

EASTERN UKRAINE

Current humanitarian situation and outlook

OVERVIEW

Conflict has been affecting people's lives and driving humanitarian needs in eastern Ukraine, particularly in Donbas region, since 2014. One consequence has been the separation of the country into the government-controlled areas (GCAs) and the non-government-controlled areas (NGCAs) with a 427km-long contact line, where most security incidents between government and non-government forces occur (OCHA 13/01/2022). There are five crossing points along the line, but only two are operational. The other three have been closed since March 2020 because of COVID-19 containment measures. Both COVID-19 measures and insecurity result in movement restrictions, limiting access to basic services, livelihood activities, and aid. As at January 2022, about 2.9 million people have humanitarian needs, with 1.6 million people coming from NGCAs. There are over 1.46 million registered IDPs. This number includes those who regularly cross the contact line to be registered as IDPs, which is a requirement to continue receiving pensions (UNHCR 05/03/2021; OCHA 14/01/2022; NRC 12/10/2020).

Recent developments pose a risk of ceasefire failure and conflict re-escalation, which could change the humanitarian situation in the country. From the end of 2021 to early 2022, over 100,000 Russian troops were deployed to the borders of Ukraine, both with eastern Russia and Belarus. There are reports of mutual military preparedness from Ukraine and Russia and the deployment of Russian troops (Bloomberg 17/12/2021; Al Jazeera 25/01/2022).

In case of any form of escalation of political or military tensions, civilian casualties, displacement, acute humanitarian needs, damages to infrastructure and public facilities, and access constraints are likely to increase. The degree of humanitarian impact, resulting additional needs, and the primary areas affected will vary depending on the form and time frame of escalation.

Key humanitarian concerns

- Access of humanitarian responders to people in need
- Displacement
- Documentation
- Potential impact on countries dependent on Ukraine food production

Key drivers of needs

- Military developments
- Relations between Russia and the separatist movement in Ukraine
- The use of heavy weaponry and the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance
- Cyberattacks and critical infrastructure
- Contact lines and status of the borders
- Hydrocarbon industry

Current affected areas in eastern Ukraine



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (29/11/2021); USAID (08/12/2021); OCHA (12/2021). Full map on page 13.

TIMELINE




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About this report

Aim: The report explores the possible impacts of escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine on the humanitarian situation in Donbas and potentially the rest of the country. It presents the response capacity and various operational constraints faced by responders. It also analyses the factors that may increase needs and potential key humanitarian concerns in the coming months.

Methodology: The analysis is based on interviews of experts on Ukraine and the humanitarian crisis and a review of publicly available data and published reports or media sources up to 15 February 2022.

Limitations: The uncertainty around how political and military tensions between Russia and Ukraine will develop makes it very difficult to establish how the humanitarian situation in Ukraine can change. Relevant information on the current humanitarian situation is also lacking. Detailed and up-to-date information on humanitarian needs and presence in NGCAs is limited. Information on the status of temporary settlements for IDPs near the contact line is also extremely limited.

SITUATION OVERVIEW

Background


The current conflict in Ukraine started in 2014 with protests against the Ukrainian Government after rejecting an economic integration agreement with the European Union. A violent crackdown by state security forces followed these protests, triggering bigger demonstrations and leading to the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovich. In May 2014, Russia then took control of and annexed Crimea (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol city, Ukraine), a region inhabited mostly by ethnic Russians. The annexation triggered demonstrations by pro-Russian Ukrainians in Donetsk and Luhansk, two separatist regions (oblasts) of eastern Ukraine. They took over authority and declared independence. Protests in these two regions, in the wider non-administrative region of Donbas, turned into armed conflicts in spring 2014. The armed forces of the People's Republic of Luhansk and the People's Republic of Donetsk, both supported by Russia, fought against the Ukrainian army (RULAC 30/05/2021 and 29/01/2018). Since then, a 427km-long contact line between GCAs and NGCAs has divided the region. Conflict de-escalated following the signing of the Minsk Accords (Minsk II) in 2015, although fighting and tensions continued, including episodes of persistent shelling and attacks along the contact line (ACAPS 11/04/2019). The latest and longest ceasefire agreement was signed in July 2020. This agreement helped decrease hostilities and ceasefire violations through the end of 2020, although there were records of ceasefire violations escalating again in April–May and October–November 2021 (OSCE Accessed 17/02/2021; CARE 13/01/2022). Despite these incidences, the contact line has not changed since 2015 (ICG accessed 13/02/2022). As at January 2022, casualties to the conflict included 3,000 civilians killed, over 50,000 houses damaged or destroyed, and many other infrastructures damaged, including water facilities, hospitals, and schools (AP News 15/04/2021; The Washington Post 22/01/2022).

Humanitarian needs peaked in the first year of the conflict in 2015, with about 5 million people needing humanitarian assistance (OCHA 30/11/2021). In mid-May 2016, there were about 1.78 million people registered as IDPs in both GCAs and NGCAs (UNHCR 05/03/2021). Between 2014–2015, 1.1 million people moved to Russia, with the majority receiving some sort of legal status (Russian Federal Migration Services 19/02/2016).

Current situation

Tensions along the eastern and northern borders of Ukraine have been increasing since October 2021, when Russia began moving troops and military equipment on their side of the border, reigniting concerns over a potential confrontation (Al Jazeera 02/02/2022 a). Since the escalation of tensions, Russia has denied any plans for military intervention in Ukraine. On 15 February, Russia announced that some of its military units were returning to the bases after the military exercises. The exact numbers remain unclear (Reuters 16/02/2022).

Number of ceasefire violations quarterly



Source: OSCE (accessed 17/02/2022)

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

People in need and priority areas

Over 2.9 million people need humanitarian assistance in 2022, over 55% of whom (1.6 million) are in NGCAs. The severity of needs is more pronounced in GCAs close to the contact line and in NGCAs because of ceasefire violations that cause security incidents (OSCE 12/02/2022; OCHA 30/11/2021). Shelling and threats of more violence create uncertainty for businesses and affect people's access to income-generating activities on both sides of the contact line (FSC 20/09/2021). The closure and downsizing of companies as a result of the economic decline affect people in urban conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine. In rural areas, landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) restrict people from engaging in agricultural activities (OCHA 29/01/2020). Pre-conflict poverty in NGCAs in Luhansk and Donetsk compounds the economic hardships of the oblast populations, although livelihood needs are relatively lower in Mariupol city in southeastern Ukraine (OCHA 15/02/2021 a; REACH 12/04/2021).

IDPs

There are over 1.4 million IDPs in Ukraine, more than half of whom are in Donetsk and Luhansk (IOM 15/12/2021). IDPs in GCAs have limited access to the job market. The loss of employment, the lack of livelihood opportunities, or the inability to pay rent prompt some to return to NGCAs (IOM 12/10/2021). There is a limited understanding of humanitarian needs, including of IDPs, in NGCAs due to the restrictions to humanitarian access (KII 14/02/2022).

Since the beginning of the conflict, nearly 55,000 houses have been damaged on either side of the contact line. Between January–October 2021, more than 145 residential buildings in GCAs and nearly 190 in NGCAs were damaged despite the ceasefire (OCHA 11/02/2022 a). Shelter needs are particularly high in NGCAs, as de facto authorities do not offer compensation for damaged houses (OCHA 15/02/2021 b).

IDPs on both sides of the contact line need housing and livelihood assistance (OCHA 15/02/2021 a). In GCAs, they face challenges in confirming house ownership or rental agreements. Legislative complexities, bureaucracy issues, and the financial cost of obtaining ownership documentation potentially limit people's ability to apply for state compensation. The mandatory re-registration of property in NGCAs also adds to the fears of IDPs in GCAs of losing property rights (OHCHR 23/09/2021; OCHA 15/02/2021 b).

Sectoral needs

Livelihoods

In 2022, 1.1 million are estimated to be in need of livelihood assistance. Movement restrictions and security concerns affect people's access to livelihoods in conflict-affected areas in eastern Ukraine, particularly for people closer to the contact line. Those who relied on agriculture, fishing, and businesses as their main source of livelihood prior to the conflict no longer have access to such activities (OCHA 11/02/2022 a). Landmines and ERW contaminate 7,000km² of GCAs in Donetsk and Luhansk, majorly restricting peoples' ability to engage in agricultural activities (FSLC 10/05/2021; OCHA 11/02/2022 a). Given the lack of livelihood alternatives, some people risk their lives and continue to perform economic activities in landmine-contaminated areas (OCHA 11/02/2022 a).

The prolonged closure of crossing points and movement restrictions limit people's access in NGCAs to livelihood opportunities and income. These people need to register as IDPs in GCAs to continue receiving social benefits and pension funds. Those unable to travel because of a lack of resources or old age lose access to these payments (CSIS 02/02/2022; OHCHR 23/09/2021; UNHCR 16/06/2021; TNH 05/04/2021). Livelihood needs are particularly high in NGCAs, where people do not have access to livelihood support (FSLC 10/05/2021).

The COVID-19 pandemic led to the downsizing or closure of many businesses and the unemployment or underemployment of many urban residents, affecting their living standards (OCHA 11/02/2022 a). The closure of border crossing points as a COVID-19 pandemic containment measure has also increased isolation between the two sides of the contact line and further restrained people's access to livelihoods (OCHA 11/02/2022 b).

Food security

Over 20% of the population in Luhansk and 19% in Donetsk suffer from insufficient food consumption levels (WFP accessed 03/02/2022). Security threats affect the functionality of markets. Farmers and workers are unable to access their workplaces or farms, and traders refrain from operating near the contact line given elevated insecurity levels. The limited access to income or income-generating activities and limited market functionality affect people's food security levels (KII 01/02/2022; OCHA 15/02/2021 b; FSC 20/09/2021; ACTED 10/08/2021). Because of various movement limitations, food prices are higher in NGCAs, meaning food insecurity is also higher in those areas than in GCAs (FSLC 10/05/2021).

Health and psychological support

Around 1.5 million people need healthcare assistance (Health Cluster 28/01/2022). Active hostilities and landmine contamination restrict access to health facilities (OCHA 15/02/2021 b). The disrepair of health facilities because of the lack of resources for maintenance also limits their functionality. This situation is particularly true in rural conflict-affected areas of eastern Ukraine, where people have reported distance, the lack of transportation, and high costs as main barriers to accessing healthcare (OCHA 11/02/2022 a; Health Cluster 28/01/2021).

Distance, transportation costs, and movement restrictions also limit people in GCAs from accessing healthcare services, as most referral health centres are located across the contact line in NGCAs (OCHA 29/01/2020 and 11/02/2022 a; Health Cluster 25/07/2019; KII 10/02/2022).

Access to healthcare in NGCAs is limited given the shortage of specialised medical personnel, particularly in Luhansk region. Other reasons include the lack of resources to maintain health facilities and medical equipment and the high cost of medicines and treatment. Remaining healthcare workers lack training, experience, and appropriate skills. There is also an overall lack of medical equipment, particularly outside the two main cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. These limitations are a problem particularly for people who have lost access to income (OCHA 15/02/2021 b; KII 10/02/2022).

Ukraine has the fourth-highest level of tuberculosis (TB) infections in the EU (The Lancet 12/02/2022). TB emerged as a health issue in Ukraine in 2004. Despite considerable progress, TB prevalence and mortality rates remain a source of concern (WHO 23/03/2021). Organisations support the health response to both TB and drug-resistant TB by providing technical assistance, implementing prevention programmes, and providing psychological support to help patients adhere to the treatment (MSF 19/09/2021; WHO 23/03/2021). Rapid diagnosis, adequate nutrition, and shelter are important components of TB care and control (Kuchuloria et al. 09/2016).

The fourth wave of COVID-19 infections in GCAs and NGCAs since December 2021 has been adding to the strain on health services in the area. While there is less information about the COVID-19 situation in NGCAs, the high number of infections among health workers is concerning (Health Cluster 28/01/2022; OCHA 18/10/2021; KII 10/02/2022). Since the beginning of November, the increase in COVID-19 cases has been affecting the services offered by health facilities and has increased hospital occupancy rates in GCAs to over 70%. Healthcare limitations in NGCAs also affect the treatment of COVID-19 patients, leading to a high fatality rate of 8.7% (OCHA 11/02/2022 a). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, with the resulting damage to houses and civil infrastructure, and COVID-19 containment measures have also had an adverse effect on the psychological health of the affected population (OCHA 11/02/2022 a). Over 40% of the surveyed population within the contact line reported having no information about the availability of mental health services, and less than 30% reported having access to mental health services (REACH 07/2019).

WASH

As at November 2021, over 1.4 million people on either side of the contact line had limited access to water or were at risk of water supply problems from water system disrepair (WASH Cluster 13/12/2021). Because of low water tariffs, the water company supplying water on both sides of the contact line has been facing financial difficulties in maintaining operations and repairing damage (Politico 25/06/2021; OCHA 15/02/2021 a). Long-standing issues, such as non-payment and debt to water companies, have led to frequent disruptions of water supplies (OCHA 15/02/2021 b). Military activities and indirect shelling also continue to cause damage to the water supply system (WASH Cluster 13/12/2021). Access to water is more constrained in NGCAs, as the main water sources are in GCAs and low tariffs that cause tensions regarding payment to the water company have been leading to utility cuts (Health Cluster 21/01/2022; WASH Cluster 13/12/2021).

Limited access to water affects sanitation measures and contributes to the spread of COVID-19 (OCHA 15/02/2021 b). The impact is likely higher in NGCAs in Donetsk, where the prices of hygiene products are more than 35% higher than in subcentres in GCAs (ACTED 10/06/2021).

Water and heating systems are interconnected in the conflict-affected areas in eastern Ukraine, as over 80% of the heating systems in the area are water-based (OCHA 15/02/2021 b; WASH Cluster 13/12/2021). The lack of functional heating in a country where winter temperatures regularly drop to -20° C increases the risk of contracting flu and suffering from deadly hypothermia, particularly for elderly and vulnerable people (WASH Cluster 24/06/2021; OCHA 15/02/2021 b).

ACCESS CONSTRAINTS

Only two border crossing points, Stanytsia Luhanska (between Luhansk's NGCAs and GCAs) and Novotroitske (between Donetsk's NGCAs and GCAs), remain open, while the other three have been closed since March 2020 (KII 01/02/2022; OCHA 14/01/2022). Technical issues and bureaucratic constraints add to waiting times at these crossing points, with people spending the night in the grey zone waiting to be admitted or turned back (OCHA 18/01/2022). People from NGCAs are opting to transit through the Russian Federation via the crossing points of Milove (Luhanska oblast) and Hoptivka (Kharkivska oblast) to travel to and from the other side of the contact line to access essential services and maintain social connections with relatives. The limited capacity, particularly for Milove crossing point, and long processing times have resulted in people spending up to 24 hours to cross to GCAs (OCHA 18/01/2022, 22/10/2021, and 12/08/2021).

Humanitarian access in Ukraine is very highly constrained and is deteriorating because of both COVID-19 containment measures, such as movement restrictions, and the increasing number of ceasefire violations, particularly since October 2021 (OSCE accessed 17/02/2021). More information is available in the latest ACAPS Humanitarian Access Overview.

The delivery of humanitarian assistance in GCAs is easier, as access constraints and the complex bureaucratic system of gaining operational permits and renewing accreditation limit the delivery of humanitarian assistance in NGCAs. The de facto authorities in NGCAs discourage the affected populations in their areas from participating in information-gathering and assessment exercises, which constrains the ability of humanitarian organisations from planning effective responses (CSIS 02/02/2022; OCHA 30/11/2021 and 18/05/2021; FSLC 10/05/2021; Health Cluster 16/07/2020).

Physical access is also constrained by the presence of landmines and explosive devices, which has been responsible for 70% of casualties in the country since July 2020 (OCHA 30/11/2021; OCHA 15/02/2021 b). Access constraints also present a serious challenge to humanitarian operations in eastern Ukraine. The delivery of humanitarian assistance is becoming increasingly difficult with winter weather and the worsening of the COVID-19 situation (OCHA 30/11/2021).

Transport and road infrastructures have suffered considerable damage from the conflict. Transportation companies do not provide services in many conflict-affected areas because of insecurity, military checkpoints, and the harsh conditions of roads and bridges that result from mostly conflict-related damage. The lack of regular, affordable, and predictable transportation services limit people's access to other social services, including health and education (UNHCR 01/12/2021; USAID 08/12/2021; OCHA 30/11/2021).

Response capacity

The cluster system is present in Ukraine and has been active since December 2014, with six operational clusters, subclusters, and working groups (OCHA 29/11/2021). Although NGOs and INGOs, UN agencies, and other entities are present in Ukraine to provide humanitarian assistance, only a limited number are operating in NGCAs. As at September 2021, 81 entities had completed or were implementing projects in the country, mostly in Donetsk and Luhansk GCAs. Almost half (41) of the organisations with active or past humanitarian projects were national organisations, 26 were INGOs, and 12 other international organisations or UN agencies, and the rest (2) were government or other organization. Most of the organisations responded within the protection, WASH, health, and food security and livelihoods sector (OCHA 30/09/2021).

In July 2015, the de facto authorities in NGCAs started requiring the registration of humanitarian organisations, with activities suspended for those who did not comply (OCHA 30/11/2017 and 29/11/2021). Aside from information on the number of operational agencies and humanitarian activities in NGCAs remaining limited, it is also challenging to know who exactly is operating in which areas, although there is some limited information on the type of response available on some of the clusters' pages (OCHA 29/11/2021; FSLC accessed 15/02/2022).

The International Committee of the Red Cross is also responding in Luhansk and Donetsk, with local offices present both in GCAs and NGCAs. It has increased its presence since the beginning of conflict in 2014. Their response focuses on addressing conflict-driven needs and the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (ICRC 17/04/2020 and 12/01/2022; ICRC accessed 15/02/2022).

OUTLOOK

Introduction

Conflict escalation is expected to change different factors, which can consequently alter or create additional humanitarian needs. This section highlights those potential factors and discusses humanitarian concerns for the next six months. The report focuses on potential key drivers of needs regardless of the scale of the tension.

Some international stakeholders have highlighted the risk of a possible military ground intervention into Ukraine, but current Russia-Ukraine tensions and relations could still evolve in multiple directions or remain in status quo. This evolution highly depends on the outcome of diplomatic discussions around the Minsk Accords and NATO's potential integration of Ukraine.

The movement of troops from both sides along the contact line; increased support of separatists in Ukraine from Russia; targeted military interventions by Ukraine, Russia, or both; or a full-scale military operation in Ukraine will likely lead to a chain reaction, with negative humanitarian consequences. If the status quo is maintained, humanitarian needs will remain high across the affected population.

HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

Civilian casualties, displacement, acute humanitarian needs, and access constraints (for humanitarian responders to people in need and vice versa) are very likely to increase in case of conflict escalation. The potential damage or loss of equipment and personnel (in case of movement restrictions and the displacement of people), as well as closure or the lack of resources for maintenance, are likely to affect public and private infrastructure (such as health facilities; schools; and housing, water, and electrical facilities).

Crossing points between NGCAs and GCAs are also very likely to close, leading to further mobility limitations. Aside from affecting humanitarian operations, such restrictions will also likely hinder displaced people from reaching safe areas (NPR 07/12/2021; OCHA 13/12/2021 and 02/12/2021; ICG 08/12/2021). Electricity and fuel shortages are very likely to prevent people from accessing related basic needs, including heating and transportation (Kyiv Post 03/06/2021). Elderly people and people near the contact lines are highly likely to be among the most affected groups, given that they are less likely to displace to safer or better-served areas (i.e. areas with easier access to aid or basic services).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

In NGCAs: Analysis of response capacity and access to people in need is only based on anecdotal information. Aside from challenges regarding crossing the contact line and the presence of landmines and ERW, humanitarian responders also face complex bureaucratic registration and administrative requirements from both government and non-government authorities. Given the situation, responses mainly rely on local organisations. Humanitarian organisations are also at risk of expulsion or compelled to entirely break off their operations in case of any escalation of tensions. Overall, in case of military advances, conflict and security concerns will affect the ability of organisations to respond (OCHA 13/01/2022, 30/11/2021, 15/02/2021 b, and 29/11/2021; KII 08/02/2022).

In GCAs: in case tensions escalate, access to people will likely deteriorate because of increasing security incidents, curfews, and new checkpoints. Movement restrictions as a COVID-19 containment measure and physical constraints, including road disruptions, will also likely complicate this access (KII 08/02/2022).

Displacement

Conflict re-escalation will likely increase displacement numbers, and the size and direction of displaced people will depend on the scale and intensity of conflict. In the event of internal displacement, people are very likely to move away from the contact line, where most ceasefire violations will take place. In case of international or cross-border displacement, people are likely to move from NGCAs to Russia and from GCAs to neighbouring countries, such as Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.

Together with people living near the contact line, the elderly are likely to be among the most affected groups because of mobility issues (KII 14/02/2022). Displaced people will likely need shelter, cash, and NFI assistance.

Documentation

People who flee during fighting potentially leave behind their belongings and essential documents, including any civil and identity documentation necessary to access services and be guaranteed rights. Legal aid and some form of mechanism to provide aid for people without documentation may be essential in case of emergencies (NRC accessed 15/02/2022; KII 14/02/2022).

Applying for social benefits or pensions became possible online only in late November 2021. The digitalisation of the process has guaranteed better access to services, especially for people in NGCAs (UNDP 29/11/2021).

Potential impact on countries dependent on Ukraine food production

Severe conflict escalation will likely affect Ukraine exports. Wheat, corn, barley, and rye support the Ukrainian economy and are key imports for countries in Asia and Africa. Any disruption of these exports will likely temporarily disrupt food availability and affect food security in countries that rely on importing staples from Ukraine (FP 22/01/2022).

KEY DRIVERS OF NEEDS

Military developments

Russia's military positions and directions of offensive

Russian forces are amassed to the north, east, and south of Ukraine, including along its entire northern border with Belarus. Conflict dynamics, including reactions from the US and European countries, in the event that Russia enters Ukraine from any of these directions are difficult to predict. That said, any military advancement into Ukraine will escalate conflict and insecurity and affect the humanitarian situation.

The military situation may also stay as it is, with Russia and international troops prepositioned around the region and political and diplomatic tensions maintained.

Russian forces could also respond to any attack or start any military activity under the pretext of the protection of Russians in Ukraine. They could advance into Ukraine or send support to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine (Atlantic Council 25/01/2022; NYT 25/01/2022).

In the event of full-scale Russian military operations into Ukraine or around Kyiv, Ukraine will likely receive military support from international stakeholders, potentially resulting in full-scale conflict. This event could highly restrict movement and hamper humanitarian access to those affected and vice versa. The scale of the displacement will depend on the location, length, and lethality of the positioning or direction of any potential Russian military advancement. Movement from NGCAs to GCAs will hardly be possible as the contact line becomes very difficult to cross. In the event of a bigger escalation, cross-border and internal displacements are expected, particularly of families living in villages near the contact line. Those movements may be from NGCAs to Russia or from GCA areas near the contact line to the rest of Ukraine.

Ceasefire agreements

There have been 29 ceasefire agreements signed between the Ukrainian Government and non-government authorities since the beginning of the conflict in 2013 (Pravda 07/09/2020; ACLED 24/11/2020; Tass 23/10/2018). They signed the first ceasefire agreement, known as the Minsk Protocol, on 5 September 2014 (Reuters 06/12/2021). Most ceasefire agreements were upheld for a few weeks before they were breached. The last ceasefire agreement signed on 22 July 2020 has been the longest. It is also considered the most effective between Ukraine and non-government authorities so far, with fighting kept low, despite daily ceasefire violations.

A significant increase in ceasefire violations will likely affect the de-escalation process. Civilians might also get caught in the attacks, resulting in injuries and casualties. Movement will likely be restricted, affecting access to services, assistance, and livelihoods. There were over 6,800 ceasefire violations recorded in January 2022, which was lower than the 11,000 recorded in December 2021 and the 15,700 in November (OSCE accessed 15/02/2022). The decrease in ceasefire violations in January 2022 could be attributed to military preparations (KII 01/02/2022).

Crossing points will likely be closed, barring people from crossing between NGCAs and GCAs. Civilians will likely be stuck in areas with limited access to aid and services. Humanitarian access constraints will also likely increase, and NGCAs will likely become inaccessible because of the closure of crossing points and security concerns over ceasefire violations. In this case, there will be a need for collective facilities and temporary shelters.

Movement restrictions from curfews and checkpoints will be very likely, leading to further access constraints and affecting supplies. South and east Ukraine are known for their agricultural productions. Mine contaminations associated with the escalation of conflict will likely put people working in fields in a dangerous position (KII 01/02/2022).

Expected impacts of the driver:

- the closure of entry/exit crossing points
- no movement between GCAs and NGCAs
- civilian casualties
- destruction and damage of infrastructure
- internal and international displacement
- the presence of mines and explosive devices.

Relations between Russia and the separatist movement in Ukraine

Without entering into Ukraine, **increased financial, political, or military support to the pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk regions** will likely translate into an increased number of ceasefire violations and the use of heavy weaponry.

In 2014, Russia intervened in Crimea claiming to support the ethnic Russian population in the area. Even without any direct military interventions in Donbas, potential financial, political, and military support to the separatist movement will likely translate in the increased capacity of the separatists, leading to a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations and use of heavy weaponry. This situation, as well as a possible recognition of the independence of

Donetsk and Luhansk, will trigger a reaction from both Ukraine, through the use of heavy weaponry and drones, and international stakeholders, through the application of sanctions to Russia.

Expected impacts of the driver:

- civilian casualties
- destruction and damage of infrastructure
- internal and international displacement
- civilian unrest in Ukraine and protests in Russia
- movement restrictions

The use of heavy weaponry and the threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance

The use of heavy weapons, drones, and artillery from both sides of the conflict is very likely in case of conflict escalation. This event will lead to the destruction or suspension of critical infrastructures (such as electricity and WASH networks, health structures, and schools), limiting access to essential services and increasing needs for WASH, health, and education services. The situation will also increase casualties, psychological trauma, and stress. Shelling will very likely affect critical infrastructure and restrict movement, especially between GCAs and NGCAs.

Expected impacts of the driver:

- the disruption of infrastructure
- limited access to essential services, including health facilities
- movement restrictions between GCAs and NGCAs
- civilian casualties
- population displacement away from the contact line.

Cyberattacks and critical infrastructure

Cyberattacks were already used twice in January 2022. One was an attempt to disrupt the Russian build-up by hacking a Belarusian railway system, while the second was an attack on Ukrainian government websites that temporarily brought down 70 government websites. Cyberattacks are highly likely to be a main threat in case of escalation (The Guardian 25/01/2022;

BBC 14/01/2022; Fox News 29/01/2022; CNN 24/01/2022). Cyberattacks threaten the privacy of people, including humanitarian workers (ICRC accessed at 21/01/2022).

Critical infrastructure

Industrial facilities in Donetsk, Horlivka, and Mariupol that store chemical and explosive materials are at risk of being affected. Conflict around these areas will likely increase the risk of pollution, leading to illnesses and agricultural pollution in already hard-to-reach areas (OCHA 15/02/2021). Targeting communication infrastructures, including internet, cable, and mobile connection, will likely lead to humanitarian access constraints and an information blackout (KII 08/02/2022).

Expected impacts of the driver:

- the targeting or attack of public services, such as hospitals, schools, and other civilian facilities
- the disruption of online services
- the breaching of personal data
- radiation leak and environmental pollution.

Contact lines and status of the borders

Change of contact lines

Any changes on the contact line without political settlements will likely lead to displacement and increase humanitarian needs.

Movements from NGCAs to Russia and from GCAs to Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Poland are expected in case of a bigger conflict escalation. Although unlikely, if international borders are closed or become difficult to cross as a result of full-scale military operations, cross-border displacement can become very challenging (KII 08/02/2022).

Expected impacts of the driver:

- inhibition of the affected population from moving freely and safely to where humanitarian assistance is available
- besieged areas and travel restrictions
- the presence of checkpoints towards or in affected areas
- cross-border displacement.

Hydrocarbon industry

Russia is the largest supplier of gas to Europe, and they transport about 33% of gas products via Ukraine (The Guardian 27/01/2022; Reuters 29/01/2022). About 66% of the diesel consumed in Ukraine is imported from Russia and Belarus. There is considerable risk of the import and transport of fossil fuels and gas being disrupted if political or military tensions escalate. This disruption would lead to significant economic losses for Ukraine, which uses fossil fuels to operate factories and transports (Kyiv Post 03/06/2021). Such a loss will compound losses in agriculture and industrial item production because of the expected decrease in exports and fuel shortages.

Expected impacts of the driver:

- reduced economic activities throughout eastern Ukraine
- increased poverty
- reduced livelihood opportunities among the population as a result of instability.

INFORMATION GAPS

- Overall, information regarding internal and cross-border displacement is limited. The number of IDPs in NGCAs and any information on past cross-border movements into Russia are unavailable.
- There is limited information on the humanitarian response presence and capacity in NGCAs.
- Although a good number of publicly available sources cite the elderly as being disproportionately or more severely affected by the crisis in Ukraine, especially in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, there is limited information on their specific needs.
- There is a lack of recent assessment data around people in need and the conditions of people in affected areas.
- There is a lack of clarity around how the breakdown of people in need was calculated.
- Aside from information on the number of operational agencies and humanitarian activities remaining limited in NGCAs, it is challenging to know who exactly is operating in which areas.


ANNEX ADMIN 1 COMPARISON TABLE

Admin1	Name	population census 2001	People in need December 2021	IDPs June 2021	IDPs in need June 2021	IDPs in need December 2021	Residents in need December 2021	Number of international NGOs	Number of international organisation	Number of national NGOs	Number of UN agencies	Number of health facilities	Number of conflict events 2019	Number of conflict events 2020	Number of conflict events 2021	Number of fatalities 2019	Number of fatalities in 2020	Number of fatalities in 2021	ACLEd fatalities 2022	Number of airfields	Number of certified airfields
UA01	Avtonomna Respublika Krym	2041098						0	0	0	0		20	22	43	3	0	1	0	0	0
UA05	Vinnytska	1767731						0	0	3	3		34	23	16	1	0	0	0	5	4
UA07	Volynska	1065151						1	0	1	2		27	23	8	0	0	0	0	1	1
UA12	Dnipropetrovska	3373733						2	0	6	3		107	85	50	2	0	0	0	13	13
UA14	Donetska	4446161	1661470.696	195653	106917	88125	1573345.696	55	4	51	19	400	6443	5474	278	81	123	5	0	0	
UA18	Zhytomyrska	1355108						0	0	1	2		34	35	18	0	0	0	0	4	3
UA21	Zakarpatska	1259239						1	0	1	3		24	19	13	0	1	0	0	2	2
UA23	Zaporizka	1835806						4	0	10	6		108	55	63	3	0	0	0	4	4
UA26	Ivano-Frankivska	1420582						0	0	2	4		24	32	49	2	0	0	0	3	3
UA32	Kyivska	1832810						1	0	4	4		54	34	28	5	0	0		10	8
UA35	Kirovohradka	1067644						1	0	2	3		24	26	25	2	0	0	0	3	2
UA44	Luhanska	2318100	1056280.826	146900	76897	45102	1011178.826	48	1	33	19	166	3100	1968	1845	85	30	23	3	0	0
UA46	Lvivska	2616540						2	0	5	3		138	115	95	1	0	0	0	3	2

UA48	Mykolaivska	1223165						1	0	3	2		26	22	28	1	0	0	0	1	1
UA51	Odeska	2450972						0	0	3	4		134	113	94	2	1	0	0	2	2
UA53	Poltavska	1574434						0	0	1	3		31	25	40	0	0	0	0	2	2
UA56	Rivnenska	1181065						0	0	1	2		39	25	32	2	0	0	0	2	1
UA59	Sumska	1232923						0	0	1	3		24	16	17	0	0	1	0	2	2
UA61	Ternopilska	1135518						0	0	1	2		29	30	11	1	0	0		1	0
UA63	Kharkivska	2831091						4	0	6	3		156	130	93	8	0	0	0	4	4
UA65	Khersonska	1119892						0	0	4	3		96	51	41	0	0	0		2	2
UA68	Khmelnyska	1432606						0	0	1	2		18	7	14	0	0	0		2	2
UA71	Cherkaska	1359263						1	0	1	3		35	35	22	1	0	0	0	2	2
UA73	Chernivetska	934365						0	0	2	4		28	32	34	0	0	0	0	1	1
UA74	Chernihivska	1202366						1	0	2	2		32	14	11	1	0	0	0	3	2
UA80	Kyivska	2845020						4	0	10	4		464	552	451	5	0	1	0	6	6
UA85	Sevastopilska	342580						0	0	0	0		15	5	6	0	0	0		0	0
0	Other		157824	391881	158732		0	0	0	0	0		4			0					

Source: OCHA, ACLED

CURRENT AFFECTED AREAS IN EASTERN UKRAINE



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (29/11/2021); USAID (08/12/2021); OCHA (12/2021)