

**An independent evaluation of UNICEF's response
to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, 2012-2015**

James Darcy (Team Leader)

Susan Durston

Francesca Ballarin

Jeff Duncalf

Burcak Basbug

Hasan Buker

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CONTENTS

- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Map
- Executive Summary

Section 1 Background and context

- 1.1 General context
- 1.2 Host Country context
- 1.3 UNICEF's response in Turkey and the Syria Sub-Region
- 1.4 Evaluation purpose and approach

Section 2 Findings on UNICEF's role and strategy

- 2.1 Review of strategic context
- 2.2 Refugee Education strategy
- 2.3 Refugee Child Protection and Psychosocial Support strategy
- 2.4 Health, Nutrition, WASH strategies

Section 3 Findings on Programme performance

- 3.1 Overview and criteria for evaluating performance
- 3.2 Refugee Education programme performance
- 3.3 Refugee Child Protection & Psychosocial Support performance

Section 4 Findings on UNICEF's collaboration and coordination

- 4.1 Context and general issues
- 4.2 Collaboration with Turkish Government authorities
- 4.3 Collaboration with other agencies
- 4.4 UNICEF's role in coordination

Section 5 Findings on UNICEF management & operational issues

- 5.1 Review of context and overall operational support
- 5.2 Management structures and process
- 5.3 Human resources
- 5.4 Supply and procurement
- 5.5 Financial management and fundraising

5.6 Communications

Section 6 Future perspective and lessons learned

- 6.1 Introduction: general perspectives
- 6.2 Future perspectives on Education
- 6.3 Lessons learned and best practices in Education
- 6.4 Future perspectives on Child Protection
- 6.5 Lessons learned and best practices in Child Protection

Section 7 Conclusions and recommendations

- 7.1 General conclusions
- 7.2 Sector specific conclusions
- 7.3 Management and support conclusions
- 7.4 Recommendations

ANNEXES

- A. Facts and Figures
- B. Timeline of the crisis and response
- C. Evaluation Terms of Reference
- D. Evaluation matrix and interview questions
- E. List of interviewees
- F. Format and guiding questions for key informant interviews
- G. MoRES in Education

Preface

The authors would like to thank all those who took the time to meet with the evaluation team and to respond to their enquiries. In particular they would like to thank the UNICEF staff in the Turkey Country Office who devoted considerable time and effort to engaging with the evaluation team during an already very busy working schedule. Particular thanks are due to Cairan O'Toole for all his work in supporting and helping organise the evaluation in-country mission; and to Lori Bell for her patient support and critical engagement with the team, which helped considerably in strengthening the resulting analysis.

This report is the result of an evaluation by independent consultants. The views expressed in the report remain those of the authors, and should not be interpreted as representing the views of UNICEF.

List of abbreviations used

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
AFAD	The Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkey
CCCs	Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (UNICEF)
CEE-CIS	Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (UNICEF region)
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)
CFS	Child Friendly Spaces
CPiE	Child Protection in Emergencies
DFID	UK Department for International Development
DGMM	Directorate General of Migration Management (Min. of Interior)
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes (UNICEF HQ)
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund (UNICEF)
EWG	Education Working Group
FT	Fixed Term (employment contract)
GoT	Government of Turkey
HACT	Harmonized Approach to Cash Transfers (UN)
HEBs	High-energy biscuits
HR	Human Resources
IMC	International Medical Corps
INEE	Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies

Evaluation of UNICEF's Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey 2012-15

IOM	International Organization for Migration
L3	Level 3 (Corporate Emergency)
LoU	Letter of Understanding
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East and North Africa (UNICEF region)
MENARO	UNICEF MENA Regional Office
MoFSP	Ministry of Family and Social Policies
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoNE	Ministry of National Education
MoRES	Monitoring Results for Equity Systems (UNICEF)
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
NLG	No Lost Generation (advocacy and fundraising initiative)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD/DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PSS	Psychosocial support
RO	Regional Office
RRP	Refugee Response Plan
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SSOP	Simplified Standard Operating Procedures
TA	Temporary Appointment (employment contract)
TCO	Turkey Country Office (UNICEF)
TEC	Temporary Education Centre
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRCS	Turkish Red Crescent Society
UAM	Unaccompanied Minors
UNCT	UN Country Team
UNDP	UN Development Programme
UNDSS	UN Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation
YOBIS	Education management information system for Syrians

Figure 1: General map of Turkey showing Syria and other neighbouring countries



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This evaluation, commissioned jointly by the UNICEF CEE-CIS Regional Office the Turkey Country Office and the Evaluation Office at HQ, covers UNICEF's response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey between 2012 and early 2015. It was conducted by a team of six evaluators (four international, two Turkish national) between March and May 2015, and included a three-week mission in country. Interviews with UNICEF staff, partners, government officials and donors were supplemented with field visits and focus group discussions with Syrian refugees. Consultations were also held with staff in the CEE-CIS and MENA Regional Offices and with staff in UNICEF headquarters in New York.
2. While this evaluation is stand-alone, it should also be read in conjunction with the sub-regional evaluation of the wider UNICEF response to the Syria crisis, to which it is closely related. Note that the Turkey evaluation does not cover cross-border assistance into Syria.
3. Now in its fifth year and showing no signs of abating, the conflict in Syria has to date caused some four million Syrians to flee their country and seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Of these, Turkey hosts the largest number of any of the host countries: currently over 1.7 million, including over 900,000 children. The generosity of the Turkish response is remarkable; but it is being put under strain as the numbers grow and the situation becomes ever more protracted. Although Turkey is a high middle-income country, the financial burden of hosting the refugees is high and growing; while the immediate burden of hosting refugees has fallen disproportionately on the poorer South-Eastern provinces of the country. Here tensions are rising locally over the growing pressure on overstretched services and competition for jobs. In some areas, the ratio of refugees to host communities is close to 50:50.
4. The extent of the Turkish Government's ownership of and control over the response to the refugee crisis is one of the defining features of the context. UNICEF's response and that of the wider international community have to be understood in the light of this.
5. The wider geopolitical situation, including hostile relations between Turkey and the Syrian government, the unresolved political conflict with the Kurdish PKK, and Turkish and international concern about immigration and the potential for radicalised elements coming into Turkey from Syria and Iraq, are all part of the context within which the refugee situation and the response to it need to be understood.

Findings

6. Space for operational engagement by UNICEF was limited in the early stages of the crisis, and was initially confined to the camps. UNICEF has in general been able to establish good working relations with AFAD, the lead government agency for the response, and to build effectively on its existing country programme relations with the Ministries of National Education (MoNE) and Family and Social Policies (MoFSP). It has been slower to establish relations at

the Provincial and District levels, though this is now changing – particularly with regard to education policy and coordination of child protection.

7. In addition to collaboration with AFAD and the Ministries, UNICEF forged an important partnership with the Turkish Red Crescent Society, notably in the establishment of Child Friendly Spaces (CFS) in camps and in some urban locations. This partnership should continue and be expanded. UNICEF has limited partnerships with the few international NGOs present; but some of these (e.g. with IMC) hold potential for more extensive collaboration in partnership with Turkish NGOs.
8. With regard to the relevance and appropriateness of UNICEF's response, the evaluation concludes that UNICEF established essentially the right role for itself in this context, with a strategic focus on education and child protection. Basic needs including WASH were well met by others in the Government camps. UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the government in the border areas, in collaboration with WHO, following the polio outbreaks in Syria in 2013/14. The overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrian refugees are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles; and the evaluation recommends that UNICEF collaborate further with WHO and the Turkish Government on this agenda. Chronic malnutrition demands similar vigilance, particularly with regard to risks associated with micronutrient deficiencies.
9. In the education sphere, UNICEF supported school construction and supplied educational equipment. Crucially, it also helped to shape policy concerning refugee education (e.g. on Syrian curriculum) and established a teacher compensation payment scheme in collaboration with MoNE and the Turkish Post Office. The establishment with MoNE of YOBIS – a data system for foreign students and teachers in Turkey – has been slow but is an important innovation that will help fill a vital data gap.
10. UNICEF now faces an immediate challenge concerning the sustainability of the teacher compensation scheme. This has allowed Syrian teachers to practice, but if they are to be retained it is crucial that they are able to secure a proper salary and job security – something that constitutes an advocacy priority for UNICEF.
11. On child protection, UNICEF has successfully used the CFS model as a way of providing psychosocial support and a protective environment for refugee children. Its 'adolescent empowerment and participation' approach, using youth leaders, appears to have been highly effective in the camps and was particularly well suited this context. The main limitation of this approach seems to be the absence of prospects for youth volunteers after the age of eighteen; a gap that UNICEF now rightly recognises. Greater attention is now needed on the vulnerabilities of children outside the camps, including child labour, child marriage and street children. Each of these categories requires

the availability of specialised case management and related referral mechanisms.

12. UNICEF has tended to be *ad hoc* in its response to date and has lacked an overall strategy to unite its two main programme strands. Combined with the separation of the emergency response from regular programme (now reversed), and separation of the education and child protection responses, this has adversely affected the coherence of the response. The No Lost Generation initiative still provides a useful conceptual framework for this purpose, though its full potential has not yet been realised in Turkey. A joint approach with UNHCR to the Turkish Government on this agenda – which is widely recognised as pivotal in the current situation – could go a long way to helping shape policy and practice as well as support the scaled-up coverage required.
13. In the implementation of its programme, UNICEF has been hampered by a number of factors, including major funding and human resource constraints. In the period 2013-14, UNICEF received on average only 56% of its required funding. It was perhaps too reliant on specific donors and the evaluation questions why advance financing using UNICEF's Emergency Programme Fund could not have been used to 'kick start' the programme earlier.
14. With regard to human resources, the relative lack of capacity and emergency experience in the Turkey Country Office had to be compensated by surge deployments, resulting in high turnover of staff, discontinuity of external engagement and high transitional costs. Not enough use was made of the flexibility offered by UNICEF's Simplified Standard Operating Procedures for L3 emergencies. Most strikingly, there was a lack of investment at the field level (Gaziantep), with the result that UNICEF lacked continuity of senior staff presence and engagement with local and provincial level actors. In general, UNICEF's programme struggled to keep pace with the scale and nature of the evolving needs, and UNICEF underestimated the related support requirements. The staffing imbalance between Ankara and Gaziantep is now being addressed by the Country Office.
15. In spite of these limitations and the difficulty of the operating environment, UNICEF was substantially able to deliver on its core objectives and the programme outputs were generally of good quality. Slow implementation affected some aspects of the programme, though this was often related to factors beyond the organisation's control. Overall, UNICEF has done what it could to make sure that its Core Commitments for Children were addressed, although its reach and influence has been limited, particularly outside the camps. The evaluation concludes that UNICEF's programme fulfilled a vital role in enabling Syrian children – at least those in camps – to access appropriate education and protection services and in establishing appropriate policy frameworks in both areas.
16. The biggest strategic challenge now for UNICEF is how to scale up its support to education and protection outside the camps. On the education side, only some 30% of refugee children in host communities are enrolled in school,

leaving around 400,000 out of school – not counting those who fail to attend. On the protection and psychosocial support (PSS) side, little provision for refugee child protection is currently made outside the camps. The report makes a range of related recommendations. These include a much closer strategic alliance with UNHCR in education and protection – including a joint advocacy agenda – while forging a more distinct role for UNICEF in child protection. The evaluation supports the current strategy to strengthen links at the provincial and local levels, while maintaining a close collaboration with both MoNE and MoFSP in Ankara. On protection and PSS coverage, extension of the CFS model in multi-service centres is recommended; but given the scale of the challenge, this will need to be supplemented with other approaches. The link with schools is key to this.

17. There remain critical gaps in information, both about the programme and more generally about the situation and priorities of refugees and host communities. Greater emphasis on programme monitoring is required, together with a renewed push on joint needs assessment to help fill the major gaps in data and community profiling, without which the programme cannot be properly targeted or equity-focused. More could be also done to support NGOs in social mobilisation, information and awareness raising about access to services – particularly given the language barrier. Youth mobilisation was the right strategy for protection in the camps and remains a crucial strategy for tackling the community awareness agenda. Working with youth will also be key to reducing tensions between refugee and host communities and tackling social cohesion more generally.

18. In summary, the report makes the following recommendations:

- UNICEF should articulate, within a **single overarching strategic framework**, its strategies on **education** and **child protection** in relation to the on-going refugee crisis in Turkey. This should build on the No Lost Generation agenda and identify areas of synergy between the two sectors. It should establish short, medium and longer-term objectives and provide a clear basis for programming, monitoring and fundraising, while being flexible enough to accommodate changes in priorities over time and new opportunities as they arise.
- UNICEF should include in its overall strategy components relating to refugee **health, nutrition and WASH**, based on a re-assessment of needs and of UNICEF's comparative advantage in these areas.
- An evolving **advocacy strategy** should be an integral part of both the overall strategy and its sector-specific components.
- The design of the strategy should be informed by a **process of consultation** with others, including in particular the Government of Turkey, other agencies working in the same field and refugee communities themselves. It should be designed in **collaboration with UNHCR**, underpinned by a renewed strategic partnership between the two agencies and a country-level LoU.

- Specific programme elements should be designed, in collaboration between Education and Child Protection, to address the growing **social cohesion** agenda in refugee hosting communities.
- UNICEF should seek to **increase the priority given to the refugee child protection agenda** and should itself take a more leading role on that agenda.
- UNICEF should continue to give more emphasis to **collaboration at the provincial and local levels**, and to the **scaling up of both programmatic and operational support staffing** in the Gaziantep/South Eastern Turkey intervention area.
- UNICEF should endeavour to **strengthen its role as the link between I/NGOs and the Government of Turkey**.
- The report sets out what the evaluators believe to be areas of best practice in the UNICEF response to the refugee crisis in Turkey. These should be **properly documented** for sharing with others.
- UNICEF should adopt to a more rigorous and systematic approach to **programme monitoring**, with direct feedback to programme implementation. This should include monitoring of quality and continued relevance of programme outputs, as well as target achievement.
- Building on the “No Lost Generation” initiative, a **global awareness campaign** highlighting the plight of Syrian refugee children in Turkish host communities should be undertaken, as part of a wider campaign on the situation of child refugees in the region.
- UNICEF should use the experience of the Turkey refugee crisis response to **review the guidance provided on applying the CCCs and SSOPs**, particularly with regard to contexts where the humanitarian role played by UNICEF is non-operational or only semi-operational.
- Based on a review of the experience from Turkey and elsewhere in the Syria sub-region, **UNICEF should review the adequacy of its advance financing mechanisms**, and specifically the Emergency Programme Fund, to meet response demands in gradually emergent crises of this kind.

Section 1 Background and context

1.1 General context

1.1.1 The conflicts in Syria (now in its fifth year) and in Iraq show no signs of abating, and continue to generate large numbers of refugees throughout the sub-region. The history and dynamics of these conflicts are well documented elsewhere.¹ We focus here on the particular aspects relating to the refugee crisis in Turkey, and specifically on the Syrian refugee crisis.

1.1.2 As at March 2015, the number of refugees from these conflicts living in Turkey was 1,738,448, of whom around 54% are children.² Of these, 253,101 (around 15%) were living in camps; and 1,485,347 (around 85%) were living outside camps.

1.1.3 As shown in the chart below, the numbers of people fleeing conflict in Syria have escalated steadily since the end of 2012. While the numbers in camps have remained fairly stable for the past two years, the increase is accounted for largely by the growth in numbers of non-camp (mainly urban) refugees settled among host communities. It is this aspect of the refugee situation that now poses the greatest strategic challenge to those seeking to respond to the crisis.




Figure 1: Syrian refugee numbers over time (source: UNHCR)

1.1.4 The majority of the refugees are Syrian Arabs fleeing the conflict in the north and west of Syria, coming from what are currently largely opposition-held areas. Their places of origin are shown in the table contained in Annex A. The majority come from Aleppo (Halab) (35%) and Idlib (21%) Governorates, followed by Ar-Raqqah(11%), Latakia (8%), Hama (7%) and Al Hasakah (5%).

1.1.5 As well as the Syrian Arab refugees, there are significant numbers of Kurdish, Turkmen and Yazedis (from Iraq). The major influx of Kurdish refugees from Kobane in Syria to Suruc in Turkey in September 2014 illustrates not only the continued volatility of the situation in Northwest Syria but also the indiscriminate nature of the conflict: all ethnic groups are affected. The situation confronting them in exile varies somewhat according to ethnicity and the extent of existing family or cultural ties. However, all face the problem of being in a country where the majority and official language is not their own. Thus language and cultural factors play a major part in the challenges faced by the refugees.

1.1.6 The chart (Figure 2) below shows the breakdown of the refugees by age and gender, based on available sources. It also shows the number of children currently enrolled in school, broken down between camp and non-camp refugees. The continuing low figure (30%) for school enrolment outside the camps is particularly striking.

Figure 2: Refugee demographic data over time showing numbers of children (0-18)

Year	2012	2013	2014	April 2015
No of Syrians in Turkey (cumulative)	141,240	538,983	1,060,209 ³	1,758,092 ⁴
Male	73,445 ⁵ (52%)	269,761 ⁶ (50%)		893,111 (51%)
Female	67,795 ⁷ (48%)	269,222 ⁸ (50%)		864,981 (49%)
Boys	65,310 ⁹ (67%)	153,224 ¹⁰ (52%)		
Girls	32,485 ¹¹ (33%)	143,513 ¹² (48%)		
Enrolment in school (camp)		(60%) ¹³		73,000 ¹⁴ (89%) ¹⁵
Enrolment in school (outside camp)			(14%) ¹⁶	150,000 ¹⁷ (30%) ¹⁸

1.2 Host country context

1.2.1 Turkey is an upper middle-income country, approaching high-income status. Its population at the end of 2014 was some 77 million. It is an OECD member and currently chairs the G-20, wielding considerable influence internationally. The size of the country’s economy contrasts with most other refugee receiving countries in the region and it has invested heavily in the response. That said, wealth and development are unevenly shared across Turkey and most refugees are living in the relatively much poorer southeast of the country. And while the overall ratio of refugees to Turkish citizens is low compared to Lebanon and Jordan, the concentration of refugees in particular areas

has resulted in ratios approaching 50:50 in some places like Kilis in the southeast. This is creating very considerable social, political and economic stresses.

1.2.2 Turkey has been generous in its welcome of refugees¹⁹ and in the provisions it has made for them. From a protection perspective, this has included the maintaining of an open border policy and the grant of temporary protected status to Syrian refugees that has now been formalised in law.²⁰ This includes access to essential services and potentially (subject to the passing of enabling legislation) to work; though as at the date of this report, no such legislation looked likely to be passed. Thus, while not optimal from a legal perspective, the overall protection and assistance afforded to Syrian refugees is stronger in practice than that which most other countries in the Syria sub-region are able to offer.

1.2.3 The Turkish Government has asserted strong ownership of and control over the refugee response from the outset, and this is one of the defining characteristics of the response context. Yet while in 2011 the GoT had indicated that it had sufficient capacity to deal with the influx alone, by April 2012 the significant rise in numbers, prompted it to accept support from international organizations in the form of core relief items for Syrian refugees in camps; and subsequently for the needs of refugees living outside camps. It has however, resisted most calls for needs assessment by international agencies.

1.2.4 The emergency response by the Turkish Government has been relatively centralised, and has been led by AFAD (the Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) in coordination with the relevant Ministries and with the newly-created Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) in the Ministry of Interior. That various government bodies involved have different and somewhat overlapping roles, resulting in approaches that are not always entirely consistent. To add to this complexity, there are significant areas of decentralised decision-making and responsibility at the Provincial, District and Municipality levels. Altogether, this poses a challenge for engagement by external agencies seeking to assist in the refugee response. Securing agreement at one level does not necessarily entail agreement at another. That said, AFAD's lead role has created a clear focus for leadership and coordination that has brought a number of benefits.

1.2.5 Of the various non-governmental bodies involved in the response, the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) is the most significant. As an auxiliary to the GoT, it has been central to the response. Where UN agencies and INGOs have sometimes struggled to define a role for themselves, the TRCS has played a full role in both camps and (latterly) in non-camp settings. They occupy a pivotal position and constitute a very important partner for UNICEF and others, especially given the actual and potential scope of their operations.

1.2.6 One characteristic of the Turkey context that distinguishes from most other emergency contexts is the comparatively low-key and small-scale role played by international NGOs, including many of UNICEF's traditional partners. Few have obtained registration with the Turkish Government.²¹ The NGOs have not been granted permission to work in the refugee camps and have only limited reach in the host communities – where they are often dependent on partnership with Turkish NGOs to deliver services. As with the TRCS, Turkish civil society has

played a vital role in the response; and its role is likely to increase in importance as greater attention is paid to the situation of refugees in host communities.

1.2.7 The role of the UN and its various agencies is covered in more detail in the following sections. Although the situation was declared a system-wide L3 Emergency in January 2013, no Humanitarian Country Team has been established; rather, the UN Country Team fulfils this role, with the Resident Representative as *de facto* Humanitarian Coordinator heading a UN Syria Task Force in Ankara. Because of the nature of the crisis, UNHCR takes the lead coordination role among the international agencies,²² working in tandem with the Government of Turkey and other agencies in the leadership of particular sectoral working groups.

1.2.8 Coordination of – and fundraising for – the international response has been largely conducted under the umbrella of a series of inter-agency Regional Refugee Response Plans (RRPs numbers 1-6) for the Syria regional crisis as a whole.²³ The current iteration of this is named the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (‘3RP’), reflecting a new focus on the protracted nature of the crisis and its impact on refugee hosting communities.

1.3 UNICEF’s response in Turkey and the Syria Sub-Region

1.3.1 UNICEF’s response to the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey is part of its wider sub-regional response to the Syria crisis. From 2012-2014, UNICEF appealed for nearly US\$ 1.36 billion in total for the Syria Crisis – including US\$ 765 million for 2014 alone, more than one third of UNICEF’s 2014 annual global Humanitarian Action for Children appeal. As of September 2014, UNICEF had received a total of US\$ 965 million for the Syria crisis. UNICEF’s response now encompasses six country offices – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt.

The annual funding requested and received for the UNICEF refugee response in Turkey specifically is shown in the chart below:

Figure 3: UNICEF TURKEY FUNDING 2012-2015
(in \$millions)²⁴

Year	Required	Funded	% Funded
2015*	60.35	17.38	29%
2014	64.96	32.47	50%
2013	33.9	21.07	62%
2012	6.42	1	15%
TOTAL	165.63	71.91	43%
*as at May 17 th 2015 ²⁵			

The funding deficits shown are largely in line with the wider regional picture for 2014-15, but in 2013 UNICEF in Turkey fared significantly worse than other UNICEF offices in the region, which achieved around 90% funding (see further section 5). This was reportedly a challenge shared by other UN agencies in Turkey.²⁶

1.3.2 In January 2013, UNICEF in common with other UN agencies declared the entire Syria crisis including the situation in Turkey an L3 corporate emergency. It took the unusual step of appointing dual Global Emergency Coordinators for the response – one in New York HQ (the Director of EMOPS) and the other the Regional Director for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Unlike the other countries listed above, which all fall within the MENA region, Turkey falls within a different UNICEF region: Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS). The response has therefore had to be coordinated between two regional offices, with some attendant complications that are considered in the following sections.

1.3.3 In common with most other UNICEF Country Offices in the Syria sub-region, the pre-crisis profile of the UNICEF Turkey office was that of a relatively small upstream (policy-) focused programme, with an annual programme budget of around USD 8 million.²⁷ It did not have the full spectrum of UNICEF specialist capacities (it did not for example have a health section) and had little emergency specialist capacity. This changed quite radically to meet the needs of a large-scale emergency response programme, albeit one that was only partially operational. Along with this came a substantial change in the number and profile of staff employed, and the need to open a new field office. The related operational support issues are explored in section 5 below.

1.3.4 A timeline for the refugee emergency response in Turkey is provided in Annex C. It shows how the situation and related UNICEF response evolved from 2012, when numbers of refugees were relatively limited and largely confined to camps, to today's situation, when Turkey hosts more refugees than any other country in the region and the majority of them are living outside camps in host communities in southeast Turkey.

1.3.5 UNICEF has a long history of educational involvement in Turkey, though little experience of emergencies of this kind.²⁸ It has a history of effective collaboration and established relationships with the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) and with other players in education. At the onset of the crisis, it was assigned responsibility for education and early child development (ECD) among UN agencies under the 2011 UN Turkey Contingency Plan – an appropriate and relevant role which it now shares with UNHCR,²⁹ and which is in line with its own Core Commitments for Children³⁰ and Strategic Plan³¹.

1.3.6 With regard to Child Protection, UNICEF has a history of engagement in promoting child rights in Turkey, and had pre-established and constructive partnerships with the Ministries of Family and Social Policy and Justice as well as the Ministry of Education. In the emergency sphere, UNICEF supported the government in the response to the Van earthquake in 2011, when it rolled out an ambitious psychosocial training programme for teachers and social workers, and provided temporary shelter and safe educational spaces for affected children, strengthened the relationship with the MoFSP and TRC.

1.3.7 One general issue thrown up by the Turkey response is the question of how the response should be categorised – and therefore what criteria should be used to judge it. For all the reasons outlined in section 1, this is far from being a typical 'emergency' – although there are emergency elements within it, including the

influx of refugees from Kobane to Suruc at the end of 2014. The overall situation deserves to be categorised as a protracted crisis, but one that has developmental aspects and implications. In short, neither the standard humanitarian or development paradigms fit this case. The situation is structural in many ways, but has a high degree of urgency and acute vulnerability associated with it. Crucially, the Government itself has asserted strong ownership and control over the response.

1.3.8 Given this, the question of how the CCCs are to be achieved is to a great extent a question of how the government and others can be encouraged and supported (directly and indirectly) to fulfil the standards in question. This can only partly be a matter of how far UNICEF has itself delivered on the commitments.

1.4 Evaluation purpose and approach

Background, scope and purpose of the evaluation

1.4.1 This evaluation was commissioned by the UNICEF CEE-CIS Regional Office together with the Turkey Country Office. It has been conducted in parallel with a wider evaluation of the overall UNICEF response to the Syria crisis and it shares the same basic logic as that evaluation – for which it effectively constitutes the Turkey component. However, the current evaluation is different in kind from the wider evaluation, providing a more in-depth consideration of a specific country context and UNICEF's response to it. The Terms of Reference (ToR) are contained in [Annex B] to the present report.

1.4.2 The evaluation is intended to serve both an accountability function (historical / summative) and a learning function (forward-looking / formative). As described in the ToR, the purpose is to provide a comprehensive assessment of UNICEF's overall response to the Syria refugee crisis in Turkey against its own mandate and standards, its stated objectives, and OECD/DAC evaluation criteria. This is intended to generate lessons and recommendations for UNICEF's future humanitarian responses both in the sub-region and elsewhere. It is also intended that it should help inform the new Turkey Country Programme strategy for 2016-20.

1.4.3 The main focus of the evaluation is on the period mid-2012 to March 2015, though it includes some analysis of future scenarios and future strategic options for UNICEF. Reflecting the balance of the programme, the sectoral focus is on education and child protection, though some analysis is also made of other areas of intervention, including health and nutrition.

Approach and methodology

1.4.4 After scoping visits to the TCO in September 2014 and January 2015, followed by a period of documentary review and preliminary interviews, the in-country component of the evaluation was undertaken from 15th March to 3rd April 2015. This involved spending twelve days in Ankara and six days in the field, based out of Gaziantep. Key informant interviews were held with UNICEF staff, with Government officials and with other agencies and informants in each location. Between them, the team visited refugee camps and host community refugee facilities in Gaziantep town, Nizip, Kilis, Suruc, Sanliurfa, Mardin, Nusaybin, Islahiye, Osmaniya, Adana and Cevdetiye. Informal focus group discussions were

held with refugees at the location of UNICEF-supported facilities, particularly Child Friendly Spaces. Discussions were also held with (mainly Syrian) teachers, who were themselves refugees and parents.

The site visits were chosen to give a reasonably representative sample of UNICEF-supported work in both camps and host communities. The geographical spread allowed visits to refugee communities of different ethnicities (including Arab and Kurdish) and different places of origin within Syria.

1.4.5 A full list of those interviewed for the evaluation (inside and outside UNICEF) is contained in Annex E. The interview format and guiding questions are included in Annex F. UNICEF's ethical guidelines were used to guide informant interviews and focus group discussions.

1.4.6 The evaluation considers the response under four main headings:

- (i) UNICEF role and strategy
- (ii) Programme performance
- (iii) Working with others
- (iv) Internal management and process.

1.4.7 Based on issues raised by initial findings, the evaluation went into greatest depth on the first two of these topics, the findings for which are contained in Sections 2 and 3 below. Under the fourth heading, the effectiveness of the global, regional and country-level UNICEF management arrangements are evaluated only to a limited degree. The primary focus is on the role that UNICEF has played and continues to play in this (atypical) emergency context, the effectiveness of the approaches that it adopted, and the lessons that can be learned from this.

1.4.8 A modified version of the OECD DAC evaluation criteria is used to assess UNICEF's response against *relevance* and appropriateness, *timeliness*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, *coverage*, *coherence* and *sustainability* (or 'connectedness').³² It was not possible to evaluate the wider *impact* of UNICEF's interventions, although consideration of impact is included in the analysis of sustainability. In parallel with use of these criteria, the evaluation considers the question of the *quality* of UNICEF's response, judged largely against best practice standards, internal and external. In this context, performance monitoring is considered partly with regard to UNICEF's MoRES framework³³, but more specifically in relation to the UNICEF's system of Humanitarian Programme Monitoring. Beyond these generic criteria, the UNICEF *Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action* ('the CCCs') are used as key benchmarks. Against this backdrop, the evaluation considers the achievement of the specific programme objectives that UNICEF set for itself. The evaluation questions are set out in an evaluation matrix in Annex to this report.

1.4.9 The applicability of emergency standards to the current situation in Turkey is discussed in the following sections. The evaluation found that the Core Commitments for Children, while they provided a sound basis for programming and were used by the UNICEF team, had to be understood in context. For the most part, the issue was less about whether UNICEF itself had 'delivered' on the commitments, more about how it had tried to ensure that children were provided with the assistance and protection that the commitments embody.

Limitations

1.4.10 As with any evaluation, the team was highly dependent on the availability of existing data. There is a striking absence of needs assessment data and information about the situation of refugees living in host communities. This reflects the Government's reluctance to allow assessments to be conducted, although some progress is now being made in this respect. The lack of assessment data affects every part of the programme and constitutes a major strategic challenge.

1.4.11 Data relating to UNICEF's own programme also proved patchy in some areas, in part a reflection of a relatively weak system of monitoring and reporting. This is discussed further below. Attempts to evaluate specific aspects of the overall programme, including the extent to which it was responsive to gender issues, were significantly hindered by lack of data.

Section 2 Findings on UNICEF's role and strategy

2.1 Overview and general issues

2.1.1 As noted in section 1, the evaluation team used a range of criteria to assess UNICEF's programme performance, including the OECD DAC criteria (modified), the UNICEF CCCs, and the programme objectives as stated in the RRP and elsewhere.³⁴ In this section, we consider the *relevance, appropriateness, coverage and coherence* of the role and strategy adopted by UNICEF, in view of the priority needs of the Syrian refugees, UNICEF's own mandate and capacities, the role and capacities of the Government and other actors, and other relevant contextual factors.

2.1.2 The strength of the Government of Turkey's ownership of the refugee situation and its leadership of the response is one of the defining features of the context – and given the generosity of its response, this should be counted as a major positive factor. The Government's control over the response has been correspondingly strong from the outset. It declined initial offers of assistance from UN agencies and subsequently restricted their role to assistance in camps. It was not until March 2013 that Government of Turkey (GoT) asked for help outside the refugee camps, in acknowledgement of the massively escalating scale of the problem of refugees hosted within existing (largely urban) Turkish communities.

2.1.3 By then, the country fell within the ambit of the UN L3 declaration (January 2013), under which the situation in Turkey became a corporate response priority for UNICEF and other UN agencies, with related changes in management arrangements and applicable procedures.³⁵

2.1.4 For all of its many positive aspects, the position adopted by the GoT has created a challenging operating environment for international agencies, and one that is far from the typical L3 emergency context, in which government capacity is assumed to be largely overwhelmed. This is a highly controlled environment, and this is evident in the restricted access granted to INGOs – including some of UNICEF's more established partners. This has restricted UNICEF's ability to engage in operational response programmes as well the scope for policy and advocacy work. It also determined the way in which UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children were interpreted: more as an overall agenda-setting framework, less as an accountability framework for UNICEF's own programme.

2.1.5 The result of the GoT's interventions in collaboration with the Turkish Red Crescent Society, WFP and UNHCR has been that the basic needs of camp refugees – including food, water, shelter and health care – have generally been well met, and the need for international assistance (financial, technical or otherwise) has been relatively low in this respect.³⁶ In other areas, including education and child protection, the scope for such assistance has been greater. Meanwhile, the challenge of meeting the needs of non-camp refugees has steadily escalated over the past two years as numbers have increased (see figure 1 above). They now outnumber the camp refugees by around 8:1; but the lack of any systematic needs assessment and socio-economic profiling for refugees in different host

communities means that their assistance requirements are still largely undefined and un-quantified.

2.1.6 It is this challenge of meeting the needs of non-camp refugees, and the growing strains put on already overstretched services to the local Turkish population, that now poses the biggest strategic challenge both for the GoT and for agencies like UNICEF. These refugees' needs have to be understood as part of the wider political, social and economic reality of the communities in question. There are major stability, social cohesion and security aspects to this, particularly given the proximity of the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Many of the refugee settlements are concentrated near border areas.

2.1.7 Although, as described below, UNICEF has developed various strategy documents over the period in question, it lacked a clear (written) overarching strategy to inform programme choices and policy advocacy. This has, we believe, hampered it in its ability to make strategic judgements, to influence agendas and to seize opportunities as they arose.³⁷ This is hard to demonstrate; but the overall impression is of a programme that evolved somewhat *ad hoc* and in response to available resources and political space, rather than one based on a clear vision and proactive approach to programming and resource mobilisation.

Box 1 The 'No Lost Generation' initiative ('NLG')

Prompted by UNICEF's own two-year report on the regional Syria crisis, this multi-partner initiative was launched in October 2013 by UN agencies and NGOs together with leading governmental donors (including the US, EU and UK). The purpose was to put a spotlight on two relatively neglected but critical areas of the crisis response: education and child protection, including psychosocial well-being. The idea was partly to try to generate more resources for these sectors, but also to raise their policy profile by creating a consortium of partners and providing a basis for common advocacy. It combined elements of both humanitarian and development analysis, consistent with a move towards 'resilience' that prefigures the 3RP approach.

The initiative had considerable success as a fundraising platform but less as a policy-advocacy one at country level. Largely defined at HQ level, each country was left to interpret the initiative in its own way. In Lebanon, a major push on Education (supported by the World Bank) was one result. In Turkey, the initiative appears to have had less traction. The evaluation team believes that it remains a powerful and highly relevant framework for advocacy and programming in the current context in Turkey. It proposes that UNICEF take steps to update and deepen the NLG analysis in relation to the current and likely future developments of the refugee situation, and seek to breathe new life into the initiative in collaboration with the GoT, UNHCR and others.

2.1.8 The most clearly strategic aspect of UNICEF's overall advocacy efforts is the 'No Lost Generation' initiative (see Box 1 above), which was initiated as a communication and advocacy strategy. Its central purpose is to keep the issues of education and child protection high on the agenda of donors and host governments in the Syria sub-region. While Turkey appears to have benefitted less from the resulting funds than other recipient countries,^{38 39} the TCO has used the occasions associated with this and the launch of the 3RP in Berlin to advocate for education within the Turkish Government.⁴⁰ Overall, the evaluation concludes that the NLG initiative has more potential than appears currently realised, and that

it could be used for raising global awareness about the threat not only to a generation of Syrian children, but also to existing host populations, to overstretched systems and services and to social cohesion.⁴¹ It can also reasonably be said to relate to issues of national and international security.

2.1.9 No comprehensive Theory of Change is documented either for Education or for Child Protection, but it is possible to identify a *partial* theory of change for the overall education response, mostly limited to more immediate goals and their direct means of achievement.⁴² For example, in the Adjusted Education strategy for 2014 the main outcome statement appears to be the following: *the education response strategy in 2014 will continue to focus on ensuring that Syrian refugee children have access to formal and non-formal education both in camps and in host communities*. In the Suruc strategy of December 2014, the objective for education is defined as: *Syrian children and youth have access to relevant education activities in Suruc Camps and Host Community areas*.

2.1.10 Most such documents focus on more immediate goals, which is justifiable for an emergency response strategy. One exception is in the proposal to DFID, which refers to the possibility of Syrians returning home. This kind of forward vision is absent in most of the strategy documents, and is not comprehensively addressed in any one place. Outcomes are better articulated in donor documents and RRP, but these do not constitute UNICEF's overall strategy. The result is a series of documents containing sets of activities against short-term objectives rather than a strategic vision, with medium to longer-term goals. Apart from outcome statements, the other components that go to make up a theory of change (analysis of contributory factors, change 'pathways', working assumptions, etc.) are hard to find in the documentation and are not brought together in one place.

2.1.11 The lack of a clear overall strategic framework is partly a reflection of the GoT's own multi-faceted response; but more directly, it reflects an internal fragmentation that affected the coherence of UNICEF's response. There are two dimensions to this: first, the separation of the child protection and education responses (which were initially conceived together); and second, the separation of the emergency response from the regular programme.

2.1.12 The changes over time in UNICEF's approach can be traced as follows:

❖ 2012 to August 2013 – An integrated approach

The funding proposal submitted to the EU in late 2012⁴³⁴⁴ envisaged a close and reciprocal relationship between the Education and Child Protection sectors. This initial emphasis on creating synergies between⁴⁵ the two sectors demonstrated a solid contextual understanding of the operating environment in Turkey. Given the reluctance of the governmental authorities in prioritising child protection actions, and the high priority allocated to education by the same actors, establishing a permanent link between the two sectors prepared the ground for using education as an entry point for child protection actions, both in camps and in host communities.

❖ August 2013 to October 2014 – Two-track approach

In August 2013 a decision was made to separate the Child Protection and Education components of the EU funded project, for reasons that are unclear.⁴⁶ In parallel with that, the functional separation of the emergency response from the regular programme⁴⁷ resulted in a strategic disconnect between the emergency programme on the one hand and the TCO child protection section⁴⁸ and CEE-CIS Regional Office on the other.⁴⁹ Meanwhile the integration of the emergency response in Turkey with the overall UNICEF regional response led by the MENA Regional Office was progressing.

❖ October 2014 to date – Reunification of the Emergency Response and Regular Programming

The process of reunification of the emergency response and regular programming was driven by the Programme and Budget Review process and multiple reflections of the Country Office team with the support of the CEE/CIS Regional Office.⁵⁰ Some elements of the emergency work-plan 2014 were already conducive to this:⁵¹ for example, the Family Parenting Training Programme in collaboration with MoFSP⁵² and the Child Rights Committees Outreach to Syrian children. In November 2014, the first draft of the Child Protection in Emergency Strategy was produced by the Child Protection Section; but the former integrated strategy between Child Protection and Education was not reactivated. This seems a missed opportunity.

2.1.13 Against this backdrop, and given its mandate and capacities, UNICEF has had – and continues to have – an essential role to play in the refugee response. While the space for UNICEF to scale up its support has opened, the constraining factor is now as much financial and resource-related as it is political. As we argue below, this will take a revitalised and ambitious plan of action and enhanced collaboration with the GoT at national, provincial and district/municipal levels; as well as with UNHCR, TRCS and other key non-governmental actors. The conceptual framework set out in the No Lost Generation initiative remains valid but needs updating in relation to the current realities in Turkey.⁵³

We review in more detail below the development of UNICEF's sectoral strategies over the past four years against the context and needs, UNICEF's own standards (the CCCs etc) and other key benchmarks.

2.2 Refugee Education: role & strategy

Box 2 UNICEF CORE COMMITMENTS FOR CHILDREN – EDUCATION

Commitment 1: Effective leadership is established for education cluster/inter-agency coordination (with co-lead agency), with links to other cluster/sector coordination mechanisms on critical inter-sectoral issues.

Commitment 2: Children, including preschool-age children, girls and other excluded children, access quality education opportunities.

Commitment 3: Safe and secure learning environments that promote the protection and well-being of students are established.

Commitment 4: Psychosocial and health services for children and teachers are integrated in educational response.

Commitment 5: Adolescents, young children and caregivers access appropriate life skills programmes and information about the emergency, and those who have missed out on schooling, especially adolescents, receive information on educational options.

2.2.1 UNICEF has played key roles within the education sector over the time period under review⁵⁴: as education partner within the UNCT and Regional Response Plans (a responsibility shared latterly with UNHCR); main fundraiser for the UN education response; provider of emergency supplies; technical assistance for key interventions/pillars for the education of Syrians in Turkey; and material and coordination support to the GoT. It has also been a significant policy advocate, engaging in dialogue with the GoT leading to legal and policy developments in support of Syrians.⁵⁵ INGOs see UNICEF as having provided a 'framework';⁵⁶ that is, a set of related components and standards, which they too, can work to.

2.2.2 UNICEF's education interventions to date provide an internally coherent set of programme components in line with the CCCs and INEE guidelines⁵⁷. They can be grouped as follows:

- Provision of **school places and facilities** attractive to children in the form of prefabricated buildings (classrooms and libraries); school materials and supplies and readers for the libraries (for grades 1-6);
- **Data** for planning⁵⁸: the establishment of YOBIS, a data system for foreign students and teachers in education in Turkey;
- **Teachers**: emergency training of Syrian teachers; training of teachers in psychosocial support; technical assistance UNICEF has provided GoT for the Education Personnel Management Strategy, which includes teacher compensation, code of conduct, and recruitment;
- An adjusted Syrian **curriculum** enabling children to learn in their own language (where UNICEF contributed by engaging in early dialogue with UN and NGO partners) and many of the elements mentioned above have also contributed to programme quality.⁵⁹

2.2.3 The benefit of these interventions has largely been felt in the camps. The major improvement in enrolment levels within the camps (from 60% in 2013 to 89% in April 2015)⁶⁰ reflects UNICEF's success with Back to School campaigns, with provision of prefabricated school buildings to replace tented schools, as well as sufficient teachers and school supplies. However, an estimated 70% of school-age refugee children in host communities remain out of school.⁶¹ Despite early recognition by UNICEF and the UN as a whole that children outside camps were in need of support,⁶² UNICEF's efforts to assist education outside the camps were

limited to provision of some basic supplies to a limited number of schools in host communities until GoT granted permission in 2013 for the UN to work in host communities.

2.2.4 UNICEF now faces the challenge of helping to shape and deliver the scale and type of educational support required by the majority of Syrian families living outside camps. In this respect, the pace of the collective response has been slow to evolve in order to meet the new challenges; and while UNICEF was able to predict and support changes to policy (as evidenced by their donor proposals, e.g. to DfID) the parameters for operation were only spelled out in the MoNE Circular of September 2014.⁶³ Together with a range of operational constraints, this has considerably delayed a collective response outside the camps. In addition, UNICEF's strategy does not appear to be completely defined or understood by other agencies.

2.2.5 Given the evolving and unpredictable situation, there appear to be different views as to what the strategy for education is or should be.⁶⁴ Various strategy-type documents exist for education⁶⁵ and these have been updated over the life of the crisis. While it is common practice to have consultants advise on the formulation of strategy, a review of those particular documents reveals many pertinent questions left for UNICEF to answer. Some of these are addressed in donor proposals and subsequent strategy notes; but the consultant reports themselves do not constitute a strategy, owned and finalised by UNICEF institutionally, and specifically by the TCO. They should be used to assist GoT to formulate a strategy, based on sound analysis and theory of change, and drawing on the relevant perspectives in section 6.2 below.

2.2.6 There is scant evidence available to determine whether UNICEF considered alternative options for programme components and approaches in the overall education strategy. However, the chosen options do fit with UNICEF's comparative advantage, both globally and in Turkey. One of UNICEF's pillars in the regular programme is education. Combined with UNICEF's global experience in Education in Emergencies response on the ground and in the education cluster, together with recent experience responding to the Van earthquake, this gives UNICEF a comparative strategic advantage in responding to the current refugee crisis. The Teacher Compensation Scheme is worthy of note as UNICEF researched alternative approaches to the issue globally and, within Turkey, alternative mechanisms for making payment.⁶⁶

2.2.7 No assessment of refugee needs in education has been made with involvement of the UN, despite the best efforts of both UNICEF and UNHCR.⁶⁷ These efforts included development of a cross-sectoral tool for rapid needs assessment (Education and Child Protection) that was submitted to MoNE.⁶⁸ Permission was not granted to conduct an assessment using the tool. It is unclear how the 2013 needs assessment of GoT, or other sample survey assessments⁶⁹ and studies,⁷⁰ were utilized for UNICEF programming. There remains a pressing need for a collaborative assessment of educational needs and existing capacities, particularly for the refugees living outside camps in host communities. In this

regard, the MoNE initiative supported by UNICEF to develop Provincial Plans for the education of Syrian children, based on needs assessment, is a positive step.

2.2.8 In terms of advocacy, strategy notes from the UNICEF country team describe advocacy priorities and activities, suggesting that UNICEF was closely following political and legal developments and the opportunities they afforded.⁷¹ Using their pre-existing close relationship on the regular programme with MoNE, much advocacy was said by staff respondents to have been done behind the scenes. As one staff member noted, *"it is very difficult to make the results of our (mostly behind-the-scenes) upstream policy work tangible. Often we planted the seeds of 'ideas' ... How can we 'prove' [that] the almost daily visits to [the Ministry], the many times [we were] called for advice, the various joint field visits and trainings we conducted, and the conferences and trainings MoNE attended, contributed to building their capacity to achieve equitable results for children? We think we have used the little space we had as best as we could'.*

2.3 Refugee Child Protection & Psychosocial Support: role & strategy

Box 3 UNICEF CORE COMMITMENTS FOR CHILDREN – CHILD PROTECTION

Commitment 1: Effective leadership is established for both the child protection and gender-based violence (GBV) cluster areas of responsibility, with links to other cluster/sector coordination mechanisms on critical inter-sectoral issues. Support is provided for the establishment of a mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) coordination mechanism.

Commitment 2: Monitoring and reporting of grave violations and other serious protection concerns regarding children and women are undertaken and systematically trigger response (including advocacy).

Commitment 3: Key child protection mechanisms are strengthened in emergency-affected areas.

Commitment 4: Separation of children from families is prevented and addressed, family-based care is promoted

Commitment 5: Violence, exploitation and abuse of children and women, including GBV, are prevented and addressed.

Commitment 6: Psychosocial support is provided to children and their caregivers.

Commitment 7: Child recruitment and use, as well as illegal and arbitrary detention, are addressed and prevented for conflict-affected children.

Commitment 8: The use of landmines and other indiscriminate or illicit weapons by state and non-state actors is prevented, and their impact is addressed.

2.3.1 UNICEF's child protection interventions in support of Syrian refugee children can be grouped as follows:

- **General Child Protection in Emergencies (CPiE):** Translating and disseminating CP international standards; training and capacity development of GoT and TRC; contributing to the development of the GoT national Psychosocial Support Response Plan; Transformed Engagement Task Force: Child Focused Humanitarian Action
- **Child-Friendly Spaces:** Establishing CFS in the camps and host communities; TRC capacity development; establishing web platform as monitoring system; facilitating youth-led evaluations and planning (SWOT, etc.); IPA Conference preparation, participation and facilitation of partners, youth workers and children.
- **Establishing CPiE systems and supporting protective communities:** Development of CPiE training packages adapted to the Turkish context; conducting local level trainings; supporting local level CPiE mechanisms to enhance

identification and protection of children at risk; support to MoFSP in developing the Parenting Training programmes; conducting the PT programme in camps.

- **Substitute Care Strengthening:** Support to the formal care system applied to Syrian children through the CP working group and local level initiatives
- **Child Rights Committees Outreach to Syrian children:** Phase I: Raising awareness on Syrian children and reaching them in host communities (out of camps); Phase II: Capacity Building among child rights committee members and adult focal points to work with Syrian children; Phase III: Developing activities with Syrian Children; Phase IV: Children Festival/ Forum.
- **Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism:** documentation of grave child rights violations committed in Syria based on refugee interviews

2.3.2 The child protection role UNICEF played was found by the evaluation to be consistent overall with the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action – see Box 3 above. The CCCs guided the strategic Child Protection sectorial analysis in the Turkey Country Office⁷² and the overall Child Protection analysis at regional⁷³ level, feeding into the interagency No Lost Generation strategy⁷⁴. However, some commitments have been acted on only to a limited extent, namely the leadership and coordination role and SGBV. As a member of the UN Country Team, UNICEF has taken an active part in representing children's right in the relevant working groups: Protection (UNHCR-led), Sexual and Gender Based Violence (UNDP) and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (IOM). But the overall impression gained by the evaluation team is that the child protection agenda has not had the leadership and prominence it deserved.

2.3.3 Considerable advocacy efforts have been made on child protection towards the Turkish Government. Despite the initial reluctance of governmental counterparts (especially AFAD) to acknowledge child protection risks and concerns,⁷⁵ UNICEF consistently used its influencing position to keep child protection and psychosocial support on the Government's agenda. An example of that is the advocacy for adequate alternative care for unaccompanied and separated children (UAMs)⁷⁶ that included a study visit to Jordan for decision makers of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.

2.3.4 The separation between the child protection and education responses might have slowed the influencing process⁷⁷ (see paragraph below). That said, the systematic use of child protection cases identified in CFS to raise child protection issues in the field, in parallel with advocacy actions at central level,⁷⁸ led in 2014 to the involvement of AFAD Officials across Turkey in a series of trainings on child protection⁷⁹ and psychosocial support. One indication of the success of these initiatives is the recently signed UNICEF-AFAD Working Plan on Psychosocial Support.⁸⁰

2.3.5 The provision of Child Friendly Spaces in camps proved to be an optimal way of providing inclusive psychosocial support to children, given the growing size of the population. Alternative options (e.g. providing counselling services) were analysed by the UNICEF Child Protection staff in the early days of the Syrian influx. The CFS methodology was selected in consideration of the likelihood of the increase of Syrian children,⁸¹ and the evaluation team found that this was the appropriate choice.

2.3.6 Besides providing psychosocial support services, child friendly spaces also offered a 'soft' mechanism for identification of child protection cases. This in turn provided opportunities by UNICEF to raise awareness of governmental authorities at local level (e.g. AFAD Camp Management, District Directorates of MoFPS, etc) on the need to set up specific child protection systems to prevent and respond to emerging protection issues. As an example, in the Cevdetiye camp in Osmaniye province, youth workers recognised that several youth were urged by their families to go back to Syria to join the conflict. Advocacy with camp authorities to protect those children's rights led the authorities to prevent those children from returning.⁸²

2.3.7 The use of the CFS methodology in host communities proved to be more difficult⁸³ and had limited reach – especially for girls⁸⁴ and children with disabilities. The integrated operational model (interaction between schools and CFS) was used to the extent possible and this needs to be boosted, since the education system could ensure wider protection coverage in the medium and long term at least.⁸⁵ That said, enrolment rates of Syrian refugee children have (to date) been so low as to limit the suitability of this approach as a primary strategy.

2.3.8 The selection of the Adolescent Empowerment and Participation methodology – already positively tested and used within the regular programme⁸⁶ to engage Youth Volunteers in CFS – was extremely relevant not only in responding to psychosocial support needs but also in preventing serious child protection incidents⁸⁷ -- particularly recruitment of adolescents in camps by armed groups and early marriages.

Box 4 UNICEF's evolving approach to the refugee crisis

The development of UNICEF's approach to the refugee crisis could be characterised broadly in four overlapping 'phases' as follows:

Phase 1: Direct service provision (mid 2012 to present)

Given the immediate needs and the support requested by the GoT, UNICEF undertakes a series of interventions in the camps: supply of school materials, support to the construction of prefabricated schools, and establishment of Child Friendly Spaces. This "foot-in-the-door" approach gained UNICEF some credibility as a partner with the GoT, as well as opening a channel for dialogue on issues of further coverage in host communities. But it has also led to a perception that UNICEF will continue to provide material support in this way (e.g. school construction) and it is not clear whether UNICEF has an exit strategy for this.

Phase 2: Extension of support to more sustainable approaches (Education - late 2013-present)

Provision of supplies and facilities continues, but in education the focus changes to providing technical assistance to key pillars of education in emergencies: the Teacher Incentive Scheme, recruitment of Syrian teachers and Code of Conduct; Turkish language for High School graduates so that they may take up University places in Turkey; and dialogue on curriculum and certification. These have wider application than service delivery, and will contribute to a more sustainable approach by GoT. This phase also coincided with the possibility to work in host communities outside camps, both through constructing and equipping Temporary Education Centres and supporting double shifting in existing Turkish education facilities.

By contrast, UNICEF's child protection work for the refugees shows little evidence of this 'sustainability' approach. This is partly a reflection of the lower priority given to refugee child protection interventions by GoT. The current approach based on CFS may not be sustainable or sufficient, particularly outside camps.

Phase 3: Embedding system-wide approaches (2014 to present)

This is the most recent phase, including: training for teachers to recognize the psychosocial needs of students; the establishment of a data system recording Syrian students and teachers (YOBIS) and the generation of reports by GoT; the operationalization of the Teacher Incentive Scheme; further piloting and expansion of facilities and responses in host communities; and support to Provinces to plan and manage the response locally. To a limited extent, other elements of the child protection work also fit under this heading (e.g. MoFSP Family Training Programme).

Phase 4 (future, medium term): Gradual transition from service delivery, stronger policy advocacy role, focus on social cohesion (2016 onwards)

While in the short term substantial involvement in service delivery may be required, this phase – partly reflected in current UNICEF thinking – would involve re-strategising based on future scenarios for Syrian children and host communities. It would include developing strategies that allowed a gradual transition to more sustainable approaches and strengthening of national systems in order to reach vulnerable Syrian and Turkish children as per the resilience strategy (3RP). It would also involve working with GoT and NGOs to model and promote cost-effective solutions to the education of Syrian children in communities, articulating and promoting strategies to address social cohesion, and providing support and a framework for I/NGOs operating in the Education and Child Protection sectors, such as negotiating the same rate for teacher incentives and harmonising approaches to psychosocial support.

2.4 Other sectors: Health, Nutrition, WASH

2.4.1 UNICEF's decision to devote relatively less attention to health, nutrition and WASH – normally areas in which it would be expected to play a major role in an emergency setting – was largely justified by the circumstances. The recent findings from nutrition monitoring activities indicate that there is no major problem of acute malnutrition, although levels of chronic malnutrition (relating back to life inside Syria) are relatively high. Given the chronic nature of the refugee situation, discussion with WFP and the GoT about the potential for school feeding programmes is warranted – for nutritional reasons as well as for its potential to act as an incentive for school attendance. More generally, discussion should be held with WFP and the GoT about refugee children's dietary and micronutrient requirements, including vitamin A supplements to help boost their immunity and reduce vulnerability to diseases like measles.

2.4.2 The WASH needs of refugees in camps have been well covered, though UNICEF is right to have established a WASH working group at field level, particularly given the identified gaps in hygiene promotion. Whether those living outside camps have access to adequate WASH services is less clear. An assessment of WASH needs is needed, particularly in the more overcrowded host communities, e.g. Kilis town; and this represents an area of potential future cooperation with municipal authorities and other agencies in such areas. As recommended by a recent consultant's report, hygiene facilities and practices should be paid particular attention by UNICEF.

2.4.3 With regard to health, UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the government in the border areas, in collaboration with WHO as part of a region wide initiative following the polio outbreak in Syria in 2013/14. The government decided to stop those supplementary campaigns in favour of routine immunization to maintain vaccination levels among Syrian refugees. This carries some risks, while the overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrians are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles.⁸⁸ The risks involved are compounded by high levels of chronic malnutrition and low rates of breastfeeding.

2.4.4 Health coordination structures are not active in Turkey. Coordination meetings at Ankara level are reported to be irregular, though they take place in Gaziantep; and health sector coordination and response is said to be correspondingly weak. This sets an advocacy agenda for UNICEF: to seek to strengthen WHO leadership and secure the systematic involvement of the Turkish MoH on the Syrian issue. Without such engagement, space for UNICEF involvement on health issues is relatively limited.

2.4.5 Although the lack of an existing health section in the TCO at the outset of the crisis hampered thinking about the UNICEF's proper role in health, this was largely offset by support from the ROs. A total of twelve technical support visits on health, WASH and nutrition were made from the CEE-CIS RO.⁸⁹ In the latter stages of the response, a health specialist was employed in Ankara, and a WASH consultant was contracted to advise on UNICEF's WASH role, both as implementer and sector coordinator.

Section 3 Findings on UNICEF's programme performance and effectiveness

3.1 Overview and criteria for evaluating performance

3.1.1 A number of different criteria need to be considered in evaluating the performance of UNICEF's programme of response to the refugee crisis. The main focus of this section is on the *timeliness*, *effectiveness* and *quality* of UNICEF's interventions, and issues related to programme delivery. We take the CCCs, UNICEF and sector-wide best practice standards, and UNICEF's own stated objectives as benchmarks here.

3.1.2 A number of factors have made it hard to assess performance in any consistent way across the range of different programme interventions. The first is a lack of clarity on purpose and intended outcomes. The stated objectives vary between different documents and between years. The second factor is the lack of baseline and other data against which to gauge progress, reflecting a relative absence of needs assessment. The third factor is the lack of consistent programme monitoring against objectives, so that the documentary record on programme delivery is patchy and incomplete. A fourth factor is that the programmes themselves evolved according to context and available resources. While some degree of flexibility was both necessary and desirable given the fluctuating context, the lack of a settled, resourced programme made planning and programme management difficult.

3.1.3 Judged against the 'assessment, monitoring and evaluation' commitments in the CCCs, the Turkey response, while Commitment 3 (evaluation) is partly met by the current evaluation, but the ability to assess progress and impact has been hampered by the inability to achieve Commitments 1 and 2 (assessment and monitoring). This is largely, but not entirely, due to external constraints. The GoT has not allowed systematic assessment of the situations either in the camp or non-camp settings – though the space to conduct such assessments *may* be opening up somewhat, as the joint nutrition assessment suggests.⁹⁰ The lack of monitoring is less explicable, and the implications of this are considered below.

3.1.4 Where delays in implementation occurred, these are sometimes attributable to external bureaucratic factors, e.g. the time taken to get government or donor approval. The funding constraints that slowed UNICEF's response at various times deserve further consideration. While the fundraising environment for the Turkey response has been difficult – in part because of the GoT's initial declaration of self-sufficiency – UNICEF appeared to lack the means to underwrite what appeared to be essential early interventions in child protection and education. It is not clear whether this was because the TCO did not push for such funding, or that there simply were not sufficient funds available (through the EPF or otherwise) to kick-start the Turkey programme.

3.1.5 The problem of underfunding has had a very significant effect on UNICEF's ability to deliver on its objectives. The figures cited in section 1 (Figure 3) show the extent of the problem. With funding running at only around half of the requirement, shortfalls in achievement of objectives were inevitable, although

those shortfalls cannot always be attributed to lack of funds. Programmes could only commence once funding was secured: for example, as reported in the 3RP Progress Report in June 2015, programmes planned for 100,000 children or adolescents had not started due to lack of funding. The uncertainty over funding also had implications for UNICEF's ability to hire the necessary support staff, and more generally for its ability to plan ahead.

3.2 Refugee Education programme performance

3.2.1 Overall, UNICEF has addressed the five commitments in education in the CCCs, within the prevailing constraints mentioned above. Some major deficits remain, particularly with regards to the access to education of children in host communities (Commitment 2); and much remains to be done to integrate education and psychosocial support services (Commitment 4). We consider here the effectiveness of UNICEF's interventions judged both against the agenda set by its core commitments and by its specific programme targets.

3.2.2 With regard to Core Commitment 1, no cluster was formed – this situation being covered by the UNHCR refugee response coordination model ⁹¹ – but UNICEF supported the Turkish Government to lead and develop appropriate coordination mechanisms consistent with the UNHCR model. On the international side, the lead coordination role has been assigned by the UNCT to UNHCR and UNICEF jointly (latterly in collaboration with UNDP). Overall, coordination between UNICEF and UNHCR on education was weak in the earlier stages of the crisis, and uncoordinated approaches to donors and government bodies suggest a degree of unhelpful inter-agency competition. This hampered prospects for joined-up advocacy and strategic thinking on the critical topic of refugees' access to education. Coordination between the two agencies is now reported to be strengthening, and the evaluation found some evidence of this (see below).

3.2.3 The Education Working Group ⁹² is a forum for discussing needs and responses. Initially limited to coordination at Ankara level between GoT (MoNE, AFAD and later DGMM), TRCS and UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM), the model has now been extended to include a working group that meets at field level (Gaziantep etc.) and which involves Turkish and international NGOs. This has the potential to strengthen the response as more actors become involved. At present (at least at the field level) it appears less a strategic planning and joint action forum than an information-sharing one. ⁹³

3.2.4 Access to education (Commitment 2) remains severely unbalanced as between camp and non-camp refugees, the latter (who constitute the great majority) having much lower levels of enrolment: around 30% as against 85%+ in camps. This is due to a number of factors: limited school and teacher capacity in host communities, lack of accurate data concerning the scale of the issue in host communities, and the rapid increase in numbers of Syrians coming to Turkey. It also reflects the time taken to situate international assistance (including that of UNICEF) in the response outside camps, ⁹⁴ and the limited scope and pace of registration of NGOs working in this field.

3.2.5 Within the camps, UNICEF has been able to have more impact. It has assisted AFAD to provide school facilities better suited to the needs of children by replacing original tent schools with prefabricated structures, and has met its targets, first by managing the process itself and then through providing cash assistance to AFAD. This has considerably enhanced the attractiveness of school for both children and their parents. Together with the Back to School campaigns in the camps,⁹⁵ and the siting of these prefabs outside the main residential areas of the camps,⁹⁶ school access in camps has improved.

3.2.6 It is difficult to obtain data on the achievement of UNICEF overall targets against plans largely because of the different means of reporting across the evaluated period. Annex A gives the available data by outcome as reported for RRP 5 and 6 and in reports on the NLG initiative. Reasons for the shortfalls against target appear to include a number of factors besides those noted above, including (for UNICEF) funding shortfalls, the 'moving target' of ever growing numbers of refugees, and the lack of technical staff capacity to support the programme adequately and consistently.

3.2.7 cumulative total of Syrian children reported by MONE to be enrolled in school in host communities and camps as at end June 2015 is 215,000. Of these, UNICEF reports having enabled access for 99,766. The basis of this figure is unclear.

3.2.8 The Code of Conduct, signed by all Syrian teachers at their training, is a useful instrument to address the provision of a safe and secure environment (Commitment 3). However, issues of corporal punishment have been noted by the EWG⁹⁷ and UNICEF separately⁹⁸, and mentioned to the Evaluation Team on more than one occasion. At the time of finalising this report (June 2015) UNICEF and UNHCR had drafted a concept note to address the issue.⁹⁹ Syrian children also appear to be vulnerable to bullying in double shift schools.¹⁰⁰ These are clearly areas for joint Child Protection and Education work.

3.2.9 Training for teachers for psychosocial support (Commitment 4) has been carried out, reportedly for 11,000 Syrian teachers.¹⁰¹ It was only a part of the initial one-day training for Syrian teachers (2013) and the basic subject of another round of training in November 2014, which is late in the overall timeline. More traction could have been gained by better integration with the child protection psychosocial programme.

3.2.10 With regard to Communication for Development, the evaluation team was told that efforts to inform young people and their parents of all the educational opportunities available to them will be underway in the near future (UNICEF in partnership with UNHCR). This would involve '[developing] clear messages and information about schooling opportunities available for Syrian children in Turkey, and [disseminating] brochures/information leaflets to Syrian families and children via local educational authorities and registration offices prior to the new school year'.¹⁰² It is unclear whether caregivers (in this case, teachers) and young people have access to life skills education, or indeed what that means in this context; though it is reflected in the Education Section's work plan for 2015 (Commitment 5).

Delivery of Programme Inputs¹⁰³

3.2.11 Timeliness of delivery has been an issue for some elements of the education programme. Complaints came from those interviewed both in AFAD and MoNE in Ankara and the Provinces, concerning UNICEF's implementation capacity, particularly the time taken to construct schools, order photocopiers etc. A common response was that if they had known that it would take so long, they could have done it themselves more quickly. Indeed a library building visited in one camp had been provided by AFAD, was operational and had more books than those visited supported by UNICEF. In other cases, promised library buildings had not materialised up to nine months after the due completion date.

3.2.12 Implementation problems affected UNICEF's school construction activities. The construction of schools should have been handed over to AFAD earlier: it took seven months (May to November 2013) for the first two schools to be constructed, in part because of delays in securing AFAD permissions. The third school was similarly slow. From 2014, UNICEF handed over responsibility for construction to AFAD (January 2014), providing the necessary finance through the HACT mechanism.¹⁰⁴ In the opinion of AFAD,¹⁰⁵ the various delays have been a 'loss of valuable time during which the refugee children could have been in school'. The construction of child friendly spaces in the camps has also suffered delays, for a combination of reasons.

3.2.13 This complaint of slowness of delivery is apparently levelled against at least one other agency, suggesting some underlying factors. In fact an examination of timelines (see Annex B) suggests that delays have occurred on all sides, in seeking and granting permission for and ordering time for books; submission of project proposals and granting of donor funds. When put together, these represent considerable lead times to deliver some inputs, especially supplies. Some of the factors involved may be outside UNICEF's control, but UNICEF needs to ensure that on their side the project development and approval time is minimised. This will depend partly on adequate staffing, and prioritisation, as illustrated by the example of YOBIS below.

3.2.14 MoNE has raised concerns over the delivery of YOBIS. UNICEF has recognised problems in the delivery of YOBIS and has undertaken a bottleneck analysis to identify blockages. On UNICEF's part, this highlights the delay in making timely payments to the contractor, and recommends timely release of TOR, calls for tender, contract and payments.¹⁰⁶ It is recommended that a similar analysis be conducted for other persistently problematic components of the programme and that corrective action is taken accordingly.

3.2.15 As with other elements of the UNICEF response, programme monitoring with regard to the education component has been somewhat piecemeal. Elements of it are found in a variety of documents: donor reports, RRP monitoring reports, situation reports and (latterly) the Education dashboard for which UNICEF is apparently responsible. Despite the lack of an overall monitoring system, important pillars of such a system are in place (for example YOBIS, teacher compensation tracking through PTT) and the evaluation team strongly endorses the intention of the TCO to develop one comprehensive system.

3.2.16 The lack of needs assessment or explicit vulnerability criteria mean that it is unclear how the most vulnerable children have been identified. According to one education officer, 'all children are somewhat vulnerable in this situation'. From the available data, some specific vulnerabilities in education can be identified, e.g. youth of high school age,¹⁰⁷ disabled children,¹⁰⁸ and those living outside camps. Another group frequently mentioned are young girls who are married early, which takes them out of school. While this is largely unsubstantiated by hard data, girls do seem to be particularly vulnerable in this and some other respects. In some cases, the lack of provision of high school grades or post-high school opportunities (including work) itself makes girls vulnerable to forced or early marriage.

3.2.17 It was brought to the attention of the Education Working group that some married girls had been asked to leave education in the temporary education centres.¹⁰⁹ Intended interventions for children vulnerable to bullying and corporal punishment now need to be strengthened. A review of vulnerability amongst refugee children and their families is overdue. This presents an opportunity for collaboration with national and international NGOs, combining education, child protection and other sectors.

Quality and Equity Issues

3.2.18 UNICEF has overall produced work of good quality in the education sector. Despite some construction issues with prefabricated structures, the school accommodation is of a good standard as compared to other refugee situations. UNICEF has followed international standards (including INEE Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies) as well as the GoT's own standards for making decisions, although compromises have had to be made as refugee numbers increased. Some of the materials provided have been criticised for lack of quality (e.g. the school bags provided as part of the back to school campaign were felt to be of poor quality).

3.2.19 A number of equity issues have arisen in relation to refugee children's education, but these have not usually been attributable to UNICEF. As already noted, access to education has been highly unequal as between camp and non-camp populations. A very proactive head teacher in one double shift school told the evaluation team that he had 1,000 Syrian children waiting for a place.

3.2.20 UNICEF's education work (camp and non-camp) has largely been undertaken in the South-East, leaving out non-camp populations in Ankara and Istanbul, for example. This is understandable given Government restrictions and limited resources, but a review of vulnerability amongst refugee children and their families in these other contexts is overdue. It is noted that there appears now to be a degree more GoT openness relating to the problems of refugees in Istanbul and Ankara. UNICEF should use this to address the issues of children's needs and vulnerabilities in the cities.

3.2.21 UNICEF has made efforts to address the issue of equity between different groups. One access-related measure supported by UNICEF was the issue of Turkish language education for Syrians, a bottleneck to school participation and

University entrance. Another was training Syrian teachers to teach students in Arabic, their native language.

3.2.22 What is less clear is the relationship between the needs of refugee children and those of host communities, where poverty and exclusion from the Turkish education system also exist. Amongst other factors, this creates a problem of perceived inequity, with supplies and services being given to Syrian children when some Turkish children are also in need of e.g. education supplies, school uniforms, and access to education in their own language. This perception has the potential to harm community relations, and needs to be addressed as part of a wider social cohesion strategy.

3.2.23 The indications are that more girls than boys in non-camp settings could be out of school¹¹⁰, and that children with disabilities are not generally gaining access to school. Therefore any programming in non-camp communities, for example Back to School Campaigns and support to facilities, needs to incorporate appropriate responses for girls and boys and as far as possible children with disabilities.¹¹¹ Syrian teachers with experience in special needs should be identified through the recruitment process. Early marriage and participation needs to be monitored as much as possible.

Participation

3.2.24 There is some evidence of community participation in key UNICEF programme interventions; for example, teachers were consulted on the compensation scheme during focus group discussions while they were training. It is not clear how much young people have had a voice or been consulted in the design and implementation of programmes.¹¹² Syrian people need a voice in their education options as this will have serious impact on their future life chances.

3.3 Refugee Child Protection & Psychosocial Support programme performance

Effectiveness in relation to the CCCs and programme targets

3.3.1 UNICEF has made sustained efforts – both through direct programming and through advocacy – to ensure that the protection-related CCCs are delivered. Analysis of the CCCs in the Turkey political and humanitarian context led UNICEF to prioritise the Child Protection Commitments 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6; while Commitment 2 (MRM) is being coordinated at regional level, with a contribution from the Turkey programme.

3.3.2 With regard to Commitment 1 (Leadership and Coordination), UNICEF has played an important role in supporting the Turkish Government (specifically the Ministry of Family and Social Policies) in undertaking an overall leadership role on Child Protection coordination both at national and local level. Within the international coordination model, the picture is less clear. Responsibilities for leading and coordinating work in Protection, Sexual and Gender Based Violence, and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support are assigned respectively to UNHCR,

UNDP and IOM. Within these wider sectors UNICEF has been responsible for representing children’s rights under the overall assumption that a coordinated response on the broader sector would benefit children as well. However, this assumption proved to be incorrect; child protection does not appear to have been given the prominence it deserves within the wider protection agenda, and wider protection responses have not benefited children as they should.¹¹³ This indicates the need for a more specific focus on child protection within the coordination mechanisms.¹¹⁴

Figure 4: Child Protection results as reported against RRP5 and 6 and 3RP

RRP5 2013	Planned targets	Achieved results
	153,000+107,100	19,704 8% of the annual target achieved
	Funding requested (USD)	Funding received (USD)
	10,410,000 USD (as per end of the year dashboard)	6,390,000 USD (61% of the requested funding)
RRP6 2014	Planned targets	Achieved results
	103,500 children/ adolescents with access to psychosocial support services	37,542 children/ adolescents with access to psychosocial support services 36% of the target annual target achieved
	5,175 children receiving specialised services from qualified frontline workers (from the dashboard)	2,714 children receiving specialised services from qualified frontline worker (52% of the target)
	Funding requested (USD)	Funding received (USD)
	17,650,000 USD	5,320,000 USD (34% of the required funding)
3RP 2015 (Jan-March)	Planned targets	Achieved results
	50,000 conflict-affected boys and girls with equitable access to psychosocial support services, including in Child-Friendly Spaces and mobile units	11,594 23% of the annual target achieved in the first quarter of the year

3.3.3 UNICEF programmatic efforts concentrated in the years under evaluation on strengthening child protection mechanisms (Commitment 3) through establishing Child Friendly Spaces, Adolescent Empowerment and Participation, Family Parenting Training Programme and Peer-to-Peer Social Cohesion and Peace-building among Syrian and Turkish Adolescents and Youth programmes. While those efforts were mostly effective in ensuring prevention and response to child protection risks in camps, more needs to be done in addressing child protection needs in host communities.¹¹⁵

3.3.4 UNICEF made considerable efforts to advocate with AFAD and MoFS¹¹⁶ to promote family-based care for unaccompanied minors (Commitment 4) in the years under examination. Despite that, achievement against this benchmark was extremely limited. Difficulties in collaboration with UNHCR on this issue (see section 4) may have influenced the credibility of the UN agencies and negatively impacted on the advocacy process towards the Government.

3.3.5 Early marriage and child labour, especially in hosting communities remains largely un-tackled (Commitment 5), mostly as the result of the erroneous assumption mentioned above that responses under the broader protection and SGBV agendas would have benefitted children as well. Renewed commitment towards addressing those emerging protection concerns is already envisaged in the TCO Child Protection in Emergency Strategy (November 2014) and this urgently needs to be put into action.

3.3.6 With regard to providing psychosocial support for children and their caregivers (Commitment 6), Child Friendly Spaces coupled with the Family Parenting Training Programme in camps proved to be an optimal and efficient way of providing inclusive psychosocial support to children and their families. In host communities the model of incorporating CFS in Multiservice Centres has shown a positive potential but its reach capacity needs to be further boosted in order to meet the size of the current needs.

3.3.7 Although not originally prioritised¹¹⁷, prevention of child recruitment (Commitment 7), appears to have been very effectively addressed by the Adolescent Empowerment and Participation methodologies used in the implementation of the Child Friendly Spaces through youth volunteers. In the focus group discussion in Nizip Camps 1 and 2, boys openly declared that the leadership role they could play thanks to the activities in the CFS was a determining factor in their decision not to return to fight in Syria.

Delivery and quality of programme inputs¹¹⁸

3.3.8 The specific components of the emergency child protection programme were implemented with varying degrees of timeliness. The psychosocial intervention in camps – originally planned for December 2012 and delayed due to late approval of the EU proposal¹¹⁹ until the end of March 2013 – has since been implemented without major delays.¹²⁰ Psychosocial support activities for non-camp population only started in July 2014¹²¹ after over one year from the permission to work in hosting communities (March 2013). The Family Training Programme was implemented with no major delays.

3.3.9 While the target achievement for 2014 broadly reflects the funding received, the low delivery figure for 2013 shown in Figure 4 (8% of target achieved, against 61% funding received) appears to reflect the start-up delays noted above. But it raises questions about how the use of funds is accounted for publicly that requires some further explanation.

3.3.10 As with education, there remain major deficits with regard to the scope of coverage beyond the refugee camps. The initial reluctance of the Turkish authorities to prioritise child protection actions ¹²² required considerable advocacy and influencing efforts throughout the response. Even so, some of the main child protection concerns are still not addressed: for example, no consolidated information on child protection trends exist, child protection and psychosocial referral mechanisms are at a very embryonic stage, and SGBV has been only recently systematically tackled.¹²³

3.3.11 The timeliness of delivery of the psychosocial support integrated into the Education programme (Teachers' training on psychosocial support) was less than optimal. Psychosocial support was integrated as one of the topics in the one day training received by 76 teachers on November 2013. ¹²⁴ A stand-alone psychosocial support training was not conducted for teachers until November 2014.

3.3.12 Lack of baseline information and inconsistent collection of monitoring data ¹²⁵ made impossible a comprehensive analysis of the *coverage* of the programme in the period under examination. Available data show that the coverage of the psychosocial support component of the programme through CFS in the camps has been remarkable: since 2013, CFSs were able (progressively) to reach up to 80% (March 2015) of the children in camps. However, coverage in the host community remains extremely limited, with only a very small proportion of children covered by the CFS in Multiservice Centres in Gaziantep, Istanbul and Sanliurfa.

3.3.13 Translating the main international child protection standards and best practices into Turkish and training relevant actors (including AFAD, camp managers and UNICEF partners) provided a sound basis for ensuring the *quality* of the overall child protection response. Judged against these standards, the overall quality of the services provided by the different components of the emergency programme was found to be very good.

3.3.14 The use of a sector-based approach in the emergency response had an impact in terms of *equity* of the overall Child Protection programme. The CFS approach could not in fact ensure an equal coverage in camps and host communities. Children in host communities have remained largely excluded from receiving psychosocial support and other child protection services. An integrated strategy between child protection and education could have ensured increased access to those services.

3.3.15 The innovation in the online monitoring system in CFS¹²⁶ also introduced an element of quality monitoring: activity progress is tracked through an online monitoring system that links youth workers to partner organizations. While established as a basic reporting system, it now allows agencies to monitor trends and support youth workers to identify and solve problems, as well as allowing timely higher-level action to be taken on issues that cannot be resolved by the frontline workers.

3.3.16 Family Parenting Training Programme: the training is an adaptation of the existing family parenting training programme for Turkish families within the MoFSP. The training modules were selected, tailored and enriched with content relevant to the Syrian population, including newly-developed modules on child protection in emergency based on the contents of the translated standards and best practices.

3.3.17 Peer-to-Peer Social Cohesion and Peace-building among Syrian and Turkish Adolescents and Youth programmes. These attempted to ensure meaningful child participation in society. In 2014, Child Rights Committees¹²⁷ created under the regular programme have initiated several projects to address the role of children in emergencies, and it was decided that the main theme of this year's Children's Forum would be on children and emergencies. In collaboration with Ministry of Family and Social Policies and Parliament, UNICEF supported the 15th Children's Forum in Ankara with the participation of Syrian children from host communities in November 2014.¹²⁸

3.3.18 UNICEF experience in Turkey and the wider region gives it a comparative advantage in terms of combining emergency relief and 'resilience'-related approaches. Despite initial inconsistencies in the strategic approach (separation of the regular and emergency programmes, different approaches towards cross-sectoral reinforcement), the child protection emergency response was planned since its origin to be integrated into the regular country programme with a medium-long term perspective, in close collaboration with the Government of Turkey.

3.3.19 An illustration of this longer-term perspective is the Two Year Rolling Work-plan 2014-2015 agreed with the Child Service General Directorate of the MoFSP, which includes a specific component in favour of the Syrian children and their families, the Family Parenting Training Programme. This programme is also an example of best practice: it shows how UNICEF can support the Government in adapting and using its existing resources in different circumstances, thus strengthening the existing child protection mechanisms as envisaged in the No Lost Generation strategy.

3.3.20 Lack of reliable baseline data and inconsistencies in the definition of the targets for child protection objectives¹²⁹ during the period under examination, make it difficult to undertake the systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of the emergency child protection programme. In particular, the absence of a comprehensive child protection needs assessment¹³⁰ has represented a serious obstacle to the clear identification and quantification of priority needs. Although priority areas of child protection concern have been clearly identified in previous years¹³¹ by UNICEF and other organisations, the need has not been clearly quantified. This has been made more difficult by the constant influx of new refugees and their migration to different parts of the country.

3.3.21 In this framework, while child protection objectives included in the RRP and 3RP for Turkey from 2012 to 2015 remain relevant, evaluating progress remains challenging. Specific components of the programmes such as the Child Friendly Spaces have proven to be extremely effective in providing psychosocial support in the camps. As of March 2015, 80% of children in camps have been

reached by psychosocial support activities¹³² and 3.1% provided with specialised psychosocial support.¹³³

Section 4 Findings on UNICEF collaboration and coordination ('Working with others')

4.1 Context

4.1.1 Many of the factors affecting the context for coordination and collaboration in responding to the refugee crisis were described in sections 1 and 2. These include the extent of GoT leadership and control of the overall response, at Ankara and local levels; the lead coordination roles assigned by UNCT to UNHCR and (latterly) UNDP, the absence of many of UNICEF's usual international NGO partners; and the overall lack of established emergency programme partnerships between UNICEF and Turkish civil-society organisations, with the important exception of the TRCS – itself a relatively new partner.

4.1.2 The GoT-led sectoral coordination process has until recently been largely Ankara-based, though working group meetings are now being held for some sectors at field level (Gaziantep etc.). These working groups have not been supported by any consistent process of needs assessment or data gathering, making analysis of sectoral gaps and overlaps difficult. The few coordination meetings observed by the evaluation team¹³⁴ were well run and had good attendance but did not appear to have a clear strategic agenda. This may change as they become better established.

4.2 Collaboration with Turkish Government authorities

Education

4.2.1 UNICEF has had an education programme in Turkey for many years and according to both Ministry officials and UNICEF staff, has established a good working relationship with the central Ministry of National Education. However, there has been a period of less good relations between UNICEF and MoNE in relation to the Syrian response, due largely to AFAD managing the response and the split between the regular and emergency programmes within UNICEF. UNICEF's direct relationship with AFAD, necessitated by the imperatives of the emergency response, alienated MoNE.¹³⁵ Latterly, UNICEF has done much to help bring the two bodies together.

4.2.2 The continued relevance of standard (short-term) approach of education in emergencies is questionable in the current context, when a longer-term, sustained strengthening of the Turkish education system is needed. UNICEF could have done more to build on the established relationships of the regular programme with stronger internal communication between regular and emergency programmes, and by presenting one 'face' to MoNE.¹³⁶ The reintegration of the regular and emergency programmes should help repair these relationships, and this needs the support of the UNICEF Representative.

4.2.3 Field visit observations confirmed the good relationship that UNICEF has with MoNE at provincial level, where UNICEF is hoping to get more traction for education of children in host communities through the promotion and support of Provincial Education Plans for Syrian children. UNICEF needs also to cement its relationship and work with municipalities.

Child Protection

4.2.4 The relationship between UNICEF and the Ministry of Family and Social Policies – the ministry in charge of child protection in Turkey – has gone through different phases. As with MoNE, the relationship has been challenged somewhat by the appointment of AFAD as the institutional entity in charge of the response overall. But despite the changes in UNICEF programme structure and the schism between emergency and regular programming, efforts have been made throughout the years to keep the MoFSP as one of UNICEF's main interlocutors.

4.2.5 The two-year rolling work-plan 2014-2015 with the Child Services Directorate General of the MoFSP, which includes a component relating to Syrian children and families, is an example of how the relations with this ministry evolved over time. In addition to the joint plan of action, UNICEF has significantly invested on the capacity development of the MoFSP through training on child protection in emergencies and the translation of the main sets of international standards and best practices. UNICEF technical support in adaptation and implementation of the Family Parenting training is a further example of successful collaboration and building of technical skills within the Ministry.

4.2.6 The kind of partnerships UNICEF has engaged in over child protection has implications for the sustainability of the related programme modalities. That with the MoFSP is highly sustainable as it builds on existing structures and focuses on strengthening MoFSP capacities. By contrast, the running of CFS in camps is not currently sustainable, and there is a need to develop transition plans and to strengthen the capacities of TRCS.¹³⁷ This could include supporting TRCS to develop an internal pool of trainers on child protection in emergencies and on psychosocial support. Such a move is recommended in order to increase sustainability of the CFS in the camps.

4.2.7 Considering the reluctance of the Turkish Government to acknowledge the need to include psychosocial support and child protection in the emergency response, UNICEF succeeded first of all in making authorities realise the importance of the sector. Providing AFAD, MoFSP and TRCS with training and relevant standards and tools has greatly contributed to building national capacities. Further strengthening of these capacities by supporting the establishment of in-house training capacity within AFAD, MoFSP and TRCS is suggested.

4.3 Collaboration with other agencies

4.3.1 UNICEF was at first the only UN agency with capacity to work in the education sector. But after UNHCR strengthened its education capacity in Ankara and Gaziantep, it was able to play a meaningful role in the sector, for which UNICEF provided the entry point. UNICEF has collaborated with UNHCR to bring about synergies in service delivery.¹³⁸ The alleged differences in the philosophy of the two agencies regarding the integration of Syrian children in the Turkish system of education caused friction that considerably harmed relationships at several levels.

¹³⁹ These are now being rebuilt, but the differences reflect wider problems of inter-agency coordination. In the case of UNICEF and UNHCR, we suggest that the two organisations need to develop an LoU for their education response in Turkey, in line with the global LoU and related guidance.¹⁴⁰

4.3.2 In the child protection sphere, collaboration with UNHCR has proved difficult for UNICEF – in part because of different approaches towards the Government. Although the evaluators could identify no substantial differences in the agencies' basic positions, differences in attitudes created frictions. An example is the approaches adopted in pursuing the unaccompanied minors issue. While UNHCR publicly criticised the Government for its performance on this agenda, accusing it of not fulfilling its mandate, UNICEF adopted a more collaborative strategy, engaging the Government in dialogue and trying to influence decisions through other means, such as an exploratory field visit to Jordan [ref].

4.3.3 Such tensions between UNICEF and UNHCR have remained unresolved, with negative consequences. It has diminished the joint advocacy and influencing potential of the two organisations. It has also produced among other actors the impression of the UN as investing time and effort in contesting each other, rather than working together.¹⁴¹ This has impacted on the UNICEF reputation at times.

4.3.4 Although limited by official policy, UNICEF initially pursued informal relationships with international and Turkish NGOs, and subsequently helped provide the entry point for INGOs to work in the education sector with refugees in the host communities.¹⁴² Increased collaboration with NGOs for service delivery and modelling new approaches would help to consolidate UNICEF's role as one of strengthening sustainable system-wide approaches for the future.

4.3.5 In the field of child protection, the partnership with TRCS was highly appropriate for a number of reasons. This was the only non-governmental body allowed to work in camps, it had very substantial emergency capacity, it was well known to the Turkish host communities and it was able to achieve large-scale coverage in both camps and host communities. In addition, the TRCS had already worked on psychosocial support with UNICEF in the response to the Van earthquake and had recently established a Psychosocial Support department.

The partnership with IMC was also strategically relevant and appropriate, considering that organization's early registration with the Government of Turkey and what appears to be a highly effective standard operating model that involved working through 'Multiservice Centres' in host communities.¹⁴³

4.3.6 UNICEF's engagement with Syrian children, adolescents and their families has been high in the camps. On March 2014 a 'Youth Led Assessment' of the impact of the CFS in camps was carried out. Although UNICEF has only a modest presence in host communities, the XV Children's Forum held in Ankara in November 2014 with the support of the MoFSP and the participation of Syrian children from host communities is an example of best practice in child participation and consultation.

4.4 UNICEF's role in coordination

4.4.1 UNICEF was allocated the responsibility of the education sector in the UNCT and RRP until UNHCR brought in a specialist, mid-2014, from which time

it has shared that responsibility.¹⁴⁴ More crucially in developmental terms, UNICEF supported MoNE to establish the Education Working Group at the beginning of 2014, and co-supports MoNE to chair it.¹⁴⁵

4.4.2 UNICEF has played a big part in bringing MoNE and NGOs together in education, and has supported GoT to arrange meetings with them.¹⁴⁶ Providing a link between NGOs and MoNE is a key role for UNICEF. NGOs are looking to UNICEF for guidance on standards, teacher compensation and other aspects of their own response, for which UNICEF is negotiating sector-wide standards with MoNE.

4.4.3 Leadership in Child Protection and SGBV within the UN coordination system was very weak. UNHCR played the main coordination role and limited space was left to other actors. In this context UNICEF assumed that discussing overall protection and SGBV would have benefited children as well. This was not true in the Turkish context and has inexcusably delayed coordinated actions on urgent protection concerns such SGBV and early marriages.

Section 5 Findings on UNICEF management and operations

5.1 Context and general issues

5.1.1 In this section, we consider the overall *efficiency* with which UNICEF managed its response to the refugee crisis, including the efficiency of operational support to the programme

5.1.2 Turkey is medium-high income country with a good supply of educated, experienced human resources to draw on and a plethora of suppliers and transport companies, available both in Ankara HQ and the South East Turkey intervention area. The funding situation, although inherently competitive due to other on-going L3 global interventions, has to date provided adequate funding to run the most important programmatic interventions currently envisaged, albeit with some reductions in activities. It has, however, limited the potential for expansion as well as for providing adequate support.

5.1.3 Operational support activities are reinforced both at a regional level through the Geneva CEE/CIS Regional Office, and through the Syria Hub office based in Amman, within the MENA Regional Office. Support has been provided by either one or other of these offices as required, dependent on needs; although some confusion appears to have existed concerning which office was responsible for providing technical support. Little support appears to have been provided (or requested) from HQ level.

5.1.4 The TCO has a number of very experienced local staff within its operational support departments, some with more than ten years of service with UNICEF in Turkey. This foundation has led to the day-to-day good management of the operational support departments. However as described in section 3.5 above, there have been some shortfalls.

5.1.5 The operational support functions have been working within a strong governmental structure where compliance with legal obligations must be strictly observed. The government itself is the major player within the response, without whose approval very little can happen. This has some benefits in terms of clarity of regulation, but the need to agree all activities with governmental counterparts before they can be undertaken has led to some delays (the delivery of the winterisation kits is a notable example).

5.1.6 In terms of infrastructure and services, internal communications are well developed and roads and transportation infrastructure are of good quality. Furthermore, there are a number of experienced transport companies available to deliver goods and commodities to all locations. Facilities and services are available, and although the security situation (especially in the South East) can be changeable, to date the security of staff in general has been well managed under the UNDSS umbrella.

5.1.7 From the perspective of the TCO, the nature of the challenge posed by the refugee crisis only became apparent over time, in terms of the numbers of refugees, the duration of their stay and the predominantly non-camp, urban and dispersed nature of their settlement patterns. Having initially been confined to a

role in the camps, it took time to adapt to the new opportunities that arose. As discussed below, the under-resourcing of the Gaziantep office, the concentration of staff in Ankara and the time taken to recruit emergency staff reflect the difficulty that the Turkey office had in adapting its priorities to match the emerging reality of a massive refugee influx and a Level 3 corporate response expectation. These HR factors in turn made it harder to respond to opportunities at the provincial/district level as they arose.¹⁴⁷

5.1.8 The relatively low priority given by UNICEF as a whole to resourcing the Turkey response – both in human and financial terms – compounded the difficulty of scaling up. The assumption that Turkey was largely self-sufficient arose in part from the government's own early stance, and the country's relative wealth and state of development. While Turkey was part of the UNICEF regional planning process, it appears to have been of comparatively low priority in terms of support and fundraising from the Syria Hub/MENARO and HQ. In this respect, Turkey's self-proclaimed 'difference' worked against it. Lack of communication and some ideological differences between the two regional offices concerned were reported by some respondents to have led to unclear and sometimes contradictory messages being sent to the Turkey country office. The evaluation team was unable to further substantiate this.

5.1.9 The evaluation concludes that, to some degree, a lack of ambition on the organisation's part with regard to scale and coverage was a contributory factor to the slow evolution of the programme. This was far from being a typical emergency response, as the TCO and CEE/CIS regional office recognised. It took time for UNICEF as a whole to recognise the particular nature of the Turkey context, and the implications for UNICEF's response. Nevertheless, the pressure from the MENARO office to scale up was understandable given the scale of the needs. While this was not for the most part a life-threatening situation, there was (and remains) a high degree of urgency to help meet the growing deficit in terms of refugee children's access to education and protection services.

5.2 Management and operational support

5.2.1 As described in section 1, for the purposes of the emergency response the TCO has reported to both the MENARO Regional Office and the CEE/CIS Regional Office since the Level 3 announcement was made – with reporting to the RD in Amman as joint GEC, and to the Syria Response Hub as the regional coordinating mechanism. This proved to be problematic in the earlier stages of the intervention when the reporting hierarchy and lines of communication were not inherently clear. While some confusion about support roles persists, communications between the two ROs are now reported to be functioning better than before..

5.2.2 For future interventions that cut across two or more regions, guidance needs to be given from the start to the country offices concerned. Whether or not in this instance the most efficient processes were used is not fully clear. For example, with respect to HR, the recruitment of surge staff for the TCO has been provided by both CEE/CIS regional office and from Amman. Permanent staff recruitment, however, was required to be routed through Geneva and then New York, with only technical oversight provided by MENARO. Time was inevitably

lost while information was shared and approval received across the four offices, and this is reflected in the lead times for some recruitments.

5.2.3 One clear shortcoming in the management of the TCO was the seven month gap between the departure of the former Country Representative and the arrival of his permanent successor.¹⁴⁸ Although the Deputy Country Representative covered the Representative position during this period, she continued to have the Deputy's responsibilities and was inevitably compromised by not having the authority of the permanent post holder. Decisions tend to be deferred in such circumstances, and the delay in filling the post slowed the evolution of UNICEF's strategy and programme. This seems to be evidenced in the under-resourcing of the Gaziantep office, a situation that is now being rectified.

5.2.4 Capacity in UNICEF's education team was compromised by the departure of the Chief of Education in the regular programme at more or less the same time as the Education in Emergencies Chief, putting an extra burden on other education staff, and potentially creating a gap in UNICEF GoT counterpart relations. All of this put an additional burden on the Deputy Representative who had to take on some of the related responsibilities.

5.2.5 The day-to-day functioning of the operational support departments of UNICEF has been generally well managed considering the resources available. However, despite a tremendous amount of hard work and dedication from the experienced operational support staff, there have been some problems with respect to the operational support provided. This has been due, in part, to the reticence shown by the TCO in scaling up operational support staff numbers.

5.2.6 The TCO has recruited over 50 new staff members during the last two years; and while the recruitment timescales for emergency staff have been reasonable¹⁴⁹ this together with the high numbers of surge staff coming and going¹⁵⁰ has seen a high volume of turnover of staff. We describe this in more detail below. While the quality of staff recruited seems to have been good, this has resulted in discontinuity of programmatic staff and additional time spent at all levels inducting and training new staff on their arrival.

5.2.7 The stationing of approximately 70% of programmatic staff in Ankara, rather than in South-Eastern Turkey where the bulk of the programme has been conducted, has had a serious detrimental effect on programmatic performance. While there are crucial functions to be performed in Ankara (including liaising with government departments), and Ankara-based staff travelled to the provinces, the fact that as of March 2015 there were only four programme staff based in Gaziantep is surprising. The two field coordinators (both on relatively junior national staff contracts) are supposed to monitor and report on all UNICEF operations in the 25 refugee camps and as well as activities in the host communities, whilst also carrying out a number of other functions. That this is an impossible task is reflected in the frustration shown by some governmental officials based in the camps¹⁵¹ who question UNICEF's performance, commitment, and lack of presence.

5.2.8 The Gaziantep office has lacked a senior manager, and apart from one education officer, the office has relied for technical support on visits from Ankara.

The evaluation team believes that the lack of regular presence of technical staff contributed to the slow evolution of the programme and probably led to missed opportunities at the local level. It certainly meant that UNICEF was not well placed to influence the policy agenda at the provincial and district levels. The out-posting of an education officer to Gaziantep proved useful both in building and maintaining relationships with Provinces and in monitoring progress. This problem has now been recognised, and the Country Office plans to substantially increase its capacity at Gaziantep level.

5.2.9 The monitoring and evaluation department in Ankara itself does not seem to perform the standard M&E role with regard to humanitarian programme monitoring, being focused more on reporting than on learning and accountability. This needs to change, as currently little post-distribution monitoring work is undertaken, with significant implications both for accountability and for programme quality. Instead of having M&E field staff, the two Gaziantep based field coordinators are expected to perform this function, which has included (temporarily) covering 27 school construction sites¹⁵², along with their other responsibilities, which include being the front line responders for any new refugee influxes. This is neither realistic nor appropriate, given the need to keep the monitoring function separate from the delivery function.

5.2.10 Overall, the evaluation team noted a tendency not to scale up adequately in terms of operational support staff, an issue that extends to the Ankara office. For example, the HR office in Ankara has only ever had one officer allocated to it.¹⁵³ It would appear that additional support in this department would have been beneficial. Future interventions would need to see sufficient resources allocated to operational support roles beyond minimum staff levels, ensuring additional capacity to cover sickness and statutory holiday entitlements as well as the ability to cope with increased programme demands.

5.3 Human resources

5.3.1 Over 50 new staff have been recruited during the response period, including a number of senior staff positions that can be difficult to fill. A common complaint expressed by TCO staff during the evaluation concerned the high turnover of staff and the excessive time taken to recruit new staff, although this seems to have been worse for non-emergency staff¹⁵⁴ than for those recruited specifically for the emergency.

5.3.2 For each new recruitment or surge deployment, time is required for training on in-house software, administrative procedures and security awareness, as well as getting up to speed regarding their own sectoral responsibilities. Clearly, the high turnover of staff has led to time being spent on induction that could have been better spent elsewhere – not to mention the negative effects that the discontinuity of staffing has had in terms of programme continuity and external representation.

5.3.3 The time taken to recruit the 24 emergency staff recruited in 2013 and 2014 is illustrated in the following table:




Figure 5: Staff recruitment timescales.

As can be seen above, 5 emergency staff members have taken over three months (the expected recruitment standard)¹⁵⁵ to recruit. But overall, performance in this area was in line with expectations.

5.3.4 The announcement of an L3 emergency in March 2013, and the related application of the HR SSOPs, has led to some positive benefits in terms of the recruitment of surge staff, the development of HR strategies, and staff being brought in through standby partners. However, there were only five instances of staff being recruited by desk review, and this approach only tended to work well when the candidates were already known to the TCO.

5.3.5 It has been difficult to attract emergency staff to work on Temporary Assignment contracts. The following table illustrated how Fixed Term contracts were used far more for programmatic and operational support staff compared to emergency staff. This is based on a sample of 54 staff recruited in 2013 & 2014.




Figure 6: A comparison of FT and TA employment contracts awarded.

As can be seen, all emergency staff brought in during 2013 were on TA contracts and only in 2014 were two FT contracts issued as the long-term nature of the crisis was realised.

5.3.6 The TCO’s reluctance to move towards fixed term (FT) contracts for emergency staff is understandable, given the uncertain funding picture. But it also made recruitment more difficult, at a time of great competition for new staff between UN agencies, some of which had already started to offer (more attractive) FT contracts. This is linked to the slow realisation within the TCO that the Syrian refugee situation in Turkey was going to be a long-term commitment, and the need to budget for such roles accordingly.¹⁵⁶ A compounding factor was the need for FT staff to be approved by either the RO (for National Officers) or New York HQ (for international staff), which seems to be an over cumbersome administrative requirement in such a context.

5.3.7 The following chart illustrates the emergency intervention staffing levels during the period of response as compared to the total refugee numbers.




Figure 7: Staffing levels compared to refugee numbers

The camp population has remained more or less constant since Q2 2013 when there were 20 camps, until now, when 25 camps are in operation. The population in the camps has only increased marginally during this period from approximately 200,000 in Q2 2013 to 220,000 in Q1 2015.

5.3.8 However, at the same time, the number of refugees remaining in host communities rose from approximately 200,000 in 2013 Q2, to 380,000 in 2014 Q1, to more than four times that figure in 2015 Q1, and has continued to rise since. In this respect UNICEF has been slow to scale up in relation to the escalating scale of the overall refugee crisis.

5.4 Supply and procurement

5.4.1 The volume of procurement undertaken by TCO has increased significantly over the last couple of years (2013 – \$6m. 2014 – \$13m, \$2.8m as at March 2015). However, the efficiency of the procurement process has at times been questionable. The provision of winterisation kits has been late in both 2014/15 and 2013/14.¹⁵⁷ Although the latter delay has been blamed on the late arrival of

final government figures (received in December 2014), better forward planning, and the prepositioning of stocks in estimation of required needs, could have avoided this problem – the result of which has been that refugees received the assistance they needed only as the winter was coming to an end. A solution to this issue needs to be found for the coming winter, possibly by a switch to cash distribution. But since this is an area of programming already falling under the remit of UNHCR and IOM, it is suggested that these organisations might be asked to take responsibility for the whole caseload, leaving UNICEF to focus its attention on its areas of distinctive competence.

5.4.2 To date the vast majority of all purchasing has been undertaken at Ankara level, increasing significantly in volume over the last three years. The August 2014 audit report has highlighted some concerns in terms of documentation protocols and the use of the Vision tracking software, but in general concluded that procedures were being followed correctly.

5.4.3 Although correct procedure appears to have been followed, there is concern that at times the procurement process has taken too long, even after the L3 emergency was announced. The situation has been improved during the second half of 2014 by the establishment of a number of long term agreements (LTAs) with identified suppliers (e.g. for diapers and school furniture), which according to the senior procurement staff has reduced transaction times by 2-3 months. This is to be welcomed, although perhaps such time savings could have been achieved earlier.

5.4.4 All staff in the Procurement Department are currently on TA contracts¹⁵⁸, including the Supply Officer, and the department has seen its share of staff turnover, including a number of surge placements. It should be noted that international placements, while helpful in strengthening the procurement processes under L3 emergency operations, can take longer to adapt and to understand the local purchasing environment. Wherever possible it would be preferable to employ local procurement officers, even in temporary roles, with adequate supervision.

5.4.5 Medical supplies have tended to be purchased overseas and are stockpiled within the MoH. Together with HEBs these seem to be the main items treated in this way. Considering the tardiness of the procurement of winterisation kits, it might be worth considering stockpiling these items as well (unless a cash distribution is substituted).

5.4.6 More could perhaps be done to ensure UNICEF are paying the correct price for items purchased. Cost comparisons are analysed with the UN common services system, although not all UN agencies are fully contributing to this. The Supply department could look further afield to monitor what INGOs are paying. The government (AFAD) reported that they are paying less than UNICEF for the same design school buildings they are constructing even though they have to pay VAT (as UNICEF did not). This may be due to factors like economies of scale, but it suggests the need to be vigilant. It may also be useful to compare procurement costs between different countries in the Syria sub-region to ensure funds are being used efficiently.

5.4.7 One example of a contract that appears inefficient is that for the use of outside interpreters at \$600 per day. While it may be difficult to find potential employees with the relevant Arabic, Turkish, and English Language skills, it would appear to make better economic sense to employ someone on a full time contract (even if not fully utilised¹⁵⁹) than to pay external interpreters, who may have little idea of the work UNICEF does and who may therefore be less well placed to interpret on UNICEF's behalf. The lack of an in-house translator also has a detrimental effect in terms of communications capacity.

5.4.8 As much as L3 SSOP procedures have been used in procurement, some delays have still occurred. The requirement, as during standard operations, for a contract review committee to authorize purchases over USD 50,000 has been responsible for some of the delays, and this level of authorization would appear to be too low. Although there are a number of long-term agreements (LTAs) now in place, these might have been organized earlier in the intervention.

5.5 Financial management and fundraising

5.5.1 Day to day financial operations have been well managed, with authorisation levels and the delegation authorities distributed and adhered to as per standard accounting practices. The only real area of concern, as mentioned in the August 2014 Audit report, is the AFAD school construction activities which are being implemented under the Harmonised Cash Transfer (HACT) system. These require an independent audit in the near future, as do the operations of other implementing partners working under this system. This is being followed up with the necessary government departments.

5.5.2 Although HACT is an accepted UNICEF implementation strategy, the possibility that some contentious issues may arise within the audit process needs to be anticipated, given the relatively high risks associated with this type of work (e.g. misappropriation, use of cheap materials). Should such risk materialise, it could put a strain on relations with the Government. It should also be noted that the HACT transfers are normally to be reported on within three months (a one page explanation of what funding has been spent on) before another transfer can be made. Exceptions have had to be made for AFAD in this respect.

5.5.3 Annual planning and monitoring of expenditure by project is well managed, with spending shortfalls highlighted in advance. There have been difficulties aligning reporting on spends with the consolidated reporting system adopted in MENARO/the Syria Hub. This has now been resolved and spending to date figures can now be consolidated by sector for each of the emergency programme activities.

5.5.4 There does seem to be some difficulty however producing overall funding situation information on an annual basis due to the need to re-phase unspent funds. As at the end of 2014, \$17.4m of funds from 31 grants received during 2014 remained unspent and needed to be inserted into budget plans for 2015. However, all grants were reported to have been utilised fully before their expiry date.¹⁶⁰

5.5.5 A funding strategy was in place for 2014/15 whereby fundraising is primarily done through regionalised consolidated appeals, although resources have been acquired through a number of individual proposals to USAID, the EU and DFID. The Turkey response received 62% (being \$21M out of \$34M requested) of its regional appeal in 2013, and 50% (\$32M out of \$65M) in 2014. Although a number of respondents thought that underfunding was not a significant constraint for the TCO, these were the lowest percentages of funding compared to the other four countries incorporated in the appeal. In 2013 all the other four countries were at least 90% funded. Where a shortfall has occurred the activities highlighted in the plans have been prioritised, and less urgent or less important activities are cancelled or reduced. There is no indication that budgets have been inflated nor any lack of donor confidence in UNICEF.

5.5.6 Turkey received the lowest percentages of funding compared to the other four countries incorporated in the regional appeal – though it should be noted that was a system-wide phenomenon, the response plans for Turkey being relatively underfunded compared to other countries. In 2013 all the other four UNICEF country programmes were at least 90% funded. The gap between TCO funding levels and those in other COs in 2014 was less significant, due in part to increased pressure from the TCO for a great share of the contributions received. In general, the TCO felt that enough funding had been raised to undertake the activities with highest priority, and that where a shortfall had occurred, less urgent or less important activities were cancelled or reduced.

5.5.7 UNICEF appears to have been highly dependent on individual donor proposals to kick start its response – notably the EU proposal approved in March 2013, which also allowed it open its office in Gaziantep. In that case, the gap between submission of the concept note and approval of the project was around four months. In an emergency context, that is too long a delay. The evaluators question whether UNICEF's capacity for advance (self-) financing is adequate for such contexts. The delay to implementation in this case was considerable, and might have been avoided had it been possible to underwrite at least the initial stages of the intervention from UNICEF's own funds.¹⁶¹

5.5.8 As the response expands into host communities the need to identify new funding sources will increase. More perhaps could be made of the presence of the National Committee office located in Ankara, which although generating some funds for the TCO intervention could possibly produce more. Similarly, although generally provided on a loan basis, more could have and possibly should be made of the UNICEF central Emergency Programme Fund (EPF). CERF funding has been successfully applied for and utilised.¹⁶²

5.6 Communications

5.6.1 Media communication activities are undertaken by an experienced team within the TCO supported from both the Syrian Hub office and the communications department in Geneva. The former has the greater capacity to support activities both financially and in terms of availability of time. The Geneva office covers twenty-one countries and as such only has time for technical guidance and oversight as required.

5.6.2 As a communications vehicle, the No Lost Generation initiative seems to have had some impact, but international awareness of the scale and volatility of the situation of the 1.7 million refugees in Turkey appears relatively low, particularly with regard to the non-camp population. As the TCO operations move towards a greater focus on such communities, and the need for funding grows accordingly, there needs to be a renewed effort to raise awareness both in the donor and public domain.

5.6.3 UNICEF does well within Turkey itself in terms of social media attention, although some feel that the Turkish public is losing interest, despite the ever-increasing numbers arriving and the associated social issues. Again, a renewed effort needs to be made here – perhaps in collaboration with the Turkish National Committee.

Section 6 Sustainability, future perspectives and lessons learned

6.1 Overview

6.1.1 This section essentially addresses the *sustainability* and *connectedness* evaluation criteria, and the related 'resilience' agenda. In this context, we offer some perspectives to help guide UNICEF thinking about future strategy and approaches in response to the on-going refugee situation. This poses challenges in both the short and medium-longer terms, regardless of which of various possible scenarios actually materialise (return, local settlement, etc.). Some of these reflections are in the form of guiding questions rather than answers.

6.1.2 This section also pulls together what we believe to be key lessons learned from the UNICEF response to the Turkey refugee crisis. Documenting these lessons (see recommendations) we believe is an important step in the process of organisational learning.

6.1.3 After almost four years, there is general recognition that the refugee crisis is not going to be resolved soon and that a shift in the approach from emergency to longer-term assistance needs to be made. This is complicated both by political factors and by the available funding sources; although donors too are beginning to take a longer-term perspective.¹⁶³ The No Lost Generation Initiative provides a framework for a common response to the needs of Syrian children across the region. Initially focussing on emergency response actions, the One Year review of the initiative acknowledges the need to re-think its strategic goals into a longer-term vision.¹⁶⁴ The present evaluation confirms this view.

6.1.4 In undertaking this strategic exercise in Turkey – and in other countries in the region – there is a need to analyse possible future scenarios for Syrian families and their children (i.e. return, integration, resettlement), to assess which child-related issues are likely to arise in each of the scenarios and what would be the impact and repercussions if these issues are not addressed.

6.1.5 The 3RP document makes the following projection concerning the evolution of the crisis: *'The projected number of Syrian refugees in Turkey in 2015 is 2.5 million of whom 300,000 will reside in 25 camps and 2.2 million people will live among communities. In addition, it is estimated that 8.2 million people in refugee hosting areas will be impacted.'* The impact on the people concerned (Syrian and Turkish) is likely to be felt across generations.

6.1.6 As understood in the 3RP, the resilience agenda demands consideration of the wider impact of the refugees' presence on the host communities: *'The resilience-based response will enable the international community to extend its support to the most affected local populations with reference to basic needs, public water and waste management, health care, education and livelihood initiatives, jointly devised with the relevant authorities.'* This poses a considerable challenge to UNICEF in defining its priorities given the available resources, but is consistent with its equity focus and demands proper consideration.

6.1.7 As described in the earlier sections, the social cohesion agenda is likely to be of continuing importance and we believe that UNICEF has a significant role to play here. This is particularly true with regard to access to jobs and services. Several studies have highlighted the impact of Syrian refugees on Turkish communities, especially with regard to access to services.¹⁶⁵ Medical care is an example encountered by the evaluation team in its field visits. Under the Temporary Protection Regulation of 2014, Syrians have a free access to medical care and free provision of medicines. Contradictory perceptions about the practical reality of this appeared widespread: on the one hand, reported perceptions among host communities that Syrians tended to be prioritized over Turkish patients; on the other hand, perceptions among Syrians that they were discriminated against by the health authorities in favour of Turkish families.¹⁶⁶

6.1.8 UNICEF's education and child protection programmes provide a unique opportunity to work on social protection. The establishment of pre-school education that brings Turkish and Syrian children together (as proposed by the TCO) is a good example of concrete social cohesion activity, and UNICEF should collaborate and advocate with NGOs to scale this approach. Consideration should be given to jointly working on peer-peer activities within the school environment (for both teachers and students); removing the objects of accusation against Syrians, particularly of cleanliness and aggression, by (for example) compensating school cleaners in double shift schools. Staff with programmatic experience in social cohesion and peace-building in the two sectors need to be retained and recruited, and advice sought from specialists in UNICEF HQ on this agenda.

6.1.9 UNICEF should work through NGOs and others for service provision and modelling on the ground, and rebalance its strategy in favour of policy, advocacy and knowledge management.

6.1.10 Meanwhile, UNICEF faces some more immediate challenges concerning the sustainability of its current approaches. Perhaps the most pressing is the question of teacher remuneration, discussed below. The current compensation scheme has allowed Syrian teachers to practice but it is not a substitute for a properly paid job. If teachers are to be retained, it is crucial that they are able to secure a salary and job security. The question of whether they will be permitted to work as salaried teachers in the Turkish system is therefore a pivotal one, and a priority area for UNICEF advocacy.

6.1.11 With regard to the sustainability of child protection approaches, the current reliance on the CFS model as the 'entry point' for protection leaves much to chance – including the willingness of donors and the GoT to continue supporting this model. Demonstrating the importance and effectiveness of this approach in the camps is essential if support is to be maintained; hence our recommendation below concerning evaluation of the CFS programme. Whether the same approach provides a scalable model outside the camps is less clear, although it provides a clear entry point in conjunction with 'multi-service centre' approach. New ways of reaching vulnerable children (including unaccompanied minors and those living on the street) will be required, adapted to the urban environment in which many are located.

6.2 Future perspectives on Education

6.2.1 *Education and accreditation* is fundamental to the life chances of Syrian children, yet many children have not been to school for a few years, there are not enough places for them anyway, and apart from the few who gain access to Turkish Universities, they may not achieve certification which gains them access to further studies or work. If education needs are not addressed quickly, the next generation will suffer, as global evidence suggests that the education of children (particularly girls) is influenced by the level of education of their parents (particularly mothers).

6.2.2 The *type* of education needed depends on a number of uncertain factors – especially whether Syrians will return home and if so, in what timescale.¹⁶⁷ Education therefore needs to be discussed in the context of integration into Turkish society, habitation within the country, return to Syria or (in some cases) third country resettlement. Most refugees will wish to return home at some stage, and have a right to do so, but this may not happen perhaps for some years. Meanwhile they need to function in Turkish society, for which the acquisition of Turkish language is especially important.

6.2.3 What skills will the refugees need in order to function in the short-term in Turkey while learning and maintaining skills to rebuild their country and their communities in the medium to longer term? Does the latter justify a region-wide education programme?

6.2.4 *Integration.* If GoT intends (in a broad sense) to integrate Syrians into the Turkish system, what will be the nature of their particular needs? What will this mean in terms of curriculum, qualifications, physical facilities, human resources and support services? What will it mean for the Turkish system as a whole, in terms of places, capacity, social cohesion processes?

6.2.5 *Reconciliation of principles.* A number of different principles apply here: the best interests of the child, the right to a quality education, the right to an identity and to learn in their mother tongue and the aspirations of Syrian young people and their families.¹⁶⁸ How are these resolved? Who decides – and will there need to be a variety of education paths from which parents and young people can choose?

6.2.6 *Equity* in relation to all population groups, including host population communities and other refugee groups. What are the equity challenges for education? What opportunity does this crisis present in Turkey for making the Turkish education system more inclusive?

6.2.7 *Social cohesion.* The evaluation team encountered attitudes to Syrians, especially in double-shifting schools, concerning 'aggressive' behaviour and the condition in which facilities are left after classes. Simple measures like the remuneration of Syrian cleaners might help address such perceptions. More generally, the goodwill of Turkish people towards Syrians is showing signs of diminishing as problems like rent increases and job shortages are attributed to

Syrians. The Evaluation team found some positive approaches to addressing social tensions, such as sports events which brought Syrian and Turkish children together, and the presence of Turkish language teachers (who had clearly befriended Syrian teachers) in Syrian shifts. However, the enormous material gulf between the two groups was evident, especially when discussing their accommodation and certain cultural differences relating to family circumstances.

6.2.8 Education can and needs to address social cohesion at several levels. What can be done to lessen potential damage from the refugee situation on the fabric of Turkish society? What role can education play in positively enhancing social cohesion?

6.3 Some key lessons learned and best practices in Education

6.3.1 UNICEF has piloted several education-related initiatives in the refugee response in Turkey that provide useful lessons and potential models for wider application:

(i) The Code of Conduct for teachers that is signed by all Syrian teachers at the end of their training, sets out standards for behaviour. This has given the authorities an instrument with which to address corporal punishment, and other behaviours, while training is strengthened in these areas.

(ii) Incentive payments under the Compensation Scheme for Syrian teachers have been introduced with an innovative modality, through the Post Office (PTT) that requires only one account that all teachers can access, and which is also said to be of potential use for payment of personnel in other sectors.¹⁶⁹ While the level of remuneration was criticised by some Syrian teachers during field visits, it was in general appreciated. The eventual success of this will be proved by its sustainability; the programme has perhaps one more year of funding to support the payments. However, there is a possibility opening up through dialogue on the granting of a specified number of work permits to Syrian teachers, leading to salaried remuneration on the Turkish system scales.

6.3.2 Both the Code of Conduct and the Compensation scheme are part of the Management Strategy for Education Personnel and have use beyond the programmes implemented with UNICEF support. In particular, this strategy can be used as a framework by the NGO community. Practice relating to teacher compensation and levels of remuneration, the Code of Conduct and recruitment practices should be agreed sector-wide. UNICEF is currently in negotiations over the level of teacher compensation, which vary widely across agency-supported programmes.

6.3.3 The development of the data system (YOBIS) for foreign teachers and students in Turkey will fill a critical data gap, and could be considered in other such refugee contexts where other methods of needs assessment are problematic. One of the key pillars is the system's compatibility with the existing Education Management Information system in the Turkish system, and the potential of YOBIS to be applied to all foreign students and teachers, rather than Syrians alone, providing one aspect of a more inclusive system. This also demonstrates the use of non-traditional modes of partnership.

6.4 Future perspectives on Child Protection

6.4.1 Despite the lack of consolidated and systematically collected data on child protection, a number of outstanding protection issues are evident in the Turkish context. Early marriage is one of these. During the evaluation, multiple sources – including focus group discussions with girls and women in Nizip and Sanliurfa – confirmed an increasing trend of early marriages for Syrian girls.

6.4.2 Although early marriage is not a new phenomenon among Syrians¹⁷⁰, conflict-related drivers contribute to girls marrying at increasingly younger ages. Economic pressures on the family and weaker social and community protection mechanisms are the main underlying causes of girls marrying young. In the TRCS Centre in Sanliurfa, a mother confirmed that when resources are scarce, early marriage is a viable alternative available to families. “Mothers are now eager to give away their female children as soon as they can”.

6.4.3 Besides the effect that early marriage is having on the current generation of girls, the repercussion of this phenomenon on the next generation of children should be analysed. Specific to the context in Turkey is the increasing trend of girls being married as second wives to Turkish men. The potential for discrimination and limited access to rights for the children born in these informal marriages should be carefully considered.

6.4.4 Economic and security concerns among families are driving other harmful practices. Although the extent of child labour is unclear, it appears to be widespread and leaves the children concerned – particularly street children¹⁷¹ – vulnerable and lacking in education. Similarly, family protection strategies that take children (especially girls) out of school and keep them at home have negative implications for the well-being of children today, and for their role as the future parents of tomorrow.

6.4.5 Child Protection staff in the TCO have rightly identified social cohesion as a priority and it forms one of the components of the 2015 strategy. The peer-to-peer social cohesion programme is a first and concrete attempt to address the issue from a CP perspective: Turkish Child Rights Committees engaged in peer to peer social cohesion programming with the support of Ministry of Family and Social Policies and UNICEF in ten provinces.

6.4.6 There is scope for Education and Child Protection social cohesion initiatives to be better aligned in the process of designing an overarching strategy.

6.5 Some key lessons learned and best practices in Child Protection

Some of the child protection interventions by UNICEF provide lessons learned and potential best practice models:

(i) The Adolescent Empowerment and Participation methodology, which has the potential to become a standard operational methodology for CFSs in the Region. Its way of functioning and its impact on Youth Volunteers and children needs to be thoroughly examined, so as to provide lessons for the use of a similar model in

other contexts in the region. Based on what the evaluators saw, it is recommended to extend the age group of youth leaders up to twenty-four as suggested in the way forward of the One Year review of the No Lost Generation Initiative.

(ii) The online monitoring platform has also the potential for being replicated in similar context. Benefits and challenges in adopting the platform need to be evaluated and to be documented.

(iii) Particularly since it is a new model of response for emergency actors in Turkey, the CFS experience in the camps needs to be evaluated in its own right and the results used for different purposes (e.g. advocacy with the Government, learning for TRCS, etc.)

(iv) The Family Parenting Training Programme is a further example of best practice: it shows how UNICEF can support the Government in adapting and using its existing resources in different circumstances, thus strengthening the existing child protection mechanisms.

Section 7 Conclusions and recommendations

7.1 General conclusions

7.1.1 With regard to the *relevance* and *appropriateness* of UNICEF's response to the refugee crisis, the evaluation concludes that UNICEF established the right priorities for itself by focussing on education and child protection. This reflected both the priority unmet needs and the comparative advantage of UNICEF in Turkey, particularly given its pre-existing relations with the relevant ministries. The response has been slow to evolve in relation to the growing problem of non-camp refugees, due largely to resource constraints and limited operating space, but is now being appropriately re-focused on this dominant challenge.

7.1.2 An overarching UNICEF written strategy is needed to unite the different strands of UNICEF's thinking. This should be 'owned' by the TCO – a country-based approach to strategic planning that should have been supported and encouraged by the ROs from the outset, but was perhaps constrained by the emphasis on regional planning. In the case of Turkey, the crucial link between the education and child protection strands of UNICEF's response was lost during the earlier response, resulting in a significant loss of overall *coherence*. This link needs to be re-established, both conceptually and programmatically. The decision to re-unite the emergency and regular programmes (after a period in which they were separated) is the right one. The separation of the two caused problems, not least in terms of coordinated engagement with ministries, and more generally in loss of programme coherence and quality.

7.1.3 The decision to devote relatively less attention to health, nutrition and WASH – normally areas in which UNICEF would be expected to play a major role in an emergency setting – was largely justified by the circumstances. The WASH needs of refugees in camps have been well covered, but whether those living outside camps have access to adequate WASH services is less clear. An assessment of WASH needs is needed, particularly in the more overcrowded host communities. With regard to nutrition, while acute malnutrition is not prevalent among the refugees, levels of chronic malnutrition are high. Given both the general developmental implications for children and the specific health risks associated with micronutrient deficiency (e.g. Vitamin A deficiency), UNICEF should continue to collaborate with the GoT, UNHCR and WFP on this issue.

7.1.4 With regard to health, UNICEF played an important role in the polio vaccination campaigns conducted by the government in the border areas, in collaboration with WHO as part of a region wide initiative following the polio outbreak in Syria in 2013/14. The government decision to stop those campaigns appears risky, and the overall levels of vaccination coverage among Syrian refugees are low enough to raise significant concerns about potential future disease outbreaks, including measles.

7.1.5 While the evaluation concludes that UNICEF's strategic choices were the right ones, UNICEF programming has struggled to keep pace with the scale and nature of the evolving needs. This has been largely related to restricted operating space and limited data, together with limited availability of financial and human resources. At the time the evaluation was conducted (March 2015), the emphasis on camp and non-camp work was roughly equal in programme terms, although

the ratio of camp to non-camp refugees was around 1:8. Yet for two years – since March 2013 – the option of working outside camps had been open in principle, suggesting that the reasons for the slow evolution of the programme and its coverage go beyond the question of operating space and governmental permission.

7.1.6 The evaluation is able to draw only limited conclusions about the *effectiveness* of the programme. A variety of factors lie behind this, in particular: the lack of clear or consistently stated objectives; the lack of baseline and assessment data; weak and inconsistent programme monitoring; and inconsistent reporting against objectives. In some cases, targets appear to have been missed by a wide margin, and this cannot simply be attributed to lack of funding. Some of the targets set were probably not realistically achievable in the prevailing context. A difference between targets for which UNICEF had direct responsibility for delivery and those for which it had either joint or indirect responsibility compounds the difficulty of evaluating its performance in this regard. This distinction is particularly significant when evaluating performance against achievement of the CCCs. Overall, the evaluation concludes that in most respects, UNICEF did what it could within the constraints of the operating environment and the available resources to ensure that the CCCs were met.

7.1.7 While slow delivery has affected the *timeliness* of some of UNICEF's interventions, the bigger issue has been lack of *coverage*. Specifically, UNICEF (and others) have not been able to ensure the access of non-camp refugees to essential services, including education and child protection. While this has largely been due to circumstances beyond UNICEF's control, including the GoT's reluctance to accept the need for help with this agenda, opportunities now exist to significantly increase the scope of UNICEF's work in this area, assuming that funding can be secured. This may require an approach quite different to that adopted inside the camps.

7.1.8 The *efficiency* with which the programme was implemented was affected by some of the factors described above, and UNICEF appears to have underestimated the support requirements of a programme of this scale. Human resources limitations, including high levels of dependence on temporary surge staff over a long period, had a negative impact on delivery and quality. Slow implementation affected some aspects of the programme, though this was often related to factors beyond UNICEF's control.

7.1.9 With regard to the *sustainability* of UNICEF's interventions, progress has been made in the latter stages of the response as the UNICEF has increasingly focused on encouraging system-wide changes in policy and practice. That said, a number of its more direct interventions (including paying teacher incentives) are dependent on external funding that is unlikely to continue in the medium term. Their sustainability may depend on the GoT including them in its own spending plans. The sustainability of the CFS model, and its viability outside camps, is also in question.

7.1.10 Concerning the *connection* with the wider country programme, Syrian refugee issues have been included in the new Country Programme Document and integrated into the analysis and outcomes of the regular Turkey Country Programme. This is a significant step in the attempt to integrate responses to the

Syrian crisis into the regular programme and needs to be followed by appropriate management and implementation arrangements. While donors are likely require separate proposals and reporting for refugee-related programmes, the case should be made for an integrated approach.

7.1.11 While UNICEF made good use of the limited space and resources available, and worked hard and creatively to influence government policy, it tended to be reactive rather than proactive in some aspects of its response, including fundraising. UNICEF has tended to do what it can with the available resources (internal and external) – often with considerable ingenuity. We suggest that a more proactive approach is now needed, based on a re-formulation of the strategic case for providing greater assistance in Turkey. The No Lost Generation initiative still provides a sound conceptual framework for this, but requires updating and elaboration in relation to the particular circumstances now prevailing in Turkey.

7.1.12 UNICEF's approach to risk in this context has been conservative overall. On the one hand, it has taken what the evaluation concludes were some appropriate organisational risks on the programme side, including the initial commitment to construction of schools. On the other hand, as noted above, it has been risk averse in terms of advance financing and underwriting of programme expenditure. The SSOPs that apply in L3 contexts were only used to a limited extent and could have been used more.

7.1.13 One factor that affected not only UNICEF but also the wider the response was the extent of gaps in knowledge about the living conditions and profile of the refugee population, particularly those living in host communities. The government's initial reluctance to allow international agencies to conduct needs assessments may now be changing. UNICEF has an important role to play in collaboration with the government, UNHCR, TRCS and NGOs in shedding new light on the needs of refugee children. This should be an organisational priority. UNICEF advocated strongly with GoT in the early stages of the response for joint, cross-sectoral needs assessments (education-child protection) but so far only sample surveys and qualitative studies exist, largely carried out by other agencies such as INGOs. These provide helpful insights but are no substitute for the more comprehensive needs assessment now urgently required.

7.2 Sector-specific conclusions

Education conclusions

7.2.1 Given the political and operational constraints of the context, UNICEF established an appropriate role for itself within the education response, both within the UN and with GoT. It has both the mandate and comparative advantage to do so, not least because of its global experience and credibility in emergency education. However, the longer-term strategy on education is unclear to the evaluation team.

7.2.2 UNICEF has substantially addressed the five Core Commitments in Education in the CCCs with regard to camp-based populations and has continued to demonstrate leadership in the sector, despite some differences in approach and 'turf battles' with UNHCR. As noted in section 2, there have been some gaps. Most

importantly, while good coverage of needs was possible in the early stages of the crisis when the majority of school-age children were housed in camps, UNICEF and others have been unable to extend coverage to the majority of children in non-camp settings for the reasons described above.

7.2.3 Some outstanding elements of the response deserve special mention. One is the Education Personnel Management Strategy, which includes much-needed components of teacher compensation, and a code of conduct for teachers. These and other areas of best practice are detailed in section 6 above.

7.2.4 On the question of programme performance, UNICEF's close relationship with MoNE was an asset, particularly in policy terms, though it sometimes struggled to reconcile this relationship and that with AFAD in the emergency response. Delays in implementation have been a source of some frustration for AFAD, although the fault for these does not lie solely with UNICEF. Procurement lead times and the time taken to secure funding from donors to work in newly opened space, have prevented UNICEF from responding as early as they could have. As noted above, there is a significant HR dimension to this.

7.2.5 Overall, UNICEF has been responsive to the specific factors relating to the education needs of Syrian children in Turkey, particularly the issues of language and curriculum. Their needs relate both to the immediate future in exile, and to the longer term future either in Turkey or back in Syria. In the transition, students need to be enabled to learn; and much remains to be done to equip these children for life in Turkey (e.g. through extra Turkish language classes), while pursuing activities related to preserving their own culture and preparing them for return.

Child Protection conclusions

7.2.6 Considering the challenges in the operating environment, UNICEF's child protection response to the Syrian crisis has been an appropriate one. That said, in some areas the UNICEF comparative advantage has not been fully utilised. A leadership role in child protection was played only to a limited extent, opportunities for joint advocacy with UNHCR have not always been taken, and the link between child protection and education has not been used to its full potential. As noted above, the de-linking of these two strands has now been tackled and this is already produced promising synergies, including a longer-term approach to the response.

7.2.7 An example of longer-term thinking is the two year Child Protection Strategy proposed to the MoFSP at the end of 2014. One of the strategy components is the further strengthening of the institutionalised national child protection and coordination mechanisms under the MoFSP in the southern provinces. This should reinforce the ability of the Provincial Directorates of Child Services to prevent and respond to child protection concerns for Syrian and Turkish children.

7.2.8 Providing psychosocial support through Child Friendly Spaces proved to be an optimal solution to addressing to psychosocial needs of children in the camps. However, more needs to be done urgently to scale up the presence in non-camp situations where the majority of Syrian children live. Embedding CFS into

Multiservice Centres in non-camp situation is an effective model to attract children and building trust with their families; although other options may need to be explored to achieve the scale of coverage required.

7.2.9 Child Protection advocacy actions towards government at central level have played a substantial role in the change of attitude of the governmental actors. The general realisation that the Syrian refugee crisis is a protracted one paves the way for an increased emphasis on preventing and responding to specific child protection concerns (e.g. child labour, street children, early marriages) that require specialised case management and referral mechanisms in place.

7.2.10 The use of the Adolescent Empowerment and Participation methodology to engage adolescents and youth as leaders in the CFS appears to have been highly successful. However, no impact evaluation of this component of the programme has yet been undertaken. The main limitation of this approach seems to be the absence of prospects for youth volunteers after the age of eighteen. This is already being corrected in line with the No Lost Generation initiative. In this context, UNICEF needs to concern itself also with the 18-25 age group.

7.3 Management, finance and support conclusions

7.3.1 In general, the day to day functioning of the operational support departments has been well managed within the expected operational protocols that exist. This has been facilitated by the experienced core members of the operations support team. Issues have been raised, notably with respect to the high turnover of staff, the type of contracts onto which staff are recruited, the late delivery of some winterisation items, and in the lack of conventional monitoring and evaluation activities being undertaken from Ankara. Some of these issues have already been identified and are being rectified; for example, the regional financial reporting issue and the need for more local staff in the procurement department.

7.3.2 Overall, it would appear that the TCO has scaled up emergency sectoral staff, without undertaking the equivalent (necessary) increase in operational support staff. In terms of the overall structure of the response, more staff needed to be dedicated to the South Eastern Turkey field of intervention much earlier than they have been. Staff levels in Gaziantep at the time of the intervention were well below what would be required to match an emergency of the scale that is faced, although efforts are underway to address this. To a certain extent UNICEF's reputation in some areas has been diminished because of this, and this needs to be rectified. Increased programmatic presence and a diversified response that supports both camp and host community refugees will help this process.

7.3.3 Supply activities have increased substantially over the intervention period, and although generally well managed considering the high turnover of staff in this department, efforts need to be made to sure that UNICEF know they are getting the best price and quality for their expenditures. The financial management of payments have been well controlled, the only cause for concern could be the audit report of AFAD construction activities that needs to take place in the near future

according to HACT procedures. The on-going monitoring of actual costs against budgets is well managed and controlled.

7.3.4 Fundraising activities have been carried out by the management team as a unit, whereas perhaps allocating the responsibility to one person may have been beneficial. Communications activities have also gone well with support from both MENARO and Geneva.

7.3.5 The financing of the response in Turkey suffered two significant drawbacks. One was uncertainty and delay in financing the proposed programme budgets, making forward planning difficult. Less reliance on specific donor proposals and greater availability of advance financing would have assisted significantly in this respect. The second main reported problem was that, with funds channelled through the separate emergency section in the TCO, only limited funds were available to explore options for expansion beyond the refugee camps to meet the needs of the majority of refugees living in host communities.

7.4 Recommendations

Recommendation 1A: Overall UNICEF strategy (TCO – near term)

UNICEF should put together an overarching strategy for its response to the refugee crisis, covering short, medium and longer-term objectives.

- This should be complementary to sector-specific strategies for Child Protection, Education and other sectors, providing a common contextual analysis for the sectors (scenarios etc.), identifying areas of synergy between them, and providing a framework for identifying programme and advocacy priorities. The NLG framework could be used as a basis for this.
- The strategy should be consistent with the priorities set out in the CPD.
- The strategy should be based on a stock-take of the current situation including likely future scenarios; perspectives of GoT, international and local agencies; and the aspirations of Syrians themselves. It should be underpinned by a theory of change that properly reflects the variable factors at work.
- The strategy needs to define any new direction for UNICEF inputs and interventions and detail an exit strategy from any components already established which have been overtaken by new needs. Particular discussion is necessary in relation to the creation of new facilities (e.g. TECs, CFSs), or adaptation of existing facilities.
- The strategy should be accompanied by costed action plans and a related fundraising strategy. It should also include a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation plan, such as to test the direct and indirect benefits of interventions.
- This strategy should be designed in collaboration with UNHCR and full consultation with GoT. It is recommended that UNICEF and UNHCR should jointly conduct a short series of consultations with key actors in education and child protection, culminating in a high-level round table discussion. These consultations should in turn be informed by evidence about the wishes and intentions of the refugees themselves, indicating a need for collaboration with NGOs.
- An evolving **advocacy strategy** should be an integral part of both the overall strategy and its sectoral sub-components (below).

- The strategy should be flexible enough to accommodate changes in priorities over time and to allow new opportunities to be seized as they arise.

Recommendation 1B: Education strategy (TCO – near term)

UNICEF should put together a short, medium and longer-term strategy for supporting the education needs of refugees in Turkey.

- The strategy should centre on the need for UNICEF to scale up its support to GoT to tackle the challenge of meeting the education needs of school-age children in host communities.
- It should include a specific component on Syrian teacher compensation
- It should be done jointly with UNHCR based on consultation and needs assessment. UNICEF and UNHCR should jointly assist the Turkish Government to formulate a plan of action on refugee education for discussion with a wider group of stakeholders, making clear their respective support roles.
- It should encompass education outcomes including not just access to quality education within Turkey but consideration of the core skills that would serve Syrians upon their return to Syria as well as for the time period during which they may remain in Turkey.
- All modalities need to be considered for delivery of education services, as there are insufficient places in existing school facilities. Those who have missed out on years of schooling will need options, including distance education, double shifting in existing facilities, catch-up education and other non-formal as well as formal options.
- An inclusive approach is needed, that takes proper account of gender and equity dimensions of the problem. Meeting the needs in both secondary and vocational education is crucial, but rather than implement in this area (apart from perhaps language and life skills), UNICEF should play a convening role.
- Emphasis needs to be put on Turkish language acquisition, maintenance of Arabic (or other language), preservation of identity within the new situation and adaptation of existing Syrian culture to their new Turkish environment, and social cohesion within the local and broader Turkish community.

Recommendation 1C: Child Protection strategy (TCO – near term)

UNICEF should review its current Child Protection strategy in the light of the proposed strategic consultation.

- As a matter of urgency, UNICEF should explore means to expand the coverage of protection and psychosocial support services to non-camp situations. To do this, partnerships with civil society organisations must be strengthened as well as the field presence of the UNICEF child protection staff.
- In particular, it should review options for combined education and CP initiatives in non-camp settings. Specific programme elements should be designed in collaboration between Education and Child Protection, to address the growing social cohesion agenda in refugee hosting communities. The Child Protection and Education sections should also collaborate to address areas of obvious overlapping concern such as the issues of corporal punishment and bullying.
- Options should be explored for continued support to TRCS to develop its capacity and increase the sustainability of the CFS in both camps and host

communities. This might include supporting TRCS to develop an internal pool of trainers on child protection in emergencies and psychosocial support. The age group of youth leaders should be extended up to 24 as suggested in the way forward of the One Year review of the No Lost Generation Initiative.

Recommendation 1D: Health, Nutrition and WASH strategy (TCO, with technical support from the ROs – near term)

UNICEF should include in its overall strategy components relating to refugee health, nutrition and WASH, based on a re-assessment of needs and of UNICEF's comparative advantage in these areas. This may require a primarily advocacy-based approach, and should be done in close collaboration with UNHCR, WHO and other relevant international actors, as well as with national and local government authorities.

Recommendation 2: UNICEF's contribution to Social Cohesion (TCO, with technical support from NY HQ)

Specific programme elements should be designed, in collaboration between Education and Child Protection, to address the growing social cohesion agenda in refugee hosting communities. UNICEF is well placed to spearhead social cohesion and both the education and child protection programmes provide a unique opportunity for this. The establishment of pre-school education for Turkish and Syrian children together proposed by the UNICEF Country office is a good example of concrete social cohesion activity, and UNICEF should collaborate with NGOs to scale this approach.

Recommendation 3: Enhanced Collaboration with UNHCR (TCO and ROs – near/medium term)

UNICEF and UNHCR in Turkey should conclude an LoU outlining their respective roles and proposed areas of collaboration in relation to the refugee crisis. This should be consistent the global LoU between the two agencies and should provide a framework for the joint strategies and action plans in Education and Child Protection proposed above.

Recommendation 4: Child Protection Leadership (TCO – medium term)

UNICEF should seek to increase the priority given to the refugee child protection agenda and should itself take a more leading role on that agenda within the existing Protection Working Groups and Sexual and Gender Based Violence Working Group, at central and field level. Joint advocacy strategies should be designed with UNHCR.

Recommendation 5: NGO Liaison (TCO)

UNICEF should strengthen its role as the link between I/NGOs and GoT in the current climate of increased collaboration with I/NGOs for service delivery and modelling approaches. This will help to establish UNICEF's role in promoting sustainable, system-wide approaches for the future.

Recommendation 6: Field presence and staffing structure (TCO, near term)

As a matter of priority, the TCO should scale up both programmatic and operational support staffing in the Gaziantep/South Eastern Turkey intervention area. The evaluation strongly supports current plans to increase the level and seniority of management in the Gaziantep office, and to out-post province-level education monitors.

The Evaluation team also recommends that TCO section staff are reorganised not along regular or emergency lines, but some other configuration covering both regular and refugee needs.

Recommendation 7: Evaluation & Learning (TCO – medium term, with support from ROs & HQ in disseminating, replicating & adapting best practices)

Best practices in responding to the refugee crisis in Turkey should be properly documented for sharing with others. Suggested areas of best practice are set out in section 6 above. Specifically, evaluation of the use of the Adolescent Empowerment and Participation and CFS methodologies are proposed. Lessons should also be documented concerning the application and interpretation of the CCCs in high middle-income countries where UNICEF's humanitarian response is largely non-operational.

Recommendation 8: Monitoring (TCO – near to medium term)

As a matter of priority, the Ankara-based M&E department should revert to a more standard M&E role supporting field activities through independent monitoring, including post-distribution monitoring. UNICEF should adopt a more rigorous and systematic approach to programme monitoring, with direct feedback to programme implementation. This should include monitoring of quality and continued relevance of programme outputs, as well as target achievement.

Options for sharing lessons on experience in programme and situational monitoring across the wider Syria response should be investigated.

Recommendation 9: Communications (TCO, ROs, HQ – near to medium term)

Building on the “No Lost Generation” initiative, a global awareness campaign highlighting the plight of Syrian refugee children in Turkish host communities should be undertaken, as part of a wider campaign on the situation of child refugees in the region.

The Turkish component of this should be led by the TCO Communications dept., with support from MENARO and CEE-CIS RO communications teams. It should be linked to a fundraising drive to support new host community interventions.

Recommendation 10: Review the application of the CCCs and SSOPs in high middle-income context (HQ)

UNICEF should use the experience of the Turkey refugee crisis response to review the guidance provided on applying the CCCs and SSOPs, particularly with regard to contexts where the humanitarian role played by UNICEF is non-operational or only semi-operational.

Recommendation 11: Review of advance financing mechanisms (ROs, HQ)

Based on a review of the experience from Turkey and elsewhere in the Syria sub-region, UNICEF should review the adequacy of its advance financing mechanisms, and specifically the Emergency Programme Fund, to meet response demands in gradually emergent crises of this kind. Both the scale and efficiency of the mechanisms should be considered, together with the interaction with external mechanisms like the CERF. Comparison should be made with the mechanisms used by other agencies, including UNHCR and WFP.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ See for example the ALNAP CALL portal at www.syrialearning.org
- ² As of 10 April 2015, UNHCR and AFAD data
- ³ Total no of refugees according to RRP6 Turkey chapter inclusive of male and female
- ⁴ As of 10 April 2015, UNHCR and AFAD data
- ⁵ Obtained from SITREP (20/12/2012)
- ⁶ Sourced from SITREP as of 12/12/2013
- ⁷ Obtained from SITREP (20/12/2012)
- ⁸ Sourced from SITREP as of 12/12/2013 (difference between total affected less male no)
- ⁹ Boys between 0-18, from SITREP (20/12/2012) since RRP3 targets age 0-24 for quality education
- ¹⁰ Boys between 0-18, from SITREP (12/12/2012)
- ¹¹ Girls between 0-18, derived from SITREP (20/12/2012) since RRP3 targets age 0-24 for quality education
- ¹² Girls between 0-18 from SITREP (12/12/2013) since RRP3 targets age 0-24 for quality education
- ¹³ COAR 2013 states that 60 per cent of children at school age are enrolled in camps
- ¹⁴ From UNICEF Evaluation data sheet number of boys and girls combined in camps
- ¹⁵ Per cent for boys and girls combined enrolment rate in camps
- ¹⁶ Boys and girls combined rate in non-camps (UNICEF Adjusted Education Strategy Document early 2014)
- ¹⁷ From UNICEF Evaluation data sheet number of boys and girls combined non-camps
- ¹⁸ Per cent for boys and girls combined non-camp
- ¹⁹ The refugees, initially called 'guests' by the Turkish Government, are now referred to as 'people under temporary protection'.
- ²⁰ The 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees does not apply in Turkey to refugees from outside Europe. The issuing of the Temporary Protection Regulation in October 2014 – under the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (April 2013) – formalises the grant of temporary protection to Syrian refugees, protecting them from deportation or *refoulement*, as well as guaranteeing them access to services (the Regulation does not extend to refugees from Iraq). It does, however, in effect prevent Syrians from claiming refugee status and asylum, for as long as the Regulation is in force (see *Implications of the New Turkish Law on Foreigners and International Protection and Regulation no. 29153 on Temporary Protection for Syrians Seeking Protection in Turkey* - Meltem Ineli-Ciger, Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration Vol. 4, No. 2). The same article goes on to note that: *The 2014 Regulation does not guarantee an explicit and unlimited right to work, education, and social assistance for temporary protection beneficiaries. The 2014 Regulation indicates that access to primary and higher levels of education and other language and vocational training, access to labour market and social assistance may be provided to temporary protection beneficiaries... but the Council of Ministers is free to decide whether these rights will be provided or not... Article 29 of the 2014 Regulation makes clear that the Council of Ministers can limit access of temporary protection beneficiaries to certain sectors, professions or geographical areas (UNHCR Operational Update, p.4).*
- ²¹ Only nine have done so at the time of writing
- ²² Latterly shared with UNDP, under the 2015 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan ('3RP')
- ²³ Not including the response inside Syria itself, which has its own planning process, the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan ('SHARP').
- ²⁴ Figures provided by the MENARO office, May 2015.
- ²⁵ As of end June, this figure had risen to 39%
- ²⁶ Feedback from Country Office on earlier draft of this report
- ²⁷ Based on UNICEF Draft Country Programme Document 2011-2015 presented to the Executive Board in June 2010 Ref. E/ICEF/2010/P/L.6
- ²⁸ It did have recent experience of emergency response, in collaboration with the Turkish Government and the TRCS, in response to the Van earthquake of October 2011. See the related evaluation of UNICEF's psychosocial support work [UDA-DMC, 15.12.14].
- ²⁹ UNHCR 2013 *Syria Situation Inter-agency Refugee Contingency Plan – Turkey Period: September - December 2013* lists UNICEF and UNHCR as providers within the Education Sector, but only UNICEF is allocated responsibilities in Basic Needs and Services, Output 4: Quality inclusive education opportunities provided to all children and youth, including children with disabilities.(p.19).
- ³⁰ UNICEF *May 2010 Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action*
- ³¹ A). *United Nations Economic and Social Council 11th July 2013 The UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2014-2017 Realizing the rights of every child, especially the most disadvantaged*
B). *United Nations Economic and Social Council 11th July 2013 Annex: Supporting document to the UNICEF Strategic Plan, 2014-2017 Outcome 5 Education: "P.5.7 Number and percentage of children in humanitarian situations accessing formal or non-formal basic education (including pre-primary schools/early childhood learning spaces);" Output d: Increased country capacity and delivery of services to ensure girls and boys*

access to safe and secure forms of education and critical information for their own well-being in humanitarian situations.

³² These criteria are based on the list of modified DAC criteria used in the ALNAP guide to Evaluating Humanitarian Action (ODI, 2006)

³³ Monitoring Results for Equity Systems. See Briefing Note on Enhanced Programming and Results through Monitoring Results for Equity Systems (MoRES), February 1st 2013, which states that '*MoRES is based on a determinant framework to identify barriers, bottlenecks and enabling factors which either constrain or advance the achievement of desired outcomes for disadvantaged children. MoRES emphasizes strengthening the capacity of government and partners to regularly monitor intermediate outcomes (between outputs and higher level outcomes/impact) to enable more effective programme implementation and timely course corrections in plans and strategies at all levels.*' With regard to humanitarian emergencies, a 2013 UNICEF guidance note ('CCC E-resource: Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (PM) Toolkit') states that '*in major humanitarian situations (e.g. where appeals exceed US \$15 million in emergency funding for UNICEF), country offices will need to prioritize and redirect their monitoring efforts in line with the CCCs. Humanitarian Programme Monitoring (HPM) is the specific adaptation of MoRES for these contexts.*'

³⁴ See further the evaluation matrix in Annex

³⁵ Specifically, the management of UNICEF's Turkey refugee emergency response then fell under the responsibility of the dual Global Emergency Coordinators – which in day-to-day practice meant that the Country Representative was answerable to the Regional Director for MENARO.

³⁶ Evidence for this conclusion came both from direct observation and from interviews with UNHCR, TRCS and other agencies. It is a view corroborated by key donors, including the EU.

³⁷ The relevant sections of the Regional Response Plans cannot be said to constitute a UNICEF strategy, but are more in the nature of a list of priority activities within a more general inter-agency humanitarian strategy.

³⁸ *UN Turkey 2015 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) National Launch UN House, ANKARA March 19, 2015 Summary Notes.*

³⁹ Turkey received 43% of funding requested, being in 4th place of the 6 countries that applied. See further charts in Annex A. This is also indicative of the lower percentage Turkey received in terms of overall funding from the RRP (see section 5.5.4 below).

⁴⁰ By supporting specific government personnel to attend these meetings, accompanied by UNICEF senior staff from TCO.

⁴¹ *M. Murat Erdoğan November 2014 Syrians in Turkey Social Acceptance and Integration Research. Executive Summary and Report. The Hacettepe University Migration and Politics Research Centre*

⁴² *Rogers, P. (2014). Theory of Change, Methodological Briefs: Impact Evaluation 2, UNICEF Office of Research, Florence.*

⁴³ The Concept Note was developed in November 2012, the proposal was approved on 21-03-2013

⁴⁴ The title of the proposal "Increasing Resilience of Syrian Children under Temporary Protection in Turkey" is revealing of the underlying UNICEF strategy. On the one hand, it qualifies the intervention in psychosocial terms (the term "resilience" originates in the psychosocial sector in reference to individuals, and has been in recent years extended to families and communities). On the other hand it also anticipates the forward-looking approach to strengthening existing systems in the two sectors of the project.

⁴⁵ An example was the development of a joint Education and Child Protection assessment package, presented to AFAD and relevant Ministries in February 2012.

⁴⁶ Documentary evidence concerning this decision is scarce. Interviews with TCO staff suggest that the change was made by the previous Country Representative on pragmatic grounds, including increased management efficiency.

⁴⁷ Again, seemingly on grounds of management efficiency. See UNICEF, 2011 "Organisation Chart" and UNICEF, 2014 "Organisation Chart pre PBR"

⁴⁸ An illustration of that is the fact that MoFSP was not included in UNICEF's press release about the EU Emergency Project. This created resentment on the side of MoFSP and efforts from the CP Regular Programming were needed to normalize the relations (UNICEF, 2013 Minutes of the Emergency Meetings 03-04-2013)

⁴⁹ Interviews with UNICEF staff in Ankara, Amman and Geneva reported a decreasing involvement in the strategic thinking on the emergency response of the regular Child Protection staff in Ankara and Child Protection Advisor in CEE-CIS Regional Office, with an increase in involvement of the MENA Regional Office.

⁵⁰ Interview with UNICEF staff in Ankara

⁵¹ UNICEF 2014 Emergency Work-plan

⁵² UNICEF MoFSP, 2014 "Two Year Rolling Workplan (RWP) with Ministry of Family and Social Policy – Child Services General Directorate.

⁵³ The 'Ways Forward' section of the One Year Report on NLG goes some way to doing this, but lacks specificity with regard to Turkey.

⁵⁴ Documentation and interviews with education actors inside and outside UNICEF

⁵⁵ Interviews with key government personnel, UNICEF and others

⁵⁶ Interviews with Save the Children and Concern. UNHCR (Ankara) also commended some of these interventions, particularly those under the Management of Education personnel.

⁵⁷ These are discussed more fully in Section 3 (Performance)

⁵⁸ Complaints from education managers in the Provinces that any available data was not readily shared are contained in the summary of Provincial meetings.

⁵⁹ *Interviews with key education staff.* For the debate about this, see later in the section and Section 4: Working with Others.

⁶⁰ UNICEF Turkey *Providing Educational Opportunities to Syrian Children and Youth in Turkey.* Source of statistics: UNHCR External Update – March 2015

⁶¹ *UNICEF COAR 2014.* This can only be an estimate because the population outside camps is not known. Of the 1.6 million it is estimated that there are 576,000 school-aged children (6-17 years) –with 65,000 in schools in camps and 45,000 in host communities, and a further 7,500 in Turkish schools *Regional refugee and resilience Plan 2015-2016 in response to the Syrian Crisis.*

⁶² Reflected in RRP revision September 2012, however UN not given permission until July 2013 although the possibility is reflected in March 2013

⁶³ Republic Of Turkey Ministry Of National Education General Directorate Of Basic Education Educational Services for Foreign Nationals in Turkey 2014

⁶⁴ Respondents answered this question in a variety of ways: “[the strategy] is reflected in the RRP”, “UNICEF does not need a strategy if GoT has one”, consultant reports outlining a strategy or an approach to develop one; internal strategy notes with limited documentation of a Theory of Change and possible alternative routes to achieving outcomes.

⁶⁵ These include a specific strategy for responding to the influx from Kobane in late 2014: *UNICEF Turkey (021214.) UNICEF's response Strategy to Recent Influx. Internal Document*

⁶⁶ *MoNE August 2014 (with UNICEF support) Management Strategy for Education Personnel providing services to Syrian Children Under Temporary Protection in Turkey Section V: Teacher Compensation.*

⁶⁷ *Joint UNHCR/UNICEF Education Mission Turkey Kilis and Islahiye Camps October 8-9 2012 Report and Recommendations* Two joint education missions between UNICEF and UNHCR were carried out in 2012, in April and October. Documentation has only been made available following the October mission to Kilis and Islahiye camps. The report recommended a needs assessment.

⁶⁸ *UNICEF February 2013. Joint Education/Protection Rapid Assessment of the Situation of Children in Camps at the Turkish Border with Syria.* This tool is mentioned in several documents.

⁶⁹ For example: IMC/ASAM Rapid Needs Assessment of Gaziantep Based Syrian Refugees, 2014, AFAD Needs Assessment 2013. Stephanie Dorman/YUVA September 2014 Educational Needs Assessment for Urban Syrian Refugees in Turkey. It is hoped that YOBIS will provide some on-going information to satisfy on-going needs Assessment of those in education facilities

⁷⁰ For example Amnesty International

⁷¹ *One example is in UNICEF: 2014 Education Response Strategy Syria Emergency 2014 (popularly known inside TCO as "Adjusted Education Strategy early 2014)*

⁷² Confirmed by multiple sources (interviews and documentary review)

⁷³ Confirmed by several interviews in the Turkey Country Office and MENA Regional Office

⁷⁴ UNICEF, UNHCR, Mercy Corps, Save the Children and World Vision, 07.01.2014 "No Lost Generation" strategy

⁷⁵ As in many other contexts, Child Protection is extremely sensitive in Turkey. The need of protecting children is understood as an implicit allegation of existing threats in the society that the State is not able to address. For that reason in many cases Child Protection is referred to merely as Psycho-social Support which has been found a less threatening way to channel concerns for the child wellbeing.

⁷⁶ Done in parallel with UNHCR although with different modalities and reciprocal perceptions (source interviews with UNHCR).

⁷⁷ Separation between Education and Child Protection in Emergency programming may have unintentionally reinforced the Government of Turkey's perception that Child Protection was not a priority.

⁷⁸ In an interview with AFAD in Ankara UNICEF has been reported “too much insisting” on child protection since the very first day of the crisis.

⁷⁹ The main sets of international standards and best practices were translated into Turkish, as follows:

- Minimum Standards for Child Protection in Humanitarian Action (CPWG, 246 pages),
- Interagency Guiding Principles on Unaccompanied and Separated Children (ICRC, UNHCR, UNICEF, Save the Children, IRC, 72 pages)
- Caring for Child Survivors of Sexual Abuse (UNICEF, IRC, 250 pages)
- Guidelines for Child Friendly Spaces in Emergencies (15 pages) – Adapted

In addition to that a 5 day training programme has been developed and carried out (GSM, 2014 CPiE Training Final Report)

⁸⁰ AFAD-UNICEF, 02-03-2015 Working Plan on Psychosocial Support

⁸¹ Source: interview with UNICEF Staff in Ankara and Geneva.

⁸² Source: interview with CFS Youth Workers Cevdetiye camp, Osmaniye Province

⁸³ Difficulties in reaching out the children population, distrust from parents, difficulties in engaging Youth Volunteers, and limited attendance of children due to protection concerns on the way to the CFS especially for girls have been reported as challenges in CFS operating urban areas in several interviews with staff working in CFSs in Ankara, Gaziantep and Saliurfa. However, operating the CFS within a multiservice centre

model as in the IMC-ASSAM and TRCS cases, was reported as a way to mitigate some of these difficulties, especially those relating to building trust.

⁸⁴ Document review, interviews and focus group discussions confirmed that there is a widespread sense of insecurity for women and children living in host communities. Harassment on the street has been reported as a serious concern especially for girls. The most common protection strategy to the threat at family level is restricting girls to the home.

⁸⁵ As described in many reports (IMC - ASAM 2014 "Rapid Needs Assessment of Gaziantep Based Syrian Refugees" and Concern Worldwide - Mavikalem, 2013 "Needs Assessment Report of Syrian Non-Camp Refugees in Sanliurfa/Turkey") on the beginning of the crisis education was not perceived as a priority for the Syrian families upon the conviction that their displacement was going to be short term. Gradually, such perception changed but in non-camp situation other factors such as lack of school buildings, transportation and increasing protection concerns along the route to school still challenge the enrolment/attendance to school. Particularly the protection concerns along the route were mentioned in different focus group discussions with Syrian teachers and Syrian women in Salinurfa.

⁸⁶ UNICEF Country Office, 2011, 2012, 2013 Annual Reports and UNICEF, 2013 Turkey Country Programme 2011-15 Mid-Term Review Report

⁸⁷ Confirmed by multiple sources: focus group discussions with Youth Volunteers in Nizip, interviews with TRCS staff in Nizip, Sanliurfa and Osmaniye

⁸⁸ It should be noted that existing data about immunization coverage among Syrian refugees is very limited and out-dated.

⁸⁹ Interviews, CEE-CIS RO

⁹⁰ This is uncertain: the results of the assessment have yet to be released, and the Ministry of Interior has recently issued a new regulation prohibiting any data collection on Syrians under temporary protection without prior approval from relevant Ministries [ref]

⁹¹ UNHCR Geneva 20 November (no year) UNHCR Refugee Coordination Model : Adaptation of UNHCR's Refugee Coordination in the Context of the Transformative Agenda.

⁹² See minutes of meetings: *Education Working Group Minutes 16.01.2014, almost monthly until 05.03.2015*

⁹³ Based on direct observation of a meeting of the Group on [date]. See further Section 4 below.

⁹⁴ MONE Regulation, September 2014

⁹⁵ Conducted In 2013 for the 2013/14 school year

⁹⁶ The team was taken by AFAD to the residential areas in one camp and witnessed the previous site of the school, in very cramped conditions, which now houses a pre-school,

⁹⁷ *Education Working group Meeting Notes 12/01/2015* also Nurten Yilmaz, *op.cit., Notes on visit to Islaiye camp, for example.*

⁹⁸ Internal correspondence in UNICEF 25th April 2015

⁹⁹ UNICEF/UNHCR 21 May 2015 Concept note – Co-ordinated response to addressing violence in TECs

¹⁰⁰ *Interview notes*

¹⁰¹ Feedback from TCO on earlier draft

¹⁰² Interviews with UNICEF and UNHCR staff in Turkey. In feedback on the draft of this report, TCO staff noted: *In 2015 the country office has made scaling up of non-formal/informal educational opportunities and life skills a priority, carrying out assessments of over 10 possible non-governmental partners. Via such new partnerships as of July 2015 UNICEF is supporting the establishment of 3 new community centers in Gaziantep; 1 in Şanlıurfa and 1 in Mardin which will offer a set of comprehensive life skills, including critical language classes, psychosocial services and peer-to-peer support for out-of-school adolescents and youth. 52,500 children and adolescents are expected to benefit from these programs over the next 12 months. In Şanlıurfa, 2 new safe spaces for adolescent girls will address their specific gender-related needs through specialized multi-sectoral support services.*

¹⁰³ For data on reported achievement against targets for UNICEF interventions under the RRP, see Annex A

¹⁰⁴ Irrespective of who did the construction AFAD needed to approve school designs, allocate the land and give necessary permissions.

¹⁰⁵ Interviews, Ankara

¹⁰⁶ *UNICEF internal note n.d. (probably February 2015) "Foreign Education Management System" (YOBIS) Information Note.*

¹⁰⁷ More youth are out of school in host communities, and indications are that more girls than boys, (*Mercy Corps, June 2014. Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish Adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to Support Personal Resilience: Report*), but dropout is also present inside the camps as young people, especially males, leave school to seek work.

¹⁰⁸ Nurten Yilmaz, *UNICEF HQ Mission Report Inclusive Child Protection Interventions In The Syrian Response UNICEF Turkey Country Office, reports* "The majority of field colleagues reported that children with disabilities, and in particular children with intellectual disabilities do not attend school due to the inaccessibility of school infrastructure, bias, lack of inclusive curriculum and awareness among school personnel."

¹⁰⁹ *Education Working group Meeting Notes 12/01/2015*

¹¹⁰ For example *Mercy Corps, op.cit.*

¹¹¹ In one GoT double shift school visited by the Evaluation team, a small group of children some of whom could not hear and others who could not speak, were being taught by Syrian teachers through sign language as well as books. These children reported that this was the first time they had had an opportunity to go to school, so it is possible.

¹¹² See for example, *Mercy Corps, June 2014. Understanding the needs of Syrian and Turkish Adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey, to Support Personal Resilience: Report.*

¹¹³ UNICEF interviews, Ankara

¹¹⁴ This is one of several apparent shortfalls in the coordination of the humanitarian response. Sectorial working groups were considered by many of those consulted to be essentially venues for sharing information, with only limited effectiveness in coordinating strategy and programme responses. This is considered further in section 4 below.

¹¹⁵ The evaluation acknowledges that at the time of the field mission further efforts to this end were already planned (UNICEF- AFAD 2015, Working Plan on Psychosocial Support; UNICEF Proposed strategy paper to MoFSP; UN Regional Refugee and resilience Plan 2015-2016)

¹¹⁶ Unaccompanied and separated Syrian children were initially referred by AFAD to the State Residential Care System as the Turkish children. Since July 2014 a pilot residential care unit was built in Adana camp offering an institutionalised type of care. UNICEF strongly advocated towards AFAD and MoFSP for the development of alternative care system (family-based care) and promoted a study visit to Jordan. MoFSP, AFAD, UNICEF and UNHCR participated in the visit. However, no change in the GoT policy on this issue has been demonstrated so far.

On March 2015 UNICEF submitted a proposal to ECHO specifically targeting unaccompanied minors, thus showing full accountability on the issue.

¹¹⁷ Regional Response Plan 2012 (RRP3), 2013 (RRP 4 and 5), 2014 (RRP6)

¹¹⁸ For data on reported achievement against targets for UNICEF interventions, see Annex A

¹¹⁹ The Concept Note was developed in November 2012, the proposal was approved on 21-03-2013

¹²⁰ Slight delay in the opening of CFS in camps (3 months) was due a relatively lengthy process of setting up the project Steering Committee composed by UNICEF, AFAD, MoNE and TRCS, and formalising the Memorandum of Understanding with TRCS (UNICEF, 2013 March –August Minutes of the Emergency meetings). Further minor delays were created by the difficulties in recruiting Arabic speaking Youth Workers (first CFS opened 3 months later than planned). Occasional exceptions of very late opening also exist (e.g. Viransehir camp and Nusaybin camp). See UNICEF, 2013-2014 Evaluation location selection criteria - CP inputs.xlsx

¹²¹ UNICEF-IMC, 2014, Simplified PCA, 10-07-2014 included 2 CFS one in Gaziantep and one in Istanbul. Only in 2015 a CFS in Sanliurfa was opened in partnership with TRCS.

¹²² Confirmed by multiple sources (interviews with AFAD, TRCS, MoFSP, IMC, ASAM and UNICE staff in Ankara among others and documentary evidences).

¹²³ UNICEF, 2015 “Unicef programming as part of the 3RP protection sector”

¹²⁴ Topics of the training were: on classroom management and techniques, the impact of war on children and how to address it, lesson planning, and mentoring

¹²⁵ Targets for the period under evaluation differ in the way they are calculated from year to year and are not available for all years. In addition, ways of calculating the number of children benefitting directly and indirectly for the UNICEF Child Protection response are not consistent across the years and no disaggregated data are available. The online monitoring system was launched only in 2014.

¹²⁶ UNICEF 2013-2015 Quarterly reports to EU

¹²⁷ As one of the outcomes of the National Child Congress (2000) and upon the request of children, Provincial Child Rights Committees were established in 81 provinces in Turkey in collaboration with Social Services Child Protection Agency (currently Ministry of Family and Social Services) as the official coordinator of CRC implementation in Turkey. Since that time, children (12-18) have been organising several activities at the local level to promote child rights.

¹²⁸ 15th Children's Forum - Final Report - Nov 2014

¹²⁹ Regional Response Plan 2012 (RRP 3), 2013 (RRP5), 2014 (RRP6), Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP)

¹³⁰ No needs assessment has been authorised by the Government of Turkey so far.

¹³¹ Confirmed by multiple sources. Among others UNICEF, 2013, 2014, 2015 inputs to the Regional Planning; Concern World Wide, 2013, Needs Assessment Report of HC Refugees in Sanliurfa -, IMC - ASAM 2014” Rapid Needs Assessment of Gaziantep Based Syrian Refugees”; UN 2014 Common Country Assessment; 2014 AFAD Survey of Syrian Women in Turkey,

¹³² EU Quarterly Report, March 2015; Excel File Entitled “Data CFSs” provided by the TCO.

¹³³ Percentage in line with the international experience, IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support and WHO statistics.

¹³⁴ Meetings of both the Education Working Group and the general inter-agency coordination group were attended in Gaziantep, March 2015

¹³⁵ The situation was still raw in the minds of MoNE, who more than once complained about the issue to the evaluation team. To some extent this is also an issue between MoNE and AFAD. MoNE is now in charge of the construction programme (*Education Working Group Minutes 12. 01.15*) and UNICEF has an MOU with MoNE since September 2013.

¹³⁶ The evaluation team was told about parallel approaches by UNICEF over certain issues – to AFAD and MoNE separately – without sufficient coordination on the content of the message.

¹³⁷ Capacity building is now included in the new PCA with TRCS.

¹³⁸ In the camp schools, UNICEF supplies materials while UNHCR supplies teaching materials, by agreement. IOM also has some involvement in education, supporting school transportation.

¹³⁹ From interviews with UNHCR staff, they believe UNICEF is setting up a parallel system of education by supporting the adjusted Syrian Curriculum in Arabic, and setting up Temporary Education Centres even in host communities, while UNHCR promotes integration of children in the Turkish education system. UNICEF, on the other hand, believes in making all opportunities available to children to learn and is not wedded to one path or the other (*UNICEF Regional office central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States February 2015 Position paper Education of Syrian Refugees in Turkey*). This argument became polarised and became the face of the tensions between the two agencies.

¹⁴⁰ A). *UNHCR-UNICEF January 2015 Partnership Guidance Package for field-level collaboration*; B). *January 2015 UNICEF - UNHCR COOPERATION IN REFUGEE OPERATIONS Letter of Understanding (LoU) Annex B: Guidance for Technical Areas: for the development of a country work plan and joint plan of action.*

¹⁴¹ This point was frequently made in interviews both with Government authorities and civil society.

¹⁴² NGOs have not been permitted to work in the refugee camps.

¹⁴³ UNICEF 2014 “programmatically need for the partnership with IMC”

¹⁴⁴ UNICEF globally coordinates the Education Cluster with Save the Children and leads many in-country GPE partnerships. That experience it brings to a situation like this and because of its presence on the ground is a natural leader for the sector. This is complemented by the experience of UNHCR in refugee education

¹⁴⁵ UNICEF facilitated a meeting in Gaziantep between AFAD and MoE in September 2013, ahead of the establishment of the EWG in early 2014. This includes in its membership: AFAD, MoNE, UNICEF, UNHCR, IOM and Türkiye Diyanet Foundation. From the first meeting in 2015, TRCS has been included. *Education Working Group Minutes 16.01.2014, almost monthly until 05.03.2015*

¹⁴⁶ GoT requested UNICEF to support them in this and 2 meetings, on 27 November 2013, UNICEF organized the first information-sharing meeting with NGOs in Sanliurfa, at the request of MoNE to UNICEF to liaise with NGOs, and on 7 February 2014 UNICEF supported MoNE to hold a more comprehensive, nation-wide education information sharing meeting with NGOs in Gaziantep. *UNICEF Turkey: November 2013-30 January 2015. Increased Access to Inclusive Quality Emergency Education and basic Health Services for Syrian Children living in Host Communities in Turkey. Progress Report - UK AID.*

¹⁴⁷ The evaluation recognizes that steps are being taken to remedy this situation, including the recruitment of education field assistants to be located in the affected Provinces.

¹⁴⁸ The person originally identified as successor was diverted to fill the Representative post in Damascus.

¹⁴⁹ There have been more issues with respect to the recruitment of non-emergency staff.

¹⁵⁰ The number of L3 emergencies on-going worldwide compounded this issue as surge staff were not easy to find.

¹⁵¹ Interviews conducted in camps in Killis.

¹⁵² Due to the lack of a supervising construction engineer between March and May 2015

¹⁵³ A decision to rectify this was made as a part of the 2014 PBR, but this is yet to be acted upon (June 2015).

¹⁵⁴ Ten staff recruited in 2013 took over 120 days to recruit.

¹⁵⁵ UNICEF Key Performance Indicator

¹⁵⁶ Refugee numbers started to rise significantly in the 2nd Qtr. of 2013.

¹⁵⁷ Items were delivered in January/February 2014, and in February 2015

¹⁵⁸ The November 2014 PBR proposes changing these positions to FTs.

¹⁵⁹ With an expanded team and increased activities expected in Gaziantep the need for a regular translator can only increase.

¹⁶⁰ Feedback on draft report from TCO

¹⁶¹ Although some funds were accessed from the UNICEF Emergency Programme Fund in 2012, these were not on a scale to allow significant scale up. Nor was the scale of CERF funds that were allocated to Turkey.

¹⁶² USD 325,280 was received at the end of 2012, and a further USD 840,000 was received in 2015.

¹⁶³ Donor interviews, Ankara

¹⁶⁴ See ‘No Lost Generation Initiative – One Year report (September 2014) at <http://childrenofsyria.info/download/5750/>

¹⁶⁵ Three in particular deserve mention: 1. Osman Bahadır Dinçer, Vittoria Federici, Elizabeth Ferris, Sema Karaca, Kemal Kirişçi, And Elif Özmenek Çarmıklı, 2013 *Turkey And Syrian Refugees: The Limits Of Hospitality*; 2. Kemal Kirişçi, 2014 *Syrian refugees and Turkey's challenges: Going beyond hospitality*; 3. Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center For Middle Eastern Strategic Studies), 2015 *Effects Of The Syrian Refugees On Turkey*

¹⁶⁶ Interviews, Gaziantep

¹⁶⁷ UNHCR predicts that refugees in a crisis like this will spend at least 5 years in a new host country [ref]

¹⁶⁸ AFAD, *Syrian Refugees in Turkey –Field Survey Results 2013*, reports that 56% in camps and 63% in host communities would go back when the conflict ends, and 25% of those in camps and 15% of those in host communities would go back when the regime changed and only a small number of Syrians would stay in Turkey 5 % of those in the camps and 8 % of those out of the camps.–but that was 2013, and two years on,

one wonders what the results would be now. Refer also to *Mercy Corps June 2014 Understanding the needs of Syrians and Turkish adolescents in Gaziantep, Turkey to support resilience*

¹⁶⁹ Interview with UNHCR in Ankara

¹⁷⁰ According to Article 16 of Syria's personal status law, the age of marriage in Syria is 18 for males and 17 for females, with an exception in Article 18 to decrease the age of the girl to 13 years old if three conditions are met: puberty, the approval of a judge, and the consent of a guardian, father or grandfather (IRC 2014 "Are we listening?")

¹⁷¹ Including street-living children and street-working children