KPMG

GAHI

Lessons Learned
December 2019

Summary

The Global Alliance of Humanitarian Innovation (GAHI) was launched at the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in Istanbul in June 2016. The overall aim was to address the innovation needs in the sector that could not be effectively tackled by individual actors and organisations working on their own. Unfortunately, GAHI never achieved its full ambition of the initiating partners and was closed down in May 2019. This report presents the main lessons learned from GAHI's life cycle - from its initial conceptual phase until the discontinuation of the organisation.

The GAHI concept was relevant for the stakeholders within the humanitarian innovation ecosystem. Donors, organisations, innovators and fieldworkers saw a need for a platform for collaboration where learning could be done, failures could be shared, and where people together could join forces for enabling scaling of successful innovative solutions. GAHI did, however, not become the alliance that the initiators aimed for.

The main findings and lessons learned from GAHI's life cycle are:

✓ GAHI was *a needed, and an ambitious initiative*. The initiative had a clear vision and distinct goals, however, when launched, it became clear that the initiators' ambitions for the Alliance was disproportionate in relation to the resources and timelines available for implementing the concept on the ground.

✓ GAHI was launched without a clear plan for *operationalisation*, which in turn resulted in a protracted and challenging administrative set-up phase, and consequently a lack of delivering activities in accordance to the expected progress schedule.

✓ The set-up phase of GAHI was *crowded*. The UK NGO Elrha was first contracted to host GAHI and to set up the Alliance. After approximately a year, the Executive Director of GAHI was recruited and during this shift of management, some significant variances in the donors' and the Executive Director's visions for the Alliance became apparent, which in turn increased the administrative work for all involved in GAHI.

✓ When GAHI's Secretariat was finally up and running, the planned governance structure was never operationalised, the lines of communication and decision making became unclear, which resulted in difficult working relations between the donors and the Executive Director.

✓ The two year timeline of the GAHI project was more or less spent solely on setting up the administration of GAHI, although activities towards its members were carried out, these were consistently down-prioritized.

✓ Despite GAHI's failure, the need for a mechanism to collaborate, learn and share lessons on innovations prevails.

The key lesson learned is that GAHI <u>did not</u> fail due to its irrelevance in the humanitarian ecosystem. On the contrary, the key reasons for GAHI's closure were mainly due to the planning, structuring, governance and management of the Alliance.

The underlying challenges in the humanitarian innovation ecosystem are still present and the ecosystem is still in need of a collaborative platform for enhancing the impact of humanitarian innovation.

Content

Foreword

The report was commissioned by Elrha. Dr. Unni Karunakara, professor at Yale University, was appointed as a Chair of the exercise. Elisabeth Fosseli Olsen, Head of Innovation at KPMGs International Development Advisory Services, was selected to conduct the review.

We would like to thank all the people who have taken their time contributing with their honest views, experiences and insights to this report. We hope that the report will be useful in accelerating the innovation efforts within the humanitarian system in the near future.

Abbreviations

DFID	Department for international Development
GAHI	Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation
ISG	Interim Steering Group
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RIL	The Response Innovation Lab
Save UK	Save the Children UK
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit

Introduction

Background

The Global Alliance of Humanitarian Innovation was launched at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in June 2016. The recommendation to form the alliance was based on the notion that the innovation ecosystem was not functioning as it should.[1] GAHI's unique contribution was said to address the innovation needs in the sector that could not be effectively tackled by individual actors and organisations working on their own. In the summary from the WHS, GAHI was highlighted as an actor that could match problems with the people that might solve them. The Alliance was intended to mobilize social, intellectual, and financial resources, as well as sharing knowledge of what works.[2]

GAHI was launched with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) as one of the main initiators, together with other representatives from the ecosystem that together constituted the initial working group. When GAHI was launched, it was supported by 40 founding members (see Annex 4) and was promised a two-year pilot funding, provided by the ministries of foreign affairs of Australia, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK Department for International Development.

GAHI was closed down in May 2019, as the donors decided to discontinue their funding of the initiative. In June, the same year, the GAHI Interim Steering Group commissioned an assignment to explore lessons learned.

Scope of Study

The overall aim of this assignment is to identify GAHI's lessons learned from the period of conceptual development prior to the WHS, to the contracting of the host for the alliance, establishment of a Secretariat, and finally, the discontinuation of the Alliance. The purpose is to analyse and draw out specific findings as to the progress GAHI made during its operations, and why GAHI did not deliver on the initial ambitions as set out at the WHS.

Another innovative initiative that was established and developed in parallel with GAHI was the Global Humanitarian Lab. During this period, some discussion and tension arose regarding the division of labour and roles between the initiatives. We have not looked at these discussions in detail in this report since it is outside of the scope of this review. Both of these high-level initiatives where launched at the WHS in June 2016, which can be considered the peak of optimism and enthusiasm for innovation within the humanitarian sector.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) emphasises that the exercise shall explore both the *internal work* and relationships set up to deliver and support GAHI's strategy, but also review *the wider political system* which the GAHI wanted to influence and add value to. In accordance with the ToR, the review will in particular consider arrangements, achievements and challenges of the following:

- ✓ The original GAHI vision
- ✓ Preparation and set-up
- ✓ Financing arrangements
- ✓ Hosting arrangements
- ✓ Governance
- ✓ Positioning and political engagement
- ✓ Leadership
- ✓ Strategy
- ✓ Delivery

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[1] GAHI Stakeholder Consultation Report 2017

[2] https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3854

Methodology

The framework for this lessons learned assignment was approximately 20 working days, in the period between 4th of September until the 28th of October 2019. The review is based on a desk review and in-depth conversations with key informants, consisting of stakeholders that were suggested by Elrha and GAHI's previous Executive Director. The consultant included two people from the Norwegian humanitarian innovation ecosystem to the list. A draft report was sent to the Interim Steering Group, the former Executive Director and Elrha for clarifications and review. This process turned out to be very useful for the review, as it also provided further data and information of relevance for the further analysis. A draft report was presented for the Interim Steering Group (ISG), Elrha and the former Executive Director in London, 8th of November. The final report has included comments from this presentation.

Desk Review – Adjusting the Scope and Adding Questions to the Review

A document review was conducted in the initial phase of the assignment. The consultant received documents from Elrha, and these were mainly related to the hosting agreement, GAHI's strategies, GAHI's publications and minutes from meeting with the Interim Steering Group. After a further request, the consultant received additional documents that were substantial for understanding the GAHI life cycle. These were related to financing, including donor agreements, staff contracts, initial concept papers communication between Elrha, GAHI and the donors, staffing agreements, as well as reports and strategy documents produced by GAHI (approximately 20 documents).

Key Informant Interviews:

The review was followed up with in-depth interviews through Skype. 23 key stakeholders accepted the invitation for sharing their experiences in this review (list of interviewees is attached in Annex 1). Three additional interviews were supposed to take place, but the persons did not show up to the agreed Skype appointments. The key informants consisted of representatives from:

Direct stakeholders:

- ✓ GAHI staff
- ✓ Elrha staff
- ✓ Funding Donors
- ✓ Members of Interim Steering Group

Indirect stakeholders:

- ✓ Individuals involved in early development of GAHI concept
- ✓ Initial GAHI members
- ✓ Representatives from the wider humanitarian community who have engaged in GAHI's work and strategy

Lessons Learned from the GAHI's Life Cycle

Initial Stage

Finding 1: A mismatch between GAHI's overall design and its given mandate to deliver on the ground

The working group behind the GAHI initiative consisted of representatives from OCHA, donors, other UN agencies, Elrha and RIL. Together they developed the idea and concept of GAHI with the goal of making it as one of the key initiatives to be launched at the Summit in Istanbul. The process towards the launch was a collaborative and positive process, where stakeholders in the humanitarian system managed to come together and develop a relevant and needed initiative that would benefit the whole innovation system.

The GAHI vision was to achieve higher humanitarian impact and efficiency through innovation. Ultimately the GAHI wanted to enable the humanitarian system to do more, for more people, at a lower cost.

GAHI was launched with a clear vision and expectation of resolving the current pressing issues within the humanitarian innovation ecosystem. GAHI was expected to be a convener, to facilitate consensus, to support its members in pooling resources and advocating for change, and to ensure ethical innovation.

GAHI's goal was also to work on some prioritised member-driven initiatives. The initiators identified six key areas (or initiatives) that were meant to be further worked out and verified by the GAHI Secretariat. These were; Innovation in emergencies; refugees and energy; data and improved education outcomes; community engagement; global humanitarian research and innovation prioritisation exercise; and the promotion of ethical use of data.[3]

The original GAHI concept had a clear vision of its overall governance structure and ambitious goals, probably overambitious. Not only was the entire organization supposed to be up and running six months after the launch,[4] it was also expected to carry out quite a few activities in this initial phase such as: establishing and piloting five initiatives; having working groups in place; and having about 40 GAHI members on board.

Key Lessons Learned:

✓ New, ambitious concepts should be designed and implemented in an agile manner, as this enable a project design that is continuously adjusted and changed as a result of trying and failing during the set-up phase.

Set Up Phase

Finding 2: GAHI was launched without clear plans for operationalisation

Any launches of new initiatives engender excitement, enthusiasm and a momentum for action. This was also the case for GAHI, and the humanitarian innovation community was looking forward to collaborate on this important, new initiative. The key finding from the initial phase was that the GAHI concept that was launched at the WHS was lacking a clear plan for operationalisation.

It is difficult to see how the initiators and donors envisioned that GAHI would reach its initial goals and outputs without a clear plan for setting up the Alliance itself. There were in particular three key factors that were missing right from the start: 1) An agreement with the host organisation, 2) funding agreements (as the negotiation of a host organisation was not completed), and 3) recruitment of an Executive Director of the Secretariat. Consequently, instead of GAHI starting its important work in for example communicating with

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[3] GAHI: Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation. Connect – Mobilize – Amplify (Undated)

[4] GAHI: Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation. Connect – Mobilize – Amplify (Undated)

members or establishing and piloting important initiatives, the first five months of GAHI were spent on early stage contracting with a host organisation.

Another key lesson learned from the initial phase, is that GAHI was launched without a clear structure for decision-making. An Interim Steering Group was established when GAHI was launched. The group consisted of funding donors, Elrha, OCHA and Leiden Data Centre. However, according to the donors, the ISG was lacking a clear chair role. The lacking plans for operationalisation, in particular the lack of a secretariat and a host organisation when the Alliance was initiated, caused in turn major delays in GAHI's ability to deliver and contribute towards its objectives.

The consultant's findings show that in particular two incidents seem to have disturbed the initial start-up phase of GAHI right after the launch. Firstly, OCHA, which had been leading the process of conceptualising GAHI, was starting to pull back from GAHI due to budget cuts right after the WHS, although they were still involved in the ISG. Secondly, simultaneously to the OCHA withdrawal, several of the key representatives from the donors where changing their positions within their respective ministries. The removal of several key staff and institutions seems to have moderated the initial enthusiasm for the remaining work of setting up GAHI. Furthermore, it was not clear what would be required to set up GAHI as a multi-donor organisation.

Key Lessons Learned:

✓ A global alliance should not be launched unless it has a clear plan for setting up the organisation and implementing key activities.

✓ To launch new initiatives involves risks, and the initiators should have developed a plan for monitoring, and the responsibility for managing risks in the initial set-up phase.

Finding 3: Challenges in positioning GAHI within the system

When GAHI was launched, Elrha was chosen as its host organisation. In addition, they were given the mandate to conduct the initial work of setting up GAHI until an Executive Director and the Secretariat was in place. When the *Executive Director* for GAHI was on board in June 2017 (approximately one year after the launch of GAHI), it became clear that the new leader had a different understanding of the vision and mission than its founders. He wanted to establish a global based Secretariat, which the donors accommodated, and thus the Executive Director remained in New York City. The hosting agreement, however, was facilitated for employment and presence in the UK. The Executive Director also wanted to recruit staff at director level at a minimum, which in turn implied higher salary costs than the donors had planned and budgeted for.

The Executive Director's plan for staffing and placement of the Secretariat was neither in line with the original plan of GAHI, nor proportioned to the practicalities laying the ground for GAHI's operation through the hosting agreement with Save the Children UK. The Executive Director's goal was to provide services to the members of the Alliance – and GAHI Members were in his view headquartered in Geneva, New York and Washington D.C – not in London. The criteria for the start-up phase of GAHI might have been unclear, or maybe it was simply not followed. Nevertheless, the consequence was that the initial phase of setting up the administration of GAHI was further delayed, as the Executive Director's vision involved employment outside UK, and recruitment of staff on a higher level than the ISG had envisioned initially.

> **Choosing a host organisation**
>
> *The ISG was in charge of identifying a host organisation and a secretariat for the alliance. After a targeted call, was the UK NGO Elrha selected by ISG as GAHI's host organisation. However, as ELrha was itself a hosted organisation of Save the Children UK (Save UK)[1], the agreement to host GAHI was in fact between Save UK and individual donors. Save UK provided the legal entity for the GAHI Secretariat, as well as the office facilities and employment contracts of staff. It also provided the legal, insurance and governance structure for programme in-line with UK statutory regulations. Elrha and Save UK was jointly being responsible for the financial management and for the regular audit of the Secretariat.[1]*

Another issue that became apparent when the Executive Director was brought on-board, was that the ISG and the Executive Director had very different perceptions of the appropriateness of the existing host agreement with Elrha. The Executive Director perceived the hosting agreement as limiting GAHI's scope of opportunities. He envisioned GAHI to be situated within the UN system, as this would give the Alliance broader outreach and relevance for the humanitarian system. He also saw that a new hosting agreement would overcome the limitations that GAHI was facing regarding approaches to donors and funding more independently. The ISG, on the other hand, were not convinced by the rationale for change of host put forward by the Executive Director, as only UNOPS was proposed, without – in their view – any convincing

reasoning for this. The donors also perceived the existing hosting agreement as solid and in terms with the Alliances' goals. Another change would, according to the donors, have required new due diligence processes by all four donors, and consequently a lengthening of the period without activity, and increased frustration with the bureaucracy that this would cause.

Key Lessons Learned

✓ The set-up phase would probably have been smoother and more efficient if the initiators had developed clear criteria for roles and responsibilities of the ISG and the Secretariat.

✓ The set-up phase would also have been more straightforward if the initiators had identified the host organisation and recruited GAHI's Secretariat before the launch.

Operations

Finding 4: Lack of strategic continuity

Setting up GAHI depended upon key stakeholders who were willing and able to collaborate for achieving GAHI's goals. The different visions of GAHI, however, continued into the operational phase, resulting in a lack of strategic continuity in the set-up phase of GAHI.

Elrha was commissioned by the ISG to conduct the initial strategic work for the Alliance. The objective was to gather perspectives on the strategic functions, thematic priorities, the best suited ways for GAHI to work and finally to make recommendations for the GAHI strategic and operational plan. Based on a process of consultation with GAHI members and humanitarian innovation experts, Elrha published the report 'The Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation (GAHI) – Stakeholder Consultation Report' in April 2017. The immediate recommendations that were set out in this report were focusing on the need of operationalising GAHI and to sharpen the strategic objectives, to develop governance structures and to develop work plans that could be shared with members.

The GAHI Secretariat continued Elrha's strategy work by identifying the Alliance's values, as well as pathways to impact.[5] A multiyear process was outlined, in addition to the main convening opportunities. GAHI's next step was to ensure that members would commit to any of the opportunity areas. And then to convene the humanitarian community around specific outcomes, create a space for experimentation and facilitate the collection of evidence that in turn would enable change and what GAHI described as impact at scale.

The new strategy conducted by the Secretariat was a continuation from Elrha's first strategy document, and did not disturb the strategic continuity at a *policy level*. However, in real life, the strategic thinking of GAHI became a bit crowded, as too many actors with too many directions and diverging opinions were involved. Consequently, Elrha and GAHI started to blame each other for interfering with each other's spaces. Elrha argued that GAHI did not follow its strategy in practice, and was afraid that GAHI would step too close into Elrha's core work, and thus becoming a competitor instead of a strategic partner. GAHI, on the other side, often found it difficult to understand Elrha's position and perceived ownership of GAHI, and often asked themselves if GAHI was a project of Elrha or if it was simply being hosted by them.

Key Lessons Learned

✓ It would probably have been more efficient if either Elrha or the Secretariat had the whole responsibility for setting up and implementing the strategy work for GAHI. There were too many actors with diverging opinions. Ideally, the Secretariat should be responsible for the Strategy work of its Alliance.

Finding 5: A Governance structure that was never operationalised

Once the Executive Director was in place, there was an urgent need for establishing a well-functioning governance structure for GAHI, including line of communication and decision-making processes between the

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[5] "The Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation. Strategy 0.1 (undated), GAHI.

Secretariat and the Steering Committee. Secondly, there was an expectation of the Executive Director to set up a structure for involvement of the members, ensuring that the GAHI work represented its members.

A severe failure in the whole GAHI life cycle was that the ISG was being dissolved by the Executive Director, without a new steering committee being established.

As a result, the decision-making procedures in GAHI became unclear. It was difficult for staff, host organisation, donors and members to know whom had decided what, including the prioritized activities and the implementation of the new strategy. The Secretariat's working plans were in addition continuously changed for reasons that were unclear for staff, donors and members. The recurring question was to/for whom the Executive Director was accountable?

At the same time, the donor group, led by DFID, therefore convened to decide their way going forward. The donor group acted collectively in writing to the Executive Director to request answers to specific questions. Later, the donor group worked in consensus to agree on the priorities for the shut-down period. After this unsuccessful attempt by the donors to correct the direction of GAHI, they lost faith in the Alliance, or at least they were not responding to the inquiries from the Secretariat. The donors no longer prioritized meetings or giving feedback to the Executive Director of the Secretariat.

> *GAHI-initiators had a clear vision of establishing a platform for collaboration, organised as a global alliance. The alliances' initiatives were to be led by relevant GAHI members who had a direct interest in the success of the initiatives. There was also a clear vision for the Secretariat's structure. It was emphasised to be a light, agile and nimble organisation, capable of responding quickly to the needs of the sector. In addition, was the expected governance structure to consist of a Steering Group, Member organisations and GAHI Ambassadors.*[1]

The missing governance structure resulted in two major weaknesses for GAHI: Firstly, there was no longer any accountability between the Secretariat, the host organisation and the donors, and secondly, the communication between the donors, the Secretariat and its members was correspondingly deteriorated.

Key Lessons Learned:

✓ It is important to clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities and to clarify accountability in the governance, management and leadership of a global alliance.

Finding 6: The Members were not prioritized

The idea behind GAHI was to create an initiative where the organisations in the humanitarian community were in partnership with each other. In real life, however, GAHI spent most of the two-year pilot funding on setting up the organisation. Consulting the members and implementing member-related activities were consequently given a lower priority.

At the initial phase of GAHI, however, there were strong efforts in implementing member-driven activities that were in accordance with the GAHI strategy. The initiative of setting up a project related to the working stream *Education Cannot Wait,* is one example. This involved a collaboration between GAHI and some member organisations, where the members saw the added value of GAHI as curator of their innovation work. The work started early 2018, with a thought through concept, a steering committee in place and a plan for rolling out the project. After a while, it became clear that the project did not manage to deliver on its plans and strategies. GAHI and some of the member organisations started to interpret the content of their commitments differently, and some actors started to realize that there was a gap between planned and actual activities. The project was not moving forward, and at the end, it was shredded.

Later on, the processes and decision-making behind the Secretariat's chosen activities proved more unclear. The members were, however, not necessary left behind. For example, GAHI invited its members to a retreat to help shape GAHI's strategy.

The Secretariat's ambition was to establish a niche where GAHI could be the convenor for collaborating on scaling. There were in particular two types of activities that were prioritized by GAHI in their final six months of operation; 1) producing reports, and 2) organising events. It is unclear if these activities were decided by the members, but it seems like the Secretariat was choosing the activities, while the members were asked to *engage* in specific activities. This included the production of the report 'Blockchain and distributed ledge technologies in the humanitarian sector' (March 2019), another report; 'Humanitarian Innovation: Untangling

the many paths to scale' (February 2019), and the follow-up workshops during Humanitarian Networks and Partnerships Week in Geneva the same year.

The overall challenge seems to be lacking structures that ensured that GAHI's strategy and activities were *membership-driven.* As a consequence, GAHI members and stakeholders within the community started to perceive GAHI's Secretariat as becoming more and more the heart of the organisation.

Key Lessons Learned

✓ A membership-driven alliance is not sustainable unless there are some fundamental structures for involving and communicating with the alliance members.

Closure

Finding 7: A new initiative may fail, but the need for the initiative prevails

GAHI was closed down in May 2019 as the initial funding donors did not want to prolong the pilot funding. GAHI's closure happened more or less at the same time as the Secretariat staff were finally in place and could start working on activities and outputs.

Stakeholders that were interviewed in this lesson learned exercise emphasise that GAHI was a needed initiative, and that a neutral convenor that can facilitate for a collaborative platform still is highly needed. GAHI was closed because the organisation lost confidence from its donors. Most of the work during two years of piloting had been related to administrative issues, rather than in piloting initiatives and activities that could strengthen the humanitarian innovation ecosystem. The key question, then, is to ask whether the closure of GAHI was the right decision.

This question has of course several answers. Several stakeholders claim that the Secretariat never was given the chance to proof itself. The staff never got the chance to realise their strategy and displaying their relevance and GAHI's contribution to improving the innovation ecosystem.

On the other hand, however, this review also shows that too many mistakes had taken place in GAHI's life cycle, where the initial mistakes of GAHI's design and lack of plans for operationalisation cumulatively led to the next errors. The cumulative effects of these errors would probably make it difficult to adjust or change GAHI for the better.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The key lessons learned is that GAHI close down is <u>not due to its irrelevance</u> in the humanitarian ecosystem, but mainly due to the designing, structuring and management of the Alliance. The underlying challenges in the humanitarian innovation ecosystem are still present and the ecosystem is still in need of a collaborative platform for enhancing the impact of humanitarian innovation.

Although GAHI has been closed down, innovators are still aiming at transforming the humanitarian system. There are currently more than 800 initiatives related to humanitarian innovation[6] and the ecosystem has come further in their efforts of building innovative solutions that are both sustainable and scalable. UNHCR innovation services are for example increasing its efforts by establishing their own innovation fund together with other initiatives such as the Humanitarian Education Accelerator (a DFID-funded partnership) and a Community Connectivity Fund. Public funding schemes for innovation in the humanitarian sector are still comprehensive. Denmark decided for example in 2018 that their strategic CSO partners could spent up to 10 percent of MFA funding to innovation. In Norway, the newly launched Humanitarian Innovation Program Norway has – after the first pilot year only – decided to increase the funding with 8,2 mill NOK, thus with a total of 38,2 mill NOK for innovating and scaling solutions to the humanitarian sector for this year.

A global alliance for collaboration on humanitarian innovation is thus still a need, and a relevant idea. In particular since there are few initiatives aiming at building bridges and partnerships across donors' and organisations' existing efforts within the field humanitarian innovation. The questions that need to be asked are then; how can it be designed and operationalised? In this regard it is needed to look closer at *what are the most important needs* for collaboration, and *how can a collaboration be structured* to meet the needs, address them, and ensuring that the innovation ecosystem becomes more robust in overcoming them? Should an alliance also include program elements, where partnership activities includes funding?

Key Recommendation:

✓ **The main recommendation is to explore if and how a collaborative alliance may be designed to be powerful enough to do something meaningful in the space of humanitarian innovation**.

A note on finance and funding

The funding donors provided funding for GAHI for a two-year pilot phase. Four different donors, with separate donor agreements with GAHI (through Save UK), funded GAHI. These were UK DFID, Netherlands MFA, Danish MFA and Australia DFAT that contributed with a total of £1.2 million during this period. The original funding structure was as following:

✓ Ministry of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, The Netherlands: USD 391.400
✓ Danish MFA: USD 320.000
✓ DFID: Not exceeding USD 496.000
✓ Australia DFAT: USD 348.000

Due to the lower level of activity than expected during the two years of operation, GAHI never had any needs for additional funding. The challenge, from the Secretariat's point of view, was that their activity related work commenced simultaneously as the original funding donors were starting to withdraw their commitments to further funding of the GAHI.

Thus, at the same time as GAHI's pilot phase was approaching the end, the Secretariat was finally able to step up their deliverances on activities and outputs. Simultaneously, they were now approaching new donors for securing new funding and investment in GAHI in a long-term perspective. According to the Executive

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[6]file:///G:/Advisory/04.%20Kunder/GAHI/Background%20documents/The%20New%20Humanitarian%20_%20Humanitarian%20innovation%20f.pdf

Director, Luxembourg had committed further funding, and Grand Challenges Canada had offered GAHI to become their new host. GAHI was nevertheless closed down in May 2019.

Annex

Literature

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Annex 1: Interview List

Name	Institution
Aiden Goldsmith	Australian DFAT
Andreas Schuetz	OCHA
Andrew Billo	GAHI
Andy Andrea	Alliance4Impact
Ben Kumph	UNDP/Dfid
Chris Cushing	GAHI
Dan McClure	GAHI
Graham Lang	UNICEF
Grant Gordon	IRC
Giulio Coppi	Fordham University/NRC
Harriet Milsted	GAHI
Howard Rush	University of Brighton
Ingvild Strand Von Krogh	Innovation Norway/UNICEF
Jessica Camburn	Elrha
Kate O'Reilly	Elrha/GAHI
Kjersti Sommerseth	Norwegian MFA
Laura Sørenson Topp	Denmark MFA/Danida
Laura Walker McDonald	GAHI
Lesley Bourns	GAHI
Maxime Vielle	Response Innovation lab
Rahul Chandran	GAHI
Tarah Friend	Dfid
Wendy Fenton	ODI

Annex 2: Interview Guide

Criteria	Assessment questions	Initial questions
RELEVANCE	*To what extent were GAHI's vision, objectives and activities relevant to the national and international, strategies, policies, and programs for humanitarian innovation?* GAHI Vision: "Achieve higher humanitarian impact and efficiency through innovation. Ultimately the GAHI will enable the humanitarian system to do more, for more people, at a lower cost. " GAHI Objective: To create a global network comprised of governmental actors, knowledge institutions, businesses and humanitarian organisations, bringing together a unique combination of resources, expertise and capabilities. Global governance	**ALL**: <u>ABOUT HUMANITARIAN INNOVAITON</u> Introduction: What is your relationships to GAHI? What do you understand as the Humanitarian innovation system? What are the most important needs within the humanitarian innovation system? What is the main strategy for humanitarian innovation in your work? <u>ABOUT GAHI – initial phase</u> **Indirect stakeholders + GAHI/ELRHA staff** When GAHI was established – what were your expectations of unique role that GAHI would play? GAHIs original objective was to establish a collaborative platform, for stakeholders to come together. Do you find this as a relevant objective in order to ensure efficient innovation and impact in the humanitarian system? • Was the objective relevant to humanitarian system at that stage? • Should the original objective been different? How and why? **GAHI initiators/initial members:** <u>WHY SETTING UP GAHI IN THIS PARTICULAR WAY?</u> What was the initial diagnoses of the unique role that GAHI would play? Why was GAHI important for you as a donor? Why did you choose this way to put it (GAHI) up in the way, (to first make a contract with Elrha, and thereafter establish a secretariat)?
	To what extent did GAHI's activities address the felt needs and priorities of the innovators in the humanitarian field? <u>GAHI was initially envisioned to work against the core strategic approaches of;</u> -Connecting diverse stakeholders -Mobilising collective interests, priorities and resources -Amplifying evidence-based ideas and messages	**Direct stakeholder involved in the initial phase:** How did you ensure that GAHI's activities addressed the needs and priorities of the stakeholders in the field of humanitarian innovation? **ELRHA/GAHI Staff** How did you perceive that the initiators of GAHI addressed the needs and priorities of the stakeholders in the field of humanitarian innovation? Do you find the initial activities for achieving the four strategic goals (see left) as relevant for reaching GAHI's overall objective?

		-Working towards the achievement of four strategic goals; More evidence-based innovation management processes	
	Results	**To what extent have GAHI's objectives and intended results been achieved?** GAHI was envisioned in 2016 to work towards the achievement of four strategic Goals; 1.Stronger, more evidence-based innovation management processes in humanitarian settings 2.Strenghten multi-stakeholder collaborations and networks around humanitarian innovation 3.More and better R&D investment in humanitarian efforts 4.More and better evidence for humanitarian innovation **Vs:** Strategy document in 2017 claiming GAHI has one task: to help bring innovations to scale in the humanitarian system + Matrix: Education in Emergencies New Tech for the Grand Bargain Urban Response/Pandemics Responsible innovation Data Ethics Impact investment Next gen scaling method Next-gen evidence Next gen instruments	**GAHI staff and direct stakeholders** There is a shift in the GAHI strategy in 2017. Why did GAHIs new strategy focus on scaling innovations, and not on establishing a platform of collaboration, which was set as the alliance's original objective in 2016? Did this shift effect GAHIs work and relationships to their members? Who participated in the decision-making of the new strategy? Is it your opinion that GAHIs activities after 2017 still answered to the objective and mandate given by its members and initiators? Please explain **GAHI staff: (relate to GAHI MEAL Matrix)** Tell me how you worked on your main activities. How did you go about, f.eks when you decided to work on education in emergencies? Which of the planned activities/core strategic approaches did you manage to undertake? Which activities did you fail to undertake, and why? Did you experience any challenges in implementation of your activities? If so, what where the challenges and how did you mitigate them? How could such failures be avoided in the future?

KPMG

	What are the factors that facilitate or inhibit the achievement of the project's objectives and outcomes?	**GAHI Staff** What where some of the successful activities you undertook, please give reasons? What do you think they are the main reasons for successfully achieving your objectives in the programme?
	Which project activities had more significance to contribute to GAHIs overall objective?	**GAHI Staff:** During the last two years, in your opinion, what do you think was as the most significant change that took place due to GAHI's work?
	To what extent has the governance structure in GAHI and the coordination between the parties been efficient? – Contributing to results Governance structure consists of; 1.GAHI Secretariat (management) 2. Host-organization 3. Relations to funding donors To what extent have the project management and coordination been efficient?	**Direct stakeholders:** The original documents for GAHI stated the need of setting up an organisation consisting of a Secretariat (with a director), Steering group and Ambassadors. How did this work in real life? • How did the Steering committee perform? • How did the GAHI secretariat perform? • How did the GAHI Members, ambassadors and other voluntary roles perform? How could the Governance structure of GAHI have been different to improve the results of GAHIs work? Was it an efficient structure and set up between funding donors and GAHI? If not, what could have been done differently? How adequate has ISG and Funding donor's support been to GAHI? Was the governance structure optimal for enabling GAHI to deliver on innovation outcomes?
	Management/leadership **To what extent have the GAHI management been efficient?**	**Direct stakeholders:** How did the secretariat collaborate with the Steering Committee, Ambassador members and volunteers? Who participated in the decision making regarding new strategies and priorities in GAHI
	Hosting/Financial arrangements	How did the hosting agreements benefit GAHI? How did the financial agreements benefit GAHI? How did the hosting and financial agreements prevent GAHI's work or progress?

	Planning and implementing key actvities	**To Direct stakeholders:**
		
		What is the most significant reason for successfully achieving the milestones in the project?
		
		Was the project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?
		
		Financing arrangements; Did you experience the financial agreements from donors as a constraint for GAHI's work?
		
		   - Risk appetite among donors?
		   - Legal issues?
		   - Tech-issues?
		
		Positioning

	Positioning and political engagement	How was GAHI positioned in the humanitarian system? How do you perceive its political engagement? Why where these important
5. Future steps?	*What are the enabling as well as constraining factors that influence the sustainability of the project?*	**All:** **What do you think is the main reason for GAHI being shut down?** **What is the most important lesson learned from GAHI?** **What has been the most important change in the humanitarian innovation system since 2016 (when GAHI was originally established)?** **What should be the priority within humanitarian innovation in the future?** **How should be the first step to take to ensure improved collaboration between stakeholders?**

Annex 3: Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference
GAHI Lessons Learned Exercise

Background

In May 2016 a commitment to create a new **Global Alliance for Humanitarian Innovation (GAHI)** was announced at the *World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)*. The GAHI received financial support from the governments of Australia, Netherlands, Denmark and the UK, and early membership commitment from over 40 organisations.

In 2016 an Interim Steering Group (ISG) of donors and members from key stakeholder agencies was created to support the initial establishment of the GAHI and Terms of reference for an operational host were announced. Through competitive selection, Elrha (at the time a hosted initiative within Save the Children UK) was selected as the hosting organisation by the ISG.

In May 2017 an Executive Director was appointed with the remit to deliver on the proposed objectives and workplan set out in the grant agreements with the four funding governments.

Unfortunately, despite a strong commitment from multiple stakeholders and two years of operational work, ultimately the GAHI did not achieve the full ambition of the initiating partners and operations were closed down in May 2019. The reasons for this are multiple and complex and deserve analysis. The launch and ambition of the GAHI was envisioned to be a serious commitment to investing in and building the humanitarian innovation ecosystem. As such there is a deep commitment from all stakeholders (secretariat, donors, host and governing bodies) to review the evolution of the GAHI- from initial concept to closure in 2019- in order ensure accountability to the community behind the WHS launch and to draw valuable lessons that can inform ongoing efforts to build the humanitarian innovation ecosystem.

Overview of the GAHI

The **GAHI Vision** (set out in 2016) was to *achieve higher humanitarian impact and efficiency through innovation. Ultimately the GAHI will enable the humanitarian system to do more, for more people, at a lower cost.*

GAHI's **objective** was to create a global network comprised of governmental actors, knowledge institutes, businesses and humanitarian organisations, bringing together a unique combination of resources, expertise and capabilities. GAHI aimed to add value to the growing diversity of actors working on humanitarian innovation by providing a platform to convene these actors and build bridges to new stakeholder groups so as to bring the best and most diverse range of expertise and experience to bear on humanitarian innovation.

GAHI was initially envisioned to work against the core strategic approaches of *connecting* diverse stakeholders, *mobilising* collective interests, priorities, and resources, and *amplifying* evidence-based ideas and messages, working towards the achievement of four Strategic Goals.

- **Goal 1: Stronger, more evidence-based innovation management processes in humanitarian settings**

- **Goal 2: Strengthen multi-stakeholder collaborations and networks around humanitarian innovation**

- **Goal 3: More and better R&D investment in humanitarian efforts**

- **Goal 4: More and better evidence for humanitarian innovation**

The lessons learned exercise will explore how and in what ways the GAHI was able to meet these goals, and identify the specific impediments and limits to their achievement that were in play during the period of the GAHI funding period.

Overall aim of the review

The overall aim of the review is to identify objective lessons from the two years of GAHI operational work and the period of conceptual development prior to WHS and contracting of the host, that can be made available and add value to ongoing and future efforts to build and structure the global humanitarian innovation ecosystem.

Specific objective

The specific objective is to undertake a forensic and reflective review of GAHI's history from 2016 through to 2019. The purpose of the exercise is to analyse and draw out specific findings as to the progress GAHI made during its operational work and why GAHI did not deliver on the initial ambitions set out at the World Humanitarian Summit.

The review will need to explore both the internal workings and relationships set up to deliver and support GAHI's strategy, but also crucially to engage with the wider political system which the GAHI sought to influence and add value to.

In particular, the review should consider arrangements, achievements and challenges of the following: the original GAHI vision, Preparation and set-up, financing arrangements, hosting arrangements, governance, positioning and political engagement, leadership, strategy, and delivery.

The purpose of the review is *not* to apportion blame on any actor/group as to why GAHI was not a success, but to identify clear lessons that will enable the GAHI experience to add value to ongoing efforts to build the humanitarian innovation ecosystem. Therefore, the review should focus on drawing out high-level lessons that can be drawn out from the research, rather than presenting low level detail. It will also be critical for the review must be undertaken in a manner that is sensitive to invested stakeholders but also robust, frank and transparent in the ultimate conclusions that are made.

Methodology

- **Document review.** An initial document review- Elrha and the outgoing GAHI Director will compile a set of key documents covering the period of review (2016-2019). Additional documents can be requested by the consultant and will be made freely available, subject to appropriate consent being acquired.

  Types of documents will include: Pubic launch documents, Grant agreements and hosting agreements, governing ToRs, Governance papers and reports, recruitment plans, public communications, strategy papers, GAHI publications and donor reports.

- **Key informant interviews** will be conducted with a selected number of stakeholders. This should be divided into two categories:

  a. Direct stakeholders: including GAHI and Elrha staff, funding Donors and members of the Interim Steering Group (up to 15 interviews)
  b. Indirect stakeholders: including individuals involved in the early development of the GAHI concept, initial GAHI members and those in the

wider humanitarian system who have engaged in the GAHI's work and strategy. (up to 15 interviews)

Proposed interview lists for both groups will be compiled in advance of the contract commencement. Additional names can be proposed by the consultant as part of the review process.

Deliverables

1. A concise **lesson's learned report** that can be made publicly available

2. If required- a more detailed internal report that provides lessons on any sensitive information not suitable for the public domain.

3. Presentation of review findings at a stakeholder event in early 2020 (date to be confirmed).

4. Logbook of all interviews under-taken and documents reviewed. Note that interviews can be logged as anonymous as required.

Project management

The lessons learned exercise is being commissioned by the GAHI Interim Steering Group. However, as the ISG are an invested stakeholder an independent chair will be appointed to ensure the independence of the review. The independent Chair will receive the reports from the consultant, manage any negotiations between the consultant and the ISG and sign- off on the final report as an independent and objective report.

Contractual and administrative support for the exercise will be provided by Elrha.

Budget

The overall budget available for the review is up to GBP £15,000. This amount is inclusive of travel, expenses and VAT. Please note that value for money will be a consideration in candidate selection along with expertise and candidate 'fit' for the work.

The successful applicant will be expected to be compliant with GDPR.

Timeline

Indicative dates	Activity
Friday 9th August **midday**	Deadline for submission of bids
Week 12th August 2019	Meeting with independent Chair to discuss proposed methodology and alignment with expectations Contract signed
week 19th August	Review commences
20th September 2019	Draft report submitted to Chair for review
30th September	Final report submitted and presentation provided to ISG

The dates may be subject to change depending on availability of members of the ISG.

Candidate Requirements

The successful candidate will ideally be an independent consultant with strong familiarity with the humanitarian innovation landscape. The candidate will have a diplomatic but robust style and will ideally have proven experience of undertaking reviews of a similar nature.

It is critical that the candidate is independent of the primary stakeholders involved in GAHI and feels able to undertake the review without any direct or indirect conflict of interest.

Candidate Selection

The application deadline is **Friday 9th August midday BST**

Applications should be submitted to info@elrha.org with the title **GAHI Lessons Learned** and should include:

- A covering letter, setting out interest in and suitability for this work.
- A CV and summary profile of the individual(s) that will undertake the work
- Description of how the data will be managed and recorded given the potential sensitivity, particularly key informant interviews
- Minimum of three *relevant* examples of reports or research undertaken in the last five years.
- Proposed budget including day rate (if relevant).

Annex 4: GAHI members

Access2Innovation
ADRRN
Airbnb
Atma Connect
Australian Aid
Blue Rose Compass
Box.org
DCHI
Centre for Humdata
Centre for Innovation, Leiden University
Cisco
Development United
Development Watch
Elrha
Field Ready
Frog
Grand Challenges Canada
Human Surge
Humanitarian Design Bureau
Humanitarian Leadership Academy
Humanitary Road
IIHA
Mercy Corps
Microsoft
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
Net Hope
OCHA
Philips Foundation
Response Innovation Lab
Spring Impact
Start Network
The Government of the Grand Duché of Luxembourg
UK Aid
UNDP
UNICEF
University of Virginia
World Food Programme
World Humanitarian Summit
World Vision

KPMG

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