UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation Post-2021: How to Stay the Course





REPORT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE LONGITUDINAL, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION





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Executive summary

1.1. This report extends a previous evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation.

This report presents the findings of an extension of the evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation. The original evaluation was conducted between 2018 and 2021. The extension tracked how UNHCR has followed up on the evaluation's recommendations in 2022 and presents new evidence on lessons learned, good practices, and the effects of humanitarian-development cooperation on refugees.

The evaluation extension draws on interviews with 135 staff members working at headquarters, in regional offices, in UNHCR's country operations in Kenya and Mauritania, as well as in other countries of operation. In order to understand the effects of humanitarian-development cooperation, we conducted rigorous statistical analysis on UNHCR datasets covering refugees in Jordan and refugees, stateless persons, and local residents in Kenya. We also held focus group discussions with refugees in Mauritania.

1.2. UNHCR remains committed to humanitarian-development cooperation and has made progress on recommendations requiring technical capacities and tools.

UNHCR faces a challenging environment, characterized by many competing priorities and growing financial pressure. Despite these challenges, its commitment to humanitarian-development cooperation in general - and to an agenda promoting the inclusion and self-reliance of displaced people in particular - has remained high. This is visible in UNHCR's recent Strategic Directions² and in new and expanded partnership agreements with different development actors.

UNHCR's commitment to humanitarian-development cooperation is also reflected in the progress made in following up on many of the recommendations made in the original evaluation, published in 2021, especially where they require strengthening technical capacity or developing tools. Notable developments include:

UNHCR's new results-based management system COMPASS and incipient practice of developing multi-year plans in country operations enable longerterm thinking and a more strategic focus on refugee inclusion and self-reliance

¹ Julia Steets et al., "Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation. Report on a Longitudinal Evaluation" (September 2018 – March 2021), Volume 1, UNHCR, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/61af7be94.

² UNHCR, "UNHCR Strategic Directions 2022-2026", https://reporting.unhcr.org/strategicdirections-2022-2026.

(where this is a priority for country operations). The new approach also enables country operations to develop multi-year budgets. Budget approvals, however, remain single-year, limiting the focus on the longer-term and preventing multiyear agreements with implementing partners.

- The number of staff members dedicated to development cooperation has continued to increase and efforts to deploy staff members with a development background, for example as part of the response to the war in Ukraine relatively early on, are visible. The evaluation team also found more examples where Senior Development Officers report to country-level management and where their positions are funded as part of an operation's core budget. However, these positions were felt to be under pressure in several contexts.
- There has been continued investment in collecting more relevant data as well as an increasing effort to strengthen UNHCR's capacity to provide data analysis.
- ▶ Guidance on when UNHCR should and when it should not seek to mobilize financial resources from development actors for its own activities has been adopted, including clear instructions on who needs to be consulted as part of the process.
- ▶ UNHCR has invested in further developing tools for providing analyses of the protection situation of displaced people to development actors. There have also been more examples in which UNHCR's protection staff have started to play a more active role in the cooperation with development actors.

1.3. UNHCR has made less progress on contentious issues and issues requiring more deep-seated change.

While consulted staff members recognize the progress made on the points above, they emphasized that a range of key sticking points have not yet been addressed, or that they have not been addressed satisfactorily. Examples include the following:

- There is no consensus or agreed definition on key concepts like inclusion.
- The commitment to humanitarian-development cooperation at country level remains dependent on the priorities of UNHCR's country-level management and is thus high in some country operations, but much lower in others.
- UNHCR's headquarters has decided that multi-year financial contributions from development actors would lead to an increase in the authorized budget of a UNHCR country operation (the "operating level") in the first year of the project. For subsequent years, the initial operating level allocations for country operations already include these contributions, so that they do not lead to subsequent increases. Most consulted country-level stakeholders would prefer to treat multiyear development contributions continuously as "additional" so that the resources remain clearly earmarked for the activities agreed on with the development partner.
- While investments in data gathering and data analysis have been ongoing, UNHCR has not included any steps for addressing the constraints on data sharing with development partners in its management response to the evaluation's recommendations. Country-level stakeholders continue to see addressing UNHCR's constraints in data sharing, which currently require lengthy processes

for arriving at data sharing agreements, as a priority. Ongoing efforts to conclude a global data sharing agreement with the World Bank are a promising step in the right direction.

While UNHCR has further developed its formal tools for delivering protection analyses to development actors, not much progress has been visible at country level in addressing the limitations in its ability to provide less formal and more applied advice on how to address protection concerns in development programme planning. However, the Division of International Protection has recently established a policy unit to help build capacity and address this issue.

1.4. Experiences with including refugees in national service systems in different sectors have generated valuable lessons.

The evaluation team analysed experiences with efforts to promote inclusion in Kenya and Mauritania and facilitated a broader exchange of lessons learned among staff members working to promote inclusion in education, social protection, and health in different countries of operation. Some of the more generalizable lessons include:

- It is important to involve affected people in plans for including them in national service systems from the beginning in order to be transparent about, and potentially address concerns displaced people may have about losing access to humanitarian assistance and services.
- Including displaced people in national data systems is often the first step for including them in public service systems. The current lack of guidance in UNHCR on how to address concerns about data security can hamper this process.
- Mobilizing sufficient and sustainable financing for the inclusion of refugees in national service systems often remains a challenge, as expectations of governments, humanitarian and development actors on who should cover the recurring costs of such inclusion diverge.
- Promoting the inclusion of displaced people in national service systems requires a good understanding of the set-up and functioning of these systems, including which access constraints displaced people face and which authorities are responsible for these systems at the different levels of local, regional and national administration.

1.5. Refugee inclusion has overwhelmingly positive, demonstrable effects, even as some concerns about a potential decrease in service quality following inclusion in national services remain.

The evaluation team used rigorous quantitative methods to analyse UNHCR datasets and establish what effects humanitarian-development cooperation has on refugees and other persons served by UNHCR. The results of these analyses are overwhelmingly positive.

In Jordan, the original evaluation had already demonstrated that enabling Syrian refugees to get work permits had significant positive effects - not only on their levels of income and expenditures, but also on their protection situation. Households with work permits were significantly less likely to have specific legal or physical protection needs. Holding a work permit also significantly decreased the prospects of having to accept risky, degrading, exploitative or illegal jobs to meet basic needs as well as of having to send children to work. New data collected after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrate that these effects remain robust in the event of a profound external shock like the pandemic.

In **Kenya**, data collected from various groups of refugees demonstrate that it is not the camp or settlement type as such that determines how self-reliant refugees are. Rather, the strongest drivers of refugee self-reliance in this context are access to services (especially to electricity, credit, and communication) and resident status. Such enabling factors also have a positive effect on the refugees' sense of well-being, as does the quantity of aid they receive. The quantitative analysis also shows that gender matters. Living in a female-headed household has a significant negative effect on economic self-reliance and particularly on the chances of being employed.

While the positive results of these quantitative studies are irrefutable, refugees consulted about other examples of their inclusion in national or local service systems often express a concern that they might lose access to humanitarian assistance and services, and that services provided by the state might not be of as high quality. To date, UNHCR lacks a coherent position on how to handle such situations and potential trade-offs.

1.6. To stay the course, UNHCR should urgently tackle the outstanding, often more contentious issues.

The findings of this evaluation extension confirm that UNHCR is on the right track with its efforts to engage systematically in humanitarian-development cooperation. To stay the course as it enters the fifth year after the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees, UNHCR needs to tackle the outstanding issues identified in the original evaluation.

First and foremost, UNHCR should urgently conclude the process of defining under what circumstances it seeks to mobilize financial resources from development actors for its own activities. UNHCR should also reconsider whether it would be possible to treat the entirety of multi-year contributions from development actors as additional to the internally authorized budgets of its country operations (the "operating level"). Equally important is to remove remaining obstacles that keep its staff members from focussing fully and strategically on supporting the inclusion of refugees in national systems. This would require defining what inclusion means and clarifying how UNHCR handles situations that entail a trade-off between inclusion and service standards.



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List of acronyms and abbreviations

| BMZ | Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany) | | |
|----------------|---|--|--|
| DSPR | Division of Strategic Planning and Results | | |
| GCR | Global Compact on Refugees | | |
| GIZ | Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit | | |
| GPPi | Global Public Policy Institute | | |
| GRF | Global Refugee Forum | | |
| HQ | Headquarters | | |
| IDA | International Development Association (World Bank) | | |
| INTPA | Directorate-General for International Partnerships (European Commission) | | |
| ISDC | International Security and Development Center | | |
| JDC | Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement | | |
| KEQ | Key Evaluation Question | | |
| KISEDP | Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Programme | | |
| MSF | Médécins Sans Frontières | | |
| NHIF | National Health Insurance Fund (Kenya) | | |
| RB | Regional Bureau | | |
| SDO | Senior Development Officer | | |
| SUN program | Support to UNHCR in facilitating the operationalization of the Global Compact on Refugees in the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus | | |
| UN | United Nations | | |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme | | |
| UNICEF | United Nations Childrens Fund | | |
| WFP | World Food Programme | | |
| WHO | World Health Organisation | | |
| | | | |

1.Evaluation background

1.1. As UNHCR continues to adapt to its new role, a prior evaluation on humanitarian-development cooperation was extended to track ongoing progress.

Four years ago, the UNHCR Evaluation Service commissioned a longitudinal evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation, spanning the period from 2018 to 2021.3 The evaluation was intended to support UNHCR in an institutional change process that puts more emphasis on supporting the inclusion and self-reliance of refugees and on cooperating with development actors in this endeavour. The evaluation generated various documents to encourage reflection and support learning (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Main products of the original evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitariandevelopment cooperation4



The following changes to global trends in forced displacement and to global policy motivated the original evaluation:

- an altered forced displacement reality, in which displacement lasts longer than before;
- > a growing awareness that forced displacement is relevant to development, and vice versa;
- the international community's reinvigorated commitment to changing the way it responds to forced displacement, with an emphasis on a wide array of relevant stakeholders working together to reduce affected people's vulnerability and needs, and to strengthen their self-reliance and resilience, so as to contribute to meeting the Sustainable Development Goals under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Through the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) a widely supported policy document reflecting this approach - and its Global

³ Julia Steets et al., "Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation. Report on a Longitudinal Evaluation" (September 2018 – March 2021), Volume 1, UNHCR, 2021, https://www.unhcr.org/61af7be94.

⁴ The outputs are available under the following links: Think piece (2019); 4 discussion papers (2020); Evaluation report (2021); video (2022); UNHCR management response (2022).

Refugee Forum (GRF), UNHCR has been assigned a key role in facilitating this new response model.⁵

Like other international stakeholders, UNHCR is adapting to this new model, reconfiguring its role as a protection agency that seeks to support self-reliance and resilience as well as the responses of other actors – including development actors - while at the same time retaining its capacity to deliver life-saving aid. It has done so primarily by building formalized partnerships with a number of multilateral and bilateral development actors, such as the World Bank Group, AFD, BMZ, Enabel, INTPA, JICA, the Netherlands, SDC, and by increasing cooperation with others. UNHCR has also changed some of its systems and processes, including adding new staff roles, changing responsibilities for existing roles, implementing a dedicated support structure for humanitarian-development cooperation at Headquarters (HQ) and Regional Bureaux (RBx), and reforming planning frameworks. In addition to external factors, such as host government policy positions and donor policies and priorities, these internal changes have been instrumental in shaping UNHCR's position and role.

Meanwhile, changes within the organization take time, and the 2018–2021 evaluation also found evidence that a focus on partnerships has meant that UNHCR has not consistently focused on how it can alter its own operations to gradually integrate refugees into local and national service systems - too often conducting "business as usual" instead. What is more, humanitarian-development cooperation is happening in a fast-changing environment (see the following section).

Against this background, UNHCR decided to continue the longitudinal evaluation for another year (2022), with three objectives:

- Track progress and consolidate change, disseminating and following-up on priority areas for implementing the recommendations from the 2018–2021 evaluation and the management response to these recommendations.
- Further develop the ways in which UNHCR country operations can mainstream development engagement from the outset, transforming UNHCR's own operations and promoting multi-year and longer-term approaches, including with the help of partnerships.
- ▶ Collect new evidence on the effects UNHCR's engagement in humanitariandevelopment cooperation has on refugees, particularly efforts to improve refugee integration and inclusion⁶ in national programmes and services.

⁵ The compact has been adopted by the UN General Assembly, with 181 votes in favour, two opposed (the US and Hungary), and three abstentions (the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, and Libya). For the link between the GCR and the SDGs, see https://www.unhcr.org/5ef33d3f4.pdf#zoom=95 (accessed 9 December 2022).

⁶ On the use of this term, see chapter 2.

1.2. Recent trends in funding and humanitarian needs put the humanitarian-development nexus to the test.

The past five years have been a golden age for humanitarian-development cooperation, with a plethora of policy and financing commitments made by a number of stakeholders. Bilateral and multilateral development funds injected into refugee situations have now reached an estimated US\$ 5.3 billion per year.⁷ This has come on top of humanitarian funding, which has seen average annual growth rates of around 10 per cent in recent years, with higher growth rates in refugee situations. In this situation, most refugee-hosting states continue to rely on external humanitarian funding for their responses to forced displacement.10

Since 2021, the funding situation has been under stress. Humanitarian funding grew by only 2.6 per cent in 2021. Its future financial outlook is under pressure, as many industrialized economies are experiencing weak economic performance and need more funding internally, both for refugees and to address the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. High inflation rates, driven by high food prices in particular, 11 and the emergence of new acute crises are further exacerbating this situation. In addition to the war in Ukraine, which has caused widespread displacement, the consequences of global heating are becoming more severe. This is currently visible in the Horn of Africa, among other places. In Somalia, more than one million people were internally displaced due to drought in 2022, including many who had already fled conflict. 12 The risks of future displacement due to the climate crisis, interlinked with violent conflict, are highest for countries in the so-called Global South and are very significant in scope. Recent displacement risk models anticipate a 50 per cent increase in the number of displaced people for each degree of global heating.¹³

⁷ See the High Commissioner's opening statement to the 73rd session of the UNHCR Executive Committee, October 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/admin/ hcspeeches/6343e6e44/high-commissioners-opening-statement-73rd-session-unhcr-executivecommittee.html.

⁸ Angus Urquhart, Fran Girling-Morris, Suzanna Nelson-Pollard, Erica Mason, "Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2022", 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://devinit.org/resources/globalhumanitarian-assistance-report-2022/.

⁹ Between 2018 and 2019, for example, humanitarian aid to refugee situations increased by 20 per cent in comparison to the preceding two years. See UNHCR, "Global Compact on Refugees, Indicator Report", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/global-compact-refugees-indicator-report/ wp-content/uploads/sites/143/2021/11/2021_GCR-Indicator-Report_spread_web.pdf.

¹⁰ In 2019, the share of humanitarian funding was at 74 per cent of all ODA allocated to refugee situations. See https://www.unhcr.org/people-forced-to-flee-book/wp-content/uploads/sites/137/2021/10/ Doreen-Kibuka-Musoke-and-Zara-Sarzin_Financing-for-Forced-Displacement-Situations.pdf (accessed 9 December 2022).

¹¹ Philip Barrett, "How Food and Energy are Driving the Global Inflation Surge", IMF Blog, 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/09/cotw-how-foodand-energy-are-driving-the-global-inflation-surge.

¹² UNHCR, "UNHCR's Grandi sounds alarm as drought grips Horn of Africa", 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/10/63583c444/unhcrs-grandi-soundsalarm-drought-grips-horn-africa.html.

¹³ Bina Desai et al., "Addressing the human cost in a changing climate", Science, 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.abh4283; Reinhard Mechler, Ansa Heyl, "Assessing the risks of human displacement in a changing climate", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://previous.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/about/210625-assessing-risks-of-humandisplacement.html.

These increased financial and humanitarian needs are likely to put humanitariandevelopment cooperation at UNHCR to a test. On the one hand, development financing and approaches are likely to become more important as they involve multi-year financial commitments and seek to create sustainable solutions. On the other hand, UNHCR is already experiencing less financial coverage in relation to humanitarian needs. At all levels of the organization, this requires difficult decisions on priorities. There may be pressure to deprioritize humanitarian-development cooperation, with its emphasis on facilitating a broader set of stakeholders in their responses to longer-term goals, as compared to providing direct, life-saving assistance. What is more, both the percentage and the absolute amount of flexible, unearmarked funding have also decreased.¹⁴ For many UNHCR country operations, however, handling earmarked contributions remains a challenge, especially when it comes to humanitarian-development cooperation, as the related activities are not often included in the part of their country operations plans covered by UNHCR's central resource allocations.



¹⁴ UNHCR, "Global Compact on Refugees, Indicator Report", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/global-compact-refugees-indicator-report/wp-content/uploads/ sites/143/2021/11/2021_GCR-Indicator-Report_spread_web.pdf.

2. Evaluation design

2.1. A learning and accountability-oriented evaluation focusing on selected themes and country cases.

The overall purpose of the evaluation extension is to continue to support UNHCR in adapting to the new response model in a challenging environment and implementing its new role as effectively as possible. The evaluation extension is therefore focused on learning and also serves to strengthen accountability to the extent that it tracks follow-up on some of the key recommendations made previously.

While the evaluation extension pursues the same overall goal as the original evaluation, its focus is only partly the same. It extends the original focus on trying to understand how humanitarian-development cooperation affects refugees by analysing additional data. It deepens the effort to collect lessons and good practices by focusing in on different sectors of the response. And it goes beyond the original focus by examining to what extent the measures taken by UNHCR in response to the recommendations made help address the issues that were identified. For the latter, the evaluation extension focuses on selected priority themes: resource mobilization and budgeting; the role of protection staff in humanitarian-development cooperation and the potential for cooperation on core protection themes; the staff support structure needed for humanitarian-development cooperation; and the evidence on the effects of such cooperation.

This evaluation extension draws evidence from three country operations (Jordan, Kenya and Mauritania) and derives certain insights from experiences gained as part of the response to the war in Ukraine. It covers the period from late 2021 to the end of 2022. An inception report for the evaluation extension describes the goals, scope and methods used in greater detail.

2.2. Key evaluation questions, methods and data sources

The evaluation extension focused on three key evaluation questions:

- 1. How consistently is UNHCR following up on the strategic recommendations of the 2018-21 evaluation, how effective are related actions perceived, and have any gaps emerged?
- 2. What lessons and good practices relating to the inclusion agenda emerge from experiences made in Kenya and Mauritania and specifically in education, health, and social protection?
- 3. What are the effects of humanitarian-development cooperation on the lives of refugees and other persons of concern, particularly in relation to the inclusion agenda?

The evaluation team used a mixed-methods approach, combining semi-structured key informant interviews, document review, focus group discussions, statistical analysis,

and workshops to answer the key evaluation questions. Figure 2 provides an overview of the methods used to gather relevant data.




Figure 2: Overview of data gathering methods and sources

Semi-structured interviews are a key data source for the first two key evaluation questions. The evaluation team selected interview partners purposively and focused on UNHCR staff and partner organisations working in Kenya and Mauritania (where interviews took place in person). Interviews also covered staff members working at UNHCR's headquarters, as well as Senior Development Officers working in other contexts and at the regional level, including on the response to the war in Ukraine. Annex 1 contains a list of individuals interviewed. We analysed interview data in three iterations: following a research mission to UNHCR's headquarters, after each country mission, and towards the end of the evaluation with the aim of making comparisons.

Document analysis was another key data source for key evaluation questions 1 and 2. It included a review of strategy, policy, and guidance documents; evaluative studies and lessons learnt documents; and sector strategies.

Workshops with UNHCR technical staff provided additional insights for key evaluation question 2, which focuses on lessons and good practices on inclusion. Two separate online workshops brought together UNHCR experts on education and social protection (including cash) working in different contexts. They discussed their experiences in trying to promote the inclusion of refugees in national systems in their respective sectors. The workshops thus provided an opportunity for learning and contributed to the collection of data for the evaluation extension.

Quantitative analysis served to establish what effects inclusion has on the lives of refugees (key evaluation question 3). Evaluation team members based at the International Security and Development Center (ISDC) used existing UNHCR datasets to conduct rigorous statistical analyses. In Jordan, we expanded on our earlier analysis of the impact of work permits on the socio-economic and protection situations of Syrian refugees by analysing new waves of UNHCR's home-visit surveys which cover the period affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. In Kenya, we analysed data from the Kenya Covid-19 Rapid Response Phone Survey to understand what drives refugees' trust in the government, their intentions to follow government instructions during the pandemic, and their self-reliance, including their likelihood of finding employment and their sense of well-being. A more detailed description of the datasets, the analysis methods used, and the results are available at https://gppi.net/UNHCR-quantitative-results.

Focus group discussions with refugees complemented the quantitative impact analysis. The evaluation team conducted six focus group discussions in the Mbera camp in Mauritania. Three of the discussions were among women and three among men. Together, they involved 54 purposively selected participants. Regarding health, discussions focused on service quality following the handover of the Mbera health centre's management to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health. With respect to social protection, discussions focused on the individual- and household-level effects of a government-led social protection instrument complementing WFP cash assistance.

The evaluation extension emphasizes gender when assessing what effects humanitarian-development cooperation has on refugees. To this end, the evaluation team conducted separate focus group discussions with women and men and disaggregated the results of the quantitative analyses based on indicators relevant to gender, such as households headed by women vs. households headed by men.

2.3. Case selection

The evaluation collected or analysed data relating to four crisis contexts:

| Context | KEQ | Focus | Methods |
|---------------------|--------------|---|---|
| Kenya | KEQ1 KEQ2 | General assessment of progress Promotion of inclusion | Qualitative – key informant interviews with UNHCR staff and partners |
| | | Drivers and effects of inclusion | Quantitative – descriptive statistics; bivariate and multivariate analyses |
| Mauritania | KEQ1 KEQ2 | General assessment of progress Promotion of inclusion Effects of inclusion on health and social protection | Qualitative – key informant interviews with UNHCR staff and partners; focus group discussions with refugees in Mbera camp |
| Jordan | KEQ2 | Effects of inclusion (work permits) | Quantitative – regression analyses based on nearest neighbour matching |
| Ukraine regional | KEQ1 | Experiences with humanitarian- development cooperation in the context of the regional response to the war in Ukraine | Qualitative – key informant interviews with Senior Development Officers deployed to support the response |

Case selection took the following criteria into account:

- Learning cases for the inclusion agenda (selection: Kenya; Mauritania): During inception interviews, the evaluation team asked for stand-out examples to illustrate the (positive or negative) effects of the inclusion agenda; for particular sectors or activities that are perceived as relatively advanced when it comes to inclusion, or for country cases that stood out as learning examples. These examples were complemented with an analysis of relevant host country policy pledges¹⁵ from the 2019 GRF, potential alignment of these pledges with World Bank engagement and a screening of the nature of the displacement context. Finally, the evaluation team checked the emerging longlist against the number of past and current evaluations.
- Follow-up on robust evidence collected during the 2018–2021 evaluation, with new data covering the shock of Covid-19 (selection: Jordan): Rigorous statistical analyses on the effects of work permits for Syrian refugees in Jordan were conducted during the initial phase of the evaluation. The collected evidence is strong, but the data used for the original evaluation did not yet cover the potential impacts of recent shocks, including those related to Covid-19. In order to have a more up-to-date analysis, this evaluation extension mirrors the approach previously used with a new wave of UNHCR home-visit data.
- Data availability for new quantitative analysis (selection: Kenya): Datasets available in the UNHCR-World Bank Microdata library were scanned for datasets that reflect a large refugee population, that cover a variety of socio-economic dimensions and that pertain to a country which, ideally, overlaps with countries identified as examples of learning with regard to inclusion.
- Insights emerging from a high-profile emergency with different context conditions (Ukraine): The most recent phase of the war in Ukraine began after the terms of reference for the extension of this evaluation had been finalized. While it was too late to include the Ukraine response as a full case study, the evaluation team - in consultation with UNHCR - decided to conduct additional interviews with Senior Development Officers deployed to the region in order to better understand experiences with humanitarian-development cooperation.

2.4. Areas excluded from the scope of the evaluation extension

A number of organizational change processes relevant to humanitarian-development cooperation have been covered in different evaluations or other research projects. They are therefore excluded from the scope of this evaluation extension:

The responsibilities and division of labour for different types of partnerships, including humanitarian-development partnerships, were part of a partnership mapping project that GPPi is projected to conduct (on hold);

¹⁵ For more information, please see the GCR's dashboard of Pledges & Contributions, accessed 9 January 2023, https://globalcompactrefugees.org/pledges-contributions.

- Efforts to recruit dedicated staff to support the tracking of development funds directed at refugee situations were ongoing;
- A synthesis of evidence and an evaluation of internal displacement was planning to cover humanitarian-development cooperation in internal displacement contexts; a joint UNHCR-GIZ study related to the nexus was also planning to cover internal displacement contexts;
- An evaluation of UNHCR-led initiatives to end statelessness has recently been completed;16
- ▶ An initial lessons-learned exercise for UNHCR's COMPASS results-based management platform had already been conducted, and the timeframe for the evaluation extension would not allow for collecting lessons over multiple years of planning;
- The alignment of the timeframes, analyses and results of UNHCR's multi-year strategies with UN development planning processes is not included in the scope of this evaluation extension since the shift is expected to be completed only in 2023. Similarly, actions related to commonly agreed objectives on humanitariandevelopment cooperation for Representatives in UNHCR's new performance management system, or developing the capacity for situational analysis and multi-year strategy development are scheduled to be completed only in 2023 or 2024, and were therefore excluded from the scope of this evaluation;
- Finally, this evaluation extension does not assess the ways in which individual partnerships have progressed or establish how the scope of humanitariandevelopment cooperation on both global and country levels has evolved.



¹⁶ Brian Majewski et al., "Evaluation of UNHCR-led Initiatives to End Statelessness", 2021, Volume 1, UNHCR, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/60f18fcd4.pdf.

3. Progress and gaps in recommendation follow-up

In this chapter, we assess what progress UNHCR has made in following up on the recommendations made as part of the first phase of this evaluation (KEQ1). As is standard for evaluations at UNHCR, senior management and leadership at UNHCR issue a Management Response to recommendations set out in evaluation reports. Table 1 provides a summary of the recommendations and the related management response.

Table 1: Main evaluation recommendations and the management response to them

Recommendation

Management response and top line planned actions

Recommendation 1

Further invest to strengthen UNHCR's engagement with the UN development system, expand cooperation with development actors on rule of law and access to justice, explore opportunities for cooperating on internal displacement, and better prepare UNHCR for its facilitation, supervision, monitoring, reporting and advocacy roles.

Management response: Agree. Planned actions:

- 1. The 2022-2026 Strategic Directions prioritize humanitarian-development cooperation, and the SET provides robust leadership on humanitariandevelopment cooperation guiding divisions, RBs and country operations to prioritize humanitarian-development cooperation.
- 2. Corporate strategies, plans and guidance provide a consistent and coherent approach to humanitarian-development cooperation, building upon lessons learned and reflecting SET-agreed priorities.
- 3. Develop and maintain the core capacities required to meaningfully engage in humanitarian-development cooperation including facilitation, supervision, monitoring, reporting and advocacy roles.
- 4. Ensure more systematic cooperation with development actors on internal displacement, including through strengthening UNHCR's engagement with the UN development system.
- 5. Expand cooperation with development actors on rule of law and access to justice.

Recommendation 2

Systematically pursue the integration of services for refugees with national and local service systems throughout UNHCR's own programmes, focusing the ongoing introduction of multi-year planning on this objective and strengthening incentives.

Management response: Agree. Planned actions:

- 1. Strengthen capacities of operations on situational analysis and multi-year strategy development in order to enable integration-related gap analysis and the formulation of integration related results that are based on specific country context.
- 2. Develop and implement global and regional parameters on integration of services for refugees and IDPs in national systems.
- 3. Engage in policy dialogue on inclusion in specific sectors at country level.
- 4. Support governments and development actors to include refugees and IDPs in development planning at sectoral and national level.
- 5. Include modules on humanitarian-development cooperation/inclusion in trainings/learning materials targeting senior management.
- 6. Increase cross-fertilization of knowledge between UNHCR and development agencies.
- 7. Strengthen Representatives' accountability vis à vis objectives related to integration of services for refugees and IDPs with national and local service systems.

Recommendation 3

Ensure that UNHCR core budgets that country operations are authorized to spend and standard job descriptions include the time and resources to engage with development actors and processes. Clarify under what conditions UNHCR seeks funding for its own activities from development actors and make these contributions additional to regular core budgets.

Management response: Partially agree. Planned actions:

- 1. Put systems in place that enable greater clarity and predictability with regards to funding from development actors.
- 2. Guidance on UNHCR's position on fundraising from development partners.
- 3. Country operation plans and standard job description adequately capture the required work on UNHCR's development engagement.

Recommendation 4

Make UNHCR's support structure for humanitariandevelopment cooperation more effective by clarifying the role of the Regional Bureaux and strengthening the focus of staff members dedicated to humanitariandevelopment cooperation on internal change processes.

Management response: Agree. Planned actions:

- 1. Clarify division of responsibilities and roles of staff dedicated to humanitariandevelopment cooperation between HQ-Bureaux and Country Operations.
- 2. Establish and develop channels of communication and cooperation between regional bureaux and regional counterparts in development partners (where they exist).
- 3. Updating of the Roles, Accountabilities and Authorities frameworks for Country Offices, Regional Bureaux and HQ Divisions & Entities.
- 4. Continue capacity building and learning exchanges targeting Bureaux and Country Operations.

Recommendation 5

Accelerate efforts to strengthen UNHCR's capacity for and practice of collecting, analysing and sharing data.

Management response: Agree. Planned actions:

- 1. Support the cleaning and publication of anonymized datasets on affected populations in UNHCR/ World Bank or other microdata libraries.
- 2. Establish and strengthen the work of the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement.
- 3. Develop and deploy standardized data collection approaches within UNHCR.
- 4. Engage with internal stakeholders and development partners on data and evidence.

Recommendation 6

Make the role of protection in humanitariandevelopment cooperation more explicit and exercise this role more actively, specifically in terms of planning and analysis. providing operational protection advice. monitoring the situation of persons of concern, and cooperating directly with development actors.

Management response: Agree. Planned actions:

- 1. Improving planning and analysis. Systematic provision of quality protection analysis to development partners to inform their strategies, funding priorities and programming at country and regional levels.
- 2. Providing protection advice and support to pro-actively engage development partners on protection and solutions priorities.
- 3. Monitoring the situation of persons of concern. On-going protection monitoring activities and data collection support directly the monitoring of persons of concern in the context of socio-economic development. Specific efforts need to be carried to adequately analyse the data and make it useful to development actors.

Our assessment included progress in general in achieving the recommendations and the actions set out in the Management Response, as well as focusing on selected priority themes. The findings are presented here in order of the priority interviewees assigned to them. The actions committed to as part of the management response to the evaluation recommendations are broadly perceived to be relevant and show progress over time. However, some gaps remain, including on issues that the interviewees perceive to be the most important.

3.1. UNHCR has made progress in clarifying that inclusion and self-reliance are central objectives, but uncertainty regarding some key concepts and priorities remains.

One of the most important issues interviewees raised in previous years concerned UNHCR's level of clarity on the objectives and priorities of humanitarian-development cooperation. The evaluation's first recommendation focused on priorities and suggested a number of additional areas UNHCR could concentrate on in its engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation. The second recommendation focused on self-reliance and inclusion, and suggested that UNHCR should systematically concentrate its own programmes on these objectives. Interviewees mentioned a number of examples that demonstrate progress in terms of clarifying self-reliance and inclusion as top-level objectives for UNHCR's engagement in humanitariandevelopment cooperation. When it comes to the more specific suggestions, progress has been more uneven and varied. The following observations support this finding:

UNHCR has adopted a number of important strategy, policy and guidance documents at headquarters which reflect the ongoing priority of humanitariandevelopment cooperation:

- The newly adopted Strategic Directions for 2022–2026 define "to include" as one of the five strategic directions. This involves supporting the inclusion of refugees, internally displaced and stateless people in national development frameworks as well as national or local services, and also supporting livelihoods and economic growth for both displaced people and the local communities where they live. Moreover, one of the eight areas highlighted for focused attention is "mainstreaming development engagement in [...UNHCR's] responses from the outset, especially by building coalitions with development partners". While this direction remains relatively broad, it does reflect the recommendation to pursue the integration of services for refugees more systematically and to better define UNHCR's long-term role. A strategic plan for the focus area of engaging development actors outlining more detailed positions was adopted in early 2023.
- ▶ The High-Level Officials Meeting in December 2021 the biennial review meeting for the Global Refugee Forum – issued a recommendation that the "combined humanitarian, development, and peace capacities" should be better used "to achieve the GCR objectives". It also issued recommendations to increase development financing in support of refugee situations, and to increase social inclusion for refugees. Social inclusion was further highlighted as economic inclusion and access to livelihoods, access to quality primary, secondary, and

- higher education and health care via strengthened national systems. ¹⁷ Again this reflects the evaluation's recommendation to pursue the integration of services for refugees with national and local systems more systematically.
- ▶ UNHCR formally committed to adhering to the OECD/DAC recommendation on improving programming, finance and coordination in the humanitarian, development and peace nexus in October 2021. Among other pledges, adherents commit to "invest in local capacities and ensure that, wherever possible, local actors are an integral part of their response with the ultimate goal to gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance by fostering self-reliance and resilience."18
- At a more sector-specific level, UNHCR's new Global Public Health Strategy¹⁹ emphasizes (among other factors) the importance of integration and inclusion into national systems, working in partnership, and capacity strengthening and support, and defines strategic objectives relating to these issues. Similarly, the High Commissioner's 2022 Dialogue on Protection Challenges²⁰ focused on development cooperation and covered cooperation as part of early action, on inclusion, and for solutions. The evaluation's recommendations stressed the role of UNHCR's global sector strategies as a means of clarifying UNHCR's objectives and priorities in humanitarian-development cooperation.
- Similarly, some updated partnership frameworks reflect these objectives. This includes, for example, a new Strategic Collaboration Framework between the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and UNHCR that emphasizes supporting host communities and governments to work towards including refugees in national systems. Another example is a new global collaboration framework between the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNHCR, which outlines collaboration among others on livelihoods, rule of law and local governance, and conflict prevention and peacebuilding.²¹

The evaluation team identified three main limitations in the clarification of objectives and priorities for humanitarian-development cooperation that had been recommended. Firstly, the draft strategic plan for the focus area of mainstreaming development engagement from the outset mentions deeper partnerships with UN agencies as a key strategy. This reflects the recommendation made to strengthen engagement with the UN development system. Other suggested shifts in attention – such as cooperation with development actors on rule of law and access to justice, cooperation on internal

¹⁷ UNHCR, "Outcomes of the High-Level Officials Meeting", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https:// www.unhcr.org/623dd8834.pdf#zoom=95.

¹⁸ OECD, "DAC Recommendation on the OECD Legal Instruments Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus", OECD/LEGAL/5019, 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/ public/doc/643/643.en.pdf.

¹⁹ UNHCR, "UNHCR Global Strategy for Public Health, 2021–2025", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/612643544.pdf#zoom=95.

²⁰ UNHCR, "2022 High Commissioner's Dialogue on Protection Challenges: Development Cooperation. Outcome Document", 2022, accessed 27 June 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/media/2022-highcommissioners-dialogue-outcome-document-dialogue-action-english.

²¹ UNDP and UNHCR, "Global Collaboration Framework for Inclusion and Solutions 2023-2025", 2023, accessed 15 March 2023, https://www.undp.org/publications/global-collaboration-frameworkinclusion-and-solutions-2023-2025.

displacement, and an increased focus on supervision, monitoring, reporting, and advocacy roles - are not directly reflected in the strategies, policies, or guidance elements mentioned.

Second, uncertainty remains around fundamental concepts, such as inclusion: while UNHCR has developed draft internal guidance on its approach to refugee inclusion,²² it is not clear what "inclusion" entails in different response sectors. In particular, agreement is lacking on whether situations in which humanitarian funding is used to enable access to public services qualify as inclusion.²³ UNHCR has not taken a clear stance on whether or not it promotes inclusion also in situations in which this requires compromises on service quality or coverage, except in the health and education sectors. Another aspect of uncertainty relates to the level of priority that should be given to humanitarian-development cooperation on internal displacement and stateless persons. The draft strategic plan for the focus area of mainstreaming development engagement from the outset covers all population groups served by UNHCR, but does not explicitly address these issues.

Third, the level of agreement on and commitment to humanitarian-development cooperation at the country level seems to be increasing, but this is still variable. Since much of the data collection for this evaluation focused on positive cases, many interviews unsurprisingly reflected a high level of internalization of the humanitariandevelopment cooperation agenda at the country level. Our interview partners typically referred to objectives on humanitarian-development cooperation and inclusion defined at the country level as well as to certain global-sector strategies, rather than to the new Strategic Directions more generally.²⁴ Meanwhile, in some of the country operations we covered in additional interviews with Senior Development Officers, our interviewees still thought that such country-level objectives were lacking. Others felt that an increasingly tight funding situation had pushed UNHCR to work in the "old ways", prioritizing "care and maintenance". The interviewees consistently emphasized how important the respective country representative's position was in determining the level of priority given to humanitarian-development cooperation. Staff members at headquarters report that a work stream addressing the skills of senior management and other frontline staff is foreseen.

²² UNHCR, "Approach to Refugee Inclusion Contexts", 2022, internal document on file with the authors.

²³ The term is used inconsistently within the organization. For example, the UNHCR Global Health Strategy distinguishes between "integration" and "inclusion", while this distinction is not clearly apparent in other strategy documents. See UNHCR, "Global Public Health Strategy 2021–2025".

²⁴ In Mauritania in November 2021, for example, UNHCR adopted a new five-year strategy emphasizing humanitarian-development cooperation and approaches as one of its five impact areas, thus feeding into multi-year planning (see also the section on multi-year planning below). In Kenya, where the political space for inclusion has recently become more challenging, sectoral priorities on humanitarian-development cooperation are defined by the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (KISEDP) for Turkana county and, going forward, potentially by an equivalent Development Plan for Garissa county.

3.2. Some issues related to fundraising and budgeting - a major pain point for humanitarian-development cooperation - have recently been addressed.

When interviews for this evaluation extension were conducted in 2022, the most urgent issues they raised pertained to fundraising and budgeting. As a first aspect, the original evaluation made an urgent recommendation to clarify when UNHCR seeks funding from development actors and when it does not. In 2022, messages from headquarters on this issue remained split. Some UNHCR messages indicated support for senior management at country level in their frequent wish to mobilize additional funding from development actors, as promoting inclusion often demands higher upfront investments, and as the overall funding situation has been growing increasingly tight. Other messaging, however, continued to emphasize concerns that more fundraising from development actors could push UNHCR operations into a more project-based logic and that resource-mobilization efforts could undermine the strategic nature of UNHCR's partnerships with development actors. In 2023, UNHCR issued a Focus Area Strategic Plan on Engaging Development Actors, which includes clear guidance on the matter: Country operations are instructed to focus first on leveraging resources and capacities for the people it serves and host communities, rather than seeking development funding for UNHCR. Decisions on when to implement projects funded by development actors need to be based on a benefit-risk calculation that is discussed with the relevant departments at headquarters and approved by the responsible Regional Bureau. Since the guidance was adopted after the finalisation of this evaluation extension, it was not possible to cross-check whether stakeholders at country level perceive it as appropriate.

A second aspect is how development actor funding is handled in the internal resource allocation process. The recommendations suggested that development actors' contributions should be additional to the budgets country operations are authorised to spend (the operating level). UNHCR's headquarters has also clarified its stance on this issue, but many country operations view the position as unsatisfactory. The new Resource Allocation Framework foresees that when a country operation mobilizes contributions from development actors that span several years, the contribution will increase the budget the operation is authorized to spend in the first year of the contribution. Thereafter, a case will be made to the Budget Committee to cover related activities in the operating level for subsequent years. Interviewed staff members believe that this continued uncertainty over whether or not they can spend the development resources they raise can threaten project implementation and thereby create a reputational risk for UNHCR. As a result, country operations are likely to shy away from seeking significant development funding. An alternative proposal is that funding provided by development actors is allocated to country operations outside the regular budget allocation process, thus ensuring that such resources are automatically additional.

One new example illustrating how the uncertainty around fundraising and resource allocation creates tensions is the funding allocated by the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships (INTPA) for several countries in Eastern Africa and in Mauritania. INTPA was planning to channel significant funding through UNHCR. In addition to reflections on whether that made sense given UNHCR's

mandate, capacities, and competencies, however, the organization had lengthy internal deliberations on whether such funds would increase the authorised budgets of the country operations concerned. Our interview partners emphasized that this was even more of an issue than before because their general budgets have been shrinking as a result of a funding situation that was challenging overall. UNHCR Mauritania was granted an increase in its operating level in 2022, but this was prompted by the recent influx of Malians, not by the funding allocated through INTPA.

The evaluation team also collected additional evidence that UNHCR's strategic partnerships and facilitator role can benefit from financial relationships if the related projects are well implemented. For example, the global programme implemented by GIZ and UNHCR with funding from the German Development Cooperation Ministry, BMZ, has contributed to extending the overall strategic partnership between UNHCR and BMZ. The ministry has aligned its dedicated funding instrument on forced displacement with the objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees and seeks to support the pledges countries make at the Global Refugee Forum with funding. Mauritania offers another example. The World Bank is the most important development actor relating to forced displacement there. Under the IDA window for refugees and host communities, it invests US\$ 69 million in health, social protection, WASH, and infrastructure in the Hodh Chargui region, an area that is hosting over 68 000 refugees. UNHCR and GIZ implement the ProNexus project,25 which is funded by BMZ and involves implementation of activities by both organizations. These two organizations have planned their intervention in such a way that it complements World Bank programming, focusing on government capacity building and advocacy on the socio-economic inclusion of refugees. As part of this, they support the national civil registration agency in including displaced people in the social registry. They are also supporting the Mauritanian employment agency, Techghil, in establishing a presence in the town of Bassikounou, near the Mbera camp, so that services will be accessible to both refugees and the host population. Our interview partners believe that this partnership with GIZ, which also involves a transfer of funds, has increased UNHCR's value as a facilitator for other organizations, including the World Bank.

Increased development funding would potentially require other changes as well, especially with regard to financial tracking and dedicated project-management capacity. Some of these changes are ongoing. In particular, headquarters is currently working to replace UNHCR's financial management system with a new system that will make it easier to track earmarked contributions. This would facilitate the work of potential dedicated project managers, as it would allow project-based reporting as part of the same reporting system used for programme-based work.

²⁵ The full title of the ProNexus Project in Mauritania is "Building capacities for strengthened socioeconomic inclusion of refugees, asylum- seekers and vulnerable members of host communities in Mauritania". It is part of the wider GIZ-UNHCR Global Programme "Support to UNHCR in facilitating the operationalization of the Global Refugee Compact in the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (SUN)", financed by BMZ.

3.3. Mainstreaming humanitarian-development cooperation and transforming UNHCR's own programmes remains a work in progress.

In addition, the central recommendations from the original evaluation that focus on mainstreaming humanitarian-development cooperation and transforming UNHCR's own programmes continue to resonate strongly among the staff members we interviewed. For example, the original evaluation suggests that Senior Development Officers (SDOs) should focus more on supporting internal change processes than on engaging with external partners.26 It also recommends introducing multi-year planning within the organization to support a more general shift towards pursuing the integration of services for refugees with national and local service systems more systematically.

The goal of sector staff engaging more intensively in humanitarian-development cooperation remains work in progress. Several SDOs reported that they now engage more strongly with their sector colleagues and with planning processes, and that their sector colleagues, in turn, are taking a more active role in engaging with development partners. However, this by no means applies to all operations included in the data gathering for this evaluation extension. Moreover, interviewees identified several challenges to increasing staff's involvement in humanitarian-development cooperation. Firstly, the frequent staff turnover caused by rotation makes it more difficult for sector staff to build networks and to acquire the necessary deep knowledge of the local political context, including the distribution of responsibilities between the national and the regional/local levels, and the political economy of inclusion. Secondly, accessing line ministries can be difficult for more junior staff members. Thirdly, there is sometimes a tendency to "silo" sector staff rather than involving them as a general resource to promote inclusion, particularly when it comes to identifying further opportunities.

Experiences of the ways in which the new COMPASS system and multi-year planning facilitate inclusion are mixed. As discussed above (see chapter 3.1), recent UNHCR policies and strategies consistently mention inclusion and self-reliance as priority objectives. Many of the staff members working at headquarters who were interviewed towards the end of the original evaluation in 2021 felt that introducing the results-based management system COMPASS and multi-year planning could help to reach these objectives. The introduction of these systems has since started.²⁷

In Kenya, UNHCR has created a multi-year plan under that system for the first time, and the Kenyan government has endorsed this plan. The interviewees report mixed results when it comes to humanitarian-development cooperation and the inclusion agenda; they believe that multi-year planning contributes to a more predictable course

²⁶ See also Julia Steets, Julian Lehmann, "Paper 2: How Can UNHCR Close the Remaining Gaps between Commitments Made in the Context of the Global Compact on Refugees and Operational Practice?", GPPi, 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://gppi.net/2021/02/08/unhcrsengagement-papers-1-4.

²⁷ However, most of the elements in the management response that relate to multi-year planning fall outside the scope of this evaluation extension, as they will be completed only in 2023.

of action for the UNHCR operation over several consecutive years. However, they also see that UNHCR's ability to plan its contribution to inclusion granularly, beyond a one-year horizon, is limited as a result of political uncertainty, volatility due to drought, and predominantly single-year humanitarian funding. Staff members therefore see a trade-off between defining steps towards inclusion in a more detailed way on the one hand, and retaining the flexibility needed to respond to new crises and policy shifts on the other. Moreover, as budgets are approved on an annual basis, UNHCR's ability to conclude multi-year agreements with implementing partners also remains limited.

That said, in countries where the external conditions for inclusion planning are favourable and such planning is prioritized internally, the new system enables thorough and inclusion-focused multi-year planning that aligns with both the goals of the Global Compact on Refugees and the planning tools of other UN partners. The evaluation extension also found that positive UNHCR examples can support the system's introduction. In Mauritania, multi-year planning will only be introduced in 2024. The country operation has prepared for this by requesting a country strategy evaluation and developing a new multi-year strategy and theory of change, among other pieces of work. In the Middle East and North Africa region, an inclusion task force developed a theory of change, based on which it identified indicators for inclusion linked to the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan, which are now being tracked in a dashboard.

3.4. Dedicated support capacity for humanitariandevelopment cooperation has been strengthened, but country-level positions are under pressure.

Our interview partners once again highlighted the fact that a dedicated support structure for humanitarian-development cooperation is important until the issue is fully mainstreamed across UNHCR. The original evaluation contains several recommendations on this support structure. It recommends that core facilitation costs (including the costs for SDO positions where they fulfil this facilitation function) should be covered via a country operation's authorized budget, so that positions do not depend on dedicated external funding. It also suggests that UNHCR should clarify its Regional Bureaux's role in humanitarian-development cooperation.

Appreciation for the SDO role at the country level remains high in a number of the operations observed for this evaluation. The evaluation team collected a number of examples demonstrating that senior management places a high priority on such positions. In some cases, related staff costs were covered with unearmarked resources and thus did not depend on dedicated donor funding. In an increasing number of contexts, the position was designed to serve a direct advisory function to the country representative, which is recognized as good practice. In Mauritania, for example, interviewees perceived this as one of the elements that helped the country operations to strategically focus on partnerships with development actors and the promotion of the inclusion of refugees in national systems, together with creating a position on public health and prioritizing competence on socio-economic inclusion when staffing a key management position. For the Ukraine response, SDOs or other developmentoriented staff were also deployed relatively quickly – arriving in June or July 2022 in Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland, for example – using a fast-track procedure. The overall number of SDO positions increased to 30 in 2022.

Nevertheless, SDO positions also face limitations and pressures. Firstly, "first wave" rapid deployment teams do not yet include any development-oriented positions, and the system does not enable the identification of staff members with relevant qualifications.²⁸For this reason, development / inclusion-oriented staff arrived only several months into the emergency response in the various countries affected by the war in Ukraine. That meant, for example, that it took longer to explore what role the private sector might be able to play in supporting the economic inclusion of refugees or to mobilise additional capacity for fully mapping social protection systems and developing inclusion roadmaps. Secondly, it is not yet common practice to cover dedicated development focused positions as part of an operation's authorised budget. Several interviewees believed that development-oriented positions would be likely to be discontinued once dedicated donor funding for them runs out. Thirdly, the institutional set-up and organogram continues to vary with regards to the reporting lines and position of SDOs or equivalent (although there seems to be a trend towards anchoring more positions in the representative's office).

The support structure at the regional level did not emerge as an important issue in this phase of the evaluation. Outwardly, the situation regarding the role of Regional Bureaux in humanitarian-development cooperation is relatively unchanged: there is little guidance on what role SDOs should play at the regional level, and their institutional anchoring varies. In practice, however, regional SDOs as well as some regional sector staff have emerged as crucial counterparts for multilateral and bilateral donors with a regional structure or focus. Few concerns about the regional level merely "adding a layer" were expressed in this round of interviews.

At headquarters, the role of the support structure for humanitarian-development cooperation has shifted. The new COMPASS platform allows country operations greater leeway to define sector-specific goals, such as with regard to inclusion and partnerships. As a result, support at headquarters focuses more on developing global partnerships and facilitating the sharing and exchange of information across operations. Most major bilateral donors now have a dedicated counterpart in the Division of Resilience and Solutions. This has enabled a strong collaboration between UNHCR and the European Commission's INTPA, for example, with UNHCR providing advice about how to work on forced displacement. UNHCR has developed internal fact sheets on key partners that provide basic information and important orientation for engaging with them.

²⁸ This is potentially resolvable through the new HR platform UNHCR has recently adopted but which has thus far been able to be effectively used to fully map qualified candidates with sufficient experience in these areas.

3.5. Despite further investments and flagship initiatives, challenges around data and analysis persist.

Collecting, analysing, and sharing data are key for the UNHCR's role as a facilitator, since data plays an important role in planning and decision-making for many development actors. The original evaluation recognized UNHCR's investments in this area and recommended accelerating related data reforms and transformation related to its facilitator role. The main policy document in this area is UNHCR's Data Transformation Strategy 2020–2025, which states that the organization seeks to become a leader in data and information on refugees and other displaced people by 2025, through investing in data management and governance, information systems, capacities, and evidence-informed decision-making.²⁹

The evaluation extension also highlighted additional instances of successful data initiatives. For example, the World Bank-UNHCR Joint Data Center on Forced Displacement (JDC) supported the analysis of data from the National Statistics Office in Chad, which in late 2020 informed asylum legislation granting freedom of movement as well as access to basic services and to justice. Data collected by the JDC is also being used for social protection programmes supported by the World Bank. In the Middle East and North Africa region, data on poverty collected by UNHCR and the World Bank Poverty and Equity Practice has informed the programming of both humanitarian and development partners in multiple countries, including Jordan.

As the management response to the original evaluation indicates, the organization is also implementing several other flagship initiatives on data. At the same time, it has invested in analytical capacity, particularly in terms of creating more economist positions and Data, Identity Management and Analysis units in the Regional Bureaux. None of the staff members and partners interviewed for the evaluation extension commented on the success of any of these individual initiatives, but rather highlighted the following issues, in addition to reiterating the general importance of data and analysis for humanitarian-development cooperation:

- Not all the interviewees believe that there is a consensus on the need to invest in data and analysis across UNHCR, including among country representatives.
- Stakeholders interviewed at the country level see data-sharing as the most pressing issue when it comes to data and analysis, particularly as much effort and lengthy, multi-layered processes are often required to obtain clearance for data-sharing agreements. Yet the management response does not address data-sharing.
- The interviewees stressed that investments in data and analysis were highly uneven between countries and sectors, and that the criteria for choosing investment cases were not clear to them. Thus, some country operations see large flagship surveys rolled out, whereas others do not, and the JDC can only serve the demands of some country operations.

²⁹ UNHCR, "Data Transformation Strategy 2020–2025", 2019, accessed 6 February 2023, https:// www.unhcr.org/5dc2e4734.pdf.

3.6. Cautious progress has been made on strengthening the role of protection in humanitarian-development cooperation.

Protection is at the heart of UNHCR's mandate and is also a key competence UNHCR brings to its cooperation with development actors. Nevertheless, staff members working in protection units in UNHCR country operations were often perceived as hesitant about their role in humanitarian-development cooperation during the original evaluation. The evaluation therefore recommended that the role of protection should be made more explicit, and that UNHCR should exercise that role more actively. On the whole, the data gathered during the evaluation extension suggests that UNHCR has made progress - albeit uneven progress - on this issue, both in terms of providing development actors with analyses on refugees' protection and socio-economic conditions and in terms of protection staff's direct engagement in humanitariandevelopment cooperation. For some country operations, therefore, this is less of a priority now than it was two years ago.

While some constraints remain, UNHCR has strengthened its ability to provide development actors with general protection analysis. Especially at headquarters, UNHCR has invested in several flagship analysis tools, which are either in development or now well established. However, various interviewees at country level were concerned whether development actors are widely using these tools. A comprehensive analysis of use patterns and the reasons why development actors may or may not use the information provided was unfortunately beyond the scope of this evaluation extension.

The most important tools remain the Refugee Protection Assessments and the country summaries for the Refugee Policy Review Framework that UNHCR drafts as an aspect of its partnership with the World Bank Group. Refugee Protection Assessments provide non-public analysis of whether the refugee policy in any given country is adequate for the purposes of receiving funding from the International Development Association's Refugee and Host Communities Sub-Window. Under the leadership of the Division of International Protection, the analysis is updated every six months to assess progress and to identify trends and risks.

Refugee Protection Assessments are most important in the period before the World Bank decides on allocations from the Refugee and Host Communities Sub-Window. The stakeholders we consulted have mixed opinions on the impact of this process. So far, UNHCR has rarely denied the adequacy of a protection framework for the purposes of funding under this sub-window. However, recent examples show that the High Commissioner can use the process for diplomatic engagement. In two recent cases, looming inadequacy assessments were used to increase leverage in policy discussions. In Kenya, the World Bank also appears to draw on the document during its own programme development. In other contexts, by contrast, UNHCR staff members we interviewed have the impression that the World Bank does not actively use the results of the Refugee Protection Assessments, and they therefore question whether the frequent updates to the assessments are worth the effort. This perception exists despite the fact that the World Bank has a legal requirement to use the assessments to establish eligibility for funding and whether conditions on the adequacy of the refugee protection frameworks are met.

The Refugee Policy Review Framework provides a public analysis that builds on Refugee Protection Assessments and forms part of the mid-term review of allocations under the Refugee and Host Communities Sub-Window.³⁰ Initially foreseen as a World Bank product, UNHCR now conducts the review, which is co-led by the Division of Resilience and Solutions and the Division of International Protection. This analysis tool has recently received a lot of attention within UNHCR and involves a range of different sector experts at the country level. It covers both protection themes, such as security of status and access to civil registration, security and justice, and analyses economic opportunities and access to national public services. Interviewees praised the comprehensive scope of the tool, but some expressed similar concerns about the current use of the information provided.

Along with these efforts, UNHCR's previously dormant rights-mapping tool RIMA (now re-branded as RIMAP) has gained new traction. At the time this report was written, this monitoring and analysis tool was still being prepared for roll-out, although disagreements on whether to accept earmarked donor funding for the purpose has held the process back. It is intended to provide a non-public assessment of compliance with international legal standards for the treatment of refugees. Since the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees includes a number of socioeconomic rights, RIMAP will also cover states' practices regarding socio-economic opportunities and inclusion in public services. Data collected through RIMAP will therefore help to inform the Refugee Policy Review Framework. While these efforts alongside the development of new tools for example on inclusion in national child protection systems will expand the scope of UNHCR's protection analysis, they have not yet helped to translate general observations on legal and policy frameworks into regular, specific advice informing the design of development programmes (beyond individual examples), as was suggested in the original evaluation's recommendations.

There has also been some progress regarding the direct engagement of UNHCR protection staff in humanitarian-development cooperation. The examples we collected suggest that further opportunities for expanding this kind of engagement exist:

- In order to better understand the interlinkages between protection and socioeconomic inclusion, UNHCR is currently conducting **protection case studies** on development cooperation in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa region. These case studies explore the links between financial inclusion and protection, for example, as well as between education inclusion and protection. In a similar vein, the original evaluation demonstrated that socio-economic inclusion in Jordan, where a certain number of Syrian refugees had been given work permits, had positive effects on refugees' protection situations.31
- ▶ UNHCR recently created a **Policy Unit** in the Division of International Protection that aims to ensure that protection analysis is progressively improved to inform development planning, to strengthen development mainstreaming in protection strategies and interventions, to strengthen capacity on development, and to track

³⁰ World Bank Group, "IDA19 Mid-Term Refugee Policy Review", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/826851636575674627/IDA19-Mid-Term-Refugee-Policy-Review.

³¹ Julia Steets et al., "Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian Development Cooperation. Volume II: Annexes", UNHCR, 2021, Annex 4, accessed 7 February 2023, https://www.gppi.net/ media/UNHCR-HD-Cooperation-Evaluation-Report_Annexes.pdf.

- protection effects of cooperation with development actors. In addition, UNHCR established a dedicated position at headquarters focusing on the rule of law, governance, and peacebuilding and is working on defining its anticipated role in peacebuilding through a paper that is currently under development.
- As in other countries, and consistent with the findings of an evaluation on asylum capacity development,32 UNHCR Mauritania has not yet entered into partnerships with development actors on capacity development for refugee status determination. However, UNHCR collaborates with the National Agency for the Civil Registry and Secured Documents and the German development agency GIZ in order to develop national registration capacities more broadly. Joint mobile teams consisting of representatives of both the national agency and UNHCR were created to register refugees outside camps in real time, using hardware provided by GIZ. The plan is for such teams to address the documentation needs of the host population in future as well.
- Access to civil documentation and national identification documents can facilitate the inclusion of refugees in public services and can strengthen socioeconomic opportunities. In the Hodh Chargui region in Mauritania, UNHCR provides funding to the relevant national agency and helps to verify data in order to support the issuance of national identity cards to refugees. Although the number of cards issued is still relatively low (2,800 in the past three years), they are an asset for socio-economic integration, particularly since they allow the cardholder to open a bank account.
- Similarly, in Iraq, UNHCR has shifted its focus from individual legal counselling work for internally displaced people to developing the government's capacity to deliver key civil documents.33
- In Nigeria, a financial inclusion survey established that lack of documentation was the biggest obstacle to financial inclusion, which prompted UNHCR to adjust its advocacy priorities.34
- The evaluation extension also collected examples of UNHCR protection staff facilitating the implementation of development interventions. In Mauritania, for example, UNHCR community protection staff support eligibility assessments, communication, and logistics around implementing the national, World Banksupported social protection instrument, Tekavoul, in the Mbera camp. Interviewees from other country operations also report that their community-based protection teams are providing particular support to development actor activities involving community participation.

³² Roger Zetter et al., "UNHCR Asylum Capacity Development (ACD) Evaluation, An Independent Evaluation of UNHCR's Support for Strengthening National Asylum Systems", UNHCR, 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/76ccb600-d481-409c-9e1c-129ce36e6d27/629730f94.pdf.

³³ UNHCR, "Access to Civil Documentation, IDPS and IDP Returnees in Iraq, 2022–2023", accessed 9 December 2022, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/cecdb119-38b2-4232-b6d5-3533e1664a06/ Access%20to%20Civil%20Documentation%20by%20IDPs%20and%20Returnees%20in%20 Iraq%202022-2023_19.8.2022.pdf.

³⁴ UNHCR, "Recent examples of DRS-JDC's role in mobilizing development partners and advancing the inclusion of forcibly displaced populations in national systems", 4 October 2022, on file with the authors.

3.7. Conclusions regarding UNHCR's follow-up on recommendations

This chapter has provided a review of how UNHCR staff and partners based in selected countries of operation perceive the follow-up to the recommendations made as part of the evaluation of UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation. It shows that humanitarian-development cooperation remains high on the agenda, despite competing priorities and a changing funding environment. The evaluation team has noted progress, particularly in areas that have to do with technical capacities and tools, such as dedicated capacity for humanitarian-development cooperation, data collection and analysis, and protection analysis.

However, one key practical obstacle to humanitarian-development cooperation is still only in the process of being addressed: the question of when UNHCR should (and when it should not) work to mobilize funding from development actors for itself, and how such funds should be treated in the organization's internal resource allocation system. As suggestions have been developed, resolving this issue now requires the High Commissioner and his leadership team to take a clear stance and to ensure that all parts of the organization follow that stance. UNHCR has also made less progress on issues that are part of long-term organizational change processes and require a change in mindset and/or in standard work approaches. Thus, mainstreaming humanitarian-development cooperation across UNHCR's different sectors and functions remains a work in progress, as does shifting the organization's operations to support the inclusion of refugees and other persons of concern.



4. Lessons on facilitating refugee inclusion in national service systems

In addition to tracking follow-up on key recommendations made as part of the first phase of the evaluation, this evaluation extension sought to collect lessons on efforts to support the inclusion of refugees in national or local service systems. This chapter draws on experiences gained in the case study countries as well as in different response sectors and focuses on education, social protection, and health. We have analysed the steps UNHCR can take to support inclusion as well as the challenges and constraints it may encounter.

4.1. Situating inclusion within UNHCR

As discussed above, UNHCR has no generally accepted definition of inclusion. For the purposes of this evaluation, we understand inclusion as a continuum of multiple phases with the goal of ensuring that refugees have access to local or national services and systems on a par with nationals (e.g., in health, education, social protection, financial services, justice, and labour markets)35 and are included in national policies and planning.

Inclusion is at the heart of the 1951 Convention, in which signatories commit to giving refugees the same treatment as nationals, or in some cases at least treatment "not less favorable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances". Despite this clear commitment, a standard practice has emerged in which refugees are housed in camps and receive separate services from UNHCR and other humanitarian partners, rather than having access to the labour market and being included in national or local service systems, which often face capacity or quality issues. A key objective of the Global Compact on Refugees is to strengthen these services so that they can better serve both host populations and refugees, and to enable more self-reliance. The first phase of the evaluation found that UNHCR had invested much effort in strengthening its engagement with development partners, but that it was still too often conducting "business as usual" on the ground and had not sufficiently transformed its own approaches to promote inclusion as systematically and strategically as possible.

Depending on the political context of the country hosting refugees, the phase of the response, the sector, and the funding environment, promoting inclusion can range from advocating for inclusion to harmonizing humanitarian services with national or local services, from supporting the inclusion of displaced people in national and international development plans to helping to mobilize funding to cover the costs of

³⁵ UNHCR, "Approach to Refugee Inclusion Contexts", internal draft on file with the authors.

including refugees, to strengthening the capacities and quality standards of these national or local systems.

4.2. Education

The objective of promoting inclusion is clearly defined in the education sector. UNHCR's global sector strategy for education³⁶ defines "sustainable inclusion" as the goal and identifies different means of reaching it, ranging from aligning curricula and exams to including refugees in national education information systems and mobilizing development actor engagement to strengthen national education systems. As in other sectors, UNHCR staff members working on education at the country level are familiar with the global sector strategy and use it to guide their activities.

In Mauritania, the political context for inclusion in education is positive. The government pledged to grant refugees access to the national education system and has included refugee children in related development plans. UNHCR's experiences in supporting refugee inclusion in education in Mauritania include the following:

- In the Mbera camp, dedicated schools for refugee children are currently run by humanitarian partners. To lay the groundwork for closer integration with the Mauritanian system, UNHCR and its partners are planning to switch to using the Mauritanian (rather than the Malian) curriculum and to teaching classes in Arabic (rather than in French). Since refugees have been sceptical about this change, UNHCR has been using its relations with refugees to build acceptance. An important lesson learned in this context is to involve affected people in preparing for such changes from the very beginning.
- The concern about a potential decrease in service quality when switching from dedicated services for refugees provided by NGOs to national standards or services was broadly shared by other UNHCR country operations as well. In Djibouti, for example, refugees' expectations were not met when the Ministry of Education provided them with courses but discontinued additional offerings, such as afternoon activities, and health and psychological services. The vast majority of UNHCR staff accept that inclusion may entail lower service standards and that the international community should therefore redouble its efforts to support raising quality across the board. However, as the first phase of the evaluation highlighted, this compromise prevents many staff members from pursuing inclusion strategically, and UNHCR's headquarters has not yet addressed the issue by defining a common position on how to approach this trade-off.
- UNHCR has also provided technical expertise from headquarters and the regional level on including refugee children in Mauritania's upcoming national 10-year strategy for education and has worked with other education partners to identify what resources and actions are needed to make this happen.

³⁶ UNHCR, "Refugee Education 2030: A Strategy for Refugee Inclusion", 2019, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/publications/education/5d651da88d7/education-2030-strategyrefugee-education.html.

In parallel, UNHCR has been phasing out financial support for refugee enrolment in private schools in Mauritania, investing in equipment and facilities for public schools instead.

Kenya also provides a positive political context for including refugees in education. The government signed the 2017 Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education, which commits members to ensuring that refugees have access to quality education without discrimination.³⁷ Refugee children feature in the national education sector plan,³⁸ follow the national curriculum, and can access public schools. While schools in refugee camps are considered public schools, they are operated by NGOs and are not covered by the national budget. Both the country operation and the Regional Bureau have gained key experiences in supporting inclusion in education, such as the following:

- UNHCR began by aligning refugee education with the national system. The organization requires its implementation partners to use the Kenyan Teacher Service Committee to build teachers' capacities and monitor their quality. UNHCR facilitated this process in practical terms by managing the logistics of bringing government staff to the camps. It is also supporting the introduction of Kenya's new curriculum in camp-based schools.
- ▶ UNHCR has been advocating with the government for the inclusion of refugees in the national examination system. The government was concerned that including such a significant number of refugees could affect the quality of education and decrease overall performance in national exams. Therefore, in cooperation with UNESCO, UNHCR supported the Ministry of Education in developing an inclusion policy and a costed plan for implementing it. An important lesson learned from this is that effective engagement with the government requires a good understanding of the different levels of government and their responsibilities. Thus, county governments in Kenya are responsible for early childhood preprimary education, while responsibility for older children, young people, and adults is centralized in the federal Ministry of Education.
- UNESCO's and UNICEF's joint efforts to support the inclusion of refugees in the national education management information system facilitated policy engagement with the government. However, data gaps on attendance, performance, and outof-school children remain a key challenge, making it hard to analyse the status quo and to monitor progress. In part, these data gaps are due to a lack of UNHCR internal policy or guidelines on how to address concerns about data security. This issue also affects staff from other UNHCR country operations, who call for quidance or policies on data security and protection so they can more easily integrate data systems for refugee schools with national education management

³⁷ Djibouti Declaration on Regional Conference on Refugee Education in IGAD Member States, 14 December 2017, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.refworld.org/docid/60a28cea4.html. The Declaration is accompanied by a Plan of Action with national-level commitments. UNHCR's Regional Bureau has been supporting the implementation of the Diibouti Declaration, including by contributing to the related taskforce and helping to monitor progress. UNHCR plans to conduct an evaluation of the progress made in implementing the declaration in 2023.

³⁸ Kenya Ministry of Education, "National Education Sector Strategic Plan for the Period 2018–2022", 2019, accessed 9 December 2022, https://assets.globalpartnership.org/s3fs-public/document/file/ kenya-nessp-2018-2002.pdf?VersionId=tdCPzVW5gwJ1DODIRJsOWkwpP7BDDrKv.

- information systems. Staff members also request support in advocating with governments and explaining the added value of restructuring their respective information systems to incorporate refugee education related data.
- UNHCR has also been trying to facilitate development investments to promote the inclusion of refugees in Kenya's national education system, including by supporting the eligibility assessment for the World Bank's Sub-Window for Refugees and Host Communities and by attempting to mobilize funding from other donors for the costed education plan. These efforts have proven to be challenging. First, the Kenyan government did not accept the terms and conditions for receiving World Bank funding under this sub-window. Other WB investments in the education sector appear to be gap filling rather than system strengthening. Other donors, at the same time, were very hesitant to cover recurring costs like teacher salaries or to channel funding through the Ministry of Education. Ironically, this has created a situation in which national authorities see UNHCR as the preferred "donor". Ongoing efforts were set back by the government's announcement in March 2021 that it would close the existing refugee camps³⁹ and seek the refugees' return to their countries of origin. While the announcement has not translated into practice and Kenya's new refugee act includes more language on economic inclusion, the changes in the government's stance, together with the uncertainty around the outcome of the 2022 elections made it harder to adopt a longer-term inclusion perspective and to mobilise financial resources for it. The struggle to mobilise sufficient and sustainable financing for inclusion is an issue many other UNHCR country operations face as well.

4.3. Social protection

Social protection is "a set of policies and programmes aimed at preventing or protecting all people against poverty, vulnerability and social exclusion throughout their lifecourse, with emphasis on vulnerable groups".40 For UNHCR, efforts to increase the inclusion of refugees in national social protection systems generally aim to support displaced populations' access to national social safety nets. As an intermediary step, such efforts may also involve providing displaced people with cash-based assistance in a way that resembles national systems. Cash-based assistance can also foster inclusion in other basic service systems, such as health care or education, if they require users to pay a fee for using the service.

³⁹ While the camp closure did not happen, the announcement was a setback for ongoing processes and discussions on the socio-economic inclusion of refugees. Discussions on the implementation of local development plans for counties hosting refugees resumed in early 2022, when the government presented a new plan to expand the settlement approach piloted in the Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement with the help of international funding.

⁴⁰ Social Protection Inter-agency Cooperation Board, "Collaborating for Policy Coherence and Development Impact", accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ dgreports/@nylo/documents/genericdocument/wcms_644769.pdf.

Globally, UNHCR has recently invested in building the knowledge and evidence base around its role in supporting inclusion in social protection systems.41 Building on a variety of analytical papers, UNHCR adopted an internal "Roadmap for inclusion of persons of concern in social protection systems (2022–2025)", which defines UNHCR's strategic priorities and its role. It sees the partnership with the World Bank in particular as key both for advocating inclusion in social protection and for mobilizing the necessary resources. UNHCR has supported the planning and implementation of social protection projects in Asia and Africa that are funded under the World Bank's Sub-Window for Host Communities and Refugees. 42 Moreover, UNHCR's global policy on cash-based interventions⁴³ emphasizes activities that link cash-based assistance and social protection.

Similarly to education, possible steps to promote inclusion in social protection include advocating for access to rights and for inclusion; supporting resource mobilization; strengthening government capacity for social protection; supporting displaced people's enrolment in social registries; supporting access to required documentation; and monitoring the effects of inclusion.44 Cash-based interventions can provide an important bridge until national services are available, particularly if these interventions enable displaced people to access financial services.

In Mauritania, refugee inclusion in the national social protection system is relatively advanced. Formally, refugees have access to the two main national programmes that are both supported by the World Bank: Tekavoul, a conditional cash transfer program targeting approximately 30,000 households living in extreme poverty; and Elmaouna, a short-term cash programme that provides additional support to the most vulnerable households affected by drought during the dry season. The World Bank has been supporting the expansion of these programmes to the Hodh Chargui region, where most refugees are hosted. Once refugees are included in the social registry, the intention is for *Tekavoul* and *Elmaouna* to replace humanitarian cash assistance. In this context, the key experiences gained in supporting the inclusion of displaced people in social protection systems include the following:

When UNHCR advocated with the World Bank for the extension of the social protection programmes to the refugee camp in Mauritania, it was able to draw on data from a standardized food security analysis and classification tool maintained as part of the humanitarian coordination system, the Cadre Harmonisé. 45 More generally, however, UNHCR staff working in various country operations emphasized the fact that lack of relevant data is often still a significant

⁴¹ UNHCR, "Social Protection", accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/social-protection. html.

⁴² UNHCR, "Emerging Lessons from World Bank Group Social Protection Investments in Refugee-Hosting Areas", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/61bb41d24.pdf.

⁴³ UNHCR, "Policy on Cash-Based Interventions, 2022–2026", 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/afr/61fbc91a4.pdf.

⁴⁴ UNHCR, "Inclusion of Refugees in Government Social Protection Systems in Africa", 2021, accessed 9 February 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/publications/brochures/61bb42624/inclusion-refugeesgovernment-social-protection-systems-africa.html.

⁴⁵ For more information, see the Cadre Harmonisé website, accessed 9 January 2023, https://www. ipcinfo.org/ch/.

constraint when it comes to efforts to integrate refugees into national social protection systems, because they are often excluded from national surveys or other data gathering exercises, and UNHCR either does not have or cannot easily share comparable data on refugees.

- In Mauritania, in cooperation with WFP, UNHCR supported the social registry by implementing social profiling of all refugee households in Mbera camp. This profiling used the same methodology as the social registry for Mauritanians and served as the basis for establishing who was eligible to receive government social protection payments.
- To be able to engage in effective policy dialogue with the Mauritanian government, in cooperation with the World Bank – for example, on expanding the social registry to include refugees who arrived more recently and increasing the government programme's cash pay-outs – good knowledge of the existing social protection system was important. Several country operations reported that they aim to map existing social protection schemes and their timelines in order to facilitate these efforts. UNHCR's headquarters conducted a baseline survey of social protection systems in 45 countries. This information proved useful in many ways, for example in aligning humanitarian cash systems for Ukrainian refugees with national social protection systems and addressing practical barriers to accessing these systems. However, staff members working in various country operations mentioned that they lack guidance and good practice examples for their engagement with governments on inclusion in social protection.
- Aligning humanitarian cash programmes with national social protection systems is a key step in transitioning to inclusion in social protection. In Mauritania, UNHCR coordinates the cash-based interventions of humanitarian actors working in Mbera camp, with a view to replacing humanitarian cash programmes with national social protection systems for the households that are included in that system. While WFP and UNHCR use the vulnerability classification provided by the social registry's socio-economic profiling, the targeting methodology for humanitarian cash programmes has not yet been harmonized with the national social protection programmes. This has contributed to concerns among refugees that they will lose access to cash assistance once the transition to the national system is complete.

Other country operations also work to align humanitarian cash programmes with national social protection systems. This process has been completed in Iraq, for example. 46 With regard to cash-based programmes for Ukrainian refugees, especially in Moldova and Poland, our interviewees report that a potential transition to national social protection systems was on the agenda from the very early stages of the response, since national capacities existed in both countries,

⁴⁶ When UNHCR developed a new targeting tool applicable to humanitarian cash programmes in Iraq, the tool (based on proxy means testing) was aligned with the World Bank's and other social protection actors' targeting methodologies. Harmonizing registration and targeting tools with other humanitarian agencies and with social protection programming, which is more relevant for inclusion, can provide the basis on which to encourage more actors to use the same certificates to provide cash assistance. See Pierre Townsend, Jason Collodi, Sara Pavanello, "Country Portfolio Evaluation: Iraq", Evaluation Report August 2020, UNHCR, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr. org/5f6df4a04.pdf.

and since refugees in Poland benefitted from the European Union's temporary protection status, which includes access to social protection mechanisms. However, a broad range of different humanitarian cash-based interventions still sprang up, for example in Moldova, and it took considerable time and effort to align these with the national social protection systems.

Several country operations mentioned that UNHCR's leverage over humanitarian cash programmes and national social protection systems is comparatively small because it normally focuses on cash assistance solely for refugees and has a relatively small budget for cash-based assistance.

In Mauritania, UNHCR also played an important role in facilitating inclusion in the national social protection system in practical ways. It provided logistical support for World Bank staff and crucially carried out communication and community outreach activities to prepare and explain planned adaptations to humanitarian cash programmes, which are very sensitive issues for many refugees. UNHCR is also working with a commercial Mauritanian Bank to set up a presence in Mbera camp so that refugees can receive cash assistance via ATM cards or full bank accounts.47

4.4. Health

"Integration and inclusion into national systems" and "working in partnership" are cross-cutting strategic approaches in UNHCR's Global Public Health Strategy 2021–2025, including for mental health and psycho-social support services. 48 Both approaches are reflected across all the document's strategic objectives and results. The types of activities planned to support the inclusion of displaced people in national health systems are similar to those in other sectors. Depending on the context, these may include providing an analysis of the health system's capacity as well as the options for and barriers to inclusion and access; advocating for refugee inclusion in national policies and plans, and supporting development planning; monitoring health needs, access, and service quality; strengthening national systems' capacities; and supporting resource mobilization. The global public health strategy is one of the few documents that addresses the potential trade-off between inclusion and service quality, specifying that inclusion will be promoted only where the quality of the national system is deemed sufficient.49

According to a survey conducted by UNHCR, 29 of the 47 national health policies covered in the survey include refugees, and 12 of 33 national health insurance schemes partially or fully cover refugees. 50 The report on the first phase of the evaluation of

⁴⁷ UNHCR, "Les interventions en espèces du HCR en Mauritanie", 2021, accessed 2 December 2022, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/86529.

⁴⁸ UNHCR, "Global Public Health Strategy 2021–2025".

⁴⁹ It should be noted that there is an on-going need for further clarity on the principles that define sufficiency both in this and other sectors.

⁵⁰ UNHCR, "Public Health Services Survey", accessed 9 February 2023, https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrljoiMWQ00GM4YWEtNzYxZS00MTVILTk4ZTltMjk4YzU5N TkwYjhhliwidCl6ImU1Yz M3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9 &pageName=ReportSection.

UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation describes the experiences gained from efforts to include Syrian refugees in the public health system in Jordan, from facilitating a multi-donor fund to finance this inclusion, and the effects these measures had on refugees. Here we add experiences from Kenya and Mauritania.

In **Kenya**, the level of inclusion in health is dynamic. Kenya has a comparatively strong health-care system,⁵¹ which includes the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF),⁵² a government-led, highly subsidized insurance scheme. The scheme is mandatory for Kenyan formal workers and has a voluntary track for informal workers. Including refugees in the health-care system has been one of the UNHCR's strategic priorities in Kenya for several years. 53 Like for other sectors, integration and inclusion in health is more difficult in camp-based settings than for urban-based refugees, because the camp context lends itself to establishing parallel facilities with weaker capacities. UNHCR has facilitated inclusion through the following activities in particular:

- UNHCR has been building a partnership with the NHIF to pilot refugee integration in the national health insurance scheme. Based on a memorandum of understanding concluded in 2014, refugees selected by UNHCR can be included in the NHIF as long as UNHCR pays for their membership at the same rate that informal workers pay (KES 500, or approximately US\$ 5, per household per month). The number of refugee households included in the NHIF has increased from 5,200 in 2014 to approximately 22,500 in 2022 (which is 16 per cent of all the refugees in Kenya).54
- UNHCR has been advocating with the Kenyan government to strengthen the formal inclusion of refugees in health care. Refugees who are registered and have documents can enrol in the NHIF independently of UNHCR. The organization follows a similar strategy in Pakistan, where it pays the premiums for including vulnerable refugees in the government's insurance system before working to strengthen self-enrolment options.
- UNHCR has been supporting the alignment of health facilities in camps with the national system. As part of this effort, health facilities in the camps – which are still operated and financed by humanitarian actors – were registered as public facilities and are now open to host populations. This has a perceived positive side effect on social cohesion in areas such as Garissa and Turkana counties, where major refugee camps are located and the state of public health facilities remains poor.

⁵¹ Josiah Kiarie, "Delivering quality and affordable health services: Kenya's road to Universal Health Coverage (UHC)", Social Protection blog, 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://socialprotection. org/discover/blog/delivering-quality-and-affordable-health-services-kenya%E2%80%99s-roaduniversal-health.

⁵² NHIF was previously an abbreviation for "National Hospital Insurance Fund". The name was changed at the beginning of 2022.

⁵³ UNHCR, "Global Focus: Kenya", accessed 9 December 2022, https://reporting.unhcr.org/ kenya?year=2022.

⁵⁴ NHIF Kenya, "Presentation – Kenya: Lessons from refugee inclusion in the National Hospital Insurance Fund (NHIF)", 2022, accessed 9 December 2022, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/ details/91830.

- Efforts to align and integrate health information systems are still ongoing. UNHCR maintains a separate health information system but also promotes the inclusion of refugees in the national health information system. As a first step, it is working to adopt the same information management tool. Similarly, UNHCR integrated the refugee health information system into the government's system in **Uganda** and is working to increase interoperability between different healthcare monitoring databases. In a number of other country operations, including Pakistan, a lack of available disaggregated data on refugee health continues to hamper an adequate health response and decreases the government's ownership.
- Finally, UNHCR has supported the inclusion of refugees in developmentoriented planning and health infrastructure development. UNHCR supported development-oriented planning first in Turkana county, and later in Garissa county. As a result, an ongoing tendering process is underway to build a hospital with EU funds, which would be jointly operated by the county and UNHCR.

In Mauritania, our interview partners perceive the health sector as one of the most advanced sectors in terms of refugee inclusion. Refugees have the same access to the fee-based public health system as nationals, although health standards remain guite low in practice.55 In 2019, the Mauritanian government joined the WHO's Universal Health Coverage Partnership, and it made a pledge at the Global Refugee Forum to establish a universal health insurance system, which is not yet in place.⁵⁶ Refugees were also included in the Covid-19 preparedness and response plan.⁵⁷ The National Health Sector Development Plan 2022-2030 (Plan National de Développement Sanitaire, PNDS),⁵⁸ however, does not specifically mention refugees or displaced people. Key efforts to support refugee inclusion in the public health system in Mauritania include the following:

UNHCR has supported the World Bank to ensure its health-system support project, INAYA, covers the district in which the Mbera refugee camp is located. Building on its existing partnerships with both the World Bank and the Ministry of Health, UNHCR contributed to project planning and supported project-appraisal missions. This is part of a process of transitioning from humanitarian service delivery to a user-funded system managed by the Ministry of Health. In mid-2020, humanitarian partners handed over the health facilities in the Mbera camp to the Ministry of Health. In parallel, public health facilities outside the camp were strengthened, which included transforming the health centre in the town of

⁵⁵ Access to services and medical support falls under the main decree that defines conditions for refugees in the country, Decree 2005-022: see https://www.refworld.org/docid/492530d02.html (accessed 9 December 2022).

⁵⁶ See Universal Health Coverage Partnership, "Mauritania", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https:// extranet.who.int/uhcpartnership/country-profile/mauritania.

⁵⁷ Similarly, in Malawi UNHCR successfully advocated for refugee inclusion – sometimes even under the particularly vulnerable status – in response and preparedness plans for certain diseases (e.g., for the Ebola virus, as well as for COVID-19 and vaccines). However, refugees remain unmentioned in the country's Health Sector Strategic Plan II (2017–2022). UNHCR uses revision processes to advocate for refugee inclusion in overarching national plans.

⁵⁸ Ministère de la Santé, "Plan National de Développment Sanitaire (PNDS) 2022–2030, Volume I: Analyse situationnelle et PNDS", accessed 9 January 2023, https://www.sante.gov.mr/?wpfb_dl=234.

Bassikounou into a hospital to benefit both the host community and refugees.⁵⁹ "Extremely vulnerable"60 individuals benefit from specific health support under INAYA. As in the case of the social protection system discussed above, eligibility is determined via Mauritania's social registry. The socio-economic profiling of the refugee households in the Mbera camp, conducted by UNHCR and WFP, facilitated the inclusion of refugees in the social registry. The goal is that lessvulnerable refugees will pay for health-care services like Mauritanians do. However, there are concerns about refugees' ability to do so. UNHCR is therefore seeking to strengthen livelihoods in order to reduce the need for assistance. Views vary on the extent to which such activities would need to be scaled before UNHCR can reduce selected benefits in health care.

- Financial burden-sharing has been an important part of the transition. Since management was handed over to the Ministry of Health, salaries for the three doctors in the Mbera health centre have been split, with one staff member paid through INAYA, one by UNHCR, and one through the health centre's own means. The centre aimed to attain financial autonomy by the end of 2022 by receiving fees for the services it offers. This financial burden-sharing has helped to smooth the transition, to maintain both medical staff and equipment, and to preserve institutional memory at the health centre. This contrasts with experiences gained in the Mantapala settlement in Zambia, where short-term contracts led to a high turnover rate among public health personnel, which affected the maintenance and continuity of monitoring and data collection on refugees access to health facilities, for example. In Malawi in 2021, UNHCR agreed to top up the salaries of the four health workers in refugee health centres who were paid by the government, and it continues to cover the salaries of the other 76 health workers completely.
- Beyond staff salaries, UNHCR continues to pay the cost of medication for the highest vulnerability category in Mauritania, while INAYA covers all other health costs and is planning to cover medication as well as procedures and laboratory costs for the lower vulnerability categories eventually. All medication is obtained through the Mauritanian national medical procurement firm, even though this implies higher costs for UNHCR and the need for a larger "buffer" of medications on hand, given delays in delivery.
- UNHCR also contributes to health coordination in Mauritania. It participates in a joint working group of humanitarian and development partners on health access and transition, chaired by INAYA. This group is in the process of elaborating a health transition plan. Similarly, UNHCR joined a regular meeting between the Ministry of Health and its health development partners in Uganda, which enables the organization to access this platform as well as health policy advisory committee meetings to advocate for refugee inclusion.

⁵⁹ This is similar to efforts in Pakistan, where UNHCR has sought to strengthen the public health sector strategically. It supported health infrastructure, equipment, and supplies to prepare for refugees' transition into the national health system while also ensuring peaceful co-existence.

⁶⁰ UNHCR and the World Bank define vulnerability based on a combination of five socio-economic dimensions, such as education and food security. For more detailed information, see Government of Mauritania, UNHCR, World Bank, "Inclusion of Refugees from Bassikounou in Mauritania's National Social Registry: Key Results from the Socio-economic Survey", 2021, accessed 23 December 2022, https://reliefweb.int/attachments/778f1c04-fbcb-3497-9967-75932142b465/UNHCR-WFP-Registre%20Social%20-%20%20Socio%20economic%20survey%20-%20presentation.pdf.

While the case of Mauritania serves to illustrate how UNHCR can accompany progress towards inclusion in national systems, it also exemplifies the fact that sustainable funding for health inclusion is a persistent challenge. Due to the volatility of the situation in Mali, new refugees have been arriving in Mauritania. This has increased needs and put a strain on the resources allocated for the handover. What is more, the progressive Mauritanian policy pledges have not yet been matched by commitments from a greater variety of donors other than the World Bank, BMZ, and the EU. Consistent with the findings of the first phase of the evaluation, UNHCR's leverage over other donors' funding priorities has been limited.⁶¹ One major development actor in Mauritania, for example, explicitly does not provide funding to the refugee-hosting region of Hodh Chargui because humanitarian actors are present there. There is therefore a question on how sustainable the current approach will be once the projects under the World Bank's Sub-Window for Host Communities and Refugees expire, particularly since both development and humanitarian funding in the future will likely have to focus not only on crisis related displacement but also on addressing climaterelated shocks, such as drought and flooding. Future advocacy for development funding for refugees and host communities should therefore include climate risk mitigation and adaptation instruments.62

⁶¹ Other country operations report mixed results on efforts to mobilize development actors' funding for refugee-hosting areas. Thus contributors to internal learning exchanges felt that UNHCR had influenced multilateral development donors' funding decisions in Brazil and Costa Rica, and had supported the inclusion of refugees in public services in Chad by collecting, analysing, and sharing socio-economic data collected, in part, in collaboration with the World Bank. By contrast, a recent country strategy evaluation for Zambia found that "UNHCR is hobbled in its ambition to leverage strategic influence" on other stakeholders because a relevant institutional platform for stakeholders is lacking and opportunities to influence existing fora or conduct ad hoc advocacy were missed. See Margie Cook et al., "UNHCR Country Strategy Evaluation: Zambia", 2021, accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.unhcr.org/625428bb4.pdf#zoom=95).

⁶² Global initiatives to help fund programmes to support adaptation to the climate crisis or to mitigate its impacts are attracting increasing international attention and financial commitments. A focus on advocating for the inclusion of funding for areas hosting refugees is particularly important as action plans for key instruments are being developed. For example, during COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, the G7 and the V20 launched the "Global Shield against Climate Risks", which aims to increase and ameliorate financial support for a more systematic approach to tackling climate-related loss and damages, as well as to provide more pre-arranged protection against climate- and disaster-related risks. This has already attracted over US\$ 220 million in funding. In countries like Mauritania, there may be more potential to adapt to the climate crisis or to avert its more severe impacts through reforestation and greening initiatives, for example. Similarly, the UN Secretary General's earlier call to provide early warning systems for everyone worldwide by 2027 led to a US\$ 3.1 billion action plan for the "Early Warnings for All Initiative". This action plan mentions the specific risks faced by displaced people, but without further specification; see UN, "Early Warnings for All Initiative: Executive Action Plan 2023–2027", accessed 9 December 2022, https://www.preventionweb.net/ media/84612/download. UNHCR could, for example, share lessons learned from including refugees in shock-responsive social protection programmes in Mauritania and engage in developing early warning systems for refugees and host communities.

5. Effects of inclusion

In this chapter, we present new evidence on the effects of inclusion on refugees from Jordan, Kenya, and Mauritania. For Jordan and Kenya, we used extensive UNHCR survey data to conduct statistical analyses. In Mauritania, we conducted focus group discussions with refugees living in Mbera camp.

5.1. Work permits continue to have very positive effects in Jordan after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, although they have declined in number.

The first phase of the evaluation included a rigorous statistical analysis of Home Visits data collected by UNHCR in Jordan from a very large sample of refugees between 2014 and 2019, looking at the difference work permits made to Syrian refugees. The analysis demonstrated that work permits had a much stronger positive effect on refugees' socioeconomic situation than either the refugees themselves or the aid workers perceived. Work permits also had a positive effect on the protection situation, significantly reducing refugees' odds of having specific protection needs. Having a work permit decreased refugees' prospects of having to accept risky, degrading, exploitative, or illegal temporary jobs to meet basic needs, as well as of having to send children to work. 63

For the evaluation extension, additional waves of Home Visits survey data became available. These were collected between 2019 and 2022, and thus cover the time immediately before and after the outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic. The evaluation team used these data to analyse what effect having a work permit (as a form of socio-economic inclusion) has on refugees during a period of crisis. The full analysis is available at https://gppi.net/UNHCR-quantitative-results.

A descriptive analysis of the survey data finds that the share of survey respondents who report having a work permit declined markedly with the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. In responses given between 2019 and the onset of the pandemic in January 2020, 8.2 per cent of respondents indicate that at least one member of their household has a work permit. In responses given after the start of the pandemic, only 6.7 per cent of respondents report having a household member with a work permit. The share of work permit holders may be underreported as respondents may fear a reduction in aid when indicating that they have a work permit. Yet, we would expect similar degrees of underreporting both before and after the start of the pandemic. The decline in reported numbers of work permits is therefore highly significant, especially considering that the survey covers a very large sample of refugees. This finding is at odds with UNHCR reports suggesting that Jordan issued a record number of work permits in 2021.64 At the same time, the level of reported employment remained relatively stable, even showing a slight increase from 17.3 per cent before the pandemic to 17.6 per cent during the pandemic.

⁶³ Julia Steets et al., "Evaluation of UNHCR's Engagement in Humanitarian-Development Cooperation", Volume 1, https://www.unhcr.org/61af7be94, chapter 5.3.

⁶⁴ UNHCR, "Jordan issues record number of work permits to Syrian refugees", 2022, accessed 9 $February\ 2023, \underline{https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-record-number-press/2022/1/61effaa54/jordan-issues-press/2022/1/61effaa5/jordan-issues-press/2022/1/61effaa5/jo$ work-permits-syrian-refugees.html.

HOW TO READ THE FIGURES

regression analyses that explore how


If a coefficient is **negative**, it means that the factor makes it less likely to see the outcome in question. If it is positive, it

The **bigger** the coefficient, the bigger the effect.

The lines around the dot show confidence: The real size of the effect is extremely likely at 99% to lie within the area indicated. If the area indicated by the line covers, for example, both negative and positive values (crosses there is an effect. If the entire area is on one side of the 0-line, we know that there is a statistically significant effect.

Before the pandemic, not all refugees were equally likely to obtain a work permit. This situation persisted during the pandemic, with similar factors driving who was more and who was less likely to get a work permit. However, some changes in the relative importance of these factors occurred. Belonging to a femaleheaded household still had a significant negative effect on the odds of receiving a work permit, but this effect was less strong during the pandemic, with the coefficient dropping from approximately -0.1 to -0.07. That is, female-headed households were 10 percent less likely to hold a work permit than male-headed households before the pandemic, and 7 percent less likely during the pandemic. Similarly, the negative effect of having family members with serious health conditions declined (from -0.03 to -0.02). By contrast, the importance of having a service card issued by the Ministry of the Interior increased, with the coefficient rising from 0.02 to almost 0.05 (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Factors affecting who is likely to obtain a work permit before and after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic



Work permits continued to have highly positive effects for refugees during the pandemic. The evaluation team used propensity score matching to ensure that households with and without work permits covered in the survey were statistically comparable. This means that households with work permits were compared to households that do not have work permits but are similar in their other characteristics. On average, having a work permit accounts for more than 68 Jordanian Dinar (JOD) or about US\$ 96 of additional total income per month – a huge effect, considering that the mean monthly income is JOD 183. As Figure 4 shows, work permits also account for higher earnings and expenditures. They have no statistically significant effect on donations received and reduce remittances only slightly.

Average change in monthly JOD when having a work permit Total income Remittances Expenditures **Earnings Donations**

Figure 4: Effect of having a work permit on monthly incomes and expenditures

Figure 5 (below) shows that having a work permit reduces the risk of a household of living below the absolute poverty line by almost 11 per cent and the likelihood of having to buy food on credit by about 6 per cent. Work permits also continue to have important effects on refugee protection. Work permit holders are about 30 per cent less likely to have socially degrading, exploitative, high risk, or illegal temporary jobs and they are slightly less likely to have to send children to work. The positive effects on protection and food security remain significant even when we control for the difference made by higher incomes.




Figure 5: Effect of having a work permit on poverty, buying food on credit, and child labour

The beneficial effects of having a work permit were quite similar before and during the pandemic. Any differences in the effects on earnings, total income, having to buy food on credit, and having to send children to work are not statistically significant. Only two differences are statistically significant: Firstly, during the pandemic work permits account for a smaller increase in expenditures (less than JOD 50 per month) than before the pandemic (more than JOD 60 per month). Secondly, the demonstrable effect that having a work permit has on a household's food consumption score changes with the onset of the pandemic. During the pandemic, having a work permit led to an improved food consumption score. Before the outbreak of Covid-19, however, having a work permit had a negative influence on the quality of food consumed by the household in question – despite the fact that the household had more earnings, total income, and expenditures. This unexpected shift occurred in all income groups covered in the survey. A potential explanation is that refugees' activities and spending patterns changed with the onset of the pandemic. However, the survey data do not allow exploring the reasons for this change further.

5.2. Access to services and resident status are the strongest drivers of self-reliance in Kenya.

The evaluation team analysed panel data from the Kenya Covid-19 Rapid Response Phone Survey,65 which covered Kenyan nationals, Shona stateless people, and different groups of refugees – including refugees living in camps in Kakuma and Dadaab, in the settlement in Kalobeyei, and in urban areas. The data are representative for each group and span six waves of data, collected between May 2020 and November 2021. The analysis focused on economic aspects of inclusion – economic self-reliance – and different social aspects of inclusion, such as a sense of well-being and attitudes towards the government. Using linear regression models, we assessed the extent to which these outcomes are impacted by different factors identified as important for enabling self-reliance as well as by aid. 66 The full description of the data and analysis is available at https://gppi.net/UNHCR-quantitative-results.


A descriptive analysis of the data shows that there are important differences between the various groups covered by the survey. For most aspects, the starkest differences are those between refugees and the local population (Figure 6):

- Economic self-reliance is markedly lower among refugees and stateless people than in local communities. This is true for aggregate self-reliance indices as well as specific indicators such as employment and a sense of well-being.
- Similarly, factors believed to enable self-reliance are much more strongly present in local communities than among refugees and stateless people.
- By contrast, trust in the government is higher among refugees and stateless people than among people in local communities. Nevertheless, refugees and non-refugees are similar with regard to their intentions to follow government guidelines for managing the Covid-19 pandemic.
- ▶ Refugees and stateless people receive aid from more sources than local people, but that aid is lower in total value.

⁶⁵ Survey data are available in the UNHCR micro data library, accessed 13 February 2023, https:// microdata.unhcr.org/index.php/catalog/296/.

⁶⁶ The analysis used the definition of self-reliance enabling factors developed by Alexander Betts et al., "The Kalobeyei Settlement: A Self-reliance Model for Refugees?", Journal of Refugee Studies, Volume 33, Issue 1, March 2020, Pages 189-223, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez063.

Figure 6: Mean values of key outcomes of different respondent groups




The differences between various groups of refugees and stateless people are less pronounced. Understanding these differences is particularly interesting because UNHCR cooperated with local authorities in order to pilot a settlement approach in Kalobeyei in 2016. Rather than establishing a refugee camp, they created a mixed settlement for refugees and local residents, supported through an integrated development plan.⁶⁷ Some of the policies were later also extended to the nearby camp in Kakuma. The Dadaab refugee camp, by contrast, is notorious for its size, poor conditions, and "doing business as usual". In addition, the locations have different demographic characteristics such as religion, country of origin, and duration of stay. The evaluation team used regression models to study what drives differences in outcomes for these different groups of refugees. A set of cross-sectional regression models explored whether being in a specific location or member of a specific group of refugees had an effect on key outcomes - that is independent or in addition of the effects of other key factors like enabling factors (which models like the settlement approach in Kalobeyei try to promote), aid, and demographic factors. The analyses found that there are some residual effects that can be ascribed just to living in different camps, settlements or urban areas (and not to higher or lower levels of enabling factors that are found in these locations) (Figure 7):

- Other things being equal, living in the model settlement in Kalobeyei (which was used as the baseline for the regression models) does not increase the selfreliance of refugees. To the contrary, all other groups and locations positively affect self-reliance when compared to Kalobeyei. Belonging to the group of Shona stateless has the strongest positive effect on self-reliance, followed by living either in urban areas or in Dadaab camp.
- Results for employment are similar. Other things being equal, being a Shona stateless person improves employment outcomes, as does living in Dadaab.
- ▶ For refugees' sense of well-being, the opposite is the case. All refugee locations are more or less the same in terms of their effects on well-being, but being stateless has a decidedly negative effect on well-being.
- Finally, being stateless as well as living in Dadaab have a slightly negative effect on the level of trust respondents have in the government, but overall, the local environment only has a weak effect on attitudes towards the government.


⁶⁷ UNHCR and the Government of Kenya agreed in 2015 to pilot a new approach focusing on enhancing livelihood opportunities of refugees and the host population and promoting inclusive service delivery. They developed an integrated 15-year development plan, the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Programme (KISEDP), to implement the new approach. Materials on KISEDP are available at https://www.unhcr.org/ke/kisedp-2.

Figure 7: Effects of different locations / respondent groups on key outcomes compared to Kalobeyei




These findings demonstrate that the geographical location of Kalobeyei or Kakuma as such does not have a positive impact on self-reliance, employment or sense of well-being. Rather, other factors must be at work, which were the focus of a set of powerful panel regression analyses conducted by the evaluation team. These analyses show that – independent of where people live – a range of enabling factors have a positive effect on self-reliance, whereas aid has no statistically significant effect. This finding confirms that approaches focusing on strengthening these enabling factors (regardless of location), like a settlement approach, are a step in the right direction. Among the enabling factors, access to services and having resident status are the strongest drivers of self-reliance (Figure 8). The positive link between access to services and economic self-reliance is obtained for all groups of refugees and stateless people. It is strongest for refugees living in Kakuma and weakest for those living in Dadaab.

Figure 8: Drivers of economic self-reliance



Among the services covered in the survey, access to electricity, credit, and communication are most important for self-reliance. In addition, a more detailed analysis of the various components of education shows that primary education has a positive effect on economic self-reliance (Figure 9). The results are the same when conducting the analysis specifically for employment (which is one of the elements included in the aggregate index for self-reliance), with the only difference that the ability to speak English also emerges as a significant predictor of success.

Figure 9: Drivers of economic self-reliance (detailed)



Enabling factors also influence the refugees' sense of well-being positively. Access to services enhances well-being, as does the amount of aid received. Having resident status is also associated with higher levels of well-being, but the sample of refugees with resident status is too small for a robust statistical result (Figure 10).




Figure 10: Drivers of well-being

Another important outcome is whether or not refugees have the intention to return to their countries of origin. While many other considerations affect this, not having the intention to return is also an indicator of how socially integrated refugees feel. Overall, the overwhelming majority of refugees – between 89% and over 97% depending on the group – indicated in the survey that they do not intend to return to their countries of origin. These rates dropped somewhat when the government of Kenya announced in 2021 that it would close existing refugee camps (see chapter 4.2. above for more details) to between 83% and 92% of refugees stating that they did not intend to return. Figure 11 shows that refugees with resident status, are less likely to have an intention to return. Having access to services and receiving aid, by contrast, lead to more refugees wanting to return to their countries of origin.




Figure 11: Drivers of having no intention to return to countries of origin

Among respondents' individual characteristics, gender plays an important role for economic self-reliance (Figure 12). Living in a female-headed household significantly reduces economic self-reliance, especially employment. It also reduces the expressed willingness to follow government guidelines on managing the Covid-19 pandemic. However, gender is not a significant driver for any of the other outcomes assessed. The effects of living in a female-headed household are not statistically significant when it comes to the level of well-being, the level of trust respondents have in the government, or the intention to return to one's country of origin.




Figure 12: Effects of living in a female-headed household on key outcomes

5.3. Mauritania

In Mauritania, similarly detailed, panel-structure datasets that would enable a rigorous statistical analysis of the effects of inclusion were not available. Instead, the evaluation team conducted six focus group discussions with refugees living in the Mbera camp in order to better understand the effects of inclusion in health and social protection. Focus group discussions took place separately for women and men. Each discussion included between eight and eleven participants. Four focused on health and included participants who had arrived before 2020 and had accessed health services, so that these groups were able to compare the effects before and after humanitarian NGOs handed over service provision to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health. The remaining two groups focused on social protection and included participants who had received assistance through the government's World Bank-supported Tekavoul programme, as well as some participants who had also received Elmaouna.

So far, inclusion in the social protection system has not made a big difference for those who receive assistance through the national system. Previously refugees received cash-based assistance from WFP, and this cash assistance was simultaneously reduced. For refugees who are included in the social registry⁶⁸ and considered particularly vulnerable,69 the additional Tekavoul contribution meant that

⁶⁸ Government of Mauritania, UNHCR, World Bank, "Inclusion of refugees from Bassikounou in Mauritania's national social registry".

⁶⁹ Key informants have highlighted the fact that they do not have insight into the government's vulnerability analysis, which impedes UNHCR and WFP from applying the same indicators to determine a household's vulnerability.

the overall amount they received increased by MRU 500 (or approximately US\$ 13) per distribution, while the distribution process remained unchanged. By the same token, refugees who did not receive Tekavoul saw a reduction in the total amount they received. Participants in the focus group discussions (all Tekavoul recipients) deplored the fact that some of their neighbours had not been present when the social registry assessment happened. As a result, the refugees report that they now share their assistance with even more people, even though they consider the amount they receive to be insufficient, providing for little beyond buying oil and rice.

The main point of contention is whether rolling out the national social protection system causes reductions in humanitarian cash programmes. Other than that, participants in the focus group discussions felt well informed about the transition. They criticized the fact that each household received the same amount irrespective of its size. This is particularly an issue for polygamous families, which are often larger and in which husbands may share the assistance unequally between the different sub-families. Women therefore stressed the importance of being registered as heads of household for their respective sub-family.

In health, refugees noted deteriorating standards associated with the handover of services to the government. Interview partners emphasised that the service standards of the NGOs - particularly those of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) - were very high compared to regular health service standards in Mauritania. Women who participated in the focus group discussions reported that they used to access medical services several times per month, either for themselves or for the people they take care of. Since the handover, they have generally felt discouraged from going to the health centre. They perceive that less funding is available for medical support in the camp. As a result, fewer medical personnel, less medication, and fewer ambulances are available. This leads to longer waiting times for treatment or transfer to the hospital in Bassikounou. It also means that refugees have less access to treatment in their own languages. Since the maternity ward was moved from the camp health centre to the hospital in Bassikounou, women receive less medical support during pregnancy, especially during and after childbirth. Participants also perceived a lack of specialized health-care services for both host communities and refugees in the district.

In addition, services in the camp were previously free for everyone. With the introduction of the fee-based system under INAYA, only registered refugees receive free health care. Many participants described this as a burden. As one focus group participant put it: "With MSF, it was like a lake – water was available for everybody. Now, it is like a water well – you need power to extract water, and not everybody has that power."70

This example highlights that the question remains pertinent of how to handle concerns over a potential decrease in service quality that can be associated with the inclusion of refugees into national or local service systems. The original evaluation had recommended clarifying UNHCR's stance on this issue and to detail what kinds of decreases in service quality are deemed acceptable, but UNHCR has since not provided such a general clarification.

⁷⁰ Translated from the French by the authors.



6. Conclusions

Recently issued policies, strategies, and statements show that UNHCR remains highly committed to the agenda of the Global Compact on Refugees and to promoting refugee inclusion and self-reliance. This is noteworthy and laudable, since the context has changed significantly in recent years. A number of competing priorities – such as addressing internal displacement and dealing with the effects of global warming - have moved higher up the agenda, and mobilizing sufficient resources for humanitarian responses has become increasingly challenging.

The findings of this evaluation extension confirm that **UNHCR** is on the right path with its reform efforts. The effects of humanitarian-development cooperation on the persons UNHCR serves are overwhelmingly positive, even if refugees sometimes have mixed perspectives and concerns about the shift from humanitarian to development approaches. Refugees have expressed concern about losing access to humanitarian assistance, which is often more generous than government services, and - just like local residents – they worry when services are not available or of insufficient quality.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the benefits of inclusion are undeniable. These emerge more clearly from rigorous quantitative analyses than from an analysis of refugee perceptions: service inclusion demonstrably strengthens economic selfreliance and also has a positive effect on refugees' sense of well-being. UNHCR and its development partners can support specific measures that can make an enormous difference in such contexts: giving refugees work permits, ensuring that refugees have access to electricity, credit, and communication, and supporting refugees in gaining resident status all have a significant effect on the refugees' socio-economic and protection situations in Jordan and Kenya. Moreover, the gap between humanitarian needs and available resources continues to grow at an increasingly faster rate. Promoting sustainable solutions therefore becomes more urgent than ever. While this is a challenging task, the evaluation shows that different UNHCR country operations have taken steps in various response sectors. Some of the lessons learned through these experiences may be transferrable between different contexts.

The first phase of this evaluation made six recommendations to further strengthen UNHCR's engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation. One year after UNHCR accepted these recommendations in its management response, progress is visible on issues that can be addressed by creating additional capacity or technical tools. For example, dedicated capacity for humanitarian-development cooperation has been further strengthened, and a trend towards anchoring these positions within UNHCR's country operations management is increasingly evident. UNHCR expanded the collection of relevant data by implementing a number of flagship surveys and through the work of its Joint Data Center with the World Bank. The organization has also continued to develop its tools to deliver protection analyses, and the number of examples involving direct cooperation between UNHCR's protection practice and its development partners has grown.

UNHCR has also recently addressed some key issues that are controversial and require UNHCR's leadership to take a clear stance. Notably, guidance on when UNHCR seeks funding from development actors and when it does not has been adopted. However, there has been less progress on other controversial issues, which is leading to some frustration among UNHCR staff and development partners. First and foremost, this concerns the questions around the budgeting of funding from development actors. While processes have been clarified, country operations still find the way in which funding from development actors is allocated internally unsatisfactory, as it does not provide certainty that they will be able to use the earmarked development contributions they mobilize in addition to the general budget they are authorized to spend.

Second, UNHCR still faces internal obstacles to fully promoting inclusion, even if, in many cases, external challenges and contextual limitations ultimately determine what opportunities UNHCR may have. Development actors may not be willing to focus on refugee-hosting areas and UNHCR may not have sufficient leverage to change this. Restrictive host government positions may also limit the space for inclusion. Even if these external aspects may be difficult to address, UNHCR could create the right internal conditions to encourage staff members to strategically pursue refugee inclusion. This would require defining what inclusion entails. If would also require taking a clear stance on what UNHCR's position is when the inclusion of refugees in national service systems entails compromises on service quality and/or coverage. In interviews, most UNHCR staff members acknowledge that achieving the same service standards for refugees as for host populations is the right thing to do, not least because higher service standards for refugees can create tensions between host communities and refugees. UNHCR has not taken a general position on this issue to date.

Based on these findings, the evaluation team believes that taking decisions on these controversial issues and ensuring that these decisions are implemented across the organization are of utmost importance as UNHCR enters the second year of implementing its management response to the evaluation of its engagement in humanitarian-development cooperation.

Annex 1: Interviewees

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|--------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| Abou Chabake | Tarek | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Absalon | Paul | UNHCR RB | Senegal |
| Absura | Mahmud Mohamed | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Abulaye | Dailoo | FAO | Mauritania |
| Aden | Hassan | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Ag Malha | Mohamed (Momo) | Mbera Camp | Mauritania |
| Ahmed | Sofia Mohammed | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Ahmed | Mohamed | UNICEF | Kenya |
| Alain | Sou | French Red Cross | Mauritania |
| Ali | Sara | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Ali | Perveen | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Allan | Fiona | UNHCR Ukraine CO | Ukraine |
| Allanra | Kemnda | Action Against Hunger | Mauritania |
| Al-Mahdawi | Ammar | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Amadou | Ismail | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Andrews | Jon | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Arsac | Maguelone | UNHCR RB EHAGL | Kenya |
| Asmat | Salwa | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| Astrom | Line Kristel | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Atrafi | Saboor | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Atrafi | Hélène | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Avognon | Guy | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Ayoubi | Ziad | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Babe | Ebi | Food Security Commission - CSA | Mauritania |

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|----------------|--------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Babiker | Sitnour | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Balaya | Cyprien | Resident Coordinator Office | Mauritania |
| Bare | Dakane Ahmed | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Barroeta | Federico | ILO | Mauritania |
| Batundi | Adolphe | French Red Cross | Mauritania |
| Baureder | Christian | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Befekadu | Tseday | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |
| Beltramo | Theresa | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Berhanu | Naol | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |
| Beyene | Kasahun | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Bilher | Blandine | UNICEF | Mauritania |
| Black | Maribeth | WFP | Mauritania |
| Browne | Jamal | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Brusset | Bénédicte | AFD | Mauritania |
| Burton | John Wagacha | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Burton | Ann | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Byram | lan | UK embassy | Mauritania |
| Cabral | Diogo | UNHCR Poland CO | Poland |
| Carmona | Alejandra | WFP | Mauritania |
| Carver | Freddie | ReDSS | Kenya |
| Cheung | Samuel | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Chotia | Nazia | Resident Coordinator Office | Mauritania |
| Christ | Heidi | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Corliss | Steven | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Crentsil | Matthew | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Currie-Roberts | Elise | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Danni | Abdoulaye | WFP-UNHCR Joint Hub | Mauritania |
| d'Ansembourg | Benoit | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|---------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| de Villeroche | Hervé | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Diakite | Alassane | US embassy | Mauritania |
| Duale | Ali Omar | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| El Faouz | Tarik | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Eyster | Elizabeth | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Falcy | Louis | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Fasel | Nicolas | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Gardener | Clare | UNHCR RB EHAGL | Kenya |
| Gaunt | Anna | UNHCR RB EHAGL | Kenya |
| Gaye | Cheikh | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Georgopoulou | Athanasia | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Gottwald | Martin | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Hambrouck | Kristine | UNHCR RB EHAGL | Kenya |
| Hasegawa | Nodoka | UNHCR Bangladesh | Bangladesh |
| Herneryd Yahya | Katarina | UNHCR Nigeria | Nigeria |
| Hurwitz | Agnès | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Ingutia | Edith | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| Ismail | Kahin | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Isselmou | Medahid | Ta'azour | Mauritania |
| Jambazishvili-Yucer | Sophie | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| Kakule Sivasima | Benjamin | UNICEF | Mauritania |
| Karanja | Rufus | Prospect - Netherlands | Kenya |
| Kariba | Norah | Windle International Kenya | Kenya |
| Kayembe Mukendi | Benoit | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Kelly | Mochtar | FAO | Mauritania |
| Khalifa | Sidi | UNDP | Mauritania |
| Kiani | Maria | UNHCR South Sudan | South Suda |
| Klink | Susanne | UNHCR Regional Bureau for Europe | Switzerland |

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|----------------|-----------------|--|-------------|
| Kone | Amara | UNICEF | Mauritania |
| Kortekaas | Leopold | UNHCR Cameroun | Cameroun |
| Koukpo | Gilles | French Red Cross | Mauritania |
| Kow-Donkor | Martha | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Lavaissiere | Delphine | World Bank | Mauritania |
| Lippman | Betsy | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Lupton | Bryan | USAID | Kenya |
| Lusigi | Milicent | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |
| Magnes | Elisabeth | EEAS | Kenya |
| Maina | Andrew | ReDSS | Kenya |
| Malik | Sajjad | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Malle | Kassim | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Manji | Ayaz | Office of the UNRC Kenya | Kenya |
| Maouloud | Moussa Mohammed | FAO | Mauritania |
| Meiser | Lisa | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Mersch | Celine | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Mitchell | Andrew | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Moctar | Fatimetou | UK embassy | Mauritania |
| Mohamedou | Anne | ILO | Mauritania |
| Mohamedu | Lembrabodt | ALPD | Mauritania |
| Morlang | Claas | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Мроуі | Willy | WFP | Mauritania |
| Muhlen-Schulte | Arthur | UNHCR RB Mena | Jordan |
| Mulbah | David | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Muragijemariya | Goretti | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Musongechi | Bienfait | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Mutavi | Mercy | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| Mwanza | Katee | Department of Refugee Services (Kenya government) | Kenya |

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|---------------|-------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Ndawula | Carolyn | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |
| Ndoye | Anta | IMF | Mauritania |
| Njuki | Venanzio | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Ntampera | Emile | UNICEF | Kenya |
| Oertli | Aloïse | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Okoth | Stephen | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |
| Omeira | Neda | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Ouattara | Ferdila | UNHCR RB WCA | Senegal |
| Ould Bakar | Hamza | GIZ | Mauritania |
| Ould Ibrahim | Ahmed | SOS Desert | Mauritania |
| Owusu | (Felicia) Mandy | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Oyuko | Matthew | UNHCR Kenya SO Dadaab | Kenya |
| Pronyk | Jason John | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Rappeport | Wendy | UNHCR Rwanda | Rwanda |
| Razagh | Bechir Abd | Techghil | Mauritania |
| Reese | Benjamin Christopher | World Bank | Uganda |
| Roberts | Jennifer | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Russo | Roberta | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Sarria Capape | Samanta Victoria | World Bank | Mauritania |
| Savage | Jeffrey | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Schilperoord | Marian | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Seevinck | Julia | UNHCR Burundi/Tanzania | Burundi/ Tanzania |
| Sghair | Boide | ANRPTS | Mauritania |
| Shara | Luba | IFC | Kenya |
| Shundi | Ejona | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Sidiki Traore | Boubacar | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Soe | Apollinaire | Save the Children | Mauritania |

| Name | First Name | Organisation | Country |
|------------------|------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| Sok | Ousmane | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Somé | Jessica | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Taylor | Jennie | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Telford | Rebecca | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Thalmas | Didier | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Thiandoume | Sokhna | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Thote | Katharina | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Traole | Bintou | ALPD | Mauritania |
| Tukow | Nuuh | Save the Children | Kenya |
| Unluova | Ivana | UN HABITAT | Kenya |
| Vall Mahmud | Mohamed | Techghil | Mauritania |
| Vall Ould Issa | Mohamed | ALPD | Mauritania |
| Van Buren | Caroline | UNHCR Kenya CO | Kenya |
| Van Kempen | Marije | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Van Praag | Clara | UNHCR RB EHAGL | Kenya |
| Vidarte Chicchon | Rosa | UNHCR Colombia | Colombia |
| Wambugu Muriithi | Jesse | UNHCR Kenya SO Kakuma | Kenya |
| Wane | Dr. | Health Center Mbera Camp | Mauritania |
| Wood | George | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Wouters | Cornelis | UNHCR HQ | Switzerland |
| Yero Diallo | Amadou | Tekavoul | Mauritania |
| Zaghriou | Naima | UNHCR | Mauritania |
| Zelalem | Kaleab | UNHCR Ethiopia | Ethiopia |

Annex 2: Focus group discussions

In Mauritania, the evaluation team conducted focus group discussions with refugees based in Mbera camp. Interviewee selection was facilitated by the UNHCR sub office in Bassikounou. Selection was carried out depending on the research interest.

| Location | Research interest | Types of respondents | # of respondents, gender, age groups |
|------------------------------|---|--|--|
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Effects of benefiting from a national social protection program on individual and household levels | Camp-based refugees who are eligible to the social protection program Tekavoul | 11 (all women) |
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Effects of benefiting from a national social protection program on individual and household levels | Camp-based refugees who are eligible to the social protection program Tekavoul | 8 (all men) |
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Impacts on the camp's health services before and after the handover of service provision from a humanitarian NGO to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health | Camp-based refugees who arrived in Mbera before 2020 | 8 (all women) |
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Impacts on the camp's health services before and after the handover of service provision from a humanitarian NGO to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health | Camp-based refugees who arrived in Mbera before 2020 | 10 (all women) |
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Impacts on the camp's health services before and after the handover of service provision from a humanitarian NGO to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health | Camp-based refugees who arrived in Mbera before 2020 | 7 (all men) |
| Mbera camp, Mauritania | Impacts on the camp's health services before and after the handover of service provision from a humanitarian NGO to the Mauritanian Ministry of Health | Camp-based refugees who arrived in Mbera before 2020 | 10 (all men) |

