

INDONESIA EARTHQUAKES AND TSUNAMI RESPONSE (MDRID013) – FINAL EVALUATION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Final Evaluation for this operation is led by;

Dr David Stone, Independent Consultant and Team Lead, UK

With team members support from;

Ms Vanessa Cheng, Hong Kong Branch of the Red Cross Society of China

Ms Rina Utami, PMI Central Java Province, Indonesia

Mr Astrid Firdianto, PMI Jambi Province, , Indonesia

Ms Siripan Wandee, IFRC CCD Bangkok

Ms Nathalie Botcherby, British Red Cross

Ms Lotte Heuberger, Netherlands Red Cross

Ms Marij Zwart, Netherlands Red Cross

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Environmental Partnerships for Resilient Communities

Due to sensitivity of information, the full evaluation report will remain private and confidential only to the National Society. Only the Executive Summary of the Evaluation is published and available externally.

BACKGROUND

Three separate disasters caused extensive damage and loss of life and properties in Indonesia between July and December 2018. The first was a series of earthquakes – some of which reached a magnitude of seven on the Richter Scale – that struck the islands of Lombok and Sumbawa, from July to August 2018. The IFRC allocated an initial CHF500,000 from its Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) to enable the National Society, *Palang Merah Indonesia* (PMI) to meet priority humanitarian needs in the most heavily impacted areas. By August 2018, an Emergency Appeal was launched for CHF8.9 million to enable the PMI to assist some 20,000 households.

A series of strong earthquakes also struck Central Sulawesi Province on 28 September 2018, the strongest of which measured 7.4 magnitude, with the epicentre in Donggala Regency, close to the provincial capital, Palu. The earthquake triggered a tsunami which reached three metres in some places. Both events, combined with subsequent liquefaction and landslides, caused significant loss of life and damage.

Finally, on 22 December 2018, another tsunami struck Carita beach in Banten Province and the coast around the Sunda Straits, specifically in Pandeglang, South Lampung and Serang districts.

Combined, the three disasters caused damage amounting to more than CHF1.6 billion. The IFRC allocated CHF750,000 from its DREF for the Sulawesi response bringing the total DREF advance to CHF1.25 million for Lombok and Sulawesi. In addition, the Emergency Appeal¹ was revised to CHF22 million to incorporate the response in Sulawesi, enabling PMI to deliver assistance to a total of 40,000 households – 20,000 in each of Lombok and Sulawesi. Overall, the Emergency Appeal sought to reach CHF38.5 million to assist 280,000 people (70,000 households) who were affected by the three disasters. The Appeal was originally planned for completion by 28 February 2021 but was extended to 30 September 2021, eventually covering a total of 37 months.

Acting as the government mandated lead agency for the Movement in the three operations, the PMI worked with IFRC and ICRC as well as Partner National Societies (PNSs) in country, the latter including the American Red Cross, Qatar Red Cross, Turkish Red Crescent, Japanese Red Cross Society and German Red Cross. Bilateral support was also provided to this operation from other National Societies, including the Singapore Red Cross, Turkish Red Crescent, Malaysian Red Crescent, Kuwait Red Crescent, German Red Cross, Hong Kong Branch of the Red Cross Society of China and the Qatar Red Crescent.

Technical expertise available to the operation through the IFRC Country Cluster Delegation included disaster management, risk management, health, water, sanitation and hygiene, national society development, protection, gender and inclusion (PGI), communications, community engagement and accountability (CEA) and support services in planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, finance, logistics, and human resources and administration.

The International Committee of the Red Cross supported the setup of a restoring family links hotline system in addition to providing assistance to the PMI and a Movement-wide CEA Technical Working Group

¹ The emergency appeal was limited to interventions in West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi where the Government of Indonesia specifically asked for support from the international community.

established at the national level in managing community feedback and complaints received through social media.

THIS EVALUATION

Originally intended as a Mid-term Review to be conducted from February to April 2019, this evaluation was deferred on several occasions because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

The overall purpose of this evaluation was to examine the response's operational strategy and implementation **during the relief phase, transition into recovery** and the **reconstruction phase** of the operation. The evaluation was also asked to examine **how the response adapted to the Covid-19 pandemic**, in addition to the **exit process**. Programme achievements in connection with the emergency plans of action were analysed.

Particular attention was also to be given to assessing the **response strategy, co-ordination, structure, system, procedures and performance of different PMI and IFRC sectors and services involved in the operation**. Specific thematic sectors such as WASH were examined in some detail while additional consideration was given, modalities such as cash assistance and other approaches.

An Evaluation Management was assembled under the auspices of a three-person Evaluation Management Team. The former comprised an independent consultant, as Team Leader, two people from the PMI (who had not been involved in this operation and a further five people from within the Federation. Though this was a sizeable team, only a few members were able to devote their attention to the evaluation full time.

The Evaluation Team took all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation was designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of those people and communities involved in this overall response and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate and reliable. In addition, it did its utmost to ensure that it was conducted in a transparent and impartial manner and could contribute to organisational learning and accountability.

The evaluation was conducted from August to September 2021.

METHODOLOGY

The eventual methodology for this final evaluation was heavily dictated by the Covid-19 pandemic, both in Indonesia, the South-east Asian region and more broadly at the international level. After much discussion and careful reviews, a decision was taken that the evaluation would be conducted completely on a remote basis.

As part of an initial Inception Report and based on secondary data made available to the Evaluation Team, a series of guiding questions were compiled to guide interviews with different intended actors – beneficiaries of assistance, local leaders, volunteers, government authorities, PMI staff from some of the different offices involved and a wide range of people from within the Movement. Questionnaires were intended to help with consistency – as so many people were conducting interviews – and assist with triangulation.

Key informant interviews and some focus group discussions were help using Zoom, Teams, WhatsApp and other applications. On the few occasions where a small group of people were able to meet in person, priority was given to personal safety around Covid-19.

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this operation has delivered considerable assistance and support to a significant number of people, though not without certain challenges. From a positive perspective, the following are among some of the main – summary – points that stand out:

- ✓ Health – one of PMI’s focus sectors – was well addressed, including later realignment of activities to address Covid-19 and building this into certain ongoing activities such as Malaria awareness campaigns.
- ✓ though lacking needs assessments and accountability at the outset of relief distributions in both Central Sulawesi and WNT, the beneficiary selection process was considerably strengthened with CEA inputs for later distributions, including cash;
- ✓ Feedback mechanisms received high recognition from international and national staff and beneficiaries alike: one person spoken with described it as a “*good legacy*” to leave behind;
- ✓ The provision of cash (though delayed) was widely appreciated by beneficiaries who experience very few challenges in getting this into their bank accounts;
- ✓ Provision of fresh water to affected rural and urban communities was important for peoples’ well-being, hygiene and personal dignity though more attention should have been given to sustainable options that prolonged water trucking;
- ✓ From a co-ordination perspective there was very good early deployment from the Country Cluster Delegation, with some key needs being met in terms of Human Resources early on;
- ✓ There was very good co-ordination between the IFRC and Partner National Societies in terms of communications, co-ordination and collaboration; and
- ✓ Good communications, transparency and honesty played a critical part in maintaining confidence with several key donors: keeping donors and partners informed on time was essential to adapt to timelines and priorities.

At the same time, there were some challenges encountered which required adjustments to the planning process, not least of which of course was having to respond to a global pandemic at the same time as managing three complex disasters. Amongst the areas for improvement, one should consider:

- Localisation was a constant consideration in this operation and, while recognising the importance of this, the structure of the National Society was not yet prepared to take real advantage of this.
- Learning from experiences of this operation, PMI can do much to better position itself and prepare for future multiple disasters. National Society Development, Human Resources and Administration should be strengthened at the central level while communications and delegation of responsibilities to the Provinces and Branches needs to be accelerated.
- Volunteering – while playing a core part of each of the responses in this operation –a should be modernized, especially in terms of peoples’ understanding of the IFRC Code of Conduct, consistent insurance coverage being provided, safety and well-being needs and enhanced training in specialist themes in addition to approaches such as CEA and data collection and information management.
- IFRC needs to better orient PMI board members and senior management of the working mechanisms of the Movement in general, and the importance of the National Society’s auxiliary role.
- Better and earlier mutual agreement of roles and responsibilities between the IFRC and PMI, particularly focused on the Emergency Plan of Action and Emergency Appeal is needed. Both should

be developed through close consultation and collaboration with open sharing of information and common agreement on what is expected and planned from each other.

SELECTED OECD-DAC CRITERIA

In addition to reviewing findings according to specific sectors or approaches, the evaluation also considered its observations with respect to some of the OECD-DAC criteria, which are summarised below).

Relevance And Appropriateness: Although there were challenges in the implementation of the operations, such as the cancellation for the provision of the shelters, the goal and strategies of the operations, the overall interventions, and the approaches taken by PMI and IFRC in the operations were relevant to the needs of the communities. Many beneficiaries responded positively that the strategies employed met their needs and preferences for assistance. Beneficiaries spoken with were broadly grateful for all the assistance they received, though it must be acknowledged that there were still a great many households who could not be supported through this operation. It is worth noting that PMI and IFRC's support to the local health facilities such as Pustu (*Puskesmas Pembantu*, Satellite Health Clinics) was among the interventions most appreciated by the communities. One sector where additional gains could have been made given the impact the events had on water supplies and latrines was Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). While water provisioning was prioritised, nominal attention was given to promoting good hygiene and sanitation practices such as hand washing, personal hygiene and others. The few instances where experienced people from PMI and IFRC personally took this on board, and the resulting uptake of the skills learned, show the relevance and relative ease of including such considerations as part of the overall WASH package in an emergency response.

PMI and IFRC's approach were also in line to the government's policy to accelerate the restoration of the lives of the people affected by these disasters. For instance, the operation in Central Sulawesi is in line with the Bappenas – the Master Plan for Recovery, 2019 which focused on the acceleration of post-disaster economic recovery and reconstruction, and post-disaster social, economic, cultural normalization. It is also in line with local policy, as the operation also supported the Governor's Decree No. 10/2019 on the recovery and rehabilitation for the period of 2019 up to 2021.

Effectiveness and Efficiency: Effectiveness measures the extent to which an intervention attained its objectives through the available resources while efficiency measures how well the resources (humans, financial, etc.) were used in the operations.

There were two streams of objectives in the operations that were achieved with varying degrees of success. The first objective was to build back more resilient communities and re-stimulate local markets affected and do so in a sustainable manner. The second stream was to ensure that PMI continued to grow to be a strong and reliable civil sector partner to the public authorities, with local branches well positioned to address future potential humanitarian needs.

One of the ways used to achieve the first objective was through employing a cash transfer and voucher assistance modality. For example, in Lombok, PMI and IFRC worked together with local vendors to provide shelter/relief items where the communities would purchase using the cash/vouchers provided by PMI-IFRC. The purpose of the cash and voucher assistance approach in the shelter/relief programme was not only to restore the lives of the affected communities by providing the necessary means to rebuild their homes, and to restimulate the local economy; but it also intended to nurture resilience by giving the

communities trust and ownership to make the decisions to use the fund they received to restart their lives, as who better know what the communities' needs if not the communities themselves.

One of the contributing factors to the achievement of this first stream of objective was the community engagement and accountability (CEA) approach in all three operations. The operations were a good example of successful CEA integration into all sectors and modalities: cash, health, shelter, livelihoods and DRR, in both Central Sulawesi, Lombok and Sunda Strait. CEA systems were set up including coordinating and transferring knowledge on CEA to PMI Head Quarters and branches at the provincial and district levels. The CEA approach employed in the operations was proven effective to support the implementation of the planned actions, as well as to improve the operations and make informed decisions.

Localisation was at the foundation of the second objective. The Seville Agreement² and the Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Disaster Relief³ govern how the National Societies may become the lead agency in times of disasters that required international assistance. In the case of this operation the notion of how the response may be localized with the host national society as the lead organisation was paramount. However, the process to profile PMI as a strong and reliable civil sector partner to the public authorities was not without challenges as identified and specified throughout the evaluation. In all three disaster PMI was one of the first organisations to work alongside the authorities to distribute relief items, provide health services, performed search and rescue, as well as providing clean water to the survivors.⁴

However, positioning local branches to address future potential humanitarian needs was challenging and affected the efficiency of the operations. There are many factors contributing to issues of efficiency of the operations including a lack of qualified personnel for deployments at the provincial/district levels, an unclear HR system for emergency in PMI, no specific procurement/logistics procedures in emergency in the IFRC, and a weak knowledge management system in both PMI and IFRC. For example, PMI has had for a long time a national surge mechanism (i.e., the SATGANA⁵, *Satuan Tanggap Bencana*, Disaster Response Team); but weak knowledge management and poor personnel retention systems have made the knowledge of this mechanism less known to new personnel not only in the PMI, but also in IFRC and other RCRC Movement components. The lack of knowledge and understanding of this internal surge mechanism contributed to difficulties in ensuring a coordinated response for surge deployments between PMI and IFRC. Another issue centred on distributions, primarily in the early stages of the operations, which, in some instances were done with little beneficiary selection criteria and without records of who received these items.

One area that was both effective and efficient was the co-ordination and working relations between IFRC, regional structures such as the CCD and APRO and Partner National Societies. Ongoing communication proved very effective in allowing the teams to adjust depending on how the context evolved.

² 1997. RCRC Movement. The Seville Agreement and Supplementary Measures. Available on: <https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jp4y.htm> (accessed on 22 December 2021).

³ 2015. IFRC. Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance. Available on: https://www.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/2021-07/Principles_Rules_Red_Cross_Red_Crescent_Humanitarian_Assistance_EN.pdf (accessed on 22 December 2021)

⁴ 2018 – 2021. IFRC. Summary of various reports produced throughout the emergency appeal timeframe. Available on: https://www.ifrc.org/appeals?date_from=&date_to=&appeal_code=MDRID013&text= (accessed on 22 December 2021)

⁵ 2008. PMI. Petunjuk Pelaksanaan SATGANA PMI. Available on: <https://downloadbukupmi.blogspot.com/2015/02/petunjuk-pelaksanaan-satgana-pmi.html> (accessed on 22 December 2021)

Sustainability: Sustainability is often the most challenging aspect of a programme to evaluate especially taking note of the interrupted delivery of intended goods and services on account of Covid-19 also needs to be considered in this instance.

Guidance and assistance provided to communities through the integrated approach to community-based disaster risk reduction, especially livelihood initiatives, will take root in many instances and should continue to be used and adapted in the future, potentially adding to the future resilience of some of these vulnerable and at-risk communities to future disasters. Knowledge transfer though certain elements of this operation will also remain with people, though this could have been expanded in certain sectors such as a comprehensive WASH response and not primarily water trucking alone.

The investment made in training PMI personnel in specific skills, for example in CEA, procurement, health, DRR and other interventions made during the response operations will have a lasting benefit for future humanitarian responses. The evaluation also clearly showed that to have a more sustainable result, an emergency response needs a better planning that integrates a continuously/regularly reviewed risk assessment as well as proper systems of HR, administration, finance, procurement/logistics, resource mobilisations, information and knowledge management, PMER, etc, to support the operations programming.

Connectedness: This operation displayed a high degree of co-ordination and connectedness at certain key moments, primarily between the Federation, CCD, APRO and engaged PNSs. The CCD and APRO played important roles in regional co-ordination with the AHA Centre and ASEAN, for example. PMI had a clear pivotal role in national co-ordination with government in addition to its position with the cluster system and UN OCHA. With government PMI came under considerable pressure particularly when instructed to co-ordinate and manage international relief donations from the international humanitarian community.

KEY LESSONS LEARNED

- **A better common understanding of expectations and standards was required between the National Society and IFRC.**

This is an important lesson from any operation and is one to consider at the forefront of any response. This is even more important when language and culture are factored in to play, in addition to the level of capacity that already exists *in situ*. Commitments and agreements should be adhered to unless there are essential reasons to change plans mid-stream.

- **Risk management needs is essential in emergency responses.**

In a complex emergency, much consideration needs to be given to understanding the possible level(s) of risk, its likelihood and potential impact(s) as well as how to mitigate this. A Risk Register, as was incorporated throughout the operations, should be a standard undertaking by the National Society in close collaboration with IFRC: all actors engaged in this need to fully appreciate its purpose.

- **Donor requirements need to be understood.**

Donors come with different requirements and different timelines. In an operation where many changes were required and happening at the same time, this can become an onerous task: Ongoing and transparent communication ensured that donors and partners were kept well informed of changes to be able to renegotiate timelines, for example, if needed.

- **Clearer guidance is needed on cash procedures**

While there is a SOP for cash, this is still under development and is not finalised. This caused confusion for planning and implementation as changes were still happening. The current version is also difficult to adapt in an emergency.

- **Pursue an integrated approach.**

There were occasions in this operation where sectors or activities or modalities were being pursued on their own, not always considering other parts of the operation, such as PGI, CEA or IM. Joint team co-operation is crucial from planning to implementation and monitoring.

- **Systems/structures designed in an emergency should favour their uptake and sustainability**

Forward planning is important to reduce wasted time and resources when designing new structures or systems during an emergency. When advanced IM systems are built by temporary (Surge) delegates, for example, there is a high likelihood that they are not sustainable after the international support has left. Also, consider the National Society's own interests: will they continue to invest in sector X or Y after the emergency response if there is no interest?

RECOMMENDATIONS

A) General Operational

1. Procedures need to be localised – or be capable of being localised.

This operation highlighted gaps in expectations and procedures between the National Society and Federation. Some National Societies are unlikely to have the capacity or level of in-depth understanding or practical experience of applying and managing some of the Federations SOPs for example. Cash was one example in this case. Early guidance is needed to help a National Society understand what is expected of them in key administrative and programme planning and management.

2. “Localisation” needs more attention.

Further clarity on “localisation” is needed at various levels, primarily between the Federation HQ, National Societies, key donors and representative government authorities. A better understanding is needed as to whether a government is likely to classify a disaster as “local”, “provincial” or “national” and the implications of this need to be well understood by the National Society and other Federation structures, in this case the CCD and APRO, for example. A realistic overview is needed as to what is a) realistic and b) likely possible, to plan for future situations such as experienced in this operation.

3. Provide capacity enhancement for National Societies that need it in the localisation context.

Further dialogue is required with National Societies on their capacities to respond to local, provincial or national disasters, in general. Common areas where support could be availed in an unobtrusive, non-invasive way might be discussed, for example, around initial assessments, information management (to include data collection and analysis), donor relations, relief distribution, ensuring procurement and logistics – all of which should be transparently focused on helping the National Society to build a sound platform in the first few weeks of response, without feeling threatened or overwhelmed.

4. Better preparations are essential.

For countries/regions known to be especially vulnerable or at risk to disasters and other emergencies, more advance planning is required in relation to advance knowledge of working conditions (such as visas)

in country, with regards logistics, preparedness and pre-positioned essential relief items, framework agreements such as Cash Providers, customs regulations and sourcing and warehousing capacities.

5. Improve the clarity of and coordination with surge requests.

There were some obvious signs of good surge deployment in this operation less than what has been the situation in other responses of a similar size/scale because of government limiting access of international staff. That said, however, there is still plenty room for improvement to get a better understanding of what skills are needed at what stage of the response, better planning in deployment, improved and consistent hand-over – written or oral – between rotations. Surge delegates should be known to the National Society and their roles equally explained to volunteers and other key people they are likely to interact with on a regular basis on the ground.

6. Surge needs to remain flexible.

To deal with a wide range of contexts – and, at times, unknowns – the surge system needs to have a certain degree of flexibility to respond to needs as best possible, with emphasis on meeting the realities on the ground. It should not become too bureaucratic a process as this will ultimately undermine its prime function for rapid deployment.

7. IFRC delegation should consider reviewing its Status Agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

Under the current Status Agreement with MOFA, IFRC can only deploy up to five people in Indonesia at a given time. During an emergency, this places an immediate constraint on the rapid deployment of key people, which could have impact on the initial response. Deploying additional people requires agreement and approval by PMI.

8. The Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA) needs to have a shared understanding and agreed common ownership.

Have a clear Plan of Action from the beginning of the response, as this will persuade donors to donate to the areas where the funding is needed right from the beginning. The plan, however, needs to be flexible in order to evolve with changing circumstances, for example to encompass vaccine distribution now that this is needed (Covid-19), and to adapt to other changing needs. The contents and ownership of the plan need to be embedded at all levels of PMI and the wider Movement.

9. All actors need to understand the purpose of the EPoA.

The lack of a shared understating of the EPoA was seen as a weak link in this operation. This could have been accounted for by many reasons – lack of knowledge of/appreciation for the EPoA (though bearing in mind the number of emergencies that the IFRC have supported with PMI), language, institutional politics and information sharing within PMI and others. The lack of buy-in to the EPoA, at all levels did, without doubt, contribute to confusion and delayed response to affected communities.

10. Needs assessments need attention.

There were clear examples in this operation where assessments could have been done better. The quality of data feeding into some of the assessments was of questionable quality as was the way some of the data were analysed and presented. Ideally, up front clarity and agreement on what type of assessment is being conducted, why and for who, in addition to the level of detail required at specific phases of the operation should all be considered depending on the situation.

11. Needs assessments are needed quickly.

Need assessment's results often were not timely due to the slow response and technical challenges. One of the challenges was the language barrier: as assessment questions were originally in English, a translation was needed. The translation, however, was not done well as noticed by a delegate who was fluent in Bahasa Indonesia. Another issue was the slow assessment process. During the assessment, one of the recommendations was the housing repairs, so the project budget the housing reparation. By the time of the budget roll out which was led by the government, affected people were already recovering and had fixed their own homes leaving the assessment outcomes irrelevant.

12. Dedicated and qualified teams should conduct integrated needs assessments.

Needs assessments in this operation were not always conducted to the levels of quality required to inform next steps in the response. Having a skilled and dedicated team within the National Society – with appropriate plug-in support from other delegates if/as necessary should be encouraged for future operations. This, with the intent of gathering sound and workable primary data to inform decision making, which requires sound protocols to be in place in advance for data management.

13. Response planning needs to be integrated.

The IFRC has a good vision for integrated recovery and DRR, particularly so in terms of the importance it gives to community engagement. This needed to happen earlier + better + experiences from other operations

14. Be prepared – cash.

The cash intervention in this operation showed how much this was appreciated – despite the lateness of cash reaching affected and selected beneficiaries. Provisions need to be made proactively if this approach is to be used to maximum effectiveness and efficiency in future emergency responses. Existing regulation and CVA procedures need to be less complex and more flexible to allow people to adapt and speed up the assistance.

15. Systems should be appropriate and sustainable.

When advanced IM systems are built by individual and temporary (Surge) delegates, there is a high likelihood that they are not sustainable after the international support has left. As such, they should be pre-matched with the capacity and areas of interest of the National Society, so they become integrated in their systems and be owned by or handed over to National Society staff before the international staff leaves.

16. Enhance the response capacity of regional delegation offices.

As the pressure for and desire for increased and meaningful localisation to happen even in an emergency response, there is a clear need to invest in meaningful planning and support to this approach. For the foreseeable, however, it should consider to still invest in regional capacities from structures such as the APRO and CCD as they are closest to, should have the required skills, know the IFRC systems and possibly speak the local languages. First responders, however, often burn up first as they must face the brunt of the realities, so back-up support needs to be in place.

17. Need better preparation around agreements.

Given the growing acceptance of cash systems in emergency response, both the Federation and National Societies need to become more proactive in identifying and setting up essential structures, processes and procedures to improve the process and make it timelier and more responsive to needs. Having

agreements established ahead of a disaster – with modalities known to all major players – would prevent problems in executing the plan on time and on budget and would undoubtedly have improved the lives of the affected population more.

Data collection needs to be for a specific purpose.

Ensure there is alignment and integration of data between sectors, between the National Society and with the IFRC – taking language and eventual presentation.

B) The National Society

18. Become prepared.

The National Society needs to improve its preparedness for large scale emergencies. The need to respond to the three disasters covered here, in addition to other ongoing and emergencies elsewhere across the archipelago was clearly a challenge. This in provincial and local structures to build their skills and capacities to be in a better position to mobilise resources and undertake some of the earlier activities in emergency response on a better footing.

19. Roles and responsibilities among Movement partners need to be clear.

Clear agreements need to be reached as quickly as possible between the National Society, the IFRC and other partners early in the response matching expectations and standards of all parties.

20. Relations with government

PMI should make better use of their role as auxiliary to government to establish greater clarity of their role within the national disaster management plan and ensure and agreements with government counterparts are in place.

21. Volunteering needs more support.

PMI needs to review its approach to and support package for volunteers. This should start with an honest assessment of volunteering needs which should ultimately lead to better long-term impact on beneficiaries and staff and volunteers on long term.

22. Build local data management capacity.

The operation highlighted the need for additional investment in capacity building of the National Society's branch staff and volunteers in IM and PMER especially in relation to data collection, cleaning and analysis.

C) IFRC/Red Cross Red Crescent Partners

23. Establishing a more robust capacity for emergency response.

IFRC and other internal partners should have a realistic understanding of PMI's capacity: PMI consists of more than 400 Branches and the capacity amongst them is very different. In this instance, for example, some of the Branches did not yet have an operating bank account. The expectation of IFRC and PNSs on PMI should be more realistic, in terms of the capacity in which PMI could take up and perform.

24. Both PMI and the IFRC need to play to their respective and complementary skills.

IFRC needs to support PMI 100 per cent by not taking over or immediately trying to deploy a lot of people to the operation. While urgency is of course a key consideration at such times, some space should be

found to allow PMI to use its own resources as much as possible in the first instance. This, however, requires considerable advance planning, positioning and agreement.

25. Early guidance is needed on a pandemic such as Covid-19.

Ideally, earlier guidance should have been provided on Covid-19, in particular on what could and should not be attempted at the different levels of operation. This should have been accompanied with broad training and awareness raising for volunteers and staff, alike.

CONCLUSIONS

The scale and damage inflicted by the West Nusa Tenggara and Central Sulawesi events focused the country's, regions and world's attention on Indonesia once again as it came to respond to a series of complex and diverse events that continue to have ramifications on many peoples' lives today – those still forcibly displaced as well as the injured and those whose livelihoods have been affected.

While localisation was and continues to be aired in meetings about this operation, a measured consideration should apply when reviewing whether this was appropriate, whether the country and PMI were ready for this. IFRC took a cautious approach in this, showing a great deal of respect for government decisions in addition to the PMI's own strengths and profile in the country.

This was extremely important and for future operations in Indonesia and elsewhere it shows the absolute need to show respect for national and local cultures, for peoples' beliefs, their capacities and their weaknesses.

Yes, some things might have been done better, more effectively and efficiently if certain decisions were taken earlier or if fewer changes happened in terms of planning. But at the same time, the evaluation recognises, clearly, that a significant amount of resources, reflection and planning went into making this operation a success overall.

A great many people have been helped through this operation: many of them spoke with genuine feeling to the Evaluation Team about their satisfaction of having received support from PMI – support that continues today even though the operation is now ended through the presence of PMI staff and volunteers on the ground who continue to provide moral and social assistance in many cases.