NGO Perspectives on Humanitarian Response in Level 3 Crises

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Executive Summary

This review outlines key NGO perspectives on Level 3 (L3) crisis designations by providing an overview of how national and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have understood and responded to four of the five declared L3 crises to date. Building on the Humanitarian Reform process, in December 2011 the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) launched the Transformative Agenda (TA) as a set of actions that collectively represent a substantive improvement to the current humanitarian response model. Among these actions was the creation of guidance for response to L3 emergencies, major humanitarian crises which require system-wide mobilisation 'beyond normally expected levels'. The TA's guidance on L3 emergencies includes but is not limited to the engagement of national and international NGOs throughout the humanitarian program cycle. This review included a series of semi structured key informant interviews with NGO staff, coordinators and other humanitarian actors who had participated in L3 responses, as well as field visits to Iraq and South Sudan, both ongoing L3 crises at the time of writing.

Findings

Operational Support

This review confirmed that L3 declarations have been accompanied by an increase in support for resourcing, surge staffing and coordination of the humanitarian response. NGOs identified an increase in the prioritisation of material assistance, but reported a need for further emphasis on protection programming. With regards to L3 surge capacity, it was perceived that while NGO surge has mainly focused on operational support, the UN's main focus has been on coordination support. Moreover, the operational support provided in terms of common logistics and security appears to have had unintended negative implications in some L3 crises, creating operational delays and under-serving non-prioritised areas (this was reported both in Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan).

Leadership and Coordination

While leadership at national level is reported to have improved overall, coordination remains inconsistent, particularly at subnational level. Where leadership and coordination structures were considered effective prior to L3 designation, the L3 has been able to positively strengthen these existing systems (e.g. international cluster mechanisms in South Sudan and the Philippines). However, where there was perceived to be weak leadership or a lack of coordination at the national level prior to L3 activation, surge capacity was reported to remain mainly in the capital, leaving little effective subnational coordination (e.g. in CAR only 8% of coordination staff are reportedly based outside of Bangui). Coordination at hub and sub-national level needs to be reinforced, with many gaps in human resourcing outside capital cities. Information was reported to flow upwards to the capital, but much of this was not fed back to the hub or sub-national level. In some operations, such as Iraq and South Sudan, where existing refugee operations were underway prior to L3 activation, international coordination structures were duplicated, requiring more resources from NGOs to effectively engage in both processes.

UN-NGO Partnerships

Many NGOs perceive L3s as having exacerbated the imbalance of power between the UN and NGOs. Implementing partnership arrangements of some UN agencies with NGOs were sometimes reported as creating a donor-client relationship, which has limited the scope of NGO engagement in humanitarian coordination and planning, particularly when activities are scaled-up quickly in an L3. Moreover, complex implementing partnership arrangements were reported as barriers to engagement for both local NGOs and smaller international NGOs, who have much to offer in terms of contextual knowledge and specific sectorial expertise. In South Sudan for example, large INGOs were prioritised by focusing on those with capacity to engage in at least three sectors in at least three areas, while in Iraq, the focus on uniform pipeline distributions limited opportunities for NGOs to adapt their response based on specific community needs.

Financial Resourcing

While L3 processes are intended to increase the rapid availability of financial resources, the gap between met and unmet funding needs relative to the SRPs remains substantial. In addition, since L3s have led to a greater focus on inter-agency planning, with money channelled directly through the UN, it was reported that funding has not been made available sufficiently quickly to NGOs. The resulting delays are due partly to UN processes and partly on donors, who require cluster planning to be finalised before the disbursal of funds. The process of inter-sector prioritisation was reported to result in unbalanced distribution across clusters and along the Humanitarian Program Cycle. Further limitations were identified in relation to earmarked funding, which is inflexible in the face of changing priorities (e.g. funding in Iraq was specified for either refugees or IDPs, while limited funds were available outside conflict-affected states in South Sudan). Due to its focus on L3 crises, this study did not find conclusive evidence as to the impact of L3 designation on other emergencies. However, there was anecdotal evidence to suggest that the prioritisation of L3s was having a negative impact on programming elsewhere (e.g. NGO offices closing in Western South Sudan due to the focus on emergency programming for L3 response in the North of the country).

Core Issues – Protection and Gender Based Programming

NGOs reported that protection, and in particular sexual and gender based violence in conflict-affected areas, was not sufficiently prioritised in L3 designations, with leadership often prioritising the distribution of material assistance over protection programming. In L3 designations where protection was prioritised at the planning stage, it was not sufficiently implemented in programming. CAR, for example, has a poor track record of protection and response to gender-based violence. While protection has been increasingly prioritised in South Sudan, improvements are reportedly slow, due to reluctance from some donors and coordinators to shift emphasis away from material assistance.

Information Management

Overall information management was perceived as having improved, especially in terms of assessments at the early stages of a crisis. However, on-going gap analysis and evidence-based prioritisation linked to operations was reported as remaining weak. This was considered a particularly pertinent issue in South Sudan and CAR, due to poor access to information and a lack of consistent and reliable data management standards.

Awareness of the Transformative Agenda

Throughout the review it was clear that many NGO staff, despite being part of an L3 humanitarian response, were unaware or poorly informed of the TA. While there was acknowledgement of the L3 designation, the implications of the TA and its protocols were not clear to many individuals.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from the findings of this evaluation, based on NGO responses and discussions with ICVA:

- L3s have resulted in increased human and financial resources available for the response. Surge deployments must include both implementation and coordination capacity, so that responders at the operational level receive adequate practical and logistical support, as well as leadership.
- While recognising significant improvements in leadership and coordination to date, there is a need to address challenges associated with multiple coordination structures in complex and mixed-flow crises with both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)—and to strengthen coordination at sub-national level.
- Contrary to their intention, L3 designations have been reported to increase funding delays. An open discourse between UN and NGOs is recommended on partnership mechanisms, particularly with regards to making agreements faster, more flexible and adaptable to the evolving understanding of needs and priorities. In parallel, NGOs reported that a greater willingness from donors to fund bilaterally would enable greater independence. It is recommended that NGOs come together at the global level to advocate for increased flexibility and independence with regards to funding.
- In conflict settings and consequent displacement situations that have categorised four of the five L3s, there is insufficient emphasis placed on protection, specifically on activities to address gender-based violence. It is recommended that further discussion through the 2015 Whole of System Review and Peacekeeping Review address these core issues as well as receive prioritised funding.
- Recognising improvements in information management, it is recommended the MIRA is reinforced and used more broadly. Further emphasis should also be placed beyond needs assessments, including on monitoring of the response at both national and sub-national levels. There is also a clear need for improved evidence-based evaluations, particularly of understanding aid effectiveness and efficiency across large-scale humanitarian responses.
- To include all stakeholders in effective implementation of the TA, it is recommended to raise awareness and understanding of the TA and its protocols among NGO staff at country level.

Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations (or People)
ACF	Action Contre Le Faim
CAR	Central African Republic
CCO	Comité de Coordination des ONGI / INGO Coordination Committee
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHF	Common Humanitarian Fund
DHC	Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
EDG	Emergency Directors Group
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
IARRM	Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
L3	Level 3 (category of humanitarian crisis)
MINUSCA	The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central Africa Republic
MIRA	Multi-sector Inter-agency Rapid Assessment
NCCI	NGO Coordination Committee of Iraq
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPR	Operational Peer Review
RC	Resident Coordinator
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
TA	Transformative Agenda
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WFP	World Food Program
WG	Working Group

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Introduction

This review seeks to explore the implication of Level 3 (L3) designations on national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) through providing an overview of how NGOs have understood and responded to four of the five L3 designations to date. While each of the emergencies discussed in this document is unique, all are influenced by the Transformative Agenda (TA), an initiative of the IASC that has sought to improve the humanitarian response process.

In 2010, following the devastating Pakistani floods and Haitian earthquake, humanitarian agencies came together to improve a range of factors related to leadership, coordination and accountability through the TA. While the TA does not solely focus on L3 designations, a range of protocols have been developed within the TA that relate specifically to improving the humanitarian response in L3s[1]. Each of the L3 crises (Syria[2], the Philippines, Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and Iraq) provides a unique perspective on the implementation and effects of the L3 designation.

The Syrian crisis is well documented as being complex, as it involves a range of countries, cross-border and cross-line needs, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and significant–if ineffectual—political engagement that has resulted in several resolutions and Presidential Statements of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The complexity of the situation affects the humanitarian response and particularly coordination, which by necessity is multi-dimensional and decentralised across the region. While Syria is not included in this research, the crisis has spilled over into neighbouring Iraq, which already had complex security, political and humanitarian challenges.

The complexity of humanitarian needs within Iraq—different for host communities, IDPs, and refugees from Syria—peaked following attacks from Daesh[3] in June 2014. Despite much of the leadership and coordination being in place, the nature of humanitarian needs changed so substantially that a significant review of the humanitarian architecture was required; moreover the safety of humanitarians and others in Baghdad resulted in the relocation of UN staff to Erbil, which added further complexity to the already raging crisis.

CAR has had a long history of humanitarian assistance due to extreme levels of poverty and insecurity. The L3 designation resulted in a significant boost to attention on CAR, which had been previously lacking. Moreover, As in CAR, South Sudan had been receiving significant assistance prior to the L3 designation. With the onset of civil war in late 2013, humanitarian needs increased substantially. In Iraq, CAR and South Sudan, there remain a significant number of protection issues related to the conflict, with particular concerns related to gender-based violence.

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[1] Protocols of the TA include: Concept paper on empowered leadership (L3 specific); Humanitarian system-wide emergency activation: definition and procedures (L3 specific); Responding to L3 emergencies: what empowered leadership looks like in practice (L3 specific); Reference module for cluster coordination at the country level; Responding to L3 emergencies: the humanitarian programme cycle (L3 specific); Reference module for the implementation of the humanitarian programme cycle; Inter-agency rapid response mechanism (IARRM, L3 specific); Operational framework for accountability to affected populations; and Common framework for preparedness.

[2] Due to limitations of accessing Syria and the complex nature of the L3, this has been excluded.

[3] Also referred to as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State (IS).

In stark contrast, Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines was a natural disaster that affected several islands, with a history of sudden-onset disasters, humanitarian assistance and development programs. Therefore despite Haiyan being a Category 5 'super typhoon' of extraordinary power, many of the national leadership, coordination and accountability mechanisms were already in place prior to L3 designation.

This report provides an overview of the methodology, case studies, key findings and recommendations. Limitations include the exclusion of Syria, the first and largest L3, and a general focus field based perspective of emergency responders.

Methodology

The objective of this review is to inform ICVA on the perspectives from NGOs on humanitarian response in L3 crises, and of how the designations have affected the humanitarian response. This included a review of four of the five L3 designations to date, in-country humanitarian coordination mechanisms (i.e. clusters and working groups[4]), and all aspects of the humanitarian program cycle (i.e. preparedness, assessment, strategic response plan, resource mobilization, implementation of programs, monitoring and accountability, and information management). NGO engagement, leadership, accountability, and responses were reviewed from the perspective of NGOs.

The Humanitarian Programme Cycle
Source: IASC, HPC Reference Module, 2013.

The specific objectives of this review were as follows:

- Examine how national and international NGOs have reacted to L3 declarations; investigate how actors within the humanitarian system have facilitated or inhibited the involvement of NGOs in the responses; and identify potential trends and issues
- Inquire into how L3 designations may be affecting NGO operations in non-L3 emergencies
- Contribute to an evidence base that informs policy positions related to NGO leadership, coordination, accountability and financing
- Inform ICVA guidance documents for NGOs responding to L3s

The first phase of the study was a desk review to facilitate comparison across L3 designations. Furthermore, the chart on page 16 includes references advocacy points and policy developments that are recommended by existing reviews, operational peer reviews, evaluations, and assessments (a full list of documents can be found in the annexes section, p26).

Key informant interviews were conducted in four of the five L3 emergencies. This included a selection of NGO representatives put forward by ICVA, as well other stakeholders recommended in the interview process (snowballing). A total of over 35 key informant interviews were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire.

Two field visits were undertaken with further in-depth interviews of key stakeholders. These included humanitarian actors active in coordination mechanisms, such as NGO representatives, UN officials and cluster or working group leads. These field visits included South Sudan (Juba, 28-31st of October 2014) and Iraq (Erbil, 8-13th of November 2014) and have been used to inform the in-depth case studies provided below.

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[4] In Iraq, sectoral working groups were replaced with the cluster mechanism.

Finally, a workshop was held in Geneva with ICVA members and non-member NGOs to review some of the preliminary findings and provide input on the development of the analysis and recommendations.

This review includes several limitations: first, the results are based largely on operational perspectives of L3 designations at a particular point in time, though some effort has been made to match this with global NGO perspectives; second, responses from the Philippines were limited due to its non-L3 status at the time of research; and third, the Syria response was not included, which is the largest and most complex of all L3 designations to date.

Desk and Literature Review

A significant number of reviews of the TA have been conducted to date; however, there is limited literature that conveys NGO perspectives of the humanitarian response in L3 crises. This section provides a brief overview of some of the key documents available and builds on previous research in this area. This section begins with an overview of the designation of L3s, followed by an outline of the three core areas of leadership, coordination and accountability, and finishes with a discussion of the response and delivery of assistance.

Designation

The designation of L3 has two complementary purposes (IASC Working Group, 2014a): The L3 declaration supports the activation of specific measures to ensure that the appropriate humanitarian architecture is in place to manage the response to a large scale-complex crisis situation, with all the surge elements provided simultaneously. The L3 accompanying measures target leadership and coordination gaps, improved accountability to all stakeholders, and support the rapid and appropriate allocation of resources to the response.

The L3 declaration also represents a statement of priority among global crises: it is a call for prioritization of resources and capacities towards that response. The L3 signals to IASC organizations and donors the need to scale up rapidly and ensure appropriate resources for the response to the crisis.

There are five criteria used to inform the activation of an L3 designation: scale, urgency, complexity, capacity, and reputational risk of a crisis. An analysis is undertaken to review any gaps in the response, the capacity of government and existing stakeholders to respond, and needs relating to leadership, coordination and operating space for the international response. In order to reach a common understanding of the issues affecting the response, an analysis is also conducted of how the response could be scaled up, and which accompanying measures and protocols could contribute to an improved response. This information is used to determine whether or not a time-bound (maximum six-month initial designation) L3 declaration should be undertaken, and if so, to identify achievable objectives and accompanying measures.

The activation of L3s in slow-onset protracted-crises has been raised in several papers as a key issue requiring further clarification. The IASC Emergency Directors Group (EDG)-Donor (2014b) background paper noted the optimal usage of L3 in slow-onset protracted-crisis as a key issue for lessons learned. Recommendations from the EDG to the IASC Working Group (WG) (2014a) highlight specifically that clarity is required for L3 designation in slow-onset crises with regards to building common expectations, reaching agreement on the specific nature of the problem, activating only the relevant components of the L3 designation, and the time bound nature of activation (i.e. L3 activation for six months with periodic reviews). This issue is also raised by Action Contre le Faim (ACF) (2014), which notes that L3 designation for the Syrian crisis happened two years after the onset of the crisis. The L3 activation had a major impact on coordination structures, and created challenges in neighbouring countries as to the leadership roles of OCHA and UNHCR. IRC (2014) also notes that lack of clarity and knowledge around the designation of an L3 crisis and around the TA in general.

Leadership

There is general agreement among the UN, NGOs and donors that more effective leadership teams are in place with more experienced and trained Resident Coordinators (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinators (HC), as well as Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators (DHC) providing greater support (ICVA survey, EDG Survey, Ging, 2014). This was echoed by IRC (2014), noting that L3 designation improves leadership to some degree, especially through surge support from UN staff including the DHC (belated in CAR but appropriate in South Sudan). The IASC (2014b) also highlighted improvements in leadership although identified the need for a larger pool of 'L3 ready' candidates, who could be deployed within 72 hours of an L3 declaration.

ICVA (2014) undertook a survey of 244 NGO program staff across 21 crises, including some L3s, providing a broad overview of perceptions of leadership. Throughout this survey, leadership scored quite highly compared to other indicators (3.41 out of 5), although it scored lower in L3 crises (3.18). Both leadership skills and competencies of the HC scored quite highly overall (3.52), but again scored lower in L3s (3.26). Many comments were made in relation to Syria and the lack of a 'whole of Syria' approach. Areas receiving low scores in all crises included information and guidance on TA implementation (2.87); sector response plans (2.88); and strategic direction for humanitarian response (2.91). However, high scores were achieved for advocacy on humanitarian operational issues (3.59); and NGO representation on the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT, 3.71, and 4.1 in L3s), some of which also relate to leadership functions.

The results highlight a mixed set of responses, although in light of other reports and analysis there does appear to be a trend that leadership performance at the national level is improving over time. One issue raised by many, includes the double and triple hatting of the HC with the RC and/or Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG), which was perceived to reduce an individual's capacity to provide effective leadership as well as their actual or perceived neutrality. These results are discussed further in the case studies section of this report.

Coordination

Effective coordination is often linked to an individual (ACF, 2014), making it difficult to clearly separate the performance of coordination structures and individuals themselves. Double and triple hatting for HC, RC, DSRSGs, and cluster leads increases this complexity further, as individuals juggle political constraints, coordination responsibilities, and implementation roles simultaneously (ACF, 2014; ICVA, 2014). The IASC EDG-Donors briefing (2014b) notes an improvement in coordination particularly at the HCT level, and suggests improving links between the HCT and inter-cluster coordination mechanisms. Ging (2014) reiterates this, stating that while coordination has been strengthened, this may have come at the expense of implementation in some situations. In the Philippines, for example, 255 people were deployed to support coordination across eight coordination hubs. In the case of South Sudan, IRC (2014) highlights that support to coordination was beneficial in Juba, but did not always extend to sub-national locations, an observation that is echoed in the CAR case study below, where reportedly only 8% of UN staff (the largest share of coordination) were outside of Bangui. The results highlight that additional surge

capacity has been less effective in remote coordination situations, particularly when coupled with a lack of detailed data about needs and location of affected populations.

Despite this, the ICVA (2014) study shows that coordination was seen to effectively to identify gaps and priorities (scoring 3.36 out of 5), although also noted that clusters are not perceived as effectively reflecting actual humanitarian needs (2.99), particularly in L3s (2.71). It should also be noted that OCHA scored more highly than other agencies in terms of facilitating effective cluster and inter-cluster coordination (3.3). Coordination of the Syria response scored lower than average, which may have been influenced by the lack of clarity over leadership of the response.

Complex crises, including refugee responses coordinated by UNHCR, with domestic or other issues being under the responsibility of OCHA, were found to pose particular challenges. Ging (2014) references the *Joint UNHCR-OCHA Note on Mixed Situations: Coordination in Practice* as successfully improving coordination by outlining the respective accountabilities, roles and responsibilities between the organisations in mixed settings. While this may have resulted in improvements, ACF (2014) as well as respondents to the ICVA (2014) survey note that in the Syrian crisis this has remained an issue, particularly regarding the lack of operational clarity for NGOs. The complexity of cross-border, cross-line, IDP, and refugee issues in five major countries means that it is even more important to have effective coordination, though it is more difficult to achieve.

Accountability

Accountability is widely regarded as the area of the TA that has seen the least improvement, despite the IASC commitments and processes related to Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP)5. Many stakeholders recognise that key stakeholders including UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and FAO have strengthened accountability related to the implementation of the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC), largely through reviews and more deployment of staff. However despite more resources, the AAP still remains an area where according to ACF (2014) there have been no improvements over the past two years. This is highlighted in the ICVA (2014) survey, with accountability scoring the lowest overall (3.02) largely due to a failure of systematic communication and feedback mechanisms with the affected population (2.72, and 2.44 in L3s).

The IASC EDG-Donors (2014b) noted the need to continue to strengthen accountability through firstly having AAP reflected as a priority in the list of humanitarian needs, and secondly through enhancing mutual accountability amongst IASC partners. It is widely suggested that there are opportunities to learn lessons on AAP from NGOs that have a wealth of experience as the 'last mile' assistance providers (Ging, 2014; IRC, 2014; ACF, 2014). Moreover it is essential to have resources to build on what exists and to further support the implementers as well as the coordinators to link AAP back to humanitarian response.

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[5] The five commitments of the AAP are 1) *leadership and governance* to prioritise within country strategy papers; 2) *transparency* to ensure access to timely information on procedures, structures, and processes; 3) *feedback and complaints mechanisms* to actively seek input on improving processes, policies and programmes; 4) *participation* of affected populations in the decision making processes; and 5) *design, monitoring and evaluation* includes affected populations in setting the goals and objectives with their feedback being incorporated into it.

Response and Delivery

There is limited information available on the response and delivery in L3s beyond the grey literature of the Operational Peer Reviews (OPR), which are summarised in the case studies section. The OPRs are expected to be conducted within three months of L3 declaration. This happened belatedly in the case the Philippines and South Sudan, and had not yet taken place for Iraq at the time of research. Once completed, these documents will not be publicly available, but are generally accessible to the humanitarian community through informal channels.

In much of the literature reviewed, it was noted that the increase in resource mobilisation has improved the overall response. IRC (2014) observed the main impact to be additional human and financial resources to enable programming, but noted that this was not directly related to programming needs. However it is widely noted that the confluence of simultaneous L3 crises placed enormous strain on global surge capacity, humanitarian rosters, and stocks, decreasing available resources to respond to all crises. The IASC EDG-Donors (2014b) highlighted that investing up-front in the scale-up of humanitarian rosters should be a priority in order to overcome the depletion of surge staffing capacities. It was recommended that the IASC review the commitment of further funds through the CERF, in order to set up and maintain adequate transport links, improve the amount available staffing, and promote the safety and wellbeing of humanitarian workers.

Case Studies of Level 3 Crises

The Philippines (activated 12 November 2013, deactivated 14 February 2014)

While the Philippines government has high capacity to respond to natural disasters, the fact that it was already responding to simultaneous emergencies in Zamboanga and Bohol, stretched its capacity. The government asked for international support on 9 November. Following a meeting of the IASC Principals on 12 November 2013, Valerie Amos, OCHA Emergency Relief Coordinator, declared an IASC system-wide Level 3 Emergency response to Typhoon Haiyan and the HCT began supporting the response through 12 clusters. This activation included agreements on the "empowered leadership" protocol and put in place an inter-agency rapid response mechanism (IARRM) allowing for greater coordination between IASC agencies and the HC on surge deployments and with OCHA on inter-agency assessments. The activation was based on initial information following the typhoon indicating that the scale, complexity, urgency, reputational risk in the event of non-action, and limited capacity of the government to respond required system-wide action by the humanitarian community.

The scale of the emergency was considered to be high given that this was the most powerful storm to have been recorded on land, with at least 9.5 million people reported to have been affected and more than 618,000 people displaced, many of whom were living in one of 1,500 evacuation centres.

Given the scale of the destruction and the number of displaced individuals, the urgency for emergency shelter, non-food items, clean water and food was critical. Furthermore, many hospitals and other health care facilities were damaged and/or were without electricity or clean water, indicating a very high urgency for emergency health operations to treat the many thousands of survivors with injuries.

In the immediate days following the disaster, many airports and seaports were closed to commercial traffic, roads were covered in debris, and telecommunications were disrupted in the hardest hit regions, providing a very complex context in which to respond. Security was also a concern, particularly in hard-hit Tacloban, where armed groups roamed the streets looting. The scale of the disaster also mobilized military operations from foreign countries as well as large amounts of funding and influxes of emergency responders, contributing to a highly complex logistical and coordination context.

The destruction wrought by Typhoon Haiyan brought with it immense international media coverage, particularly on Tacloban. The extent of the international media coverage led to great interest and an outpouring of support for the Philippines, meaning that there was great reputational risk related to the humanitarian response.

As the first L3 natural disaster following the TA, the Typhoon Haiyan declaration came quickly and was based on the immense scale of the operations, the logistical complexity of the response, and the reputational risk of an ineffective response, especially given the widespread international media coverage (EDG, 2013).

The response built on national capacity by co-locating clusters with municipal actors, ensuring full coverage of affected areas. While engagement with the government was strong, collaboration with national NGOs was considered to have been weak. International NGOs report that the UN coordination bodies effectively engaged with them and that decisions-making was often a collaborative process.

With that said, many INGOs also report that much of the coordination capacity was concentrated at the national level and that this did not trickle down to the sub-national and hub levels. Some suggest that placing the DHC in the affected area should have been more effective to ensure better communication between Manila and the Visayas. The gap in leadership and coordination at the sub-national and hub level influenced the timeliness of decision making, exacerbated by the institutional distance of coordination from the national leadership to the hubs6.

Information management as a component of the coordination was identified as an area for improving the structure, systems and protocols surrounding rapid onset crisis. Specifically the Multi-sector Inter-agency Rapid Assessment (MIRA) was considered to be ineffective and poorly coordinated by many of the respondents7. The first MIRA was largely identified as being late and not useful for planning, prioritisation or operations; however the second MIRA was reported as being more useful even though late within the humanitarian program cycle. This appeared to be a trend at the sector level as well, with assessments becoming available on the Humanitarian Response platform a long time after the initial data collection was undertaken making them less relevant.

> *"Coordinators on the ground were effective, but too much happened at the Manila level; [the] focus should have shifted to the hubs from the very beginning. Further, at least for Shelter, WASH, and Livelihoods clusters, municipal-level focal points were determined very late, meaning unnecessary duplications happened and organisations were left out of discussions because they were far from the main hub in the area."*

The response is considered to have been fairly well-resourced (60% of the Strategic Response Plan, ICVA 2014b) albeit unbalanced due to earmarking by donors. Critical clusters for recovery such as the Shelter and the Food Security and Livelihoods clusters were funded at lower levels than others, leading to a chronic shortage of resourcing for these clusters. While it was intended for relief and recovery to be implemented from the outset, the lack of resources for longer term housing and livelihood solutions meant recovery was not able to be adequately prioritised.

Operational capacity and stock flows were relatively slow to arrive despite the rapid surge of coordination-level staff. While over 160 staff were flown into the Philippines as surge capacity to support the cluster coordination mechanisms, according to some respondents the operational capacity was slow to arrive from humanitarian actors. Moreover, much of the physical capacity in terms of roads, ports, and other aspects of the logistics supply chain were damaged by the typhoon.

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[6] Humanitarian hubs were located in Cebu, Guian, Ormoc, Roxas and Tacloban.

[7] The MIRA is designed to identify strategic humanitarian priorities during the first two weeks of an emergency, complementing the Preliminary Scenario Definition that is issued 72 hours after the onset of a disaster. The MIRA is the first step to the HCTs response to an emergency according to the IASC guidelines.

> *"A system was put in place to effectively and efficiently manage AAP with reference to ICCM and HCT. The clusters also efficiently ensured accountability in the response, with clear roles and responsibilities. However, the major gap (as in past emergencies) is that local NGOs are largely left out or when participating, their voices are drowned out by the international voices from larger organizations."*

With regards to accountability, according to NGO staff, AAP was sufficiently resourced by humanitarian actors and made a focus for the operation by the leadership. AAP was prioritised as a major focus from the onset, with a perception by NGO staff that there were sufficient dedicated accountability specialists deployed. It was noted that OCHA's leadership in this was very positive, engaged in setting up the mechanisms and ensuring the prioritisation within the clusters.

According to some NGO staff, the Typhoon Haiyan response is an example of how international and national actors can work together to provide critical lifesaving assistance to affected populations. Response leadership, however, did not effectively reach the subnational levels leading to some gaps in communication. The lack of high-level leadership at the hub level limited the effectiveness of the strong coordination at the national level, yet the focus on coordination slowed some of the sub-national-level response. Overall, the L3 declaration was successful in ensuring coordination and resources for a particularly logistically complex response. These resources, however, were unevenly appropriated and potentially slowed a shift from emergency response to recovery.

Central African Republic (activated 11 December 2013)

The dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation in the capital and the need for an urgent scale up of the response to ensure life-saving action led to the declaration of the crisis as an L3 emergency for three months on 11 December 2013, followed by the appointment and subsequent deployment of a senior Humanitarian Coordinator on 24 December. The conflict continued throughout 2014 without a tangible positive impact from the reconciliation process. Therefore, the L3 was subsequently extended for a further six months on 3 March 2014, and then a further 3 months on 5 September 2014, as the situation had not improved and support measures continue to be required.

> *"INGOs are closer to the field and don't have time to take part in so much coordination when responding. The systems' heavy and process driven initiatives might have felt out of touch with the reality on the ground."*
> *[There needs to be a] link between emergency response and early recovery.*
> *If we put so many resources into the emergency phase, it should benefit the overall situation."*

Considering the slow-onset nature of the emergency, the L3 activation has been perceived by all stakeholders as a necessary and highly relevant measure to ensure, firstly that appropriate resources (both human and financial), and reinforced coordination mechanisms were in place to respond to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation; and secondly to bring attention to the crisis making it a priority for the global humanitarian community. Furthermore, the EDGs (2014a and 2014b) noted that, "Although the degree of international attention paid to the crisis in CAR has decreased in recent months, the role of the international community is likely to be closely scrutinized in the lead-up to the

country's 2015 elections," highlighting the potential reputational risk to the international community.

While there is general agreement that the L3 has been appropriate in its designation and improved coordination within Bangui, it is less clear that these impacts have been effective for the rest of the country. One of the weaknesses of this L3 response seems to be the focus on the capital, where resources (financial and human) and coordination have been focused since the declaration with a high degree of difficulty in rolling out the response in the provinces.

> *"The non-avoidable problem of parachuting senior people in the midst of a crisis has been somehow mitigated by the presence of pre-L3 staff within clusters. The [presence] of some NGOs as cluster co-facilitators has saved the reputation of certain clusters [that otherwise would not have been effective]"*

Because the L3 has been declared following a dramatic change in the already complex and protracted crisis the CAR was facing, the system-wide emergency activation did not start from zero: HCT and clusters were already in place and both national and international NGOs active. The L3 seems to have played a role in "structuring" and certainly reinforcing two of the three pillars of the transformative agenda, at least in Bangui: leadership and coordination.

The deployment of surge human resources, both on the UN and NGO side, has strengthened leadership capacity in-country – a perception of NGOs as well as echoed in the Operational Peer Review. Though this came at the expenses of continuity of personnel and coordination according to respondents. Both at the UN level, including cluster coordination, and NGO level, notably in country management position, highly experienced staff have supported the scale up of operations, particularly in the first months following the L3 activation, while it has proven extremely challenging to recruit senior staff for longer term assignments.

> *"There seems to be a precipitation of aid that does not make time for discussing with communities before or after the intervention"*
> *"The L3 is less important for NGOs. It has less direct impact on NGOs operations compared to the impact it has on UN agencies"*

The cluster mechanism has been generally well regarded, though weak coverage of the provinces and a Bangui-centric focus was identified as an ongoing gap. NGOs' participation in coordination structures, not only as members but as cluster co-facilitators, has been a priority for the HC since the L3 activation. However there are some differences in the level of participation by some NGOs, particularly with regards to national NGOs. The establishment of the Comite de Coordination des ONGs (CCO) is perceived as a positive factor, from the humanitarian leadership and the members, which has greatly contributed to raising the level of engagement of NGOs in strategic decision-making.

NGOs' willingness and capacity to contribute to strategic planning, needs assessments and scenario and response planning, is tangible and results in a feeling of shared ownership of the operational framework defined by the SRP in CAR. The SRP is widely recognised as providing direction and guiding principles to NGOs and UN agencies alike. However, some concerns were raised with the amount of strategic planning put in place

initially, echoed in the Operational Peer Review (i.e. three plans were developed: the SRP I in December 2013; the 100 Day Plan in late December 2013; and the SRP II in January 2014).

Accountability appears to be the pillar of the transformative agenda that has progressed the least since the L3 activation – reiterated in the CAR OPR for being slow and inconsistent. First and foremost, if there is agreement in considering AAP as a top item on the humanitarian agenda, little of what has been discussed and developed in theory has been rolled out and become operational in CAR. There is some information sharing but respondents noted a lack of effective engagement and accountability both with local NGOs and affected populations. Closely associated, it is widely noted that protection of civilians in CAR remains a sector with significant unmet needs despite some progress in areas such as tracking of people's movements and programmes for victims/survivors of sexual and gender based violence. The focus of these less tangible, but just as important results, ought to be considered in the same light as life-saving activities in resourcing of the CAR response.

The lack of accountability and mainstreaming of protection is exacerbated by the fact that the L3 is generating more pressure on achieving certain types of results rapidly and, as such, on donors for the rapid disbursement of funds. Hence, NGOs and UN agencies, both in their individual and cluster programming, have paid more attention to ensuring reporting and monitoring based on contractual obligations compared to the attention given to engaging with affected communities prior and after the aid being delivered to measure its impact. In particular, the perception is that there is a clear lack of monitoring and evaluation of aid efficiency and effectiveness. Yet, there is a general recognition of the efforts made by humanitarian leadership to ensure coordination with local authorities and local communities through the establishment of regular field visits of the HC (ranging from one per week, in the initial three months, to two per month) with representatives from both the UN and the NGO community. This has been highlighted as a good practice worth considering as a standard measure in L3 system-wide emergency activations. Though to reiterate, converting these initiatives from information sharing to active engagement in decision making still remains a distant goal according to most respondents in CAR, which resonates globally as well.

The L3 has made more resources available compared to previous years, along with raising the profile, though remains short of the needs (61% of the SRP funded, IASC 2014b) weakened further by the lack of operational capacity to deliver. The catalyst role of the UN in terms of funding coupled with the time needed for UN agency to "structure themselves" to adapt to the L3 and the level of response however has resulted in a delayed de facto L3 response characterised by a concentration in "hot spots" and "highly visible" areas, notably Bangui. Despite the increase in the humanitarian response capacity as noted by the EDG, with the

> "Out of the 55 international NGOs present in CAR, 52 are listed as active participants of cluster coordination structures, corresponding to a 95% participation rate"
>
> "There is an active core of 15-20 international NGOs deeply involved in coordination by dedicating resources to it. These NGOs are mostly those that were active before the crisis"
>
> "The L3 has brought maturity within the coordination mechanism, contributing to the creation of respectful dynamics between different actors. The presence of the CCO has positively contributed to this change in dynamics. Doors that were previously closed have been opened to NGOs at the highest levels of discussion"

number of UN and NGO actors increasing from 47 to over 100 since the initial declaration of the L3, the response according to many respondents and observers remains insufficient.

In the particular context of CAR, the L3 and the corresponding SRP and funding allocations (i.e. CERF and CHF) have been praised for bringing attention to current emergency needs, and criticised for deprioritising too much the rehabilitation and development-oriented needs. As a result certain areas of the country, notably the South East, and certain "transition activities" have fallen through the cracks of the system.

Overall, it could be argued that, although its impact has probably been more visible to UN agencies, the L3 activation has been well perceived by the NGO community, which feels engaged with the humanitarian leadership and within coordination structures. From an operational level, if the L3 is considered "a success in Bangui and less so in the provinces" for both NGOs and UN alike, there is a concern over the possible implications of (i) the establishment of the integrated mission nine months after the L3 declaration (i.e. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central Africa Republic, MINUSCA); and (ii) a future L3 de-activation as coordination, leadership and accountability gaps are perceived to be filled.

South Sudan (activated 11 February 2014)

The L3 for South Sudan was activated on 11 February 2014, for an initial 3-month period. The activation of the L3 in South Sudan was delayed, as the crisis occurred around Christmas time resulting in a lack of personnel, and exacerbated by the initial assessments highlighting that the conflict and its impacts would be short lived to three months. Once the protracted crisis was recognised, and the need for additional resources acknowledged, the L3 was quickly activated. On 23 May 2014, the IASC Principals extended the L3 activation for six months, in light of the sheer size and numbers affected by the crisis. On 17 October 2014, the South Sudan HCT, comprising representatives of non-governmental organisations, UN agencies, and donors, unanimously recommended the extension of the L3 once again (EDG, 2014d).

> *"There is still a knowledge gap among NGOs with regards to what protection mainstreaming means and how it could be operationalized"*
> *"L3 operations should put protection at the core of the response. Protection is everyone's business not a "one agency" business."*
> *"If the L3 creates momentum for emergency response, this should not result in transition activities falling through the cracks, thus losing momentum for stabilisation in certain areas of the country"*

The activation and extension of the L3 was widely accepted as appropriate based on the five categories. The operating environment remained constrained, with security of humanitarians of utmost concern as their personnel and assets continue to be targeted. The capacity for the South Sudan Government to respond to the crisis has proven limited, and the capacity for NGOs to respond is shrinking through the implementation of the National Security Bill and proposed NGO bill[8] resulting in the state tightening its grip. Finally, there were increasing reputational risk to the humanitarian community: food

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[8] The National Security Bill would give broad powers to the National Security Service to detain people without warrant or charge. The NGO bill would give the government excessive discretionary powers to control the operations of civil society groups with vague requirements of compliance and would limit the number of international staff that NGOs can hire.

insecurity is deteriorating, the health crisis and outbreaks are worsening, and protection of civilians remains a priority. Meanwhile, numerous high profile visits of key global leaders and senior humanitarians draw attention to the situation as it remains in the international spotlight.

Building on a strong humanitarian architecture that was already in place – with many years of humanitarian assistance ongoing in South Sudan – the changes to the structures were quite limited. The HCT was reformed in 2012 into a more streamlined decision making body, which facilitated an effective leadership structure for the L3. Moreover, the clusters were already in place and there was limited change there. Two notable changes that were positively received were the Stand-Aside of the UNICEF Representative, who was more of a stabilisation and development expert than a crisis response expert, and the creation of a DHC that was filled by the FAO Representative acting interim.

> *"Many NGOs didn't stay and deliver. There were some that did, notably ACTED, WVI, ICRC, MSF. But others have become more risk averse than the UN. In one situation the NGOs wouldn't go because of security to a field visit arranged by the UN, and they are the ones who are meant to deliver to the last mile"*

The OPR and NGO perspectives did highlight two areas for improvements in the coordination. Firstly, a stronger level of information management, particularly in terms of identifying gaps and prioritisation rather than the current dual focus on assessments and response mapping. And secondly, coordination at the hub and sub-national level needs to be reinforced, with many gaps in human resources outside of Juba and the fact that information is largely going upwards to Juba but not being fed back.

> *"Biggest gap is the information management. There is a lot of reporting and collecting of information that is provided to Juba, though it is not sent back to the field. Moreover, it is not analysed to better understand the gaps. The problem is much is being decentralised to the state level where there isn't the capacity."*

One of the main impacts of the designation of the L3 was the provision of surge human and financial resources. The Crisis Response Plan is 72% funded for 2014 (IASC, 2014b), though a further US$269 million is required to kick start operations in 2015 at the time of the report (EDG, 2014d). The perspective of operational NGOs is not necessarily a lack of financial resources; however the shift of resources predominantly from western South Sudan where the context is more stable to conflict areas has seen a dramatic reprioritisation away from development and stabilisation programs. Moreover, there is a problem with areas of need and access being greater in opposition controlled areas, which has resulted in perceived bias by and lack of neutrality of humanitarian aid particularly by the government and its supporters. An example provided by field NGOs that highlights this is the cessation of annual flood-assistance programs in government controlled areas, with humanitarian assistance correspondingly being prioritised in conflict affected areas, including opposition controlled areas.

A significant barrier that the L3 arguably had limited impact on was the operational capacity of the response, which remained limited for many months after the initial crisis. While it is recognised that humanitarian assets were looted and damaged, and continue to be targeted, the reinstallation of these capacities were slow. This was due to the ongoing and shifting security situation, limited access to areas (which still remains), and lack of human resources across the organisations. Constraints in humanitarian hubs and logistics

supply chains continue to limit the assistance. The fact that the OPR was also delayed meant that it took 180 days from the time of the crisis until a review was done, which outlined a large number of operational recommendations – this OPR ought to be done within 90 days of activation of L3, but in fact, was completed 120 days after activation.

In order to scale up, a somewhat contentious rule was put in place that prioritised partnerships with NGOs that could scale up quickly, cover three sectors, and operate across three areas. This substantially favoured the larger INGOs, and prioritised life-saving material humanitarian assistance, which was largely limited to the delivery of physical goods and not protection, for example. The contention is that smaller NGOs were often left out, and that these organisations do have an added value particularly when it comes to protection, gender, and sector-specific needs (e.g. nutrition, health). Moreover, it disfavoured local NGOs, which most organisations believe were not adequately or effectively engaged. Further exacerbating these issues is the poor track record of AAP, noted by many respondents and in the OPR as being slow to deploy.

> *"The Food Security Livelihoods lead and co-coordinator focus on delivery and minimising reporting. They are customer focused. However the problem is that UN cluster coordinators should not implement. In WASH, IOM is the co-coordinator and are very directive in who implements what and where. They however give themselves the good work, particularly that which is high profile or easy to access"*

The perception by NGOs and other stakeholders including donors is that the L3 has exacerbated a trend of co-mingling of NGOs and the UN. While NGOs are expected to be independent, the L3 processes themselves make it more difficult for communities and political parties in South Sudan to differentiate NGOs and the UN. For

> *"The L3 has wrapped up [many] NGOs into the system and are losing their independence. For example there are a lot of restrictions on access by UNDSS that affects the common air services we have to rely upon. Without independence in funding and procedures, it is difficult to break out of"*

example, the co-coordination of clusters, the provision of communal services for logistics, the joint-assessments, the joint 'hit and run' delivery, the role of UNMISS for security, and

etcetera all make NGOs' differentiated independence difficult to identify. It was not clear whether the L3 activation or the lack of humanitarian space has exacerbated this, though the pipeline funding of UN to NGOs, which are often perceived as implementers or service contractors rather than actors with a value to add, was highlighted as a potential contributing factor by many respondents. Some NGOs were effective at remaining proactively independent, though the double hatting of the UN as donor and coordinator for NGOs can muddle this independence. In one instance highlighted by an NGO, a significant conflict of interest of a UN agency that was donor, coordinator and implementer, and reportedly directed its own agency to the highest profile sites with the easiest to deliver activities in an effort to improve its standing.

> *"The NGOs have become more corporate and are moving further away from beneficiaries. While there is NGO representation, there is not a loud united voice. While there are exceptions from some of the solidarity NGOs such as MSF, WVI and other principled actors, there are many that are echoing the voices and response of UN. "*
>
> *"The NGO engagement is good, but the reality of the problem is that there were 15 NGOs that wanted to be part of the six seats on the HCT, while the NGO steering committee didn't have enough nominations to fill all the places. This is a self-reflection of NGOs' willingness to engage"*

The South Sudan case study provides an interesting example of how the activation of L3 can radically support the resource mobilisation of a protracted and complex crisis. The prevention of starvation in early to mid-2014 in South Sudan ought to be considered a significant humanitarian achievement, particularly if this can continue into the potential famine of 2015. The benefit of having a strong humanitarian architecture in place prior to the crisis should also not be under-estimated, as building on these foundations were crucial to getting an engaged approach moving forward. However, the limited operational capacity to respond to the vast needs will continue to be a challenge within the shifting dynamics of South Sudan.

Iraq (activated 12 August 2014)

With the waves of IDPs arriving in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in July bringing the total to 850,000 people, the L3 was activated on 12 August 2014. At the time, it was clear that the scale and complexity of the crisis warranted the L3 status, but it was the lack of capacity (particularly humanitarian access to conflict affected areas) and the potential reputational risk with the second wave of IDPs that reinforced this reputational risk. Prior to the fall of Mosul in June, the main humanitarian response was to support the refugees from Syria, which had been scaling down in size and many humanitarian organisations were either closing bases or seeking to reduce their operations in Iraq in general. The objective of the L3 was to emphasise a whole of Iraq approach, combining the IDP and refugee humanitarian crises into a single response (EDG, 2014c).

The activation of the L3 brought significant attention to Iraq. Much was already underway in terms of surge capacity for coordination, reforming the coordination mechanisms, with significant resources coming in. The activation, however, brought attention to Iraq to ensure that the capacity would be increased, while also attempting to unify the Iraqi humanitarian response for both refugees and IDPs, and highlighting the distinction with the Syria L3.

> *"There is a Leadership / HC problem. 99% of the people would see 'stand aside' as a failure for themselves. There is institutional culture that does not support the concept of stand aside, nor does it enable the system to deal with poor performance. It's more of a 'push aside' concept and people take to that badly. Therefore, you don't get necessarily the right people leaving / coming to support the L3."*

The humanitarian leadership in Iraq failed to satisfy the expectation of donors, UN staff, NGOs and coordinators as leadership, coordination, and well informed strategic decision making was not achieved. The HCT, as of January 2014, was performing so poorly that participation was minimal and decisions were rarely made in the forum. With the shift from Baghdad to Erbil in June of virtually all UN staff including the HCT and the international humanitarian coordination architecture, a reinvigorated leadership is currently being implemented (with a new HC to arrive in January 2015). Despite respondents noting a lack of clear leadership or appropriate personnel for the context, no individual stood aside to allow L3 specialists to take over, unlike for example in South Sudan where the UNICEF Representative did as the crisis emerged.

It is worthwhile noting that the poor performing leadership is not unique to the UN. Self-evaluations by the NGOs also highlight the poor performance in their own coordination and leadership in Iraq. Specifically, the lack of cohesiveness and a unified voice by the NGOs has resulted in many missed opportunities for improved NGO leadership and engagement. This is despite the existence of the NGO Coordination Committee of Iraq (NCCI), which itself lacked resources prior to the events in June and struggled to position itself as an effective representation body for the national and international NGOs.

> *"Unfortunately, there are 3000 LNGOs, only 30 of which are members of NCCI so it is difficult for them to claim to represent all LNGOs. The reality is that mechanisms and approaches are not in place to engage with LNGOs (systems don't really support the political and religious affiliated organisations that are quite disparate)"*

The coordination structures in Iraq prior to the L3 were clearly the strongest within the refugee response: the sector working groups in KRI were regularly meeting for refugee coordination purposes, though after the L3 the cluster and sector working groups would be separated but meet one after each other with largely similar people involved. The perception by the humanitarian actors was that prior to the L3 there was effective planning and prioritisation done through the sector working groups. Once the L3 was activated, and the clusters moved from Baghdad to Erbil, it was clear that while the cluster mechanism ought to be the dominant coordination structure as it has a more encompassing agenda, it was much less effective than the existing sector working groups. For this reason, a dual system of coordination resulted – with clusters and working groups being held one after each other.

> *"The L3 didn't speed up access to UN funding as it is intended. Other donors waited to see how the UN would disburse the Saudi funds, which created a bottleneck. It was OFDA/DFID/others that responded as couldn't wait for this to be projectised. The slow contracting by UNHCR and UNICEF is inappropriate for the context. There needs to be more speed and flexibility. So far we have done 25 amendments with UNICEF for 2014 alone, and the first round of money came from them only in November 2014. We have bankrolled the UN. L3 is meant to give UN capacity to spend money prior to being in the bank, but this has not been seen."*

In Erbil these dual coordination systems were even more onerous on the humanitarian agencies involved, as there were also three tiers of coordination: national (all of Iraq), sub-national (KRI) and area (Erbil state). The outcome was multiple coordination mechanisms, multiple planning mechanisms, multiple reporting mechanisms, and a burdensome bureaucracy for NGOs to engage with.

Exacerbating the leadership and coordination challenges was the large number of short-term surge capacity that arrived (and continued to arrive at the time of the field visit in November 2014). Most of the human resources that surged into Iraq were to support leadership and coordination, but not operational capacity. The fact that many of these individuals were not L3 / emergency specialists meant that they came for short periods of time without a clear set of objectives to achieve. According to many, the 'A' teams of the emergency responders were not the ones that came to Erbil – perhaps as they were in CAR, South Sudan, Philippines, Ebola affected countries, or other countries neighbouring Syria.

The financial resources of the L3 in Iraq were relatively important. A generous contribution by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of US$500 million to the UN for the IDP response clearly was a game-changer for the response. However, it took over one month for the UN Secretariat (through OCHA) to divide this among the various UN agencies, in a manner that still remains unclear and opaque to external parties. The transfer of this money to NGOs has been quite limited, which was another concern raised, as the UN agencies rarely have the capacity to deliver directly to the communities. Moreover, the UN took a significant amount of time to implement projects through NGOs. All in all, it was around 3 months after the first phase of the crisis that the assistance from NGOs started to reach the beneficiaries. Some bilateral donors recognised this shortfall, and provided rapid emergency funding with short timeframes in the interim (such as DFID and OFDA), without which there could have been serious funding constraints over and above what already existed.

One respondent, however, noted that the US$500 million has resulted in "US$250 million of plastic sheets, and a lot of administration" driven by the short timelines to implement. The focus of the response therefore was on material assistance, while gender and protection issues remain a gap that was also highlighted by the EDG (2014c) and many of the respondents. The people in Iraq desperately require protection: while the refugee response is more established and protection is more capable between the Kurdish Syrians and Kurdish Iraqis, there is a particular gap with the protection services provided to the more recent IDPs particularly for the Christians, Yazidis and others that do not have the same level of benefits in KRI. However, the horrific reports of sexual violence, gender-based violence, and the psychological toll from the conflict continue to worsen. Meanwhile, the operational capacity and prioritisation of these activities remain meek, which would benefit if there was greater representation of local NGOs in the response and coordination mechanisms.

> *"Donors and coordination mechanisms led a response that was based on the status of beneficiaries (IDPs or refugees or host community). And unlike some may expect, refugees being Kurdish from Syria had better access to work and other services, than IDPs that are not Kurdish (Arab or Christian or Yazidi) who were not getting access to residential or work permits."*

Despite all of the above, it is essential to note that the outcome of poor coordination, leadership and funding modalities has not necessarily result in lives lost. No reported disease outbreaks, malnutrition, shelter shortages, or the like were blamed on the response. This could be because of the generosity of the hosting communities, the over-estimation of the life-saving nature to the assistance being provided, or perhaps a combination of both.

Key Findings

Summary of Thematic Indicators

Throughout the visits and key informant interviews, 20 thematic indicators were used to assess the impact of the L3 designation on the humanitarian response. A traffic light colour-coding of green (considered good performance), yellow (areas for improvement), and red (poor performance with significant improvement required) was used, based on a qualitative analysis of the information. Below is a consolidated summary from the four case studies.

Appropriateness of L3 (scale, complexity, urgency, capacities)	Widely regarded as appropriate for L3 designation, though should be declared more rapidly.
Country level coordination performance and engagement	Coordination with the sub-national levels is the greatest weakness (Philippines, CAR), and specific concerns raised of the lack of strong leadership in Iraq.
Cluster coordination performance and participation	Strength when there is co-cluster coordination with NGOs. Sector clusters/working groups perform poorly in mixed responses (refugee, IDP).
Strengthened leadership capacity	Generally a strong and empowered leadership capacity in place, supported by DHCs.
Engagement with government	Can be very strong (national government in the Philippines, KRG in Iraq), though in conflict situations much more complex with mixed results (CAR, South Sudan).
Engagement with international NGOs	Strong level of engagement with INGOs, with opportunities to be involved in decision making at all levels.
Engagement with local NGOs	Significant work remains to be done on engaging with and building the capacity of national and local NGOs in all contexts.
Strategic planning / results frameworks for overall response	Significant engagement of NGOs in the process for developing strategic frameworks, though improvements still required in their prioritisation and operationalisation.
Strategic planning / results frameworks for clusters	Cluster level strategic planning considered to be more effective, operationalisation to be improved (Iraq, CAR, South Sudan).
MIRA, IRNAs and Assessments for preliminary scenario definition	MIRA to be improved and more timely (Philippines), though other assessments were seen to be better developed.
Appeals (including Flash and subsequent Consolidated)	Strong engagement in the process by NGOs, and well formulated in protracted crises in particular. Increased funding to NGOs to support scale up required.
Monitoring and evaluation	Monitoring of response is well regarded, but lack of evaluation on aid effectiveness.
Information management	Improved substantially as a result of TA processes, with a need to increase focus on identification of gaps,

	prioritisation, and sub-national disaggregation.
Contingency planning	Reactive response rather than contingency planning remains the status quo (CAR, South Sudan, Iraq).
Accountability to donors	Strengthened reporting and accountability mechanisms to donors (across all L3s)
Accountability to communities	AAP to be improved, particularly with engagement of NGOs on decision making (CAR, South Sudan).
Financial resources (incl. CERF, ERF, general resourcing)	Despite resourcing not matching needs, L3 widely recognised for increasing amounts of resources available. Strengthening of CERF, CHF (CAR) and ERF (Iraq IDPs).
Human resources (coordination)	Longer term surge support recommended and more focus at sub-national levels.
Human resources (implementation)	Limited surge of implementers with appropriate experience by all humanitarian actors. Significant gap particularly in difficult contexts.
Operational capacity	L3 focus should be more balanced towards operational capacity. L3 processes perceived to reduce NGO independence, exacerbated with NGO dependency on common services (CAR, South Sudan).

Operational Support

Many respondents reported that while they believed that response to affected populations should be at the centre of the TA, there was a lack of emphasis on operational aspects of humanitarian response in the way that the TA has been implemented. The L3 process provides significant resourcing and staffing support for the coordination of a response, however additional support and emphasis must be placed on operations.

Many international NGOs have in place an internal surge mechanism that is not directly related to the L3 declaration process, although it is effectively based on four of the five L3 criteria – the one exception being reputational risk. International NGO surge capacity has focused on operational support, providing additional human resources and, to a limited degree, financial resources for the implementation of a response. In contrast, UN surge capacity was seen to focus more on empowered leadership and the provision of coordination support. While there are some complementarities in this arrangement, respondents emphasised that there remains a need to provide increased operational support from both NGOs and UN agencies.

Moreover, when operational support is provided in terms of common logistics, security and other services, it appears to have had unintended negative consequences in some instances. Specifically, some international NGOs reported that this has created challenges in delivering assistance. For example, CAR and South Sudan have seen operational delays due to common service arrangements, which temporarily restricted the supply of aid items to affected populations. In addition, an indirect consequence of security arrangements through UN security services, such as UNDSS, created the perception among crisis-affected populations that international NGOs and UN were grouped together as 'international' agencies. As a result, this lack of distinction was reported to make it increasingly difficult to implement an acceptance-based security system for international

NGOs as they struggle to 'stay and deliver' in insecure contexts and in some situations become targets themselves.

Leadership and Coordination

Personality-driven response in terms of leadership continues to create inconsistencies, however there is wide recognition of general improvements to leadership and coordination. A more systematic and rigorous process of implementing the coordination mechanisms as part of the TA would further improve the consistency of leadership at national and sub-national levels. A clear trend in the findings is that where leadership and coordination structures were considered as effective prior to the crisis, the L3 designation has been able to positively strengthen these existing systems. For example, South Sudan's mechanisms were strengthened in 2012 and this base was utilised in 2014 to scale-up the response. The Philippines' national cluster mechanism is another good example of a well-developed system, which could be built upon in the aftermath of Haiyan.

However, where there was weak leadership or a lack of coordination at the national level prior to L3 designation, additional surge capacity did not necessarily make its way out of the capital, and left significant gaps in subnational coordination. A clear finding from Iraq was that weak leadership and coordination at the national level is replicated at the sub-national level. However, strong national leadership coordination does not necessarily result in strong sub-national leadership and coordination—national mechanisms are rarely sufficient to cope with a major crisis response on their own. This echoes the results from the L3 simulation in the summer of 2013 which noted that there is a prevalence of downward coordination and leadership to sub-national level, rather than empowered leadership and coordination at both national and sub-national level—the latter proving to be more effective when in place. In CAR for example, there is a strong national level leadership and coordination mechanism, which has not extended outside of Bangui, largely due to security guidelines and not based on humanitarian needs or response.

Finally, the complexity of parallel coordination mechanisms in mixed-flow crises is of particular concern. While agreements between agencies exist on how to implement coordination in these complex situations, the results often are inefficient. Specifically, the duplication of humanitarian architecture requires additional resources by all parties to effectively engage, including NGOs, which can become a barrier for many agencies, especially local NGOs and those with fewer resources. This is exacerbated by L3 designation, which provides surge support to coordination systems, thereby increasing the size and complexity of humanitarian architecture and creating a greater burden for NGOs. This has been experienced in particular in the cases of Syria and Iraq, and also to a lesser extent in South Sudan.

UN-NGO Partnerships

Throughout this research, many contradictory perspectives have been received from national NGOs, international NGOs and UN agencies. While it is clear that there is a more united voice when it comes to the humanitarian imperative, there are stark differences in terms of the partnership arrangements between the organisations. Many NGOs believe that part of their added value is as actors complementary to the humanitarian actions of the UN and Government stakeholders, particularly in terms of their role as principle-based humanitarian actors. However, the perspective of those responding on behalf of the NGO

community is that UN implementing partnership arrangements can limit these complementarities, when NGOs are reduced to service providers with limited influence in decision-making within partnerships. This was referenced to some degree across all the case studies, but was reported to be particularly problematic in Iraq and South Sudan with regards to UN pipeline funding.

This perception of imbalance in partnership arrangements can be exacerbated in L3s, when activities are scaled up quickly. The need for a rapid response to respond to humanitarian needs can result in a disincentive to engage with local NGOs or international NGOs that focus only on specific sectors. For example, South Sudan's 3 sectors by 3 areas approach to prioritising scaling up made it difficult for local NGOs and sector-specific INGOs to be part of the scale-up process. In a similar way, Iraq's pipeline funding for the distribution of UN-procured stocks provided NGOs with limited opportunities to effectively engage with communities and add value to the material-only assistance.

These views reinforce the findings of the L3 simulation presented to the IASC in July 2013, which note a tendency for 'business as usual' rather than increasing collective responsibility for the response. In the immediate aftermath of emergency—be it a protracted crisis, slow onset or rapid onset—it is essential that engagement at the partnership level be undertaken in a way that draws upon the strengths and contextual knowledge of all potential responders. A shift is required in the way in which UN-NGO partnerships are conceived and funded, particularly in terms of providing more balanced funding allocations, more efficient pipeline mechanisms, and more complementary approaches.

Financial Resourcing

There is broad recognition that the supply of humanitarian assistance is not able to effectively meet the demand. While L3 processes are intended to increase the scale of financial resources available, the gap of unmet needs relative to the SRPs—in both L3 and non L3 situations—remains substantial. Despite this, the small number of L3 designated crises have accounted for a significant percentage of annual coordinated appeals, which is disproportionate to the reported number targeted for assistance. For example the three active L3 crises in 2013 (CAR, Syria and the Philippines) accounted for 40% of the annual coordinated appeal budget, while the total number of people targeted in these countries accounted for 16% of those targeted worldwide.9 The gap between met and unmet needs is compounded in some L3 contexts by the inability to effectively use funds in operations, and to deliver the assistance when required. In South Sudan and CAR, this was particularly limited by human resourcing and security constraints, and in Iraq for a mixture of reasons.

While a L3 declaration is intended to increase timely access to funding, too often these additional resources have been slow to be reach the delivery stage. This relates particularly to internal UN processes, through which many NGOs are funded. In Iraq, it is widely recognised that the slow disbursement UN funding delayed the capacity to scale up NGO operations in the country. The process of inter-sector prioritisation is another factor,

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[9] In 2013, a combined 11.4m people were targeted for humanitarian assistance in CAR, Syria and the Philippines, compared to a global total of 73m, (OCHA's Humanitarian Trends, 2014; OCHA Financial Tracking Service; Global Humanitarian Assistance Report for 2013)

which was reported to hinder the allocation of resources. While funds were available in the Philippines, unbalanced distribution across clusters resulted in insufficient resources to some clusters. In the case of shelter, a lack of available funds was reported to have limited the transition from temporary shelter to more permanent shelter solutions.

Finally, the inflexibility of some funding arrangements was reported to be limiting, restricting the capacity of NGOs to re-prioritise to ensure needs are met, especially in rapidly-evolving emergencies. NGOs reported that earmarked funding—for certain groups or areas—was particularly difficult to negotiate if the context changed. For example, refugee needs in Iraq could not be met using funding earmarked for IDPs, while in South Sudan, priorities outside the conflict-affected states were unable to be met effectively, due to the inability to reallocate funding elsewhere.

Core Issues – Protection and Gender-Based Programming

The need for increased focus on protection, particularly sexual and gender-based violence in conflict contexts, was regularly noted in discussions with programme staff. Respondents reported that by and large issues such as protection, gender, and accountability to affected populations within L3 crises are not sufficiently prioritised at the leadership level, due to focus on the distribution of material assistance such as food and non-food items. Respondents reported significant gaps in conflict-affected areas, where protection and gender-based violence are priority concerns. According to many respondents, protection, gender and accountability are rarely considered life-saving needs, and as a result, do not therefore receive the attention, resourcing or surge support required. When AAP is not effectively implemented, feedback mechanisms, which might allow these concerns to be raised by affected populations, often do not exist.

In CAR, despite the prioritisation of protection mechanisms at national level, a poor track record of the prioritisation of protection was reported at the sub-national level. Prevention and response to gender-based violence was also reported to be inadequate. In South Sudan protection has been prioritised in the Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites, but service provision of sexual and gender-based violence in these sites is a contentious issue that was still under discussion at national level at the time of research. With a slow scale-up in these areas due to the prioritisation of material assistance from larger humanitarian agencies, some specialist agencies have not had the space or resources to be able to sufficiently scale up protection and gender programming to meet the often very high needs.

Information Management

The capacity for information management and the emphasis on assessments, particularly in the early stages of the humanitarian program cycle, have improved since the introduction of the TA. This was widely appreciated by individuals from humanitarian agencies across all of the L3s. Surge capacity in L3 designations has largely focused on improving the identification of needs, mapping of activities, and reporting of progress. However, despite these improvements, there is a demand from both donors and implementers to improve gap-analysis, evidence-based prioritisation of funding, and to link this to operations. The capacity to undertake evaluations on the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance is either not considered at all, or considered too late in to the humanitarian program cycle to have an impact on prioritisation and operations.

The security situation in South Sudan, Iraq and CAR currently limits access to information for humanitarian actors. As a result, prioritisation is largely undertaken based on incomplete information, which therefore excluded humanitarian needs. With the exception of South Sudan, respondents reported that much of the information collected was not effectively analysed. This lack of analysis meant that gaps were not identified and response priorities not adjusted as a result.

Awareness of the Transformative Agenda

Throughout the study it was clear that many NGO representatives, despite being part of a humanitarian response, were unaware of or poorly informed about the TA. This included NGO surge support to co-coordinate clusters and other coordination mechanisms. While there was awareness of the L3 designation itself, and recognition that this raised the profile of the response, the precise implications of L3 designation in terms of leadership, coordination, accountability measures, operation, or deactivation were not clear to many respondents. Specifically, there was a lack of awareness of the protocols of the TA, and the process of activation and deactivation. As key actors in humanitarian response, it is important that NGOs understand the tools, processes and protocols so that in turn NGOs can influence strategic response plans and the humanitarian response.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are drawn from the findings of this evaluation, based on NGO responses and discussions with ICVA:

- L3s have resulted in increased human and financial resources available for the response. Surge deployments must include both implementation and coordination capacity, so that responders at the operational level receive adequate practical and logistical support, as well as leadership.

- While recognising significant improvements in leadership and coordination to date, there is a need to address challenges associated with multiple coordination structures in complex and mixed-flow crises with both refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)—and to strengthen coordination at sub-national level.

- Contrary to their intention, L3 designations have been reported to increase funding delays. An open discourse between UN and NGOs is recommended on partnership mechanisms, particularly with regards to making agreements faster, more flexible and adaptable to the evolving understanding of needs and priorities. In parallel, NGOs reported that a greater willingness from donors to fund bilaterally would enable greater independence. It is recommended that NGOs come together at the global level to advocate for increased flexibility and independence with regards to funding.

- In conflict settings and consequent displacement situations that have categorised four of the five L3s, there is insufficient emphasis placed on protection, specifically on activities to address gender-based violence. It is recommended that further discussion through the 2015 Whole of System Review and Peacekeeping Review address these core issues as well as receive prioritised funding.

- Recognising improvements in information management, it is recommended the MIRA is reinforced and used more broadly. Further emphasis should also be placed beyond needs assessments, including on monitoring of the response at both national and sub-national levels. There is also a clear need for improved evidence-based evaluations, particularly of understand aid effectiveness and efficiency across large-scale humanitarian responses.

- To include all stakeholders in effective implementation of the TA, it is recommended to raise awareness and understanding of the TA and it protocols among NGO staff at country level.

Annexes

Terms of Reference

Policy & Programme Analyst Consultancy: A review of NGO perspectives on the recent L3 designations.

Summary and Rationale

On behalf of its members and its role on the IASC, ICVA is keen to explore the implications of L3 declarations for national and international NGOs. The purpose of this consultancy is to produce a report that documents and analyses how NGOs have understood and responded to the five L3s declared to date. It will focus on how NGOs see added value, challenges and opportunities in the five L3 designations (for the CAR, Iraq, the Philippines, South Sudan, and Syria) and how these designations have impacted (positively and/or negatively) NGO operations.

The Transformative Agenda (TA) is an Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) initiative launched in December 2010 to make improvements to a humanitarian reform process that began in 2005 by introducing the cluster system, establishing new financing mechanisms and working to strengthen humanitarian leadership. The TA was designed to result in more effective, coordinated responses that meet the needs of, and are accountable to, affected populations. It is important to note that much of the focus of the TA has related to large-scale ("Level 3" or L3) emergencies.

The work of this consultancy builds on ICVA's earlier work on NGOs and the Humanitarian Reform Project (NHRP I and II), an initial survey on NGO understanding of the Transformative Agenda conducted by ICVA and InterAction in early 2014, a follow-on mid-2014 survey conducted by ICVA, ICVA members' studies and recent reviews and documents developed by various IASC bodies.

Objectives of the research

The main objectives of this research are to:

- Examine how national and international NGOs have reacted to L3 declared emergencies, investigate how actors within the humanitarian system have facilitated or inhibited the involvement of NGOs in the responses, and identify potential trends and issues;
- Inquire into how L3 designations may be affecting NGO operations in non-L3 emergencies;
- Contribute to an evidence base that informs policy positions related to NGO leadership, coordination, accountability and financing;
- Inform ICVA guidance documents for NGOs responding to L3s;
- Informs ICVA Secretariat's input to the World Humanitarian Summit and its preparatory consultations.

Outputs

- Outline and findings of the desk and literature review, including a complete bibliography.

- Final report of not more than 5,000 words (20 pages), including: an executive summary; a comparison chart showing the five L3s and NGO perspectives; and
- Analysis and findings from the research, identifying potential trends, and providing an evidence base for advocacy and policy development as well as advocacy points related to NGO concerns.

Methodology
- Desk and literature reviews
- Structured interviews with a minimum of 20-25 key NGO stakeholders
- Structured interviews with other IASC stakeholders
- Field visit to one or two L3 locations

Costs
Compensation will be competitive and in accordance with the experience of the consultant. It would cover up to 30 consultancy days, including missions to one or two L3 emergencies, and any communications costs incurred.

Management and Reporting
- The work of the consultant will be supervised by the ICVA Executive Director in consultation with ICVA's IASC Working Group.
- The consultant will submit their report ten days from the date of the completion of the consultancy.
- The consultant's report will be reviewed by the ICVA Secretariat and its IASC Working Group. ICVA's Executive Director and Director of Partnership & Policy will conduct the final editorial review of the report and the consultant will then complete the final report.
- The consultant will brief ICVA's IASC Working Group and other interested parties following completion of his/her work.

Qualifications and experience
- Demonstrated background in social science research methods and experience in humanitarian policy and research
- Excellent writing skills and experience in writing reports for publication
- Experience in working with NGOs on research intended to support advocacy
- Practical experience and first-hand knowledge of sudden onset emergency response
- This consultancy will be contracted by ICVA and managed by Nan Buzard, Executive Director.

Application process
Please send CV, motivation letter and brief proposal (no longer than 4 pages) outlining the process for conducting this work and the fees associated. These documents should be submitted to recruitment2@icvanetwork.org by Monday, cob Geneva, 29 September. Successful candidates will be notified the week of the 29 September.

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Key Stakeholder Questionnaire
Review of NGO Perspectives on the Recent L3 Designations
Revue des Perceptions des ONGs sur les Récentes Déclarations L3

Questionnaire
Hello, my name is X and I am part of the evaluation team of IMPACT Initiatives for this specific exercise.
Bonjour, je m'appelle X et je fais partie de l'équipe d'évaluation d'IMPACT Initiatives pour cet exercice.

IMPACT Initiatives[10] on behalf of ICVA[11] is undertaking a review that seeks to explore the implication of L3 designations on national and international NGOs. The purpose of this is to support the IASC and its members through a better understanding of how NGOs have understood and responded to the five L3 designations to date. The review will provide input to ICVA as secretariat of the Transformative Agenda Initiative within the IASC for future NGO partnership and policies[12].
IMPACT Initiatives a été mandate par ICVA de conduire un exercice de revue des implications que les récentes déclarations «L3» ont eu sur les ONGs nationales et internationales. L'objectif de cet exercice est de supporter le IASC et ses membres à travers une meilleure compréhension de comment les ONGs ont compris et répondu aux cinq L3 déclarées jusqu'au présent. Cette revue vise donc à fournir une contribution à ICVA (dans sa fonction de Secrétariat de l'initiative « Agenda Transformative » au sein du IASC) en vue de partenariats futurs avec les ONGs.

This interview is expected to take no more than 1 hour. It is a semi-structured interview (some structured questions, but plenty of scope to go into more detail on relevant areas). ICVA has requested notes on each of the interviews, though verbatim recordings will not be done. Are you in agreement to proceed? (y/n)
Cet entretien ne devrait pas prendre plus de 1 heure. Il s'agit d'un entretien semi-structuré (certaines questions étant structurées, mais le participant ayant la possibilité de discuter plus en détail sur des questions spécifiques). Même si l'entretien n'aura pas un enregistrement sténographique, ICVA demande des notes pour chacun des entretiens. Etes-vous d'accord pour continuer ? (oui/non)

Name of Interviewer: *Nom de l'évaluateur:*	
Name of Respondent: *Nom du Participant/Répondant:*	
Position of Respondent: *Position du Participant/Répondant :*	
Organization of Respondent: *Organisation du Participant/Répondant:*	

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[10] IMPACT Initiatives is a non-governmental organisation based in Geneva that focuses on information management, including assessments, monitoring, and evaluation for the benefit of more effective humanitarian action.

[11] ICVA is a global network of non-governmental organisations whose mission is to make humanitarian action more principled and effective by working collectively and independently to influence policy and practice.

[12] For more information, the terms of reference can be shared with you if it has not already.

Date and time of Interview: *Date/Heure de l'entretien:*	

Questions

If there are any questions you do not feel comfortable responding to, or do not feel in a position that you are well enough informed to respond, feel free to note this and we can proceed to the next question.

Si il y avait des questions auxquelles vous ne voulez pas répondre, où pour lesquelles vous considérez n'être pas assez informé pour répondre, vous pouvez passer aux questions suivantes.

Perceptions of Leadership in L3 Designations
Perceptions de Leadership dans les declarations L3

1. How appropriate do you think it is that the crisis has / was designated as a Level 3 crisis?
Considérez-vous qu'il fût approprié de déclarer la crise comme étant une crise L3?
    <u>1</u> Not appropriate at all *(pas approprié du tout*)
    <u>2</u>
    <u>3</u> Appropriate, but room to improve (*approprié mais à ameliorer*)
    <u>4</u>
    <u>5</u> Very appropriate timing and all criteria appropriately met (*approprié en timing et tout autre critere*)

Please elaborate, referencing the criteria (scale, complexity, urgency, capacity and reputation risk) and timeliness of the designation.
Merci d'élaborer votre réponse en faisant référence aux critères (ampleur, complexité, urgence, capacité, risqué de réputation) et timing de la désignation.

2. How effective do you believe that the humanitarian leadership (HCT) has been in ensuring well-functioning coordination mechanisms are in place, such as clusters, working groups, and the like?
Considérez-vous que le leadership humanitaire (Equipe Humanitaire de Pays) a été efficiente dans l'assurance de la mise en place de mécanismes de coordination, tels que les clusters, les groupes de travail et similaires ?
    <u>1</u> Coordination mechanisms not set up or functioning at all *(mécanismes de coordination pas en place ou pas fonctionnels)*
    <u>2</u>
    <u>3</u> Some mechanisms are working well, potentially some gaps in mechanisms *(certains mécanismes fonctionnent bien, potetiels gaps dans les mécanismes)*
    <u>4</u>
    <u>5</u> Most of the mechanisms are functioning and working well, with no gaps in mechanisms
    (la pluspart des mécanismes sont fonctionnels et marchent bien, sans des gaps dans les mécanismes)

Please elaborate, referencing coordination mechanisms prior to the L3 and after the L3, and any specific successful or unsuccessful mechanisms in place.
Merci d'élaborer, faisant référence aux mécanismes en place avant le L3 et après le L3, et à tout exemple de succès/insuccès des mécanismes en place.


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3. How effective has the leadership group been in engaging NGOs in the coordination mechanisms?
   Quel a été le niveau d'efficacité du groupe de leadership (HCT/EHP) pour assurer l'engagement des ONGs dans les mécanismes de coordination ?

   <u>1</u> Coordination mechanisms have limited NGO participation *(les mécanismes de coordination ont une participation limité des ONGs)*

   <u>2</u>

   <u>3</u> NGOs generally are attending and participating to some degree *(les ONGs sont généralement présentes mais à participation variable)*

   <u>4</u>

   <u>5</u> Most of the mechanisms have NGO co-leads / participation and they are proactively encouraged to engage in decision making (*la pluspart des mécanismes ont des ONGs co-lead/ qui participant et sont engages activement dans la prise de décision*)

   Please elaborate, referencing NGO engagement in terms of leadership consultations with NGOs, inclusion of NGOs in decision making, encouragement / ability for NGOs to co-lead, etc.
   Merci d'élaborer en faisant référence aux engagements des ONGs en termes de consultations du groupe de leadership avec les ONGs, inclusion des ONGs dans les prises de décision, facilitation/capacité des ONGs de co-faciliter les mécanismes de coordination, etc.

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4. How effective has the leadership group been in ensuring effective accountability mechanisms?
   Est-ce que le groupe de leadership (EHP) a été effective dans la mise en place de système de redevabilité?

   <u>1</u> Accountability to donors and beneficiaries is not in place *(systèmes de redevabilité vers les bailleurs et les bénéficiaries pas existents)*

   <u>2</u>

   <u>3</u> The leadership encouraged / put in place some accountability measures for donors and beneficiaries *(le leadership a encouragé / mis en place certaines mesures de redevabilité vers les bailleurs et les bénéficiaires)*

   <u>4</u>

   <u>5</u> Accountability measures for both donors and beneficiaries are in place, supported by leadership and clearly communicated to all parties including NGOs (*mesures de redevabilité vers les bailleurs et les bénéficiaires sont en place, supportés par le leadership et clairement communiqués à toutes les parties prenantes, y inclus les ONGs*)

   Please elaborate, referencing any NGO engagement in the design of measures, the effectiveness of measures, etc. Measures include accountability and transparency to donors and beneficiaries.
   Merci d'élaborer en faisant référence à tout engagement des ONGs dans le développement de mesures de redevabilité et transparence vers les bailleurs et les bénéficiaires.

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5. To what extent do you believe that the leadership have ensured the processes of the L3 are put in place as per the transformative agenda?
Jusqu'à quel point pensez-vous que le leadership a assuré la mise en place de tous les processus relatifs à une L3?

      1 There is a lack of communication on what the L3 processes are; nothing being done *(Il y a un manque de communication sur les processes L3; rien n'a été fait)*

      2

      3 The L3 processes are generally well known and mostly being followed *(Les processes L3 sont généralement connus et pour la plus part suivis)*

      4

      5 Clear communication from the leadership on L3 processes, and are regularly followed up *(Communication claire de la part du leadership sur le processes L3 qui sont regulièrement suivis)*

Please elaborate, considering the L3 processes of leadership, coordination and accountability mechanisms.
Merci d'élaborer en considérant les processus L3 en termes de leadership, coordination et mécanismes de redevabilité.

Engagement of NGOs in the Response since the L3 Designations
Engagement des ONGs dans la réponse depuis la declaration L3

6. To what extent do you believe that NGOs are engaged in the coordination mechanisms?
Jusqu'à quel point pensez-vous que les ONGs sont impliquées dans les mécanismes de coordination?

      1 NGOs are not interested in attending and rarely participate *(Les ONGs ne sont pas interessées à etre présentes et participent rarement)*

      2

      3 Some NGOs will contribute, but quite a few remain outside of the mechanisms or don't contribute *(Certaines ONGs contribuent, mais beaucoup restent au dehors des mécanismes ou ne contribuent pas)*

      4

      5 Most NGOs actively engage in the mechanisms including the processes rolled out *(La majorité des ONGs participent activement au mécanismes y inclus les process y associés)*

Please elaborate, referencing NGO engagement in terms of ability to attend, willingness to participate, and active engagement and contributions to the mechanisms and the process.
Merci d'élaborer en faisant référence à l'engagement des ONGs en termes de capacité à participer, envie de participer, engagement actif et contribution aux mécanismes et aux processus.

7. To what extent do you believe that NGOs are engaged in the assessments (e.g. PSD, MIRA) and appeals (e.g. FLASH or Consolidated)?
Jusqu'à quell point pensez-vous que les ONGs sont impliquées dans les analyses des besoins (e.g. PSD, MIRA) et les « appels à fonds » (e.g. FLASH, Consolidé, etc.) ?

      1 NGOs are not interested in contributing resources *(Les ONGs ne sont pas interessées à contribuer des ressources)*

<u>2</u>

<u>3</u> Some NGOs will contribute human and intellectual resources, but quite a few don't contribute *(Certaines ONGs contibuent ressources humaines/intellectuelles, mais beaucoup ne contribuent pas)*

<u>4</u>

<u>5</u> Most NGOs actively engage in the assessments and developing the appeals *(La majorité des ONGs contribue activement aux analyses de besoines et au dévéloppement des appels à fonds)*

Please elaborate, referencing NGO engagement in terms of contributing time to developing assessment frameworks, undertaking assessments, contributing to analysis, proposing ideas / projects for appeals, etc.

Merci d'élaborer en faisant référence à l'engagement des ONGs en termes de contribution de « temps » au développement des outils d'analyse des besoins, dans les évaluations ; contribution à l'analyse ; proposition d'idées / projets pour les appels) fonds, etc.

8. To what extent do you believe that NGOs are engaged in developing the Sector Response Plans?

Dans quelle mesure pensez-vous que les ONGs sont impliquées dans le développement des Plans de Réponse Stratégiques/Sectoriels?

<u>1</u> NGOs are mostly absent in the development of SRPs (*Les ONGs sont pour la pluspart absentes du processus de development des SRPs*)

<u>2</u>

<u>3</u> Some NGOs will support the development of SRPs *(Certaines ONGs participent au development des SRPs)*

<u>4</u>

<u>5</u> Most NGOs actively engage in developing SRPs *(La majorité des ONGs sont impliquées activement dans le development des SRPs)*

Please elaborate, referencing NGO engagement in terms of contributing time and knowledge to developing SRPs and their roll out.

Merci d'élaborer, en faisant référence à l'engagement des ONGs en termes de contribution de "temps" et "connaissances" dans le développement des SRPs et leur mise en œuvre.

Blockages and Mobilizers to NGO involvement since the L3 Designations
Blocages et Stimulants de l'engagement des ONGs depuis la declaration L3

9. What do you believe are the most significant blockages or inhibitors to NGOs being more engaged in the response since the L3 was designated? (Please provide up to three examples with some explanation, referencing all types of activities mentioned in Q1-7).

A votre avis, quels sont les blocages ou inhibiteurs à davantage d'implication des ONGs dans la réponse depuis la déclaration L3 ? (Merci de donner jusqu'à 3 examples avec des explications, renforçant toutes les typologies d'activités mentionnées dans les Q1-7).

1.
2.
3.

10. What do you believe are the most significant mobilizers or successors to NGOs being more engaged in the response since the L3 was designated? (Please provide up to three examples with some explanation, referencing all types of activities mention in Q1-7).
A votre avis, quels sont les stimulants ou facteurs favorisant l'implication des ONGs dans la réponse depuis la déclaration L3 ? (Merci de donner jusqu'à 3 exemples avec des explications, renforçant toutes les typologies d'activités mentionnées dans les Q1-7).

1.
2.
3.

11. Are you aware of any support provided by the humanitarian leadership for NGOs to better support and engage with the L3 response? If yes, how effective do you think these have been?
Etes-vous au courant de tout type de support ammené par le leadership humanitaire aux ONGs pour supporter advantage leur support et engagements dans la réponse L3? Si oui, estimez-vous que ce type de support a été efficace ?
Examples could include training for NGOs to participate in assessments, training for co-leads, etc. Often these are conducted through the inter-sector working group.
Examples pourraient inclure training pour les ONGs pour leur participation dans les exercices d'analyse des besoins, training pour les co-facilitateurs, etc. Avec quelles fréquence sont-ils menés par le ICC ?

Impact of the L3 Designation on NGOs
Impact de la declaration L3 sur les ONGs

12. What do you think are the most significant changes by NGOs to the humanitarian architecture as a result of the designation of the L3?
A votre avis, quels sont les changements les plus significatifs de la part des ONGs dans l'architecture humanitaire suite à la déclaration L3 ?
Examples may include more engagement by HQs, sending of surge capacity, more private funding, etc.
Exemples peuvent inclure plus d'engagement de la part des HQs, mise à disposition de ressources d'urgence ("surge" capacity), plus de fonds privés, etc.

13. To what extent do you believe the designation of the L3 has affected NGOs access to resources?
Jusqu'à quel point pensez-vous que la declaration de l'urgence L3 a affecté le niveau d'accès aux ressources des ONGs?

<u>1</u> NGOs have not been affected at all by the L3 designation for funding or other resources *(Les ONGs n'ont pas été affectées par la declaration L3 pour ce qui conerne l'accès aux fonds ou autres ressources)*

<u>2</u>

<u>3</u> Some NGOs are able to secure more funding and resources as a result *(Certaines ONGs sont capable de sécuriser plus de fonds et ressources suite à la declaration L3)*

<u>4</u>

<u>5</u> Most NGOs are able to secure more funding and resources to support their objectives *(La majorité des ONGs sont capable de sécuriser plus de fonds et ressources pour supporter leurs objectifs)*

Please elaborate considering general resourcing (e.g. funds, personell, stock, assets, etc) for the crisis, such as through the CERF/ERF, bilateral / multilateral donors, private funding, ability to recruit staff, etc.

Merci d'élaborer en considérant les moyens/mécanismes d'accès au fonds pour la cirse (e.g. fonds, RH, stocks, matériaux, etc.) comme, par exemple, le CERF/ERF, bailleurs bilatéraux/multilatéraux, fonds privés, capacité de recrutement, etc.

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14. To what extent do you believe that NGOs operations have been affected by the assessments and SRPs?

Jusqu'à quel point pensez-vous que les opérations des ONGs ont été affecté par les évaluations et le SRP?

    <u>1</u> NGOs have not changed their operations despite the assessments and SRPs *(Les ONGs n'ont pas changé leurs opérations suite aux évaluations des besoins et au SRP)*

    <u>2</u>

    <u>3</u> Some NGOs change some of their operations, but generally business as usual for most *(Certaines ONGs ont changé des aspects de leurs opérations, mais généralement leur opérations sont restées inchangées)*

    <u>4</u>

    <u>5</u> Most NGOs have changed their assessment approaches and operational modality *(La majorité des ONGs ont changé leur approches aux analyses des besoins et leurs modalités opérationnelles)*

Please elaborate why you believe there has been changes considering information management, approach to implementation, contingency planning, etc.

Merci d'élaborer sur les raisons pour lesquelles vous pensez qu'il y a eu des changements en considérant le management de l'information (IM), l'approche de mise en œuvre, planification de contingence, etc.

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Policy and Advocacy Recommendations
Recommandation de « politiques » (policy) et Plaidoyer

15. Do you believe that the designation of the L3 has had an impact on other areas of operations that are not within the L3 designation? For example, either activities within the country but are not prioritized (e.g. long term development activities) or activities outside of the country (e.g. resources being moved away from other countries to support the L3). If so, what would you recommend in response to this?

Pensez-vous que la déclaration L3 a eu un impact sur d'autres aspects opérationnels qui ne sont pas inclus dans la déclaration L3? Par exemple, activités dans le pays qui ne sont pas une priorité (e.g. activités de développement à long terme) ou activités au dehors du pays/dans d'autres pays (e.g. ressources mobilisées depuis d'autres pays en support de l'L3). Si oui, quels seraient vos recommandations par rapport à ça?

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16. Are there any specific trends or issues in relation to L3 designation that you feel should be highlighted, either positive or negative?
   Y-a-t-il des tendances ou thématiques spécifiques en relation à la L3 que vous pensez devraient être mises en évidence, soient-elles positives ou négatives ?

17. What policy developments do you think could support any reforms in the L3 designation process?
   Quels élaboration des "politiques" pensez-vous pourrait supporter toute réforme dans le processus de déclaration des L3 ?

Thank you for your time, it is much appreciated. *Merci pour nous avoir dédié votre temps. Nous vous en sommes reconnaissants.*

For any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact: *Pour toute autre question, n'hésitez pas à contacter:*

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