs', returnees' and host communities' needs and priorities highlighted in the CAPs. • Government led CBP/community consultations catalyze integration of community identified durable

	<p>solutions strategies and priorities into Federal Member State (FMS) and national peacebuilding, conflict resolution, anti-poverty and other transitional and development plans such as the recently presented FMS Stabilization Priority Plans in Somalia.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• CBP is a gender-inclusive and rights-based approach that advances IDPs and returnees participation in public affairs, at all levels, on an equal basis with the resident population. At the same time CBP meets obligations of relevant legal standards including in particular: international human rights, international humanitarian law, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.• The Midnimo <i>approach</i> contributes to government capacity building, government led and community driven efforts through existing planning and development frameworks including Somalia's National Development Plan, Peacebuilding Priority Plan, Wadajir Framework and the Durable Solutions Initiative, instills national ownership and entrenches sustainability of peacebuilding and durable solutions
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5.2.2.4 PBF/IRF 152: Kenya Somalia Cross Border Pilot

Project Name	PBF/IRF-152 - The Kenya- Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return
Project Start date	19/01/2017
Project Duration (end date)	31/12/2018
Implementing Office	Somalia: UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, IOM, ILO Kenya: UNHCR Kenya
Implementing Partners	NRC, INTERSOS, DRC, Federal Government of Somalia-National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) Somalia, Government of Kenya
Implementing locations	Baidoa (Bay region, Somalia), Dadaab (Kenya)
Funding	Original budget: \$3,000,000;
Target Beneficiaries	Host communities, returnees, and IDPs
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Prospective Somalia returnees enhanced by improved capacities for economic revitalization, peace and community reconciliation and positive participation in democratic governance</p> <p><i>Output 1.1:</i> Capacity building in peace building and conflict resolution for 3,000 voluntary returnees</p> <p><i>Output 1.2:</i> Strengthening of refugee skills and enhancing livelihoods</p> <p><i>Output 1.3:</i> Coordination mechanism for stabilization efforts are established with relevant stakeholders at national and district level (in the Performance Assessment but not in the narrative)</p> <p>Outcome 2: Somalia returnees in Baidoa peacefully co-existing with their host communities and contributing to local development</p> <p><i>Output 2.1:</i> Equitable access to social services, enhanced capacities for peace and social reconciliation for returnees in Baidoa</p> <p><i>Output 2.2:</i> Provision of basic needs and services to returnees, DPs and host communities in Baidoa</p> <p><i>Output 2.3:</i> Employment opportunities created and economic infrastructure improved</p> <p><i>Output 2.4:</i> Reduced vulnerabilities and enhanced coping capacities to shocks for both the returnees and the local community through coherent humanitarian and early recovery to development response in return/newly recovered areas.</p> <p><i>Output 2.5:</i> Management of the Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN)</p>
Risk Marker	2-high risk
Catalytic Effect	2-unleashing of process
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Direct contribution to PBF focus areas: 1- Support the implementation of peace agreements and political dialogue 2- - Promote co-existence and peaceful resolution of conflict and 3 Revitalize the economy and generate immediate peace dividends
Project Description	The pilot project builds on the Tripartite Agreement between the Government of Kenya, the Federal Government of Somalia and UNHCR of November 2013 on the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya and aims to enable a prospective group of Somali returnees in Dadaab, Kenya, to return specifically to Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia. Through the project, volunteer returnees will be supported to enable them to play a constructive and effective role in sustaining their return and reintegration, with good prospects for livelihoods and support measures to build resilience according to the principles of co-existence. The project also builds on the lessons from the recent UNHCR pilot reintegration projects and is also intended to leverage the Brussels Action Plan of October 2015. To this end, the pilot project is designed to support the Federal Government of Somalia's strategic priorities for stabilization and delivery of direct peace dividends, including commitments to reconciliation and investing in job creation.

Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Severe drought in the region resulting influx of IDPs coupled with political uncertainty over the presidential election of South West State and undue gov interference caused considerable delays • Lack of proper planning at inception made partners (NRC, DRC) on the Dadaab side feel rushed. Furthermore, no proper founded strategy why the relocation to Baidoa • Strong demand for vol rep made this intervention highly relevant • PBF funding very flexible and was repurposed to serve the large number of IDPs due to drought instead in Baidoa rather than the project activities • Majority (91.5%) of the peace-ambassador trained returnees note training on peace building and conflict resolutions has not helped them participate in democratic governance and reconciliation as they do not have any role in the government or security issues at present • Potential returnees in Dadaab reported that there was little follow up on the VST trainees who voluntarily returned to Baidoa, as some came back to Dadaab citing lack of connection with the partner UN organizations that were supposed to receive them for reintegration process. • Rehabilitation and construction of physical infrastructure was viewed as main sustainability component • No proper community engagement in design led to poorly targeted intervention (FAO, “foreign” seed distribution to returnees with no land). Other challenges included low absorption capacity in Baidoa as well as low interest to move to Baidoa. • The Startup kits were not individual but for groups which made it difficult as decision needed to be made in a group rather than individual
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)	Lessons learnt: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better coordination with the government and INGO, NGOs and partners are needed for effective intervention • Better consultation with the community so as not to miss the mark (returnee needs somewhat different than what was provided) • Strengthening existing infrastructure is ideal (UNHCR’s school rehab)

5.2.2.5 PBF/IRF-141: National Window

Project Name	PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations
Project Start date	20/05/2016-
Project Duration (end date)	30/06/2017
Implementing Office	UNDP, Ministry of Finance, FGS
Implementing Partners	Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance, World Bank, UNOPS, UNDP
Implementing locations	Somalia
Funding	Total: \$2,062,083
Direct Beneficiaries	Ministry of Finance Project Implementation Unit (PIU) team, line ministries, communities, IRA
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Somali citizens in the target locations perceive their federal member states and the Federal Government of Somalia as being more legitimate thanks to the improvement on infrastructures in their communities</p> <p>Output 1.1 The Project Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Finance successfully managed the rehabilitation / construction of four (4) small scale infrastructure s in three Federal Member State and Banadir region</p> <p>Output 1.2 The Project Implementation on Unit developed a successful communication campaign to promote the work of the FGS/IRAs in rehabilitating infrastructures</p> <p>Output 1.3 PIU and IRA civil servants use participatory monitoring tool to measure the satisfaction of citizens with the rehabilitated infrastructure</p> <p>Outcome 2: National systems strengthened with the Ministry of Finance's PIU established as a sound project management model able to deliver tangible deliverables thereby improving its credibility with the donors</p> <p>Output 2.1 The PIU's project cycle management and financial management systems are strengthened through tailored trainings and on the job coaching</p>
Contribution to PBF (any PBF indicators included?)	Contributing to PBF Focus Area 4.2-Extention of state local authority administration
Risk Marker	2-high risk
Catalytic Effect	3-unleashing of processes and financial leverage
Project Description	The project enables the Federal Government of Somalia to independently deliver services to its citizens by developing its capacity to conduct community consultations, design, manage, and implement small scale infrastructure projects. The core objective of this project is to test the use of national systems to channel funds in order to build the capacity of FGS to effectively manage funds and pave the way for other donors to use the system.
Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project is in full alignment with the Somalia Compact/ NPS, SDRF and the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. the project uses the government systems and procedures and as such is fully in line with the principles of the New Deal for Engagement in the Fragile States The indicators may not have been the most appropriate to capture change This pilot project has been effective in testing a new model to operating through the gov. This pilot has encouraged other donors to use the government systems Sustainability a challenge as the govt struggles with capacity and to pay salaries. Ownership of the infrastructure for funds transfers etc was to sit with the govt. National window enabled better coordination with other projects, that improved not only the efficiency but also reduced the possibility of duplication of efforts. The National Window Guidelines should clarify the roles of FGS level vis-à-vis FMS as needed so that roles and expectation are clear, and capacity/ testing of the systems is extended to the member states.
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)	<p>Achievement:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The pilot project and use of the government system has proved to be success to some level, despite the slow delivery. Project oversight committee established during community consultations in identification of priorities have voluntarily participated in the design of works for phase II sub-projects. This is seen to promote ownership. Volunteer committee is composed from different groups of the community <p>Challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prolonged elections delayed the implementation of the project

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There are some limitations in measuring public perception due to safety concerns• Irregular flight schedule to project locations especially Garbaharey and Hudur districts of Jubbaland and• Southwest states respectively have also contributed to the delays in project implementations.
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5.2.2.6 PBF/SOM-A2: National Reconciliation Conferences Support

Project Name	PBF/IRF-122 –Support to Somalia Local Reconciliation Processes
Project Start date	15/09/2015
Project Duration (end date)	30/04/2017
Implementing Office	UNDP
Implementing Partners	UNSOM, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, Regional Admin of Jubbaland State, Interim South West Admin, Galmudug Interim Admin, Banadir, Regional Admin of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle
Implementing locations	Galkayo (Galmudug and Puntland states), Dhusamareeb and Adaado (Galmudug), State of Hirshabelle, Marka, Jowhar
Funding	\$ 2,232,061
Target Beneficiaries	
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Outcome 1: Support the FGS with facilitating reconciliation towards state formation / The political dialogue and consultations around federalism and state formation have been supported <i>Output 1.1:</i> Support the FGS in organizing and facilitating reconciliation conferences, political dialogue and consultations towards state formation /federalism.</p> <p>Outcome 2: Increased understanding of the federalisation, legal framework and boundaries processes amongst stakeholders, citizens and civil society / Civic participation and engagement with interim state administrations is strengthened <i>Output 2.1:</i> Consultations, roundtables, meetings and workshops related to boundaries and federalization</p> <p>Outcome 3: Newly emerging/interim administration have basic organizational structures in place / The capacity of interim state administrations with a dedicated focus on ‘core public sector capacities’ is enhanced <i>Output 3.1:</i> Capacity building of IRAs/emerging state entities.</p> <p><i>(This is the original logframe based on ProDoc)</i></p>
Contribution to PPP and/or PBF	Contribution to PBF Focus Area 2.1- National Reconciliation
Risk Marker	2-high risk
Catalytic Effect	2-unleashing of processes
Project Description	<p>The project intends to provide primarily immediate and short-term assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its endeavour to form interim regional administrations (IRAs), as precursors to full-fledged federal member states (FMS), through inclusive processes and consistent with the Provisional Constitution. As such, UNSOM (through UNDP) will support the Federal Government of Somalia (and emerging Interim Regional Administrations) in convening 10 local reconciliation conferences and 3 minority rights conferences to consider key issues for the process. These reconciliation conferences will assist in ensuring that the state formation process is inclusive and considers views of all, including clans, minorities, women and youth in order to facilitate the formation of viable interim regional administrations in Somalia that will in the future likely evolve into federal member states.</p> <p><i>(Description from ProDoc & NCE)</i></p>
Evaluation Findings	N/A
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)	<p>Challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of certainty around state formation and the political landscape of Somalia • Hiraan and Middle Shabelle state formation process was launched in January 2016 but immediately stalled due to the unresolved issue of inclusivity. • The volatile political situation also affects emerging states that have already been formed. In Jubbaland, delays in reconciliation efforts meant that the process to establish a new Cabinet was held up. • Due to the extended Somalia’s Presidential election period, reconciliation and related support/activities to the interim administration was considerably slowed down. Presidential election was supposed to be concluded in the month of October 2016, but it only concluded in the month of February 2017. <p><i>(Challenges from NCE)</i></p>

5.2.2.7 PBF-IRF-120: Risk Management Unit

Project Name	PBF/IRF-120- Risk Management Support for the UNMPTF and SDRF Somalia
Project Start date	17/08/2015
Project Duration (end date)	28/02/2018
Implementing Office	UNDP
Implementing Partners	World Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning
Implementing locations	Mogadishu (Federal), Puntland, Baidoa, Kismayo, Geddo, newly emerging states and recovered areas
Funding	\$586,974
Direct Beneficiaries	Government officials at all levels (<i>assumed from project description</i>)
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: The implementation of the Compact, and the political transition, is facilitated by effective funding instruments</p> <p>Output 1.1 Somalia Risk Management Strategy Implemented</p> <p>Output 1.2 Technical Assistance provided</p> <p>Output 1.3 Do no harm approach implemented in UN MPTF projects</p> <p>Outcome 2: Sound project management implemented</p> <p>Output 2.1 RMU Management</p> <p>Output 2.2 Equipment/ supplies provided to enable project operation</p> <p>Output 2.3 Travel</p> <p>Output 2.4 M&E and Oversight</p> <p>Overall Project Progress: On Track</p>
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Contribution to PBF Focus Area 4.3. Governance of Peacebuilding resources (Including JSC/PBF Secretariat)
Risk Marker	2-high risk
Catalytic Effect	3- unleashing of process and financial leverage
Project Description	The Project provides technical capacity to the government at all levels and various stakeholders how to implement the Risk Management strategy developed for the SDF Trust Fund. This will enable the government, UN and all stakeholders to successfully implement the National Development Plan. It will also serve to increase the capacity of government and relevant stakeholders how to implement Risk Management strategies in the long-term planning and programming and increase the safeguards of the government funds and foreign aid that comes in the country. The project will contribute to maximizing the impact of the Funds on the Somalia National Development Plan priorities: Inclusive politics, Security & Rule of Law, Effective and Efficient Institutions, Economic Growth, Infrastructure, Social Development, Resilience and Human Rights through promoting fiduciary accountability, conflict sensitivity and informed decision making for portfolio management and capacity development. The project will also contribute to the establishment of the National Window of the MPTF funds as a window to building sovereignty and trust in Somalia's country systems, strengthening the relationship of the FGS with Federal Member States (FMS) by engaging actively in prioritization, assessments, capacity development and delivering projects of a peacebuilding nature - such as justice infrastructure facilities (court house), service delivery facilities (administration offices) and installation of street lights in different location, creating employment opportunities for young people and provide alternatives to criminal activities and recruitment by armed groups (Description from ProDoc and Annual report 2017)
Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The project and the JRMS collaborative approach underpin the effectiveness of the project. Joint reviews, analysis and share of risk related information have contributed to shifting the focus of risk management from fiduciary/compliance and risk avoidance towards broader programme quality assurance and mitigation. Strong interest by the donors at inception but declined as progress went along. The government had limited capacities to be an active member/implement which affected the impact The project used an integrated approach to technical capacity where issues related to risks are included as part of other training programmes, which seems to be a more efficient approach. The project delivered good results and was highly relevant for Somalia and with great potential. High staff turnover affected some of the impact. The sustainability of the JRMS achievements depends on finding ways to bring collaboration on the risk management to the partners' top priorities and producing in depth risk analysis

<p>Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report, eval etc)</p>	<p>Lessons Learnt</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sustained risk management to joint programmes and cross UN • Agencies has enabled collective response to contextual, strategic and operational risks and increased donor confidence in UN in Somalia ad renewed donor support • PBSO support to both MPTF risk management and National Window pilot project has enabled the synergy between the MPTF risk management and capacity development of government institutions as MPTF fund recipients and implementers under the national window.\ • The use of National Window supported by a strong and sustained risk management focus is an essential element of the UN support to the extension of Federal and State Authority and accountability as it enables programmes to take measured risks to expand their delivery beyond Member State capitals. • Risk Management and Use of Country systems are two areas that have contributed to collaboration with the WB in complex operations
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5.2.2.8 PBF/IRF-121: Joint Rule of Law

Project Name	PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support
Project Start date	31/08/2015
Project Duration (end date)	31/08/2016
Implementing Office	UNDP, UNOPS, UNODC, UNICEF
Implementing Partners	Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court
Implementing locations	Federal Somalia and IRAs, Puntland and Somaliland
Funding	Original budget: \$2,143,821
Direct Beneficiaries	Institutions at FGS and FMS level (e.g. The Judicial Training Center), Attorney General Offices, lawyers, traditional justice actors, Police Force, and people with no access to legal services.
Outcomes	<p>OUTCOME 1⁹⁰: Establish independent and accountable justice institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people of Somalia by delivering justice for all.</p> <p>Outcome 1(Sub-Outcome 1.1) Key Justice Sector Institutions and departments that are capable of taking on their responsibilities have been established at the Federal and Puntland by the end of the project</p> <p>Outcome 2(Sub-Outcome 1.2). Enhanced capacity of the justice system stakeholders to operate effectively, through further professionalization of laws, policies and procedures, improved facilities and enhanced knowledge management</p> <p>Outcome 3(Sub-Outcome 1.3). Increased capacity of the corrections system to safeguard the rights of detainees and operate effectively and in accordance with national and international standards through targeted activities to enhance facilities, rehabilitation possibilities, management systems and staff training</p> <p>Outcome 4(Sub-Outcome 1.5). Overall functioning of the Justice Sector enhanced through increased access to justice, improved legal education and awareness as well as the establishment of a functioning youth justice system</p> <p>Overall Project Progress: On Track</p>
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Direct contribution to PBF Focus area 2.1- National Reconciliation
Risk Marker	1-Medium risk (<i>as per Somalia Dashboard</i>)
Catalytic Effect	2 -unleashing of process (<i>as per Somalia Dashboard</i>)
Project Description	The Somalia Joint Rule of Law Program aims to enhance the capacity of the Somalia Rule of Law system through targeted support for the justice and correction institutions to ensure that areas components to cater to the needs of all, especially the most vulnerable groups. This include enhancing the capacity of the justice system stakeholders and institutions to effectively deliver on their mandate, increase the capacity of the correction system to uphold the rights of the detainees, and improve access to justice and legal education especially among at risk you and vulnerable groups (description as per ProDoc).Specifically program has focused on providing, technical, advisory and operational support to the Somali Police Force (SPF) and also to the emerging State police services, corrections, Judiciary, the Attorney General's Office and Ministry of Justice with the aim of helping them to deliver on their mandates and provide fair and equitable justice services. Scholarship and internship programmes are important components of the JROLP and contribute to improving the legal profession, and other programmes such as SGBV units, accountability and alternative and traditional justice projects have been initiated (JROLP evaluation)

⁹⁰ The outcomes and outputs listed here are based on ProDoc. Different (additional) outcomes are listed in the annual report

Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JROLP has been too broad and over-ambitious, without capturing the essence of what it wanted to achieve. • Program has an over-emphasis on capacity building the criminal justice system, at the expense of strengthening the civil law legal system. Need to invest more in the judiciary and the Attorney Generals Offices. • Donors are choosing increasingly to work bi-laterally with UN entities due to the expensive additional costs of the MPTF and administration that is involved. JROLP needs to demonstrate and reiterate the viability and relevance of the in-country MPTF programme structure to donors and national stakeholders, as well as work on a cohesive aid delivery platform • Lack of clarity about 'jointness' and meaning of 'RoL,' modalities to use and poor coordination among PUNOs which resulted in duplication of activities • Short, medium and long-term planning for sustainability, as well as exit strategies appear to be largely absent • There is a lack of clarity (e.g. a Road Map) setting out an agreed basis for how the informal and formal justice systems will develop and what the interface between the two will look like • Programmes are highly relevant and have a broad reach, having contributed to development of future justice stakeholders and entities • Unrealistic expectations on the Programme are sometimes due to circumstances outside its control; better Somali coordination is needed and more fluent and consistent funding from donors. • UNODC should either scale down its scope and ambitions in Somalia, or significantly increase its presence, with concerted efforts to correct reputational issues
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report, eval etc)	<p>Achievements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In Puntland, the Juvenile Justice Bill drafted by the Ministry of Justice, including through orientation workshop for Puntland parliamentarians; • Developed technical capacity for MoJ to monitor and supervise prison guards in Bossaso and Gardo prisons, and regular assessments of the overall conditions in these prisons. • In Somaliland, Juvenile Justice Law Amendment drafted; • Established number of children and their conditions in detention through monitoring visits to prisons and jails in Berbera, Borama, Mandheera, and Buraq; • Completed an assessment on the Women and Children Desks in police stations in Hargeisa and identified areas for improvement. • Peacebuilding impact: UNODC has used PBF funding to procure vehicles for the Custodial Corps in Mogadishu. The vehicles will be used for prisoner transport between the prisons and courts <p>Challenges:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delays in establishing fund transfer mechanisms • Low capacity of national government institutions, issues with currency exchange etc

5.2.2.9 PBF/IRF – 116: Support to Stabilization

Project Name	PBF/IRF-116- Support to Stabilization
Project Start date	13/05/2015
Project Duration (end date)	31/12/2017
Implementing Office	UNDP Somalia
Implementing Partners	Federal Member States and CSOs: Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Interior and Federalism; and State Governments; District Governments; Interim District Administrations; and Civil Society Organizations
Implementing locations	Somalia (Jubbaland State, South West State, Galmudug State, HirShabelle State)
Funding	Final budget with additions: US\$ 4,396,478⁹¹
Target Beneficiaries	14 out of 26 districts identified by MOIFA
Direct Beneficiaries	District Peace and Stability Committee (DPSC), IRA, LGA, local communities, FGS
Outcomes	<p>Outcome 1: Federal, State, and District level administrations have the capacity to oversee, coordinate and implement stabilization activities <i>Output 1.1:</i> A coordinated, and functional stabilization team is in place at Federal and district levels. <i>Output 1.2:</i> Financial procedures for the flow of funds between the various levels of governments are implemented and allow for financial support to district administrations. <i>Output 1.3:</i> Coordination mechanism for stabilization efforts are established with relevant stakeholders at national and district level (in the Performance Assessment but not in the narrative)</p> <p>Outcome 2: An enabling environment conducive to social cohesion, trust, civic participation and development led by the community is established in accessible districts. <i>Output 2.1:</i> Community Representative District Peace and Stability Committees (DPSCs) are established and strengthened <i>Output 2.2:</i> Civic dialogue and consultations are held to ensure community participation in the formation of new district governing structures. <i>Output 2.3:</i> Interim district administration capable of addressing the community needs and enhancing citizen engagement through social contract and reconciliation for all are established.</p> <p>Outcome 3: Project effectively managed (in the Performance Assessment but not in the narrative) Overall Project Progress: On Track</p>
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Direct contribution: PBF Focus Area 4.2-Public service delivery PBF Indirectly contributing to Outcome 1 in PBF PPP;
Risk Marker	2 = high risk (scored based on the review of Annual report 01/19)
Catalytic Effect	2 = unleashing of process (scored based on the review of Annual report 01/19)
Project Description	The project supports stabilization efforts, in line with the Government Stabilization Strategy and the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance and its four components (social reconciliation, peace dividends, civic engagement and local governance/district government formation) in the newly recovered areas of Somalia through capacity building and direct support to local administrations. It works to establish local district governance structures in areas of South-Central Somalia (14 out of 26 districts identified by MOIFA) and establish/strengthen community-representative bodies. The project also offers direct running cost support to the districts channeled through the National Window (<i>Description from ProDoc</i>)

⁹¹ As per ProDoc

Evaluation Findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project was overall on track in all its outputs and outcomes and achieved its overall objectives as stated in the logframe • The impact indicators & activities did not clearly demonstrate how the FGS and district level administrations would ensure the ongoing stabilization programming in terms of the proposed effects. The design didn't take into account all the institutional weaknesses. The project thus wasn't carried out uniformly in all priority locations. • Project adopted different specific objectives during its expansion phases. Design saw a change in focus over time from solely capacity building to later direct service provision to the district. • Direct implementation of activities, in the absence of another layer of governance, has enabled stabilization programming to respond more effectively to needs of affected communities across wide range of regions under government priority. • The project shifted focus from thematic meetings to geographical meeting with complaints for not having the right balance • Social reconciliation initiatives, known as low-cost/high-impact, at district levels, through CLOs were a success • S2S activities highly relevant as many actors (IOM etc) depend on these preliminary activities for their interventions • S2S were instrumental in the development of mobile courts in Jubaland and South West State. • The S2S project has, to a large part, compiled a database containing detailed information for all districts, which can be used as a reference in future stakeholder activities.
Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historic milestone: The FGS executed its first Inter-governmental Fiscal Transfer (IGFT) using bank-to-bank from the FGS to 13 districts at Federal Member States' ministries of interior. • Provision of district running cost (e.g. used for air radio early-warning messages against possible Al Shabaab attacks in communities) • Security and Access was a key constraint especially with the withdrawal of AMISOM. Repeated from all districts was the claim that participants in UN/NGO activities received threats from Al Shabaab members. • Networking with other organisations and/or community leaders was an effective strategy to facilitate the entry of the project into communities. Greater coordination with other actors doing similar work is recommended

5.2.2.10 PBF/IRF-119: Strengthening Women’s Role in Peacebuilding

Project Name	PBF/IRF-119- Strengthening women’s role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia
Project Start date	13/07/2015
Project Duration (end date)	31/12/2016
Implementing Office	UNDP, UNSOM, UN Women
Implementing Partners	Government: Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWRHD - Federal) Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs (MoWDAFA - Puntland) CSOs: Somali Women Leadership Initiative (SWLI), others to be determined through competitive bidding. Research institution: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
Implementing locations	Mogadishu (Federal), Puntland, Baidoa, Kismayo, Geddo, newly emerging states and recovered areas
Funding	Original budget: \$1,00,000
Direct Beneficiaries	Gender Advocates groups, Women Led and Gender Focuses CSOs, Women-current and aspiring political leaders
Outcomes	Outcome 1: Enhanced roles and participation by women in political and public policy making processes to sustain and consolidate peace <i>Output 1.1</i> Capacity of Gender advocates to promote women’s participation in peacebuilding and state building processes is enhanced <i>Output 1.2</i> Key policy making institutions adopt policies, legal and administrative frameworks to enable women’s participation in political and peacebuilding processes <i>Output 1.3</i> Representation of women as candidates for political offices as well as appointees to key government bodies to peacebuilding and decision-making is increased Outcome 2: Enhanced capacity of MoWHRD and women CSOs, in particular their leadership role, policy making competence, advocacy and negotiation skills so as to inform and influence the PSG processes <i>Output 2.1</i> MoWHRD effectively coordinates with CSOs on advocacy for gender-responsive policy development. <i>Output 2.2</i> CSO capacities built to promote community engagement in peacebuilding and state formation processes <i>Output 2.3</i> National policies, legislation and strategies to advance women’s participation in politics, state building and peacebuilding processes are informed by timely, relevant and consistent data and analysis Outcome 3: Compact commitments to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment realized <i>Output 3.1</i> Representation and contribution of MoWHRD, regional gender machineries and women-led/gender-focused CSOs to the Somali Compact implementation structures is increased and clear Gender results integrated into the PSGs <i>Output 3.2</i> PSG priorities for the elections, Constitutional review and state formation integrate and respond to specific concerns for women and girls. Overall Project Progress: On Track
Contribution to PPP or PBF	Direct contribution to PBF Focus area (2.2) Democratic Governance; women’s improved participation and voice in the reconciliation processes and emerging democratic institutions;
Risk Marker	1-Medium risk (<i>as per Somalia Dashboard</i>)
Catalytic Effect	2 -unleashing of process (<i>as per Somalia Dashboard</i>)
Project Description	The project aims at strengthening women’s role and agency for the advancement of their political empowerment and directly supports the gender equality commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia in the framework of the Somali New Deal Compact. Such results will be achieved by strengthening national gender machineries and providing support to Somali women civil society leaders to advocate for integration of gender concerns and representation of women in the emerging political, peacebuilding and state building processes and structures of the FGS (<i>description as per ProDoc</i>)

<p>Evaluation Findings</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Project had a moderate performance in terms of expected results, with different levels depending on the Outcome. A general consideration is that the focus of the action was placed more generally on participation of women in politics arena, and not so much in the specific thematic of peacebuilding and state building • Proposed intervention in political representation and participation are very high level and hard to achieve in such a small (and short) project. Design seems cohesive with the context; M&E not systematic; • Overall project needed to define better its contribution (e.g. capacity building or advocacy re the New Deal gender inclusion etc) and its direct impact. The successes were produced because of joint efforts with other initiatives working towards the same purpose • Much of the changes have been operated top to bottom. There have been progresses at a higher level, but those changes must be accompanied and sustained by the society. • The internal structures of coordination and joint articulation did not work and in practice. Constituted more a separation of financial resources and programmatic roles. Weak collaboration with the UN structure of the joint programme and the partners • The Project did not consider a sustainability (social, financial, or operational) strategy. However, some activities in the programming and practices in the implementation conducted to that direction
<p>Key Challenges, Milestones and/or Lessons learnt (annual report, eval etc)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Milestones: • 24% women representation in parliament (higher than the African average for women's parliamentary representation; hope for inclusive politics • The progress in the Policy and Legal reform has reached important milestones: GBV Policy, Gender Policy, FGM Policy, SOB, Constitutional review, CEDAW ratification • The project played a catalytic role in securing a grant from Dfid for \$5.6million to build on the PBF project achievements and focusing on women's enhanced political leadership and empowerment. • A focused and coordinated action between all the different social, institutional and international cooperation agents is an effective and efficient approach in a complex context, with many factors against it and with limited resources. It was demonstrated with the lobby for the 30% of seats for women in Parliament. A focused intervention, in the frame of a wider strategy, is a proper strategy to produce small changes inside a bigger agenda.

5.3 Annex 3: PPP and Individual Project Results Frameworks and Summaries

5.3.1 Individual Project Logframe Output and Outcome Indicators

Table 3.1 - First Phase Project Outcome Indicators by Priority Area⁹²

PBF Priority Area 1. Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements and Political Dialogue			
Indicator	Baseline	Targets	Endline
PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support			
# of gender-responsive police related institutions or internal units established with UN support	n/a	1	2
# of cases fully adjudicated in the mobile courts (disaggregated by criminal (rape and SGBV and other) and civil cases (e.g. women's socio-economic rights and other), and dismissals and convictions, and district) (and sex) / age)	n/a	50	574
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	n/a	2	1
PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution			
Indicator	Baseline	Targets	Endline
PBF/IRF-119 Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia			
% of women in the emerging political, peace building and state building structures, institutions and in decision making	14%	25%	25%
Number of advocacy initiatives led by MoWHRD in coordination with regional gender machineries and CSOs on enhancing women's representation in peace building processes	0	5	5
No of newly adopted policies and laws with gender equality and WPS provisions enshrined in them.	0	3	2
PBF/IRF-122 Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences			
# of federal states with agreed upon charters and approved constitutions	n/a	3	4
% of citizens with improved perceptions on federalism (disaggregated by sex)	n/a	n/a	81%
# of approved draft policy/strategy on federalism and boundary demarcation	n/a	1	3
# of CSOs and # of citizens participating in state planning processes	n/a	10	113

⁹² Data for endline is abstracted from evaluation report or latest annual report for Project in question.

Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure			
Indicator	Baseline	Targets	Endline
PBF/IRF-116 Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)			
Value in (\$) of resources expended by district administration	\$10,000 per district	10 districts expended \$ 28,000.00	\$150,500 total for 12 districts
# of coordination meetings between DPSCs and peace dividend providers	1 per district	3	16
# of reconciliation initiatives undertaken per target district	14	3	6
The existence of ToR defining the role of State authorities in government stabilization efforts	0	1	1
PBF/IRF-120 Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)			
Number of trainings on risk management (related to trust fund strategy)	5	11	15
Percentage of projects implemented through Trust Fund that proactively manage risks of gender equality and women's empowerment	75%	100%	100%
Percentage of projects implemented through Trust Fund that systematically monitor stakeholder vulnerability/concerns	75%	100%	100%
Percentage of projects applying comprehensive risk management	70%	100%	100%

Table 3.2: Second Phase Project Outcome Indicators by PPP Outcome⁹³

Outcome 1: Government Structures and Institutions			
Indicator	Baseline	Targets	Endline
PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations (National Window)			
The Project Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Finance successfully managed the rehabilitation /construction of 4 small infrastructures in three Member region	3	5	5
% of people (men and women) expressing trust in target Federal Member States	43%	80%	67%
USD disbursed through national window	0	FGS: USD 1,902,500.00 UNDP: USD 159,583 (Funds received; USD 139,408)	FGS: USD 1,815,393.36 UNDP: 139,408

⁹³ Data for endline is abstracted from evaluation report or latest annual report for Project in question.

PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia			
SDRF SC members are satisfied with the contribution of the PPP to the peace and state building goals 3, 4, and 5	n/a	75%	100%
Recipient UN/FGS implementing partners are satisfied with the level of technical support received by the PPP secretariat	n/a	75%	100%
Projects funded by the PPP support women's and girls' empowerment	n/a	at least 15% of funding is clearly budgeted to support women's and girls' empowerment	100%
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia			
# of decentralization or local governance related legislation/ sector specific policies, including fiscal decentralization developed (or drafted) and gender sensitive	0	4	4
# of districts that have systems in place to increase revenue generation (such as property taxes, business licensing and so forth)	0	8	0
Number of cases fully adjudicated by the mobile courts (disaggregated by criminal (rape and SGBV and other) and civil cases (e.g. women's socio-economic rights and other), and dismissals and convictions, and district) (and sex) / age)	1,231 cases adjudicated in 2016	increase in adjudication by 25%	345 cases
Outcome 2: Community Based Development			
Indicator	Baseline	Targets	Endline
PBF/SOM/D-1: Midnimo (Unity) -Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States			
Number of district level government authorities coordinating through regular meetings with the community leadership, leading the implementation schedule and interacting with the community leadership to facilitate the participatory planning and recovery processes	n/a	24	28
Number of individuals participating in community based planning process disaggregated by gender and socio-economic status	n/a	1200	1277
Percentage of returnees, IDPs and host community members who express improvement in their perceptions of their physical safety and security	n/a	50%	n/a
PBF/IRF-152: The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return			
# of returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions and are participating in democratic governance and reconciliation processes	0	750	626

# of youth aged 15-24 enrolled in certified livelihoods training	0	750	803
# of persons of concern (18-59) with own business/self-employed for more than 12 months	0	750	803
# of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and co-existing well with host communities	0	1500	1402
PBF/SOM/D-2: Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia			
Number of youth (% women) employed – self-or wage-employed in Baidoa and Kismayo		0	94 youth (38 women) got longer-term jobs
Number of public infrastructures rehabilitated in Baidoa and Kismayo		2	2
Number of youth (% women) got short-term jobs in rehabilitation works in Baidoa and Kismayo		0	118 youth

5.3.2 PPP Results Framework

The outcome level PPP indicators, elaborated in 2016, are based on the integrated theory of change (Annex 7.3.2) highlighting the establishment of strong citizen-state links, community resilience, responsive state institutions, and strengthening trust in political transitions. From this TOC, the PPP described six PPP level outcome indicators linked to the two PPP outcomes in addition to the standard Outcome 3 regarding PPP coordination and management (Table A3.1). These PPP Outcome level indicators were not measured for the PPP, and even if they had been, the indicators have limited ability to capture the entire range of the portfolio since the first phase projects are targeting other geographic regions and outcomes different from the PPP indicators. Even though there are no measurements at the PPP level of these indicators, some of the concepts involved behind the indicators (trust in Government, responsiveness of Government, provision of basic services, or economic empowerment) are referenced in the qualitative interviews by respondents and are measured in some of the individual project logframes.


Table A3.1: PPP Results Framework Indicators⁹⁴

Outcomes	Indicators
Outcome 1: Government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able to listen and respond to the various needs of populations in of South and Central Somalia	1.1 % of respondents naming police (or local authority) as most trusted security provider
	1.2 % of respondents <i>aware</i> of services provided by local administrations
	1.3 % of people/communities who think government (federal, regional, local) is responsive to their needs
Outcome 2: Communities in South and Central Somalia generate the demand for, and benefit from, local governance, security, justice, social and economic solutions	2.1 % of respondents who had <i>participated</i> in consultations with local administration in last 12 months
	2.2 Increase in access to employment opportunities, and social services, based on local plans/designs
	2.3 %of communities that feel that their priorities are reflected in the design and management of FGS/UN programmes (including through PRF funding)
Outcome 3: Effective coordination, monitoring, reporting, evaluation and	3.1 JSC Annual Report submitted within 7 days of the deadline

⁹⁴ From the PPP Results Framework

communication on the achievement of the Priority Plan results and the projects that support it. (<i>Standard Outcome included in all PBF projects aligned to the PPP</i>)	3.2 Quality of JSC Annual Reports rated “acceptable” by PBSO review team
	3.3 PPP projects fully meet selection criteria, including value-for-money criteria
	3.4 Key partners (e.g. RUNOs as well as non-UN stakeholders) satisfied with level and timeliness of PBO communication and coordination

5.3.3 PPP Theory of Change



5.3.4 PBF Priority Area 1: Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements

PBF Priority Area 1: Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements and Political Dialogue⁹⁵

PBF/IRF-121 Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support

The Somalia Joint Rule of Law Program aims to enhance the capacity of the Somalia Rule of Law system through targeted support for the justice and correction institutions to ensure that areas components to cater to the needs of all, especially the most vulnerable groups. This include enhancing the capacity of the justice system stakeholders and institutions to effectively deliver on their mandate, increase the capacity of the correction system to uphold the rights of the detainees, and improve access to justice and legal education especially among at risk you and vulnerable groups.

Implementing Office: UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNODC

Implementing Partners: Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, Federal Somalia and IRAs, Puntland and Somaliland

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
# of gender-responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	2 – JSC and Training Institute	Delayed
# of participants completed exchange or twining programmed (disaggregated by sex, districts and institution)	N/A	Members of JSC	Delayed
# of institutions or internal units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	1- JSC	Delayed
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	3. Strategies: a) code of ethic, b) Anti-corruption, c) Training Institute 2 Judicial Inspection schemes (FL and PL)	Antifraud and whistleblower Policies developed to support the anticorruption. Training Policies developed to support functioning of the Judiciary
# of gender-responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	2 (network of female lawyers; Bar Association)	Delayed
# of participants in justice sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of profession)	N/A	150 lawyers	FL: 20 (F: 5, M:15) PL:38 (P-2 trained on Mobile Courts)
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	Bar Association	Delayed
# of regional or national laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards	N/A	1 Policy framework to regulate the mandate of the bar association	Delayed

⁹⁵ Data from the latest report (quarterly, annual or end of project report) as available

developed or revised in support of the justice sector (disaggregated by: institution and type)			
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	500 Role of Bar; and legal rights	Pl - (M: 65, F: 85)
# of gender-responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	4 - PLDU, JISU Traditional Dispute Resolution Unit MOJ Resource Center	1 - Legal Aid Unit established under MOJ. FL MOJ and PL MOJRAR initiated steps to set up Gender Units.
# of participants in justice sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of profession)	N/A	PLDU – 12 (legal drafts) b) Traditional justice – 50 c) MOG, ISWA, IJA – 50 d) Bossaso & Garowe – 50 e) MoJ – 10 (human resources; performance appraisals; procurement; asset managing f) MOJ – 23 (legal processes and policy formulation	a) 20 (M:15, F:5) b) Delayed c) Delayed d) 30 trained in PL (M:21, F: 9), 10 participants from Gardo, Bossaso, Dahar, e) 10 in PL (F:2; M: 8) (MOJRAR, Supreme Court, AGO, PSU and legal aid providers) f) Delayed
# of regional or national laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of the justice sector (disaggregated by institution and type)	N/A	3 Policies (GBV and High risk case load; Traditional justice Policy; Harmonizing of Somali formal and informal legal codes)	2 Policies: (Traditional justice resolution; and Women's Access to Justice Policy)
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, manuals or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	8 strategies SOPs: -Justice plan - Referral guidelines for traditional justice actors - Human resources, - Performance appraisal - Training manual on legislative drafting, -3 management guidelines	0 strategy documents SOP/guidelines.
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	300 traditional justice actors	PL: 350 (M:265, F:85) (Initiated legal awareness strategy
# of tender opened for the construction or refurbishment of justice sector structures (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	2-courts	Delayed due to insufficient funding for construction
# of Justice sector structure built (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	1 Mogadishu Court and Prison complex	Construction ongoing

# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	3 Institutions (MoJ transport; AGO (IJA/ISWA: Basic equipment and transport; Judiciary: Mobile Court)	3 vehicles provided: (AGO Mogadishu – 1 Federal courts – 1 Puntland courts – 1)
# of participants in justice sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of profession)	N/A	300 judges, prosecutors, lawyers	70 Judges and Prosecutors (M: 46, F: 24) trained (Sharia and customary law; legal rights; women and child rights; formal and informal justice systems.
# of cases fully adjudicated in the mobile courts (disaggregated by criminal (rape and SGBV and other) and civil cases (e.g. women’s socio-economic rights and other), and dismissals and convictions, and district) (and sex) / age)	N/A	1,500 cases	413 cases adjudicated in PL: (158 criminal, 255 civil; 158 women assisted)
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	2 Guidelines (mobile courts) 3 Laws (criminal)	1 Operational Guide (Federal Mobile Courts)
# of districts in which court case management systems.	N/A	5 Districts	2 Districts in Puntland
# of regional or national laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of the justice sector (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	15 Policies (GBV; Traditional justice; Harmonizing of Somali formal and informal legal codes; Legal Aid Policy;	Draft legal Aid Policy and PL draft Legal education policy
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	2 strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct: (MOJ operational plan; Protocol between Executive and Parliament on policy to develop laws)	Operational guide for mobile courts developed; 1 strategy, SOPs, Code of Conduct developed.
# of participants in justice sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of profession)	N/A	20 trainings	Delayed
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	500	Delayed
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	3 Strategies (organizational plan, structures, procedures)	Office Plan for Puntland completed
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector	N/A	4 Strategies/ SOPs 2 policies	Delayed

institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)			
# of participants in justice sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of profession)	N/A	288; Judges – 50; Prosecutors – 50 Legal Aid – 100; AGO – 18 Other-70 Benadir, Garowe, Bossaso, Baidoa, Gedo)	Judges and Prosecutors – 40 (M: 25, F:15) {PL only - Sharia and Customary Law}
# of individuals that have received legal internship / graduate placement (disaggregated by sex, institution and district)	N/A	70	30 Law graduates in internship programme (F:17, M: 13). (FL: 15; PL 15)
# of individuals that have received legal scholarships (disaggregated by sex and district of University)	N/A	FL – 160 PL – 48	112 students (F: 47, M: 65) (FL:47; PL:65)
# of districts that are provided with corrections services or structures	N/A	14	Delayed
# of regional or national laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of the justice sector (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	1 anti-corruption law	Draft National Petroleum Act, and National Defense Act; Money Laundering Act reviewed and translated into Somali
# of participants receiving legal aid or counseling (disaggregated by sex, type of cases, and district)	N/A	7,000 150 by Diaspora expert	Puntland - 2,097 (F:1473, M: 624). No results for the FL.
Number of legal aid offices supported (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	8	5 legal aid centers in Puntland
Percentage of women working in legal aid centers supported increased (disaggregated by role (lawyer, paralegal or intern) and district)	N/A	Lawyers - 45% Paralegal - 75% Interns - 60%	Puntland: Lawyers 50% Paralegals 20% Lawyer Assistants - 50%
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	3 Policies -Women -Children -Legal Aid	Draft legal Aid Policy
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	2 on victim and witness protection	Delayed
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	2 institutions or units (IJA and ISWA)	Delayed

# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	1 (outreach material package)	Delayed
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	1000	Puntland – 350 (M:265, F:85)
# of Programme Steering Committee Meetings	N/A	3	No data
# of gender-responsive police related institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	1 - Police Ethics Academy	2 community policing units established (Ahmed Dargah and Central Police Station in Hargeisa)
# of participants in police sector training (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and rank)	N/A	1000	Delayed
# of students benefiting from scholarship (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	30	Graduated - 25 Police (F: 6, M: 19). 2nd Year Scholarship - 25 (F: 5, M: 20)
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	Federal level - 4 Regional - 16	Constructed - Gardo Model Police Station Furnished - Eyl Model Police Station
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SPF (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	1 national strategic policy	Delayed
# of gender-responsive police related institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	6 Institutions {(a) Community advisory committee; (b) Joint Somali-international monitoring group, (c) Integrity and investigations Unit, (d) Gender Unit, Specialized investigation cell on SGBV cases, (e) SGBV task force}	Somali Police Force Gender Unit established; Police Community Advisory Committee launched at federal
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SPF (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	9 strategies	1 Draft (Legislative framework for Community Advisory Committee)
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are gender-responsive and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SPF (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	1 Computerized staffing system for the SPF	Delayed

# Number of participants in police sector trainings (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and rank)	N/A	200 participants	Delayed
# of regional or national laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of the police sector (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	3 Policies: 3 Policies: (Reform Making, Federal Police Act Civilian Right Act)	Delayed
# of Programme Steering Committee Meetings	N/A	3	1
Somali Land⁹⁶			
# of justice sector professionals trained on the convention of the rights of children disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type	N/A	25	Training delivered to Judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers on Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Somaliland Juvenile Justice Law.
# of laws and policies that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of the justice sector (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	4 Policies (Child prisoners, Juve Delayed justice law; Female prisoners; Criminal Procedure Code)	Draft – Juve Delayed Justice Law Amendment
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	200, 000 (Including on gender justice issues)	1 Litigants Charter Legal awareness campaign
# of cases fully adjudicated by mobile courts (disaggregated by criminal: rape and SGBV and other; and civil cases: women’s socio-economic rights; dismissals and convictions; by district, sex and age)	N/A	50 cases per Month, 150 Per Quarter Mobile courts represented 1,824 cases in SL	574: SL Mobile Courts adjudicated 574 cases (274 Civil and 294 Criminal). 434 were disposed of. Total 1380 beneficiaries from mobile courts services in SL (Women: 234, Juve Delayed: 184, IDPs/Refugees: 138, Impoverished people 262)
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	5 vehicles donated to the mobile courts for 5 regions	5 vehicles procured (still at Berbera Port
# of participants receiving legal aid or counseling (disaggregated by sex, type of cases and district)	N/A	8,000 receive legal aid or counseling	1,186 (F: 392, M: 794) individuals supported by Hargeisa University legal clinic. Additional 1018 were supported by UNDP in Q1 and 2 2015.

⁹⁶ This part of the logframe is not in the design document but is part of the consolidated annual (2015) report.

# of legal aid centers supported (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	12 legal aid centers	Hargeisa University Legal Clinic with 2 Legal aid offices and Head Office at Hargeisa University Faculty of Law and the Office in front of the Hargeisa courts
# of gender-responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	1	2 institutions (AGO and the newly established Women and Child Units).
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	100,000 people	Legal awareness on legal rights and resources for 50,000 individuals (F: 23,124, M: 26,876)
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions. (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	2	Delayed
# of individuals that have received legal scholarships (disaggregated by sex and district of University)	N/A	50	50 law students (F: 22, M: 28) University of Hargeisa (26) and Amoud Universities (24).
# of policies promoting women's access to justice developed	N/A	2 Policies - Access to justice - Legal aid policy	Delayed
# of justice actors trained on women rights and gender justice	N/A	Judges – 30 Prosecutors – 30	Delayed
# of individuals that have received legal internship / graduate placement (disaggregated by sex, institution and district)	N/A	100 Students (Hargeisa – 50; Borama – 30; Burao – 20; Female - 30%)	25 law graduates under judicial internship (F: 7, M: 18)
# of gender-responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	2	One center at Hargeisa Group Hospital. Constructed Baahikoob SGBV center in Hargeisa General Hospital.
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	4 Strategies/ SOPs (1 justice sector reform plan; 1 human resources strategy, 1 MoJ budget plan; 1 system of criminal data collection and analysis)	Delayed
# of gender responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	1 MoJ women and children's unit	In progress
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, Manuals or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions. (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	1 Package of training materials for Judges	1 Operationalization of two Judicial Codes of Conduct in Somaliland in 2015.

# of justice sector professionals trained (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of professional such as: prosecutors, judges, MoJ, Custodial Corps)	N/A	6 trainers trained	59 individuals trained (F: 17, M: 42); 42 participants (F:12, M: 30) trained on Monitoring and Data recording;
# of justice sector structures refurbished or renovated (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	2 Justice sector structures	Delayed
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment	N/A	6 regional district courts	12 regional district courts
# of corrections officers trained in women rights and gender justice	N/A	50	Delayed
# of participants in trainings disaggregated by sex, topic and district.	N/A	100 Custodial Staff and 600 Prisoners	Delayed
# of justice sector structures refurbished (disaggregated by type and district)	N/A	Rehabilitate 1 prison; and Construct 1 Tailoring workshop	Delayed
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment	N/A	Vehicles - 6 Uniforms - 100 Tailor machine - 1	
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, Manuals or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions. (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	3 (Implementation Plan; SOPs and directives to accompany the Draft Attorney General Bill)	Criminal Legal Aid Manual for law Practitioners, Criminal Trials Court Bench book for Judges, Launched Feb 2015. Further implementation in 2015 delayed
Number of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, Manuals or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions. (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	1 package of training materials for Prosecutors	Prosecution Manual, , Launched February 2015 Further implementation in 2015 delayed
Number of justice sector professionals trained (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and type of professional such as: prosecutors, judges, MoJ, Custodial Corps)	N/A	6 trainers trained to deliver training programme	Delayed due to lack of funding
# of gender responsive justice sector institutions or internal units established with UN support	N/A	2	AGO employed 7 female prosecutors specialized for the SGBV related cases and linked to Baahikoob centers and regional Hospitals
# of facilities rehabilitated for the Attorney General's Office	N/A	1	Delayed
# of facilities rehabilitated or constructed for the PD	N/A	1	Delayed

council			
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, Manuals or systems developed or revised in support of justice sector institutions. (disaggregated by: institution, and type)	N/A	5 (Plan; SOPs, TORs and directives for Draft Public Defender Bill)	Delayed
# of people reached by awareness campaigns (disaggregated by provider, topic, sex and district)	N/A	120 (To harmonize traditional, religion and formal legal systems)	Delayed
# of traditional justice actors trained in women rights and gender justice	N/A	100 traditional justice actors, including religious leaders	Delayed
# of police related institutions or units established with UN support	N/A	2 Units: (Gender unit each in MoI and SLP)	Delayed
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SLP (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	6 Documents (Guidance on integration of women; SOP for SLP Gender Unit; Guidelines on data collection and analysis; Plan for women and children at police stations; Programme on GBV Case Management; Guideline on mentoring of female police officers)	Delayed
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	4 police stations	Delayed
# of Police offices Trained and sensitized on Community policing	N/A	40 police officers	40 Participants: (F: 15, M:25) Police (F:4, M:16) Committee members (F: 11; M: 9)
# of strategies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SLP (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	5 documents	Delayed
Equipment (hardware and software) delivered to operationalize Crime Records	N/A	Database developed and accessible from 15 stations	Pilot programme rolled out in Hargeisa Prison
# of police trained on community-policing and deployed in selected police stations (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and rank)	N/A	40 police officers	40 participants (F:15, M:25) Police Officers – 20 (F:4, M:16) Ahmed Dargah and Central Police Station
# of monitoring civil society committees established	N/A	15 CSO	Delayed
# of police trained (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and rank)	N/A	150	Delayed

# of strategies, Policies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SLP (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	2 Documents: (Staff audit report; Biometric registration strategy)	Delayed
Comprehensive Training Programme for Police tested and finalized	N/A	56 modules tested and finalized 1 new module developed on SGBV investigations	Delayed
# of police trained (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and rank)	N/A	Trainers – 25; Officers -120 (pilot phase) Officers - 150 (Phase 1 roll out) Manuals - 500	Delayed
# of Police trained (disaggregated by sex, topic, districts and ranks)	N/A	450 (F:150; M:300) Refresher – 100; Trainer mentor - 25	Delayed
# of individuals that have received scholarships	N/A	30 Officers (M:22, F8)	Scholarships – 30 (F:8; M:22)
# of strategies, Policies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SLP (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	3 Documents (Buildings needs assessments; Communications; and Transport)	Delayed
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	1 unit (6 vehicles)	Delayed
# of police related institutions or units established with UN support	N/A	1 (SOP Police Planning Unit)	Delayed
# of police related institutions or units established with UN support	N/A	1 MOI Police Reform Team	Police Reform Team reactivated
# of strategies, Policies, SOPs, Code of Conduct, or systems that are non-discriminatory and meet human rights standards developed or revised in support of SLP (disaggregated by: institution and type)	N/A	10 Policies (SOPs drafted and approved by the government)	4 -SL Strategic Plan; -Police Monitoring Plan; -Community policing training handouts; -Guidelines on assessment for SL Police
# of institutions or units that receive procured equipment (disaggregated by district, type and recipient)	N/A	0 (Baseline to be established through Capacity Assessment)	Delayed
Number of Programme Steering Committee Meetings	N/A	N/A	N/A

5.3-5 PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution

5.3-6 PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution⁹⁷

PBF/IRF-119- Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia

The project strengthens women's role and agency for the advancement of their political empowerment and directly supports the gender equality commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia in the framework of the Somali New Deal Compact. The project aims to strengthen the capacity of CSOs advocating on women participation as well as to bring a gender focus in the national government structures.

Implementing Office: UNDP, UNSOM, UN Women

Implementing Partners: Government: Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (MoWRHD - Federal) Ministry of Women Development and Family Affairs (MoWDAFA - Puntland) ; **CSOs:** Somali Women Leadership Initiative (SWLI), others to be determined through competitive bidding; **Research institution:** Heritage Institute for Policy Studies

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Indicator 1.1 No of newly adopted policies and laws with gender equality and WPS provisions enshrined in them.	Gender is cross-cutting in the Somali New Deal Compact. No National Gender Policy	3	2
Indicator 1.2 % of women in the emerging political, peace building and state building structures, institutions and in decision making	14% in FGS Parliament, 1/5 woman in ICRC, 3/26 in Technical Reconciliation Committee, 0/18 in Technical Committee on the Formation of Interim South West Administration	25%	25%
Indicator 1.3 Adoption of quota for women's participation in the political party law, newly endorsed Federal Constitution	n/a	n/a	n/a
Indicator 1.1.1 Number of gender and women's rights advocates trained in advocacy and leadership for peace building	n/a	100	180
Indicator 1.1.2 Number of advocacy initiatives undertaken and supported by trained gender advocates on enhancing	n/a	5	5
Indicator 1.2.1 Adoption of quota for women's participation in the political party law, newly endorsed Federal Constitution	0	30%	yes
Indicator 1.2.2 Gender Polices adopted and include framework for implementation of UNSCRs 1325 – 1820 nationwide	n/a	n/a	n/a

⁹⁷ Data from the latest report (quarterly, annual or end of project report) as available

Indicator 1.3.1 % of women candidates on party lists from major political parties in federal election	Legislations are being put in place.	30%	partially
Indicator 1.3.2 % of women in various commissions, bodies and structures in federal states	1/5 woman in ICRC, 3/26 in Technical Reconciliation Committee, 0/18 in Technical Committee on the Formation of Interim South West Administration	30%	25%
Indicator 2.1 Results of Partnership Satisfaction Index	0	80% of stakeholders positively assess the value of the coordination achieved	100%
Indicator 2.2 No of evidence based research, and studies informed state-building and peace building policies and laws	0	3	1
Indicator 2.1.1 MoWHRD convenes quarterly coordination meeting of/with regional gender machineries and women CSOs.	0	5	5
Indicator 2.1.2 Number of advocacy initiatives led by MoWHRD in coordination with regional gender machineries and CSOs on enhancing women's representation in peace building processes	0	5	5
Indicator 2.2.1 Number of CSOs trained in community engagement in peace building and state formation processes using the CCE-CC approach.	n/a	6	9
Indicator 2.2.2 No of communities reached by CSOs using the CCE-CC methodology to promote gender-responsive peace building	n/a	10	10
Indicator 2.3.1 Number of - research and studies conducted; policy briefs, analysis and tools for integrating gender into peace building and state building processes developed and disseminated	n/a	3	1
Indicator 2.3.2 Number of new gender sensitive/transformational policies or legislations developed	n/a	n/a	n/a
Indicator 3.1 Increase in representation of MoWHRD, regional gender machineries and women's groups in the Compact implementation/coordination structures.	absent of women/gender machineries and women leaders/CSOs in high-level compact structure and in all PSG processes.	MoWHRD has representation in high-level Compact implementation/coordination forums such as SDRF, HLPF and all PSG working groups.	Yes

Indicator 3.2 Percentage of funding for New Deal Compact implementation supporting GEWE	n/a	20%	
Indicator 3.1.1 Number of Compact related meetings and events in which MoWHRD, regional gender machineries and women-led/gender-focused CSOs participate	n/a	4	3
Indicator 3.1.2 Monitoring and reporting on gender mainstreaming in the implementation of the Compact	n/a	3	2
Indicator 3.2.1 Provisions for women's rights and gender equality are enshrined in the newly approved Federal Constitution	n/a	Specific provision of women's rights and participation, including quota are enshrined in the constitution	Constitutional process is underway. yet to be ascertained
Indicator 3.2.2 Non-state actors with influence on elections, constitutional review and state formation processes support inclusion of women and girls.	n/a	70%	50%

PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution

PBF/IRF-122 –Support to Somalia Local Reconciliation Processes

The project intends to provide primarily immediate and short-term assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in its endeavor to form interim regional administrations (IRAs), as precursors to full-fledged federal member states (FMS), through inclusive and participatory processes. The project supports the convening of 10 local reconciliation conferences and 3 minority rights conferences in order to consider the views of all clans, youth, women and vulnerable groups in key issues for the process of IRA formation.

Implementing Office: UNDP

Implementing Partners: Government: UNSOM, Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, Regional Admin of Jubbaland State, Intermin South West Admin, Galmudug Interim Admin, Banadir, Regional Admin of Hiraan and Middle Shabelle

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
# of federal states with agreed upon charters and approved constitutions	N/A	3	4
# of inclusive and gender responsive mediation processes supported and led by state administrations or FGS	N/A	2 (30% women)	6 (20.72% W)
% of state administration staff trained in conflict management and community problem solving (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	75% in at least 3 Federal member states (30% women)	All States = 26.01% with 42.36%W*
# of inclusive consultations undertaken on federalism and federal states endorsement process by the FGS	N/A	2	5 (46.88% W)
Additional Indicator: # of community members/leaders and other citizens trained in conflict management and	N/A	600 (30% women)	182 (20% W)

community problem solving (disaggregated by sex)			
# of technical advisors/officers (TA/Os) and interns provided to BFC to assist in policy development and implementation (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	TA/Os & 3 interns (30% women)	3TA/Os (2M:1W) & 3 interns (2M:1W)
# (and %) of BFC members with access to basic equipment (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	9 (100%)	9 (100%)
# of approved draft policy/strategy on federalism and boundary demarcation	N/A	1	3
# of TA/Os (or desk officers) and interns provided to FGS MoIFAR/OPM to assist in policy development and implementation on federalism process (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	2 TA/Os & 5 interns each (30% women)	9 TA/Os (7M:2W) & 10 interns (7M:3W) at MoIFAR, and 2 TA/Os (2M), 1 Intern (1W) at OPM
% of MoIFAR units that receive office equipment	N/A	100%	100%
# of gender responsive consultations with regions and federal states convened and facilitated by FGS/MoIFAR	N/A	1 (30% women)	5
Additional Indicator: # of consultative workshops on boundaries and federalism conducted by the BFC	N/A	6	8 with 45.45% women (300M; 250W)
Additional Indicator: # (and %) of BFC members trained on framework and policy on boundary and federalism process	N/A	9 (100%)	8 (88.89%)
Additional Indicator: # of public outreach workshops/events to promote federalism process led by FGS	N/A	4	5
# of federal member states with baseline assessments conducted prioritizing key infrastructure support for the Cabinet/ministries/ agencies of the State Administrations	N/A	2	2
# of new or rehabilitated infrastructure projects undertaken in the State Administrations	N/A	2	6 (1 completed; 5 in progress)
Additional Indicator: # of new or rehabilitated social infrastructure delivered for one federal member state	N/A	1	2 (1 completed; 1 in progress)
Additional Indicator: # of state-level institutions provided with equipment/supplies to perform duties	N/A	3	4*
# of baseline assessments completed and used to prioritize human resource and other needs	N/A	2	2
# of technical advisors/officers and interns supported in interim state administrations for organizational development and planning processes (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	3 TA/Os & 8 interns in each State Administrations (30%	JSS: 3 TA/Os (2M:1W) & 7 interns. (5M:2W) SWS: 3 TA/Os (all men) GSS: 3

		women)	TA/Os (2M:1W) & 10 interns 6M:4W)
% of staff members of beneficiary state ministries/agencies that receive trainings on core of government functions (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	80% (30% women)	All States (JSS/GSS/SWS) = 24.61%** with 23.65% Women (255M: 79W)
# of gender responsive coordination structures established	N/A	2	2 SWS
% of interim federal member state ministries that have organization structure and terms of reference in place	N/A	60%	100% (JSS, HSS, GSS, SWS)
% of citizens with improved perceptions on federalism (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	N/A*	81% (85%M, 78% W)
# of gender responsive public outreach campaigns on federalism/state formation	N/A	2 in at least 2 federal states (30% women)	All States = 8 (JSS:3, SWS:3, GSS:2) with 46.56% Women (256M: 223W)
# of public accountability forums held by federal member states towards citizen and government engagement process	N/A	2 in at least 2 State Administrations (30% women)	2 (JSS=1; SWS=1)
# of CSOs and # of citizens participating in state planning processes (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	10 CSOs & 300 citizens in each of 3 State Administrations	CSOs: 113 of which 48M, 65W (SWS:46 of which 27M, 19W; JSS: 47 of which 5M, 42W; GSS: 20 OF WHICH 16M, 4W), Citizen: 307 (256M, 51W) of which 161M, and 39W are from GSS
Additional Indicator: # of awareness-raising workshops/events on federalism state building and/or good governance led by interim federal member states	N/A	2 in each FMS	8 (SWS=3; JSS=3; GSS=2)
Additional Indicator: # of citizens sensitized on political participation	N/A	At least 100 citizens sensitized in each FMS	121 (JSS, SWS, GSS)

PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution

PBF/SOM/D-1; Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns Jubaland and South West States

The project aims to enhance local leadership capacities to facilitate the sustainable return, recovery, social integration and peaceful co-existence of displacement affected, returnee, other migrant groups and host communities in Jubaland and South West State. The project is Government-led and community-driven to ensure a bottom up approach to drive transition and recovery processes in displacement affected communities.

Implementing Office: IOM; UNHABITAT

Implementing Partners: Government: Government: -Jubaland Refugee and IDP Agency for Jubaland State; Ministry of Planning & International

Coordination for South West State

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Output Indicator 1.1.1. Number of district and/or community level government representatives trained and included in the core facilitation group for community consultations	n/a	24	30
Output Indicator 1.1.2 Frequency of follow-up meetings held	n/a	Quarterly	20
Output Indicator 1.2.1 Number of district level government authorities coordinating through regular meetings with the community leadership, leading the implementation schedule and interacting with the community leadership to facilitate the participatory planning and recovery processes	0	24	28
Output Indicator 1.2.2 Number of government staff trained on relevant subjects including data management, data analysis, and use of data	0	24	24
Output Indicator 1.2.3 Number of information products (including assessments and data collection) developed in coordination with the government entities supported through this Project.	0	10	11
Output Indicator 1.3.1: Number of radio and TV programs broadcasted, SMS messages disseminated on social cohesion, peaceful coexistence, and the benefits of working together to achieve a common vision	0	6 radio, 4 TV, 4 SMS messages	6 radio, 4 TV, 4 SMS messages
Output Indicator 1.3.2 % of audience who participated in the feedback survey expressing their improved understanding of the benefit of joint planning and a common vision.	n/a	65%	85%
Output Indicator 1.4.1: Number of bylaws, directives and regulations drafted and ready for approval by competent authorities	0	3	2
Output Indicator 1.4.2: Number of Spatial Strategic Plans developed, validated by stakeholders and ready for approval by authorities	0	1	1
Output Indicator 1.5.1: Number of toolkits developed for: Land use planning in IDP settlement, Spatial development plans, Land dispute resolution	0	3	2

Output Indicator 1.6.1: Framework document agreed upon with the relevant authorities and stakeholders	0	1	1
Output Indicator 1.7.1: Number of final draft terms of reference aligned with the Regional Constitution ready for approval	0	1	1
	0		
Output Indicator 2.1.1: Number of individuals participating in community based planning process disaggregated by gender and socio-economic status	n/a	1200	1277 (712 male and 565 female) comprising youths, orphans, widows, disabled, livestock farmers, crop farmers, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, IDPs, returnees and vulnerable host community members.
Output Indicator 2.1.2: Number of core facilitation teams formed and trained	0	6	7
Output Indicator 2.1.3 Number of community driven planning exercises completed	0	12	9
Output Indicator 2.2.1: Number of analysis, visioning, planning and prioritization processes taken place	0	12	9
Output Indicator 2.2.2: Number of Community Action Plans developed	0	12	9
Output Indicator 2.3.1: Number of CAGs and CBM&Es formed and the number of participants disaggregated by gender	0	12	14
Output Indicator 2.3.2: Number of community based monitoring plans developed	0	6/7	7
Output Indicator 2.4.1; Number of beneficiaries with improved access to basic services and means to sustain their living	0	2,880	720
Output Indicator 2.4.2; Percentage of returnees, IDPs and host community members who express improvement in their	n/a	50%	0

perceptions of their physical safety and security			
Output Indicator 2.5.1 Number of community advisors hired per pilot project site	0	1	1
Output Indicator 2.5.2 Number of projects selected by communities are submitted to the advisors	0	24	28
Output Indicator 2.6. 1: Number of committees trained	0	6	2
Output Indicator 2.6.2: Number of training sessions held	0	9	2
Output Indicator 2.7.1: Number of community meetings held per target site	0	18	2
Output Indicator 2.7.2: Number of community selected projects are supported by technical advisors and finalized	0	4	0
Output Indicator 2.7.3: Number of mixed use settlement areas identified by communities and authorities for small scale resettlement	0	2	1

5.3.7 PBF Priority Area 3: Revitalize the economy and immediate peace dividends

PBF Priority Area 3: Revitalize the economy and immediate peace dividends⁹⁸

PBF/IRF-152⁹⁹ - The Kenya- Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas of return

The projects support the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya and aiming to also enable a prospective group of Somali returnees in Dadaab, Kenya, to return specifically to Baidoa, Bay region of Somalia. The project empowers volunteer returnees to a constructive and effective role in sustaining their own return and reintegration, with good prospects for livelihoods and support measures to build resilience according to the principles of co-existence.

Implementing Office: Somalia: UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, IOM, ILO Kenya: UNHCR Kenya

Implementing Partners: NRC, INTERSOS, DRC, Federal Government of Somalia-National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI) Somalia, Government of Kenya

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
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⁹⁸ Data from the latest report (quarterly, annual or end of project report) as available

⁹⁹ This project contributes to PBF Priority Area 1, 2, and 3. However, it is placed under Priority 3 here to match the PBSO Database shared by PBSO NY.

Indicator 1.1 # of returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions and are participating in democratic governance and reconciliation processes	0	750	626
Indicator 1.2 # of youth aged 15-24 enrolled in certified livelihoods training	0	750	803
Indicator 1.3 # of persons of concern (18-59) with own business/self-employed for more than 12 months	0	750	803
Indicator 1.1.2 # of returnees trained in peace building and conflict resolutions.	0	750 (3000)	626
Indicator 1.2.1# of persons provided with entrepreneurship/business training.	0	750	803
Indicator 2.1 # of persons benefit. The Indicator Based Performance Assessment from social services provided in newly resettled areas	0	3,000	4,387
Indicator 2.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and co- existing well with host communities	0	1,500	1,402
Indicator 2.1.1# of persons benefit. The Indicator Based Performance Assessing from social services provided in newly resettled areas	0	3,000	4,387
Indicator 2.1.2 # of returnees recorded and tracked in PRMN as successfully integrated and co- existing well with host communities	0	1,500	1,402
Indicator 2.2.1 # of children attending primary school.	0	1,800	1,863
Indicator 2.2.2 # of teacher training and incentives	0	75	60
Indicator 2.3.1 # of short term jobs created	0	200	600
Indicator 2.3.2# of beneficiaries with VST, business/entrepreneurial skills.	0	100	200
Indicator 2.4.1# of short term jobs created and number of beneficiaries receiving agricultural package.	0	610	610
Indicator 2.4.2 # of beneficiaries receiving livestock package	0	160	160

5.3.8 PBF Priority Area 4: Essential administrative services and infrastructure

PBF Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure¹⁰⁰

PBF/IRF-116- Support to Stabilization

The project supports stabilization efforts, in line with the Government Stabilization Strategy and the Wadajir National Framework for Local Governance and its four components (social reconciliation, peace dividends, civic engagement and local governance/district government formation) in the newly recovered areas of Somalia through capacity building and direct support to local administrations. It works to establish local district governance structures in areas of South Central Somalia (14 out of 26 districts identified by MOIFA) and establish/strengthen community-representative bodies. The project also offers direct running cost support to the districts channeled through the National Window.

Implementing Office: UNDP and UNMPTF

Implementing Partners: Federal Member States and CSOs: Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Interior and Federalism; and State Governments; District Governments; Interim District Administrations; and Civil Society Organizations

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Indicator 1.1.1 # of Staff at district and federal level recruited and in place to support stabilization.	1 staff per district and 3 at Federal level	13 LGAs (F: 1, M:12 5 staff (F:2 M: 3) at federal level recruited and are operational	Total 17 staff are operational at district and Federal level: 14 (13M and 1F) at district staff.
Indicator 1.1.2 The frequency of activity reports by staff working on stabilization.	Monthly	90% project staff submit report	85% District level staff submitted reports. This is based on average number received 12 out 14 = 85.5%.
Indicator 1.2.1 # of financial procedure adopted and implemented	The financial procedure reviewed and adjusted to project implementation reality. Payment made to 11 districts	4 sets of financial procedures as per attachment 5 of PRODOC have been partially applied	5 sets of financial procedures as per attachment 5 of PRODOC have been applied
Indicator 1.2.2 Value in (\$) of resources expended by district administration	10,000.00 per district	10 districts expended \$ 28,000.00	12 districts expended a total of 150,500.00 in year 2016 - \$900,323. MOIFAR is transferring funds from the Central Bank to district and Mogadishu staff and state implementing partners 2018 -\$ 76,000.00

¹⁰⁰ Data from the latest report (quarterly, annual or end of project report) as available

Indicator 1.3.1 # of stakeholders participating in monthly coordination meetings	At least 10 organizations/institutions representing FGS, FMS, International organization, NGO and donors	30 institution/ organization: October 32 institution/organization: November	Total 87: 26 organization/ institutions (on 29th of Jan 2018); 30 organization/ institution (on 26th March 2018); 31 organization/institution (on May 28th, 2018)
Indicator 1.3.2 The existence of ToR defining the role of State authorities in government stabilization efforts.	0	TOR has been developed and agreed by Federal Member	TOR has been developed and agreed by Federal Member State, FMS and FGS that defines the role of the state authorities in government stabilization efforts. Also, 14 focal points for stabilization in each (FMS) have been nominated based on clear ToRs
Indicator 2.1.1 # of gender-fair DPSC established with approved TOR	1 per district (out of 15 district projects targeted)	Total 11, 1 per district out of 15 districts targeted. With Total 244 (M: 213 F: 31)	Total 42 out 187 DPSC members are women (22%), however, in War sheikh 9 out of 27 (30%) DPSC members are women and Garbahey 9 out of 26 (35%) DPSC members are women who are yet to be trained.
Indicator 2.1.2 # of coordination meetings between DPSCs and peace dividend providers	Minimum 1 per district	3 coordination meetings between DPSC, local community, and authority has been conducted at Abudwak, Barawe and Baidoa	2. 16 coordination meetings between DPSC, local community, and local authority have been conducted at Warshiikh, Baidoa, Bardhere, Hudur, Beledweyne, Barawe.
Indicator 2.2.1 # of consultations and conferences held	10 conferences	Four districts in total (Hudur, Bardale, Baidoa and Barawe)	CLOs and LGAs advised local authorities and communities in establishment of District Peace and Stability Committees harmonizing and explaining Terms of Reference, helping readjust their membership where certain groups, especially women and youth, lacked representation.
Indicator 2.2.2 # of people participating	100 people	0	N/A

	participating (50/50)		
Indicator 2.3.1 # of reconciliation initiatives undertaken per target district	14 (1 per district)	3	Six districts, including Hobyo, Abudwak, Hudur, Bardale, Baidoa and Barawe
Indicator 2.3.2 # of reconciliation initiatives undertaken per target district	4	4	4 districts, including Baidoa, Garbaharay, Abudwak, Baladweyn
Indicator 3.1 Project Board Meeting	1 project board meeting	4 Project Board Meeting held in 2016	7 Board meeting held (first monthly, then quarterly)
Indicator 3.2 Oversight and Monitoring - UNDP	technical meeting/Spot-check	0	3

Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure

PBF/IRF-141 Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations

The project enables the Federal Government of Somalia to independently deliver services to its citizens by developing its capacity to conduct community consultations, design, manage, and implement small scale infrastructure projects. The core objective of this project is to test the use of national systems to channel funds in order to build the capacity of FGS to effectively manage funds and pave the way for other donors to use the system.

Implementing Office: UNDP, Ministry of Finance, FGS

Implementing Partners: Federal Government of Somalia, Ministry of Finance, World Bank, UNOPS, UNDP

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Indicator 1.1: The Project Implementation Unit of the Ministry of Finance successfully managed the rehabilitation/construction of 4 small infrastructures in three Member region	3 infrastructure projects	5 infrastructure projects in Kismayo (courthouse), Benadir (installation of solar panels in three streets), Bandiradley Administration Office and solar street lights, North Galkayo Administration Office. Furnishing Court house and solar panels in admin Office North Galkayo	All projects completed
Indicator 1.2 The Project Implementation Unit developed a successful communication campaign to promote the work of the FGS/IRAs in rehabilitation infrastructures	n/a	Communication on of the UN and WB projects and procurement process o the dedicated PIU/SFF-LD (MOF_ web page to ensure awareness and visibility and Facebook	Completed
Indicator 1.3 PIU and IRA civil servants use participatory	n/a	Joint monitoring activities	Completed

monitoring tool to measure the satisfaction of citizens with the rehabilitated infrastructures		implemented by the PIU and IRA/State authorities and PIU and the UN	
Indicator 1.1.1 % of people (men and women) expressing trust in targeted Federal Member States	43%	80%	67% of the residence are confident with the district administration according to OCPV report.
Indicator 1.1.2 Number of infrastructures built and functional	0	4	4
Indicator 1.2.1 Number of Public Service Announcements are aired on popular radios in target locations where infrastructures are being rehabilitated/constructed	0	7	7
Indicator 1.2.2 PIU Facebook page	0	Min. 3 posts per week during project implementation n At least 1000 likes by the end of the project	24 Facebook post had been made and 6,613 likes for the entire project duration.
Indicator 1.3.1 % increase in knowledge of PIU and target federal states staff on M&E and target federal states staff on M&E	Unknown	95%	75%
Indicator 1.3.2 Number of people attending (men and women) community consultation held by PIU and JA staff	0	120	120
Indicator 2.1 USD disbursed through national window	0	FGS: USD 1,902,500.00 UNDP: USD 159,583 (Funds received; USD 139,408)	FGS: USD 1,815,393.36 UNDP: 139,408
Indicator 2.2: # of operational observations found in UN monitoring visits	n/a	4 operational observations found during phase one of the procurement project which were rectified prior to completion of the procurement process	Completed
Indicator 2.1.1 # of monitoring visits/site visit by PIU staff to FMS's	0	16	18
Indicator 2.1.2: PIU staff take part in 4 tailored trainings on Project Cycle Management, Financial management	0	4	6

PBF Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure

PBF/IRF-120- Risk Management Support for the UNMPTF and SDRF Somalia

The Project builds the technical capacity of the government at all levels and various stakeholders on how to implement the Risk Management strategy developed for the SDF Trust Fund. The project enables the government, UN and all stakeholders to successfully implement the National Development Plan. It

also serves to increase the capacity of government and relevant stakeholders how to implement Risk Management strategies in the long term planning and programming and increase the safeguards of the government funds and foreign aid that comes in the country.

Implementing Office: UNDP

Implementing Partners: World Bank, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Indicator 1.1 Somalia ISF implementation rate	23% off track, 17% delayed, 60% on track (from Feb.2016 internal ISF monitoring report	15 off tracks, 20% delayed, 65% on track (due to the drought conditions if delivery can be maintained on political and development outcomes it will be a significant progress	The project has met the target with over 70% implementation rate of the annual allocations.
Indicator 1.1.1 Risk analysis and RMG convened according to strategy	RMG met monthly since RM was hired in 2016. RMG meets monthly in 2018	Monthly meetings have taken place in 2016 In 2017 RMG agreed to meet bimonthly to allow time for data collection and analysis as set up in the updates calendar. In 2018 following internal review of the JRMS, RMG met quarterly on risk updates and conducted meetings on GBV risk analysis	Quarterly meetings of the RWG, bi-annual meetings of Fund Administrators and bi-annual meetings with SDRF co-chairs
Indicator 1.2.1 Number of trainings on risk management (related to trust fund strategy)	5	Target 11.	The project has exceeded the target. Number of risk management trainings related to trust funds strategy is 15 by the operational completion of the project.
Indicator 1.2.2 Proportion of recommendations to offset emergent risks implemented	100%	100%	Target achieved. The RMG has regularly updated the risks emerged due to the changing environment, set up a risk updating calendar and responded to changes in a proactive manner. I.e. risk updates during the elections, drought etc,
Indicator 1.3.1 Percentage of projects implemented	75%	100%	100%

through Trust Fund that proactively manage risks of gender equality and women's empowerment			All joint programmes have mainstreamed gender targeting 30% of beneficiaries are women. Gender indicator has become a mandatory requirement for all joint programmes.
Indicator 1.3.2 Percentage of Trust Fund resources allocated to gender specific activities/interventions	13%	20%	Targeted achieved. RCO and UN Women have introduced gender indicator in the progress reports to ensure proper monitoring of the gender related activities with sufficient resources, having a direct and indirect impact on gender empowerment.
Indicator 1.3.3 Percentage of projects implemented through Trust Fund that systematically monitor stakeholder vulnerability/concerns	75%	100%	100%, target achieved. Stakeholder vulnerability has been streamlined in all the trust fund JPs, which are closely monitored and reported quarterly until the end of 2017 and bi-annually in 2018
Indicator 2.1	n/a	n/a	Implementation team comprises in MPTF Risk Manager who has worked closely with RMU in her capacity as acting Head of the RMU since June 2017, with the WB, AfDB and other partners. Risk Manager has closely monitored the outcomes, outputs and annual targets to make sure that they are on track.
Indicator 2.1.1			
Indicator 2.1.2 Percentage of projects applying comprehensive risk management	70%	100%	100% - target achieved. Three level risk management implemented: - fund level - programme/ project level. Office facilities, equipment and supplies provided to the MPTF

			Risk Manager.
Indicator 2.2.1 Office facilities provided			
Indicator 2.3.1 Number of travels to Somalia on risk management and national window	10	Monthly monitoring travels to Somalia in 2017 (12)	Targeted achieved and exceeded in 2016, 2017 and 2018 Jan-August. In September 2018 the MPTF Risk Manager was deployed to Mogadishu.
Indicator 2.4.1 Project evaluated once in its project live	Project evaluated in Q4 2017	Project evaluated during Q3 of 2018	Project evaluation completed as part of a multi-project evaluation, as recommended by PBSO.

PBF Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure

PBF/IRF-143: Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia

The project provides technical capacity to government, the UN, and other partners to design, implement, and monitor projects to ensure they contribute to achieve the objectives of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. The project also helps to transfer the conflict analysis and peacebuilding programming knowledge to national counterparts for use in long term planning.

Implementing Office: UNDP

Implementing Partners: Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister's Office, World Bank, UN Global Pulse RUNOs, UNSOM

Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
Indicator 1.1 SDRF SC members are satisfied with the contribution of the PPP to the peace and state building goals 3, 4, and 5	N/A	75%	100%
Indicator 1.1.1 Quality PRF project proposals have been developed by the UN and FGS and endorsed by the SDRF SC	0	5	100%
Indicator 1.1.2: Projects funded by the PPP support women's and girls' empowerment	N/A	at least 15% of funding is clearly budgeted to support women's and girls' empowerment	100%
Indicator 1.2.1: Number of workshops and trainings provided to PRF applicants/implementing partners	0	4	100%
Indicator 1.2.2 Recipient UN/FGS implementing partners are satisfied with the level of technical support received by the PPP secretariat	N/A	75% are Satisfied/very satisfied	100%

Indicator 1.3.1 PPP Secretariat functions effectively performed	0	6 SDRF SC - PPP meetings held	Coordination of the PPP projects have been done through the ordinary aid coordination structure and the Pillar Working Groups under the SDRF SC.
Indicator 1.3.2 Ensure timely and quality reporting of PBF-funded projects	N/A	75% of reports submitted on time and are deemed of good quality by PBSO	Reporting of the PBF portfolio up to date and progress is being made to ensure that concluded projects are operationally and financially closed
Indicator 1.3.3 Functioning Knowledge Management System developed	0	1	A workshop with PBF implementing partners was held in Mogadishu in beginning of September. The work will be carried out by the successor project.
Indicator 2.1.1 Agreed project plan and signed concept note among key stakeholders. With specific role and responsibilities	PPP Stakeholders do not know about the Big Data project	Concept note, project plan and work plan agreed in consensus by key stakeholders	-Concept note designed and agreed by all stakeholders. - Big Data Project Advisory Group established by partners and met 9 times. - Work plan for implementation, budget and TORs approved. -2 workshops with partners held to launch project implementation and support progress.
Indicator 2.2.1: Prototype technology for data analysis is developed	No prototype existed	An experimental technology package for analysis of Big Data content in Somali language from Facebook and radio is developed	IT equipment to capture radio content deployment and installed in Mogadishu are fully operational Software to filtered out radio content developed Software to target FB public pages developed and adapted Software platform "Catalog" developed
Indicator 2.2.2: Data analysis relevance is assessed	No Big Data Analysis was available for Somalia	Conduct assessment on the relevance of Big Data analysis to support Peace building in processes in Somalia	Analysis of the use of media in Somali conducted. Evaluation of biases and potentialities of radio and Facebook analysis conducted.

			Complete list of radio stations that can be captured with reasonable quality, in Mogadishu compiled
Indicator 2.2.3: Insights are incorporated into decision-making processes	No Big Data analysis is used in decision-making processes	Insights extracted from Big Data analysis in Somalia are used for decision making processes in the context of Peace Building.	Working session held in Mogadishu in November 2017 with stakeholders to understand how insights of Big Data analysis could be used in decision making processes in Somalia 3 set of analysis using Big Data have been shared with stakeholders 3 day user training session on Catalog provided
Indicator 2.3.1 Developed future phase III project plan	No phase III project plan exists	Phase III project plan produced and endorsed by stakeholders.	- Scaling up phase of the project discussed during Advisory Committee meetings. - Inputs and feedback on need and challenges are collected for the drafting of Phase III plans through interviews and working sessions.
Indicator 2.3.2 Funding for future phase III secured	No funding is secured	Funding is available for scaling up of the project.	Donors have been contacted to explore interests in funding scaling up. Engaged in meetings with stakeholders on collaborating for a joint proposal. The need for Phase III highlighted during Advisory Committee meetings.

PBF Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure

PBF/SOM/D-2-Daldhis (Build your Country)

This project works with local community leaders, elders, formal and informal justice services and newly selected local governments, in collaboration with state ministries, to entrench stability and peace, enhance social service delivery, provide economic opportunities for young men and women and provide an accessible system for resolution of people dispute and determination of their rights. This project constitutes the first concerted programmatic effort to translate the Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A) into practice.

Implementing Office: UNDP, JPLG (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNCDF, UNHABITAT), UNIDO			
Implementing Partners: Federal Government of Somalia: MoIFA, MoPublic Works, MoJustice, MoF, Federal Member State (Jubbaland/SWS): Mo Interior , Mo Justice, MoEducation, Mo Labour and Employment, MoTrade and Industry			
Performance Indicators	Indicator Baseline	Target	Endline (incl. latest annual report)
# of decentralization or local governance related policies that are developed or drafted and gender sensitive	0	2	2
# of decentralization or local governance related legislation/ sector specific policies, including fiscal decentralization developed (or drafted) and gender sensitive	0	4	4 (two adopted by SWS and JS. 2 drafts by HS and GS)
# of coordination and oversight meetings	0	6	12
# gender sensitive policies, guidelines and policies issues for effective coordination and oversight of the activities.	0	2policies drafted (FGS - SWS and FGS – JBL)	0
# of formal mechanisms of coordination that exist at Federal and states level	0	2 (FGS - SWS and FGS – JBL)	2
# of districts that have systems in place to increase revenue generation (eg property taxes, business licensing etc)	0	8 (South West and Jubaland)	0
# of monitoring visits completed by state governments staff to district level governance bodies	0	Target: 8 (1* 4 quarters*state governments of SW and JB - 1*4*2). It is minimum required number of visits.	1
1: No. of Mobile Training Units established. 2: No. of trainings delivered by the Mobile Training Units. 3: No. of target participants trained by the Mobile Training Units.	0	4	3 training teams in 2017 0 in JL and SW trainings expanded to other FMS in 2018
# of CSO and NGOs that are part of the dialogue with local government/ authorities.	0	at least 50% of those present in South West State and Jubaland	0
# of socioeconomic issues constructively discussed in the dialogues with local government/ authorities (Suggested - employment, health, education, social infrastructure, youth and etc)	0	TBD	0
# of local and central government personnel trained in at least one PEM module	0	TBD as per training plans	206 100 in Jubaland, 106 in SWS

# of district council members trained in civic education, public management, procurement.	0	TBD as per training plans	30 in Hudur SWS
Number of cases fully adjudicated by the mobile courts (disaggregated by criminal (rape and SGBV and other) and civil cases (e.g. women's socio-economic rights and other), and dismissals and convictions, and district) (and sex) / age)	1,231 cases adjudicated in 2016	Increase in adjudication by 25%	Total: 345 • South West: 23 (22 civ, 1 crim) F:8 and M: 15; • Jubaland: 55 (42 civ and 13 crim) F:18 and M:37;
Number of youth (% women) trained in civic education and life-skills for social rehabilitation and economic reintegration in Baidoa and Kismayo	n/a	200 youth at risk (100 from Baidoa and 100 from Kismayo) at least 30% women	200 youth (46% women) Total 404 youth Number of youth (% women) employed – self-or wage-employed in Baidoa and Kismayo 0 94 youth
Number of youth (% women) employed – self-or wage-employed in Baidoa and Kismayo	n/a	0	94 youth (38 women) got longer-term jobs
Number of public infrastructures rehabilitated in Baidoa and Kismayo	n/a	At least 2 public infrastructures	2
Number of youth (% women) got short-term jobs in rehabilitation works in Baidoa and Kismayo	n/a	0	118 youth (30 women) in Kismayo and Baidoa by creating 9,204 workdays

5.4 Annex 4: Evaluation Matrix

Evaluation Matrix PBF Evaluation – Somalia PBF Support portfolio

Category 1: Political and Strategic Implications

Key Questions:

1. Assess to what extent the PBF Envelope of support has made concrete and sustained impact in terms of building and consolidating peace in Somalia, either through the PBF Portfolio direct action or through catalytic effects which added value to the peacebuilding programming context.
2. Assess critical peacebuilding gaps to be addressed in future support
3. Assess to what extent were the PBF support portfolio and project Theories of Change relevant for addressing peacebuilding needs in Somalia?

Areas of Analysis:

1. PBF Portfolio Outcomes
2. PBF support portfolio Added Value (Catalytic Effects)
3. Peacebuilding Relevance
4. Peacebuilding Gaps

No.	Key Question: To what extent did the PBF portfolio as a whole from 2015-2019 achieve higher level results?	Data Tools	Data Analysis Modules
1.0	To what extent are Government structures and institutions at Federal, Regional, District and Community Level strengthened, accountable, and transparent so as to better be able to respond to needs of the population?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Analysis Exercises • Semi-Structured Interview Guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Stakeholders/External Observers ○ Implementing Partners ○ District and Municipality Representatives • Thematic FGDs (District level and community groups) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF Process Consolidation • TOC Analysis • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Data Analysis Modules
1.1	To what extent did interventions help build the capacity of national and state institutions to carry out their mandates for governance in promoting equality before the law and non-discrimination?	1.1.1 Legislation supports governance mandate and equality before the law 1.1.2 Laws, policies developed through PBF support 1.1.3 Stakeholders consider national and state institutions to have governance mandate 1.1.4 Citizen trust in national and state institutions has increased 1.1.5 Stakeholders consider national and state institutions to practice non-discrimination	Document synthesis Interviews FGDs
1.2	To what extent did interventions help build the capacity of national and state institutions to address specific grievances that may have fueled conflict?	1.2.1 Corrective measures in the implementation of laws are acted upon as a result of oversight groups 1.2.2 Legal and judicial stakeholders trained through PBF project activities 1.2.3 Disputes taken up by formal and informal institutions 1.2.4 Violent disputes decreased 1.2.5 Stakeholders perceive grievances to have been actively addressed 1.2.6 State initiates dialogue on past issues including diverse groups 1.2.7 Stakeholders perceive dialogue to have been effective	Document synthesis Interviews FGDs
1.3	How well did interventions support the role of youth and women in decision making forums and in equally leading peacebuilding activities	1.3.1 Youth and women involved in decision making in forums and leadership in peacebuilding activities including community dispute resolution committees and other grievance mechanisms 1.3.2 Women and ethnic minorities in authority positions 1.3.3 Women and youth perceive increased inclusion and opportunities for peacebuilding	Document synthesis Interviews FGDs
1.4	To what extent was the state capacity to deliver services enhanced including service delivery, conflict resolution and reconciliation, infrastructure	1.4.1 State documentation on service delivery 1.4.2 State documentation on reconciliation services 1.4.3 State documentation on infrastructure development 1.4.4 State documentation on economic opportunity promotion	Document synthesis Interviews FGDs

	development, and promoting increased economic opportunities	1.4.5 Citizens assess state capacity for delivery of services to be enhanced	
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Data Analysis Modules
2.0	To what extent have communities demand and benefit from local governance, security, and economic institutions?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Analysis Exercises • Semi-Structured Interview Guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Stakeholders/External Observers ○ Implementing Partners ○ District and Municipality Representatives • Thematic FGDs (District level and community groups) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF Process Consolidation • TOC Analysis • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Data Analysis Modules
2.1	To what extent have non-state actors at local levels associated the Government with an improvement in quality of life?	2.1.1 Citizens associate local Government with improved economic, reconciliation, equal treatment and infrastructure development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
2.2	To what extent have PBF funded interventions helped to reduce mistrust and foster social cohesion?	2.2.1 Citizen trust in the government at local, level is increased 2.2.2 People believe that IRA/FMS members and religious leaders are working to promote peaceful relations 2.2.3 Traditional and religious leaders establish linkage between formal and informal legal systems 2.2.4 Citizens perceive social cohesion among groups to have increased?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
2.3	How effectively have local self-governing bodies support conflict resolution, dialogue, and mediation?	2.3.1 Documentation cites training to LSG bodies for conflict resolution 2.3.2 Documentation cites reference to LSG for local dispute resolution 2.3.3 Citizens perceive capacity of LSGs to have increased for dispute resolution 2.3.4 Citizens perceive local security to have improved 2.3.5 documentation on number of violent disputes shows decline	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Data Analysis Modules
3.0	To what extent has PBF portfolio of support contributed to indirect positive social changes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Analysis Exercises • Semi-Structured Interview Guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Stakeholders/External Observers ○ Implementing Partners ○ District and Municipality Representatives • Thematic FGDs (District level and community groups) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF Process Consolidation • TOC Analysis • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews

No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Data Analysis Modules
3.1	To what extent has PBF portfolio of projects been successful to leading to increased well-being?	3.1.1 State institutions support measures to improve participation in public life 3.1.2 Creation of peace dividends: Sustainable economic development opportunities for marginalized groups (IDPs, youth, women, returnees) are created 3.1.3 Reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants 3.1.4 Citizens have a positive disposition toward others	
3.2	Among the projects within the PBF Portfolio of support, what were key factors for success?	3.2.1 Project reports and evaluations highlight lessons learned 3.2.2 Project RUNOs can cite success factors in projects in PBF Portfolio 3.2.3 Community and Government stakeholders can cite positive success factors	
Daldhis and Midnimo Observations			
No.	Key Question	Data Tools	Data Analysis Modules
4.6	What was the relevance of the two flagship projects Daldhis and Midnimo for contributing to peacebuilding in Somalia during the 2015-2019 period?	1. Programme documents reflect situation analysis and context documents in design 2. Stakeholder perceptions of relevance	Document synthesis Interviews
4.7	How timely and cost efficient were the implementation of the Daldhis and Midnimo projects?	1. Programme reports reflect timely implementation of planned activities 2. Stakeholder perceptions of programme efficiency	Document synthesis Interviews
4.8	To what extent did Daldhis and Midnimo, as flagship projects under the PBF portfolio of support, complement each other and have strategic coherence, and how were the inter-linkages between the PRF and IRF projects implemented during 2015-2019?	4.8.1 Document reports reflect intentional strategic complementary and coherence 4.8.2 Stakeholders identify examples of strategic complementary and coherence	Document synthesis Interviews
4.9	How sustainable are the gains achieved in the implementation of the Daldhis and Midnimo projects?	1.9.1 Document reports identify sustained gains 1.9.2 Stakeholders can identify gains that can be sustained from the project	Document synthesis Interviews

No.	Key Question		
5.0	How catalytic, relevant and sustainable was the PBF investment in the PPP, for ongoing peacebuilding programming?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Analysis Exercises • Semi-Structured Interview Guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Stakeholders/External Observers ○ Implementing Partners ○ District and Municipality Representatives • Thematic FGDs (District level and community groups) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF Process Consolidation • TOC Analysis • Document Synthesis • Stakeholder Interviews
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Sources
5.1	To what extent did the PBF portfolio as a whole, and the way it was implemented, contribute added value for future peacebuilding processes in Somalia?	5.1.1 PBF investments seen as innovative and pioneering in terms of taking risks compared to other donors	Document Synthesis PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation
		5.1.2 PBF support portfolio seizes important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact	
		5.1.3 BF Portfolio leveraged its niche role for maximum effect	
		5.1.4 PBF Portfolio supported activities/approaches being mainstreamed into other projects by the local stakeholders and/or other donors/RUNOs/INGOs in the country (or in other contexts)	
		5.1.5 Government commitment to peacebuilding is increased	
		5.1.6 Processes unleashed that contribute to other peacebuilding efforts	
		5.1.8 Synergies verified across outcome areas of the PBF Portfolio (e.g. networks created that serve as platforms for other peacebuilding efforts)	
5.2	What are key peacebuilding gaps remaining to be addressed?	5.1.9 Integration of key stakeholders in more inclusive manner in PBF support and in the design, implementation and oversight of the PBF Portfolio.	TOC Analysis PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation
		5.2.1 Peacebuilding Gaps in TOCs	
		5.2.2 Peacebuilding gaps in PBF Portfolio Operationalization of TOCs that led to missed opportunities of the PBF Portfolio and of PBF funding	
		5.2.3 Perception of peacebuilding gaps critical to be addressed in future support	
		5.2.4 Respondents can outline the role of PBF support within the IDP crisis	
5.2.5 Respondents can articulate the PBF role under HIPC initiatives			
No.	Key Question		

6.0	What are key lessons learned from for future peacebuilding programming?	6.0.1 TOC alignment and gaps	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation TOC Analysis Document Synthesis
		6.0.2 Key innovative practices	
		6.0.3 Key sustainability barriers and successes	
		6.0.4 Important approaches for maximum impact	

Category 2: PBF Portfolio Process Considerations – Evaluation Dimensions & Management

Key Questions:

1. Assess how relevant, efficient, effective, sustainable, and gender sensitive the PBF support portfolio and PBF management has been to Somalia
2. To what extent were inclusive decision making, ownership and engagement and overall timeliness and responsiveness integrated into the management systems for the PBF and PBF Portfolio in the 2015-2019 operational period?

Areas of Analysis:

2. PBF Portfolio Development Process
3. PBF Portfolio Operationalization Process
4. PBF Portfolio Implementation Process
5. JSC, RUNO, PBF Management functions

No.	Key Question	Data Tools	Data Analysis Modules
7.0	To what extent have PBF process and PBF Portfolio management been responsive, efficient, and effective?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Document Analysis Exercises • Semi-Structured Interview Guides <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ National Stakeholders/External Observers ○ Implementing Partners ○ District and Municipality Representatives • Thematic FGDs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation • Document Synthesis
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Sources
7.1	How efficient was the PBF Portfolio development process?	7.1.1 Timely development 7.1.2 Responsive 7.1.4 ToC development factors 7.1.5 Decision making transparent 7.1.6 Decision making strategic	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
7.2	How relevant was the PBF	7.2.1 Theory of change for PBF Portfolio connected to Somalia conflict	PBF Portfolio Process

	Portfolio for addressing key peacebuilding needs?	analysis 7.2.2 Number of alternative ToCs identified that provide enhanced relevance 7.2.3 PBF Portfolio projects' theories of change connected to PBF Portfolio TOC 7.2.4 PBF Portfolio aligned with peacebuilding priorities in NDP and other high level strategic documents (e.g. New Deal Compact, CRESTA/A, etc) 7.2.5 PBF Portfolio integrated into FGS peacebuilding priorities	Consolidation Document Synthesis
7.3	How efficient was the PBF Portfolio Operationalization process?	7.3.1 Timely development 7.3.2 Responsive 7.3.3 TOC development high quality 7.3.4 Decision making transparent 7.3.5 Decision making strategic 7.3.6 Project selection process in place and clear 7.3.7 RUNO selection process in place and clear 7.3.8 Clear criteria for selection 7.3.9 Operationalization contributed to the operationalization of CRESTA	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
7.4	How effective were the management processes for the PBF Portfolio implementation phase?	7.4.1 Timely processes 7.4.2 Strategic analysis 7.4.3 Responsive to adjustments 7.4.4 Seized important political opportunities? 7.4.5 Risk factors assessed and managed? 7.4.6 Projects were innovative and complementary	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
7.5	How sustainable are the Peacebuilding gains from the PBF Portfolio?	7.5.1 Degree of Government commitment 7.5.2 Degree of institutional capacity 7.5.3 Degree of UN Commitment 7.5.4 Degree of Government Commitment 7.5.5 External and Internal Political context factors	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis

No.	Key Question		
8.0 How effective and efficient were the arrangements in-country and between PBSO/PBF and the UNCT for PBF Portfolio Management			
No.	Sub-questions	Judgment Criteria	Sources
8.1	How well did the management processes with the PBF/PBSO provide good support to the PBF Portfolio?	8.1.1 Decision making processes transparent 8.1.2 Decision making processes efficient 8.1.3 Decision making processes led to good decisions 8.1.4 Approval processes timely	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.2	To what extent did the JSC processes include high degree of ownership and diverse engagements	8.2.1 Government Leadership Strength 8.2.2. Civil Society Representation 8.2.3 Stakeholder diversity	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.3	How responsive was the JSC to adaptation over the course of the PPP?	8.3.1 Leadership 8.3.2 Membership levels 8.3.3 Technical capacity 8.3.4 Structure 8.3.5 Government, civil society, and RUNO/UNCT ownership and engagement	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.4	What was the level of technical capacity of the JSC for project cycle management?	8.4.1. Factors contributing to supporting or inhibiting timely project processes 8.4.2. JSC support bodies functioning effectively 8.4.3. Quality Assurance of monitoring data and reports 8.4.4. Oversight of PBF Portfolio 8.4.5. Early Warning and Risk Management systems in place and used	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.5	How strategic were the JSC decisions regarding the PBF Portfolio?	8.5.1 Degree of project complementarity 8.5.2 RUNOs actively collaborated for common strategic objectives 8.5.3 PBF Portfolio and projects well anchored into national frameworks and UN strategic priorities for Somalia 8.5.4 Degree of strategic analysis carried out by JSC	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.6	What was the degree of technical capacity of the individual RUNOs and their implementing partners	8.6.1 Absorption capacity of RUNOs for implementation 8.6.2 Semi-Annual and Annual Reviews and report quality 8.6.3 RUNOs reporting against higher-level outcomes	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis

8.7	To what extent were the gender considerations mainstreamed throughout PBF support to Somalia via the PBF Portfolio and individual projects?	8.7.1 Projects supporting gender responsive peacebuilding 8.7.2 Women involved in decision making forums and leadership of peacebuilding activities 8.7.3 Change in women's participation in community development activities 8.7.4 CDRC and other locally led local grievance mechanisms include women 8.7.5 Women's committees functioning effectively	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
8.8	To what extent were Gender and Do No Harm principles integrated into project cycle management and implementation	8.8.1 Gender sensitivity present in all four phases: Design, implementation, monitoring and reporting 8.8.2 Sufficient gender expertise available in the UNCT to support gender integration 8.8.3 Do no harm principles integrated into daily management and oversight processes	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis
Key Question			
9.0	What are important lessons for international PBF Management of PBF Portfolio?	9.0.1 Number of lessons learned for management of PBF Portfolio and PBF with international application including successes and challenges	PBF Portfolio Process Consolidation Document Synthesis

5.5 Annex 5: Evaluation Team Mission Schedule

Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Weds	Thursday	Friday	Saturday
29- Sept	30 -Sept	1-Oct	2-Oct	3-Oct	4-Oct	5-Oct
<i>Government interviews Mogadishu</i>	<i>Government interviews Mogadishu</i>	<i>Government interviews Mogadishu</i>	<i>Government interviews Mogadishu</i>	<i>Government interviews Mogadishu</i>		ET arrival A.M. MIA: Induction meeting with PBF Coordinator <i>Team meeting</i>
<i>District Council Baclad Interview</i>	<i>District Council Baclad Interview</i>	<i>District Council Baclad Interview</i>	<i>District Council Baclad Interview</i>	<i>District Council Baclad Interview</i>		
6-Oct	7-Oct	8-Oct	9-Oct	10-Oct	11-Oct	12-Oct

<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews (Team together) 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews Government stakeholders Interviews 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Baidoa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government stakeholders Interviews UN/NGOs Interviews 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Baidoa</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government stakeholders Interviews UN/NGOs Interviews 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p><i>Travel from Baidoa to Hurdur (1 ET member)</i></p> <p><i>Travel from Baidoa to MIA (1 ET Member)</i></p>	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN /Virtual Skype interviews <p>Hurdur</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential Thematic FGDs KIIs with govtstakeholders 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Hurdur</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential Thematic FGDs KIIs withGovt stakeholders
13-Oct	14-Oct	15 –Oct	16 –Oct	17 –Oct	18 -Oct	19-Oct
<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews Government stakeholders Interviews 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Kismayo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government Stakeholders UN/NGOs 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Kismayo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government Stakeholders UN/NGOs 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Kismayo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/NGOs <p>Dollow District</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Potential Thematic FGDs KIIs with govt stakeholders 	<p>MIA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/virtual Skype interviews <p>Kismayo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> UN/NGOs <p><i>Travel from Dollow to MIA (1 ET Member)</i></p>	<p>MIA</p> <p>ET Meeting - Data Analysis</p> <p>Team together day</p>	<p>MIA</p> <p>ET Meeting - Data Analysis</p> <p>Team together day</p>
20-Oct	21-Oct	22 –Oct	16 –Oct	17 –Oct	18 -Oct	19-Oct
<p>Exit Debriefing: Preliminary Presentation of findings</p> <p>Team together day</p>	ET Departure					

5.6 Annex 6: List of Persons Interviewed

Inception Phase

Name	Title
George Conway	Acting SRSG for Somalia
Liam Perret	Peacebuilding Expert in Cameroon (former PBF Coordinator for Somalia)
Nikki Ganz	Assistant to SRSG for Somalia
Peter Nordstrom	PBF Coordinator for Somalia
Marcus Lenzen	Deputy to the Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding
Marc-André Franche	Director of PBF

Field Phase

#	Name	Organization/Title	Location/Date
	Adam Abdemoula	DSRSG/RC/HC Somalia	Magodishu, 06/10/2019
	George Conway	Former acting DSRSG/RC/HC, DSRSG	Magodishu, 06/10/2019
	Dyane Epstein	IOM Chief of Mission	Magodishu, 06/10/2019
	William Ejalu	UNHCR Head of Sub-Office for South Central	Magodishu, 07/10/2019
	Peter Opio	UNHCR	Magodishu, 07/10/2019
	Bornface Banda	UNHCR	Magodishu, 07/10/2019
	Paul Simkin,	JPLG, Daldhis	Magodishu, 08/10/2019
	Anka Katunzi	UNCDF, Daldhis	Magodishu, 08/10/2019
	Ygor Scarcia	UNIDO, Daldhis	Magodishu, 08/10/2019
	Ishaku Maitumbi	UN Habitat Country Representative	Magodishu, 08/10/2019
	Martha Kow Donkor,	UNHCR, Cross Border Pilot project	Magodishu, 09/10/2019
	Abdulkadir	ILO- Kenya Somalia Cross Border Pilot project	Magodishu, 09/10/2019
	Chanil	Global Pulse	Magodishu, 09/10/2019
	Merita Jorga	Risk Management, Pilot project Strengthen Service Delivery through Federal Government Systems	Magodishu, 09/10/2019
	Sahra Bile	UNDP, UN Joint Rule of Law Programme	Magodishu, 10/10/2019
	Ruth Pleiderer	UNDP, UN Joint Rule of Law Programme	Magodishu, 10/10/2019
	Dr Yahye Ali	Senior Advisor, Office of the Prime Minister, Support to Reconciliation Conferences	Magodishu, 10/10/2019
	Julius Otem	UN Women, Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding	Magodishu, 13/10/2019
	Peter Nordstrom	PBF Coordinator	Magodishu, 05/10/2019
	Petros Vanderpoll	S2S Project Manager	Magodishu, 06/10/2019
	Ramadhan Elmi	Ministry of interior federal affairs and reconciliation and is the stabilization coordinator	Mogadishu International Airport, village hotel, 19/09/2019
	Teresa Del Ministro	Durable Solutions, Integrated Office	Mogadishu, 09/10/2019
	Mohamed Hussein Hassan	Minister of Justice South West State	Baidoa, 08/10/2019

	Abdulkon Hassan Ibrahim	Ministry of Justice South West State, Admin/Finance/HR Officer	Baidoa, 08/10/2019
	Abdusalam Osman	Ministry of Justice SWS, Senior Legal Officer	Baidoa, 08/10/2019
	Abdullah Asan Ibrahim	Ministry of Justice SWS, Mobile Court Coordinator	Baidoa, 08/10/2019
	Nasir Abdi Arush	Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management SWS	Baidoa, 08/10/2019
	Mohamed Maolin Isack	Board Member and former programme manager WARDO NGO/Daldhis project	Hudur, 09/10/2019
	Suliyman Bashir Mohamed	Focal point man WARDO	Hudur, 09/10/2019
	Jaylani Ukashi Akukar	Programme manager WARDO	Hudur, 09/10/2019
	Abdulahi sheikh Hussein Mohamed	Current D.G petroleum and mine resources (former DG min of labour, and employment) UNDP YES (ERD) Economic, Recovery and Development Unit	
	Mubarik Mohamoud	Project Officer, UNDP Gender, Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding Project	Skype, 13/10/2019
	Shipra Bose	UN Gender Advisor, Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding	Skype 14/10/2019
	Sophos Sofianos	UN Habitat	07/10/2019
	Gulaid Ahmed Hassan	Supreme Court Technical Advisor (UNDP ROL)	30/09/2019
	Yusuf Haji	Ministry of Justice Technical Advisor	30/09/2019
	Osman Moalim	SOYDEN Executive Director (S2S)	06/10/2019
	Ali Mohamed Osman	Director of Local Government, Ministry of Interior	06/10/2019
	Abdiaziz Omar	HDC NGO Executive Director	06/10/2019
	Abdulkadir Hirsi Ali	WARDo Executive Director	08/10/2019
	Mustafa Abdulahi Hassan	DG Ministry of Interior, SWS	09/10/2019
	Zubair Moallim Hassan	SOYDEN Community Liaison Officer	09/10/2019
	Muktar Nor Ayanle	YES Regional Coordinator, MOSLA SWS	09/10/2019
	Mohamed Lukman	WARDo Project officer	09/10/2019
	Mohamed Maalim Ahmed	DC and mayor of Hudur	09/10/2019
	Ali Yusuf Ibrahim	Community Liaison Officer, Hudur	09/10/2019
	Albert Soer	UNDP, Portfolio Manager, Effective Institutions & ERD	06/10/2019
	Shawn Patterson	UNIDO Technical Officer, YES	07/10/2019
	Mohamed Sufi Adam	DG SWS, MOLSA	08/10/2019
	Jeremy Shushterman	Chief Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation, UNICEF	08/10/2019
	Doel Mukerjee	UNDP Rule of Law Programme	10/10/2019

	Sadia Mohammed	Director of Gender, Ministry of Women.	10/10/2019
	Abdirahman Abdi Ahmed	DG Ministry of Interior, Jubaland	13/10/2019
	Ahmed Osman	DG, Ministry of Education, Jubaland	15/10/2019
	Abdirahman Barkadle	UN Habitat Programme Officer, Kismayo	15/10/2019
	Ben Mbaura	IOM, Durable Solutions Project Officer	15/10/2019
	Irfan Mahmood	Operations Specialist, Inclusive Politics Portfolio/REES Reconciliation/Project, Mogadishu	16/10/2019
	Isak Abdulchi	former Project Officer, Reconciliation Project/STEF	16/10/2019
	Samuel Teneegen	Operations Officer, REFS	16/10/2019
	Atul Shekhal	former Project Manager, Reconciliation/STEEF/PBF/	16/10/2019
	Samira Hassan,	former Program Manager, STEEF/PBF/ skype	16/10/2019
	Basra Arte	Strategic Governance Advisor Peacebuilding & Sustainability, Ministry of Interior, Jubaland State of Somalia, Midnimo Project /skype	17/10/2019
	Fadumo Mumin	M&E Specialist, PBF Secretariat	17/10/2019
	Ali Yusuf Abdirahman	Community Liaison Officer - Hudur	15/10/2019
	Mohamed Sugow Geedi	Beneficiary - Chairman of Shakalaha Jubaland	17/10/2019
	Mohamed Ali	Beneficiary - Jubaland IDP Community Representative	17/10/2019
	Abdi Fatax Aden Abdillahi	Beneficiary - Jubaland - Chairman Fanole Residence	17/10/2019
	Farhan Mohamud Farx	Beneficiary - Jubaland - Allanley Resident Community Spokesperson	17/10/2019
	Farax Ahmed Rashid	Beneficiary - Jubaland - Returnee Community Representative	17/10/2019
	Deeq Abdulahi Farah	Ministry of Interior - Jubaland - Admin and Finance Officer	15/10/2019
	Mohamed Noor Xathar	Jubaland IDP and Refugee commission - Ministry of Interior	15/10/2019
	Abdisalan Kassim Salat	UNIDO Field Coordinator - (until Dec. 2018)	15/10/2019
	Liam Perret	Former PBF Coordinator Somalia	1/11/2019
	Marcus Lenzen	Deputy to the Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding	1/11/2019
	Patrice Chiwota	Former Deputy to the Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding – Somalia Contact	6/11/2019

5.7 Annex 7: Project by Project ToC Analysis

PBF Priority Area 1. Support to Implementation of Peace Agreements and Political Dialogue			
Outcome level ToC	PBF programme practice is effective IF it results in more functional institutions of justice and security providing fair and competent services to the population, and reducing then frustration and the potential for instrumentalization of populations to undertake violent or extra-legal action		
<i>Project title (RUNO)</i>	<i>Somalia Joint Rule of Law Programme - Justice and Corrections Support</i> UNDP, UNOPS, UNODC, UNICEF		
Project Level ToC	<p>IF (i) capable and responsible key justice and security institutions are established at the Federal level and Puntland; (ii) the capacity of the justice system stakeholders and law enforcement are enhanced, facilities are improved, and the knowledge management is enhanced; (iii) capacity of the corrections system to safeguard the rights of detainees and operate effectively and in accordance with national and international standards through targeted activities is increased; and (iv) the overall functioning of the Justice Sector is enhanced through increased access to justice and improved legal education and awareness and functioning youth justice system is established;</p> <p>Then Somalia will have independent and accountable justice institutions capable of addressing the justice needs of the people by delivering justice for all.</p>		
Key Outputs/Activities	<p>-Provide training, technical assistance, and infrastructure to 1) key justice institutions; 2) police force and security institutions, 3) lawyers and legal aid service providers; 3) Ministry of Justice priority units or departments</p> <p>-Provide infrastructure, equipment, and training to permanent and mobile courts</p> <p>-Build, refurbish, or equip corrections service structures</p> <p>-Develop standards of performance and internal regulations for justice and law enforcement institutions</p>		
Obs.	The project has a complex logframe with two sub-ToCs one for Somalia and one for Somaliland. There project logic directly contributes to Outcome 1 of the PPP and PBF Priority Area 1.		
PBF Priority Area 2. Promote coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution			
Outcome level ToC	PBF programme practice is effective IF social cohesion at local level becomes a key driver for national reconciliation through inclusive partnerships, the strengthening of democratic institutions and civil society organizations to contribute to the management of root causes of conflicts		
<i>Project title (RUNO)</i>	<i>Strengthening women's role and participation in peacebuilding - Towards just, fair and inclusive Somalia</i> UNDP, UNSOM, UN Women	<i>Support for Somalia Reconciliation Conferences</i> UNDP	<i>Midnimo (Unity) -Midnimo (Unity) - Support for the Attainment of Durable Solutions in Areas Impacted by Displacement and Returns in Jubaland and South West States</i> IOM & UNHABITAT
Project Level ToC	IF (i)the participation of women in political and public policy making processes is enhanced; ii) the capacity of MoWHRD and women CSOs, in particular their leadership role, policy making competence, advocacy and	IF (i)the FGS is supported with facilitating reconciliation and political dialogue around federalism and state formation,(ii) there is an increased understanding of the federalization, legal framework and boundaries processes amongst	IF (i) government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able, to respond to the various needs of the population in Southern and Central Somalia and (ii) targeted communities in Southern and Central Somalia are able to define and drive their own recovery,

	negotiation skills so as to inform and influence the PSG processes is increased, and iii) the commitments by the Compact to advance gender equality and women's empowerment are realized, THEN , women's role in peacebuilding will be strengthened	stakeholders, citizens and civil society; (iii) the civic participation and engagement with interim state administrations is strengthened; and (iv) newly emerging/interim administration have basic organizational structures in place / THEN Somalia will have an inclusive political dialogue which will build relationships between the Federal Government and existing or emerging administrations and will initiate the process of social reconciliation to restore trust between communities.	durable solutions and community security, THEN Displaced, returnees and host communities will be able to coexist peacefully and recover sustainably towards self-resilience.
Key Outputs/Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Increase capacity of gender advocates to promote women's participation in peace building and state building processes - Key policy making institutions adopt policies, legal and administrative frameworks -Increase representation of women as candidates for political offices - MoWHRD effectively coordinates with CSOs on advocacy for gender-responsive policy development. - CSO capacities built to promote community engagement in peacebuilding and state formation processes -Representation and contribution of MoWHRD, regional gender machineries and women-led/gender-focused CSOs to the Somali Compact implementation structures is increased and clear Gender results integrated into the PSGs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support the FGS in organizing and facilitating reconciliation conferences, political dialogue and consultations towards state formation /federalism. -Consultations, roundtables, meetings and workshops related to boundaries and federalization -Capacity building of IRAs/emerging state entities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Train district and/or community level government representatives to facilitate durable solutions and community driven recovery -Create community action groups (CAGs) and community-based monitoring and evaluation committees (CBM&Es) to ensure participatory planning, implementation and M&E - Improve access to basic services for target population and communities -Train community-based local dispute resolution committees on land dispute mediation, upgrading and resilience to disasters and local building culture (LBC) -Pilot projects focused on neighborhood-led settlement upgrading, creation of new settlements (mixed use), improved connectivity and services in target clusters of IDP settlements
Obs.	Outputs aligned with the ToC. Logic of intervention contributes to the PBF priority area and PPP outcomes 1 and 2.	Outputs aligned with the ToC. Logic of intervention contributes to the PBF priority area and PPP outcomes 2 and 2.	Outputs aligned with the ToC. Logic of intervention contributes to the PBF priority area and PPP outcomes 2 and 2.
PBF Priority Area 3. Revitalise the economy and immediate peace dividends			
Outcome level ToC	PBF programme practice is effective IF youth with opportunities to articulate political and social views peacefully (engagement) and earn livelihoods are less easily instrumentalized into extra-legal political conflict and mob violence		
<i>Project title (RUNO)</i>	<i>The Kenya-Somalia refugees and peacebuilding cross border pilot project for voluntary return, co-existence and sustainable Reintegration in the areas</i>		

	<i>of return</i> UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, WFP, IOM, ILO				
Project Level ToC	IF (i) the capacities for economic revitalization, peace and community reconciliation and positive participation in democratic governance are in increased and (ii) Somalia returnees in Baidoa peacefully co-exist with their host communities and contribute to local development THEN overall capacities for peacebuilding will be enhanced and reintegration of returnees will be successful				
Key Outputs/Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Capacity building in peace building and conflict resolution for 3,000 voluntary returnees; training refugee gatekeepers on conflict resolution - Coordination mechanism for stabilization efforts are established with relevant stakeholders at national and district level (in the Performance Assessment but not in the narrative) - Equitable access to social services, enhanced capacities for peace and social reconciliation for returnees in Baidoa - Provision of basic needs and services to returnees, DPs and host communities in Baidoa - Employment opportunities created and economic infrastructure improved - Livelihood support to refugees and IDPs; agricultural and livestock package to returnees - Reduced vulnerabilities and enhanced coping capacities to shocks for both the returnees and the local community through coherent humanitarian and early recovery to development response in return/newly recovered areas. - Management of the Protection and Return Monitoring Network (PRMN) 				
Obs.	Outputs aligned with the ToC. No activities listed in the logframe. Logic of intervention contributes to the PBF priority area 1, 3, and 4 and PPP outcome 2.				
PBF Priority Area 4: (Re-)build essential administrative services and infrastructure					
Outcome level ToC	PBF programme practice is effective if it results in supporting administrative reforms at local level that address unequal access to basic public services as underlying conflict cause, and increasing trust of populations in governments				
<i>Project title (RUNO)</i>	<i>Support to the Federal Government of Somalia in Stabilization in Newly Recovered Areas (S2S)</i> UNDP and UNMPTF	<i>Pilot Project to Strengthen Service Delivery Through Federal Government Systems in Federal Member States and Interim Regional Administrations</i> UNDP, Ministry of Finance, FGS	<i>Risk Management Support for the UN MPTF Somalia and Somalia Development and Recovery Facility (SDRF)</i> UNDP	<i>Coordination Support for the Implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority and Measures to Pilot Studies of Public Response to Peace and State building Efforts in Somalia</i> UNDP	<i>Daldhis (Build Your Country) - An integrated approach to re-establish the State-Citizen link in Jubbaland and South West State of Somalia</i> UNDP, JPLG (UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, UNCDF, UNHABITAT), UNIDO

<p>Project Level ToC</p>	<p>IF (i)the Federal, State, and District level administrations have the capacity to oversee, coordinate and implement stabilization activities and (ii)an enabling environment conducive to social cohesion, trust, civic participation and development led by the community is established in the inaccessible districts THEN the newly recovered areas will be supported in the stabilization process</p>	<p>IF (i)the Somali citizens in the target locations perceive their federal member states and the Federal Government of Somalia as being more legitimate thanks to the improvement on infrastructures in their communities and (ii) the National systems with the Ministry of Finance's PIU are established as a sound project management model able to deliver tangible deliverables thereby improving its credibility with the donors THEN the government will gain greater legitimacy and more service delivery will be through the Federal government system.</p>	<p>IF (i)there are effective funding instruments in place and (ii) sound project management and Risk Manager position is maintained THEN SDRF Trust Funds including the UN MPTF, will have dedicated risk management capacity to reduce the occurrence and impact of risks on the Trust Funds</p>	<p>IF (i) effective coordination support in the design and implementation of the PRF projects is in place and (ii) efforts to remotely monitor Somali Public perceptions and behaviours relevant to the ongoing peacebuilding state building processes are supported THEN the Peacebuilding Priority Plan will provide an effective contribution to Somalia's peacebuilding and statebuilding</p>	<p>IF (i) Government structures and institutions at Federal, regional, district and community level are strengthened, more accountable and transparent and better able to listen and respond to the various needs of the population of South and Central Somalia and (ii) Communities in South and Central Somalia generate the demand for, and benefit from local governance, security, justice, economic and social solutions, THEN the state-citizen relationship and trust will be strengthened and State legitimacy increased</p>
<p>Key Outputs/ Activities</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implement financial procedures for the flow of funds between the various levels of governments - Establish coordination mechanism with relevant stakeholders at national and district level - Establish community Representative District Peace and Stability Committees (DPSCs) - Hold civic dialogue and consultations to ensure community participation in the formation of new district governing structures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PIU leads rehabilitation/ construction of four (4) small scale infrastructures in three FMS and Banadir region - PIU develops successful communication campaign to promote the work of the FGS/IRAs in rehabilitating infrastructures - PIU and IRA civil servants use participatory monitoring tool to measure the satisfaction of citizens - Tailored trainings and on the job coaching 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Somalia Risk Management Strategy Implemented - Technical Assistance provided - Do no harm approach implemented in UN MPTF projects - RMU Management - Equipment/ supplies provided to enable project operation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PRF project proposals developed - Technical assistance provided - PPP implementation coordinated -PPP Relevant stakeholder buy-in and proper needs assessment among potential users - Project outcomes achieved as agreed in project plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Develop policy and legislation of the Federal Member States to enable decentralization -Strengthen coordination in support of decentralization by Federal Member States Administration - Strengthened capacity to develop standardized local government systems and structures in Jubaland/South West State -Strengthened civic

					<p>engagement and dialogue with local government/authorities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased access to public and judicial services -Enabling environment through youth dialogue and Local Economic Development
Obs.	Outputs are in alignment with the TOC. No activities listed in the logframe. Project logic contributes to PPP outcome 1 and PBF priority area 4.	Outputs are in alignment with the TOC. Project logic contributes to PPP outcome 1 and PBF priority area 4.	Outputs are in alignment with the TOC. No activities listed in the logframe.	Outputs are in alignment with the TOC and the PPP.	Outputs are in alignment with the TOC and the PPP.

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5.9.2 Semi-Structured Guides

Semi Structured Interview Guides

These guides are designed to be a “semi-structured” interview guide. A semi-structured interview guide is one that is intended to provide some guidance to a conversation, but it is not intended to be read word for word nor followed exactly such as a fixed-response questionnaire.

A different guide has been developed to be tailored to each stakeholder group. However, the numbers in parentheses are to show the linkage between each interview guide question and the corresponding themes in the evaluation matrix.

All notes are recorded in a response matrix and all responses for a particular evaluation matrix theme will be analyzed in combination at the end of the field phase to determine emergent themes and patterns across the responses.

For the actual interview, the interviewer should re-phrase the questions as they see fit to make them appropriate for their audiences. Questions can also be omitted if they are not relevant to the group or if they do not seem to be generating good data and insights. Semi-structured interview guides should be seen as general skeletons, but it is up to the facilitator to provide the “meat” to the conversation. A normal semi-structured guide is organized as follows:

1. General, **open-ended**, questions that allow respondents to answer in whatever form comes to their mind first.
 - a. It is important to note what people say first and to allow them to express themselves in their own words.
2. Underneath each open-ended question are a series of short checklists called **“probes”**.
 - a. **These are not to be read as part of the question.** Probes are intended to serve to remind the facilitator about items they may wish to inquire about more deeply as follow up.

Each section covers a different segment of the Evaluation TOR and Matrix. The facilitator should only cover a segment if the respondent has sufficient experience or insights to address the segment. Depending on the stakeholder and its knowledge/degree of engagement with the PPP/projects, the interviewer should foresee 1,5 hours on average for each interview. The interviewer should introduce itself and clarify the purpose of the evaluation, as well as the confidentiality of the interview (i.e. when quoting KIs, attribution will be made to categories of stakeholders, not individuals or organizations)

Semi Structured Interview Guide Coordinating Committee¹⁰¹/PBF Secretariat

Section 1: PBF Portfolio Framework Development

1. What do you see as some of the main challenges and successes of the PPP or PBF Portfolio framework development phase? (4.1)
2. To what degree did you see the recommendations from the Needs assessments and conflict analysis taken into account in terms of interventions and stakeholders? (4.1)
 - a. youth, women, corruption, government capacity, early warning systems, rumour control (media), language, police inclusion, political mediation, political parties
3. Looking back from the PBF's early engagement since 2016 what main changes did you see in programming approaches? (4.1)
4. What were the primary frameworks that were used to orient the PBF portfolio of support? What did you see as some of the main strategic objectives?
5. In retrospect, how relevant do you see the theories of change developed in the design of the current phase of PBF support for identifying the key/central peace building issues in Somalia? (2.2)
 - a. Gaps that couldn't be addressed
6. Were there any political/strategic issues you felt should have been addressed or are missing under the PBF portfolio of support? (2.2)
7. How well integrated do you see the PBF portfolio of support into: (2.2)
 - Government of Somalia priorities
 - NDP/UNCT?

Section 2: Operationalization of the PPP

8. We would like to hear your perspective on the process for the operationalization of the PBF portfolio of support. What were some of the successes and challenges in the project selection phase? (4.2)
 - a. Criteria/Logic for project support and selection?
 - b. Frameworks used for alignment projects.
 - c. Innovation and catalytic effect consideration?
 - d. Interests and Positions?
 - e. What types of projects were NOT selected?
9. In retrospect, how well do the collection of projects contribute to the key strategic challenges/opportunities for Somalia? (4.2)
10. How well do you see the final collection of projects representing the Theory of Change? (2.2)
11. How innovative were the range of projects supported? (2.1)
 - a. Which ones were seen as riskier?
 - b. More traditional

Section 3: PBF portfolio of support Efficiency, Effectiveness and Gender

12. In general, was the PBF portfolio of support implemented in a timely and cost effective manner? (4.3)
 - a. What were the most significant barriers to efficient implementation?

¹⁰¹Some of the coordinating committee members may be interviewed as part of the UNCT or government, in which instance some of the specific questions under this interview guide may be taken and adapted to the standard interview guides.

13. How responsive was the PBF portfolio of support to new challenges or barriers to implementation (4.3)
 - a. What adjustment were made based on lessons learned
14. How did you see gender considerations integrated into PBF interventions (5.7)
 - a. Response to women's needs
 - b. Women inclusion in decision making
 - c. Women inclusion in project monitoring
15. Did you feel there was sufficient gender expertise available in the UNCT to support integration of gender into programming? (5.7)
16. To what extent did the PBF projects and implementing partners work in complementarity? (5.5)
17. To what degree were early warning and risk management systems in place and used by the PBF portfolio of support? (5.4)
18. How responsive was the PBF portfolio of support in seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact (5.3)
 - Positive examples
 - Missed opportunities

Section 4: Impact& Sustainability

Impact

19. In retrospect, what do as you see as being the primary contributions of the PBF portfolio of support to peacebuilding in Somalia? (1.0)
20. How did you see the PBF portfolio providing added value from its niche in the overall context of funding? How strategic has been its leverage for peacebuilding?

Sustainability

21. In your perspective, how sustainable are the peacebuilding gains achieved in this the PBF portfolio of support cycle? (2.3)
 - By outcome?
 - By project?
22. What are some factors that are supporting or inhibiting potential sustainability of the gains? (2.3)
 - Government commitment – which sectors
 - Institutional capacity – Local, state, national, civil society
 - Stakeholder dynamics
 - External and internal political forces
 - Other social forces

Section 5: Management

In this section, we'd like to explore in more detail the dynamics of the PBF portfolio of support management structure and the various support entities that we touched on earlier.

PBF/PBSO

23. How well did the management processes with the PBF/PBSO provide good support to the PBF portfolio of support? (5.1)
 - Successes/Challenges
24. How would you rate the decision making processes within the PBF/PBSO? (5.1)

- Transparent
- Responsive
- Strategic
- Timely

25. How timely were the PBF/PBSO management processes? (5.1)

- Approvals delays
- Disbursement delays
- Others

Coordinating Committee

26. To what extent did the coordinating committee and management processes include a high degree of ownership and diverse engagements? (5.2)

27. What changes or adaptations did the coordinating committee go through over the course of the last three years of this cycle? (5.3)

- Leadership
- Membership levels and categories
- Technical capacity for management
- Government ownership and engagement
- Civil society ownership and engagement
- RUNO/UNCT ownership and engagement

28. What was the level of technical capacity of the coordinating committee for managing the PBF portfolio of support? (5.4)

a. Strategic discussions?

29. How successful was the use of the coordinating committee support bodies for management of the PBF portfolio of support? (5.4)

- Successes/challenges

30. To what degree did the coordinating committee engage in context analysis for early warning or risk management? (5.4)

RUNOs.

31. How would you rate the technical capacity of the RUNOs for meeting the PBF expectations for project management? (5.6)

- Specific dimensions (management and implementation)
- Variations among RUNOs

32. How would you rate the technical capacity of the implementing partners for project management? (5.6)

33. How did you see principles of gender sensitivity and do no harm being integrated into the PBF projects and their management? (5.8)

Section 6: Value Add, Lessons Learned and Future Directions

34. Comparing the projects that were developed under the PBF portfolio of support before 2018 with those that were developed since then, what similarities or differences do you between these two clusters of projects?

- Design
- Thematic orientation
- Coherence
- Management
- Framework alignments
- Others

35. What types of catalytic effects from the PBF processes have you seen contributing to peacebuilding in Somalia? (2.1)
- a. Has the PBF catalysed additional support/commitment (political, financial) by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - b. Has the PBF catalysed additional innovative programming adaptation by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - c. Networks as a platform for other peacebuilding?
 - d. Government commitment or changes
 - e. Innovative and Risk Taking Programming
36. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for peace building programming to consider? (3.0)
37. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for PBF management? (6.0)
38. Looking ahead, what do you feel should be the next peacebuilding priorities in Somalia? (2.4)
- a. What would be the most meaningful change towards lasting peace?

Government, Civil society and Donors General Guide for the overall PBF Portfolio of Support

Section 1: Introduction

1. What has been your role in peacebuilding work in Somalia?
2. To what degree are you familiar with the overall PBF portfolio?

Section 2: Relevance

1. In your view, how relevant was the PBF portfolio of support for addressing the key peacebuilding needs in Somalia?
2. How well aligned do you see the PBF portfolio of support into: (2.2)
 - Government of Somalia Priorities
 - NDP, CRESTA/A alignment
3. How responsive was the PBF portfolio of support in seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact? (5.3)

Section 3: Impact & Sustainability

Impact

1. In retrospect, what do you see as being the primary contributions of the PBF portfolio of support to peacebuilding in Somalia?
2. How did you see the PBF portfolio providing added value from its niche in the overall context of funding? How strategic has been its leverage for peacebuilding?

Sustainability

1. In your perspective, how sustainable are the peacebuilding gains achieved by the gains cycle? (2.3)
 - By outcome?
 - By project?
2. What are some factors that are supporting or inhibiting potential sustainability of the gains? (2.3)
 - Government commitment – which sectors
 - Institutional capacity – Local, state, national, civil society
 - Stakeholder dynamics
 - External and internal political forces
 - Other social forces

Section 4: Value Add, Lessons Learned and Future Directions

1. Comparing the projects that were developed under the PBF portfolio of support before 2018 with those that were developed since then, what similarities or differences do you see between these two clusters of projects?
 - a. Design
 - b. Thematic orientation
 - c. Coherence
 - d. Management
 - e. Framework alignments
 - f. Others
2. To what degree do you see donors and others using the PBF frameworks and priority plan as a reference for their own programming? (2.2, 2.3)

3. Have you seen synergies or complementarity between the PBF portfolio of support and other peacebuilding action? (2.3)
4. What types of catalytic effects from the PBF portfolio and management processes have you seen contributing to peacebuilding in Somalia? (2.1)
 - a. Has the PBF catalyzed additional support/commitment (political, financial) by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - b. Has the PBF catalyzed additional innovative programming adaptation by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - c. Networks as a platform for other peacebuilding?
 - d. Government commitment or changes
 - e. Innovative and Risk Taking Programming
5. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for peace building programming to consider? (3.0)
6. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for PBF management? (6.0)
7. Looking ahead, what do you feel should be the next peacebuilding priorities in Somalia? (2.4)
 - a. What would be the most meaningful change towards lasting peace?

Implementing Partners

To be used with stakeholders who have been involved with a specific project

Section 1: Introduction

- . What has been your role in this project? (if the project is a follow-up from a previous project, was he/she involved in the project?)
 1. How long have you been connected to the project?
 2. To what degree are you familiar with the overall PBF portfolio of support and management?

Section 2: Project Development

Project Development

1. How would you describe the process that was used for the development of this project? (4.2)
 - a. Inclusive process
 - b. Level of government consultation
 - c. Other
2. Can you describe the process that was used to develop the Theories of Change for the Project? (4.2)
 - a. Collaborative and Consultative
 - b. Any particular interests dominated
 - c. Intentional reference to PPP TOC
3. In retrospect, how relevant do you see the project theories of change for identifying the key/central peace building issues in Somalia? (2.2)
 - a. Gaps that couldn't be addressed.

Section 3: Operationalization of the Project

1. We would like to hear your perspective on the process for the operationalization of the project in the project. What was the process for selecting this project to be included in the PBF Portfolio of support? (4.2)
 - a. Frameworks used for alignment.
 - b. Criteria/Logic?
 - c. Interests and Positions?
 - d. Clear communication?
 - e. Delays?
2. How innovative is this project in the peace building context? (2.1)
 - a. Factors making it innovative
 - b. Factors making it traditional

Section 4: Evaluation Dimensions: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Gender

1. In general, were the Project interventions implemented in a timely and cost effective manner? (4.3)
2. What were the most significant barriers to efficient implementation? (4.3)
3. How responsive was the project to new challenges or barriers to implementation (4.3)
 - a. What adjustment were made based on lessons learned
 - b. Any adjustments made as a result of changes in context, if any?
4. How responsive was the coordinating committee or other PBF Management to challenges or barriers to implementation for this project? (4.3)
 - a. Adjustments on lessons learned.
 - b. Connected/Not connected
5. How would you describe how gender considerations integrated into Project interventions (5.7)
 - a. Response to women's needs

- b. Women inclusion in decision making
 - c. Women inclusion in project monitoring
6. To what extent did the project (and implementing partners) work in complementarity with other PBF supported projects? (5.5)
 7. How responsive was the project in seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact? (5.3)
 - a. Positive examples
 - b. Missed opportunities

Section 5: Impact & Sustainability

1. In retrospect, what do you see as being the primary contributions of the PBF portfolio of support to peacebuilding in Somalia?
2. How did you see the PBF portfolio providing added value from its niche in the overall context of funding? How strategic has been its leverage for peacebuilding?

Sustainability

3. In your perspective, how sustainable are the peacebuilding gains achieved in this project cycle? (2.3)
 - a. By level
 - b. By stakeholder
4. What are some factors that are supporting or inhibiting potential sustainability of the gains? (2.3)
 - a. Government commitment – which sectors
 - b. Institutional capacity – Local, state, national, civil society
 - c. Stakeholder
 - d. Political or social forces

Section 6: Management

In this section, we'd like to explore in more detail the dynamics of the PPP management structure and the various support entities that we touched on earlier.

PBF/PBSO

1. How well did the management processes with the PBF/PBSO provide good support to the Project? (5.1)
 - a. Successes/Challenges
 - b. Relevance?

Coordinating Committee (CC)

2. How would you rate the management processes within the CC as they impacted the project? (5.4)
 - a. Success/Challenges
 - b. How strategic were the CC decisions regarding the project (if any)?

RUNOs

3. How would you rate the technical capacity of the RUNO for the project for meeting the PBF expectations in project management? (5.6)
 - a. Dimensions of managements
 - b. Dimensions of implementation
4. How did you see principles of gender sensitivity and do no harm being integrated into the project and its management? (5.7)

Section 7: Value Add, Lessons Learned and Future Directions

1. Comparing the projects that were developed under the PBF portfolio of support before 2018 with those that were developed since then, what similarities or differences do you see between these two clusters of projects?
 - a. Design
 - b. Thematic orientation
 - c. Coherence
 - d. Management
 - e. Framework alignments
 - f. Others
2. What are some of the most important types of catalytic effects from the project processes have you seen contributing to peacebuilding in Somalia? (2.1)
 - a. Has the project catalyzed additional support/commitment (political, financial) by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - b. Has the project catalyzed additional innovative programming adaptation by (i) national stakeholders, and (ii) donors/international actors?
 - c. Networks as a platform for other peacebuilding?
 - d. Government commitment or changes
 - e. Innovative and Risk Taking Programming
3. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for peace building programming to consider? (3.0)
4. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for PBF management? (6.0)
5. Looking ahead, what do you feel should be the next peacebuilding priorities in Somalia? (2.4)
 - a. What would be the most meaningful change towards lasting peace?

District Council Stakeholders

Section 1: Introduction

1. What has been your role in the District?
 - a. For how long?
2. Which projects do you remember being implemented for peacebuilding in this district?
3. How connected were you with any of these projects?

Section2: Development and Relevance

1. Would you describe the process that led to the development of the project/s? (4.3)
 - a. How did you first hear about the projects?
 - i. Inclusive?
 - ii. Transparent
 - iii. Government commitment
2. From your perspective, how relevant were the project/s in this District for achieving peacebuilding outcomes? (2.2)
 - a. What were some gaps for peacebuilding that weren't being addressed by the project/s
3. How innovative did you see the project activities? (2.1)
 - a. Originality/traditional
4. How well integrated do you see the project/s into: (2.2)
 - a. Local Government Priorities
 - b. Other development and peacebuilding work in the area
5. How has the project/s enabled the municipality to address strategic political/governance and security challenges in the District? (1.0)

Section 3: EvaluationDimensions: Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Gender

1. Based on your observations, how well did it seem that the management processes with the implementing partners provide good support to the projects? (4.3)
 - Successes/Challenges
2. In general, were the project/s interventions implemented in a timely and cost effective manner? (4.3)
3. How did you see the processes for implementation? (5.8)
 - Inclusive and participatory
 - Gender sensitive
 - Ethnic minorities represented
 - Sensitive to language and politics
4. What were the most significant barriers that you saw to efficient implementation? (5.6)
5. How responsive did you see the projects in addressing new challenges or barriers to implementation (5.6)
 - What adjustment were made based on lessons learned
6. To what extent did the project (and implementing partners) work in complementarity with other peacebuilding supported projects? (5.5)
7. How responsive was the project in seizing important political opportunities for greater peacebuilding impact? (5.3)
 - Positive examples

- Missed opportunities

Section 4: Impact and Sustainability

Impact

1. In retrospect, what do you see as being the primary contributions of the PBF portfolio of support to building peace in the District? (1.0)
2. If you had to pick one story or example that best illustrates the type of change brought about by these projects, which story or example would you share? Why did you select this one? What did you like about it?

Story Summary	
Criteria for Selection	

Sustainability

3. In your perspective, how sustainable are the peacebuilding gains achieved in this project for the District? (2.3)
4. What are some factors that are supporting or inhibiting potential sustainability of the gains? (2.3)
 - Government commitment – which sectors
 - Institutional capacity – Local, state, national, civil society
 - Stakeholder dynamics
 - External and internal political forces
 - Other social forces

Section 5: Community Changes

For this next section, we'd like you to reflect a bit on what things were like in the region/district/community three years ago and how they are now on the following factors. Compared to three years ago....

How visible and established are state institutions compared to three years ago?	
How has the level of access to and delivery of services from state and local government offices changed?	
1. To what degree have you seen national legislation changes having an impact at the local level?	
2. To what degree have police and judicial agencies been more responsive and open to inter-ethnic dynamics?	
3. To what degree has the capacity of the local government changed in terms of being able to address disputes or tensions?	
4. How are the inter-clan relationships in the municipality now compared to three years ago?	

Same/better/worse?	
5. What is the sense of common civic identity in the municipality now? Do people feel stronger social cohesion?	
6. How well functioning are the youth organizations (such as the youth committees) in this community? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet regularly • Stable membership • Active • Contain multiple group membership 	
7. How well functioning are the women's organizations (such as the Women's Council) in this community? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet regularly • Stable membership • Active • Contain multiple group membership 	
8. How well are marginalized groups (returnees, ex-combatants, ethnic minorities) integrated into local government entities now compared to three years ago? E.g. Council of Elders, Schools, local police, etc	
9. Beyond the municipality, do you see differences in how women, youth, and ethnic minorities are represented in national government bodies – including legal and judicial law enforcement?	
10. How responsive are the state institutions to human rights and obligations now compared to three years ago?	
11. How would you rate the level of empowerment of youth, women and minority groups in the municipality compared to three years ago? What examples do you see?	
12. How much trust do you think people have in the local government bodies now compared to three years ago?	
13. To what extent are youth, women and minority groups play increased roles in the governance and civil life of the municipality now compared to three years ago?	
14. To what extent are returnees, ex-combatant or other vulnerable groups in the governance and civil life of the municipality now compared to three years ago?	


What types of catalytic effects have you seen from the projects being implemented in this municipality? (2.1)



- a. Has the project catalysed additional support/commitment (political, financial)?
- b. Has the PBF catalysed additional innovative programming adaptation
- c. Networks as a platform for other peacebuilding?
- d. Government commitment or changes
- e. Innovative and Risk Taking Programming
- f. Increased social cohesion and inclusivity

Section 6: Lessons Learned and Future Directions

1. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for building peace in this municipality? (3.0)
2. What do you see as the most important lessons learned for managing projects like these in the municipality? (6.0)
3. Looking ahead, what do you feel should be the next priorities for building peace in the municipality? What are some challenges yet? (2.4)
 - a. What would be the most meaningful change towards lasting peace?

5.9.3 Thematic FGD Exercises

Session: FGD		
☑	Session Objective	Participants engage in description of the context of the municipality in terms of peacebuilding elements.
⊕	Schedule	60 minutes
①	Facilitators	Evaluation Team
	Methodology	<p>Step 1: One a sheet of paper, the facilitator should have a list of the possible dimensions being addressed by PPP. These are to help with memory as the respondents describe their community changes and to serve as prompts as they discuss.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Social Cohesion b. Inter-clan collaboration c. Legal systems and responsiveness d. Violent disputes settled peacefully e. Youth employment f. Local capacity for dispute resolution g. Linkage between FGS and FMS and provision of services h. Women's empowerment i. Access to services especially for MV (IDPs, returnees) _ j. Reintegration and rehabilitation (ex-combatant) k. State institution responsiveness l. Linkage between the traditional and religious legal/justice system and the formal system <p>Step 2: The facilitator should ask people to remember back to 2015.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Think back to 2015. If someone would have asked you to describe the peace conditions in the municipality at that time, what would you have said? What were some things that were challenging for peace? What are some strong peace conditions in the community?</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ As people start describing, take notes under the relevant categories to build a picture of what the community was like. It doesn't matter which theme or order they describe them ○ As they talk, the facilitator should try and get people to describe the most specific incidents or stories that they can. ○ Use the list of dimensions to ask them to talk about different things they've seen. <p>Step 3: After the participants have described 2015 all of the activities that they can repeat the process for 2019.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Now, let's think about 2019. If someone would have asked you to describe the peace conditions in the municipality at that time, what would you have said? What were some things that were challenging for peace? What are some strong peace conditions in the community?</i> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Don't forget to prompt for the same dimensions in the 2015 description.</p> <p>Step 4: The facilitator now asks participants: <i>Now that you've described these</i></p>

		<p><i>changes, what would you say has been the biggest factors that have contributed to either more or less peace now? What caused these conditions to change?</i></p> <p>The facilitator should write down comments around the causes noting successes, challenges, and why.</p> <p>Note which projects were present in the municipality and which types of factors are being highlighted. Are some projects being mentioned more than others?</p> <p>Step 5: After they have reflected on the community context, then the facilitator should ask the Semi-Structured related to future directions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thinking of the future, what are the three most important activities that should be continued to be supported for peacebuilding? Thinking of the future, what are the three most important pieces of advice for peacebuilding work? <p>The note taker should write these responses into the accompanying timeline open-ended questions matrix apart from the rest of the notes on the timeline</p>	
	<p>Documentation</p>	<p>Flipcharts summary observations titled “patterns and conclusions”</p> <p><i>These notes should be added to the excel spreadsheet under the file “FGD Group xxx District Council xxx”</i></p>	
	<p>Resources, Materials and Preparation</p>	<p>Participants</p>	<p>N/A</p>
		<p>Facilitators</p>	<p>Interview guide</p>
		<p>Logistics</p>	<p>Need to select meeting space that can accommodate 10-12 people</p> <p>No new materials needed</p>

5.9.4 Response Matrixes

Evaluation Response Matrixes

Coordinating Committee/PBF Secretariat

Objective	Observations/Notes
PPP Development	
<i>Challenges and Success (4.1)</i>	
<i>Integrated Lessons Learned (4.1)</i>	
<i>Main changes from IRF& PRF (4.1)</i>	
<i>TOC Development (4.1, 2.2)</i>	
<i>TOC Relevance (2.2)</i>	
<i>Missing Issues (2.2)</i>	
<i>Integrated into Frameworks (2.2)</i>	
Operationalization of PPP	
<i>Challenges and Success (4.2)</i>	
<i>Projects key strategic (4.2)</i>	
<i>Connection to PPP TOC (2.2)</i>	
<i>Innovation (2.1)</i>	
PPP Evaluation Dimensions	
<i>Timely and Cost Effective (4.3)</i>	
<i>Responsive to barriers (4.3)</i>	
<i>Gender consideration (5.7)</i>	
<i>Gender expertise (5.7)</i>	
<i>Complementarity (5.5)</i>	
<i>Early Warning/Risk (5.4)</i>	
<i>Responsive to political opportunities (5.3)</i>	
Impact (1.0)	
<i>Development of laws, policies, reforms</i>	
<i>Upholding the rule of law and improving access to justice and protection</i>	
<i>Building local government capacity to reduce tensions</i>	
<i>Improving inter-ethnic relationships</i>	
<i>Increased social cohesion in targeted areas</i>	
<i>Increase trust in local authorities</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in local and state judicial and law enforcement</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, returnees and ethnic minorities in local decision making processes</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in peacebuilding initiatives</i>	
<i>Responsiveness of state institutions to human rights obligations/Rehabilitation/reintegration of ex-combatant</i>	
<i>Empowerment of rights holders</i>	
<i>Improved employment for youth</i>	
<i>Improved linkages between informal (traditional and religious) and formal legal/justice systems</i>	
<i>Functioning of municipalities/Districts</i>	
<i>Increased local capacity and mechanism for peace resolutions</i>	

<i>Functioning of Women's Councils</i>	
<i>Functioning of Youth Committees</i>	
Sustainability	
<i>Gains Sustainable (2.3)</i>	
<i>Factors and challenges (2.3)</i>	
Management	
PBF/PBSO	
<i>Good support?5.1</i>	
<i>Rate decision making processes 5.1</i>	
<i>Timely5.1</i>	
JSC	
<i>Ownership (5.2)</i>	
<i>Changes and adaptations (5.3)</i>	
<i>Technical capacity (5.4)</i>	
<i>Support bodies (5.4)</i>	
<i>Early warning/risk (5.4)</i>	
RUNOs	
<i>Technical capacity (5.6)</i>	
<i>IP capacity (5.6)</i>	
<i>Gender and do no harm (5.8)</i>	
Catalytic and Lessons Learned	
<i>Comparison IRF/PRF (3.0, 6.0)</i>	
<i>Catalytic effects (2.1)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned programming (3.0)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned Management (6.0)</i>	
<i>Peacebuilding Gaps (2.4)</i>	

National Government, UN, Donors

Objective	Observations/Notes
PPP Relevance	
<i>Relevance for key issues (2.2)</i>	
<i>Integration (2.2)</i>	
<i>Responsive to political opportunities (5.3)</i>	
Impact (1.0)	
<i>Development of laws, policies, reforms</i>	
<i>Upholding the rule of law and improving access to justice and protection</i>	
<i>Building local government capacity to reduce tensions</i>	
<i>Improving inter-ethnic relationships</i>	
<i>Increased social cohesion in targeted areas</i>	
<i>Increase trust in local authorities</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in local and state judicial and law enforcement</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, returnees and ethnic minorities in local decision making processes</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in peacebuilding initiatives</i>	
<i>Responsiveness of state institutions to human rights obligations/Rehabilitation/reintegration of ex-combatant</i>	
<i>Empowerment of rights holders</i>	

<i>Improved employment for youth</i>	
<i>Improved linkages between informal (traditional and religious) and formal legal/justice systems</i>	
<i>Functioning of municipalities/Districts</i>	
<i>Increased local capacity and mechanism for peace resolutions</i>	
<i>Functioning of Women's Councils</i>	
<i>Functioning of Youth Committees</i>	
<i>Others</i>	
Sustainability	
<i>Gains Sustainable (2.3)</i>	
<i>Factors and challenges (2.3)</i>	
Catalytic and Lessons Learned	
<i>PPP as a reference for programming? (2.2, 2.3)</i>	
<i>Complementarity and Synergies (2.3)</i>	
<i>Catalytic effects (2.1)</i>	
<i>IRF/PRF Comparison (3.0, 6.0)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned programming (3.0)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned Management (6.0)</i>	
<i>Peacebuilding Gaps (2.4)</i>	

Implementing Partners

Objective	Observations/Notes
PPP Development	
<i>Challenges and Success (4.2)</i>	
<i>TOC Development (4.2, 2.2)</i>	
<i>TOC Relevance (2.2)</i>	
<i>Missing Issues (2.2)</i>	
Operationalization of PPP	
<i>Challenges and Success (4.2)</i>	
<i>Innovation (2.1)</i>	
PPP Evaluation Dimensions	
<i>Timely and Cost Effective (4.3)</i>	
<i>Barriers (4.3)</i>	
<i>Responsive to barriers (4.3)</i>	
<i>Gender consideration (5.7)</i>	
<i>Complementarity (5.5)</i>	
<i>Responsive to political opportunities (5.3)</i>	
Impact (1.0)	
<i>Development of laws, policies, reforms</i>	
<i>Upholding the rule of law and improving access to justice and protection</i>	
<i>Building local government capacity to reduce tensions</i>	
<i>Improving inter-ethnic relationships</i>	
<i>Increased social cohesion in targeted areas</i>	
<i>Increase trust in local authorities</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in local and state judicial and law enforcement</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, returnees and ethnic minorities in local decision making processes</i>	

<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in peacebuilding initiatives</i>	
<i>Responsiveness of state institutions to human rights obligations/Rehabilitation/reintegration of ex-combatant</i>	
<i>Empowerment of rights holders</i>	
<i>Improved employment for youth</i>	
<i>Improved linkages between informal (traditional and religious) and formal legal/justice systems</i>	
<i>Functioning of municipalities/Districts</i>	
<i>Increased local capacity and mechanism for peace resolutions</i>	
<i>Functioning of Women's Councils</i>	
<i>Functioning of Youth Committees</i>	
<i>Others</i>	
Sustainability	
<i>Gains Sustainable (2.3)</i>	
<i>Factors and challenges (2.3)</i>	
Management	
PBF/PBSO	
<i>Good support?5.1</i>	
JSC	
<i>Successes and challenges/strategic (5.4)</i>	
RUNOs	
<i>Technical capacity (5.6)</i>	
<i>Gender and do no harm (5.8)</i>	
Catalytic and Lessons Learned	
<i>Catalytic effects (2.1)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned programming (3.0)</i>	
<i>Lessons learned Management (6.0)</i>	
<i>Peacebuilding Gaps (2.4)</i>	
Community Changes (1.0)	
<i>Development of laws, policies, reforms</i>	
<i>Upholding the rule of law and improving access to justice and protection</i>	
<i>Building local government capacity to reduce tensions</i>	
<i>Improving inter-ethnic relationships</i>	
<i>Increased social cohesion in targeted areas</i>	
<i>Increase trust in local authorities</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in local and state judicial and law enforcement</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, returnees and ethnic minorities in local decision making processes</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in peacebuilding initiatives</i>	
<i>Responsiveness of state institutions to human rights obligations/Rehabilitation/reintegration of ex-combatant</i>	
<i>Empowerment of rights holders</i>	
<i>Improved employment for youth</i>	
<i>Improved linkages between informal (traditional and religious) and formal legal/justice systems</i>	

<i>Functioning of municipalities/Districts</i>	
<i>Increased local capacity and mechanism for peace resolutions</i>	
<i>Functioning of Women's Councils</i>	
<i>Functioning of Youth Committees</i>	
<i>Others</i>	
MUNICIPALITY Comparison (1.0, 2.1)	
Catalytic Effects (2.1)	

**Evaluation Response Matrix
Provincial and District Representatives**

Objective	Observations/Notes
Project Implementation	
<i>Relevant for peace issues municipality (2.2)</i>	
<i>Innovative (2.1)</i>	
<i>Timely and efficient (4.3)</i>	
<i>Barriers (4.3)</i>	
<i>Complementarity (5.5)</i>	
<i>Responsive for political ops (5.3)</i>	
Community changes (1.0)	
<i>Development of laws, policies, reforms</i>	
<i>Upholding the rule of law and improving access to justice and protection</i>	
<i>Building local government capacity to reduce tensions</i>	
<i>Improving inter-ethnic relationships</i>	
<i>Increased social cohesion in targeted areas</i>	
<i>Increase trust in local authorities</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in local and state judicial and law enforcement</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, IDPs, returnees and ethnic minorities in local decision making processes</i>	
<i>Inclusion of women, youth, and ethnic minorities in peacebuilding initiatives</i>	
<i>Responsiveness of state institutions to human rights obligations/Rehabilitation/reintegration of ex-combatant</i>	
<i>Empowerment of rights holders</i>	
<i>Improved employment for youth</i>	
<i>Improved linkages between informal (traditional and religious) and formal legal/justice systems</i>	
<i>Functioning of municipalities/Districts</i>	
<i>Increased local capacity and mechanism for peace resolutions</i>	
<i>Functioning of Women's Councils</i>	
<i>Functioning of Youth Committees</i>	
<i>Others</i>	
District Comparison (1.0, 2.1)	
Catalytic Effects (2.1)	
<i>Next priorities for peace (2.4)</i>	

5.10 Annex 10:List of Acronyms

CAG	Community Action Group
CBM&E	Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation
CDRC	Community Dispute Resolution Committees/Centres
CRESTA/A	Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority/Accountability
DPSC	District Peace and Stability Committee
ET	Evaluation Team
FIMM	Fragility Index and Maturity Model
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FHH	Female Headed Household
FMS	Federal Member States
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IR	Inception Report
IRF	Immediate Response Facility
JSC	Joint Steering Committee
KII	Key informant interview
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoIFAR	Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoWDAFA	Ministry of Women's Development and Family Affairs
MoWRHD	Ministry of Women and Human Rights Development (Federal)
MPTF	Multi Partner Trust Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PPP	Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PRF	Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility
RC	Resident Coordinator
RUNO	Recipient United Nations Organizations
TBD	To be determined
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNHABITAT	United Nations Human Settlement Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia