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Real-Time Response Review – DEC programme for Cyclone Idai

Zimbabwe country report

Key Aid Consulting

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Report authors

Blessing Mutsaka, Anne Dlugosz, Basileke Gift Kanike, Thandie Harris-Sapp, Helene Juillard.

Under the overall technical guidance and coordination of Katy Bobin, DEC MEAL Manager.

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Contribution

The authors would like to thank all DEC and DEC partners, team members, as well as crisis affected households who contributed to the success of the review by sharing their views and insights. A special thanks go to the DEC Secretariat for their continuous support throughout the review process.

Collaboration

The DEC and the Humanitarian Coalition (HC) in Canada have made an ongoing commitment to collaborate, where appropriate, when undertaking such reviews due to a significant overlap in membership.¹ In this instance, Care, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Oxfam, Plan International and Save the Children are shared DEC/HC responders, along with a number of local/ national partners. Whilst it was not considered necessary for the Humanitarian Coalition programmes to be assessed separately, the head office in Canada actively contributed at inception phase, sent a senior representative to accompany field work in Zimbabwe, and participated in the learning workshops in both Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The Humanitarian Coalition has also committed to translate the report into French language and proactively support with dissemination.

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¹ <https://www.humanitariancoalition.ca>

Executive summary

Cyclone Idai hit eastern Zimbabwe with heavy rains and strong winds on 17 March 2019.² The cyclone caused riverine and flash flooding with subsequent deaths. It destroyed infrastructure; washed away roads and bridges, damaged water points and water reticulation systems as well as schools. Cyclone Idai also disrupted livelihoods and trade; it swept away fields, granaries, and damaged irrigation schemes.

The Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) estimates that 270,000 people were affected by the cyclone and 10,000 houses were destroyed. 15,270 people were still displaced by the cyclone as of the end of June 2019.

The total DEC appeal funds allocated to Zimbabwe for Phase One of a DEC response is 2,404,176 GBP, out of a total of 14,660,429 GBP for the three countries (Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe).³ The greatest sectoral share of the Zimbabwe funding was in WASH (31%) followed by Food (13%) and nutrition (9%).

Seven DEC members have responded to the cyclone in Zimbabwe, which are: World Vision, OXFAM, Action Aid, CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development), Save the Children, Christian Aid and Age International. The seven members aim to support a cumulative 10,451 households in Phase One of the response. DEC members are responding in Chipinge, Chimanimani and Buhera districts. The seven DEC members are working in the following sectors: Livelihoods, WASH, Health, NFI, Shelter, Education, Nutrition, Protection and Food Security.

A real-time review (RTR) was commissioned by the DEC with the purpose of collecting reflection and learning in a participatory manner as the project is being implemented, which will be used to make program changes in different areas of the response, during the final months of Phase One implementation as well as to the design of Phase Two activities. Key informants and FGD participants as well as from participants in the second country workshop at the end of fieldwork participated in the review by making recommendations, giving feedback on the preliminary findings, identifying best practices, and sharing lessons learned.

Relevance and appropriateness of the response

DEC members targeted the most affected districts and wards of the country in Chimanimani and Chipinge. DEC members targeted these districts with emergency lifesaving support which was in line with the needs and requirements of affected communities. FGDs and KIIs confirmed the relevance and appropriateness of DEC member interventions. However, DEC members' responses could not address all of the community needs. The review notes large gaps in the

² OCHA SITREP, June 2019

³ DEC. "Cyclone Idai Appeal Consolidated Finance – Phase 1 Plans," n.d.

coverage of food aid assistance, psychosocial support, and health care. Gaps were mainly due to the enormous needs that the cyclone created.

DEC members' responses catered for needs of special population groups (children under the age of five, school going children, the elderly, and women of reproductive age, pregnant and lactating mothers). Widows and grandmothers caring for school-going children noted they would have challenges paying for school fees as many lost their livelihoods and family members who were the household breadwinners.

The DEC members' Phase One response timelines are in line with the seasonal calendar of the affected area. The DEC response covered the period just before and during the winter season. Affected households were assisted with temporary shelters, blankets and dignity kits. DEC members' Phase Two response will, however, need to start responding to emerging needs around recovery and the planting season.

DEC members' activities were able to adapt to the changing operating environment adequately. This is in part due to DEC flexible funding rules that enable activities to adjust to changing needs and circumstances.

Effectiveness in achieving intended outcomes

Overall, DEC members felt their activities were on track to achieve intended outcomes. However, some sectoral responses fall short of meeting the community's needs, especially for food and shelter.

KIs with health workers revealed that they were satisfied with the support they received in hygiene kits and promotion, nutrition monitoring and supplementary food. At both health centres visited, the nurses pointed out that they did not see a significant spike in diarrhoea cases as may have been expected.

In the education sector, DEC members are working on more permanent rehabilitation of schools, but in the interim period, they provided temporary classrooms (under non-DEC funding).

The effectiveness of interventions in the shelter sector was more difficult to ascertain, as DEC members with shelter activities had to revise their plans after the GoZ issued a directive for agencies to stop providing temporary shelter. All agencies are directed to work on more permanent shelters.

Of all services provided by DEC members, they mentioned food aid as the service that affected communities thought was inadequate. Affected communities felt that agencies were targeting fewer people than those in need and for a shorter period.

Both affected communities and DEC members' staff felt that psychosocial support services were inadequate given the scale of the disaster. DEC member staff thought that the service was simply not enough because of the sheer number of people who required it versus the number of service providers.

In FGDs, communities appreciated livelihoods training and indicated that it was enabling them to start thinking about recovery. The same communities, however, thought the training would be more effective with more widespread and timely distribution of agricultural inputs.

Accountability to affected population

DEC members put in place a variety of thorough accountability mechanisms across the project cycle. Communities felt consulted on their needs and responses were in line with humanitarian standards. Affected communities were knowledgeable of the various selection criteria used by DEC members across sectors.

Communities also knew the project feedback mechanisms. Confidential ways of giving feedback were the most preferred. Several community members had reservations with feedback mechanisms that involve interfacing directly with other community members, for fear of reprisals.

Participants across all focus group discussions (FGDs) and community level key informant interviews (KIs) strongly and consistently stated that they had not heard or seen any examples or even rumours of fraud, mismanagement, corruption, sexual exploitation or assault in the agency's cyclone response in their communities. Participants pointed out that they knew how to respond if they did come across such negative activities.

Sustainability and connectedness of the response

The review noted that the response considered sustainability issues. The response factored in sustainability through community capacity building and training, conducting assessments for the longer-term and recovery needs, inculcating a sense of ownership within communities and working with existing community groups such as school development associations and community health clubs. DEC members worked on community assets that communities will continue using after the cyclone response. Longer-term assets that DEC members supported include springs, water systems at clinics, school classroom books and latrines.

These approaches take into consideration existing community capacities and build future capacities.

Coordination and complementarity

The GoZ instituted the main coordination bodies at national, provincial and district levels. Coordination worked well with the District Administrators (DAs) allocating operational districts to different agencies. DEC members attended coordination forums regularly and submitted weekly and monthly reports within the response clusters. There was no DEC-specific coordination forum for member agencies, but this was not necessary since members are part of various other coordination fora.

Conclusion

A cyclone response presents unique challenges: physical access is difficult in the first few days and communication is made difficult by infrastructure destruction. Overall, DEC members' response to the Cyclone Idai can be considered a success, in so far that it provided a flexible source of funds that allowed members to adapt their responses quickly to changing circumstances, addressed those needs the targeted communities' expressed as being the most relevant, and made efforts to build accountability to affected populations into the response.

In Zimbabwe, the scale of the disaster seems to have been more significant than the GoZ and other humanitarian actors initially anticipated. It, therefore, stresses the importance of preparedness from DEC members for future disasters. Prior knowledge and experience working in disaster-prone areas are assets that DEC members can build upon. With a high likelihood of another disaster (drought or floods), preparing would help strengthen the gains made in this response and potentially protect people from the worst effects of another disaster.

Recommendations

1. Expand and extend food aid coverage. Food distributions need to stretch beyond the current three months as households will only be able to recover after the next harvests around March 2020.
2. Advocate with the Government of Zimbabwe for infrastructure reconstruction. Roads and bridges are pivotal for the livelihoods of the affected communities.
3. Focus Phase Two livelihood response on interventions that support the timely recovery of pre-existing livelihood activities. This could entail agricultural input support schemes and also market assessments of how key value chains were affected by the cyclone.
4. Strengthen mobile or community health delivery structures through continuous training and provision of supplies.
5. Make sure the needs of older persons (OP) are considered and addressed.
6. Collaborate more intentionally among DEC members to foster more complementarity between their interventions through greater collaboration at the project design phase.
7. Plan early for possibilities of limited access to some affected communities during the upcoming rainy season. Also, consider approaches that do not need the physical presence of DEC members' officers on the ground.
8. Employ at least one confidential feedback mechanism such as toll-free numbers or suggestion boxes.

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List of acronyms

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
AREX	Agricultural Research and Extension
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standards
CPU	Civil Protection Unit
DA	District Administrator
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
HC	Humanitarian Coalition
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
KII	Key Informant Interview
NFI	Non-Food Item
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OP	Older Persons
PESA	Prevention of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
ToR	Terms of Reference
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WATSAN	Water and Sanitation
ZIMCODD	Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
ZIMVAC	Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

I. Introduction

I.1. Humanitarian context in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe is emerging from 40 years of Robert Mugabe's presidency, which severely weakened the country's economy. In recent years, acute foreign currency shortages hampered market functionality, causing havoc with the demand and supply of essential commodities.⁴

Zimbabwe is prone to natural disasters, especially floods and drought. Moreover, the succession of extreme weather conditions in the past decade has eroded household capacity to cope with shocks. This was especially the case with the 2015-17 drought, driven by one of the strongest El Niño events of the last three decades. This drought left around 30% of the overall population food insecure.⁵

Tropical Cyclone Idai made landfall during the night of 14 to 15 March 2019 near Beira City, Mozambique. The cyclone then continued across land as a tropical storm, hitting eastern Zimbabwe with heavy rains and strong winds on 17 March 2019.⁶ In Zimbabwe, the cyclone struck the provinces of Manicaland, Masvingo and Mashonaland. Manicaland Province was the most severely affected, and the districts of Chipinge and Chimanimani were the most affected with Buhera and Bikita districts also suffering some effects of the cyclone.⁷

In Chimanimani and Chipinge, the cyclone caused riverine and flash flooding leading to deaths, destruction of livelihoods, and properties. Complete settlements were destroyed at Coppa Township in Chimanimani District and houses flattened by mudslides in Ngangu township of Chimanimani. Settlements and infrastructure along the Nyahode River, which runs along eastern Chimanimani into Mozambique, were particularly devastated.⁸ Other major rivers such as the Umvumvumu, which runs across Chimanimani, also flooded, causing subsequent extensive damage to infrastructures such as roads, bridges, houses and irrigation schemes.⁹

Figure 1 below shows an aerial view comparing the Nyahode River before and after the cyclone. The picture illustrates the devastating effects the flooding and rockfalls had on Coppa Township in Chimanimani district which has come to symbolise the damage caused by the cyclone in Zimbabwe.

⁴ World Bank, October 2018

⁵ Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2016-2017 Drought Appeal

⁶ OCHA SITREP, June 2019

⁷ GoZ Tropical cyclone international humanitarian assistance appeal, 2019


⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.



Cyclone Idai’s human toll and devastating effects on households in Zimbabwe, especially in Manicaland Province, are detailed further below.

Figure 2: Sectoral Impacts of cyclone Idai in Zimbabwe (sources GOZ, UNICEF, OCHA, primary data collection)

Food Security and Nutrition 

- Washed away fields
- Destroyed crops at maturation stage
- Damaged fruit trees
- Washed away food stocks
- Washed away livestock
- Destruction of agricultural infrastructure

Shelter 

- Estimated 10,000 houses completely destroyed
- Many other houses damaged
- Families lost household property

Education 

- 30,000 learners impacted
- Classroom blocks destroyed
- Teachers’ houses destroyed
- Some affected schools closed for close to two months
- 54 classrooms from 114 schools have been affected by the floods
- Learning materials destroyed
- 48 per cent of the affected population is under 18 years of age

WASH 

- Water sources destroyed
- Latrines collapsed
- Access to clean water cut

Protection 

- Estimated 60,000 children are in need of immediate protection services
- 100,000 children are in need of welfare and civil registration services

¹⁰ Spot 7 and Pleiades imagery: Airbus/Sertit/CNES, retrieved from BBC World News

Figure 3 Human costs Cyclone Idai in Zimbabwe as of June 2019 (sources GoZ, OCHA)


COUNTING THE HUMAN COST



Prior to Cyclone Idai, the country was already dealing with the consequences of a drought; the UN funding appeal (as of June 2019) shows unmet needs created by Cyclone Idai and the drought. The cyclone exacerbated an already precarious situation, with food assistance as the most prioritised, as well as funded, humanitarian need.

Figure 4: United Nations Zimbabwe Humanitarian Assistance Appeal (Source: UN, 2019)

FUNDING OVERVIEW BY CLUSTER




In its own Cyclone Idai appeal, the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) prioritised the food security and nutrition sectors. This is because Zimbabwe has long been plagued by food insecurity. Long before Cyclone Idai, most of the areas that were later affected by the cyclone were in a food security crisis, classified as a “Phase Three” food security crisis under the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) system.¹¹

¹¹ FEWSNET, 2019

I.2. Humanitarian response provided by DEC members

The total DEC appeal funds allocated to Zimbabwe for the Phase One of the response is 2,404,176 GBP, out of a total of 14,660,429 GBP for the three countries.¹² The highest sectoral share of the Zimbabwe funding was in WASH (31%) followed by food (13%) and nutrition (9%).

Figure 5 Sectoral funding allocation Zimbabwe¹³



In Zimbabwe, seven DEC member agencies are responding to Cyclone Idai, and intend to support a cumulative 10,451 households in their response.¹⁴ The overall geographical scope covered by them comprises Chipinge, Chimanimani and Buhera districts of Manicaland province, although not every member agency is in each of the districts.¹⁵

The map below shows the areas and sectors of the intervention of the seven DEC members.

Map 1 Sectors and areas of intervention of DEC members in Zimbabwe following the cyclone¹⁶


¹² DEC. "Cyclone Idai Appeal Consolidated Finance – Phase 1 Plans," n.d.

¹³ This sectoral allocation has been calculated on the basis of the 1,414,691GBP dedicated to programmes in country.

¹⁴ Action Aid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, World Vision, Save the Children, Age International and OXFAM

¹⁵ DEC cyclone Idai response plans, 2019


¹⁶ Ibid.



DEC members responded immediately after the cyclone. Members used start-up emergency funds to begin the response before the DEC appeal. With DEC funding, member agencies do not need to wait for plans and budgets approval at the onset of an emergency response to commence activities. Pre-financing drawdown may precede submission of plans.

None of the DEC members had pre-positioned stocks or commodities in Zimbabwe. The destruction of roads and bridges as well as continuing inclement weather hampered the initial response. Affected areas were completely cut off as the main highway, and other smaller roads into Chimanimani were impassable. The weather restricted access through the air. The figure below shows the response timeline:

Figure 6 Zimbabwe cyclone Idai response timeline¹⁷



1.3. Longer term development efforts

Of the DEC members responding to the cyclone, four had prior longer-term programming in the response areas. World Vision, Christian Aid, Action Aid, and Save the Children UK were operating in Chipinge and Chimanimani before the cyclone. Apart from one local partner of Action Aid, DEC members were not operating in the most affected wards. A breakdown of DEC members’ activities in the affected districts is provided in the below table:

¹⁷ Source is RTR primary data collection.

Table 1:DEC Members longer term programming in the affected districts¹⁸

DEC Member	District/s	Longer term programming in affected area prior to cyclone Idai
World Vision	Chipinge and Chimanimani	Food security, nutrition, livelihoods, community assets creation
Christian Aid	Chipinge	Prevention of gender-based violence (GBV)
Save the Children	Chipinge and Chimanimani	Child protection
Action Aid	Chimanimani	Women entrepreneurship and life skills

II. Objectives and scope of the review

The primary purpose of the response review was to instigate collective real-time reflection and learning to inform programmatic adjustments across DEC members’ response. The review drew on the initial phase of the response in order to generate lessons that will be applied in real-time as well as during the second phase (month seven onwards) of the members’ programmes. The response review also serves as an accountability function for both communities affected by the crisis as well as to the UK public. The review was participatory and user-oriented. The target audience for this report includes the affected communities, UK public, DEC members and their partners, the Government of Zimbabwe and local authorities in Zimbabwe.

A similar review to this one was also conducted in Malawi and Mozambique, and a common report will aim to look at lessons across all three countries.

The objectives of this response review were to:

- Draw out key learning and recommendations from the response to date, to inform Phase Two plans;
- Provide an overview and assessment of the response so far of DEC member agencies with a focus on relevance, sustainability, accountability, coordination, adaptability and effectiveness;
- Identify good practices in the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC;
- Identify priority areas, gaps, and areas of unmet needs;
- Highlight challenges that may affect implementation and programme quality.

The review focused on the activities and decisions conducted during Phase One of the response. The review covered all activities undertaken by DEC members in Zimbabwe.

The review strove to answer the following questions:

¹⁸ Source is RTR primary data collection.

1. To what extent is the response relevant and appropriate to the needs and priorities of the target population?
2. How effective and efficient is the project in achieving its intended outcomes?
3. How adaptable has the response been so far?
4. How are DEC members ensuring accountability to affected populations?
5. How sustainable and connected to longer-term issues has the Phase One of the intervention been?
6. How are DEC members maximising coordination, partnerships and complementarity with other organisations to achieve the intended response outcomes?

The response review matrix is available in [Annexe X.I.I.](#)

III. Methodology

The review adopted a participatory and user-oriented approach, as much emphasis was on the process as on the final output (i.e. the report). The methodology involved a desk review and inception phase followed by primary data collection using Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). A learning and feedback workshop followed the primary data collection. After the learning workshop, Key Aid conducted data analysis and reporting. The figure below shows the methodology employed for the review. The Humanitarian Coalition (HC) was part of the review, participating in primary data collection and the learning workshop. The Detailed methodology is available in [Annex XI.2](#)

Figure 7: Methodology Matrix

	Inception report	Desk review
Inception phase & desk review	Briefing with DEC Secretariat (3 June) Review tools development (interview questionnaires etc.)	Comprehensive and structured review of 60 documents (projects information and relevant external documentation)
Data collection	In-country	
	5 July: Country briefing workshop in Mutare with 25 participants from 10 organisations	12 FGDs with 150 people in total in Chipinge and Chimanimani districts
	19 July: Learning workshop with 19 participants from 12 organisations including HC	25 KIIs from 8-20 July with 7 DEC members, 4 partners, 4 coordinating bodies, Gov and donors accompanied by HC
	Total of 175 individuals consulted	
Final report	Data coding and analysis.	First draft: 11 August 2019. Final draft: 30 August 2019.

The review team was accompanied by a GoZ official during the community level primary data collection phase. While the GoZ official gave important insights into the response and the context, one cannot be exclude that this could have affected how participants responded

to some questions. To mitigate the risk of a potential bias the review team has taken great care to triangulate the findings with secondary data, KIIs that could be done without the presence of the GoZ and with the discussions during the learning review workshop.


IV. Relevance and appropriateness of the response

IV.1. Geographical targeting of DEC members' activities

Map 2: DEC Members' response areas Source OCHA, 2019

The eastern parts of Chimanimani and Chipinge districts have the highest concentration of

DEC member(s) activities. These districts were the most affected in Zimbabwe. Two DEC members also had activities in Buhera district, which had the third highest number of affected people at 15,000.



In the respective districts, DEC members' implemented activities in the most affected wards and locations, such as ward 9 of Chipinge and wards 13, 16, 21 and 22 in Chimanimani. In past years, localised flooding commonly affects the Lowveld western parts of the two districts, but the cyclone hit the eastern Highveld. A simple analysis of the most affected areas and DEC members' responses show that they correctly targeted the districts and wards by the impact of Cyclone Idai.


IV.2. Community needs as of now and the DEC response

The review demonstrated that although the needs prioritised by DEC members matched those identified by affected communities; some affected communities' needs were not covered. Based on the assessments at the beginning of the cyclone, DEC members prioritised food, shelter, water, health services, sanitation and protection. FGDs with the affected communities confirmed these needs. The affected communities nonetheless also

highlighted needs related to infrastructure, cellular network, radio coverage, reburials and location of missing relatives.

The figure below compares the needs identified during the FGDs with the services provided by DEC members. Communities also identified their needs going forward, which are mostly recovery-related rather than emergency needs.

Figure 8: Expressed community needs and DEC Member services¹⁹



Although DEC members and other agencies are providing psychosocial support, the needs seem to outstrip the available service. The same applies to food aid, with affected communities requesting for additional people to be included on the food aid registers. DEC members provided some support in the health sector, but affected communities had problems accessing health services due to distances to the nearest health centres, more so after the withdrawal of mobile clinics. According to affected communities, health centres had shortages of critical drugs for common conditions such as high blood pressure.

Other needs that DEC members are not providing but communities require such as clothing are being catered for by other development agencies. Although the GoZ 's main priority remains roads, bridges and other infrastructure rehabilitation, given DEC members' mandate and budgets, this is difficult for DEC member agencies to address directly. The road infrastructure is critical for accessing the communities, for disaster preparedness and for supporting the fruit marketing system. Fruit production and marketing is one of the most important income sources for households in the area. Another gap between community needs is the provision of permanent or at least semi-permanent shelter. This gap is important given the coming rain season.


IV.3. Special population sub-groups

An analysis of the services offered by DEC members showed that they targeted their services and support to various population sub-groups. The DEC members' response provided specific services and support to women of reproductive age, pregnant and lactating mothers, children under five and school-going children. The figure below shows the support

¹⁹ Source is RTR primary data collection.

the various sub-groups are receiving. FGDs confirmed that the needs of special population groups were considered in the provision of services.

Figure 9: Population sub-groups' support



Although one DEC member agency, Age International, was working on advocacy platforms for OP, there seemed to be no referral mechanisms between the advocacy platforms and other DEC members or other agencies. According to the FGDs, this limited the utility and functionality of the platforms. OP FGD participants noted that services and items offered by agencies need to be tailored to their needs. These include latrines and food distribution modalities. OP pointed out that they had difficulties in accessing and transporting food aid as well.

Looking to the future, widows and grandmothers caring for school-age children noted they would have challenges in paying for school fees as many lost their livelihoods and breadwinners in the family.

As part of the dignity kits, DEC members distributed disposable sanitary pads to women of reproductive age. In discussions with women, this support was greatly appreciated. Some key informants thought that reusable sanitary pads would be more useful and sustainable. The review team could not ascertain the affected communities' preferences between disposable and re-usable sanitary pads, but DEC member agencies can include this question as a part of future post-distribution monitoring.

According to key informants, disability was one of the factors prioritised in the selection criterion for receiving assistance. Beyond being a priority criterion for receiving support, the review team could not ascertain specifically how DEC members' responses took into account disability issues. Jairos Jiri, a local organisation not affiliated to DEC members, specialises in supporting people with disabilities (PWD) affected by the cyclone, and closer collaboration with them may be warranted to improve inclusion of PWD in the response.

One of the DEC member agencies pointed out that the needs of the LGBTQ+ community were not explicitly assessed. This issue did not come out at any point during the community meetings.

According to FGD participants, GBV has decreased since the cyclone. FGD participants attributed this to, in part, the shared solidarity of a traumatic experience. The affected communities also stated that agencies provided clear and consistent messaging in direct sessions or in conjunction with other interventions about gender equality and overcoming GBV. In the future, it may be interesting for DEC member agencies addressing GBV to conduct a targeted assessment on the prevalence of GBV and related attitudes and knowledge, with specially trained staff or researchers. It would be beneficial to measure the extent of the changes reported in this review and whether they were temporary or have continued.

IV.4. Changing needs of over time

The wards that were severely affected by the cyclone in the eastern highlands of Chipinge and Chimanimani are in the Eastern Highlands prime communal livelihood zone.²⁰ According to FGDs and the Zimbabwe livelihoods baseline profiles report, one of the main livelihoods in the affected areas is fruit production and distribution (bananas, avocados, and citrus fruits), and field crop (including maize, beans, sweet potatoes, and groundnuts) production.

The cyclone disrupted this livelihood system by destroying road networks, sweeping away fields, destroying crop trees and crops and decimating food stocks. As the seasonal timeline for the affected areas show, Cyclone Idai hit in mid-March during maturation and harvesting period for field crops and fruiting stage for fruit trees. Consequently, households' current and future food and income production capacity was negatively affected.

²⁰ ZIMVAC, *Zimbabwe Livelihoods Profiles report*. Harare: Government Publishers, 2011

Figure 10: Eastern Highlands Prime Communal livelihood zone seasonal calendar (source: ZIMVAC,2011)

	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar
	Dry Season							Wet Season				
Legend		planting		cons. green		harvest		Off farm				
		cattle		shoats		cattle and shoats		onfarm				
Land Preparation												
Planting												
Weeding												
Maize												
Sweet Potato												
Beans												
Bananas												
Livestock sales												
Livestock heats and births												
Milk production												
Other												
Lean season												
Food Purchases												
Local labour												

An analysis of the seasonal calendar reveals that the affected communities will be moving into the principal land preparation and planting season. After the planting period is the main hunger season, starting from November until the next harvest around March. Interviewed communities indicated that the planting season starts as early as late August/early September for wetter areas. According to the beneficiary communities and Government of Zimbabwe Agricultural Research and Extension Officers (AREX), early planting in these areas reduces the vulnerability of maize crops to witchweed, which is a common and severe weed affecting maize. In the FGDs, seed and fertiliser support, support with income-generating ventures, and support with irrigation equipment were strongly favoured as the most important livelihoods needs.

The seasonal timeline shows that the main rain season will be starting around October. Discussions with local leaders, District Administrators (DAs), and local authorities revealed that the upcoming rain season has implications on access to the affected areas. The impending rains are also a threat to households with temporary or unstable shelter as well as to any current construction work. The temporary roads and bridges constructed after the cyclone may be damaged by rain, rendering some of the areas inaccessible.

The DEC members’ first phase response timelines are in line with the seasonal calendar of the affected areas. The DEC response covered the period just before and during the winter season. Affected households were sheltered by the support on temporary shelter, blankets and dignity kits. DEC members’ second phase response will need to start responding to emerging needs around recovery and the planting season.

IV.1. Challenges in the operating environment and adaptation of programs

Based on interviews with DEC members’ staff, programs were flexible and adaptable within scope. DEC members’ key informants noted that with justification, they could quickly reprogram DEC funds within the cyclone response without much difficulty. This flexibility was

cited as a strength given the fluid nature of emergencies, changing beneficiary needs and the uncertain political and macro-economic situation Zimbabwe.

Several challenges were noted by key informants, predominantly currency restrictions and transportation bottlenecks, causing delays. Other changes or unforeseen circumstances in the operating environment cited by DEC members include a GoZ directive which ordered agencies to halt the provision of temporary shelter, changes in the accessibility to areas, lack of river sand as a material for rebuilding, and community requests for alternative water supply solutions.

IV.1.1. Challenges related to currency restrictions

Since the start of the cyclone response, the major change that has happened in the operating environment is the official introduction of the new Zimbabwean currency and the restrictions on the use of the US dollar and other foreign currencies as legal tender on June 24, 2019. After almost a decade of hyperinflation, Zimbabwe demonetised the Zimbabwean dollar and adopted a multi-currency system in 2008. The US dollar emerged as the main trading currency in the multi-currency regime. Due to the sudden and unexpected nature of the currency introduction and ban on US dollars, there was a lot of uncertainty and panic within the economy.

In response to the new currency rules, suppliers increased their prices by up to 200 percent²¹ or stopped trading as they assessed how the new currency would perform. According to key informants, agencies faced difficulties in procuring goods and services, and the value of their money was reduced.

The new currency rules also meant that agencies using cash modalities could not make any payments to beneficiaries in US dollars. This presented both logistical and programmatic problems for the response. Depending on the exchange rate between the US dollar and the new local currency, beneficiaries would have less value for their money, and consequently diminishing their purchasing ability.

Zimbabwe is facing growing economic woes, which have seen the escalation of fuel shortages, crippling electricity cuts, sharp increases in basic commodities prices and low Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows over the past years²². The Zimbabwean economy has seen year on year inflation rising to 175 %.²³ The local power company has nine-hour power cuts daily, and people have to queue for up to four hours to obtain fuel. These challenges have increased the running costs of programs as agencies turn to generators for power, and as transporters and suppliers charge more for their goods and services. According to key informants, the transaction costs of running a response have gone up.

²¹ Mutingwende B, *Socioeconomic Implications of the Monetary Policy Measures – Statutory Instrument (SI) 142/2019*, Harare: ZIMCODD, 2019

²² Ibid.

²³ ZIMSTAS, *Month on Month Inflation Figures Bulletin*. Harare: Zimbabwe Statistics, 2019

The sum effect of the economic and currency problems has been the delay in food distributions and activities, as agencies struggle to secure fuel and transport for commodities. One DEC member had to delay distributions by a month, impacting service delivery to affected communities. In another instance, a DEC member is planning to distribute commodities without pulses because of supply delays.

Agencies are now rethinking cash modalities such as cash for work and unconditional/unrestricted cash. Agencies could pay these in local currency but are unsure if beneficiaries will be able to buy the same value of goods they previously did before the new currency regulations. All planned cash US dollar disbursements to beneficiaries also had to stop until there are further clarifications to the rules.

To adapt to the economic challenges, DEC members have had to change their assistance modalities to non-cash modalities. Agencies have had to pace and delay activities to respond to the fuel challenges and procurement delays. Some DEC members are considering regional and international procurement to safeguard their value for money and also have assurances of supplies.

IV.1.2. Transportation and storage bottlenecks

At the onset of the disaster, most affected areas were cut off due to broken bridges and swept away roads (Government of Zimbabwe, 2019). As a result, aid agencies had no direct access to communities. Aid agencies, private sector players, and members of the public would send aid items to a logistics hub closest to the affected communities. The Zimbabwe National Army, private companies, the UN, and other stakeholders would then airlift the prioritised needs to the affected areas. The government coordinated and managed this hub at Silver Stream. Other donors and agencies (not necessarily DEC members) would drop off aid commodities in Mutare, and GoZ and partners organised transport which ferried the commodities to Silver Stream.

According to key informants, given the scale of the disaster, and resources at the GoZ 's disposal, this arrangement created a logistical bottleneck. After the partial restoration of road access, NGOs including DEC members negotiated with the GoZ to have direct access and contact with affected communities. This adaptation to by-pass the central logistical hub enabled more rapid reach to affected communities. The move also increased DEC members' accountability of distributed aid. The GoZ, through the Civil Protection Unit (CPU) and DA's office, however, continued with the role of coordination. As the [coordination section](#) will show, the DA's office allocated agencies operational wards depending on the type of support different agencies were able to offer.

IV.1.3. Adaption to changed circumstances

Despite unforeseen events and changing circumstances, DEC member agencies were able to address these challenges by modifying their programmes. The table below shows how DEC members have been able to adapt programming to changing circumstances:

Table 2: Program adaptation²⁴

Changes/Unforeseen Circumstances	How DEC members' programs adapted
New currency rules	Changed modalities away from cash
Temporary order to stop certain shelter activities	Negotiating with government for transitory kind of shelter
Identification of permanent shelter as a major problem/gap	Prioritised and started fundraising for more permanent shelter
Beneficiary preferences on water supply	Changed program focus in the highlands from borehole drilling to protection of natural springs
Shortage of locally available resources (river sand) for building	DEC member agencies now assist in provision of transportation for river sand
Improved access to communities	Changed modalities to direct distributions to affected communities

According to the affected communities, the main changes or adaptations they would like to see from the DEC member agencies would be an increase in the caseload of people benefiting from food aid and an extension of the duration of food aid until the next harvest. Communities contend that while agencies are targeting the most vulnerable, many other vulnerable households are unable to get food aid support. The cyclone affected a larger number of households than the number of those that are currently receiving food assistance. The affected community also states that they will only be able to recover when they harvest their next field crops around February – March 2020, and when their fruit business is up and running.

The barriers DEC members had in adapting programs are the costs as well as DEC member mandates. DEC members have a limited budget to address needs like permanent shelter. Some of the affected communities' needs, such as roads and bridges do not fall within the scope of a DEC response.

To improve internal program adaptation, DEC key informants suggested that agencies move quickly in activating emergency procurement protocols, which would give field managers greater authority.

²⁴ Source is RTR primary data collection.

V. Effectiveness in achieving intended outcomes

The response review was mainly qualitative and did not focus on quantitative monitoring and evaluation data. Monitoring and evaluation quantitative data would have allowed a more definitive judgment on the achievement of outputs and outcomes, and as the response transitions into early recovery, DEC member agencies should prioritise the collection of such data to measure outcomes and further refine activities.

DEC members faced a several environmental challenges starting with the inaccessibility of affected communities due to damaged infrastructure, harsh nation-wide macroeconomic conditions, and changes to currency laws.

FGDs with communities gave qualitative information about their satisfaction with the services that they received from DEC members. Of all services provided by DEC members, food aid was seen as the service most in need of a scale-up. Affected communities felt that agencies were targeting fewer people than those in need.

Both affected communities and DEC member agency staff felt that psychosocial support services were inadequate given the scale of the disaster. These staff thought that the service was not enough because of the volume of people who required it versus the number of service providers.

All of the DEC member agency key informant interviewees thought that they were doing well in achieving their targets and rated their response as meeting the needs of the communities, except for meeting food needs and meeting needs related to shelter and permanent infrastructure.

KIs with nurses and FGDs with village health workers revealed that they were satisfied with the support they received in hygiene kits and promotion, nutrition monitoring and supplementary food. At both health centres visited the nurses pointed out that they did not see a significant spike in diarrhoea cases as may have been expected. At Chidamoyo clinic in Chipinge health workers indicated that there was only a slight spike in diarrheal diseases just after the cyclone, but this quickly reduced. Village health workers and hygiene club members attributed the absence of diarrhoea outbreaks partly to the WASH response from DEC member agencies.

In the education sector, DEC members were working on more permanent rehabilitation of schools. In the interim, they have provided temporary classrooms, although the temporary classrooms are not under DEC funds. Schools were able to open after two months, and lessons have continued. Some larger schools like Ndima primary school in Chimanimani have had increased enrolment as students transfer from smaller schools after the storm. According to interviews with school development associations, a headmaster, and community leaders, temporary classrooms have enabled schools to accept all children back

to schools in a closed environment. The permanent structures that DEC members are working on will enable schools to resume their regular programming.

The effectiveness of interventions in the shelter sector was more difficult to ascertain. DEC members working on shelter had to halt their activities and revise plans after the GoZ issued a directive for agencies to stop providing temporary shelter, as noted in [Section IV.1.1](#). All agencies were directed to switch to more permanent shelter solutions. DEC members such as Action Aid and Christian Aid changed their plans and are either fundraising for more permanent shelter activities or are advocating for cheaper but effective transitory shelter support.


Oxfam GB provided livelihoods support through training in agriculture. Oxfam GB also linked local AREX workers with community members just after the cyclone. In FGDs, participants appreciated this support and indicated that it was helping them start thinking about recovery. They did, however, think that the training would be more effective with more widespread and timely distribution of agricultural inputs. In interviews, AREX officers and trained community-based lead farmers indicated that the intervention would be more effective if they received support with training equipment, as well as information and communication materials. Due to the terrain in the affected areas, the AREX officers also thought that bicycles or motorcycles would increase the scope of their outreach.

VI. Accountability to affected population

VI.1. Accountability mechanisms

DEC members put in place a variety of sound accountability mechanisms across the project cycle. The figure below shows the mechanisms employed during the response.

Figure 11: Accountability through the project cycle



According to DEC staff, the initial responses were based on sound humanitarian standards and known needs of disaster-affected communities. Due to access and urgency considerations in the first days after the cyclone, agencies started distributing lifesaving aid to meet the various needs of the affected communities. Agencies had not yet done any formal assessment that included direct contact or interviews with the affected communities. DEC members were only able to do a more detailed assessment of needs after access was partially restored two weeks after the cyclone. After access was partially restored, DEC members then instituted more specific assessments focusing on gender, water and sanitation, rapid needs assessment, and child protection, and they then based their responses and approaches on the findings. As highlighted in [Section IV](#), support from DEC matched community needs.

Across all FGDs, participants had an appreciation of why interventions were targeted at particular groups. Beneficiary communities were cognisant of targeting criteria for targeted and specialised groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, children under five, nutrition, water and sanitation. Examples include participants knowing that DEC members were targeting high yielding freshwater springs that served more people, and were providing tents to people with damaged houses. Communities understood that the basis for receiving aid was the extent a household had been affected negatively by the cyclone as well as the wealth status of the household.

Where FGD participants disagreed with the DEC member agencies' targeting was with the targeting for food aid. Households that were not receiving food aid thought they also deserved the support. Unsurprisingly, individuals and communities who were affected by the crisis but not targeted (often due to agencies not having large enough budgets)

reported being frustrated and unsatisfied. There was no uniform understanding of the food aid ration sizes per beneficiary or household as well.

VI.1.1. Complaints and Feedback Mechanisms

DEC members had an array of complaints and feedback mechanisms (CFM) that they put in place during Phase One of the Cyclone Idai response. Beneficiary feedback mechanisms ranged from confidential ones to more public mechanisms. These included suggestion boxes and toll-free numbers as well as face-to-face mechanisms such as the help desks, local beneficiary committees, contact numbers for NGO staff, and use of traditional local leadership. According to FGDs, the most popular way of giving feedback was the suggestion box. Affected communities preferred this method because it allowed for some privacy and confidentiality. In places where affected communities indicated that they knew of the toll-free numbers, it seemed the use of toll-free numbers was limited. In two wards where the review team conducted FGDs, cellular network coverage was problematic, limiting the utility of toll-free lines. Interviews with DEC staff members indicated that toll-free numbers were set up later in the response and not at the onset. In the FGDs, it was also noted that affected communities liked the face-to-face feedback methods as they allowed for dialogue and interaction between communities and DEC member agency staff.

Affected communities liked the concept of having community members and leaders being part of the help desk and feedback mechanisms. Some community members, however, highlighted that they find it challenging to present feedback and complaints about the community leaders. FGD participants who expressed this view felt safer approaching and dealing with DEC member staff directly in the absence of community and traditional leadership.

Community participation in project activities was high. Communities participated as volunteers for hygiene promotion, as village health workers, and as lead farmers. Communities also participated by providing local resources such as stones, bricks, and labour in construction type activities. The selection of beneficiaries was community-based, with community members providing input on who were the most affected people.

VI.2. Prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation

Participants across all FGDs and community-level KIIs strongly and consistently stated that they had not heard or seen any concern or examples of fraud, mismanagement, corruption, sexual abuse or exploitation (SEA) in the agencies' Cyclone Idai response. Participants mentioned that they would know how to respond if they did witness or learn of these issues being perpetrated. FGD participants stated that DEC members address and raise awareness on the prevention of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation (PSEA) and accountability channels. FGD participants indicated that DEC members raise awareness publicly before and during program activities on PSEA and accountability issues.

DEC member agency key informants stated that each of their staff members must sign a form explaining the agency's code of conduct and that all staff members undergo some

form of training or induction on the accountability and PSEA guidelines. The code of conduct details the expected conduct of staff members and steps that will be taken by the agency if it is not followed. KIs and interactions with DEC member field staff showed that they are aware of expected conduct and standards.

VI.3. Meeting Core Humanitarian Standards

One area of focus for the RTE was to assess DEC member agencies' progress on meeting the CHS. There are nine commitments which are part of the CHS:

1. Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate to their needs.
2. Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time.
3. Communities and people affected by the crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.
4. Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them.
5. Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.
6. Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.
7. Communities and people affected by crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflection.
8. Communities and people affected by crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff and volunteers.
9. Communities and people affected by crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.

Figure 12: CHS Commitments



Based on information available to them, the review team made subjective judgements on how the response was meeting the CHS. The figure below shows how the review team rated each of the nine CHS commitments, with colours corresponding to the score. Commitments shaded in grey are those which could not be assessed during the review due to lack of available data.

The reasoning for the scoring on each of the commitments is as follows:

- As outlined in [Section IV](#), the response was deemed appropriate and relevant by beneficiary communities. DEC members provided assistance that was in line with the expressed needs of communities.
- The response was timely and effective, despite being hampered by the inaccessibility of some locations; DEC members were able to mobilise and respond as soon as the cyclone hit.
- The DEC response was able to use local capacities and communities, as highlighted later in [Section VII](#), despite some communities feeling that the agencies could have done more in recruiting locals as part of the response team.
- DEC members had open lines of communication and feedback with the affected communities. As outlined in [Section VI.1](#), the mechanisms have been used by the communities at differing levels.
- The review team felt that the response was well coordinated but could have done more in terms of intentional complementarity of interventions, as detailed in [Section VIII](#).
- The review team could not make any judgments on items seven, eight and nine in the figure above because the review did not specifically focus on those areas and the review team did not have adequate information to score the DEC response on those commitments.

VII. Sustainability and connectedness of the response

A review of DEC members’ plans shows the consideration of sustainability in the design and assessments. The table below shows some of the ways sustainability was considered in DEC members’ plans.

Table 3: Examples of sustainability considerations in DEC members’ plans²⁵

<p><u>Community capacity</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training • Skills transfer: community case care workers 	<p><u>Assessments planning</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Livelihoods assessments • Assessment of infrastructure damage
<p><u>Community ownership</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution of local resources 	<p><u>Working with community groups</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • School development associations • Community health clubs

²⁵ Source is DEC member agency output and narrative plans.

DEC members' plans had sustainability considerations around ensuring community ownership, assessing long term needs of communities, working with existing community groups and building the capacity of community bodies and members.

World Vision, which had a presence in Chipinge and Chimanimani before the cyclone, used its long term food security and area development program staff and resources in the initial phase of the disaster. They were able to use the resources and staff already in place in conducting assessments, providing initial response items, and providing logistical and warehousing support. This enabled its emergency team to scale up quickly.

Although, as expected, the support provided by DEC members during Phase One of the response was emergency, it built the base for future longer-term programming. Based on KIIs and FGDs, DEC members instituted several measures that support longer-term sustainability.

The physical assets that DEC members are rehabilitating or building will continue to be used after the end of the cyclone response. Communities will keep benefiting from these assets if suitable management structures are in place. The assets are primarily education and WASH; examples include household and school latrines, classroom blocks, boreholes, spring protection, and water reticulation schemes at schools and clinics.

Other approaches that DEC members are employing include sustainability in the emergency response, setting up of community management structures for various assets, and setting up behaviour change types of groups such as school health clubs and hygiene clubs. DEC members are working with long term community resources such as village health workers, GoZ health and agricultural extension workers, and other GoZ structures, to enhance the sustainability of the response.

Based on KIIs and FGDs, the longer term livelihoods in the affected areas revolve around fruit farming and field crops for household food security. For longer-term sustainability, the value chain for the fruit farming and systems for field crops production should be functional. Infrastructure such as roads, bridges and footpaths are essential for access to markets. FGDs revealed that the longer-term livelihood aspirations of the communities centre on restoration of fruit production and marketing, including physical accessibility of production areas. The main livelihood assets disrupted by the cyclone include irrigation schemes and infrastructure, roads, bridges, fields and water sources. On the social services side, long term goals of the affected communities focus on improving access to health care (including access to medicines) and access to education. In the FGDs, communities prioritised the following support in the medium and long term.

Table 4: Summary of longer-term goals expressed during the FGDs (Source: Primary data collection)

Sector	Longer term community priorities
Food security and livelihoods	Food aid support until the next summer harvests in February/March 2020; Agricultural inputs for field crops (mainly maize) – planting time varies between end of August to November; Support in re-establishing fruit crops plots;

	Support to re-establish irrigation schemes; Support for income generating activities especially for women and youth (inputs or start-up capital for poultry, gardens, piggery, trading, sewing, bee keeping).
WATSAN	Water pipes to re-establish household water supplies (Households connect small water reticulation pipes to households from springs and rivers); Permanent household and institutional latrines.
Infrastructure	Repair of (Roads, bridges, school).
Health	Access to health services including mobile or community-level access.
Shelter	Permanent shelter support with communities providing local resources.
Education	Support with learning materials and school fees support for orphaned children.

VIII. Coordination and complementarity

VIII.1. Participation in existing coordinating fora

The Government of Zimbabwe instituted the main coordination bodies at national, provincial and district levels. National level coordination was mainly concerned with mobilising external resources and pulling together assessment reports to show the nature and extent of the cyclone damage. Development agencies have the heads of agencies forum as the main coordinating and collaborating body.

At provincial and district levels, the civil protection unit (CPU) is the main coordinating body for the response. The Provincial Administrator runs the provincial CPU while the DAs head the district CPUs.

The DAs are responsible for allocating operational wards to various agencies, including DEC members. According to DEC members and the DAs, the allocation process worked well and reduced instances of duplication of efforts and helped complementarity of efforts. The DAs' offices have a register of which agencies are providing what kind of support in which areas. This way, the DAs can quickly identify gaps and allocate operational areas as new agencies come in and other programmes end.

Interviews with the DAs for both Chipinge and Chimanimani showed that DEC members attend the district CPU and cluster meetings held weekly. DEC members were providing timely weekly and monthly reports to the DAs and local rural district council's offices. Only those DEC members that had limited presence in the districts missed some CPU meetings, but they did attend the provincial meetings. DAs are generally happy with DEC members' efforts in coordinating with other players and actively attending CPU meetings.

GoZ line ministries head the various clusters with development partners working as members or at times co-chairs of the clusters.

VIII.2. Coordination Challenges

In the initial phases of the response, there were numerous coordination meetings at various levels and, some DEC members thought that coordination meetings would take away time and effort for the actual response with up to four or five meetings per day. This could be attributed to the scale of the disaster compared to past natural disasters in Zimbabwe and the huge demand for information in a disaster of this nature. Information requests were from both GoZ and humanitarian agencies' headquarters and national offices. Over time, the number of meetings lessened, and the burden became more manageable for field staff.

At the height of the response, there were some inconsistencies between district, provincial and national coordination forums (information and decisions did not flow smoothly among the layers)

The review noted that there was no intentional DEC-specific coordination forum in planning the response at the sub-national level. Most DEC staff members became acquainted with other DEC members during the inception phase. This does not mean that a specific DEC coordination mechanism is required, as the DEC members already meet and participate in the broader cluster and CPU meetings, but that there is room to increase informal coordination among the DEC member agencies. The review also noted that there was very limited planned intentional complementarity of programs or approaches by DEC members, at least from a sub-national point of view.

At the field district level, key informants noted that various agencies go into the same communities at different intervals in a week to meet the same community members. The key informants pointed out that this could take up affected communities' time for other productive activities. Key informants suggested that, where feasible, joint field visits and plans should be implemented to improve effectiveness and efficiency. Some suggested that a common DEC accountability mechanism (web or toll-free line) could avoid some of the duplication of individual agency mechanisms and make it easier for communities to provide feedback or report concerns.

Many key informants at the field level also felt that there needs to be much better communication from a national level to the district level within their organisations, to encourage awareness and coordination among DEC agencies. Others felt DEC could do more through its guidelines and funding processes to encourage and incentivise further coordination.

Due to the imperative to respond quickly, there seemed to be a tension between organisations for operational space, but this was among humanitarian agencies in general and not specifically DEC members.

Key informants at district level felt that there was no specific partners' portal or avenue for sharing assessment reports and plans in real-time. The WASH cluster was, however, able to conduct a comprehensive interagency assessment which all partners could draw on in implementing their responses. Larger agencies such as the World Food Program also share their assessments with all partners.

IX. Conclusion

In Zimbabwe, the cyclone seems to have caused greater damage than the GoZ and other humanitarian actors anticipated. Affected communities in eastern Zimbabwe are accustomed to storms and wet weather, but not a disaster on this scale. According to FGDs, when news of the impending cyclone spread within the communities, people did not foresee how catastrophic it would be. Commonly when tropical storms land in Mozambique, eastern Zimbabwe is minimally affected. The unprecedented nature of the storm made the preparedness from both the GoZ and humanitarian agencies insufficient at the very beginning of the response. The combination of strong winds, incessant rains and subsequent mudslides caused extensive damage. CPU messages normally encourage people to move to higher ground in cyclones and storms. Contingency planning and early warning are important and imperative. Although early warning information was given on the impending cyclone, adequate contingency actions were not taken. Measures such as evacuations to safer places and assembly points seem not to have even been considered before the cyclone hit. Moving ahead, these are options that the GoZ and humanitarian actors should map out and plan for before disaster strikes.

Prior knowledge and experience working in affected areas are very important. DEC members responding to the cyclone had to mount a response very quickly with limited time for primary assessments. Based on their knowledge of the context, DEC members provided emergency assistance that was specific to the context and appropriate to the needs of the population.

To address recovery and long-term needs of the affected communities requires a collaborative effort between humanitarian agencies, the GoZ, affected communities themselves, and the private sector. Humanitarian actors are unable and possibly not suited to providing some of the needs of the community, such as major infrastructure development. The recovery and development phase of the response will require more intentional and planned collaboration and coordination among the different stakeholders. Already, some private entities are supporting with permanent shelter, and the World Bank and GoZ are planning for major infrastructure rehabilitation.

The underlying issues in the response area exacerbated the effect of Cyclone Idai and limited the initial response that the humanitarian agencies were able to implement. The underlying economic challenges and food crisis in Zimbabwe before the cyclone increased the scale of the response needed, an example being food security and the higher number of households needing food assistance. The economic situation and evolving currency changes complicated the response for agencies. The ability for response adaptation and flexibility remain key, especially in fluid contexts like Zimbabwe.

X. Recommendations

Recommendation 1: Expand and extend food aid coverage

A significant finding across all FGDs was that affected communities felt that the coverage of food aid was not adequate. DEC members should explore within the funding they currently have available possibilities of expanding the food assistance to cover more people in targeted communities. Households that ordinarily would not require food aid need support because the cyclone wiped away food reserves at the household level and also reduced the ability of productive households to earn an income. The cyclone destroyed productive assets such as irrigation equipment, fields and fruit trees. Households that normally do not fit the bill of “vulnerable” households also require food support. Food distributions need to stretch beyond the current three months as households will only be able to recover after the next harvests around March 2020. Households in the affected areas are moving into the lean or hunger season at the same time they want to start land preparation and planting for longer-term recovery. DEC members can work with other partners such as the World Food Program to assess and expand coverage.

Recommendation 2: Advocate with the Government of Zimbabwe for infrastructure reconstruction

Infrastructure damage caused by the cyclone was extensive. Roads and bridges are essential for the livelihoods of the affected communities as these enable access to markets for fruit and other crops. Infrastructure is also important for aid agencies to access the affected communities. Through the Humanitarian and development partners’ fora, DEC members should advocate for the GoZ to move with speed in repairing roads and bridges. If the fruit marketing business is returned to a pre-crisis level, most households in the affected areas will be able to recover income-earning opportunities.

The extent of the infrastructure damage is such that the GoZ would need to prioritise which infrastructure to start with. Agencies could advocate for and prioritise key infrastructures from the community needs perspective.

The GoZ has set standards for permanent shelter, which remains a major concern with the upcoming rain season. DEC members working on shelter should advocate for more affordable but robust transitory shelter standards. These will enable wider and timely coverage of affected households before the onset of the rainy season. DEC members can also consider providing households with some materials and the affected communities provide locally available resources.

Recommendation 3: Focus Phase Two on recovery based on existing livelihood strategies and assets

The affected communities’ livelihoods in Chimanimani and Chipinge centre on farming of fruits and field crops. Field crops such as maize and groundnuts are important for household food security, while banana and avocado sales are essential for income earning.

In Phase Two of the DEC response, DEC members should focus on interventions that support the recovery of these livelihood strategies. Such interventions could entail input support schemes and also market assessments of how the banana and avocado value chains were affected by the cyclone and exploring how best to get the value chains working again. Any field crops support needs to be timely and consider the normal planting period in the affected communities. Support on community assets should also include rehabilitation of safe water points and ensuring access to safe water. Water infrastructure was badly affected by the cyclone. In districts like Buhera and even other areas within Chimanimani and Chipinge, DEC agencies should consider interventions tailored to the specific needs of each location and sub-populations.

Recommendation 4: Institute or intensify disaster risk management approaches in the affected areas

The affected areas suffer chronic droughts and occasional floods. DEC agencies and other partners need to support communities in disaster risk management. Mapping of the areas vulnerable to different types of hazards would be a good starting point to enhance DEC member agencies' capacity to prepare for, take early action, and respond to local disasters in the affected communities.

Recommendation 5: Strengthen mobile or community health delivery structures and preventative measures

Some households in the affected communities are quite far from the nearest health centre. With the coming rainy season and an increased risk of diseases such as malaria, enabling easier access to health services will be crucial. DEC member agencies are already working with structures such as village health workers and community case care workers. These community structures are often the first-line health care that community members are able to access. DEC members working in the health sector need to consider strengthening these structures through continuous training and provision of supplies. These structures need to work on both curative and preventative aspects of health measures.

Recommendation 6: Institute more older people friendly approaches

Interviewed older people had the perception that their issues were not prioritised. DEC members should have older people catered approaches in their interventions. Interventions should specifically look at how they are catering to elderly persons. These could range from prioritising support to older people looking after children in interventions such as food aid and education support. The age lens could also mean assessing how friendly things like latrines are to older people.

Recommendation 7: Collaborate more intentionally among DEC members

DEC members only got to meet during the inception meeting. The DEC members are working in various sectors and have different expertise and thematic specialisations. DEC members could try and foster more complementarity between their interventions through greater collaboration at the project design phase. Collaboration at that level would make

for more intentional complementarity of activities and enable members to benefit from the specific expertise or specialisation of other members. While coordination efforts can be time-consuming at the outset of a crisis, the DEC's phase two proposal and funding process provides an opportune moment for stronger and more effective collaboration especially given the scale of needs and lack of resources overall.

Recommendation 8: Plan early for possibilities of limited access to some affected communities during the rainy season

As DEC members wind down Phase One activities and plan for phase two, they need to be cognisant that most of the roads and bridges to the affected communities are temporary in nature. Due to the terrain, extensive damage to infrastructure and the coming rainy season, some areas may become difficult to access. DEC members need to consider front-loading some activities while access is still relatively easy. Examples would include early distributions or distributing items enough to cover for two or so months or distributing reusable items such as re-usable sanitary pads. Agencies can also consider approaches that do not need the physical presence of DEC members' officers on the ground.

Recommendation 9: Employ at least one confidential feedback mechanism

Agencies should use multiple methods of getting feedback from communities. The diversity of mechanisms ensures that affected communities have a choice and can choose mechanisms that best suit the type of feedback they have. In the mix of feedback mechanisms, at least one should be confidential such as toll-free numbers and suggestion boxes. This helps when communities have sensitive issues to share or fear victimisation and backlash. Confidential mechanisms should be set up very early into the response.

XI. Annexes

XI.1. Review framework

Given findings from the online survey, expectations expressed in the inception workshop in London and common practice for real-time evaluations (RTE), as per ALNAP's Guide on 'Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action', Key Aid will use the following review matrix. The matrix shows the broad areas of inquiry and sub questions. Given the qualitative nature of the review, instead of having hard indicators and measurements, Key Aid will use data analysis points. The data analysis points reflect the type of data and analytical points that Key Aid will focus on in grouping response parameters and to reach conclusions.

Table 5: Review Framework

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
1. To what extent is the response relevant and appropriate to the needs and priorities of the target population?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Was the response design consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? - To what extent are the members' phase 1 plans in line with the needs and priorities of those affected (including the needs of some specific target groups such as women, people with disabilities or the very poor)? -What assessments were carried out prior to provision of services? -Where any needs expressed in the assessments not met and why? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nature, content and scope of assessments to conduct - Information on emerging needs and priorities of affected communities - Existing gaps in services/needs of affected communities - Targeting of particular population groups or needs - Process for prioritising and coming up with needs for affected communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of the projects' ToC (if available); - Review of the methods used to assess beneficiaries' needs; - Interviews with DEC members and implementing partners, and FGDs with project beneficiaries confirm that the intervention is in line with their needs and priorities, including specific target groups; - Interviews with DEC members and implementing partners, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison of needs as expressed by beneficiaries in FGDs and assessment reports with support provided by the DEC members - Comparison of needs of particular groups with provisions put up by DEC member agencies. - Analysis of the changing needs of beneficiaries/target communities as time progresses - Analysis of seasonal timelines and livelihood profiles of target/affected areas with

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
	- Have protection concerns been adequately considered in the design of assistance?		and FGDs with project beneficiaries show how their needs are changing and give insights on how Phase II could adapt to those changes; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show that protection issues were considered at design stage and how they are being addressed	support provided and planned by DEC agencies
2. How effective and efficient is the project in achieving its intended outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent are the activities of DEC members achieving and/or are likely to achieve their intended outcomes? - Are the activities being delivered in a timely and qualitative manner? - What are likely to be some of the major factors influencing achievement or non-achievement of the objectives? -Did the project meet any unexpected and unforeseen issues during implementation? -What, if any, were the unintended effects? 	- Identify challenges to achievement of results that can be addressed going into phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of timelines to determine any potential gap between the response initial timeline and the current timeframe; - Interviews and FGDs with project beneficiaries shed light on some the visible outcomes with their community; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show that the main threats to the programme were identified and that 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparisons of planned outcomes with situation obtaining on the ground - Review of response timeline and needs versus project delivery timelines - Assess trends and issues affecting project performance

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
			mitigation measures are in place.	
3. How adaptable has the response been so far?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -What changes in approaches, targeting or other programming issues, if any, did the project make since the beginning of the response? -How are beneficiary needs now changing? And how the response adapted to those changes? -What challenges did DEC members face in trying to make any program adaptations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified structural challenges to adapting programming - Address any identified internal challenges to adaptation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Key informant interviews with project personnel with knowledge on project plans - Focus group discussions with affected communities to understand the changes in needs and the external environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Analysis of changes in the context and operating environment - Analysing how the programs responded to changes in the operating environment and affected community needs - Identify any internal or structural challenges to adapting programs
4. How are DEC members ensuring accountability to affected populations?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent are the views of crisis-affected people (including specific target groups) considered in response design and implementation? - What mechanisms exist and are being used for prompt detection and mitigation of unintended negative effects? - How compliant is the response to the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) and other guidelines on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and what areas require further attention? -What challenges did the response come across in meeting the CHS or safeguarding crisis affected households? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified accountability deficiencies going forward - Suggest measures for Advocacy on external context specific issues that affect accountability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of secondary data and KII with DEC members and implementing partners provide evidence that the views of target population were taken into consideration; - Review of the complaint and accountability mechanisms in place; - Interviews and FGDs with project beneficiaries confirm that they are aware of those mechanisms and are able to use them if necessary; - Review of secondary data and KII with DEC 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparison of mechanisms put in place by DEC members with the humanitarian standards and PSEA guidelines - Analysis of the knowledge by target communities of the existence of these mechanisms - Analysis of the use of complaints, feedback and other accountability mechanisms by target communities - Assessments of the structural and context issues that posed challenges to DEC members in implementing accountability and protection agencies

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
			members and implementing partners explain how the response is in line with the CHS and PSEA;	
5. How sustainable and connected to longer-term issues has the phase I of the intervention been?	<p>-What existing longer-term programming by DEC and non DEC members was happening in the areas?</p> <p>- To what extent are phase 1 programme plans taking into account the medium or longer-term priorities and needs of those affected?</p> <p>- To what extent have members considered how any positive effects might be maintained in the future, after the DEC response?</p> <p>- What environmental impact and other longer-term impacts is the present response likely to have?</p> <p>-Which environmental impact of programmes was considered at design stage, and how?</p> <p>-Are there any possible negative impacts of the support provided by the agencies?</p>	<p>- Inform changes/modifications to current programming to be more in line with longer term issues</p> <p>- Identify medium to longer term plans/priorities that can go into phase two programming</p>	<p>- Review of National Policies and KII with development and governmental actors in the country highlight the various longer-term development issues faced by the country;</p> <p>- Analysis of secondary data and KII show that local capacities are being built;</p> <p>- KII with DEC members and implementing partners, development and governmental actors in the country show how the response fit within the longer-term dimensions;</p> <p>- KII with DEC members and implementing partners, development and governmental actors in the country demonstrate how the response took</p>	<p>- Seasonal context analysis for a normal year versus the cyclone year to assess how the cyclone affected normal livelihoods and other household operations</p> <p>- Asses the longer-term development needs expressed by communities</p> <p>- Asses how current programming is in line with these priorities and needs</p> <p>- Assess how cyclone response is building on existing development efforts</p> <p>- Assess whether target communities will be able to continue enjoying the benefits of the support they are currently getting after project end</p> <p>- Investigate any sequencing and layering of activities/interventions</p>

Review questions	Sub question	Possible leaning points for phase 2	Data source	Data Analysis points
			environmental considerations into account.	
6. How are DEC members maximising coordination partnerships and complementarity with other organisations to achieve the intended response outcomes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To what extent is the response coordinated and complemented with the efforts of other stakeholders (including implementing partners, local actors, civil society, local authorities and government, humanitarian and development actors and new actors e.g. private sector, civil society)? -Are there specific coordination efforts between DEC members for assessment, geographical targeting and response design? - What internal coordination problems have DEC members faced and how have they been addressed? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Address any identified coordination problems/issues - Promote any coordination good practice - Advocate for any new or changed coordination mechanisms (broadly and within DEC members programming) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Review of the processes and policies in place to select implementing partners; - KII with DEC members and implementing partners show light on some of the coordination issues faced, if any; - KII with relevant in-country stakeholders confirm that the response is delivered in coordination with other initiatives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inventory of current coordination platforms and mechanisms - Assessment of challenges and success stories of coordination - Analysis of any evidence of coordination in targeting geographical areas and thematic areas of response - Assess if and how programs across organisations are completing each other

XI.2. Detailed methodology

XI.2.1. Desk review & inception phase

The review started with a remote preliminary briefing between Key Aid and the DEC secretariat on 3 June 2019. Beyond fostering a broad and general understanding of the DEC appeal-related projects and the consultancy's ToR, this briefing served to situating the consultancy in context, discuss study matrix and indicators. The briefing also served to organise logistics for the field visits and gather the list of documents available for the desk review.

Key Aid conducted a desk review of DEC members' plans, reports and budgets for Zimbabwe. The documents reviewed so far are:

- DEC Operations Manual for Members
- DEC Member Programme Plans
- DEC Focal Point Roundtable meeting minutes
- Presence Maps
- Assessments conducted by DEC members
- Situation reports
- Seasonal timelines²⁶ and livelihood zones²⁷ profiles

To start the data collection process, Key Aid conducted an online survey to gather data on DEC members' and partners' field staff priority areas of inquiry. Key Aid also conducted an inception workshop in London on 18 June 2019. The workshop served a dual purpose of briefing DEC members on the response review proposed methodology and logistics as well as a data collection platform. Key Aid used the inception workshop to gather initial data on DEC members' expectations of the response review, cyclone response timeline and priorities for inquiry. The workshop was joined by representatives of the 13 DEC members active in the Idai response and of the DEC Secretariat. Key Aid followed up the London workshop with a country workshop held in Mutare, Zimbabwe on July 5, with 25 participants from DEC members attending.

XI.2.2. Primary data collection

Key Aid used Key Informant interviews and Focus group discussions as the main data collection methods. Key Aid also utilised the London and Zimbabwe inception workshops to gather data from participants. To augment all these tools, Key Aid used the response timeline analysis, livelihoods profiles, and seasonal timelines for affected areas as secondary data points for validation. These tools supported the data analysis framework. Key Aid conducted a second online survey to reach key informants who couldn't be reached for face to face interviews.

²⁶ Seasonal timeline is a depiction of the livelihood activities that people engage in on a monthly basis across the year.

²⁷ A livelihood zone is a geographical area within which people share basically the same patterns of access to food and income.

Key Informant Interviews

Country	Key Informant type	Estimated Number	Actual
Zimbabwe	DEC members	12	14
	Local partners	2	2
	Coordination bodies	2	2
	Local government representatives	2	3
	Other (nurses, ARES officials, Headmaster)	-	4
Total Zimbabwe		18	25

Focus Group Discussions

Country	Provinces	Districts	Estimated Number of FGDs	Actual	Women FGD	Men FGD	Mixed FGD
Zimbabwe	Manicaland	Chipinge	2	3	2	0	1
		Chimanimani	10	9	4	3	2
Total Zimbabwe			10	12	6	3	3

XI.2.3. Learning workshop

At the end of the data collection phase key Aid facilitated a half day presentation of the key findings. The workshop served to collectively draw conclusions and recommendations going forward. The learning workshop provided a platform for participatory learning and action planning by DEC member organisations.

XI.2.4. Analysis and Final report

Primary and secondary qualitative data was recorded and coded to analyse emerging trends. This was done using a coding matrix organised per review topic.

Additionally, Key Aid will employed seasonal timeline analysis, response timelines and livelihoods profiles. These frameworks supported the analysis around the areas of inquiry as well as framing recommendations for Phase Two programming. Understanding the seasonal timeline of disaster affected communities helped in analysing how the cyclone affected the normal livelihood strategies of communities. It aided in understanding the nature of support communities need and will need in the future. Examining livelihood zones of affected populations deepens understanding of the effects of the cyclone on affected populations. Livelihood zones analysis helped validate information on appropriateness and relevance of interventions and in recommending appropriate interventions in phase two responses.

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