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Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) of Sulawesi Indonesia earthquake and tsunami

Final report

Prepared by Key Aid Consulting for Islamic Relief Worldwide
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Executive summary

Following the devastating series of strong earthquakes in the central Sulawesi province of Indonesia in September 2018, Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) provided support to Islamic Relief Indonesia to implement a multisectoral response to the crisis. With an overall budget of more than 2,900,000 GBP, the response represents a combination of 12 projects spread across two years and four months. These projects include a relief component (distribution of relief items right after the earthquake), as well as shelter, education, WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene), nutrition, Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and livelihood components.

Having completed the first phase of the response focusing on emergency relief and starting the recovery phase of the response, IRW commissioned a real-time evaluation (RTE).

The purpose of this evaluation was to take stock of the projects and to provide feedback on its outcomes. Specifically, the evaluation aims to highlight strengths, weaknesses, and best practices to inform the upcoming phases of the response and future programming. It assessed the projects' relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency, coordination and coherence and its connectedness to longer-term objectives.

Key findings

Relevance and appropriateness

Overall, **the response was highly relevant to the target communities' needs**. The Palu response was built off Islamic Relief's prior natural disaster responses in Indonesia. Various needs assessment exercises helped the team to design a relevant and appropriate response. **The response was also able to combat changes in needs and context**. Community consultation was included across the project cycle but increased over time. Notably, beneficiaries consulted as part of this evaluation would have liked to have been **consulted more during the targeting**. They felt that the community leaders and volunteers involved in the participatory targeting were not representative of the views of all the different groups.

This evaluation also found that **the design of the various projects implemented was consistent with the overall objective of the response**. Namely, to save lives and then to help the community to recover. It relies on lessons learnt from previous experiences. Scenarios and response plans for different levels of emergency developed by the country office also helped to form the design.

Effectiveness and efficiency

Overall, **the first phase of the response achieved its intended objective** which was to "alleviate the sufferings of individuals of the most vulnerable earthquake and people affected by the tsunami". Most outputs were achieved or on the way to being achieved. For the outputs that were not fully realised, it was largely the consequence of external factors (such as a change in government regulations regarding the use of tarpaulins). As such, **the response can be considered as effective**.

Among the positive effects of the response noted, there was a shared feeling that **Islamic Relief's (IR's) intervention really improved the life of the disaster-affected population**.

IR and partners assessed and took into consideration protection risks that could arise from their interventions from the very beginning of the response. One risk that may have been overlooked however is that which is **linked to power dynamics** within the community. Having people from the

community in charge of the targeting (via leaders and volunteers' involvement) makes the process consultative, but this should be balanced with the need for a targeting process perceived as being neutral and objective which is easier to achieve when outsiders are in charge of targeting.

IR put in place **multiple and accessible channels for complaints and feedback mechanisms** for each project of the response. **When talking to beneficiaries, most of them seemed aware of the complaint mechanisms in place, especially the complaint box.** However, they expressed a preference to have a face-to-face complaint submission

Regarding the response efficiency, all key informants mentioned that **the team had so far, worked with limited resources and made the most from them. This was done by looking for any potential efficiency gain.** As a result however, human resources have been slightly over-stretched and **the lack of permanent support functions have been and remain to be a challenge.** The organisation also tried to maximise resources by working with volunteers. However, the reported concerns with their attitude could be detrimental to the perceived quality of the response.

The partnership between the organisation and its partners seems efficient and seems to be working well on both sides. However, during the first phase of emergency, instead of working together on common operations, IR and partners were rather working independently in different geographic areas.

Coordination and coherence of the response

The government of Indonesia has been very active in the coordination of the response in Sulawesi. As such, IR worked through the coordination mechanisms in place. **IR and partners regularly coordinate with peer agencies and relevant government departments** and are actively participating in coordination meetings both at a national and field level. However, some cluster leads noted that **the level of participation in coordination at Palu level decreased compared to the first response phase.**

Despite the coordination efforts from the humanitarian community, **most beneficiaries consulted noted some duplications in the assistance** received from IR and other organisations, especially during the first onset. This could be due to private sector interventions that did not coordinate with the clusters.

Overall, **IR's response is complementary to other interventions** as it contributed to bridging the gaps in basic needs that the crisis-affected population were facing and is allowing the development of new activities, particularly in the livelihoods sector.

The response was in line with IR's international commitments and other global quality standards in humanitarian response. Those standards include the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS), the Sphere Standards, and the Build Back Better (BBB) principles among others.

The response was also in line with regional and national priorities such as the government's Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Master Plan.

Connectedness of the response to longer-term objectives

Although the first phase of the response was focused mainly on responding to immediate needs, with less focus on longer-term objectives or resilience, the second phase of activities is more forward-looking.

Resilience is in the centre of the new cycle of activities, which started from February 2019 onwards. As mentioned in the previous section, those activities focused on the BBB principle. **The organisation is also implementing a DRR project,** aiming at building resilience at the community level, through religious leaders, against earthquake triggering liquefaction and at building the capacity of district-level government.


IR tried to adopt a 'community driven approach' bringing about a basic element for resilience and sustainability of interventions.

Although IR showed a certain level of awareness regarding environmental issues, the evaluation found that the organisation could have gone further in exploring the opportunity to 'build back greener' and better integrate environmental considerations in the reconstruction efforts. **IR could also have better anticipated the change from transitional structures to permanent housing and learning centres, which could ensure longer-term positive effects of the response.**

Qualitative evaluation against the CHS

The following evaluation is based on a qualitative assessment of IR performance against the quality criteria developed for each commitment. However, it does not review the organisation's internal processes.

Figure 1: Evaluation against the CHS quality criteria¹



A more detailed explanation about the colour coding and reasons behind each colour is available at the end of the report.

¹ The standards that appear the least met are coloured in orange and red (orange meaning partially met and red not met at all) according to the consultants' judgement.

Recommendations

Recommendations for the current phase of the response and future programming are provided in the table below.

Table 1: Summary of Recommendations

Category	Recommendation
Design of the response	<p>Recommendation 1: Select the modality on the basis of situation analysis and when conditions permit, consider unconditional unrestricted cash assistance as the default option.</p> <p>IR has already used unconditional and unrestricted cash during the response. Yet, it could explore the use of cash grants for shelter repair and construction (as opposed to shelter material distribution). A CVA distribution process should maximise the benefit of this modality by encouraging the flexibility of assistance distribution time and date as well as by encouraging the prolonged used of the payment mechanism.</p>
Implementation	<p>Recommendation 2: Ensure representative participation during the targeting</p> <p>IR should seek to ensure that the leaders and volunteers involved in the selection process are representative of the different groups within the communities. Alternatively, IR could consider the creation of committees charged with selecting beneficiaries. In addition, the practice of using two selection committees and comparing their beneficiary lists can be applied across all communities as a method to reduce the risk of bias in beneficiary selection.</p>
	<p>Recommendation 3: Draw clear targeting criteria and make sure it is communicated clearly and transparently across recipients and non- recipients.</p> <p>When the list of criteria is finalised, ensure it is well circulated and communicated throughout the community, even before beneficiary selection is conducted. Communicate the timing of the selection process to make sure that potential beneficiaries can make themselves available during the household visits.</p>
	<p>Recommendation 4: Continue efforts to make sure volunteers' attitudes and behaviour are up to the organisation's standards.</p> <p>IR could either rethink its volunteers' selection process to ensure that the selected individuals' behaviour is in line with the organisation's values or organise more information sessions and training on what is acceptable behaviour. This could be achieved with the use of simulation exercises. Another option would be to find ways to incentivise them when beneficiaries are satisfied with their attitude.</p>
Monitoring	<p>Recommendation 5: Make sure monitoring allows for determining whether the response is reaching its objectives and is used to make programmatic decisions.</p> <p>Projects should all have stated SMART outcome indicators, even if this is not a requirement from the donor. It may also be beneficial to have an overall response theory of change or logical framework, so the whole team and partners know what each project is contributing towards.</p>
Complaint feedback mechanisms &	<p>Recommendation 6: Centralise all complaints and feedback in a single log in a single language</p> <p>The two current complaint logs should be centralised in a single database in a single language (either English or Bahasa). The complaint log should also keep track of the time required to close a case by registering the day when the complaint or feedback was made, the date when</p>

	potential referrals were made and date of the response given. IR should also aim to analyse the complaints received at a more macro level to inform its activity.
Partnership	<p>Recommendation 7: Progressively aim for a localised response model</p> <p>When assessing partner capacity IR should, to the greatest extent possible, think about the overall demand for partnership and work jointly with the partner to scale up its capacity.</p> <p>More broadly, this also requires a progressive shift of the business and fundraising models used by IRW and other international organisations: shifting from a model that works through local partners to actually work equitably with them from the design and fundraising stage until the exit phase.</p>
Sustainability	<p>Recommendation 8: Try and mitigate the impact of the response on the environment to avoid doing further harm.</p> <p>Develop an 'environmental monitoring plan' and develop livelihood activities that could be linked to the sustainable management of natural resources.</p> <p>Recommendation 9: Begin planning the formal exit strategy at the beginning of the project.</p> <p>Start thinking about an exit strategy at project design stage and look into longer-term consideration to ensure that activities and communications across communities and local government actors are consistent.</p>

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Abbreviations and acronyms

Acronym	Definition
AHA Centre	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
BAPPEDA	Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah (Indonesian regional body for planning and development)
BBB	Build Back Better
BNPB	Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management
CABS	Children Are Back to School
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FRORP-DRRLC	Fostering the Role of Religious Places in DRR and Livelihood Convergence'
GBP	Great British Pound
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
HH	Households
IR(W)	Islamic Relief (Worldwide)
KII	Key Informant Interview
KONSEPSI	Konsorsium untuk Studi dan Pengembangan Partisipasi
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPG	Multi-Purpose Grant
NFI	Non-Food Items
PKPU	Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat
POS	Point Of Sale
POSEAC	Provision of Shelter for Earthquake Affected Community in Central Sulawesi
RTE	Real-Time Evaluation
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
TLC	Temporary Learning Centres
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
WaSH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene

I. Introduction

I.1. Evaluation background

Indonesia is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, regularly facing earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, volcanic eruptions and flooding. About 40 percent of the country's population is vulnerable to disasters.² Climate change, poverty, population growth, and rapid urbanisation exacerbate these vulnerabilities.³

On 28 September 2018, a series of strong earthquakes struck central Sulawesi province in Indonesia. The strongest quake reached a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter scale and created a tsunami that hit Palu (the provincial capital) and Donggala.

The earthquakes, tsunami, resultant soil liquefaction and landslides have caused significant damage and casualties in affected areas. Hundreds of thousands of survivors were in urgent need of food, water and shelter. Three weeks after the earthquake, around 191,000 people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.⁴ The Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management (BNPB) estimates the total cost of material damages to be 910 million USD.⁵ The following map shows which areas of Central Sulawesi have been the most affected.

² Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Disaster Preparedness Plan Islamic Relief Indonesia', 2018.

³ Ibid.

⁴ AHA Center, 'SITUATION UPDATE NO. 12 M 7.4 EARTHQUAKE & TSUNAMI Sulawesi, Indonesia', 15 October 2018.

⁵ OCHA, 'Central Sulawesi Earthquake & Tsunami Humanitarian Country Team Situation Report #10', 10 December 2018.

Figure 2: Location of damaged areas⁶



One of the most noticeable features of the response was the quick reaction of the Indonesian government and its strong involvement in the coordination and leadership, making it one of the most localised responses to date.⁷

Islamic Relief (IR) has been working in Indonesia for more than 15 years, responding to all major natural disasters in-country (see Table 2: History of IR's natural disaster responses in Indonesia). When the earthquake struck, Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) and IR Indonesia responded immediately to the crisis to cover primary basic needs of the affected population.

From 29 September 2018, IRW and IR Indonesia deployed local and surge team staff and worked through its implementing partners, Rumah Zakat, KONSEPSI and PKP.⁸ The IR response covered food security, WaSH, and shelter/NF needs, using both in-kind as well as cash and voucher assistance. To do so, IR received funding from institutional donors such as RRM SIDA and DEC and from 10 IR Partners⁹.

To date, IR's response amounts to about 2.5 million GBP across 12 different projects. The following graph shows the share per sector whereas the table presents the timing of each project.

Figure 3: IR Response budget per sector (in GBP)¹⁰

⁶ OCHA (10 December 2018).

⁷ Humanitarian Advisory Group, 'Charting the New Norm? Local Leadership in the First 100 Days of the Sulawesi Earthquake Response', Humanitarian Horizons Practice Paper Series, March 2019. For example, only a small number of international staff were allowed to access the area to provide technical assistance on specific aspect of the response only and for a limited amount of time

⁸ Those three local organisations are recognised by BNPB (Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management) and allowed to conduct activities in disaster-affected sites.

⁹ IR UK, IR Canada, IRUSA, IR South Africa, IR Germany, IR Sweden, IR Netherland, IR Australia, IR Switzerland, IR Belgium

¹⁰ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Project List as of April 30 2019'.





Figure 4: Presentation of IR projects as part of the Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami response¹¹



¹¹ A more detailed description of the projects can be found in section VII.1

1.2. Evaluation purpose, objectives and scope

The overall objective of this real time evaluation, set by the terms of reference, was to assess the on-going IRW emergency response. The results intend to steer the design and implementation of the on-going response as well as to inform the future phases of IRW Sulawesi earthquake programme. At a global level, it contributes to IRW's commitment towards the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) and could serve as lessons learnt for future earthquake responses.

More specifically, this real-time evaluation (RTE) aimed to:

- Determine the intervention's relevance to meeting beneficiaries' needs
- Assess its effectiveness and efficiency in achieving its objectives, including highlighting any gaps or unintended effects
- Review the intervention's coherence with IRW's guiding principles and standards
- Investigate the intervention's coordination with other similar response efforts
- Determine where connectedness was considered to pave the way for future longer-term interventions.

The review focused on IRW activities starting from October 2018 onwards, with specific focus on the following projects: a) SIDA Phase 1 and DEC Phase 1 and b) SIDA Phase 2 (Livelihoods) and DEC Phase 2.

II. Overview of the methodology

The following figures gives an overview of the methodology used for this RTE. A detailed methodology is available in section VII.1.

Figure 5: Overview of the methodology

Inception Phase & Desk Review	Desk Review		Inception Report
	72 documents screened including project documentation, monitoring data, strategic documents and internal policies as well as assessments and lessons papers from other organisations		Presentation of the preliminary findings from the desk review, and agreement on the evaluation matrix, scope and tools
Data Collection	In-country : Palu and Jarkarta		Remote
	Learning Workshop held on 6 May 2019 gathering 17 participants from IR and partner staff and volunteers	23 in-country stakeholders interviewed among IR and partner staff, local authorities and cluster leads	107 beneficiaries consulted through FGDS
	3 remote interviews from 15 May to 17 May 2019 with stakeholders from HQ		
More than 140 stakeholders consulted in total			
Final Report	Data coding and analysis		First draft sent to IR on 29 May 2019 for review
Limitations	Stakeholder's lack of time and availabilities and evaluation 'fatigue'		Non-optimal conditions to lead the FGDS which forced us to shorten some of them to accommodate the needs of the most vulnerable

III. Evaluation findings

III.1. Relevance and appropriateness of the response to the context, needs and capacities

This section focuses on the activities' relevance to beneficiaries' needs; the communities' involvement in the project planning, design and implementation: the response design consistency with the project's stated outcomes and the appropriateness of targeting.

III.1.1. The relevance of the response

Interviewed community members, project implementers and local government actors all agreed that **the response sectors, as well as activities, were aligned with the target communities' priority needs.**

IR's response relevance originates from a comprehensive situation analysis. The desk review confirmed **that IR and partners undertook multiple assessments to determine the communities' needs** and did so in a **segregated manner**. For instance, during the first phase of the response, PKPU, played a major role in the joint multisectoral needs assessment¹² carried out from 03 – 08 October 2018, focusing on Palu, Donggala and Sigi districts. Furthermore, IR conducted a validation exercise of the findings between October 18 and 21 October, 2018 in Sigi district. The exercise involved consulting with the community leaders, village heads, youth representatives, children, as well as mothers.¹³ Needs-related disaggregated data exists and demonstrates **IR's understanding of the vulnerabilities and capacities of different groups**. For instance, it translated into activities tailored to the needs of women with the distribution of 6,000 hygiene kits containing sanitary items and for children with disabilities, by making the learning centres built accessible to them.

These assessments confirmed that directly after the disaster, by order of importance, access to food, shelter, sanitation, water, health services were priority needs for the communities.¹⁴ **The initial distributions given by IR (comprising of rice, bottled mineral water, tarpaulins, hygiene kits, blankets and cash) were thus relevant and appropriate.** Beneficiaries who received assistance during the first months of the response confirmed that **IR's support was appropriately aligned with their needs but also with local tradition and preference.**¹⁵

The decision to **combine several modalities** (in-kind as well as unconditional unrestricted cash) **reinforced the relevance of assistance.** Some beneficiaries mentioned that few women's items (e.g. head scarfs and cooking kits) were not included in the in-kind kit. However, such items could be procured at the local market using the 250,000 IDR grant IR provided.

Both in-kind and cash assistance were provided as a one-off, at the same distribution points at the same time, which limited the time and resources spent by earthquake-affected household to collect assistance. However, during both FGDs in Lolu, Muntaji, respondents highlighted **access challenges faced by those less able to move**, such as the elderly. Because of the limited transportation,¹⁶ some respondents had to walk for a distance deemed a long time in order to reach the distribution site.

The response has been agile and it adapted to changes in needs and in the context. For example, IR added the creation of child friendly spaces to its activities after they assessed such needs in Palu during the first few weeks of the emergency.¹⁷

¹² This joint needs assessment was a collaboration of the Emergency Capacity Building consortium and Humanitarian Forum Indonesia and other organisations who also took part in the process.

¹³ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Plan Submission', October 2018.

¹⁴ Emergency Capacity Building consortium and Humanitarian Forum Indonesia, 'Joint Need Assessment (JNA) Sulawesi Tengah Earthquake & Tsunami 28 Sep 2018 - Report v.1. 9 October 2018', (n.d.).

¹⁵ Source: FGDs with beneficiaries.

¹⁶ Means of transportation were limited during the few weeks following the earthquake and tsunami because roads were damaged and available vehicles were used for the humanitarian response.

¹⁷ Source: key informant interviews and secondary data.

In line with the government crisis cycle¹⁸, IR **integrated recovery and sustainability considerations early on in its crisis response**. IR adapted its shelter assistance accordingly and in line with government standards, restricting the use of tarpaulins considered too uncomfortable. After consultations with the communities, IR chose to provide wood as the most preferred and better value for money material for temporary shelters.

IR's livelihoods and disaster risk reduction activities started from February 2019 and was found to be relevant by both crisis-affected households and project implementers. This new phase was equally informed by assessments. In February 2019, IR also conducted a brief assessment to identify the needs of small traders and farmers, which showed that not only was there an important need for tools and equipment, but also for capacity building in product development and marketing.¹⁹ As a result, IR developed the market support and livelihoods interventions that are currently being implemented.

The relevance of the response was also reinforced by the past experience of IR to respond to natural disaster in Indonesia (as described in Table 2: History of IR's natural disaster responses in Indonesia).

Table 2: History of IR's natural disaster responses in Indonesia²⁰

Date	Event	Impacts	Response by IR
26 December 2004	Tsunami Aceh	127,720 people died, 93,285 remain missing and more than 600,000 people lost their homes. Damages included 139,195 houses, 73,869 hectares of agriculture land, more than 3,000 schools, 1,000 health facilities, 1,000 religious places, 13,800 fishermen boats, 2,600 km of road and 119 bridges (BNPB data).	Shelter, Livelihood, Education, WASH and CWP
30 September 2009	West Sumatra Earthquake	1,117 deaths, around 3,000 people injured. 179,432 houses were damaged (BNPB data).	Food and NFI, WASH, Shelter
30 November 2010	Merapi Eruption Yogyakarta	347 deaths and around 350,000 people temporarily displaced (BNPB data).	WASH and Food and NFI
7 December 2016	Earthquake Pidie Jaya	104 deaths, more than 2,000 injured people and more than 12,000 houses damaged at various levels (BNPB data).	Cash based assistance and Food security
29 July and 5 August 2018	Lombok Earthquake	460 deaths and around 417,000 people temporarily displaced ²¹	Tarpaulin, hygiene items, and food

III.1.2. Involvement of the communities in the response

In line with its CHS commitment, IR put in place thorough measures to ensure community participation across the project cycle. Those measures are detailed in the Table below. Numerous examples of community participation were shared during the evaluation by the IR team. For example, to inform the

¹⁸ The government enacted an emergency status from 28 September to 26 October 2018. Following the state of emergency, a transitional period from emergency to recovery was put in place. Initially forecasted to last from 27 October to 25 December 2018, it was then extended to 23 February 2019. It was then extended again up to 24 April 2019.

¹⁹ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 2 Plan Submission', February 2019.

²⁰ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Disaster Preparedness Plan Islamic Relief Indonesia'.

²¹ AHA Center, 'Earthquake in Lombok, Indonesia - Situation Update N°7', 16 August 2018.

temporary shelter intervention, IR deployed a child protection specialist to assess the protection issues by 'living in' with the communities affected by the earthquake.

Table 3: Community involvement in the response across the project cycle²²

Project Phase	Community participation
Design and planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consultation of communities during needs assessments and verification exercises ▪ Identify and select beneficiaries through a consultative process with village government, community representatives and community volunteers ▪ Consult with the government, village leader and village parliament (BPD) about the intervention plan ▪ Meet with communities to discuss the plan, design (for instance discussions with female groups to jointly design how to provide nutritious food for children and discussion with communities around the design of the child-friendly space or the composition of the shelter kits for instance) ▪ Communication about who IR is and what principles and values the organisation is adhering to, plus, the feedback and complaint mechanism.
Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consultations with village government and community leaders to determine the beneficiary list ▪ Set up of complaints and feedback channels accessible to beneficiaries, including a confidential one ▪ Set up a community committee to oversee the progress of intervention and handle feedback and complaints ▪ Community contribution to land clearing activities before the construction began ▪ Beneficiaries' contribution to building their shelter and supervision from community committees.
Monitoring and evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Community committees give feedback as part of project progress reporting; ▪ beneficiary feedback surveys ▪ Contribution to the evaluation through FGDs.

The evaluation generally found that **the level of participation increased over time** as during the first weeks of the response, the destruction of infrastructures as well as the urgency of the needs, rendered community consultation more challenging. This is confirmed by focus group participants who wished they had been **consulted more about the targeting criteria** and welcomed the opportunity given by the evaluation to express their opinion about the quality of the assistance received. The monitoring exercise undertaken by IR in April 2019, regarding shelter assistance, highlights the importance of the inclusiveness of the beneficiary selection process and stresses this area as one for improvement.²³ Government representatives and village leads were heavily involved in the targeting process. Crisis affected households felt they had limited decision-making powers in identifying criteria and beneficiary households, as this sat more with village leads.

²² Source: mix of primary and secondary data.

²³ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Monitoring Report on Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Response Shelter', May 2018. P.2 "However, beneficiary selection process was not consultant with community."

III.1.3. Consistency and appropriateness of the programmes design with the objectives of the response and capacities

III.1.3.1. Overall consistency of the activities with the intended effect

As described in Table 2, IR benefitted from prior experience of implementing natural disaster responses in Indonesia. As such, **the design of the various projects implemented was consistent with the overall objective of the response**, primarily to save lives and then to help the community recover, as it relies on lessons learnt from previous experiences. It has a basis in scenarios and response plans for different levels of emergency developed by the country office.²⁴²⁵²⁶

IR's response to the tsunami and earthquake in Sulawesi consists of 12 different projects, with different funding streams (as described in **Error! Reference source not found.**), but there is **no consolidated plan for the entire response in Sulawesi**. The draft of the Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Response Strategy²⁷ is an attempt to map in a single document all the interventions included in the response. However, there is no Theory of Change or overarching logical framework demonstrating how the various activities and projects are interconnected and contributing to the response goal to "meet immediate life-saving needs of earthquake and tsunami affected families and individuals and recovery support for normalized living".²⁸

Because the response plans are clustered, as are the monitoring plans, this makes it more difficult for IR teams to ensure outputs contribute to the intended outcomes, feeding into the results and ultimately reaching objectives. In addition, **the vast majority of the indicators included are output related**²⁹ (number of shelters distributed, number of latrine constructed) which does not inform on the outcome achievement (e.g. how safe is the distributed shelter, are people living in the shelter). The outcome related indicators included in the MEAL plan tend not to be specific enough to demonstrate the change that is sought (e.g. # 3700 of vulnerable families have access to water³⁰ does not say if the expected change is about quality, quantity or distance to water points). That makes it **difficult to conclude on the relevance of the result chain**.

III.1.3.2. Appropriateness of the response design to the IR and partners' capacities

Overall, **the design of the response was ambitious** for IR and its partners' capacities. Almost all key informants from IR confirmed that the number of staff members was too small for the range of activities implemented, especially considering that IR did not have a presence in Palu before the emergency. However, almost all activities were undertaken without delays, as further developed in section III.2, but

²⁴ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Scenario for Category 1 of Disaster', n.d.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Contingency Plan Scenario Level 3', n.d.

²⁷ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Islamic Relief Response Strategy - Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency', 18 October 2018.

²⁸ Islamic Relief Indonesia.

²⁹ The evaluation team acknowledge here the fact that the DEC recommended indicators are also all mostly output related as per the consulted DEC, Common Indicator List

³⁰ MEAL plan RRM SIDA Phase 1

at a great human cost. In total, one manager, three coordinators, three officers, three assistants, two community mobilisers, three consultants, five support staff as well as 20 volunteers and three partner organisations were dedicated to the response.

IR mapped its implementing partners' capacities in the response strategy and adapted the design of the projects based on those capacities.

Table 4: IR's implementing partners' strengths and capacity^{31,32}

Sectoral expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Medical evacuation and treatment using their own ambulance and doctors; <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary shelter and temporary school construction; <input type="checkbox"/> Community development (economic empowerment, justice, education, etc.); <input type="checkbox"/> Food and NFI distribution including setting up public kitchen; <input type="checkbox"/> Psychosocial support including in setting up and operationalising child friendly spaces and women and mothers' spaces.
Office management capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-existing office in Palu and Donggala; <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities available: vehicle, internet, warehouse, etc. <input type="checkbox"/> Supporting staff from neighboring provinces as they have office branch in every province in Indonesia; <input type="checkbox"/> More than 100 staff trained in emergency response for each partners <input type="checkbox"/> Stable management and policy system in order to maintain good governance.

What the IR project team underestimated was the **high demand for local partners due to the strong localisation focus of the response**. Requests for partnerships and joint project implementation were not solely restricted to IR. Instead, requests were made to all the international organisations operating in the area who had limited space for direct implementation. As a result, and because IR's three partners were among the few strong local organisations registered with and authorised to operate by the government, interviewed team members from PKPU and Rumah Zakat explained they had been overstretched. Those team members also wished they had more time for planning and procurement.

III.1.3.3. Targeting criteria and area selection

Geographical targeting was found to be relevant and appropriate for the projects. IR selected areas that were the most affected by the earthquake. Selection was further tailored to correspond to the areas where IR local partners had the most experience. As a result, the following areas were selected:

- Lolu Village-Sigi Biromaru, Sigi District (IR and KONSEPSI)
- Palu City (Rumah Zakat)
- Donggala district, particularly in ex-tsunami affected areas of Loli village and its surrounding (PKPU)

Some key informants suggested that other areas also affected by the earthquake and tsunami (Dolo for instance) received considerably less attention than the ones selected by IR and most of the other international NGOs. However, as IR was one of the first organisations to start delivering assistance after the disaster (as described in section III.2.2.1), and did not have a pre-existing office in Palu before the

³¹ Islamic Relief Indonesia.

³² Only PKPU and Rumah Zakat are considered here as KONSEPSI is under a semi-operational partnership agreement with IR.

emergency, it made sense for the organisation to focus on the most affected areas that were known by IR and partners and were more accessible.

Regarding the selection of beneficiaries within those areas, the following table presents the criteria used for each project.

Table 5: Targeting criteria used for each project³³

Project	Targeting criteria
SIDA Phase 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Families heavily affected by the earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction especially those whose houses are washed away by the tsunami, damaged/destroyed by the earthquake, and swallowed by liquefaction. During the first weeks of operation beneficiaries also included those without access to water (due to blackout of electricity) and to food (due to market closure).
DEC Phase 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Families whose houses are totally damaged and people with disability, elderly, pregnant women, or breastfeeding mothers.
SEATRI-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individuals severely affected by the earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction.
Sky-hydrant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> individuals severely affected by the earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction and beneficiaries who are currently still in dire need of drinking water in other districts, either because of distance or access issues.
RELEACS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction affected population with the specification of the families whose houses and business are totally/partially ruined by the disaster. Priority was given to poor families, especially for farmers who have lost their livelihoods due to unavailability of irrigation water, people with disabilities and single head-households.
CABS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Children at school age, particularly children affected by the earthquake, including those with disabilities.
LIRESAD - SIDA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> People lacking capital and support to continue their micro business or farming activities with a particular attention to vulnerable groups.
POSEAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women, children including orphans, older persons, people with disabilities, female headed households, minority ethnic groups affected by the disaster.
FRORP DRRLC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> People living in liquefaction areas around Sigi district. The criteria used to select beneficiaries are (1) faith leaders of Islam, Christian, Catholics, Buddhism, and Hindu (2) Communities including male, female and youths who are members of the religious places of the five religions (3) the most vulnerable communities around the areas that will receive support in livelihood strengthening.
NATFEP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Malnourished children and mothers.
DEC Phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women previously involved in the home industry sector that currently have no activities as they have lost all of their equipment and working capital; Children (orphans) headed households; Older people who used to work as farmer or small traders People with disabilities who had a business previously and need support to rerun it or increase operations Female headed households in need of support to restart or start their livelihood Unemployed men.

The selection process involved village leaders who proposed a list of households (or individuals depending on the type of activities) within the communities that meet the above criteria. The number of individuals put forward was based on the geographical split of beneficiaries shared in advance by IR.

³³ Source: projects proposals

IR volunteers within the communities would then go to each village and check the households on the list to confirm that they met the vulnerability criteria and suggest new households who may have been excluded by the first leader-led list. After completing the door to door verification, another discussion is organised with village leaders, partners, volunteers and IR to agree on a final list of beneficiaries.³⁴

The diversity and in some cases the broadness of the targeting criteria created confusion among interviewed **households**, the vast majority of which **were not able to explain why they had been selected**. Some criteria were especially broad during Phase 1, as a portion of IR assistance was distributed as a blanket coverage (e.g. all of Lolu villagers of 1,008 HHs received in-kind non-food items assistance from IR). The shift from blanket coverage to targeted assistance during Phase 2, was not clear to some of the interviewed leaders who felt that some individuals were left behind.

During FGD, beneficiaries also explained that they needed to have an ID to be targeted for assistance. Despite the fact that according to IR this procedure was not a strict requirement, it may have created barriers to assistance, especially in a post-earthquake context where households are prone to lose their ID.³⁵

Beyond the criteria, the targeting process was described on several³⁶ occasions as unfair. The crisis affected households felt that the leaders were not representative enough of the different groups within the community. Furthermore, having volunteers responsible for the door to door assessment put them in a situation of perceived power. Because IR put in place functional and accessible complaint mechanisms, crisis affected households have had the opportunity to raise questions about targeting, as demonstrated in the complaint log³⁷ made available to the evaluation teams.

III.1.3.4. Choice of modalities



As part of this response, several modalities were used to deliver assistance depending on the timing, the objectives of the intervention and the context (market functionality for instance).

During the emergency, IR distributed mostly **in-kind items**, as after the disaster many markets were closed or dysfunctional³⁸ and most of the Financial Service Providers (FSP) were inaccessible. Basic commodities (rice, eggs, water, and blankets) were thus **procured quickly** in quantities that were available. Very rapidly, IR also

provided a small cash grant (Rp.250, 000 per Household (HH) i.e. approximately GBP 13.5) in order for

³⁴ Source : mix of primary and secondary data

³⁵ Hélène Juillard and Joris Jourdain. 'ALNAP Lessons Paper: Responding to Earthquakes' (London: ALNAP/ODI, 2019).

³⁶ This was spontaneously mentioned in about a third of the FGD and by 2 KII.


³⁷ Complaints are logged in a data base that has been made accessible to the consultant, but also in a book filled both in English and Bahasa, which is only partially taken into consideration here (only the English sections have been reviewed).

³⁸ Bodamaev and Fatmaningrum, 'Market Assessment in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia'.

beneficiaries to tailor a portion of the assistance received to their specific needs (for instance, to buy baby milk for mothers).

For **shelter** construction, IR uses a **combination of modalities**: self-help, in kind distribution and technical support to ensure those shelters meet quality standards. This was deemed **appropriate** because most of the HH had the capacity to provide self-help labour and were eager to be able to choose the design of their shelter and participate in the process. For those who don't have the capacity to engage in self-help labour, IR and partners provide construction services to remain inclusive.

As the context changed from emergency to recovery and markets started to go back to normal, IR switched to Cash and Voucher Assistance (CVA), and more specifically to e-vouchers³⁹ for livelihood inputs. The **modality was selected after thorough situation analysis** comprising of a market mapping analysis, risk assessment and needs assessment. During the needs assessment, the beneficiaries were allowed to select the most relevant livelihood inputs among a range of pre-determined commodities of different brands, size, price, and quality identified during the market assessment. Before the distribution, vendors receive the list of material to prepare for each recipient. During the items distribution however, beneficiaries can change the items collected for one of the same kind (same category and price) if they prefer to. The delivery process is described in the figure below.



The use of e-voucher and Point of Sale (POS) allowed to complete the transaction within a day and to receive **real time monitoring data**.

Vouchers are restricted by nature, yet by taking into consideration the individual needs of each recipient, IR has been able to **provide relevant assistance**. The IR team explained the choice of a restricted modality as a way to ensure beneficiaries used the grant for livelihood purposes and to ensure availability of stocks as traders were able to know what would be purchased in advance. Use of vouchers tend to be common for livelihood inputs. However, the **distribution process did not maximise the**

³⁹ The official name of the programme given by IR was 'Conditional Cash Transfer programme', however as described in the section, the delivery mechanism used can be considered as e-vouchers.

⁴⁰ Source: the authors based on field observations.

potential added value of using CVA. Those missed opportunities were also noted in the RTE of DEC and Swiss Solidarity (SwS) response from March 2019.⁴¹

Table 6: Limitation of the IR distribution process

Main advantages of CVA	Limitations
CVA gives beneficiaries the opportunity to buy at flexible times within the shop opening hours.	Beneficiaries had to go to pre-identified distribution points at a precise time decided by IR and partners, hence losing flexibility in terms of assistance redemption.
To encourage fair competition within the local market and inject cash in the local economies	One vendor per type of item was selected to be part of the voucher scheme, which limited the bargaining power of beneficiaries and the cash injection with multiple traders. Benefits here are comparable to in-kind delivery with local procurement using a single supply source per type of commodity.
To encourage financial inclusion by making beneficiaries accustomed to a given payment instrument.	The SMART card beneficiaries receive to redeem the livelihood items is given to them at the entrance of the distribution site and then taken back at the exit of the site. The card here acts more as a token than as a payment instrument which could potentially be continued to be used at the end of the project.

III.2. Effectiveness and efficiency of the response in achieving its intended outcomes

This section looks at the achievement of the response objectives and the main factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of those objectives: the quality of the response, the projects' unintended effects and the response efficiency.

III.2.1. Achievement of the response objectives

Overall, all key informants agreed that the **first phase of the response achieved its intended objective** which was to "alleviate the sufferings of individuals of the most vulnerable earthquake and tsunami affected people".⁴² There was a shared feeling that IR's intervention really improved the life of the disaster-affected population.

The following table presents the achievement status for each output from DEC Phase 1 and SIDA Phase 1 projects, on which this evaluation primarily focuses.

Table 7: Projects achievement table (DEC and SIDA Phase 1 only)⁴³

Outputs	Achievement Status
DEC Phase 1	
Provision of 125 transitional shelters	100%

⁴¹ Simon Lawry-White, Brenda Langdon, and Umi Hanik, 'Real-Time Response Review of the 2018 Indonesia Tsunami Appeal Disasters Emergency Committee and Swiss Solidarity', 1 March 2019.

⁴² Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Application Form for Sida's 'Minor Humanitarian Frame' Funding Stream', n.d.

⁴³ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

IRW RTE of the Indonesia earthquake and tsunami response

Construction of 20 classrooms as temporary learning centres	100%
SIDA Phase 1	
Distribution of 3,700 tarpaulins	57,5% 2,108 units of tarpaulins and 20 units of shelter kits ⁴⁴
Distribution of 3,700 food items	99,9% 3,697 packs
Distribution of 7,400 boxes of mineral water	100% 3,379 boxes of mineral water distributed: 816 boxes are 1,500 ml and 2,563 boxes are 600 ml
Distribution of 3,700 blankets	106% 3,922 distributed
Distribution of 3,700 hygiene kits	187,5% 6,936 kits distributed
Provision of 20 generators	10 units of electric genset and 160 solar cells with lamp
Provision of 3,700 unconditional unrestricted cash grants (Rp.250,000 per HH)	99,7% 3,688 households covered

All outputs under DEC Phase 1 were fully achieved. Household visits have also shown that beneficiaries received their shelter as per specification and standards. ⁴⁵ All classrooms have also been constructed and are used.

Regarding **SIDA Phase 1**, most **outputs were achieved**. Some of them even exceeded the target. The number of tarpaulins distributed did not reach the target as the Government asked NGO to stop emergency shelter distribution and shift to a more sustainable structure, which IR did. For the food items, three packets were ruined during transportation to the sites. Lastly, regarding cash transfers, 12 households could not be found until the end of the project.

The achievements are in the face of **the many challenges faced by the team**, especially during the first onset, which included: the unavailability of goods on the markets, lootings and deteriorated security situation, challenges in transportation as most infrastructures were damaged and petrol was unavailable, government policies restricting IR to directly work in the field and to deploy international staff for support, fear among the communities regarding a new disaster and the safety of their land, high demand from other NGOs for materials, service providers, human resources and local implementing partners, etc. ^{46,47,48}

⁴⁴ The original target was 3,700, but the government of Indonesia requested to stop the distribution of tarpaulins. Instead of IR choose to reallocate resources to provide shelter kits.

⁴⁵ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Monitoring Report on Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Response Shelter'.

⁴⁶ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'CABS - Project Proposal to Islamic Relief USA', n.d.

⁴⁷ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

⁴⁸ Islamic Relief Deutschland, 'Project Proposal to Aktion Deutschland Hilft: "Provision of Shelter for Earthquake Affected Community in Central Sulawesi (POSEAC)", n.d.

IR has a centralised online database system that allow **rigorous output tracking**. However, there is **no systematic monitoring and analysis of the extent to which those outputs translate into outcomes**.

Other overreaching objectives were to leave **no-one behind and to look after protection and safeguarding issues which seemed to have been achieved**. The team benefitted from the deployment of a Protection and Inclusion officer from the first days of the response onwards. After issues were raised about privacy and protection from women and girls in government's communal shelters, IR aimed to offer to those women and girls a safer private shelter for instance. The small cash grant given to beneficiaries during the first onset was also a way to give beneficiaries the opportunity to tailor the assistance to their specific needs. During the first weeks of the emergency, IR and partners opened a child friendly space and delivered awareness raising of child protection principles when concerns were expressed about child welfare. The temporary learning centres constructed are also accessible to children with disabilities.⁴⁹

One axis for improvement mentioned by a few key informants was the ability for IR and partners to better match and adapt to the specific needs of some targeted groups such as people leaving with disabilities (accessible shelters for instance). Lastly, in terms of the coverage of the response, the fact that IR is not registered as a national organisation led to some inefficiencies. For instance, IR's partnership with UNICEF could not proceed given that IR does not have the national registration. This hindered IR's access to additional funding whereas Muslim Aid for instance, was able to get funds from UNHCR for temporary shelter assistance.⁵⁰


Most of the Phase 2 projects were still on-going or just starting at the time of the evaluation but, according to the key informants, were on track to achieve their intended outputs and outcomes. For the second phase of the response, the IR team identified the following Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) that could impact the future achievement of the response objectives:

Figure 7: SWOT Analysis of DEC and SIDA Phase 2 projects⁵¹

⁴⁹ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

⁵⁰ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd – 19th October 2018'.

⁵¹ Source: learning workshop



III.2.2. Quality of the response delivered

III.2.2.1. Timeliness

One of the main achievements of IR's response to the earthquake and tsunami in Central Sulawesi was **the speed of the intervention following the disaster**. The organisation was among the first international institutions to access the area and started delivering relief items on the third day after the earthquake.⁵² This was despite the numerous challenge around accessibility to the area (closure of airport, etc.), inadequacy of supply and burden of reporting.

The team deployed to Palu was able to quickly set up a base and warehouse and establish a supply pipeline for food, bottled mineral water and tarpaulins. Within two weeks the team were also able to set up child friendly spaces in Sigi district, which also provided freshly cooked food to children, mothers and the elderly.⁵³ According to the key informants, the response could not have been delivered quicker. The team worked very hard with the limited resources in their possession to be able to respond as fast as possible.

IR partners (Rumah Zakah and PKPU) were also on the initial list of 20 national organisations who were given clearance by the Government to contribute to the search and rescue operations. This allowed them to have fast access and IR agreed to cover some of their initial costs in the early stages which they

⁵² Source: mix of primary and secondary data

⁵³ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd - 19th October 2018'.

independently implemented. Other organisations, including DEC members, struggled to establish a foothold if they did not already have existing partner relationships with similar organisations.⁵⁴ **In this sense, IR have been particularly effective in setting-up operations.**

This was confirmed by FGD participants who largely acknowledged that IR was the fastest organisation to deliver assistance in their area.

Most projects were therefore delivered in a timely manner. Most delays happened because of transportation issues, which were outside of IR's remit. For instance, the construction of the temporary learning centre, under DEC Phase 1 project, ran a little late due to the difficulty in procurement. The selected contractor had to procure the material from the island of Java and it took several weeks to arrive in Central Sulawesi.⁵⁵ Some key informants also mentioned some issues with the water purification systems under the Sky-hydrant project. The systems were planned to be imported from Australia but IR did not sufficiently anticipate the time required to acquire and install them.

III.2.2.2. Effect of the response and beneficiaries' satisfaction with the assistance received

Overall, beneficiaries who received assistance during the first onset highlighted that **the assistance from IR made a difference in their daily life after the disaster.** The most important change brought by IR is linked to the **fulfilment of crisis-affected populations' basic needs.** The beneficiaries especially appreciated that each family member was able to benefit from the assistance because package distributed catered for the distinct needs of all family members.

Generally, the quality of the items provided was good and up to the humanitarian standards.⁵⁶ The majority of beneficiaries were satisfied with the quality and type of relief items received.⁵⁷ In terms of shelter, its design was considered to be too hot for the local conditions and a bit small for families of more than four members, yet the quality of the materials for the foundation were well-received. All of the beneficiaries were satisfied with the shelter foundation, roof and door.⁵⁸ The quality of the wall material however, was not deemed satisfactory. Some of the beneficiaries explained that walls broke down, cracked down or holes appeared.⁵⁹ Other recipients suggested considering latrine and WASH facilities with shelter support for future planning.⁶⁰

The fact that the response team did not have any technical programmes staff (WASH, food security, shelter) may have had a negative consequence on both programme design and development of funding for the longer term.⁶¹ It could also have an impact on the second phase of activities as the team does not include any livelihoods expert that would be able to support the operations in the long-term.

Beneficiaries were **happy and comfortable with IR and partners' staff knowledge and attitude.** A few mentioned that other organisations' staff were too demanding or gave too many instructions but this was not the case with IR. The majority⁶² of the FGD spontaneously expressed **concerns about the**

⁵⁴ Altaf.

⁵⁵ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

⁵⁶ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Monitoring Report on Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Response Shelter'.

⁵⁷ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'ANALISIS PDM RRM_PALU', n.d.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd – 19th October 2018'.

⁶² In five FGDs out of the nine undertaken

volunteers' attitude both during registration and distributions. Despite the fact that volunteers were trained on CHS and other humanitarian standards (protection, inclusion, complaint and response mechanisms, interview code of conduct, IR values, mission and code of conduct, etc.)⁶³, recipients felt that volunteer attitudes and the language they use could improve. Beneficiaries said that they were feeling too uncomfortable to complain about the volunteers to IR staff, which explains why IR had not received any complaints regarding this issue at the time of this evaluation.

III.2.2.3. Complaint and feedback mechanisms

Based on IRW's Complaints Policy aiming to ensure transparency, accountability, impartiality and quality assurance,⁶⁵ IR put into place **multiple and accessible channels for complaints and feedback mechanisms** for each project of the response. Those mechanisms include:

- A complaint box placed near every project activity and IR and partners' office
- A toll-free communication number where people can make a phone call free of charge;
- A specific email address to receive and respond to complaints and feedback
- During each project activity, a banner with clear written complaint email and number is put up
- Beneficiary cards will include the complaint email address and contact number of the complaint focal person
- Community committees are set up to receive feedback and complaints.

When talking to beneficiaries, most of them seemed aware of the complaint mechanisms in place, especially the complaint box. However, they expressed a preference to have a face-to-face complaint submission rather than through email, phone or writing. Some also mentioned that the complaint box could be difficult to access (the box was too far from their area) or use (for illiterate members of the community). The evaluation also found only one piece of evidence⁶⁶ that communities were consulted about the design of complaint and response mechanisms.

During the first six months of the response in Central Sulawesi, IR received 26 complaints or pieces of feedback.⁶⁷ Most of the questions raised related to the targeting process, with community members asking why they were not included in the projects or from individuals who missed the day of the



⁶³ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Activity Report: Training on Complaint Response Mechanism for IR and Partner Staff', n.d.

⁶⁴ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Activity Report: Training on Core Humanitarian Standard for IR and Partner Staff', n.d.

⁶⁵ Islamic Relief Worldwide, 'Complaints Management Guidance Pack 2018 (CHS 5)', September 2018.

⁶⁶ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Complaints LFA Reporting and Consultation', n.d.

⁶⁷ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

registration. Some other complaints related to shelter construction process (either because the contractor was late or because the design was not as planned). However, the consultants had issues in assessing the response given to the complaints and feedback as the complaint log did not give much detail on the issue and did not state any date showing how long it took for the team to respond. This was particularly the case for the complaints log at Palu level.

Among the few beneficiaries consulted who had used the complaints mechanisms in the past, some mentioned that **the response was delayed** or considered that **the answer given was not as satisfactory as expected**.

III.2.3. 'Do no harm' and the unintended effects of the response

IR and partners have carefully assessed and taken into consideration protection risks that could arise from their interventions since the very beginning of the response. As previously mentioned, they received support from a Protection and Inclusion Officer, which allow the team to identify and reflect on the potential risks. Staff demonstrated awareness about said issues. A good example of the awareness is the decision to build individual shelters as opposed to the communal shelters built by the government. This was done to avoid exposing beneficiaries and especially women and girls, to protection risks and to give them more privacy. As a result, little unintended effects were mentioned during the evaluation.

However, one risk that may have been overlooked is the risk **linked to power dynamics** within the community. As mentioned, the targeting process created a certain degree of frustration. The involvement of the volunteers during the door-to-door verification part of the targeting process placed them in a perceived situation of power. Having people from the community in charge of the targeting (via leaders and volunteers' involvement) makes the process consultative, but this should be balanced with the need for a targeting process perceived as being neutral and objective which is easier to achieve when outsiders are in charge of targeting.

III.2.4. Use of the resources and efficiency of the response

Overall, the response seems to be efficient. All key informants mentioned the team had so far worked with very limited resources and had to make best use of them by looking for any potential efficiency gain. Beneficiaries also had the impression that the assistance was delivered without diversion or wastage, except for a few duplications as explained in section III.3.

The efficiency of the cash out process could be strengthened. As observed, the distribution process requires as many staff members as an in-kind distribution, which would not be the case if beneficiaries could autonomously buy the items that they are entitled for from selected vendors at a time of their choice. IR staff also seem to spend time checking bag content which could be done by the beneficiary him/herself, as long as they receive the list of items for which they are entitled. However, this relates to one project only and should not have a big impact on the overall efficiency of the response.

In terms of use of the human resources, considering that the team is leading a total of 12 projects with only eight staff members the response has been efficient. However, human resources have been over-stretched which calls into question their ability to sustain such a workload over an extended period of time. IR also tried to maximise resource utilisation by working with volunteers. However, the reported concerns with their attitude could be detrimental to the perceived quality of the response.

The lack of permanent support functions has been, and remains to be, a challenge. For instance, no HR or finance officer was deployed into Palu during the initial few weeks of the response, which led to 'a

slow upscale of staff recruitment at Palu level and a lack of clarity on costing and commitments made to suppliers.⁶⁸ Deployment of surge staff during the first weeks of the emergency for support functions (finance, logistics, etc.) was thus helpful and appreciated by the team in Jakarta and Palu.

The partnership between IR and its partners seems to be efficient and working well on both sides. As part of the Central Sulawesi earthquake response, two partnership modalities are applied:⁶⁹

- Contractual partnership with Rumah Zakat and PKPU where the partners have independent implementation strategy based on agreed principles with IR
- Semi-operational partnership with KONSEPSI where IR can implement its standard and procedure for the implementation strategy, while KONSEPSI mostly deal with coordination, meeting and reporting to government.

The following table presents the key responsibilities or areas to be managed by IR and its contractual partners.

Table 8: Sharing of responsibilities between IR and contractual partners⁷⁰

Islamic Relief	Local partner
Funding from IR (fundraising) partners and institutional donors to support response plan. For now, Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and SIDA are the only institutional donors as local fundraising is conditional to registration as local entity in Indonesia instead of branch office of IRW.	Implementation of projects in the field offices and optimum utilisation of the funds according to terms and conditions to be listed in the partnership agreements. It is also required and necessary to ensure compliance at all levels and present/make available all supporting documents for any kind of financial or programmatic reviews i.e. internal/external audit and evaluation etc.
Technical support to local partner organisations for the implementation of projects and ensuring that the interventions are meeting compliance and globally accepted quality standards. Mainly, the support areas can be around financial management, procurement, logistics, quality and accountability. IR will also hire technical/sector specialists for WASH, Shelter and Livelihoods to not only monitor but also to guide local partners in implementation.	Local partner organisations need to ensure they are meeting the quality standards and cooperate, coordinate and communicate all the operational modalities with IR. Where required, partners can acquire direct support advisory and in-person deployment of IR staff to their operations. Partner organisations need to fulfil all the legal obligations required for receiving human resources from IR and facilitate travel arrangements for national and international staff if and when required.

Roles and responsibilities seemed clear for each organisation and overall IR partners were happy with the level of support and communication received from IR. A few mentioned feeling as if they were part of IR staff as they were sharing offices and have access to the same capacity building and support (administrative, finance, etc.) opportunities. At a more strategic level, interviewed IR partners wished to be more associated with decisions on sector focus and operational scope.

Initially, both PKPU and Rumah Zakat were given funding to autonomously implement the response as they were assessed as ‘strong’ partners during the screening process. During the first onset, the IR team

⁶⁸ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd – 19th October 2018'.

⁶⁹ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Islamic Relief Response Strategy - Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency'.

⁷⁰ Islamic Relief Indonesia.

focused on its own operation, delivering their activities in Sigi whereas PKPU was focusing on Donggala, instead of working together on common operations. Partners had to comply with IR's processes, policies, templates and tools which was sometimes difficult for them as they are experienced partners and had already developed their own.

Therefore, the initial phase of the response primarily relied on pre-existing local capacities while IR Indonesia scaled up its own response. IR Worldwide sent in international staff in order to offer the required logistical and technical support, but also to meet organisation commitment to be on the ground within 72 hours.⁷¹

III.3. Coordination and coherence of the response

III.3.1. Coordination and complementarity of the response to other humanitarian interventions after the tsunami

The government has been in charge of the whole coordination of the response from the first day. It set up the Pos Komando Tugas Gabungan Terpadu (Integrated Joint Command Post) for Emergency Response to Earthquake and Tsunami in Central Sulawesi chaired by a military commander in Central Sulawesi provincial level.⁷² The Post put in place the following mechanisms:⁷³

- All humanitarian and volunteer organisations coming to Central Sulawesi were obliged to check-in (register in the command post) and check-out when leaving
- The humanitarian organisations were grouped into several WhatsApp groups and every activity is required to be reported with description and photos including tagging of the location using open camera
- The government coordinated all incoming relief aid items into one gate, namely through Balikpapan airport. From this gate, the government then distributed the items
- The government provided support to volunteer organisations if they needed in kind and logistics support to reach their beneficiaries including transportation, water treatment, plant, generator, etc.

IR strictly adhered to those mechanisms. In addition to those systems in place, **IR and partners regularly coordinate with peer agencies and relevant government departments**. Moreover, on a bilateral basis information sharing and technical support is acquired from other agencies. For example, at global level IR and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for knowledge sharing and building expertise in shelter sector.⁷⁴

IR, and PKPU in particular have been and are still **actively participating in coordination meetings both at national and field level**. This is particularly the case with the Food Security and Livelihood sub cluster and Cash Transfer Program sub cluster. Cluster coordinators and government bodies were generally happy with the level of information received from IR and wished to know more about IR innovative projects that could generate leanings for others (hydroponic and mushroom agriculture for instance).

⁷¹ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd - 19th October 2018'.

⁷² Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Islamic Relief Response Strategy - Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency'.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Plan Submission'.

Some informants noted that the level of participation in coordination at Palu level slightly decreased in the past few weeks compared to the first response phase.⁷⁵

The lack of technical programmes staff (WASH, food security, shelter) during the first months of the response also hindered IR's ability to take on a more important role in coordination of areas such as WASH and Nutrition. These were highlighted by UNICEF as critical areas where they were looking for support.⁷⁶

Despite the coordination efforts from the humanitarian community, most beneficiaries consulted noted some duplications in the assistance received, especially during the first onset. This is not specific to IR but more linked to private sector interventions that were not coordinated with the clusters. The beneficiaries who received the same support twice explained that they were either using the duplicated assistance as a backup if the first set of items received was broken or missing or that they were bringing the extra items to another displaced person that did not receive the assistance because he/she did not meet the registration requirements.

Key informants also highlighted the gaps in the response. They include:

- A lack of at least 2,500 shelters;
- Livelihood support that is not sufficiently addressed by the current organisation;
- A need for latrine construction;
- Some more remote areas did not get much or any kind of support (Dolo in Sigi district for instance) even though they were also severely affected by the disaster.

IR contributed to bridge those gaps by providing shelter support for around 470 families and livelihood interventions.

The critical gaps are shared directly in the WhatsApp groups created, which allow other organisations to take action. **IR and partners took part in this movement and contributed to report some gaps in order for them to be addressed by the humanitarian community.**

Overall, **IR's response is complementary to other interventions** as it contributed to bridging the gaps in basic needs that the crisis-affected population were facing but it also allows to develop some new livelihood activities (hydroponics and mushroom farming) that are complementary to the traditional agricultural activities led by other organisations. IR is also focusing its DRR activities on religious leaders whereas other organisations are targeting the local governments (UNDP,⁷⁷ etc.), or the population itself (IFRC,⁷⁸ etc.).

⁷⁵ Some key informants noted that IR did not attend few coordination meetings before the evaluation and did not fill-up the last 5W report.

⁷⁶ Altaf, 'Field Visit Report - 3rd – 19th October 2018'.

⁷⁷ Ramanditya Wimbardana and Saut Sagala, 'After the Palu and Lombok Disasters: A New Chapter of Disaster Governance in Indonesia?', The Conversation, accessed 24 May 2019, <http://theconversation.com/after-the-palu-and-lombok-disasters-a-new-chapter-of-disaster-governance-in-indonesia-105860>.

⁷⁸ IFRC, 'Indonesia: Earthquakes and Tsunami - Emergency Plan of Action Operation MDRID013 Update N°6 - Indonesia', ReliefWeb, accessed 24 May 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/indonesia-earthquakes-and-tsunami-emergency-plan-action-operation-mdrid013-update-2>.

III.3.2. Coherence of the response with regional, national and international commitments, policies and priorities

Overall, the response was in line with IR's international commitments and other global quality standards in humanitarian response.

First of all, the **organisation staff were all aware of the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS)** that are used as guiding principles to deliver the response. If some of the CHS were better addressed than others as described in section IV, the response implemented was still very much in line with those standards and commitments as well as others. For instance, IR's recovery activities is also being **premised on the 'Build Back Better' (BBB) principle**, ensuring that people's houses and livelihoods are more earthquake resilient.⁷⁹ Similarly, in shelter assistance, the organisation is ensuring that it meets the minimum space required/person (Sphere standards), privacy and protection of recipient families (protection principles and CHS), the use of local materials (supporting local economy principle), that the design is acceptable (coordination and consultation with communities, government and peer agencies), that the construction is light enough so that there will be less harm if a new earthquake hits and it is situated in the neutral zone that is free from the risk of liquefaction and future tsunamis (BBB).⁸⁰

In terms of the commitments to advance the localisation of the response and the use of CVA⁸¹, IR could however have done more as previously discussed in this report.

The response was also in line with regional and national priorities. This was confirmed by the government officials consulted as part of this evaluation - they warmly welcomed IR's support. Various different bodies have been consulted to ensure the coherence of the intervention with those priorities. For instance, IR and PKPU consulted several governmental bodies (Public Infrastructure and Housing Department) in order to choose the design and material used for the temporary shelter as part of DEC Phase 1 project. They agreed on materials that can last for at least one year.⁸² For the temporary learning centres built, IR consulted the Education Ministry about the design and specifications of the centres.⁸³ CABS project is also integrated into a bigger government rehabilitation plan in the education sector.⁸⁴ Lastly, the livelihoods interventions carried out are aligned with a broader strategy from the Government's Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Master Plan. The Plan states that the significant economic growth reduction of -4,5% predicted by experts, should be recovered by the creation of productive activities for the communities in order to reinvigorate people's consumption, purchasing power, and savings.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 2 Plan Submission'.

⁸⁰ Islamic Relief Deutschland, 'Project Proposal to Aktion Deutschland Hilft: "Provision of Shelter for Earthquake Affected Community in Central Sulawesi (POSEAC)".

⁸¹ Islamic Relief is a CaLP member.

⁸² Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Final Report'.

⁸³ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 1 Plan Submission'.

⁸⁴ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'CABS - Project Proposal to Islamic Relief USA'.

⁸⁵ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'DEC Phase 2 Plan Submission'.

III.4. Connectedness of the response to longer term objectives

Although the first phase of the response was largely focused on responding to immediate needs and less focus on longer-term objectives or resilience, the second phase of activities seems much more forward looking.

Resilience is very much in the centre of the new cycle of activities which started from February 2019 onwards. As mentioned in the previous section, those activities are now focused on the BBB principle. BBB is 'an approach to post-disaster recovery that reduces vulnerability to future disasters and builds community resilience to address physical, social, environmental, and economic vulnerabilities and shocks'.⁸⁶

The organisation is also implementing a Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) project, aiming at building resilience at community level, through religious leaders against earthquake triggering liquefaction and at building the capacity of district level government in risk analysis, planning, budgeting, preparedness and mitigation against earthquake triggering liquefaction.⁸⁷ Some of the activities implemented include: participatory vulnerability and capacity assessment, production of DRR action plan, setting up community preparedness and response team, technical training on early warning, evacuation, camp management, first aid, mock drill and simulation, and implement community level mitigation.⁸⁸

IR tried to adopt a 'community driven approach' bringing about a basic element for resilience and sustainability of interventions.⁸⁹ IR is putting effort into building local authorities' capacity and involvement in each phase of the project life cycle to orient them on their role in making interventions sustainable, therefore ensuring greater sustainability of activities after the end of the IR projects. The organisation has also established community level structures (community committees) to support response, recovery and rehabilitation efforts in the affected areas of Sigi and Palu. The aims for these structures is to slowly start to independently plan, monitor, implement and sustain the interventions.⁹⁰

However, some other longer-term considerations have been set aside. ALNAP's Lessons Paper on Earthquake response draws attention to the fact that **earthquakes should be used as an opportunity to 'build back greener' and better integrate environmental considerations.**⁹¹ The environment is a particularly relevant cross-cutting issue when looking at earthquake responses, since this type of natural disaster has serious secondary impacts on the environment. These issues are too often neglected, thus exacerbating potential negative effects of the earthquake.⁹² **Although IR staff showed a certain awareness about these issues by pointing out the unsustainability of using wood as shelter material, no**

⁸⁶ GFDRR, 'Disaster Recovery Guidance Series- Building Back Better in Post-Disaster Recovery', n.d.

⁸⁷ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'FRORP-LiveDRRC Concept Note to Islamic Relief UK', December 2018.

⁸⁸ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Islamic Relief Response Strategy - Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency'.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Islamic Relief Indonesia, 'Islamic Relief Response Strategy - Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency'.

⁹¹ Hélène Juillard and Joris Jourdain, 'ALNAP Lessons Paper: Responding to Earthquakes' (London: ALNAP/ ODI, 2019).

⁹² Ibid.

other solution has been brought thus far to replace wood or make sure that the wood used was grown properly and therefore limit the impact of the response to the environment.

Lastly, IR is currently providing temporary shelter kits to communities. However, **it does not seem that this intervention is part of a wider process for establishing permanent housing which could ensure longer-term positive effects of the response.** At the moment it is unclear whether the beneficiaries of the temporary shelter kits will ever be able to have the resources to build their permanent houses unless they are also part of a livelihood intervention, which does not seem to be the case. The same principle applied to the temporary learning centres construction. If no longer-term perspective and strategies are developed, children in central Sulawesi could end up in the same situation as many children in Pakistan who were still learning in tents nearly three years after the earthquake.⁹³


IV. Evaluation against the CHS

The following evaluation is based on a qualitative assessment of IR performance against the quality criteria developed for each commitment. It does not review at the internal processes as this was not part of the scope for this evaluation and as IR Indonesia recently went through a CHS audit.

The following figure has been developed based on the official CHS representation. The colours have been changed in order to represent which standards needs the most attention based on the findings of this evaluation. The standards that appear the least met are coloured in orange and red (orange meaning partially met and red meaning not met at all) according to the consultants' judgement.

Figure 8: Evaluation against the CHS quality criteria

⁹³ Ibid.



The table below has also been developed to bring a more granular analysis and allow IR to more specifically identify which areas need to be improved within the CHS quality criteria.

Table 9: Assessment of the response against CHS performance indicators

Quality criterion	Performance indicator	IR response score
Commitment 1: Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate to their needs.		
Humanitarian response is appropriate and relevant	Communities and people affected by crisis consider that the response takes account of their specific needs and culture.	3
	The assistance and protection provided correspond with assessed risks, vulnerabilities and needs.	2
	The response takes account of the capacities (e.g. the skills and knowledge) of people requiring assistance and/or protection.	3
Commitment 2: Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time.		
Humanitarian response is effective and timely	Communities and people affected by crisis, including the most vulnerable groups, consider that the timing of the assistance and protection they receive is adequate	4
	Communities and people affected by crisis consider that their needs are met by the response.	3
	Monitoring and evaluation reports show that the humanitarian response meets its objectives in terms of timing, quality and quantity.	3
Commitment 3: Communities and people affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action		

Humanitarian response strengthens local capacities and avoids negative effects	Communities and people affected by the crisis, consider themselves better able to withstand future shocks and stresses as a result of humanitarian action.	3
	Local authorities, leaders and organisations with responsibilities for responding to crises consider that their capacities have been increased.	3
	Communities and people affected by crisis (including the most vulnerable) do not identify any negative effects resulting from humanitarian action.	2
Commitment 4: Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them		
Humanitarian response is based on communication, participation and feedback	Communities and people affected by crisis (including the most vulnerable) are aware of their rights and entitlements	3
	Communities and people affected by crisis consider that they have timely access to relevant and clear information	1
	Communities and people affected by crisis are satisfied with the opportunities they have to influence the response.	2
Commitment 5: Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.		
Complaints are welcomed and addressed	Communities and people affected by crisis, including vulnerable and marginalised groups, are aware of complaints mechanisms established for their use.	3
	Communities and people affected by crisis, consider the complaints mechanisms accessible, effective, confidential and safe.	3
	Complaints are investigated, resolved and results fed back to the complainant within the stated timeframe.	2
Commitment 6: Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.		
Humanitarian response is coordinated and complementary	Communities and people affected by crisis do not identify gaps and overlaps in the response.	2
	Responding organisations share relevant information through formal and informal coordination mechanisms.	3
	Organisations coordinate needs assessments, delivery of humanitarian aid and monitoring of its implementation.	3
Commitment 7: Communities and people affected by crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflection.		
Humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve	Communities and people affected by crisis identify improvements to the assistance and protection they receive over time.	This could not be assessed as it was IR first operation in Palu
	Improvements are made to assistance and protection interventions as a result of the learning generated in the current response.	3
	The assistance and protection provided reflects learning from other responses.	3
Commitment 8: Communities and people affected by crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff and volunteers		
Staff are supported to do their job effectively, and are	Male and female staff feel supported by their organisation to do their work	3
	Staff satisfactorily meet their performance objectives.	This could not be assessed

treated fairly and equitably	Communities and people affected by crisis find staff and volunteer to be effective (i.e. in terms of their knowledge, skills, behaviours and attitudes).	2
Commitment 9: Communities and people affected by crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically		
Resources are managed and used responsibly for their intended purpose.	Communities and people affected by crisis are aware about community-level budgets, expenditure and results achieved.	1
	Communities and people affected by crisis consider that the available resources are being used: a. for what they were intended; and b. without diversion or wastage.	3
	The resources obtained for the response are used and monitored according to agreed plans, targets, budgets and timeframes.	3
	Humanitarian response is delivered in a way that is cost effective	3

The same scoring system as the one presented in the CHS Self-Assessment tools was used, i.e.:

Table 10: Score description

Score	Description
0	The organisation does not currently work towards application of this requirement, neither formally nor informally.
1	The organisation has made some efforts towards application of this requirement, but these efforts have not been systematic.
2	The organisation is making systematic efforts towards application of this requirement, but certain key points are still not addressed.
3	The organisation conforms to this requirement, and organisational systems ensure that it is met throughout the organisation and over time – the requirement is fulfilled.
4	The organisation's work goes beyond the intent of this requirement and demonstrates innovation. It is applied in an exemplary way across the organisation and organisational systems ensure high quality is maintained across the organisation and over time.

V. Conclusion

Earthquakes response present unique challenges: physical access is difficult in the first few days and communication is made difficult by infrastructure destruction. Overall, IR's response to the Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami can be considered a success, in so far that it addressed the targeted communities' most pressing needs and achieved or is on the way to achieve the majority of its stated outputs. The timeliness of the activities and commitment of IR staff have been consistently praised during the evaluation and demonstrate that IR has been able to tackle challenges of access.

IR global organisational commitment towards the CHS cascaded down at country level, with a high level of awareness on the importance of those criteria during the earthquake response in Indonesia. The intended level of participation of the communities in the response was high from the start and aligned with CHS commitment. However, it inevitably increased over time and after the first few weeks of the response when the urgency of the needs requires swift action. Particular attention should be given to the targeting of Phase 2, ensuring the participation of representative members of the communities.

The strong partnership between IR and PKPU, Rumah Zakat and KONSEPSI, as well as the support received from IRW at critical time, appear to have been a contributing factor to the programme's success. The response should now tend to pursue further localisation commitments by giving more space to the partners to participate in strategic and operational decision making.

IR engaged broadly and swiftly with local authorities. By including market as part of the situation analysis, IR also made efforts not to undermine the work of the private sector and the recovery of the local economy. Cross-cutting issues such as gender and protection were incorporated at all stages of the response, but environmental considerations could strongly be taken on board. In the ALNAP paper, there are specific points of attention highlighted as lessons, which relate to communication with affected communities and with setting transitional shelter. In conclusion, IR phase 1 response aligned (in its vast majority) with the recently published ALNAP Lessons Paper⁹⁴ on earthquake.

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VI. Recommendations

Suggestions for IR and partners to further strengthen their response to the tsunami and earthquake in Central Sulawesi and future programming include:

Design of the response

Recommendation 1: Select the modality of the basis on situation analysis and when conditions permit, consider unconditional unrestricted cash assistance as the default option

IR has already used unconditional and unrestricted cash during the response. Yet it could explore the use of cash grants for shelter repair and construction (as opposed to shelter material distribution). Restricted assistance can be considered when specific objectives need to be met as is the case here for livelihood. CVA distribution process should tend to maximise the benefit of this modality by encouraging flexibility of assistance, distribution time and date, and by encouraging the prolonged use of the payment mechanism.

Moving forward, IR is encouraged to review the voucher distribution process so that, distance permitting, beneficiaries can directly go to the shop at a time of their convenience to withdraw the material. Similarly, IR should ensure the vendor base is large enough to ensure competition in between traders and better bargaining power for voucher recipients.

Implementation

Recommendation 2: Ensure representative participation during the targeting

The targeting process has been participatory as leaders and volunteers from the community have been heavily involved. IR should seek to ensure that those leaders and volunteers are representatives of the different groups within the communities. Alternatively, IR could consider the creation of committees charged with selecting beneficiaries. To balance the benefits of community involvement in selecting the beneficiaries (as they have better knowledge of the context and community members) with the potential threat of bias, programme implementers should ensure inclusion of women and other vulnerable groups in the selection committees (i.e. they not dominated by men). In addition, the practice of using two selection committees and comparing their beneficiary lists should be applied across all communities as a method to reduce the risk of bias in beneficiary selection

⁹⁴ Hélène Juillard and Joris Jourdain, 'ALNAP Lessons Paper: Responding to Earthquakes' (London: ALNAP/ODI, 2019).

Recommendation 3: Draw clear targeting criteria and make sure it is communicated clearly and transparently across recipients and non- recipients.

Comprehensive and clear beneficiary communication can help prevent an increase in community tensions and manage the communities' expectations about the type and amount of support they will receive. When the list of criteria is finalised, ensure it is well circulated throughout the community, even before the beneficiary selection is conducted. It is also important to clarify if certain criteria are more important than others (e.g. if there is a "core" set of criteria that must first be met before considering "other" criteria). The list of criteria needs to be more precise than the criteria developed in the proposal. For instance, 'individuals severely affected by the earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction' can include a wide range of individuals. IR should consider developing indicators such as 'households whose shelter have been damaged by 75% or more' and/or 'individuals who have lost 80% of their productive means or more'.

Communicate the timing of the selection process to make sure that potential beneficiaries can make themselves available during household visits.

Recommendation 4: Continue efforts to make sure volunteers' attitude and behaviour are up to the organisation's standards. Based on the beneficiaries' feedback, this was not always the case. However, it is vital to ensure that crisis-affected communities receive assistance in a dignified way. IR should rethink its volunteers' selection process to ensure that the selected individuals' behaviour is in line with the organisation's values. Alternatively, IR can organise more information sessions and training on what is acceptable behaviour with simulation exercises (a false distribution with beneficiaries for instance), or find ways to incentivise them when beneficiaries are satisfied with their attitude. There is also a need for IR to hold them accountable if they do not behave properly.

Monitoring

Recommendation 5: Make sure monitoring allows for determining whether the response is reaching its objectives and is used to make programmatic decisions.

Projects should all have stated SMART outcome indicators, even if this is not a requirement from the donor that aims to demonstrate the intended change. For example, for a food security intervention the indicator cannot be the number of food secure households, it should be more specific and break down the cause of food insecurity in that particular context (e.g. physical or financial access to food, use of food, food availability). It may also be beneficial to have an overall response theory of change or logical framework so the whole team and partners know what each project is contributing towards.

Complaint and feedback

Recommendation 6: Centralise all complaints and feedback in a single log in a singly language

Currently, IR has several parallel logs: one in Jakarta (soft version in English) and one in Palu (paper-based version mixed in English and Bahasa). These should all be centralised in a single database in a single language (either English or Bahasa). The complaint log should also keep track of the time required to close a case by registering the day when the complaint or feedback was made, the date when potential referrals were made and date of the response given. IR should also aim to analyse the complaints received at a more macro level to inform its activity. For instance, when several individuals complain about the targeting mechanisms, this suggests that the criteria used were not well understood within the community. In the above scenario, IR should take broader actions than just replying to complainants on a case-by-case basis. A mapping of complaint handling process done in a participatory manner may be a good first step in that direction.

In addition, IR should continue to advertise the hotline through community mobilisers, information boards, PDM surveys, etc., and try and collect feedback from beneficiaries face-to-face as much as possible.

Partnership

Recommendation 7: Progressively aim for a localised response model.

This recommendation is in line with IR global commitment to localisation of humanitarian aid.⁹⁵ When assessing partner capacity, IR should to the greatest extent possible think about the overall demand for partnership and work jointly with the partner to scale up its capacity. To do so, the presence of permanent IR support staff appear to be necessary.

More broadly this also requires a progressive shift of the business and fundraising models used by IRW and other international organisations from a model that works through local partners to work equitably with them from the design and fundraising stage until the exit phase.⁹⁶ This would involve IR and other international organisations and donors resource effective-partnerships, including supporting multi-year partnerships and overhead costs.

Sustainability

Recommendation 8: Try and mitigate the impact of the response on the environment to avoid doing further harm than the disaster. This could be done through the development of an 'environmental monitoring plan'⁹⁷ that captures the mitigation, institutional and monitoring measures to take during the implementation of the response to prevent or reduce negative environmental impacts. If locally-sourced reconstruction materials are not sustainably managed, IR should also ensure an appropriate balance between using locally sourced reconstruction materials which are often preferred by the beneficiaries (as this is the case with wood for shelter in Palu) and preserving a country's natural resources. Another option would be to develop livelihoods activities that could be linked to the sustainable management of natural resources.

Some guidelines have been developed on this topic, which could help IR better integrating environmental protection concern into programming.⁹⁸

Recommendation 9: Begin planning the formal exit strategy at the beginning of the project. Having a clear understanding of the full exit strategy from the beginning will help to ensure that activities and communications across communities and local government actors are consistent. As such, even though the second cycle of activities only started recently, IR should already start thinking about an exit strategy and look into longer-term consideration (moving from temporary shelters and learning centres to permanent structures for instance).

⁹⁵ 'Enhancing Local Capacity to Increase the Impact of Humanitarian Aid Islamic Relief Worldwide', accessed 29 May 2019, <https://www.islamic-relief.org/enhancing-local-capacity-to-increase-the-impact-of-humanitarian-aid/>.

⁹⁶ Humanitarian Advisory Group, 'Charting the New Norm? Local Leadership in the First 100 Days of the Sulawesi Earthquake Response'.

⁹⁷ Juillard and Jourdain, 'ALNAP Lessons Paper: Responding to Earthquakes'.

⁹⁸ Jha et al.'s (2010) 'Safer homes, stronger communities' for instance includes an entire chapter on how to incorporate ecological considerations into debris management, including conducting an environmental risk assessment and preparing an environmental monitoring plan.

VII. Appendices

VII.1. Programmes implemented as part of the response

Table 11: Programmes and main activities implemented by IR as part of the response

Project name & sector	Duration	Budget & Donor	Benef	Location	Activities
POSEAC <i>Shelter</i>	12 months 01/03/2019 – 28/02/2020	300,000 EUR ADH	250 HH	Palu and Sigi districts	Rumah Zakat - 250 Transitional shelters (IK distribution & self-help for 235 HH + direct build for 15HH) - One off cash distribution (IDR 500,000) for NFI
Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami response <i>Shelter</i> <i>Education</i>	6 months 29/09/2018 – 02/04/2019	170,308 GBP DEC (Phase 1)	125 HH 700 students	Sigi district	PKPU - 125 transitional shelters without latrines - 3 temporary learning centres (20 classrooms)
Central Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami recovery response <i>Livelihoods</i>	13 months 01/04/2019 - 31/05/2020	GBP 547,659.67 DEC (Phase 2)	1,000 HH 50 HH	Sigi District and Palu city	KONSEPSI - 1,000 e-money top-ups for livelihood support (MBICT4D) - 50 micro finance grants, training and cooperative - 100 beneficiaries (incl. 50 with disabilities) selected for microfinance, tools & equipment support
Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami response Indonesia <i>Relief item: Food pack (rice, eggs, mineral water, cooking oil, soy-sauce, salt), hygiene kit, tarpaulin, blanket, temporary shelter kits and cash transfer.</i>	4 months 29/09/2018 – 28/01/2019	3,511,466 SEK SIDA	3700 HH	Sigi	PKPU and Rumah Zakat - 3700 NFI & hygiene kits distribution - 3700 Food IK - Electricity supply IK (20 generators) - 3700 Tarpaulin IK - 3700 Unconditional unrestricted cash grants (Rp.250,000 per HH)
Fostering the rule of religious Place in DRR and Livelihood convergence (FRORP-DRRLC)	24 months 01/03/2019 – 28/02/2021	GBP. 287,999.51 IRUK	1000 HH	Sigi District	KONSEPSI - Build District Government Resilient: 150 govt staff trained


IRW RTE of the Indonesia earthquake and tsunami response

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Build Community Resilient at Village Level: 1000 HH, 4,000 persons - Strengthen the community livelihood: 150 HH
Children Are Back to School (CABS) in Central Sulawesi <i>Education</i>	12 months 15/02/2019 – 15/02/2020	500,513USD IRUSA	3341 pax	Sigi district and Palu City	PKPU Human Initiative and Rumah Zakat <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 72 temporary classrooms - 8 permanent earthquake resilient rooms
Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Response Indonesia-1 (SEATRI-1) <i>Wash Shelter Nutrition Education EFSL</i>	10 months 01/10/2018 – 31/07/2019	348,476CAD IR Canada	2500 HH	Sigi district	Rumah Zakat and PKPU <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IK Food and hygiene kits distribution - Temporary school set up
Restoration of Livelihood in Earthquake Tsunami Affected Communities in Central Sulawesi (RELEACS)	10 months 01/02/2019 – 30/11/2019	IR South Africa, IR Netherland, IR Swiss and IR Sweden (Multi-donors fund) 117,160 EUR	618 HH	Sigi, Palu City	KONSEPSI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Business creation support in mushroom and hydroponic farming as well as food processing through the provision of business input supply kits
Sky-hydrant water treatment plant	3 months 01/11/2018 – 31/01/2019 extended to 31/04/2019	IR Australia 85 169 AUD (Palu Office received 9 plants out of 10 distributed as part of this project)	1000 HH	Sigi district	KONSEPSI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Installation of 9 sky-hydrant water treatment plants - Hygiene promotion activities
Livelihood and recovery support for disaster affected communities in Central Sulawesi (LIREASAD)	12 months 01/04/2019- 31/03/2020	5,000,000 SEK SIDA	2500 HH	Palu city and Sigi district	KONSEPSI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - E-vouchers for 2,500 individuals - Training for 125 individuals
Nutritional & Therapeutic Feeding Provision for Earthquake Affected Children and Mother (NATFEP) Sulawesi	3 months 01/04/2019 – 30/06/2019	GBP 12,780 Partners Development	68 HH	Palu city and Sigi district	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of high nutrition biscuits, F75 and F100 feeding aliments - Provision of meal support, micronutrient, bottled drinking water - Health, nutrition, hygiene education
Livelihood recovery for Earthquake Affected Communities (LIREACS)	6 months	GBP 48, 224	578 HH	Palu city	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of livelihoods support activities

IRW RTE of the Indonesia earthquake and tsunami response

	01/06/2019	-			
	30/11/2019				

Table 12 IR projects in response to the earthquake and tsunami



VII.2. Detailed methodology

The consultancy's objectives were met through a participatory, qualitative approach relying on a variety of secondary and primary sources. The approach reflected common practice for real-time evaluations (RTE), as per ALNAP's Guide on 'Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action'. The methodology contained the following steps:

VII.2.1. Desk review & inception phase

The review started with an **in-depth briefing**, on March, 15th 2019, with the consultancy manager and teams based in Indonesia. Beyond fostering a broad and general understanding of the IRW appeal-related projects and the consultancy's ToR, this briefing was used to refine the list of documents available for the desk review and agree on a final timeframe. Once the documents received, the consultants undertook a desk review focusing on secondary data available. It included project proposals and situation reports.

The objective of the desk review was to feed into the analysis and highlight the remaining gaps to inform the primary data collection. The desk review was however carried out in an iterative manner, i.e. the consultants were able to collect more documents once in country which were added to the findings drawn from the first documents reviewed. In total, the consultants reviewed 72 documents.

The consultants then developed an inception report to IRW, which presented the finalised scope for the RTE, a refined methodology, data collection tools, and a timeframe specifying the dates of the workshop/presentation sessions and final report.

VII.2.2. Primary data collection


VII.2.2.1. Learning workshop

Primary data collection started with an in-country **workshop** with IR Indonesia, and implementing partners. The aim of this workshop was first to clarify the objectives of the review and to start collecting data. The idea behind this workshop was to bring few key stakeholders involved in response implementation together (staff, partners, etc.) in order to collectively reflect on the activities implemented since the tsunami and earthquake, using participatory methods to draw out themes and trends. This was in line with the spirit of an RTE, aiming at collecting key data in a limited number of days without overloading programme staff.

The learning event maximised productivity and ensured that the experience was positive and energising. It was facilitated with specific methodology to generate findings and learning. Methods to draw out information included SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities; Threats) design and through group techniques like Knowledge Café⁹⁹, which allowed participants to organically move from one topic to another, maximising interactions.

⁹⁹ In the Knowledge Café, topics are addressed in rounds of interactive discussions based on core questions where participants sit in tables of up to 6 people with one person acting as main host per each table. After each question round the host remains to summarise and gather what was said at her or his table while the remaining persons move to other tables as ambassadors of knowledge. They initially share the experience and ideas discussed in their previous table and listen to the host, then move on to the next question to discuss and explore other aspects.

Figure 9: Photos taken by the consultants during the workshop



Participants worked together to analyse programmatic trends and foster an understanding of which practices were most effective and relevant. The event highlighted places where project continuity and synergies led to an exponential increase in positive outcomes, whereby the sum of projects' outcomes is greater than each individual project outcome.

The location of the workshop was in Palu, as this is where most project staff were at the time of the field visit. It was carried out on Tuesday 6th May, morning. In total, the workshop gathered 17 participants: 11 from IR staff, 3 from partner organisations (KONSEPSI and PKPU), and 3 volunteers.

The table present the agenda followed for the workshop.

Timeframe	Topic
9h – 9h15	Welcome
9h15 – 9h30	Presentation and context of the RTE
9h30 – 10h30	Chronology of the response: successes and challenges

10h30-11h	Coffee break
11h-12h	Relevance and coherence of the projects: an analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities (SWOT)
12h -12h45	If we were to start all over again... Lessons learnt
12h45-13h	Next steps and closing words

VII.2.2.2. Key informant interviews, Focus Group Discussions and observations

Primary data collection then consisted of key informant interviews (KIIs), Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and observations. The purpose was to inform and triangulate the findings that arose from of the desk review.

Considering that the scope included at least six different interventions, as presented in **Error! Reference source not found.**, the consultants suggested prioritising some interventions for primary data collection and especially for the FGDs (all interventions will be covered through secondary data review and KIIs). Following discussions with IRW, those interventions were DEC and SIDA funded projects.

Kukuh conducted 9 FGDs with beneficiaries. In order to ensure that the opinions of both men and women are heard, Kukuh conducted FGD separately with men and women. In total, 107 beneficiaries were consulted; 89 women and 18 men. This disparity between the number of men and women can be explained by the fact that the response prioritised the targeting of women. Minority groups (Buddhists and Christians) and people with disabilities were included in the FGDs.

Chloé, with support from Kukuh, conducted face-to-face interviews with key stakeholders, including but not limited to IR staff, local implementers, representatives of local government and cluster leads. Those interviews were carried out in Palu, in Jakarta and also remotely with IRW staff.

The selection of key informants was be done purposefully, targeting people thought to be best able to contribute to this review process. They were representative of the following groups.

Table 13 Proposed criteria to select key informants

Proposed criteria to select key informants	Number of key informants consulted
▪ Islamic Relief Indonesia	9
▪ Islamic Relief Worldwide	3
▪ Implementing partners	3
▪ Local authorities	6
▪ Cluster leads	2
Total	23

The consultants also took part in two distributions. Kukuh was able to attend an in-kind distribution whereas Chloé took part in the pilot distribution for the cash transfer programme. This allowed the consultants to make observations on the overall efficiency of the two processes.

VII.2.3. Analysis and final report

Primary and secondary qualitative data were recorded and coded to analyse emerging trends. This was done using a coding matrix organised per review topic. The analysis was done iteratively during the data collection to adjust the data collection tools and explore some of the trends more in-depth.

The consultants segregated data as per gender and location in order to be able to run the analysis in a granular manner and explore if some specific trends can be associated with belonging to one of those groups.

When it comes to CHS compliance, the consultant used a qualitative grading system using informants' perception and professional judgement to determine compliance.

The consultants then produced the first draft of the final report, which was finalised upon receiving the client's feedback. As per the ToR, this 20 to 25-page report provides the findings, conclusions and recommendations against the CHS and per DAC criteria. It also includes a standalone executive summary with the key findings and recommendations to assist with dissemination.

Before the finalisation of the report, the consultants led a preliminary findings presentation to IR Indonesia and IRW staff. Discussions from this presentation will be integrated in the first draft of the report. Once the report is finalised the consultant will conduct a final presentation to IRW senior management via Skype.

VII.2.1. Limitations

Overall, the main limitation faced by the consultants as part of this evaluation were similar to the ones surrounding any RTE; mostly the lack of time and availability of key informants. Considering that the team in Indonesia also had to go through a financial and CHS audit, the consultants felt a bit of an 'evaluation fatigue'.

The fact that only one consultant out of the two that were doing the data collection could speak Bahasa meant that most KII had to be carried out in English, which meant that it was not always easy for key informants to express their opinion.

Lastly, the majority of FGDs had to take place out outside due to the lack of available infrastructure. Considering the heat and the fact that some beneficiaries were vulnerable (pregnant women, women with babies, elderly, people with disabilities, etc.), consultants had to be cautious about not taking too much time. They also had to shorten some FGDs and group two FGDs together, which explains why the consultants undertook 9 FGDs instead of the 10 planned.

VII.3. Evaluation matrix

The following table presents the evaluation matrix used, it is composed of the evaluation questions and sub-questions and associated indicators and data sources. The evaluation criteria, reflected in the overarching evaluation questions, reflect common practice for real-time evaluations (RTE) as per ALNAP's Guide on 'Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action.' The evaluation questions and working questions have been adapted from the topics proposed in the ToR. As the consultants evaluated the response against the CHS, the number of the standards associated with each question have been specified in the "Evaluation questions" column.

Table 14: Proposed evaluation questions and working questions

Evaluation questions	Working questions	How judgement will be formed	Data sources
<p>1. To what extent is the response relevant and appropriate to the needs and priorities of the target population?</p> <p>CHS 1, 4 and 7</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Was the response design consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? ▪ To what extent is the response in line with the needs and priorities of those affected (disaggregated by vulnerable group)? Are there any major gaps in unmet needs? ▪ How was the affected population involved in the program's design, and how are they able to provide feedback? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The context (especially needs and risks) and stakeholders are systematically, objectively and continuously analysed in order to appropriately design and implement the response ▪ The response is adapted to changing needs, capacities and context based on context analysis and beneficiaries' feedback ▪ Disaggregated data exists (gender, age, special needs, minority groups) and shows an understanding of the vulnerabilities and capacities of different groups ▪ The response is designed based on lessons learnt and prior experience ▪ Inclusive representation, participation and engagement of people and communities are ensured at all stages of the work. This includes ensuring that necessary information is provided to them to be able to participate and that appropriate feedback channels exist ▪ Beneficiaries confirm that the interventions appropriately addressed their needs, they have been consulted and that they received sufficient information to be able to voice their opinions ▪ IRW internal policies set out commitments which take into account the opinions and diversity of communities, including disadvantaged or marginalised groups. 	<p>Desk review, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Context analysis and monitoring reports ▪ Country/regional strategy ▪ Proposals, needs assessments, progress, monitoring and evaluation reports ▪ Selection criteria for people to benefit from project ▪ Progress, monitoring and evaluation reports. ▪ Proposals (inclusion of flexibility to adapt to changes in narrative and budget) ▪ Monitoring and evaluation reports, Database on key evaluation and learning resources ▪ Information sharing material, posters, radio, etc... ▪ Reports, minutes of community activities ▪ Mission and vision statement, code of conduct <p>FGDs with communities and KIIs with stakeholders</p>
<p>2. How effective and efficient is the project in achieving its intended outcomes?</p> <p>CHS 2, 3, 5, 8, and 9</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ To what extent are the activities of IRW members achieving and/or are likely to achieve their intended outcomes? ▪ What are likely to be some of the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? ▪ What, if any, are the unintended effects? ▪ How have beneficiary complaints been handled and addressed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impressions from communities and key informants that the response has been designed taking into account constraints so that the proposed action is realistic and safe for communities ▪ Activities have been delivered as per the original plan so far; ▪ Key informants identify factors likely to influence the achievement or failure of the response objectives achievement ▪ Impression from beneficiaries, staff and partners that interventions delivered were of good quality/ meet internal and external quality standards ▪ Crisis affected households are aware of the existing complaints mechanisms and those who have placed a complaint have received an answer that they considered timely and appropriate ▪ Beneficiaries report unintended effects, if any, derived from the interventions; ▪ Impressions from key informants that there is no other alternative for achieving the same results with less inputs/funds ▪ Reports from staff and partners that they received adequate support to be able to deliver their outputs on time. 	<p>Desk review, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Risk analysis/assessment and security plans. ▪ Minutes of meeting ▪ Progress and monitoring reports ▪ Feedback and response mechanisms reports, hotline reports ▪ Complaints handling policy and procedure ▪ Referral policy ▪ Information sharing material and reports of community activities ▪ Project logframe, budgets and expense reports. <p>FGDs with communities and KIIs with stakeholders</p>

IRW RTE of the Indonesia earthquake and tsunami response

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Are the activities being delivered in a timely and high-quality manner? Have resources been used responsibly and for their intended purpose? Have staff and partners received the necessary support to do their jobs effectively? 		
<p>3. Was the response coordinated, coherent with and complementary to other responses?</p> <p>CHS 6</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Has the response been coordinated and complementary to other humanitarian interventions after the tsunami? Were the gaps in the response covered by other stakeholders? To what extent is the response's planning, design and implementation coherent with regional, national and international commitments, policies and priorities? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The roles, responsibilities, capacities and interests of different stakeholders are identified in project documentation and confirmed by key informants' impressions (including partners). The response complements the action of national and local authorities and other actors as per the review of documents of other stakeholders' response and per key informants' perceptions (including coordination bodies and local authorities). The organisation participates in relevant coordination platforms and collaborates with others in order to minimise demands on communities and maximise the coverage and service provision of the wider humanitarian effort. Information about the projects is shared with partners, coordination groups and other relevant actors through appropriate communication channels; Policies and strategies include a clear commitment to coordination and collaboration with others, including national and local authorities. Work with partners is governed by clear and consistent agreements that respect each partner's mandate, obligations and independence, and recognises their respective constraints and commitments. 	<p>Desk review, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder mapping, or appropriate sections of project proposals and progress reports Commitments towards coordination, reports on involvement with coordination mechanisms and clusters Programme plans, monitoring and reporting documents, MoU with other stakeholders Minutes of coordination meetings. Coordination and partnership policy MoU templates, partner assessment formats Secondment / stand by partner policy and agreements. <p>FGDs with communities and KIs with stakeholders</p>
<p>4. Is the intervention ensuring connectedness with future responses and promoting sustainability?</p> <p>CHS 3, 7</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To what extent is the response strengthening local capacities and promoting resilience? How has the response prepared for any potential medium or long-term interventions? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The response is designed and implemented in order to promote early recovery according to key informants (IR staff, partners, local authorities and coordination bodies). Interventions are built on local capacities and work towards improving the resilience of communities and people affected by crisis. A transition or exit strategy is planned in the early stages of the humanitarian programme to ensure longer-term positive effects and reduce the risk of dependency. The organisation contributes to learning in humanitarian response amongst peers and within the sector through the participation in experience sharing activities. 	<p>Desk review, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workshops and other learning events <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Membership of learning oriented networks, publications Learning policy, knowledge management policy (organisational and programmatic). <p>FGDs with communities and KIs with stakeholders</p>

VII.4. Data collection tools

VII.4.1. FGDs questionnaire

Introduce yourself

Background

Thank you for taking the time to participate in this discussion.

We are currently conducting an evaluation of Islamic Relief Worldwide’s (IRW) response to the earthquake and tsunami. IR and its partners is providing shelter, livelihood and education support to crisis-affected communities in Palu city and Sigi district.

The evaluation will focus on reviewing the project’s relevance, coherence, effectiveness and sustainability so far in order to identify recommendations to inform the continuation of the intervention and future programming. It will also help collect lessons learnt and good practices to respond to earthquakes and tsunamis.

As beneficiaries of the [project name] project, we wanted to collect your thoughts and opinions on the subject.

When conducting the FGDs be conscious of gender, minority groups, and of the time you are going to ask people to contribute (each FGD should be a maximum of 1 hour and 15-30 minutes). If possible, try and hold separate FGDs for women and men and minority groups. Each FGDs should include between 5 to 12 people maximum.

General Information

FGD date			
Community District/location			
Interviewer(s)			
Interviewees	Name	Role (head of household, village chief, etc)	Telephone

	1.	1.	1.
	2.	2.	2.
	3.	3.	3.

Introduction questions

1. Are you familiar with the Islamic Relief activities in your community in response to the Sulawesi tsunami and earthquake?
2. What assistance have you received through this project? And when did you start receiving assistance?
3. How did you hear about this programme?

CHS 1: Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs.

4. What were your actual needs after the earthquake?
5. Was the assistance received aligned with your needs? Did it correspond to the tradition habits and preference in the area?
6. Are you satisfied with the assistance you received from Islamic Relief and its partners? Why or why not?
7. How could the assistance be made more useful?

CHS 2: Communities and people affected by the crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time

8. How soon after the tsunami and earthquake hit did you receive assistance from IR?
9. Was this assistance arriving at the right time?
10. Do you think it could have been done quicker? And if so how?

CHS 9: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.

11. Has the project made a difference? If yes, what is the most important change brought about by Islamic Relief's intervention and who benefitted in particular?
12. Do you consider that the available resources are being used: a. for what they were intended, and b. without diversion or wastage?

CHS 3: Communities and people result affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.

13. Can you identify for yourself or members of your community, in particular the most vulnerable, any negative effects resulting from Islamic Relief's response to the crisis?

14. Do you consider yourself and your community better able to cope with future shocks and stresses as a result of the assistance received? How?

CHS 4: Communities and people affected by the crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them

15. Do you know why you have been selected to receive assistance from IR?

16. Do you feel that those who need it the most are receiving assistance from IR? Can you explain why?

17. Have you been consulted about the activities to be implemented? And the modalities (cash, in-kind, vouchers) used?

18. Have you been asked your opinion about the quality of assistance delivered?

19. If you have been, has it been taken into consideration?

20. Have you or other members in your community been consulted about the safety and access conditions to receive assistance or any other element of the project design?

21. Overall do you feel you have received sufficient information about the project?

CHS 6: Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.

22. Can you identify any gap in the humanitarian assistance received as a result of the earthquake and tsunami? Which of your needs have you not been able to cover (by Islamic Relief or any other actors involved in the response)?

23. Do you see overlaps (duplication) in the humanitarian response received in your community?

CHS 8: Communities and people affected by the crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff

24. How would you describe Islamic Relief and partners' staff knowledge, skills, behaviours and attitudes?

CHS 5: Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.

25. If you have a question or a complaint about the project, how do you ask for it?

26. Have you done so? If yes, did you feel confident doing so?

27. Have you received a response? And if yes, how satisfied were you about the response?

CHS 7: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflexion

No question will be asked to beneficiaries regarding this standard.

Wrap Up

28. Do you have any suggestions for improvement for the RC and/or their partners? Please give examples.

29. Is there anything else you would like to add?

VII.4.2. KII guide with partner organisations

Background

Thanks for taking the time to speak with me today.

We have been commissioned by Islamic Relief Worldwide in order to carry out the evaluation of their response to the earthquake and tsunami in Palu city and Sigi district.

The overall objective of this evaluation, focusing on activities carried out from February 2019 onwards, is to assess Islamic Relief's response and draw lessons to inform the continuation of the intervention and future programming. More specifically, the real-time evaluation (RTE) aims to:

- Determine the intervention's relevance to meeting beneficiaries' needs;
- Assess its effectiveness and efficiency in achieving its objectives, including highlighting any gaps or unintended effects
- Review the intervention's coherence with IRC's guiding principles and standards
- Investigate the intervention's coordination with other similar response efforts
- Determine where connectedness was considered to pave the way for future longer-term interventions.

The interview will last 45 minutes. Information will be kept confidential (e.g. no one will be quoted individually) and strictly used for informing this final evaluation. Personal data will be used solely for the purpose of this review and will not be forwarded to third parties.

Key Aid Consulting is compliant with the EU's GDPR, and you can request the removal of your information by emailing info@keyaidconsulting.com.

Ask for interviewees consent.

Tell interviewees if/how they will see the results of this consultation (e.g. if the final report will be shared).

Instructions

This structured interview guide provides an overview of all the topics and corresponding questions, however each interview will be tailored to focus on the set of questions that are most directly relevant to the interviewee's expertise and interest.

General information

Name:

Position:

Organisation:

Email Address:

Introduction questions

1. How have you been involved in Islamic Relief's (activities in response to the Sulawesi tsunami and earthquake?
2. This evaluation is using the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) as a reference. Are you familiar with the CHS? Have the 9 commitments been explain to your organisation when you started working with Islamic Relief?

CHS 1: Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs.

3. To what extent do you believe that the assistance received is relevant and appropriate to address the needs of the community? Can you give a rating from 0 to 10?
0 being not relevant at all and 10 being extremely relevant.
4. Was the response able to adapt to changing needs and context? Can you give me an example?
5. Do you consider that the humanitarian response takes into account the existing capacities (e.g. the skills and knowledge) of the beneficiaries and communities?
6. Are there any groups whose needs were not addressed? Why or why not?
If not mention, ask about the targeting criteria and methodology.

CHS 2: Communities and people affected by the crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time

7. Do you consider that the timing of the assistance received is adequate, including for the most vulnerable beneficiaries? Did the projects suffer from delays compared to the original plans?

CHS 9: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.

8. In _____ your _____ opinion, _____ is _____ the _____ project _____ improving _____ beneficiaries':
 - a. *add project objectives*
 - b. *add project objective*

c. add project objectives

Can you explain why or why not?

9. Which factors can you identify will likely have an impact on the achievement of the response's objectives? Have they been considered at design stage?
10. Do you consider that the same outputs and outcomes could have be delivered with less resources? If so, how?
11. Generally speaking, are you satisfied with the partnership with Islamic Relief? More specifically, how has the partnership between Islamic Relief and your organisation been going, in terms of:
 - 11.1 Communication and information sharing?
 - 11.2 Delineation of roles and responsibility?
 - 11.3 Ways to raise and handle disagreement, if any?

CHS 3: Communities and people result affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.

12. Do you believe that the beneficiary communities are better able to cope with future shocks and stresses as a result of the assistance received?
13. Have you identified any negative effects resulting from Islamic Relief's response to the crisis, including for the most vulnerable individuals?
14. Do you consider that the capacity of local actors, including authorities, leaders and organisations with responsibilities for responding to crises, have increased as a result of Islamic Relief's response?

CHS 4: Communities and people affected by the crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them

15. Do you consider that beneficiaries receive timely access to relevant and clear information about the programme and were able to participate in the different stages of the project (design implementation, monitoring and evaluation)?

CHS 6: Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.

16. Can you identify any gap in the humanitarian assistance received by the beneficiaries as a result of the earthquake and tsunami?
17. Do you see overlaps (duplication) in the humanitarian response received by some communities?
18. Would you say that Islamic Relief coordinates activities well with other key stakeholders in your area? For instance, does the organisation takes part in coordination meetings or for a?

CHS 8: Communities and people affected by the crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff

19. According to you, did your organisation received adequate and sufficient support from Islamic Relief to deliver the intended outputs? What could be improved?

CHS 5: Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.

20. Is there any complaint mechanism available to beneficiary communities for use in relation to the humanitarian response received? Can you describe them to me?
21. Do you consider that those complaints mechanisms are accessible, effective, confidential and safe?

CHS 7: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflexion

22. Do you consider that the assistance delivered by Islamic Relief and your organisation has improved over time? Does it incorporate lessons learnt from previous experiences?
23. Do you feel that your organisation and Islamic Relief make an effort to collect and share lessons learnt from implementation?

Wrap Up

24. If the project were to start all over again, what would you like to see be done differently?
25. Is there anything else you would like to add?

VII.4.3. KII guide with IR staff

Background

NB: Background and general information are the same as for the previous KII questionnaire.

The interview will last 45 minutes. Information will be kept confidential (e.g. no one will be quoted individually) and strictly used for informing this final evaluation. Personal data will be solely used for the purpose of this review and will not be forwarded to third parties.

Key Aid Consulting is compliant with the EU's GDPR, and you can request the removal of your information by emailing info@keyaidconsulting.com.

Ask for interviewees consent.

Tell interviewees if/how they will see the results of this consultation (e.g. if the final report will be shared).

Instructions

This structured interview guide provides an overview of all the topics and corresponding questions, however each interview will be tailored to focus on the set of questions that are most directly relevant to the interviewee's expertise and interest.

General information

Name:

Position:

Organisation:

Email Address:

Introduction questions

1. How have you been involved in Islamic Relief (IR) activities in response to the Sulawesi tsunami and earthquake?
2. This evaluation is using the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) as a reference. Are you familiar with the CHS? Have the 9 commitments been explain to you when you started working for IR?

CHS 1: Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs.

3. To what extent do you believe that the assistance received is relevant and appropriate to address the needs of the community? Can you give a rating from 0 to 10 and explain why?
0 being not relevant at all and 10 being extremely relevant. Ask if the response was based on a needs assessment.
4. How did you choose the modalities used? Do you think they were the most appropriate to the context?
5. Do you consider that the response takes into account the capacities (e.g. the skills and knowledge) of the communities and your organisation?
6. Did the response adapt to changes in needs, capacities and context?

CHS 2: Communities and people affected by the crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time

7. Do you consider that the timing of the assistance received is adequate, including for the most vulnerable beneficiaries?

CHS 9: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.

8. In your opinion, is the project improving beneficiaries':
 - a. add project objectives
 - b. add project objectives
 - c. add project objectivesCan you explain why or why not?

9. What are the main challenges you can identify that could hamper the achievements of the response's intended results? How are those being addressed?
10. Do you consider that the available resources are being used efficiently, i.e. for what they were intended, and without diversion or wastage?
11. Generally speaking, how do you assess the partnership between IR and implementing partners? More specifically, in terms of:
 - 11.1 Communication and information sharing?
 - 11.2 Delineation of roles and responsibility?
 - 11.3 Ways to raise and handle disagreement, if any?

CHS 3: Communities and people result affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.

12. Do you believe that the beneficiary communities are better able to cope with future shocks and stresses as a result of the assistance received?
13. Do you consider that the capacity of local actors, including authorities, leaders and organisations with responsibilities for responding to crises, are increasing as a result of IR's response?
14. Did the organisation develop a transition or exit strategy in order to ensure longer-term positive effects of the interventions?

CHS 4: Communities and people affected by the crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them

15. To what extent are beneficiaries able to participate in the different stages of the project (design implementation, monitoring and evaluation)?

CHS 6: Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.

16. Are beneficiaries receiving assistance in a coordinated manner, both across the different sectors and with other partners, both at national and local levels)? Was adequate time and effort invested in this integration? How could this be further strengthened?
17. Do you see overlaps (duplication) in the humanitarian response received by some communities?

CHS 8: Communities and people affected by the crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff

18. According to you, does IR provide adequate and sufficient support to its implementing partners to deliver good quality and timely intervention?
19. Do you think local staff receive adequate support from the global level (Islamic Relief Worldwide)?

CHS 5: Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.

20. What are the complaints and feedback mechanisms in place and do you consider them as accessible, effective, confidential and safe?

CHS 7: Communities and people affected by the crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflexion

21. Do you feel that the response builds upon lessons learnt drawn from previous response in-country and worldwide? If no, why do you think those lessons were not considered?

Wrap Up

22. What are the main lessons learnt that you draw from the response delivered?
23. What do you expect from this RTE?
24. Is there anything else you would like to add?

VII.5. List of documents available

La mise à jour automatique des citations est désactivée. Pour voir la bibliographie, cliquez sur Actualiser dans l'onglet Zotero.

Islamic Relief Worldwide Management Response to Real-Time Evaluation (RTE) of Sulawesi Indonesia Earthquake and Tsunami

Overview

Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW) is committed to improving the quality and accountability of its humanitarian programmes. As part of the internal accountability framework, IRW conducted an external real-time evaluation of its response in Indonesia. The purpose of this evaluation was to:

- Determine the intervention's relevance to meeting beneficiaries' needs;
- Assess its effectiveness and efficiency in achieving its objectives, including highlighting any gaps or unintended effects;
- Review the intervention's coherence with IRW's guiding principles and standards;
- Investigate the intervention's coordination with other similar response efforts;
- Determine where connectedness was considered to pave the way for future longer-term interventions.

This was an external evaluation that went through a competitive bidding process. The intended users of this evaluation are: IRW, IR Indonesia Country Office, the DEC, and the Humanitarian community.

IRW implemented this project through its own country office in Indonesia. The evaluation lasted for a period of thirty days and included travel to project areas.

Overall response to evaluation:

Islamic Relief Worldwide in Indonesia would like to express its gratitude to the consultant, who has done a thorough collecting and analysing information and data of the IR's response projects in Central Sulawesi and provided conclusion and recommendation with fair and objective. We value the recommendations resulted as relevant and has been to incorporate into our way of working for better delivery to the ongoing and future activities. As our commitment to CHS no 7, we are continually learning to improve our skill, behaviour and attitude for accountability and beneficiary satisfaction.

We confidently convey that we have already implemented the recommendations as it can be found in the following:

Details of how IRW will action the recommendations can be found in the table below.

Category	Evaluation recommendations	Do we accept, partially accept or reject the recommendation?	Comments	Priority level (1-3) 1 = high/urgent priority 2 = high, but not urgent 3 = medium, but not urgent)	Actions to be taken	Who is responsible for doing it	Who is accountable for ensuring action takes place	Timeframe
Design of the Response	<p>Select the modality on the basis of situation analysis and when conditions permit, consider unconditional unrestricted cash assistance as the default option.</p> <p>Islamic Relief has already used unconditional and unrestricted cash during the response. Yet, it</p>	Accept	<p>We have implemented it: (1) we provided cash to beneficiaries who can provide coconut wood for their shelter materials under SEATRI Project IR Canada.</p> <p>(2). We request for change of modality</p>	2	Cash Programming in Emergencies guidelines to be developed /finalized	<p>HD at global level/ FSL Advisor</p> <p>Head of region/CD at country level</p>	Head of Region/CD	August 2019 onwards

	<p>could explore the use of cash grants for shelter repair and construction (as opposed to shelter material distribution). A CVA distribution process should maximise the benefit of this modality by encouraging the flexibility of assistance distribution time and date as well as by encouraging the prolonged use of the payment mechanism.</p>		<p>to donor to implement the VCA for shelter sector in POSEAC project: we (IR and its partner Rumah Zakat) are in the process of changing the modality from in-kind distribution to use cash grant for 250 units of shelter and construction.</p> <p>At HQ level, the first draft of cash programming policy has been developed and circulated and now under refinery by the cash working group</p>					
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<p>Implementation</p>	<p>Ensure representative participation during the targeting</p> <p>Islamic Relief should seek to ensure that the leaders and volunteers involved in the selection process are representative of the different groups within the communities. Alternatively, IR could consider the creation of committees charged with selecting beneficiaries. In addition, the</p>	<p>Accept</p>	<p>In increasing community participation in targeting, we have done a consultation meeting involving community representative besides community and village leaders. This has been done in the ongoing projects: Shelter, LIREASAD, LIREACS, RELEACS project that has just started.</p> <p>We have produced guideline on the beneficiary criteria and the mechanism how to consult with the beneficiaries</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>Beneficiary Selection Guidelines for emergencies to be developed</p>	<p>HD at global level</p> <p>Head of region/CD at country level</p>	<p>Head of HD</p>	<p>August 2019</p>
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	<p>practice of using two selection committees and comparing their beneficiary lists can be applied across all communities as a method to reduce the risk of bias in beneficiary selection.</p>							
	<p>Draw clear targeting criteria and make sure it is communicated clearly and transparently across recipients and non-recipients.</p>	<p>Accept</p>	<p>We strengthen the criteria of beneficiaries and communicate these criteria to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In our Qurbani project, we discussed and agreed the criteria</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Beneficiary Selection Criteria and Beneficiary Communication guidelines to be developed</p>	<p>Country Director</p>	<p>Country Director</p>	<p>August 2019 onwards</p>

	<p>When the list of criteria is finalised, ensure it is well circulated and communicated throughout the community, even before beneficiary selection is conducted. Communicate the timing of the selection process to make sure that potential beneficiaries can make themselves available during the household visits.</p>		<p>with the village office as well as with the community representatives. Then we display the selected beneficiaries' names in the announcement board at the village office and at the strategic places. We provide box complaint and complaint number information to accommodate the feedback and complaint from the communities.</p> <p>We have developed guideline on the beneficiary criteria for shelter project</p>					
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			that is already adopted for Qurbani project.					
	<p>Continue efforts to make sure volunteers' attitudes and behaviour are up to the organisation's standards.</p> <p>Islamic Relief could either rethink its volunteers' selection process to ensure that the selected individuals' behaviour is in line with the organisation's values or organise more</p>	Accept	We have done a refresher training on safeguarding covering the subject on IR policy to ensure safe and dignity of the IR's beneficiaries, volunteers, and staff by implementing IR code of conduct stressing on the behaviour of dos and don'ts to avoid power dynamics, PSAE, Complaint and Response Mechanism and Referral system. During the training, the volunteers and IR	1	Volunteer recruitment and training policy, including IR code of conduct	International HR at global level	Country Director	August 2019
					IRI Volunteer code of conduct	Country Director at country level	Dzikri Insan	September 2019

	<p>information sessions and training on what is acceptable behaviour. This could be achieved with the use of simulation exercises. Another option would be to find ways to incentivise them when beneficiaries are satisfied with their attitude.</p>		<p>staff did reflection the behaviour so far are in line with the organization policy and values. Finally, IR and volunteers agree to avoid the power abuse and to avoid conflict of interest, the volunteers agreed to work outside their area of origin. To institutionalize this, we are in process of producing the specific code of conduct for volunteers that is derived from IR Code of Conduct.</p>					
Monitoring	<p>Make sure monitoring allows for determining whether the</p>	Accept	<p>We have SMART indicator in every proposal and concept note that contain outcome</p>	1	<p>Develop standard Monitoring systems for emergencies, to enable</p>	<p>Impact and Learning Manager at global level</p>	<p>Impact and Learning Manager</p>	<p>September 2019</p>

	<p>response is reaching its objectives and is used to make programmatic decisions.</p> <p>Projects should all have stated SMART outcome indicators, even if this is not a requirement from the donor. It may also be beneficial to have an overall response theory of change or logical framework, so the whole team and</p>		<p>statement. However, we have not yet produced overall theory of change or; logical framework of the response plan. So the recommendation is valid</p>		<p>outcome/output monitoring</p> <p>Include MEAL component in the Response Plan Template in the IRI DPP document</p>	<p>Country MEAL at country level</p>	<p>Moniruzzaman</p>	<p>November 2019</p>
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	partners know what each project is contributing towards.							
Complaints & Feedback Mechanisms	<p>Centralise all complaints and feedback in a single log in a single language</p> <p>The two current complaint logs should be centralised in a single database in a single language (either English or Bahasa). The complaint log should also keep track of the time required to</p>	Partially accepted	<p>Since the beginning, the complaint log is already centralized in Jakarta in one language -English-. This centralized log is a collation from the complaint log from the area office of Palu, Lombok, Banten, and Aceh. The complaints/feedback received from the telephone, WhatsApp, SMS are managed by Jakarta office and then distributed to sub-office for recording and</p>	1	IRW field office complaints policy needs to be applied systematically especially	Country Director	Country Director	Already done

	<p>close a case by registering the day when the complaint or feedback was made, the date when potential referrals were made and date of the response given. IR should also aim to analyse the complaints received at a more macro level to inform its activity.</p>		<p>handling - depending on the scale of feedback or complaint. The complaint/feedback received through complaint boxes or direct communication with local staff will be recorded in the sub-office and then regularly reported to Country office Jakarta for logging. Handling for the complaint/feedback based on the IR CRM policy is within one month to be closed. However, response to complaint can be immediate based on the urgency.</p>					
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			As regard to the date of receipt of the complaint and the handling timing, it is already corrected					
Partnership	Progressively aim for a localised response model When assessing partner capacity IR should, to the greatest extent possible, think about the overall demand for partnership and work jointly with the	Accepted	Islamic Relief Indonesia has 7 partners in total. Modality of partnership is different from one partner to the others depending on the due diligence result. Following the CHS training provided to the partners in early 2018, we have agreed for 4 different modality of partnership: (1) Response led by partners in which	3	Localisation/Partnerships in emergencies policy or guidelines to be developed, including support for capacity development DPP document to detail the partnership modality	Head of HD/ Head of PFPD	Head of HD/ Deputy Director of Global Ops	

	<p>partner to scale up its capacity.</p> <p>More broadly this also requires a progressive shift of the business and fundraising models used by IRW and other international organisations. Shifting from a model that works through local partners to actually work equitably with them from the design and fundraising stage until the exit phase.</p>		<p>IR will support, (2) Response led by IR and partners' staff will be seconded, (3) Response led by partner with semi operational model in which certain element of the project will be done by IR, (4) Response led by IRW Global supported by IR Indonesia and partners.</p> <p>We have already implemented the modality no 1 with KONSEPSI, where since the design to implementation, KONSEPSI is leading where IR is supporting. . This is done to the</p>			<p>CD at country level</p>	<p>Zul Asfhi, Response and Preparedness Coordinator</p>	<p>November 2019</p>
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			climate change project in Lombok. The partnership modality will be clearly defined in the DPP					
Sustainability	<p>Try and mitigate the impact of the response on the environment to avoid doing further harm.</p> <p>Develop an 'environmental monitoring plan' and develop livelihood activities that could be linked to the sustainable</p>	Accepted	<p>We are currently implementing the innovative environmental safe guarding principle for shelter sector under SEATRI project: we are accommodating the request from the community to use wood for their shelters by using obsolete and unproductive coconut tree. We provide cash for the community so</p>	3	<p>Policy/Guidelines to be developed on Mitigating unintended effects (CHS 3.6), including effects on environment and livelihood</p>	<p>Head of PQ at the global level, support by Senior Poverty Reduction Advisor</p> <p>Country Director at the country level</p>	Head of PQ	August 2019

	<p>management of natural resources.</p>		<p>that they can select and cop the trees and make it into wood. For every coconut tree they cut, both IR and the community agree to replant one new coconut tree or any other perennial tree. This has two sides of benefits: the community are satisfied with the shelter materials to be provided and at the same time, we can preserve and protect the environment.</p> <p>We have produced a template of contract document that contains article on the</p>					
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			commitment to CHS 3					
	<p>Begin planning the formal exit strategy at the beginning of the project.</p> <p>Start thinking about an exit strategy at project design stage and look into longer-term consideration to ensure that activities and communications across communities and local government actors are consistent.</p>	Accepted	<p>In the response plan it is mentioned that the duration of the project is two years. So, we have already prepared for the exit plan.</p> <p>Following the master plan of reconstruction and rehabilitation issued by the Government, Islamic Relief has met with the Governor of Central Sulawesi facilitated by the Ministry of Home Affairs presenting about the participation of IR and its partner in</p>	2	Humanitarian programme strategies to be developed, to promote early recovery and linked to longer term development to enable early exit from humanitarian programming	<p>Head of HD at global level</p> <p>Head of regions/RDC/C D at regional/ country level</p>	RDC	

		<p>Rehab Recon plan up to 2021. Document of Annual Plan has been submitted and currently we are waiting for the approval from the government of national, province, and district level.</p> <p>We will provide exit strategy section in the response plan as a template</p>		<p>Linking emergency to recovery plan and its exit strategy in the Response Plan template</p>	<p>CD at country level</p>	<p>Zul Ashfi, Response and Preparedness Coordinator</p>	<p>November 2019</p>
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