

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

EVALUATION REPORT

- ▶ ▶ EVALUATION OF NORWEEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCILS DISTRIBUTION AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMMES - SOUTHERN ANGOLA 1997-2007

DISTRIBUTION AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME IN ANGOLA

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The observations, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are the exclusive responsibility of the evaluator/consultant, meaning that they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Refugee Council or its staff

Executive Summary

1. Project Description and Summary of Project Activities

Towards the end of the 1990's, when the people had to flee their villages for Matala, through the emergency phase in the reception centres, NRC in collaboration with WFP and FAO provided necessary food-aid and essential distribution of non-food items. The IDPs also received support for subsistence farming and reconstruction of schools and health-post, providing education and basic health care in the centres. To reduce the toll on the forests surrounding Matala, NRC in co-operation with MINADER also initiated a small-scale reforestation project. As the IDPs started returning to their original villages, either spontaneously in 2002 or organized in 2002/2003¹, NRC was able to refocus its Distribution Project in support of the returnees. From late 2002 and onwards, NRC provided returnees with essential non-food items, agriculture tools, seeds, livestock and supplementary food assisting the returnees back to normal life as soon as possible. NRC continued its school and health post reconstruction/rehabilitation, as well as the Reforestation project, parallel to the Distribution Project in the original villages of the returnees until the end of the project.

NRC also provided health education and civic training for the returnees through partnerships with local NGOs, and the NRC Human Rights project supported the Distribution Project addressing specific problems, such as discrimination of IDPs and dissatisfaction among the resident populations in the reception areas.

2. Project Set-up

The NRC project organisation, although not different from the structure in similar projects, have been very professional, implementing the project in an efficient manner, implementing project activities with a large degree of delegated responsibility from the NRC Country Office in Luanda. The NRC project team secured a flexible approach to the needs of the selected beneficiaries through the various phases of the project, and their good knowledge of local conditions and agriculture techniques had significant impact on the project results.

NRC co-ordinated activities within the humanitarian community, led by the UN Organisation for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). The “width and depth”, combining a number of activities under the common heading of the project, and the wide coverage in the project area, made NRC a privileged partner to the main national partners, Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER).

The feed-back from Angolan authorities and partners on NRCs performance is unanimously positive.

The Project has been relevant, and met its Overall Objectives.

¹ The Angolan Government decided that the emergency was over and decreed the start of the national reconstruction phase, deciding that villagers should return home.

3. Sustainability of Project

On Project level, based on observations, feed-back and testimony from partners and beneficiaries in the Huila province, NRC achieved its overall objective to *facilitate return, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs*, and made a difference to those persons who was displaced during the conflict and later returned to their traditional villages. There may be some “lost opportunities” discussed on page 28-29 of this report, both for NRC and provincial authorities related to the sustainability of the NRC project activities and the EU/EC Food Security project, which focuses on capacity building of the Provincial Delegation for Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER).

4. Lessons learned and recommendations

Some Lessons Learned and Recommendations are presented in this chapter on page 30.

5. Evaluation:

The NRC Distribution Project was evaluated in November and December 2007 (Annex B and C), through the study of documents, meetings and interviews with partners and donors (Annex D) in Luanda and Lubango, Province of Huila. A field trip was organised to the Municipalities of Matala, Chicomba and Jamba and the IDP Distribution Centres of Chipopia and Façenda Tomba as well as the resettled villages of Matome and Vihopio, all in the Province of Huila, for assessment and interviews of beneficiaries and local partners/stakeholders. At the time of the field visit, all project activities have ceased and the decommissioning of the project is nearly completed. Unfortunately, no visit to Kuando Kubango was possible during the period of this evaluation.

Map of Angola



1. Project Description and Summary of Project Activities

NRC Terms of Reference:

Summarize the activities implemented: what, where, when, to how many and to whom.

Introduction

In 1995, NRC first established a project in the northern province of Zaire to assist refugees returning from DRC, with support from a Country Office based in the Angolan capitol Luanda. Fighting between UNITA and Government forces increased during 1998, forcing NRC to withdraw from Makela do Zombo, to relocate to M'Banza Congo, the provincial capital of Bie Province. In January 1999, M'Banza Congo is captured by UNITA forces, and NRC have to suspend its operation, evacuating the "Northern Project" area altogether, to return only 2 months later in 1999 when the Government forces again took control of the provincial capital.

During 1999, fighting in Central and Southern Angola made a large number of people to seek refuge in and around the small southern town of Matala, Huila Province, a highly strategic location due to its hydroelectric plant and protected by Government forces (and Cubans in earlier days). As NRC simultaneously was evacuating the project in the Northern provinces it was decided by NRC to initiate project activities in the south.

Matala being one of the "hot-spots" as war broke out again in 1998/1999 it is plausible and probable that NRCs presence resulted from a request from the Provincial Government in the Huila Province, and the overall co-ordination of the humanitarian assistance in the country by OCHA and WFP.

An international organisation operating in the Province of Huila in co-operation with the World Food Programme (WFP), CARE International, was running out of funds assisting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Matala Municipality, and was thus unable to fulfil its commitment to distribute food support to the IDPs. It is probable that the Provincial Government of Huila requested the humanitarian assistance from NRC, with the result that NRC replaced CARE International in these areas of the Province.

Southern Project Chronology

1999 In March 1999 NRC initiated a combined distribution project in co-operation with World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Local Government and other Partners. Under NRCs project, the partners collaborated in distributing food, Non Food Items (NFIs) including agricultural equipment, tools and seeds, livestock and plants for reforestation. The project commenced in March 1999 in the Matala Municipality in the centre region of Huila Province where NRC supported 35 000 beneficiaries (IDPs) living in camp conditions. Towards the end of 1999, the number of IDPs in Matala nearly doubled, and in January 2000, NRC provided food aid to 65 000 beneficiaries.

- 2000** In 2000, the project expanded rapidly, both in terms of outreach and in terms of more comprehensive distribution project activities. NRC was requested by the Provincial Governments of Cunene (south of Huila towards the border with Namibia) and Namibe (west of Huila towards the coast) to assist IDPs in these provinces. In addition to food aid, NRC started distributing Non Food Items (NFIs), shelter, seeds and basic agriculture tools. Health and school programmes were initiated in the distribution centres close to Matala, and NRC constructed schools and health posts with inputs from the WFP Food For Work as incentive for the labour force recruited among the IDPs.
- 2001** NRC continued its rapid expansion eastwards in 2001 in support of IDPs in Menongue, the provincial capital of Kuando Kubango situated to the immediate east of Huila, where NRC opened a branch office of the Southern Distribution Project. In 2001, NRC programmed for a continued emergency, supporting IDPs from distribution centres in and around Menongue and Matala through 2002, which was negotiated and agreed with the donors. Although IDPs still arrived in the NRC project areas in Huila and Kuando Kubango, the developments in the armed conflict in the country meant that by the end of 2001, the armed conflict was all but over except for the continuous hunt for the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi.
- 2002** Having prepared for supporting IDPs in camps in 2002, the cessation of hostilities after the killing of the UNITA leader in February and with the Peace Agreement signed in April 2002, meant this became a hectic year for NRC, with rapidly increasing numbers of returnees from the camps in Huila and project expansion further eastward from Menongue to the previously inaccessible Mavinga.

In April 2002, NRC together with Government- and UN Officials as well as donor representatives took part in a Rapid Assessment of Mavinga in the eastern part of the Kuando Kubango province. Mavinga, being one of the major UNITA strongholds and having been almost inaccessible, except from the air, for many years, was found in urgent need of food aid and basic health services. NRC managed to negotiate the expansion with support from the donors, and started its operations in Mavinga, distributing food and providing shelter already 3 months later, in July 2002.

At the end of the armed conflict, the Angolan Government rapidly declared end to the emergency and start to the reconstruction of the country. There were strong political implications to return displaced people to their original homes to seize control of the territory and to re-establish the administrative/political structures. As the humanitarian community had planned for continued conflict in 2002, and overtaken by the rapid change in events, NRC had to re-focus its distribution project from supporting IDPs in camps to supporting large number of people returning to their original homes. Inherently, the humanitarian community's planning for an organised return process, and deliberations over how to respond to the authorities' return policies, was too slow for the Government. Some IDPs

started returning spontaneously, voluntarily, and some were forced by the events to return, but most people wanted to return home to cultivate their fields and re-establish their lives. While it took some time to re-organise the project, NRC courageously made a commitment to support the return process, initially, with assistance from MINARS, organising transport for the returnees and also distributing food rations for the returning population.

See also Annex G for illustration of development in access for humanitarian organisations between January 2002 and January 2003.

2003 The return process, caused by the events in 2002, continued in 2003. Throughout the second half of 2002, NRC planned and prepared the project for following the IDPs home, and even though still under emergency terms, refocusing the project towards establishing sustainable livelihoods and rehabilitation of community infrastructure in the returnee's areas. While the spontaneous and organised return processes started with increasing number of IDPs returning home, new IDPs continued to arrive in the reception centres in Huila, Namibe and Kuando Kubango throughout 2002 and into 2003. Supporting both new IDPs and returnees meant the number of beneficiaries of the NRC Distribution Project peaked in 2003, with 140 000 beneficiaries.

In addition to the support to IDPs in Kuando Kubango, NRC also supported ex-UNITA (demobilised) soldiers and families in so-called Gathering Areas and Family Reception areas.

The abrupt and declared transition from emergency to rehabilitation created problems for some donors, who often provide funds for the two phases from different budget lines or in some instances from different offices entirely; the scoping and financing of rehabilitation projects is often more diligent and thus take more time than developing emergency projects. The policies of the Angolan Government made the donor community more cautious funding project in Angola, reducing availability of funds considering that the government should finance more of its rehabilitation and reconstruction from its rapidly increasing oil revenues. As a result, although at the peak in 2003, the NRC Distribution Project experienced funding restrictions of its operations in this period.

Following the returnee's home meant deterioration in work safety for the NRC project staff. From providing assistance in safe camp areas and driving on safe roads, staff now had to reach beneficiaries in areas where military campaigns had been ongoing and driving on hazardous roads, suspect of being laid with landmines. To reduce the risk landmines and other explosive remnants of war posed on its staff, NRC procured 3 armoured vehicles from South Africa.

2004 2004 has by several NRC project staff been labelled "the best year" and the "end of the *dor de cabeça*" (headache). Throughout the year, the NRC Distribution Project supported the resettlement and return of IDPs in Huila and Kuando

Kubango, consolidating its operations distributing food and non-food items in addition to the increasing distribution of agriculture inputs (seeds, tools and animals) to boost agriculture development and promote self reliance in food production among the beneficiaries.

In Mavinga, Kuando Kubango, IDPs from remote areas of the province and refugees returning from Zambia and Namibia continued arriving, receiving food and NFI assistance in the reception centres. The IDP-centres in Mavinga closed down in September 2004, and the last IDPs received food, NFI, agriculture inputs as well as transport assistance to their return areas.

Most returnees and resettlers were capable of reconstructing their homes without assistance from NRC, who supported reconstruction and rehabilitation of schools and health posts although at a low pace due to lower than planned budget inputs.

The NRC project ceased its operations in the Namibe province in 2004.

- 2005** Having identified most of the beneficiaries in Huila and Kuando Kubango, the returned/returning population, as small subsistence farmers, NRC continued its project focus on improving living conditions for the beneficiaries and providing support in becoming self sufficient in food production, distributing agriculture/horticulture seeds, draught animals and ploughs.

Food distribution was limited to Food For Work operations in support of clearing agriculture land, rehabilitation efforts of schools and health posts, and some road maintenance.

- 2006** NRC continued its effort in improving food security in its project areas in the provinces of Huila and Kuando Kubango. As food distribution stopped in 2006, activities focused on distribution of agriculture- and horticulture seeds, animals and tools (hoes and ploughs). To improve basic living conditions and hygiene, NRC also distributed soap and used clothing in the project areas.

In the Jamba Municipality of Huila, NRC project staff held a capacity building training course was held for the local Agriculture Management/Co-ordination committee, consisting of technicians from the local administrations, village elders/sobas and farmers, to address the importance of maintaining the healthy condition of the distributed animals. The training course later gave foundation to the local Management/Co-ordination committee that still exist today as a result of NRCs intervention.

- 2007** In 2007, NRC distributed some small quantities of food during a limited time-period to returning refugees in Kuando Kubango. Although access remains difficult to the remote areas of the province, NRC also continued its distribution of seeds and agriculture tools also this year.

No food was distributed in Huila in 2007, although the seed and tools distribution continued and included the planting season for the next harvest. As rain has been scarce during the critical months of October and November, it is too early to predict an outcome of the harvest.

The NRC Distribution Project concluded its activities and was decommissioned by the end of 2007.

Project Components

The following project components are under the common heading of the NRC Distribution Project:

- **Food Distribution**

Direct food aid was provided to IDPs in camps, mostly during the conflict years 1999 to 2002 in accordance with rations recommended and supplied by the WFP. In 2003 and 2004, some food was distributed in the more precarious Kuando Kubango province, and for the populations returning to their homes from the camps as food supplements to secure nutritional status and to protect seeds from being consumed as food.

Arriving in IDP camps, often in a mal- or undernourished state, IDPs would initially receive food from communal kitchens. When registered, in the case of this project by WFP upon arrival, each household received its food ration on a fortnightly or monthly basis until it was able to produce its own food. The food basket provided by NRC, in collaboration with WFP, consisted of basic food staples, such as maize/maize-meal, beans/pulses, rations of dried fish or canned meat and some supplements of industrial food products such as salt, oil and sugar.

Some food from WFP has been used in Food For Work projects, where beneficiaries receive additional food incentives in exchange for work, for example constructing shelter, schools and health posts.

One of the main problems faced by NRC during the project implementation was the difficult access to, and remote areas in, the Province of Kuando Kubango. Food Aid had to be transported by air, at an unsustainable cost. In the later phases of the project, the success of implementation for NRC depended on WFP's ability to secure enough funds for its air operations. While NRC and WFP managed to obtain a minimum nutritional level among the beneficiaries in the province, the food basket depended on the availability of products from the WFP pipeline.

The direct food-aid of the project has been implemented in collaboration with the WFP, whose role in logistic support was to transport food rations to the partners, who then would distribute food to distribution centres and later to the beneficiaries. In the case of this project, WFP transported food to Matala (Huila), Mavinga and Menongue for NRC, who would transport and distribute food for the beneficiaries at the distribution centres. To increase efficiency of the operation in

Huila, WFP later agreed (2003) to transport the food rations all the way forward to the NRC Distribution Centres.

NRC has enjoyed a “special partnership” with WFP during the implementation of this project, both thanks to the size of the project translating into capacity and efficiency, and the professionalism of the project staff, who had the experience and knowledge to positively influence the distribution process in terms of the aid provided, and the methodology used for distribution. NRC was reportedly efficient in its distribution of the food aid, and managed the safety of the distribution well. Following a discussion with WFP in 2002 regarding irregularities in the verification and control of beneficiaries, the loss from poor management, for example poor storage conditions, pilferage and theft were small, compared with other comparable organisations in the project area (Huila).

FAO is a partner to the responsible governmental institutions, MINADER and MINARS, and to the NRC Distribution Project, monitoring nutritional- and food supply status in the provinces supported by NRC.

- **Non Food Items Distribution**

During the whole project implementation period, NRC, often in collaboration with other partners such as ECHO and FAO who provide funds or items in-kind, has distributed a range of Non Food Items (NFIs) to the beneficiaries of the Distribution Project. The items vary from basic arrival kits for IDPs containing used clothes, blankets, tarpaulins for shelter and “pots and pans” for kitchen use.

While in the camps, the IDPs received additional materials for building more permanent shelter, basic agriculture tools (hoes and machetes) for food production, seeds and hygiene items.

For IDPs returning to their homes, NRC provided a NFI “family kit” consisting mostly of used clothes, soap bars and kitchen sets. For farmers returning to their land, NRC also provided basic, traditional agriculture tools and seeds, as well as fruit-tree seedlings.

The NFI distribution is necessary and covers a range of basic needs, in supplement to the food aid, both for the beneficiary/receiving family and to mitigate the difficulties in change of living conditions that camp life and returning to traditional homes represent. The items offered often represent great value to the beneficiary, and while this fact may create demand in its own right, no negative feed-back regarding the distributed NFIs was observed during the field visit of this evaluation from resettled villagers, suggesting that the recipients generally were satisfied with the quantity/quality of the distributed items.

- **Agriculture Distribution**

To boost self sufficient food production among the returnees, a major activity of the NRC project targeting returnees in the period from 2003 -2007,

When returning from the IDP-centres, the returnees received a “kit” containing among other NFIs, seeds, hoes and machetes to clear their farm upon arriving home. The beneficiaries of the NRC project was identified as mostly being subsistence farmers, maize and animals being one of the major agriculture outputs (Huila), and the NRC project staff managed to convince donors and food aid experts from WFP and FAO that a change in methodology to animal distribution was necessary to provide durable solutions for the returnees. From 2003, until the end of the project in 2007, according to the accumulated data from NRC monthly project reports, the NRC Distribution Project distributed 738 oxen, 2 109 goats and 4 000 chicken to beneficiaries in Huila and Kuando Kubango. The distribution of animals was accompanied by appropriate tools, ploughs, and training in farming techniques for the recipients. The right combination of animals, equipment and training was based on the good knowledge of local conditions among the NRC project staff, appears to have been a major contributing factor to the success of the project. As one villager in Vihopio (Chicomba Municipality, Huila) put it: “the oxen were a bit skinny when they arrived, but they are still being used today”. As with other highly valuable inputs, the complaint is that there were not enough animals.

To understand the impact of the animal distribution, one need some insight in the agriculture production in this particular part of the country, as well as the “economics” involved in the use of animals in the area. Jamba, Matala and Chicomba are all on the so-called “Maize-Trail” of the Huila Province, an area that traditionally have been efficient in producing Maize (and beans) for export to the rest of the southern region of the country, and even to Luanda. This is, in other words, not a meat producing part of the country, but livestock (oxen) is extremely important input for ploughing and ground preparation to enable a large enough production of maize and beans to allow the farmer an income enabling him to provide for his family, community, and ultimately to save enough enabling him to also plant and harvest in next year. The oxen represent the highest capital investment and the most valuable tool for the farmer in his production, which is why the animals also play such a high role in the social and cultural life in the villages (see also the last paragraph of this chapter). For the success of the project in creating self-reliant livelihoods for the beneficiaries to the project, it is important that the farmer’s production is increased to a level where he can sustain an income of a level as described above. For the project to have lasting success, it is necessary for the farmer and the village/community that they are in a position to increase the production from year to next (economic growth on a local scale). The NRC project staff has estimated the provisional cost of securing production growth, and thus the economy, to a sustainable level (“solving the problem”) at USD 2.500 per farmer in the target areas of the project, which implies some unrealistic economic consequences both for NRC and the donors.

NRC has distributed a large number of chickens and goats alongside the oxen to the beneficiaries in the project area. Besides the occasional side effect of

providing animal protein in the farmer's family diet, this is a solution to the economic problem of providing enough livestock to secure economic balance and development in the project area. The economic rationale goes something like this:

- The value of 10 chickens equals 1 goat.
- The value of 10 goats equals 1 oxen.

The smaller animals, such as chickens and goats, are thus a lower capital, but equally important input to the economic development and stability for the farming population of the beneficiaries. The animals distributed by the NRC project, together with existing livestock, are circulated among the farmers in the beneficiary communities for breeding and rearing animals, creating a foundation allowing the farmer and his village/community to prosper. The provision of training to the recipients of the animals is designed to provide the farmer with knowledge and attitudes towards the importance of maintaining the livestock, to secure that they provide the economic foundation they were intended for.

When studying the distribution tables at the back of this report, the number of animals to beneficiaries may be a bit confusing. The answer to this is that the animals were not distributed directly to one farmer (for example: one farmer receives 1 ox, 2 goats, 3 chickens, etc.), but distributed as a function of number of families living in one community. The community is then responsible in ensuring the best possible use of the animals within the community itself².

Over the same period, 2003-2007, NRC continued distribution of agriculture/horticulture seeds, seedlings and tools distribution. In 2002, NRC in collaboration with MINADER established a tree seedling nursery outside Matala in the Huila Province. The nursery has produced an annual production of seedlings that was first distributed to the IDPs as a counter measure for deforestation, and later, for the same reason, to the returnees.

The 2002/2003 evaluation of NRCs IDP-projects (T&B Consult, May 2003) apparently concluded that the distribution of valuable assets, such as oxen and ploughs, rarely came to the full benefit of the most vulnerable beneficiaries they were intended for, but mostly benefited those already in position and power. This evaluation do not dispute this conclusion, but rather emphasise that, although this may hold true while IDPs were living in camps, the distribution of animals and equipment, supported by training, to the returnees have had a major impact in the returned communities, increasing the agriculture output and thus a production level and economic surplus creating the foundation for self reliance and food security among the beneficiaries. The cause of this may be that the communities at home distribute the use of the animals more in accordance with their traditional social and habitual production patterns and thus experience less conflict. The oxen

² While the distribution of animals was based on number of families/households in a community, NRC reports on 5 person average per family. The number of beneficiaries in the annexed Distribution Tables will thus carry forward an inherent error in the number of beneficiaries to number of animals, that will not add up.

represent enormous values for the villages, *Sobas*, who often build their social value system, even the legal system where the oxen is the value in which criminal punishment is offered, on the value and use of animals.

- **Food for Work - Schools and Education**

As part of the Distribution Project, NRC have constructed and reconstructed a number of school buildings and teachers quarters, both in the vicinity of the IDP/Distribution Centres and in the local communities of the returnees. NRC provides construction material and incentives for labour under the Food For Work project. The schools have been handed over to the local government, who are responsible for the provision of teaching staff and equipment.

In the areas of Huila Province visited during this evaluation, the schools rehabilitated or constructed by NRC were in use, and staffed with local teachers from the Government. In Vihopio Village of the Chicomba Municipality, the school building constructed by NRC house education facilities for 400 pupils arriving from a radius of 8 km away on a daily basis. The community have obviously taken ownership of the school, providing necessary maintenance and upkeep.

Parallel to the school construction and rehabilitation activities of the Distribution project, but as a part of the project, NRC-Angola have implemented a Teacher Emergency Package (TEP) in co-operation with the Angolan Ministry of Education and UNICEF. The TEP programme offer basic, primary education for children of that age that otherwise have missed primary education as well as teachers training. The programme has its own set-up, and is managed from Luanda.

The 2003 Evaluation of NRC's IDP Projects recommends that NRC should consider alternative investments to school buildings for promotion of education. In view of the objective of the Distribution Project, to improve and facilitate, and the fact that the buildings are in everyday use and staffed, it appears that the reconstruction and construction of school buildings serves its project purpose. Although the TEP project and the Distribution Project are different entities within the NRC Country Programme and managed by different Project Managers, it appears that the collaboration and integration of the two projects have worked well on field level, depending on shared infrastructure in the project areas. It was pointed out during the field visit of this evaluation that other organisations, with different approaches to education, have left school buildings that are not being used by the local communities.

- **Food for Work - Health**

The NRC has supported the rehabilitation and construction of health-posts, both related to the IDP/Distribution Centres and in support of the returnees. The health-posts related to the IDPs were initially operated by Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), while the government has provided nurses/health technicians

for the health-posts in the returnee's areas. In the project areas visited in Huila in December 2007, all health-posts supported by NRC were in use, and staffed with government, Ministry of Health, staff.

Although not a part of the Southern Distribution Project, NRC also trained a network of health care teams/activists to provide basic training and awareness on preventive health-care, sanitation, hygiene and related topics. The preventive health care teams/activists are selected among the target groups, mostly women, visiting areas of other target groups, providing information and public awareness related to a number of health related topics, such as awareness sessions on hygiene and basic health, syphilis, gonorrhea and HIV/AIDS. The teams/activists also make home calls to provide advice, awareness and instructions. Part of this activity was implemented in collaboration with local NGO "Clube de Jovens", who also provided Mine Awareness and addressed Human Rights topics to the target group, often using various techniques, such as theatre and other types of performances to reach a wider audience with its messages.

NRC in collaboration with its partners trained a number of 1487 Community Health Activists in Huila, Namibe and Kuando Kubango during the period from 1999 – 2006.

- **Generic Activities/Set-up**

The Southern Distribution/Shelter Project was generally managed and co-ordinated from the NRC Field Office in Lubango, Huila Province, where the Project Manager and Project Management team as well as secretarial staff was located. The Field Office co-ordinated the field activities and support functions of smaller project offices in Matala (Huila), Menongue and Mavinga (Kuando Kubango). 3 NRC Project Officers in Matala, Menongue and Mavinga supervised Field Monitors who carried out the implementation of the project on field level, supported by local "Collaborators" – Government Employees and IDPs working under the Food For Work project – who was casually contracted/employed as required for the project activities.

From 2003 and onwards, WFP delivered food supplies directly to the distribution sites of the project, and storage facilities was kept at a minimum with small warehouse facilities in Matala (Huila) and Mavinga (Kuando Kubango). In Menongue (Kuando Kubango), two 40-foot containers served as store-room facilities. The warehouses kept agriculture seeds and tools, NFI's and construction materials for shorter periods, only.

Food items for distribution in Mavinga was provided by WFP by air, and the logistics surrounding this operation was managed from Luanda, for practical reasons, as the food items originated there. Otherwise, and in particular from 2003/2004 and onwards, the NRC Southern Distribution/Shelter Project became increasingly independent from the Country Office in terms of logistics and support (transport, maintenance and management) for its field activities.

The Project Manager enjoyed a high level of autonomy and delegated responsibility from the NRC Resident Representative in planning and implementing project activities.

From NRC staff, there were some comments that logistics, initially, was run from the Country Office in Luanda. The experience on field level of this set-up was mixed, pointing out that supplying the Southern Project through Luanda was both time-consuming and costly compared to the possibilities offered by the location of Lubango with its easy and ready access to the Namibian border, through the Province of Cunene in the south, and the port of Namibe, compared to the logistics for the Northern Project that had to run through Luanda. Certain strategies, such as ordering more material and equipment earlier than necessary, was applied to surpass the delays experienced with the Luanda logistics office, and the problem all together alleviated as the Southern Project gained more autonomy throughout the project implementation. As mentioned above, the reasoning behind supporting logistics from Luanda was that the NRC Projects in the north of the country was depending on the joint administrative and financial support in Luanda, but it would probably have benefited the efficiency of the Southern Project logistics more autonomy in this regard.

The integration of activities appears to have worked well on field level, with different projects, the Distribution-, TEP- and Human Rights Projects, depending on much of the same infrastructure and at large working with the same target groups. The project management of the Distribution Project was located in Lubango, Province of Huila, and the project managers for TEP and Human Rights was located in the Capital, Luanda, may have created some organisational inconsistencies is indicated in discussions with NRC project staff. Some of the problems may stem from “normal” Field vs. Headquarter communication problems, and some from rivalry or difference in opinions, resulting in miscommunication or misunderstandings between the various projects. Although there are no indications that these problems delayed or hindered implementation of project activities, except verbally expressed irritation, NRC should ensure that it is a management responsibility to create full integration between various programme components – building down walls and “kingdoms”.

As the Southern Distribution Project clearly demonstrated the ability to accept responsibility, and to implement activities of high quality independently, further integration of other project components, such as the logistics, TEP and Human Rights could have enhanced the project’s impact and results. Not all involved with the project agree with this observation: while the issue was brought up in interview with project staff, NRC managers have indicated that delegating more autonomy to the project in the south was never an option or a theme for discussion.

- **NRC Angola Management**

Throughout the implementation period of the project, NRC maintained a Country Office in Luanda, providing necessary functions such as logistics and administrative support to the projects. The Country Office is managed by a Resident Representative who, formally, reports to the NRC Head of International Department, although to a Programme Officer based at the NRC Head Offices in Oslo on a day to day basis. The Resident Representative is responsible for overall management, policies and decision making within the NRC Angola Programme within the framework of NRCs mandate, policies, strategies and other guidelines, for example the Programme Principles for Distribution Programmes, relevant to the Angola Programme.

Distribution Tables

The following tables demonstrate the annual distribution of various components within the Distribution Projects.

Table 1, below, demonstrates the development of food aid to beneficiaries in the provinces targeted by the NRC Distribution Project. The table is derived and extended from a table found in the Final Report of the external evaluation of NRC IDP Programme (T&B Consult, May 2003). This table is intended to show the development of the project throughout the implementation, using Food Aid data as a comparative measurement, of project beneficiaries, being IDPs, Returnees or Refugees, respectively.

Table 1: Number of Beneficiaries receiving Food Aid at peak per year, 1999-2007

Month and Year	Namibe	Huila	Cunene	Kuando Kubango	Project Total
1999 (March)	0	35 000	0	0	35 000
2000 (January)	0	67 000	0	0	67 000
2000 (max)	14 000	67 000	0	0	81 000
2001	5 000	41 000	1 000	0	47 000
2002	2 560	47 360	1 740	111 620	163 280
2003	555	57 180	0	155 050	212 785
2004	0	88 810	0	118 010	206 820
2005	0	98 220	0	99 445	197 665
2006:	No food distribution				
2007:	Small quantities of food distributed to arriving refugees (externally), only.				

The data in Tables 2 - 7³ is collected from NRCs Monthly Project Reports in the period from 2002 to 2007, and is intended to demonstrate at a glance what NRC implemented within the Distribution Project core activity, the number of beneficiaries under each distribution headline, number of project staff and the donors, including amounts, to the project per year.

Table 2: NRC 2002

Year: 2002	Project Number: AOFV0202
Donor:	

³ Tables 2 to 8 are shown in full in Annex A at the back of this evaluation report.

- Norwegian MFA: NOK 10 350 000 + NOK 1 600 000 (not spent in Burundi)
- WFP: NOK 2 030 574
- NRC (own funds): NOK 712 653

(OCHA provided NOK 230 961 in a special grant due to flooding in Namibe)

Total Budget: NOK 14 693 652

Number of NRC Project Staff: 53

Table 3: NRC 2003

Year: 2003 **Project Number:** AOFV0302/AOFV0302/AOFK0307

Donor:

- Norwegian MFA: NOK 9 800 000
- WFP: NOK 1 600 000
- FAO: NOK 202 470
- NRC (own funds): 505

Total Budget: NOK 11 668 903 for AOFV0302

- SIDA: NOK 1 753 621 for AOFV 0304
- ECHO: NOK 3 414 587 for AOFK0307

Total Budget for Southern Project 2003: NOK 16 837 111

Number of NRC Staff: 59

Table 4: NRC 2004

Year: 2004 **Project Name:** AOFV0402/AOFV0404

Donor:

- Norwegian MFA: NOK 8 100 000
- WFP: NOK 1 368 126
- FAO: NOK 57 853

Total Budget: NOK 9 659 315 for AOFV0402

- ECHO: NOK 2 215 050 for AOFV0404

Total Budget for Southern Project 2004: NOK 11 874 365

Number of NRC Staff: 23

Table 5: NRC 2005

Year: 2005 **Project Name:** AOFV0501/AOFV0502/AOFR0501

Donor:

- Norwegian MFA: NOK 7 000 000
- WFP: NOK 122 422
- SIDA: NOK 1 736 000
- Norwegian MFA (to (AOFR0501) NOK 3 000 000

Total Budget for Southern Project 2005: NOK 11 858 422

Number of NRC Staff: 40

Table 6: NRC 2006

Year: 2006

Project Number: AOFV0601/AOFV 0602

Donor:

- Norwegian MFA: 4 000 000
- SIDA: NOK 1 800 000
- WFP: NOK 384 000

Total Budget for Southern Project 2006: NOK 6 184 000

Number of NRC Project Staff: 22

Table 7: NRC 2006/2007⁴

Year: 2007

Project Number: AOFK0601

Donor:

- Norwegian MFA: NOK 2 500 000
- SIDA: NOK 1 200 000

Total Budget for Southern Project 2006/2007: NOK 4 000 000

Number of NRC Project Staff: 9

2. Project Set-Up

NRC Terms of Reference:

⁴ It was reported by NRC staff that the Project AOFV0601 was planned and started implemented in 2006, but major project activities were also continued into 2007.

Assess the set-up of the project; methodology used, implementation, result/impact, partners and beneficiaries.

Project Set-up

The NRC project organisation in Angola and Lubango has been efficient, adequate and well suited to the task of implementing the Distribution Project, although not radically different from what is expected in this kind of projects. If the organisation is different in any sense, it is the relatively low participation of expatriate staff on the project's roster, the consistency of the national staff and the ability of working efficiently, independent from any "heavy handed" supervision from Luanda. Among the NRC staff, the quality and good relationships, within the project team, as well as the ambience in the workplace, is brought forth as one of the most positive experiences of having worked on the team. The project arrived in Lubango at a fortunate time, when UN and other humanitarian organisations laid off staff due to reduced activities when the country went back to armed conflict in late 1998⁵, and NRC were lucky to choose top rate staff from the top shelf of other organisations in Lubango. This fact should not overshadow NRCs apparent ability to maintain a solid "staff-base" throughout the project period, and the staff's professionalism in solving its tasks. The level of autonomy and independence the project has enjoyed also indicate a mature organisation; it takes a grown up organisation enabling delegation of responsibility to the degree that the Distribution Project has enjoyed, successfully, working under very difficult conditions.

One of the conclusions of this evaluation is that one of the success factors of the project has been the quality, capacity and professionalism of its staff. How to translate this into a lesson learned for future NRC project is not easy. The value of good, local knowledge, combined with capacity to implement is not easy to find in all circumstances, almost always underestimated, and is not at all easy in Angola. An integrated, combined distribution project, as seen in Southern Angola, requires professional inputs on various levels: food security, agriculture, logistics besides the ability of long-term thinking in humanitarian/emergency planning to mention a few. To translate the success of this project into lessons learned in other projects, NRC may consider to ensure that an "in-house" capacity⁶ in key areas such as mentioned above, is available supporting local capacities and projects with strong local foundation in planning and project definition (Quality Assurance) for future projects.

Beneficiary Selection

The documentation provided related to the Distribution Project indicate that NRC, in co-ordination with national authorities and the UN humanitarian co-ordinating bodies, OCHA and WFP, made the right selection criteria in defining beneficiaries to the project, also in line with the organisation's own defined policies⁷. The criteria for identifying Target Groups are well defined in project documents, adhering to, for example, WFPs regulations on food rations, and appear to have been met in the field. The project has

⁵ EU/ECHO, for example, suspended all funds in second half of 1998 because of the developments in the country, and many EU Country's embassies followed suit.

⁶ It is outside the scope of this evaluation to assess the in-house capacity of NRC, and does not attempt to do so!

⁷ Norwegian Refugee Council - Distribution

addressed a wide range of identified Target Groups, through various phases of war, immediate peace, return and rehabilitation, making the project the most comprehensive response to the emergency, with the widest coverage within in its project area (mostly Huila and Kuando Kubango).

NRC engaged Local authorities, IDPs as well as resident populations, where relevant, in defining needs and organising distribution related activities. The local, resident population benefited in part from the Distribution Project, for example by using schools and health posts rehabilitated by the project.

Initial registration of beneficiaries was conducted by WFP, and an earlier (2002) reported disagreement between NRC and WFP related to irregularities in the number of beneficiaries was solved in 2003. No accusations or further disagreement was reported through the later phases of the implementation of the project.

Studying project reports and documentation, it appears that NRC made necessary and relevant allowances for a gender sensitive approach in its beneficiary selection, also through the gender awareness activities of the Human Rights team and information campaigns implemented in partnership with the local NGO “Clube de Jovens” in Huila Province. In some instances, a gender sensitive approach works against the traditional gender balance, and NRC successfully insisted on the participation of women in project activities.

Humanitarian Co-ordination

The Angolan Government have assumed the responsibility for co-ordination of the humanitarian effort in Angola through its designated Ministry for Social Reconstruction, MINARS⁸, but also organisations from the UN have played a major role in the facilitation, co-ordination, information and resource mobilisation of aid and relief efforts. The UN Organisation for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance, OCHA, established liaison and co-ordination mechanisms with the governmental counterparts, first and foremost MINARS *Unidade Técnica de Coordenação de Assistência Humanitária* (UTCAH), on national and provincial levels, and also a tie-in with the donor community and the respective Embassies/Diplomatic Missions and NGOs present in Luanda.

OCHA supported the Angolan Government’s plans and strategies through UTCAH at a designated office in Luanda, facilitating co-ordination meetings between various humanitarian actors, government (Ministries and Institutes) and donors, issuing regular humanitarian update bulletins and also providing emergency funds through its Rapid Response Fund, that also NRC received financial support from. OCHA, and later the RCU, chaired the Consolidated Appeal Process, collecting and approving humanitarian projects, ensuring national coverage according to priorities set in collaboration with the Government in co-ordination with the implementing organisations.

Within the UN system, leadership in the humanitarian co-ordination is traditionally handed the UN agency with highest presence in the host country. During the emergency

⁸ Ministério de Assistência e Reinserção Social - MINARS

response in Angola, the WFP Resident Representative also carried the charge of Resident Co-ordinator, a role that was gradually handed UNDP through 2003 and 2004. In January 2005, the UNDP Resident Representative took over co-ordination efforts establishing the Resident Co-ordinator's Unit (RCU). Other UN agencies have a mandate to intervene within their particular sector, such as the UNHCR, who has the overall "Lead Agency" role co-ordinating assistance to refugees and IDPs.

On Provincial level, the humanitarian assistance was organised through the Provincial Co-ordination Groups, chaired by the Provincial Government – usually the Vice Governor for the Social Sphere. The Provincial Co-ordination Group was usually an inclusive meeting of all humanitarian actors in a province, setting priorities for the relief aid response and securing coverage through provincial co-ordination. The Co-ordination Group also fulfilled another function for the humanitarian NGOs, as this was the forum where organisations received their task, or mandate, to respond to a particular priority or situation, and raise concerns and difficulties (for example related to Human Rights) in co-ordination with the authorities.

The Provincial Co-ordination Group, supported by an OCHA Field Advisor, was divided into Sub-Groups addressing co-ordination and implementation issues in particular sectors, such as Food Security, Health, Education and Mine Action. The Sub Groups were often chaired by representatives from the line ministries who answer for specific responsibilities in the provinces. In the case of the NRC Distribution Project, for example, while MINARS were responsible for the humanitarian co-ordination, the Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) were responsible for the food situation in the province, as well as responsible for allocating land for IDP settlements and agriculture re-settlements. In addition to MINARS and MINADER, NRC also collaborated with the Ministries of Education and Health, respectively, for issues related to the education and health components of the project.

With the wide and comprehensive coverage in Southern Angola, NRC has been a valued partner to MINARS and MINADER. The assessment of NRC obtained from the Provincial Delegates (Directors) of MINARS and MINADER during the evaluation visit to the Huila Province praised NRCs approach to co-ordination, its flexibility and professionalism in the field and the positive impact the project has had on the situation in the province; not only with regard to the distribution, but also in creating infrastructure such as schools and health posts. It was also brought forward that NRC earned its "privileged" partner status through its stability in financing its operations, making NRC an organisation to be counted on by the authorities. This assessment was echoed by representatives in the local administrations during the field visit of the evaluation.

OCHA and WFP have closed their operations in the south of Angola at the time of this evaluation, and it was thus not possible to meet with representatives from these partner organisations during the evaluation. Except for the dispute between WFP and over registered IDPs NRC in 2002/2003, there are no indications that the collaborative and co-ordination effort between OCHA/WFP and NRC was made in a successful partnership.

During the implementation of the project, NRC collaborated with other, non-governmental or non-UN organisations. The local, national NGO “Clube de Jovens” was contracted by NRC to provide different types of awareness training for the IDPs in camps, and for the returnees. This collaboration appears to have worked well, although a shortage of financial means specifically in support of this activity made the basis for this partnership weak. The health posts constructed or rehabilitated by the Distribution Project was staffed in collaboration with the international NGO Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). Related to the specific support to the health posts, the collaboration with MSF appears to have worked without problems, although it was reported by NRC project staff that there were problems with MSF (Spain), in the initial phases of the project, caused by MSF’s attempt to “sneak” in on NRC’s core activity, the distribution. Apparently, this conflict was solved by WFP declaring NRC as their preferred food-aid partner in the South.

Throughout the project, NRC communicated and co-ordinated activities directly, inclusively and in a participatory manner with the beneficiaries, establishing committees and involving local leaders. The way this direct contact with the beneficiaries was handled by NRC, and its staff, has had a positive impact on the project implementation, and is a significant contributing factor to the minimal negative consequences of the project.

Human Rights/Protection

The NRC Human Rights Project has had its autonomous set-up outside the framework of the Distribution Project. Its interface with the Distribution Project has been working on specific problems related to the IDP/returnee process, such as discrimination of IDPs vs. dissatisfaction among the resident populations, land rights issues related to the “Land Law” reform in 2004 and gender issues.

Human Rights and protection is a very difficult and sensitive area, working in Angola, in past and present. During the war-years, it is anticipated that the government and its agents, such as police and military, were the main perpetrator of abuse and violations on the civilian population. While all activities conducted by the NRC Distribution Project required co-operation from and co-ordination with the Government (through, down to the local administration), it is still a core mandate of NRC to provide protection to those persons in need among its beneficiaries. A de facto break down of the Angolan legal system and the Government’s uniformed agents being main perpetrators meant there were no mechanism available to effectively handle claims of abuse and violations. In the 2002/2003 return process, there are indications of systemic rights violations by the government by forcing IDPs to return under false premises and breaking its own, national laws, protecting the basic rights of the IDPs upon his return to his settlement area.

The situation related to Human Rights appears differently in the provinces of Huila and Kuando Kubango. While the greatest problem in Kuando Kubango relates to discrimination and animosities among the resident population and IDPs of different tribal backgrounds, for example Kangelá vs. Ombundu, the population in Huila experienced a lot of abuse from the Police.

NRC, together with other NGOs and the UN system, have addressed Human Rights issues, inviting to dialogue with the Government and establishing mechanisms for reporting rights violations to the local authorities.

Throughout the implementation of the project, NRC staff has received gender sensitivity and HR training. The NRC Human Rights Officer in Lubango, Huila, informed that the project was implemented without any reported abuse or human rights violations on the part of NRC and its staff.

Impact Assessment

Since the start in 1999, the project has gone through (at least) 3 distinctive phases: the rapid expansion and IDP phase in 2000 – 2002, and the abrupt and sudden returnee phase in 2002 – 2003, and the resettlement phase in 2004 – 2007. Through the phases, the **Overall Objective** of the project appears to have been consistently in line with the expressed, overall goal for the return and resettlement process set forth by the Angolan Government – creating and/or improving living conditions for the project’s identified beneficiaries in the provinces of Namibe, Huila, Cunene and Kuando Kubango. NRC have implemented a *combined project* with a number of *immediate- or specific project* objectives integrating and combining a number of Core Activities in line with NRCs Distribution Project policy document.

Comparing anticipated results and outputs from the existing Logical Frameworks (2003 – 2007), Project Documents and Reports, the project has reached its intended results and in some instances even over-performed in comparison with the anticipations.

Some temporary, limited capacity building on local and individual level related to farming techniques and maintenance of equipment took place among the beneficiaries receiving animals and agriculture tools during 2004-2007. A generally accepted point related to capacity building is, that a fragmented piecemeal approach is likely to have limited or no impact. For example: providing information and skills in farming techniques may be achieved relatively easy, but changing attitudes of individuals and organisations towards, for example, strategic development of the agriculture sector may take longer. Although the capacity building activities performed by NRC staff are necessary, and contribute to the overall objective of the project, it is uncertain if there will be any long term impact. The potential in focusing on durable solutions, rather than developing capacities appears to have realised better results in terms of impact for the project.

Evaluating impact implies establishing how the achievement of the project objectives and outputs contributed and met the needs of the beneficiaries, and, in this case, how it solved the problems of a displaced and returning population (result). Analyzing **Indicators** and **Results** from the existing Project Documentation, interviews with project staff and observations in Huila Province, the conclusion is that the project has performed as expected in terms of Impact, while in some instances performed above expectations of the project in terms of Results. To the point, this means that the project has achieved the anticipated impact relevant to the indicators presented in the project documentation, for

example: number of beneficiaries reached or number of items distributed, but the result (what is visible; the product) of the project is higher than expected when also counting on the total, positive impact the project has had on the recipient population, local administration, establishing social infrastructure and economic basis for further development, considering that the project has been implemented in a hostile and sometimes dangerous environment with great problems in terms of access and logistics.

While observing for this report it becomes clear that, through local initiative, experience and good knowledge of the area the project has been implemented in, that the project has drawn, and benefited immensely, on the project staff.

In the NRC Distribution Project, good, durable solutions have been found, and implemented, and conflicts avoided, thanks to the professionalism and efforts of its staff, that could have lifted the project's results. In terms of the project logical framework, the logic derives that IF the project achieved its results and objectives, THEN the overall objective should be achieved. Since 2002/2003, the NRC has had Logical Frameworks in place supporting the implementation of the project. What the documentation is not good at is providing information on the results of the project, for example using the Logical Framework *Risks and Assumptions* realising the contributing factors to achieving the overall goals and objectives. The project has, in other words, achieved more and has had an impact in subject areas not well documented in the reporting. The problem, related to this evaluation, is that, in the evaluators opinion, the project has delivered the anticipated results and thus achieved its objective, but that NRC could have demonstrated more in terms of its own impact on the results and objective. For example:

- It was reported during the visit to the project area in Huila Province that NRC project staff spent more than a month in negotiating with the local government for the location of the Distribution Centre in Fasenda Tomba, before the IDPs arrived there. The awareness among the local authorities and traditional leaders on the needs of the arriving IDPs achieved through the negotiations was raised as the main reason the distribution project could be implemented in this area without conflict with the resident population.
- “No one was more efficient in distributing than NRC” was stated in one interview during the field visit. Through good co-ordination with WFP and local authorities, NRC managed to bring food aid forward, directly to the distribution sites, where food was efficiently distributed with a minimum of loss and damage.
- Through good knowledge and experience in local agriculture techniques and traditions, NRC managed to convince such entities as FAO, WFP and the donors to change from distributing hoes and shovels, only, to also include animals and ploughs, more pertinent to the local conditions, which is estimated to have had a great impact on the success of the project.

The above examples, with its positive impact on the project results, are not possible without a competent and professional organisation.

Relevance Assessment

It has not been possible to obtain any direct reference to the decision process that led NRC to set up in the Huila Province first in 1999, although it is plausible and probable that this was a result of an overall humanitarian co-ordination, including Angolan Government authorities on national and provincial level, as well as UN agencies and the participation from donors. It has been indicated⁹ by the NRC Resident Representative at the time that start-up of the NRC project in Huila was based on a request from the Provincial Government, WFP and OCHA.

During the implementation phase of the project, NRC proved a great capacity and flexibility to approach challenges, particularly in 2002 deciding to assist in the return process while the rest of the humanitarian organisations and the government was considering what to do, and later expanding into Kuando Kubango and Mavinga, and to alter implementation methodology relevance to the situation. The latter also indicate a capacity to convince donors to fund project activities.

One of the major threats to the project has been the uncertainty of working in an environment of high risk related to landmines and unexploded remnants of war. NRC assessed the risk to the extent that it took the step of purchasing highly specialised, armoured vehicles from South Africa. The risk assessment and decision to protect its staff to this extent was a correct decision under the circumstance (and it is an ongoing debate whether to expose humanitarian workers to this level of risk), and the cost of alternative means of implementing the project, for example transporting all food, NFIs and other supplies by air, would have been far too costly, reducing the possibility of the project to reach as many beneficiaries, and to the extent required, to meet the objectives of the project. This indicates that project planners and staff had a capacity to analyse the needs and requirements on the ground, in the project area, and to meet challenges with coherent plans to mitigate risks in order to meet the humanitarian needs.

With direct reference to the NRC Evaluation Policy¹⁰ (NRC, p.6, paragraph 4.3.d) Impact), the NRC-Angola has implemented a combined, integrated Distribution Project with high impact and with few negative effects produced by the intervention. The project has been **pertinent**, in the meaning that it provided the **relevant** assistance and **made a difference** to the beneficiaries; it was flexible to provide the right assistance at the right time and adapted to the reality of the provinces where it was implemented. In other words, it did contribute to the Angolan and UN overall objective of the return and sustainable resettlement of the population.

3. Project Sustainability

NRC Terms of Reference:

Assess if and how the project in reality managed to offer durable solutions to the target groups.

⁹ E-mail from Ulrika Blom Mondlane, NRC Resident Representative, dated 20. December 2007

¹⁰ Norwegian Refugee Council, Evaluation Policy – Learning from Experience

On project level, based on observations, feed-back and testimony from partners and beneficiaries in the Huila province, NRC achieved its overall objective to *Facilitate return, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and IDPs*, and made a difference to those persons who was displaced during the conflict and later returned to their traditional villages.

Various government entities took part in the NRC Planning and Implementation Cycle on provincial, municipal and village level. During distributions and/or other activities, a representative from the local government always partook, reporting through official channels on the action. According to officials from MINARS and MINADER, both on provincial and on municipal level, the collaboration worked well, “no conflict”, thanks to NRCs clear intentions, transparency and inclusive work-methods. A *Chefe de Secção* of the Jamba Municipal Administration who has accompanied the NRC Project from start to end stated that they continue monthly Community Meetings with a co-ordination group established as a consequence to the NRC project.

The European Union Commission (EU/EC) in Luanda is financing a capacity building programme for the agriculture sector under the budget line for Support to Institutional Decentralisation¹¹. There is very little, or no apparent overlap or consequence between the NRC and EU/EC projects. This raises some questions with regard to the sustainability of the NRC project in the “bigger picture”.

The Project

According to the Provincial Delegate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER), hunger and malnutrition no longer exist on a provincial level. There may be individuals that for social or economic reasons do not make the daily bread, but there is sufficient food production in the province to feed the population and create a certain surplus to facilitate growth in the rural economy. There is a widespread opinion that NRC have been a main partner to the governmental institutions, MINARS and MINADER as well as the local administrations, in arriving at this level of sufficiency through the timely and appropriate implementation of the Distribution Project during the difficult times.

While visiting the Municipalities of Chicomba, Matala and Jamba it is easy to observe obvious improvements in the economy. The important roads from Lubango to Matala and Matala to Chicomba (continues to Huambo Province) is the so-called *Rota de Milho* (the Maize Route) providing crucial infrastructure inputs for trade and commerce has undergone complete renovation during the last two years, making it possible for the local farmers to access markets with their products, and to buy seeds/tools and other inputs at better prices. Only two years ago, the travel time from Lubango to Matala was estimated at eight hours while today the same road is travelled in two hours. Over the same period, the price for Maize seeds have dropped an approximately 30%, and merchants from Benguela, Huambo, Kuando Kubango, Cunene as well as Huila are trading at the local markets, bringing produce back to their original provinces. A sign of this increasing

¹¹ Delegação da Comissão Europeia em Angola: Programa de Relançamento da Segurança Alimentar – Apoio Institucional Descentralizado “PAID”

economy, you find in the town of Matala, and in the surrounding Municipalities, where it is buzzing with Chinese made *Motorizadas* (motorcycles) that at a price of USD 800 has become an achievable, popular means of transportation among the “normal”, income generating population and farmers.

During the field visit of this evaluation, two villages that participated and received the support from the NRC Distribution Project through various phases of the emergency, arriving and living in IDP camps in Matala, and the subsequent return to their original locations, was visited. From both of the villages, Matome in the Dongo Comuna of Jamba Municipality and Vihopio in the Chicomba Municipality, the impression is that life is returning to “normal” and the feed-back from villagers and village elders (*Sobas*) is that of praise for the assistance provided by NRC.

Feedback and observations in the two villages that were visited both strongly indicate that the approach of the NRC project has been successful in providing durable solutions to the target groups. Particularly the provision of animals and agriculture tools appears to be a major contribution to the improved livelihoods of the villagers. The conditions have improved to a balanced level where the villages are producing sufficient crops and vegetables both to feed the populations and to engage in trade of the products, including trading surplus goats for more production efficient oxen.

It is a tender balance, though, and even if the current production provide enough flexibility to ensure that the villages will not return to a subsistence level with hunger and/or malnutrition, there is not enough capacity to secure development and growth through increased harvests if the next few crops are not successful.

Partners

Representatives from the provincial delegations of MINADER and MINARS as well as local administrators seem aware of the situation within their respective mandates, but it is uncertain whether the capacity and resources to reduce the risks on the population exist.

The recently appointed Administrator of the Chicomba Municipality defines the job of the local administration to bring partners in, to provide assistance to the villages in the administrative area, but offer very little in terms of initiatives, strategies, plans or budgets for the development of the area. While recognising the job done by NRC in generous terms, the Administrator also state that NRC could have done more in providing more oxen and tractors, an example of the view many local officials have towards the role of the NGO's in Angola, and a saddening example of the fact that, while livelihoods have been restored in the villages, the government is ill prepared to draw benefit of the foundation projects like the NRC Distribution Project has created for the development of the community.

The provincial delegate of MINADER realises that the main factors for positive change in the production in the province are in place; the farmer is there, there are tools and the farmers have commercial access to the markets. To enhance production, the provincial delegation of MINADER are implementing projects (schemes) for training in the private

sector and projects to vitalise the economy, for example credits to farmers and help to establish co-operatives. MINADER is also main partner to the EU/EC programme providing capacity building to improve, and link, farming with economic development, and some FAO activities. While there is still a need for NGO intervention in the agriculture and rural development sector of the Huila Province, according to the MINADER delegate, it is realised that NRC lifted a heavy weight during the emergency and aftermath of the armed conflict in the province.

It is difficult to assess if, and in that case what, NRC could have done differently to improve the long term perspectives of the project. The project developed and expanded over a short period of time with great change in the environment and outer factors influencing the critical assumptions made during project planning phases. One solution may have been to apply longer term, development oriented methodology to the emergency planning phases, defining project objectives, activities and results linked with defined counterparts to be developed during the implementation of the project.

The EU/EC capacity building programme

In the post-conflict ambience of national reconstruction, the Angolan Government have stated clear strategy to steer away from the direct, humanitarian assistance typical of the emergency situation, towards partnerships for developing institutional capacities. It is, to some degree, recognised that the aid during the emergency phase worked well in the Province of Huila, eliminating hunger and creating economic surplus. The increasing economic surplus has huge impact on the province, for example money circulation, products and employment, but also disclose that the province lack a lot in terms of support infrastructure to the farmer, such as merchants, transportation, finance and knowledge – important inputs to further increase growth.

The European Union Commission in Angola (EU/EC) have designed and financed a capacity building/institutional development programme, *Programa de Relançamento da Segurança Alimentar – Apoio Institucional Descentralizado "PAID"* addressing the challenges created by this new climate of growth in the provinces of Huila and Benguela, situated to the north of the Huila Province. The programme is addressing institutional capacity building (planning, policymaking, institutional development) of provincial institutions, mostly MINADER, and of training, institutional support and distribution of vehicles and motorcycles to establish municipal EDAs (*Estação Desenvolvimento Agraria* – municipal sub-units of MINADER) of which the EU/EC supports 4 in Huila and 4 in Benguela. The purpose of the EDAs is to improve the conditions of the local farmers, and to assist in organising local co-operatives and co-operation in the local production. Each EDA consist of 4-5 *Técnicos Agrarias* that live and work in the local communities.

MINADER have received good support from FAO in the past, but the institution is still very weak on strategy development and the concept of planning for the future, strategic planning. EU/EC has defined its role as coming into the picture to develop the actual institutions.

The development and existence of the EU/EC Programme is interesting related to the NRC Distribution Project. While NRC worked directly with the local farmer through the emergency, the EU/EC Programme should logically “take over” where NRC are leaving, further developing and creating a level of security within the Agriculture/Rural Development sector in the province. But instead, it appears to be a classic situation of lost opportunities on at least 3 parties: the EU/EC, the provincial institutions and NRC.

The approach of the EU/EC appears to have been very top-down, with little consultation and participation among the food security organisations that are, or have been, working in the province in designing the programme. There is hardly evidence of any overlap in personnel between the organisations, such as NRC, that have been working with the institutions and EDAs in the past, and those being recruited and trained by the EU/EC programme. There have been some co-operation and exchange of information among the provincial institutions in developing the EU/EC Programme, mostly related to the registration of farmers during the emergency phase; how many farmers are there and where are they, etc.

Not being able to draw on the experience and know-how of the organisations and persons involved in the food security sector in the province, is a lost opportunity for the EU/EC.

There are some organisational and individual challenges, as a negative impact of the emergency response in the province. During the emergency phase, it was MINARS role to co-ordinate the humanitarian response, including the NGOs and the inter-sectoral co-ordination within the governmental institutions in the provinces. Now, in the reconstruction phase, the emphasis is put back on the line-ministries, such as MINADER, who received little attention during the armed conflict and emergency. The human resource base in the province may have been “left behind”, occupying positions in the MINARS structure and find it difficult to switch and adapt to the MINADER structure, which is weak. It was also raised, as a negative impact of the emergency response, that a large part of the province’s knowledge base was recruited by the UN and the NGOs, who could offer better pay and conditions, and thus created the good results of the organisations.

In light of the EU/EC Programme, the NRC Distribution Project lost an opportunity could have performed differently, maximising the impact of the project, by applying Exit Strategy (or end-state) planning at an earlier stage of the project cycle. The NRC Policy and Programme Principles accompanying the implementation of the Distribution Project are vague with regard to the need- and criteria for an Exit Strategy. The existing Exit Strategy was prepared in 2006, and the projects Phase Out plan in 2007. The NRC project developed through turbulent times with often unclear horizons and abrupt political change. In the particular case of the Distribution Project, defining a strategy at an earlier phase of the project could have helped the project organisation in strengthening right relationships with identified institutions to whom the project could be handed over and supporting resource mobilisation during the implementation phase of the project by identifying clear criteria (end state and future perspectives) for a planned phase out of activities.

4. Conclusions (Recommendations/Lessons Learned)

The objective of this report has been to summarise the activities of the NRC Distribution Project in the South of Angola from 2002, when the project underwent quick and major changes and expansions to follow the dramatic political developments in Angola when peace was reinserted, to evaluate if the project provided “durable solutions” to its beneficiaries through the deliverables of the project until the decommissioning in 2007. In doing so, the report also looks into some of the most important challenges a project of this scale and ambition: its planning, partners, co-ordination, organisation, and, not at least, the future perspectives of the stakeholders to the project. The generally accepted Code of Conduct for complex emergencies stipulates that the humanitarian imperative comes first, but it also emphasises the moral obligation to do so in a manner that respects dignity, builds capacity and empowers those that one attempts to help. This is a dilemma that was also faced by the NRC project in Southern Angola.

This report concludes that the Norwegian Refugee Council has responded to the needs of targeted beneficiaries through the implementation of its Distribution Project in Southern Angola. During the implementation period, NRC has achieved its objectives supporting self reliance and applying durable solutions to the target groups; IDPs and returnees.

While there is not a commonly accepted definition of capacity building among organisations involved in the humanitarian- and/or development community, as such, definitions vary according to the mandate and principles of each organisation attempting to build capacities of others, as well as the context this capacity is built in. Although it is difficult to find a common definition of capacity, there seems to be at least three generally accepted conditions that must exist in smaller or larger extent for capacities to be built: local ownership, a context in which capacities are being built in, and that clear objectives for capacity building must exist for it to be effective. The NRC Distribution project in Southern Angola was never designed or planned as a development project, but rather a response to the life threatening human suffering caused by the armed conflict in the south of the country.

The term chosen by NRC, to provide “durable solutions”, appear to have worked well in this regard: it is somewhat less in ambition than the term “capacity building” itself, it carries a more positive “tone” and it allows for delegated responsibility to find locally based solutions that have a prospect of being “durable” in the context they were found. With a view to the three conditions mentioned with regard to capacity building in the previous paragraph, a very informal scoring system (“high-medium-low”) may be applied for the purpose of this report, saying something meaningful about “durable solutions” in the context of the Southern Distribution Project.

- The local ownership, and participation, in planning and implementation appears to have been high among the individual beneficiary, their community leaders and the local administration and authorities. NRCs approach has been to supplement the

- actual distribution of tools and animals with information and training in skills and some knowledge that enhance the application of the durable solutions term.
- The context is important to understand why specific conditions determine what activities are being implemented. While NRC in the start up period of the project focused on food security for the survival of internally displaced persons in camps, the project transformed to support food security of beneficiaries in a wider, longer term perspective. The distribution of tools and animals was a durable solution of high impact, rooted in the understanding of the local socio-economic context and boosted by the local ownership/participation, above. The effect of the skills and knowledge training provided by NRC is medium with regard to the individual and the local communities (tools and animals are being used and maintained, but it is a fragile economic equilibrium) but low in the wider context of the broader political, social and economic context of, for example, the Huila Province.
 - As mentioned above, the NRC Distribution project never had, or intended to have, a clear objective for capacity building, so the score must be low in this regard. Focusing on durable solutions, however, the score heightens: NRC leave behind a local “capacity” that is self reliant in securing its own survival, but, as the EU project in Huila has demonstrated, the capacity does not provide much in terms of strengthening the organisational capacity in the agriculture and rural development sector to undertake independent, strategic thought or planning.

The main conclusion in this report, is that, through good collaboration with relevant Ministries, Co-ordinating mechanisms and partners, the NRC Distribution Project has made a difference, recovering livelihoods and created a foundation for further social and economic development in the project target areas, although it remains for local authorities to take charge and benefit from this. There is a need for further development of economic and institutional capacities.

An important aspect to capacity development, and in the consultant’s belief, to optimising the effect of “durable solutions”, is that an exit strategy is formulated at an early stage of the project. This was not done with the NRC Southern Distribution Project, and the documents that exist to this regard appears to have been developed late in the implementation process and in response to donor decisions to end funding towards the project rather than the project itself coming to a natural end. It is not easy to answer if more funding, over a longer period, would have made the durable solutions of NRC more durable, nor is it easy to answer if a clearly spelled out exit strategy could have closed the “gap” between the end of the NRC project and the effect of the EU capacity building project kicks in. Without direct reference to texts in this report, some literature¹² observe that cutting funds and pulling out of service delivery provided by internationally funded non-state actors too quickly in a post-conflict setting may cause a “service gap” (it takes time to replace the services provided and for the new, developed capacity to have an effect) and destabilise the transition process.

Two related aspects regarding NRC and exit strategy:

¹² For example: World Bank (2005). Engaging Civil Society Organisations in Conflict Affected and Fragile States

- It provides the organisation with a framework for motivation and development of the organisation's own technical competence through inclusive/participatory strategic planning and definition of its own future. Besides LFAs, TORs and other project documents, an exit strategy offer managers an excellent management tool, as it often will provide an answer to the question “why are we here?” creating an internal consensus in the organisation that may unlock significant potential in finding durable solutions, also in future projects of similar type.
- It improves the organisation's value as a professional contender in the competitive market for (diminishing) humanitarian funds, being able to present a clear end-state or point in time in which the organisation will pull out of the operation. In a different terminology, the product becomes clear. Donors, in general, is concerned with the effect of their money have on the results for the project, and is more likely to provide sustainable funding towards a clearly stated goal. An exit strategy formulated at an early stage of the project may have enabled NRC to compete for funding towards an envisioned end-state vis-à-vis other worthy causes.

This review took place after the NRC project had closed down all its operations in the South of Angola, and all but a few staff essential for the final closing down of the Lubango office were present. One of the implications of this is that it was not possible to get a first hand impression of any of the project activities being implemented, making it difficult to produce a nuanced view on how NRC's strategies actually worked in the field and how NRC interacted with beneficiaries and partners, weakening the description of NRC's interaction between institutions and persons involved. Another implication is that the report possibly does not bear a fair testimony to the difficult conditions NRC and its staff experienced during the implementation years. It took a little less than 2 hours in a normal vehicle to drive to Matala, the centre of operations in the Huila Province, for the field visit of this evaluation, when, only a year ago, it took almost 9 hours in a 4 x 4 vehicle to travel the same stretch of road, often in fear of attacks, robbery and landmines.

The importance of the professional and dedicated staff employed by the NRC Distribution Project has been emphasised again and again in this report, to the degree that it is concluded that the results achieved by the project has depended on the following two success factors:

1. The Project Personnel have shown great technical and professional capacity, have had invaluable knowledge about local conditions and good relations to local and provincial authorities.
2. The knowledge and professionalism of the project staff meant that the project was well recognised among local authorities and partners and with enough “clout” to make necessary changes to the project implementation methodology enhancing the project's results.

The first almost 2/3 of this report is focused on the activities and deliverables of the NRC Distribution Project. It has also been stated in previous chapters that based on a study of the project's LFA indicators, alone, the project has performed according to expectations,

but when studying and observing the results and hearing testimony from beneficiaries and partners, the consultant conclude that the NRC Distribution Project has performed above expectations during the emergency in the country.

The way to explain this depends on two, interlinked reasons:

The consultant find that the report documentation from the project is very much linked to the project indicators which is understandable in “LFA-terminology” as it undoubtedly demonstrates “upward” in the system the concrete, visble achievements of the project. At the same time, a lack of verbal account of how solutions was reached, challenges met and risks (assumptions in LFA terminology) was mitigated give an incomplete picture of “what went on” and the energy that went into the project in the aftermath. The other explanation is that NRC could not have reached the good result it did without the competence and professionalism of its national staff (which the reporting is not good at bearing testimony of).

For example: the success of distributing animals could not have been envisioned without a deep understanding of the value of an animal and the economic significance of animals to the community. Indicator-reporting alone will not catch the subtlety of this understanding, based on good local knowledge among its national staff, as it will simply state how many animals, of each kind was distributed to how many households – not how and why the animals was crucial for establishing the economic balance in the project area. Nor will reporting on indicators give any value to the “battle” between the NRC and the institutional capacity builders, such as for example FAO, and how the NRC managed to influence and change opinions and attitudes towards animal distribution.

Bearing in mind the difficult environment of the implementation and the challenges linked with working with the Angolan bureaucracy, logistics and administration, it is concluded that the NRC Distribution Project has performed above expectations during the emergency in the country. The distribution process has been very professional and has made a great contribution to the increasing economic surplus in the Huila Province.

Lessons Learned/Recommendations

Reporting

NRC can improve its results and impact by improving its reporting to allow for evaluation/monitoring of assumptions and the value of decisions and practices in the field. Reporting on indicators, only, do not offer justice to the efforts that are put into a vast project as the Distribution Project in Southern Angola.

Exit Strategy

NRC can enhance the future potential of Durable Solutions in future projects by focusing more on defining exit strategy at an earlier stage of the project, to allow for

implementation of activities towards sustainability not when forced to because the project is closing.

Professional Capacities

NRC should develop and define “in-house” capacities in professional categories that may support future distribution projects with technical inputs at various critical planning phases of a project, such as Food Security, Distribution and Logistics, Agriculture and so on.

Human Resources

NRC should continue to focus on Human Resources of high quality in the project area. Often, a minimum of training/induction is required to maximise efforts of the staff. NRC could develop a training package for new staff in Distribution Projects, providing background and awareness of the most common success- and threat factors to such projects. Training almost always works as a booster and inspiration for motivating staff.

5. Evaluation purpose, scope and methodology

NRC Terms of Reference:

The overall purpose of the review is to summarise and evaluate the food security and distribution programme in southern Angola, and give recommendations to other food security and distribution programmes, especially related to durable solutions. The review will cover the programme period from its start-up in the Province of Huila in 1999, through its different phases until its close down in 2007. This will give useful information of best practices, lessons learnt (successes and mistakes in project design and implementation) etc. to further food security and distribution programmes to NRC.

The evaluator will review NRC's files in Angola, as well as conduct interviews with beneficiaries, partners and donors, including key NRC staff.

Introduction

The evaluation is conducted by one external consultant, Christian Larssen, in collaboration with NRC project staff from the NRC Country Office in Luanda and the Field Office in Lubango, Province of Huila.

From the outset it is noteworthy that this is an internal evaluation, i.e. not requested by the donor/partners to the so-called Southern Distribution Project. The focus of this evaluation has thus been, in accordance with the Evaluation Terms of Reference (Annex C) to collect, evaluate and summarise the activities, project methodology, results and impact of the project and as such, a “post-script” providing lessons learned and recommendations useful for future- and other NRC projects. In the latter, the national NRC staff has been given a lot of leverage in various, open discussions, providing their experiences as inputs to this report. In addition to the Terms of Reference, a set of questions was provided from the NRC Programme Officer in Oslo, Norway. Although this report is not strictly following the disposition of the questions document, effort has

been made to provide answers and feed-back to these questions in the text and tables that follows.

The Terms of Reference stipulate that this evaluation should cover the entire implementation period from the start in 1999, until its end in 2007. It does, although it was later agreed, in consultation with the NCR Resident Representative that the emphasis of this report should lay on the period from 2002 until 2007. There are two reasons for this:

1. In 2002/2003, following the cessation of armed conflict in Angola, the project refocused its project objectives and activities with the result that the project documentation also changed both in quality and quantity. It thus simplified the study and coherent presentation of existing project documentation in comparative tables.
2. An external evaluation of NRC's programmes in Angola was produced in 2003¹³ that evaluates the project in the period from 1999 to 2002. The present evaluation do not pretend testing the findings of the external evaluation in other ways than if, and to what degree, the recommendations of the previous evaluation was implemented in later project designs and/or actions. It does, however, present a good narrative of the entire NRC set-up in Angola for the period 1999 – 2002, which hence is not repeated in this evaluation.

Purpose

To approach the purpose, above, comprehensively, a study of Project Documents and -Reports from the entire project implementation period was conducted, but with emphasis on the period from 2002-2007, as both the quality and quantity of the reporting improved during this time allowing for a more comprehensive appreciation of the project activities.

Scope

The scope of this evaluation is limited to the Norwegian Refugee Council – Angola Distribution Project in Southern Angola. The Distribution Project was designed as an integrated project, and this evaluation present documentation for all activities under this collective heading.

NRC implemented other projects, Human Rights, Health and School Projects, in parallel to the Distribution Project. These projects are not within the scope of this evaluation, but there are links to the Distribution Project and its activities whereas notes have been made on these where this is natural or relevant for the presentation of this report.

There were no requirements in the Terms of Reference to address financial issues related to the implementation of the Project.

¹³ T&B Consult: Evaluation of Norwegian Refugee Council's IDP-Programmes in Angola (May 2003)

Methodology

The methodology used by the evaluator essentially entails, in collaboration with NRC staff, study of written documentation, individual and collective interviews and participation in meetings with remaining NRC staff.

A field trip to one of the projects target areas, Matala/Chicomba/Jamba, was arranged by NRC, by land, as a means chosen to obtain a first hand view of the results and challenges faced during the implementation of the Distribution Project. Trips to the Provincial Capital of Huila offered opportunity to meet with partners and stakeholders, such as the Provincial Agriculture Delegate and Aid Co-ordinators.

Evaluation Limitations

The evaluation takes place during the last few weeks and days of the project's implementation period. For this reason, all but the actual decommissioning activities has ceased and all but some key staff has remained on the project. The project infrastructure and Governmental/UN Co-ordination mechanisms have closed, with the result that few people actually participating and surrounding the implementation of the project were available during the evaluation process.

Among the persons available for the evaluator, both among the beneficiaries of the project, the Government- and UN partners as well as the NRC staff, the response to the project was very positive in all aspects, and no one raised any serious critical or negative feed-back. Although this evaluator did not set out to look for negative results or impact in particular, but is indeed rather pleased with the positive result of the project, there is a feeling that because the project is completed and being decommissioned, the persons met and interviewed during the evaluation choose to look ahead and let "what happened in the bush stay in the bush". It could also simply be that it was a good project, with very few reasons for complaints!

Unfortunately, there was no opportunity to visit the Province of Kuando Kubango, where NRC had project activities in Mavinga and Menongue, during the evaluation. The south-easternmost part of the country still remain very distant to the rest of Angola, with its own particular social and political challenges based in its history of UNITA and Government conflict during the war. NRC faced great challenges during the implementation of the project in Kuando Kubango – logistical, political, human rights to mention but a few – and since the references made to Kuando Kubango in this report is based on the desk study of available documents and interviews of NRC staff, rather than first-hand observations, the evaluator run the risk of being too general, omitting to the particular challenges of operating in Kuando Kubango.

As a result of the above, this report is limited to the data, information and observations available at the time of the evaluation. Outmost care has been made in ensuring the correctness of data and narrative description of events and activities in this report This evaluator believe there is a distinction with regard to the conclusions and recommendations, which must appreciated as an end-of-project Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The observations, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are the exclusive responsibility of the evaluator/consultant, meaning that they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norwegian Refugee Council or its staff

ANNEXES

March, 2008

ANNEX A:

The data in Tables 2 - 8 is collected from NRC's Monthly Project Reports in the period from 2002 to 2007, and is intended to demonstrate at a glance what NRC implemented within the Distribution Project core activity, the number of beneficiaries under each distribution headline, number of project staff and the donors, including amounts, to the project per year.

Table 2: Distribution Table, NRC 2002

Year: 2002 Project Number: AOFV0202 Project Name: Donor: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 11 949 500 • WFP: NOK 253 850 • OCHA: NOK 230 961 Total Budget: NOK 12 434 311 Number of NRC Project Staff: 53						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010102	311202	Huila Province Matala, Jamba and Chicomba	Food Distribution	47361	5413654 mts	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Huila Province Matala and Chicomba	NFI Distribution	13556	39416 units	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Huila Province Matala	Reforestation	n.a.	28600 units	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue and Mavinga	Food Distribution	111619	6611901 mts	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue and Mavinga	Reforestation	n.a.	12500 units	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Namibe Province Namibe, Camcuio, Virei and Tombwa	Food Distribution	2558	182811 mts	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA
010102	311202	Cunene Province Covelai	Food Distribution	1738	7724 mts	NOR MFA, WFP, OCHA

Table 3.1: Distribution Table, NRC 2003

Year:						
Project Number: AOFV0302						
Donor:						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 11 472 000 • SIDA: NOK 1 753 621 • ECHO: NOK 3 414 587 • WFP: NOK 192 433 • FAO: NOK 46 025 						
Total Budget: NOK 16 788 666						
Number of NRC Staff: 59						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010103	311203	Huila Province Matala, Jamba, Chicomba	Food Distribution	57177	5518192 mts	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP
010103	311203	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba	NFI Distribution	7961	262713 units	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP
011003	311003	Huila Province Matala, Jamba, Chicomba	Seed, Horticulture and Tools Distribution	See below	See below	FAO NRC
010103	311203	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga, Calai, Cuangar and Cuchi	Food Distribution	155051	11677321 mts	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP
010103	311203	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Cuchi	NFI Distribution	4574	7759 units	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP
011003	311003	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Caiundo	Seed, Horticulture and Tools Distribution	See below	See below	FAO NRC
010103	311203	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga	Reforestation	n.a.	5143	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP
010103	311203	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Animals	n.a.	18 oxen	NRC
010102	311202	Namibe Province Namibe, Tombwa	Food Distribution	555 (not exact)	61220 mts	NOR MFA, SIDA, ECHO, WFP

Table 3.2: Distribution Table FAO Project (donation in-kind), NRC 2003

From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
011003	311003	Huila Province Jamba	Seed and Tools Distribution	Returnees to original location	64845kg 3243 units	FAO
011003	311003	Huila Province Chicomba	Horticulture Distribution	Returnees to original location	144320 gm	FAO
011003	311003	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Seed, Horticulture and Tools Distribution	21125 Returnees	255150 kg 80000 gm 43580 units	FAO

Seeds = kg, Horticulture = gm, tools = units

Table 3.3: Distribution Table NRC Funds, NRC 2003

From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010903	311003	Huila Province Matala	Seed, and Tools Distribution	Returnees to original location	47950 kg 5899 units	NRC
010903	311003	Huila Province Chicomba	Seed, and Tools Distribution	Returnees to original location	54080 kg 10824 units	NRC
010903	311003	Kuando Kubango Province Caiundo	Seed, Horticulture and Tools Distribution	5550 Returnees	21150 kg 12423 gm 2220 units	NRC

Seeds = kg, Horticulture = gm, tools = units

Table 3.4: Distribution Table ECHO NFI, NRC 2003

010103	311203	Huila Province Chicomba and Jamba	NFI Distribution	7961	262713 units	ECHO
010103	311203	Kuando Kubango Cuchi, Caiundo, Mavinga	NFI Distribution	7724	12407 units	ECHO

Table 4.1: Distribution Table, NRC 2004

Year: 2004						
Project Name: AOFV0402/AOFV0404						
Donor:						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 8 100 000 • ECHO: NOK 2 215 050 • WFP: NOK 162 535 						
Total Budget: NOK 10 477 585						
Number of NRC Staff: 23						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010104	311204	Huila Province Matala, Jamba, Chicomba	Food Distribution	88808	2546183 mts	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Huila Province Matala	NFI Distribution	22736	35363 units	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
011004	311004	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba	Seed, Horticulture and Tools Distribution	Seeds 10043 Hort. 10043 Tools 2500	92438 kg 496155 gm 2006 units	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba	Animals	Food and NFI Beneficiaries	724 goats 420 oxen 2400 chicken	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Huila Province Matala	Reforestation	n.a.	12950	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga, Calai, Cuangar, Cuchi	Food Distribution	118006	7333571 mts	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga	NFI Distribution	14396	21799 units	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
011004	311004	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Caiundo	Seed, and Tools Distribution	Seeds n.a. Tools 1010	31352 kg 14717 units	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue	Reforestation	1105	1105	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP
010104	311204	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga	Animals	5795	587 goats 80 oxen 400 chicken	NOR MFA, ECHO, WFP

Table 4.2: Distribution Table FAO Project, NRC 2004

From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
011004	311004	Huila Province Jamba	Horticulture Distribution	Returns to original location	90750 gm	FAO
011004	311004	Huila Province Chicomba	Horticulture Distribution	Returns to original location	405405 gm	FAO

Seeds = kg, Horticulture = gm, tools = units

Table 5.1: Distribution Table, NRC 2005

Year: 2005						
Project Name: AOFV0501/AOFV0502						
Donor:						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 7 000 000 • SIDA: NOK 1 736 000 						
Total Budget: NOK 8 800 000						
Number of NRC Staff: 40						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010105	311205	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba, Caconda	Food Distribution	98222	3246688 mts	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Huila Province Jamba, Caconda	NFI Distribution	850	850 units	NOR MFA SIDA
011005	311005	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba	Seed, Horticulture Distribution	17660	86000 kg 11450 gm	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba, Caconda	Animals	12000	20 oxen 1200 chicken	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Kuando Kubango Province Menongue, Mavinga	Food Distribution	99444	2176237 mts	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Cuchi	NFI Distribution	n.a.	n.a.	
011005	311005	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Caiundo	Seed, Horticulture Distribution	n.a.	53022 kg 85500 gm	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Reforestation	n.a.	168	NOR MFA SIDA

Table 5.2: Distribution Table FAO Project, NRC 2005

From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
011005	311005	Huila Province Jamba	Horticulture Distribution	Returns to original location	11450 gm	FAO
011005	311005	Huila Province Chicomba	Horticulture and Tools Distribution	Returns to original location	12940 gm 139 units	FAO

Seeds = kg, Horticulture = gm, tools = units

Table 6: Distribution Table, NRC 2006

Year: 2006						
Project Number: AOFV 0602						
Donor:						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SIDA: NOK 1 800 000 • WFP: NOK 384 000 						
Total Budget: NOK 2 120						
Number of NRC Project Staff: 22						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010106	311206	Huila Province Matala, Chicomba, Jamba, Caconda	NFI Distribution	2660	15901 units	SIDA
011006	311006	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba	Seed and Tools Distribution	Seed 12775 Tools 1335	79800 kg 357 Units	SIDA
010106	311206	Huila Province Jamba, Chicomba, Caconda	Animals	12500	48 Goat 200 Oxen	SIDA
010106	310506	Huila Province Caconda, Jamba Chicomba	Preventive Health care activities		7884 Act.	SIDA
010106	311206	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	NFI Distribution	1800	9892	SIDA
011006	311006	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivundo	Seed Distribution	4752	79855 kg	SIDA
010106	311206	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Reforestation	n.a.	2000	SIDA
010106	310506	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Preventive Health care activities		731 Act.	SIDA

Table 7: Distribution Table NRC Project AOFK0601, NRC 2006/2007¹⁴

Year: 2007 Project Number: AOFK0601 Donor: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 4 000 000 Total Budget: NOK 4 000 000 Number of NRC Project Staff:						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	Food Distribution	1639	67812 mts	NOR MFA
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	NFI Distribution	1639	28209 units	NOR MFA
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	NFI Distribution	n.a.	14787 units	UNHCR
011007	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga	Seed Distribution	23225	10330 kg	NOR MFA
011007	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	Tools Distribution	n.a.	80 ploughs	NOR MFA
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, rivungo	Animals	n.a.	250 goats	NOR MFA

¹⁴ The Project AOFV0601 was planned and started implemented in 2006, but major project activities were also continued into 2007.

Table 8: Distribution Table, NRC 2007

Year: 2007						
Project Number: AOFV0701/AOFV0702						
Donor:						
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Norwegian MFA: NOK 2 500 000 • SIDA: NOK 990 000 						
Total Budget: NOK 3 490 000						
Number of NRC Project Staff: 9						
From	To	Location	Activity	Beneficiaries	Units	Donor
010107	311007	Huila Province Matala	NFI Distribution	1701	5844 units	NOR MFA SIDA
011007	311007	Huila Province Chicomba	Seed, Tools, Horticulture Distribution	20000	7530 kg 91100 gm 1414 units	NOR MFA SIDA
010105	311205	Huila Province Chicomba	Animals	3000	200 goats	NOR MFA SIDA
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	Food Distribution	1335	66 mts	NOR MFA SIDA
011007	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	Seed and Tools Distribution	36800	147800 kg 120 ploughs	NOR MFA SIDA
010107	311007	Kuando Kubango Province Mavinga, Rivungo	Animals	n.a.	300 goats	NOR MFA SIDA

Seeds = kg, Horticulture = gm, tools = units

ANNEX B:

Evaluation Team

Mr. Christian Larssen, Norway

With excellent participation and invaluable assistance and support from the Norwegian Refugee Council – Angola Team, in particular:

Ms. Ulrika Blom Mondlane, NRC Resident Representative

Mr. Aristides Henrique Paiva Monteiro, NRC Distribution Project Manager

Ms. Iolanda Costa, NRC Finance Officer

Evaluation Programme

Week 1

19.11.07	Meeting with NRC Resident Representative	Luanda
20.11.07	Review of Project documents	Luanda
21.11.07	Mission 1: Lubango	
	Meeting with NRC Project Staff	Lubango
22.11.07	Review of Project documents	Lubango
23.11.07	Review of Project documents	Lubango
24.11.07	Return to Luanda	

Week 2

26.11.07	Reporting	Luanda
27.11.07	Reporting	Luanda
28.11.07	Mission 2: Lubango/Matala	
	Meeting with MINARS	Lubango
	Meeting with EU/”PAID”	Lubango
29.11.07	Interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders	Jamba
30.11.07	Interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders	Chicomba
01.12.07	Interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders	Matala

Week 3

03.12.07	Meeting with MINADER, Provincial Delegate	Lubango
04.12.07	Interviews/Meeting with NRC Project Staff	Lubango
05.12.07	Return to Luanda	
06.12.07	Review of Mission documents	Luanda
07.12.07	Report Studies	Luanda

Week 4

10.12.07 – 13.12.07	Report Studies and Reporting	Luanda
17.12.07	Submission and presentation of Draft Report	Luanda
18.12.07-19.12.07	Finalising Report	Luanda
20.12.07	Submission of Final Report	Luanda

ANNEX C:

Evaluation Terms of Reference

ANNEX D:

List of people contacted

Name:	Position:	Place
Ulrika Blom Mondlane	NRC Resident Representative	Luanda
Aristides “Ari” Monteiro	NRC Project Manager	Lubango
Iolanda da Costa	NRC Finance Officer	Lubango
Antonio Matias	MINARS Prov. Director i.e.	Lubango
Lazaro J	MINARS Head of Department	Lubango
Luis Guillermo Cuellar Suza	EU/EC Chief, Tech. Advisory Team	Lubango
Antonio Tjivimbi	Head of Section, Municipal Adm.	Jamba
Luis Conzaga	Villager	Matome
Mateus Jamba	Villager	Matome
Sipriana Balombo	Villager	Matome
Feliciano Jamba	Villager	Matome
Lucia Francisca	Administrator	Chicomba
Soba Chimbaca	Soba	Vihopio
Faustino Samfundala	Villager	Vihopio
Simão Anda	Villager	Vihopio
Augusto Daniel	Villager	Vihopio
Faustino Francisco	Villager	Vihopio
Francisco Capenda	Villager	Vihopio
Bernardo Joaquim Tchipa	Villager	Vihopio
Dr. Lutero Campos	MINADER Provincial Delegate	Lubango
Moises Camota	NRC HR Project Officer	Lubango
Lise Stensrud	Min. Councillor Norwegian Embassy	Luanda
Åsa Bergmann	Norwegian Embassy	Luanda

ANNEX E:

List of documents used

- Norwegian Refugee Council, Prinsiprogram
- Norwegian Refugee Council, Distribution
- Norwegian Refugee Council, Evaluation Policy – Learning from Experience
- Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002 – 2007 Budget Proposals and Application Documents
- Norwegian Refugee Council, Lubango, 1999 – 2002 Monthly Project Reports
- Norwegian Refugee Council, Core Activity Policy Document, Food Security
- Mondlane, Ulrika Blom, September 2006, Exit Strategy – NRC Angola 2006-2007
- Norwegian Refugee Council, April 2007, Phase out plan – Angola 2007-2008
- T&B Consult, May 2003, Evaluation of Norwegian Refugee Council’s IDP Programmes in Angola – Final Report


ANNEX F:

Glossary and Abbreviations

DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Organisation
EDA	Estação Desenvolvimento Agraria
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU/EC	European Union/European Commission
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)
FFW	Food For Work (WFP Project)
Gm	Grams (metric)
IDP(s)	Internally Displaced Person(s)
Kg	Kilograms (metric)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affaires
MINADER	Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development
MINARS	Ministry for Assisting Social Re-integration
MSF	Médicins sans Frontières
Mts	Metric Tonnes
n.a.	Not applicable/Not available
NFI(s)	Non Food Item(s)
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Organisation for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance
RCU	Resident Co-ordinator's Unit (UNDP)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TEP	Teachers Emergency Package
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	National Union for Total Independence of Angola
WFP	World Food Programme (UN)

ANNEX G:

Humanitarian access in Angola 2002 (1 month before Savimbi dies), and January 2003.



This map has been prepared by OCHA and is designed solely to provide an indication of the main areas and road corridors