

EVALUATION REPORT

**INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF  
UNICEF'S OPERATIONAL  
RESPONSE TO THE  
JANUARY 2010 EARTHQUAKE  
IN HAITI**

EVALUATION OFFICE  
September 2011

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United Nations Children's Fund

Three United Nations Plaza

New York, New York 10017

September 2011

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## FOREWORD

I am pleased to present the results of an independent evaluation of UNICEF's response in the first three months following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010. In the aftermath of that devastating emergency, we commissioned Results Matter, a team of independent consultants, to analyse the key internal factors that helped or hindered our efforts.

We can all be proud of our colleagues in Haiti for their dedication and courage. But we can always improve our ability to respond in such emergencies. This report points the way, providing a useful overview of UNICEF's response and making valuable recommendations for the future. I thank all UNICEF staff who helped make this report possible, especially our Haiti and Dominican Republic Country Offices, and The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office, the Evaluation Office, and the Division of Emergency Operations.

UNICEF has carefully considered these recommendations and prepared a formal Management Response that sets out steps we will take to strengthen the organization's ability to respond effectively and nimbly to large scale emergencies. We are already taking the first of these steps.

We should all welcome this review, which we believe will increase our readiness to meet the harsh challenges posed by humanitarian crises, wherever they may occur. The children and women of Haiti – and those living through emergencies yet to come – deserve nothing less.

Anthony Lake  
Executive Director  
UNICEF

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Our sincere thanks are also due to all the staff we interviewed at UNICEF and external stakeholders for giving us their valuable time during the fieldwork and research, which were carried out between November 2010 and January 2011. The review team would like to acknowledge the huge efforts by the UNICEF Evaluation Office staff in organizing the exercise, which enabled us to carry out our work. A very special thank you to Robert McCouch, Senior Evaluation Officer, for his guidance during the entire review process, and to Samuel Bickel, Officer-in-Charge, for the support provided by the Evaluation Office.

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## ACRONYMS

AoR	Area of Responsibility
CC	Cluster Coordination
CCCs	Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action
CEAP	Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure
CEC	Corporate Emergency Coordinator
CEE-CIS	RO for Central and Eastern Europe and Commonwealth of Independent States
CEP	Corporate Emergency Procedures
CLA	Cluster Lead Agency
CO	Country Office
CP	Child Protection
DED	Deputy Executive Director
DFAM	Division of Financial and Administrative Management
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DHR	Division of Human Resources
DINEPA	Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement
DPP	Division of Policy Practice
DROPs	Deputy Representatives and Operations Officers
EAPRO	East Asia and Pacific Regional Office
ECD	Early Childhood Development
EMOPS	Office of Emergency Programmes
EO	Evaluation Office
EPR	Emergency Preparedness and Response
ESARO	Eastern and Southern Africa Regional Office
GCC	Global Cluster Coordinator
GMT	Global Management Team
HAC	Humanitarian Action for Children
HoA	Horn of Africa
HPM	Humanitarian Performance Monitoring
HPMS	Humanitarian Performance Monitoring System
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resource(s)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICC	Inter-Cluster Coordination
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons



IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Management
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRT	Immediate Response Team
IT	Information Technology
ISS	International Social Service
ITSS	Information Technology Solutions & Services
L2	Level 2
L3	Level 3
LTA	Long-Term Agreement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENARO	Middle East and North Africa Regional Office
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NFR	Note for the Record
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OED	Office of the Executive Director
OIA	Office of Internal Audit
PBR	Programme Budget Review
PCA	Programme Cooperation Agreement
PD	Programme Division
PM	Performance Monitoring
PPP	Programme Planning Process
RD	Regional Director
RMT	Regional Management Team
RO	Regional Office
ROSA	Regional Office for Southern Asia
RRT	Rapid Response Team
SD	Supply Division
SitRep	Situation Report
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SSA	Special Service Agreement
SSOPs	Simplified Standard Operating Procedures
TA	Temporary Assignment
TACRO	The Americas and Caribbean Regional Office
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination

UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WCARO	West and Central Africa Regional Office
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This 'Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti' was commissioned by the Office of the Executive Director (OED) and conducted from November 2010 to February 2011. While following an evaluative approach, it did not constitute a full-scale evaluation aimed at exhaustively documenting the results UNICEF achieved or did not achieve for children and women in Haiti or the many factors that have affected its response since this extraordinary disaster. Rather, as a review, it focused more narrowly on identifying key internal systemic factors that helped or hindered UNICEF's collective organizational response in the first three months after the earthquake. Its recommendations thus concentrate on the operational performance of UNICEF's internal system for emergency response.

Overall, the review team found UNICEF's early response to be marked by rapid reaction in the earthquake's immediate aftermath, followed by inconsistent performance soon thereafter. UNICEF-led clusters were activated immediately but, with the exception of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster, their leadership remained weak and unclear. Programmatically, some sectors delivered critical interventions quickly – if not entirely to scale – even in areas where UNICEF's work had been negligible beforehand. Notable examples include its timely mobilization in water delivery and its key role in the reopening of schools and ensuring that these were well stocked with supplies. In contrast, sanitation solutions were expensive and ineffective in what was a largely urban disaster – something most humanitarian agencies had little previous experience of.

In addition, UNICEF's stance on child protection in Haiti, nuanced and outspoken before the quake, became muddled in the immediate aftermath and the organization was unable to break through early on and seize the debate. Effective action on gender-based violence was stymied by the fact that this issue is not yet sufficiently integrated or mainstreamed into UNICEF's work in all programme sectors. Nutritional interventions were undertaken, but without a clear sense of what the highest-priority needs were, and its achievements in health have been difficult to systematically document.

In seeking explanations for UNICEF's mixed performance in delivering results in Haiti, the review highlights a number of factors related to both its systems and culture. Key drivers underpinning the organization's positive accomplishments include systematic action by its Supply Division, supported by clear procedures, to pre-position and rapidly deliver supplies. In addition, the establishment of Life-Line Haiti (LLH) in neighbouring Dominican Republic provided a vital means of ensuring UNICEF's response in light of unprecedented physical destruction in the country itself. The review also takes note of an organizational culture in which appropriate risk-taking, though by no means the rule, is sometimes undertaken in order to achieve results. Finally, UNICEF is credited for actively engaging the Government of Haiti in select clusters, an overture that proved vital for a coordinated response in the sectors in which it was undertaken.

Explanations for why and where UNICEF failed to consistently act nimbly or effectively in Haiti point to a range of larger impediments in its internal systems and culture. Curiously, many of these weaknesses appear to be some of UNICEF's key strengths in smaller-scale emergencies and non-emergency settings. These include the following:

1. Within UNICEF's highly decentralized structure there was a fundamental lack of clarity about who was in charge, and formal accountabilities were hard to pinpoint. Despite OED's effort to push for a faster response, the organizational culture led to a default insistence on supporting the country office (CO) in taking the lead (regardless of its actual capacity to fulfil this responsibility), rather than exploring more viable alternatives, and on decisions being subjected to a consensus-based 'chain of consultation' rather than the type of chain of command arguably required in these circumstances.
2. UNICEF's surge staffing infrastructure had been disbanded. This led to a flurry of activity to quickly deploy staff – mostly internal from across the organization – for too short periods of time and with objectives and reporting lines too unclear to be fully effective.

3. UNICEF's extensive rules and regulations – vital to a well-functioning, accountable organization during normal circumstances – proved insufficiently streamlined or flexible to enable an effective response on the scale required. Thus, with a handful of exceptions, staff were by and large loath to take risks, fearing more sanction for disregarding procedures than for taking well-intended risks that might fail to yield results.
4. Across almost all sectors and clusters, planning in the first three months was undertaken in a vacuum, with virtually no systematic needs assessment that might have informed subsequent cluster coordination and programme design, helped management monitor UNICEF's progress over time or kept key stakeholders abreast of developments with accurate, reliable information about the situation of women and children on the ground. (The report does note, however, that the accuracy and reliability of information did improve after the immediate period of the response under review.)

All told, UNICEF's challenges in Haiti depict an organization eager to tackle its responsibilities in emergencies but lacking some of the essential elements to do so effectively.

The purpose of the present review was to generate critical recommendations to help UNICEF ensure the most timely, predictable, effective and efficient response in future emergencies. In this vein, the review found that many of the findings and recommendations emerging here (at least those related to performance) echo those of previous reviews, evaluations and assessments of UNICEF's action in other emergencies. It appears that the organization has repeatedly identified the same or similar lessons but has failed to absorb them.

The review's detailed findings and specific recommendations are presented below.

## **Findings of the review**

### **1. Achieving results in the first three months**

#### ***Summary finding***

UNICEF's contributions in key areas of immediate relief assistance – namely, water supply to affected communities in Port-au-Prince and provision of non-food items – are acknowledged by external stakeholders and in the inter-agency real time evaluation. UNICEF was able to engage with and mobilize government institutions and provided reasonably effective leadership to the WASH Cluster from early on. However, its leadership capacity in other clusters remained weak in the first three months, and programme results in areas such as nutrition, child protection and gender-based violence were sub-optimal due to understaffing at both programme and cluster levels.

## **Detailed findings**

### **WASH**

- In line with its core commitments, UNICEF was able to rapidly get the WASH cluster functioning, team up with its government partner agency and deploy cluster staff in strength, aided by its standby partnership agreements with several NGOs specializing in WASH. This enabled UNICEF to ensure timely provision of water to the affected communities from the fifth day onwards and then throughout the response. However, sanitation was – and remains – a challenge in the densely populated urban context of Port-au-Prince.

### **Child protection**

- UNICEF's child protection programme in Haiti prior to the earthquake was weak and a strong programme base was not created speedily after the quake. This undermined UNICEF's efforts to provide examples of the alternatives it advocated (family reunification and care in the community) to the remedies Haitians gravitated toward naturally: institutionalization and adoption, or virtual abandonment (the *restavek* system). Had there been a strong programme on the ground prior to the quake, UNICEF would arguably have been far more effective in dealing with the child protection issues that arose.

### **Nutrition**

- The nutrition cluster and section remained understaffed in terms of the number and quality of staff for most of the response; this affected UNICEF's ability to provide a strategic response in terms of both the programme and cluster. It is understood that, unlike in the WASH cluster, use of standby partners and institutional contracts with specialist organizations as an approach to rapid deployment is not well developed in the nutrition cluster (and programme).

### **Gender-based violence**

- It is unclear to the review team how gender-based violence was prioritized in the entire programme. The team's overall conclusion is that while placing gender-based violence and child protection together as they are in the revised Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) makes logical sense, gender-based violence is not yet sufficiently integrated/mainstreamed into UNICEF's other sectoral work.

### **Education**

- UNICEF's programme response in education was generally effective in reopening the schools, assisted by its lobbying with the Government and the World Bank, and it stepped in to provide rapid supplies of school equipment. However, the cluster's leadership was weak owing to inadequate staff deployment as well as the inability to clarify roles and responsibilities between UNICEF and the other co-lead, Save the Children.

### **Health**

- The review is inconclusive on UNICEF's performance in the health programme in the first three months as there is a lack of independently verifiable data for this period.

### **Media and communications**

- UNICEF managed its media profile well. However, due to delay in deploying appropriate staff its communication was late on content related to its work on the ground and in generating the human-interest stories about real people and communities in Haiti that National Committees and fundraisers needed for maximum impact. UNICEF's capacity and deployment on the ground did not demonstrate that it was able to generate accurate information about the impact on children and women for National Committees and the general public through local and international media in accordance with its obligations under the CCCs.

### **Advocacy**

- The revised CCCs are relatively ambitious for advocacy, which they say constitutes "an integral part of humanitarian action", should be "evidence-based" and undertaken "in partnership with others". While UNICEF's advocacy appears to have succeeded on the issue of reopening of schools, its voice was weak on the crucial issues of sanitation and gender-based violence.

### **Cluster leadership**

- UNICEF was able to start the cluster meetings early on; except for the WASH cluster, however, leadership capacity remained weak in the first three months due to: (a) lack of clarity in the relationship between the roles of heads of programmes and cluster coordinators; (b) inadequate resourcing of some clusters (poor information management capacity, coordinators deployed at fairly junior level); and (c) lack of orientation of key Haiti CO staff on UNICEF's cluster lead role and a lack of understanding about how standby partnership on clusters worked.

### **Partnership**

- UNICEF's standby partnerships enabled it to provide timely response and increased coverage in several areas, especially in the WASH cluster and child protection in the first three months when it was able to deal with partners' requirements in a timely and flexible manner.

## **2. Organizational factors affecting results**

### **Summary finding**

UNICEF mobilized an organization-wide response following the Haiti earthquake. However, weaknesses in surge deployment and operations support, time-consuming business processes, lack of a clear chain of command and weak performance tracking stymied the effectiveness of the response in the first three months.

### **Detailed findings**

#### **Systemic factors affecting surge capacity**

- *Predominantly internal surge only:* UNICEF's surge is primarily internal, which has the advantage that people deployed are familiar with its systems and processes. However, slow regular recruitment processes and lack of protocol for scaling up meant that the surge was greatly protracted (to nearly six months). This, in turn, meant that UNICEF quickly depleted its internal global capacity with no means of replenishing it with external recruitment. Special service agreement (SSA) contracts were discouraged after the Haiti earthquake, which meant that temporary assignments (and standby partnerships) were the only ways to provide contracts for external surge candidates. But even though staff were identified and approved within two weeks, it took up to two months to complete recruitment with the Division of Human Resources (DHR). Language proved another constraint that delayed recruitments to this Francophone duty station.



- *Location of the emergency surge function:* UNICEF has not invested consistently in developing its surge roster, except in a very ad hoc manner. In the last few years part of the roster was managed by DHR, part of it by EMOPS and part in the regions by the regional offices (ROs). There has been no centrally coordinated process to develop the roster as a strategic tool for deployment in emergencies, except during a short period from 2006–2008 when the DHR emergency unit existed.
- *Emergency not a preferred career path in UNICEF:* Within UNICEF, emergency response is not seen as a career track for the long run. As most emergency operations tend to be concentrated in countries that are non-family duty stations, there is very little incentive for staff to opt for long-term deployments in emergency countries.
- *Cumbersome programme and budget review (PBR) process:* The PBR for Haiti was cumbersome and protracted.
- *Limited internal pool:* Finally, the pool of staff within the organization with experience of emergencies is relatively small, in sharp contrast to the large number of emergencies to which it responds.

### ***Humanitarian leadership and accountability***

- After the Haiti earthquake, UNICEF conspicuously failed to replace its practice of consultative decision-making with a clear chain of command. Broadly speaking, there was a leadership vacuum in the early weeks of the response that was partly filled by ad hoc decision-making and coordination at many different levels. Against this backdrop, different forums arose semi-spontaneously – all to some extent overlapping or even competing and none of them entirely unproblematic in their relations with others.
- The mainstreaming strategy adopted by the organization appears to work well for chronic instability where country programming needs to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. However, the case of Haiti illustrated that differentiating the roles of HQ, RO and CO in times of rapid-onset mega-disasters continues to be a major challenge.
- The specific roles of the various key entities involved in the Haiti response – such as the Haiti CO, Dominican Republic CO, RO, EMOPS and Programme Division (PD) – remained unclear. As the case of Haiti illustrates, in an altered global humanitarian landscape in which there is now far greater direct corporate accountability and demand for coherent response from media and donors than was once the case, UNICEF’s existing Accountability Framework blurs responsibility in response to major disasters.
- The structure, roles and performance expectations in UNICEF are formally configured in a way that does not explicitly locate a Level-3 emergency response (such as the Haiti earthquake) anywhere within the organization. That said, in view of this lack of clear de jure accountabilities on paper, in the early weeks of the response attempts were made by senior management (e.g., the RO, OED) to assign such accountabilities de facto – e.g., through regularly scheduled senior management meetings involving all relevant HQ division directors during which actions and decisions to be taken were assigned. To the extent that some of these actions and decisions were successfully taken and others were not, as the present report details, UNICEF’s record for fulfilling its accountabilities is mixed.

### ***Corporate trigger***

- The Haiti earthquake was a clear case where a corporate response (or ‘trigger’, as it called in UNICEF) was needed from the start. It ought to have been evident in the hours immediately following the earthquake that the scale of the destruction, humanitarian needs and global accountability of UNICEF would create confusion. UNICEF would overwhelm any CO or RO capacity, regardless of their views. UNICEF’s failure to activate the procedure for a corporate-level emergency after the Haiti quake affected its response and created confusion.

### ***Staff well-being***

- Deploying staff without even basic support for weeks, if not months, severely undermined efficiency and morale.

### ***Operations support***

- Operations support remained weak for the first three months of the response and was not prioritized in deployment, especially in the areas of IT and finance; in the area of IT in particular staff deployed were at a junior level and could therefore not be expected to manage the start-up phase of a complex operation.

### ***Planning, monitoring and reporting***

- Due to lack of a proper needs assessment, articulated plans were largely aspirational. The broad nature of planning laid the foundations for a reporting system that was unrealistic, impractical and did not track results adequately. The lack of prioritization of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) by senior leadership resulted in UNICEF not being able to track its performance from hard data or support partners in putting in place an adequate M&E and reporting system.
- UNICEF's operational reporting on its response remained weak due to its inability to collect, collate and analyse systematic data on its own operation. While it has good mechanisms to track its resource deployments, or 'admin data', and systems and procedures are heavily geared towards that, the organization was weak with regard to tracking outcomes or end results.

## **3. Performance improvement – organizational culture and learning**

### ***Summary finding***

A deeply embedded culture of risk avoidance, rather than risk management, both in individual action and in the systems to support it, hampered the response in Haiti. Lessons from prior emergencies that resurfaced in this one continually fail to be absorbed into the organization, indicating an institutional reluctance to undertake the radical changes necessary if UNICEF is serious about developing itself as a leading humanitarian player globally.

### **Detailed findings**

#### ***Learning***

- UNICEF's structure, roles, accountability and ways of working have all come up as issues before in major emergencies, but there is still an institutional reluctance to undertake the much-needed changes required to provide effective humanitarian leadership.

#### ***Risk avoidance vs. results orientation***

- There is a strong culture of risk avoidance – rather than risk management – in the organization. Combined with a predominant culture of procedures-over-results, this works against the need for a timely and efficient response. As long as procedures are sacrosanct, results or outcomes do not figure prominently in performance tracking.

## Recommendations: towards becoming a global leader

There are 20 recommendations made in this report, of which the 9 clustered under 'A. Humanitarian leadership and strategic management' are the most critical. The other 11 recommendations relate to operational aspects and are important, but these by themselves will have little lasting impact unless the organization takes action on the strategic recommendations.

### A. Humanitarian leadership and strategic management

#### *Cluster leadership*

- R1: Particular challenges posed by sanitation illustrate the need for the WASH Cluster to develop approaches better suited to urban contexts (as recommended by the inter-agency real-time evaluation<sup>1</sup>), revise their assessment methodologies to understand local contexts and identify and deploy more cost-effective solutions to problems. (See Section 2.1.)
- R2: Global cluster coordinators and country representatives should ensure that cluster coordinators are at the right level of seniority and experience, especially early on, and they should be treated on par with UNICEF programme heads. (See Section 2.9.)
- R3: As part of ongoing training programmes, the Office of the Executive Director (OED)/Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS)/Programme Division (PD)/Division of Human Resources (DHR) need to ensure that all programme and operations managers, including country representatives and their deputies, are fully oriented on the concept of cluster lead agency and interagency processes in relation to cluster accountabilities. (See Section 2.9.)
- R4: UNICEF needs to develop a cadre of highly trained information managers who can be deployed rapidly in any emergency and are able to support either its programmes or the clusters it leads. There is an opportunity to develop this as a career path for competent managers, as those trained and experienced in dealing with complex information management needs in large emergencies will be in high demand even in normal times in all countries. (See Sections 2.1-3, 2.1.5 and 2.1.9.)

#### *Humanitarian accountability*

- R15: UNICEF defines three levels<sup>2</sup> of emergency response, corresponding to the scale of the emergency and CO capacity for managing it. The OED needs to clarify that while all COs need to have capacity to deal with Level 1 on their own as part of the country planning process, the organization does not expect Level 2 and 3 emergencies to be dealt with as part of normal country programme plans, and special emergency procedures will apply to these emergencies. (See Sections 3.4.1-3.4.2 and 3.4.4.)
- R16: For Level 3 emergencies, regardless of the capacity of the CO or RO, the OED will take the overall leadership and provide strategic direction in order to facilitate an organization-wide response. This arrangement, called Corporate Emergency Procedure (CEP), will be declared within 2-12 hours after a major rapid-onset disaster. OED will immediately authorize the Director of EMOPS to act as Corporate Emergency Coordinator (CEC) for the response. However, operational decisions will still need to be taken at the country level. For this the CEC will designate an Operations Director (at least a senior D1 with humanitarian experience) for the country. The declaration of CEP will involve the following:
- The arrangement will initially be for a period of at least three months, to be reviewed at the end of this period. The CEP will only apply to emergency operations of a short-term nature. In any emergency response that involves long-term response (as in recovery and reconstruction, chronic emergencies, etc.), the default will be to handle these through

established country programme planning processes, and it will be up to the CO to seek any assistance from HQ/RO.

- The Operations Director will report to CEC for operational aspects of the response and to the Country Representative for (a) all matters relating to representation to the national government; (b) any plans or commitments that go beyond the first six months; and (c) public communication and advocacy.
- The arrangement will have a built-in working mechanism to ensure that the CO can gradually take over all responsibilities for managing the programme from the fourth month onwards (subject to periodic review). All recovery and long-term programmes that arise from the emergency will be managed by the Country Representative; the Operations Director will have no authority to take decisions in this regard unless authorized by her/him. If after a periodic review of this arrangement it is felt that the CO is able to take over full responsibility for the operations, the Operations Director will no longer report to the CEC, and the Country Representative will determine whether the services of the Operations Director are needed. For this transition to happen, the Operations Director will need to work closely with the CO from the start.
- For all Level 3 emergencies, an early visit to the country by the CEC or someone designated by him/her will be mandatory. This will help the OED and the CEC get a real-time assessment of the situation and ensure that they can make appropriate decisions about resource mobilization and allocations and provide necessary strategic direction to the CO, Operations Director and Regional Director.
- The role of the RO in Level 3 response will be determined by the OED, in consultation with the Regional Director and CEC, depending on its mobilization capacity. The reporting line between the CR and Regional Director will remain as normal and the RO will play its normal oversight role vis-à-vis any recovery or long-term programme and planning. It needs to be clear that while the CEP is in operation, the CEC provides leadership for the response; the Regional Director remains responsible for ensuring that the CO is able to integrate the response into its own planning process and take over leadership and operational responsibility for the response as soon as possible.

*(See Sections 3.4.1–3.4.2 and 3.4.4.)*

- R17: For Level 2 emergencies, the desired state will be for the RO to play the lead role, but given the limited capacity of ROs (and the fact that individual Regional Directors have varied experience and competencies in emergency response, and that emergency experience is not a key competency during their recruitment), the CEC will have an oversight as sometimes Level 2 emergencies (the Pakistan 'superflood', for example) can escalate to Level 3. For this reason, a joint assessment led by a senior emergency response team/designate of the CEC with the Regional Director (or his or her designate) must be undertaken as soon as possible. The purpose of the joint assessment mission will be to agree the modalities of the response. If it is felt by the CEC that RO capacity is weak for managing the overall response, and that the emergency could evolve into a Level 3, s/he will consult with OED and determine the respective role of the RO, HQ and CO. *(See Sections 3.4.1–3.4.2 and 3.4.4.)*

## **Culture**

- R19: UNICEF leadership needs to clearly communicate that a Level 3 emergency is not 'business as usual', but rather it is essential to change gear and resist the urge to revert to a culture of consensus in decision-making. The process needs to be kept lean. While attempts should be made to consult with whoever needs to be consulted, ultimate responsibility for determining the strategic direction for Level 3 (i.e., the shape, size and nature of a response) should rest solely with the OED assisted by the CEC as time is of essence in emergencies. Responsibility of various entities (Country Representative, Regional Director, Operations Director) for operations will be determined by the CEC (with guidance from the OED) at different points in time and depending on the capacity of each entity. (See Sections 3.2–3.4 and 4.1.1.)
- R20: The OED and Regional Directors should ensure that performance appraisals of country representatives incorporate an assessment of their competencies for effectively engaging with corporate priorities, including the CEP. (See Sections 3.4, 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.2.)

## **B. Operational management**

### ***Deployment and human resources capacity***

- R7: In future deployments, recruiting managers need to make it mandatory for all surge deployments to be for at least nine weeks, especially for staff who will play supervisory, managerial or decision-making roles in the operation. (See Section 3.2.1.)
- R8: EMOPS and DHR need to seriously invest in the development and management of a surge roster and in the creation of self-contained multi-disciplinary rapid response teams.<sup>3</sup> Taking lessons from the Supply Division on how it has developed deployment and human resources administration capacity, UNICEF needs to replicate similar arrangements for all emergency deployments, with adequate staffing located in EMOPS and working closely with DHR. (See Section 3.2.1.)
- R9: The use of special service agreements and temporary assignment contracts from pre-screened external rosters should be fast-tracked by DHR for surge, especially for all recruitments for a duration of under 90 days and for one year.<sup>4</sup> (See Section 3.2.1.)
- R10: DHR and Regional Directors should make sure in future emergencies that, instead of an elaborate programme budget review (PBR), a list of core staff is agreed for one year within four weeks of response with a detailed PBR to follow after three months for additional recruitments. (See Section 3.2.1.)
- R14: To demonstrate that UNICEF values humanitarian work and expertise within the organization, recruiting managers need to ensure that humanitarian leadership competencies are taken into account in recruitment to senior positions, especially country representatives and their deputies.<sup>5</sup> (See Section 3.4.3.)

### ***Operations support***

- R11: The Supply Division should develop dedicated capacity (through long-term agreements with suppliers or standby partners) to quickly set up accommodation and office facilities.<sup>6</sup> This must be in place for future emergencies, considering the difficulty and time needed to organize prefabs. The Haiti emergency also highlighted that there needs to be a team from Supply Division trained to set up accommodation. (See Section 3.2.1–3.2.2.)
- R12: Working with the Supply Division, EMOPS needs to ensure that UNICEF has rapid response teams specializing in operations support that can be deployed immediately after a major disaster. (See Section 3.3.)

R13: In large emergencies that require rapid scaling up of IT systems, Regional Directors and IT managers must ensure that highly experienced senior staff from the RO and HQ are deployed in the first eight weeks. (See *Section 3.3.*)

#### ***Administrative and financial procedures***

R18: Working with the Division of Finance and Administration (DFAM), the Office of Internal Audit and ROs, EMOPS needs to further simplify key business processes in emergencies and synchronize current manuals on administrative and financial procedures in emergencies. (See *Sections 3.3 and 4.1.1.*)

#### ***Monitoring and reporting***

R5: In an emergency response UNICEF will to a large extent be in the hands of its implementing partners, both pre-existing and prospective, despite the revised programme cooperation agreement (PCA) guidelines that incorporate tighter reporting requirements. For last-mile distribution data, UNICEF needs to simplify reporting formats and develop mechanisms for data gathering by and from partners. (See *Section 3.1.2.*)

R6: The use of the CCC benchmarks for reporting needs to be prioritized by CO management, and senior managers need to ensure that reports are based on outcomes rather than inputs. (See *Section 3.1.3.*)

## RESUME ANALYTIQUE

Le présent « Examen indépendant de l'intervention opérationnelle de l'UNICEF en réponse au séisme d'Haïti de janvier 2010 » a été réalisé entre novembre 2010 et février 2011 à la demande du Bureau du Directeur général de l'UNICEF. Bien que la méthode utilisée soit de nature évaluative, cet examen ne représente pas un bilan complet des résultats, positifs ou non, obtenus par l'UNICEF en faveur des enfants et des femmes d'Haïti, ou des nombreux facteurs qui ont eu une incidence sur l'intervention qui a suivi cette catastrophe sans précédent. L'examen s'efforce plutôt d'identifier les principaux facteurs systémiques internes qui ont favorisé ou, au contraire, entravé la réponse collective de l'organisation au cours des trois premiers mois qui ont suivi le tremblement de terre. Les recommandations qui suivent portent plus spécifiquement sur les résultats opérationnels du système interne d'intervention d'urgence de l'UNICEF.

En termes généraux, l'équipe chargée de l'examen a constaté que l'intervention de l'UNICEF a été caractérisée par une réaction rapide juste après le séisme, suivie d'une performance inégale par la suite. Les groupes sectoriels (clusters) dirigés par l'UNICEF ont été activés immédiatement, mais, à l'exception du groupe WASH (eau, assainissement et hygiène), l'encadrement a montré des signes de faiblesse et un certain manque de clarté. D'un point de vue programmatique, certains secteurs ont rapidement mené à bien des interventions critiques – bien que parfois incomplètes – même dans des secteurs où le travail de l'UNICEF avait jusque-là été négligeable. On peut notamment citer en exemple la mobilisation rapide en faveur de la distribution d'eau et le rôle clé joué par l'UNICEF dans la réouverture des écoles en s'assurant que les fournitures nécessaires étaient mises à leur disposition. En contrepartie, les solutions apportées aux problèmes d'assainissement se sont avérées onéreuses et peu efficaces dans un contexte où la catastrophe était largement urbaine – une situation dont les agences humanitaires, avaient peu d'expérience.

Par ailleurs, la position de l'UNICEF en matière de protection de l'enfant en Haïti, qui était nuancée et claire avant le séisme, est devenue ambiguë dans la période suivant immédiatement la catastrophe, et l'organisation s'est trouvée dans l'impossibilité de faire entendre sa voix assez tôt et d'orienter le débat. L'efficacité de l'action contre la violence sexospécifique a été compromise parce que cette question n'est toujours pas suffisamment prise en compte et intégrée de manière généralisée dans le travail de l'UNICEF, tous secteurs programmatiques confondus. Des interventions ont été entreprises dans le domaine de la nutrition, mais sans définition très précise des besoins qui avaient la plus haute priorité, et il s'est avéré difficile de documenter systématiquement les résultats obtenus dans le domaine de la santé.

En cherchant les raisons pour lesquelles l'UNICEF n'a pas réussi à agir de manière suivie en Haïti, l'examen a mis en évidence un certain nombre de facteurs liés aux systèmes et à la culture de l'organisation. Au nombre des dynamiques qui ont sous-tendu les résultats positifs de l'organisation, on peut citer le travail systématique de la Division de l'approvisionnement, soutenu par des procédures claires qui ont permis le pré-positionnement des approvisionnements et leur livraison rapide. Par ailleurs, la création de l'opération *Lifeline Haïti* (LLH) dans la République dominicaine voisine a permis de fournir des moyens vitaux pour soutenir l'intervention de l'UNICEF dans un pays ayant subi des dégâts physiques sans précédent. L'étude souligne également l'existence d'une culture organisationnelle dans laquelle des risques appropriés peuvent parfois être pris afin d'obtenir des résultats positifs, bien que ce ne soit pas une règle établie. Enfin, l'étude a reconnu que l'UNICEF avait activement associé le gouvernement haïtien aux divers groupes sectoriels, une ouverture qui s'est avérée vitale pour coordonner l'intervention dans les secteurs concernés.

L'examen des raisons pour lesquelles et des domaines dans lesquels l'UNICEF n'a pas réussi à agir habilement et efficacement en Haïti met en lumière toute une gamme d'obstacles plus généraux dans ses systèmes internes et sa culture. Curieusement, un grand nombre de ces faiblesses semblent être aussi certains des atouts sur lesquels reposent les succès de l'UNICEF dans des situations d'urgence de plus faible envergure, et dans des circonstances qui ne relèvent pas de l'urgence. On peut notamment citer:

1. Au sein de la structure fortement décentralisée de l'UNICEF, il existait un manque fondamental de clarté quant aux responsabilités de chacun, rendant difficile de demander aux acteurs concernés de rendre compte de leur action en bonne et due forme. Malgré les efforts déployés par le Bureau du Directeur général pour accélérer l'intervention, la culture de l'organisation l'a incitée à soutenir le Bureau de pays pour qu'il prenne la tête des opérations (sans considérer ses capacités à s'acquitter de ces tâches) au lieu de rechercher des solutions plus viables, et à prendre des décisions soumises au consensus d'une « chaîne de consultation », plutôt que de se fier à une « chaîne de commandement » qui aurait probablement été nécessaire dans de telles circonstances.
2. L'infrastructure de mobilisation du personnel de renfort de l'UNICEF ayant été démantelée, cela a entraîné un débordement d'activités pour déployer rapidement du personnel – essentiellement recruté au sein de l'organisation – engagé pour des périodes trop courtes et avec des objectifs et des rapports hiérarchiques trop flous pour être vraiment efficaces.
3. Les nombreuses règles et réglementations de l'UNICEF – essentielles à une organisation efficace et responsable dans des conditions normales – se sont avérées insuffisamment rationalisées et trop rigides pour garantir l'efficacité d'une intervention de cette envergure. Ainsi, à quelques exceptions près, le personnel a généralement été peu enclin à prendre des risques, craignant davantage les sanctions encourues s'il ne respectait pas les procédures que celles liées à des risques pris de bonne foi, mais n'ayant pas apporté les résultats escomptés.
4. Tous secteurs et groupes sectoriels confondus, on peut dire qu'au cours des trois premiers mois la planification a été effectuée dans le vide, sans presque aucune évaluation systématique des besoins susceptible de servir ultérieurement de base à la coordination des groupes et à la conception des programmes ; ou d'aider la direction à suivre les progrès accomplis par l'UNICEF au fil du temps ; ou de tenir les principales parties prenantes au courant de l'évolution des événements au moyen d'informations précises et fiables sur la situation sur le terrain des femmes et des enfants. (Le rapport note, cependant, que la pertinence et la précision de l'information se sont améliorées après la période de réponse initiale considérée par cette étude.)

Au bout du compte, lorsqu'on prend en compte tous ces éléments, les défis de l'UNICEF en Haïti montrent une organisation soucieuse d'assumer ses responsabilités en cas de situations d'urgence, mais ne disposant pas de certains éléments essentiels pour le faire efficacement.

Cette étude avait pour but d'aboutir à la formulation de recommandations essentielles susceptibles d'aider l'UNICEF à déployer à l'avenir des interventions plus rapides, plus prévisibles, plus efficaces et plus économiques en cas de situation d'urgence. Dans cette optique, l'étude a permis d'établir que nombre des conclusions et des recommandations qui y figurent (au moins celles qui ont trait aux résultats) reprennent celles de certaines études, évaluations et appréciations antérieures sur les interventions de l'UNICEF dans d'autres situations d'urgence. Il semble que l'organisation a identifié à maintes reprises des enseignements identiques ou similaires à tirer de son action sans les assimiler.

Les conclusions détaillées et les recommandations spécifiques figurant dans l'étude sont énoncées ci-après.

## **Conclusions de l'étude**

### **1. Obtenir des résultats dans les trois premiers mois**

#### ***Résumé des conclusions***

La contribution de l'UNICEF dans certains domaines clés des secours immédiats – à savoir l'approvisionnement en eau des quartiers de Port-au-Prince durement touchés et la livraison d'articles alimentaires et non alimentaires – est reconnue par les parties prenantes extérieures et ainsi que dans



l'évaluation inter-agence effectuée en temps réel. L'UNICEF a pu assez tôt engager la collaboration avec les instances étatiques et les mobiliser, et diriger de manière raisonnablement efficace l'action du groupe sectoriel WASH. Cependant, ses capacités d'encadrement sont restées faibles au cours de trois premiers mois en ce qui concerne les autres groupes sectoriels ; les résultats des programmes dans des domaines comme la nutrition, la protection de l'enfant et la violence sexospécifique n'ont donc pas été optimisés en raison de l'insuffisance des effectifs en personnel déployés au niveau des programmes comme des groupes sectoriels.

## **Conclusions détaillées**

### ***Eau, hygiène et assainissement (WASH)***

- Conformément à ses engagements de base, l'UNICEF a pu rapidement faire fonctionner le groupe sectoriel (cluster) Eau, hygiène et assainissement (WASH), s'associer à son agence gouvernementale partenaire et déployer le personnel du groupe sectoriel en nombre important, aidé par les accords de partenariats relatifs aux forces et aux moyens en attente conclus avec plusieurs ONG spécialisées dans les questions d'eau, d'hygiène et d'assainissement. Ceci a permis à l'UNICEF de fournir dans des délais très brefs, à partir du cinquième jour, de l'eau aux communautés touchées par le séisme et de continuer à assurer cet approvisionnement pendant toute la durée de l'intervention. Cependant, l'assainissement a été – et reste – un gros problème dans le milieu urbain très densément peuplé de Port-au-Prince.

### ***Protection de l'enfant***

- Le programme de protection de l'enfant de l'UNICEF en Haïti était insuffisant avant le tremblement de terre et on n'a pas mis rapidement en place une base solide pour ce programme après le séisme. Ceci a compromis les efforts déployés par l'UNICEF pour offrir en exemple les solutions qu'il préconisait (réunion des familles et prise en charge dans la communauté) et qui étaient différentes de celles vers lesquelles les Haïtiens se sont tournés naturellement : placement dans une institution et adoption, ou abandon virtuel (le système *restavek*). Si un programme solide avait été en place avant le séisme, l'UNICEF aurait sans doute pu traiter les questions de protection de l'enfant qui se sont posées avec une plus grande efficacité.

### ***Nutrition***

- Le groupe sectoriel et la section Nutrition ont continué à souffrir d'effectifs insuffisants en termes de nombre et de qualité pendant la plus grande partie de l'intervention ; ceci a affaibli la capacité de l'UNICEF de fournir une réponse stratégique en termes de programme comme de groupe sectoriel. Il est entendu qu'à la différence du groupe sectoriel WASH, le recours à des partenariats relatifs aux forces et aux moyens en attente et à des contrats institutionnels avec des organisations spécialisées comme méthode de déploiement rapide n'est pas bien développé dans le groupe sectoriel (et le programme) Nutrition.

### ***Violence sexospécifique***

- L'équipe chargée du présent examen n'a pas pu se faire une idée claire de la manière dont la violence sexospécifique a été mise au rang de priorité dans le programme global ; sa conclusion générale est que, bien qu'il soit logique de regrouper violence sexospécifique et protection de l'enfant, comme le fait la version révisée des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants dans l'action humanitaire*, la question de la violence sexospécifique n'est pas encore assez intégrée/prise en compte de manière généralisée dans le reste du travail sectoriel de l'UNICEF.

## **Éducation**

- La réponse programmatique de l'UNICEF concernant l'éducation a été en général efficace pour assurer la réouverture des écoles, une intervention assistée par ses démarches auprès du gouvernement et de la Banque mondiale ; l'organisation est également intervenue pour fournir rapidement du matériel scolaire. Cependant, la conduite de l'action du groupe sectoriel a été affaiblie par un déploiement inadapté du personnel, et par l'incapacité à clarifier les rôles et les responsabilités respectives de l'UNICEF et de l'autre organisation qui dirigeait le groupe sectoriel, *Save the Children*.

## **Santé**

- L'examen effectué ne permet pas de tirer de conclusions sur les résultats obtenus au cours des trois premiers mois par le programme de l'UNICEF concernant la santé, ceci en raison d'un manque de données vérifiables de manière indépendante pour cette période.

## **Médias et communications**

- L'UNICEF a bien géré son profil médiatique. Cependant, en raison des délais qu'a rencontrés le déploiement du personnel requis, le contenu de sa communication retardait par rapport à son travail sur le terrain et dans sa capacité à produire des reportages sur la réalité vécue des populations et des communautés d'Haïti, récits d'une grande utilité pour le travail des Comités nationaux et les collecteurs de fonds. Les capacités et le déploiement sur le terrain de l'UNICEF n'ont pas permis de faire la preuve que l'organisation était capable de produire des informations précises sur les conséquences de la situation pour les enfants et les femmes à l'usage de ses Comités nationaux ainsi que du grand public par l'intermédiaire des médias locaux et internationaux, et en conformité avec les obligations que lui imposent les *Principaux engagements pour les enfants*.

## **Plaidoyer**

- La version révisée des *Principaux engagements pour les enfants* est relativement ambitieuse sur la question de l'action de plaidoyer qui constitue, selon ses termes, « une partie intégrante de l'action humanitaire », doit être « fondée sur des preuves » et entreprise « en partenariats avec d'autres acteurs ». Bien que l'action de plaidoyer de l'UNICEF semble avoir connu le succès sur la question de la réouverture des écoles, sa voix est restée faible dans les domaines cruciaux de l'assainissement et de la violence sexospécifique.

## **Direction des groupes sectoriels**

- L'UNICEF a pu organiser très tôt les réunions des groupes sectoriels ; cependant, à l'exception du groupe WASH, sa capacité de direction est restée faible au cours des trois premiers mois en raison de : (a) un manque de clarté dans les rapports entre les administrateurs de programme et les coordinateurs de groupe sectoriel ; (b) l'insuffisance des ressources accordées à certains groupes sectoriels (médiocre capacité de gestion de l'information, coordinateurs déployés recrutés à un niveau hiérarchique relativement bas) ; (c) mise au courant insuffisante du personnel clé du Bureau de pays d'Haïti sur le rôle dirigeant de l'UNICEF dans les groupes sectoriels et manque de compréhension de la manière dont les partenariats relatifs aux forces et aux moyens en attente fonctionnaient.

## **Partenariats**

- Les partenariats relatifs aux forces et aux moyens en attente de l'UNICEF ont permis à l'organisation de réagir rapidement et d'accroître la couverture fournie dans plusieurs domaines, plus spécialement dans celui du groupe sectoriel Eau, hygiène et assainissement (WASH) et celui de la protection de l'enfant, au cours des trois premiers mois pendant lesquels l'UNICEF a pu répondre aux demandes de ses partenaires d'une manière souple et dans des délais satisfaisants.

## 2. Facteurs organisationnels influençant les résultats

### *Résumé des conclusions*

Au lendemain du séisme d'Haïti, l'UNICEF a organisé une intervention engageant l'ensemble de l'organisation ; cependant, les faiblesses concernant le déploiement du personnel de renfort et l'appui aux opérations, la lenteur de la mise en œuvre des processus métiers, l'absence d'une chaîne de commandement claire et l'insuffisance du suivi des résultats ont entravé au cours des trois premiers mois l'efficacité de l'intervention.

### **Conclusions détaillées**

#### ***Facteurs systémiques influençant les capacités de mobilisation du personnel***

- *Une mobilisation de personnel essentiellement interne* : la mobilisation d'un personnel de renfort à l'UNICEF s'effectue avant tout de manière interne, ce qui a l'avantage que le personnel déployé est familiarisé avec les systèmes et les processus. Cependant, la lenteur des procédures normales de recrutement et le manque de protocole pour une intensification des efforts ont fait que cette mobilisation de personnel a pris un temps considérable (presque 6 mois) ; en conséquence de quoi l'UNICEF a rapidement épuisé ses capacités internes au niveau mondial sans avoir les moyens de les renouveler en faisant appel à un recrutement externe. Dans la période qui a suivi le séisme d'Haïti, les contrats spéciaux de service (*Special service agreement — SSA*) ont été déconseillés, ce qui a fait que les missions temporaires (et les partenariats relatifs aux forces et aux moyens en attente) ont été les seules façons d'offrir des contrats aux candidats externes à l'intégration au personnel de renfort. Mais en dépit du fait que du personnel ait été identifié et agréé en l'espace de deux semaines, il a fallu jusqu'à deux mois pour compléter le recrutement avec la Direction des ressources humaines (DRH). La question de la langue a imposé une autre contrainte contribuant aux délais de recrutement pour ce lieu d'affectation situé dans un pays francophone.
- *Localisation de la fonction de mobilisation du personnel de renfort* : l'UNICEF n'a pas investi de manière régulière dans le développement de son fichier de personnel de renfort, excepté de façon *ad hoc*. Au cours des dernières années, une partie de ce fichier était gérée par la Division des ressources humaines, une autre par le Bureau des programmes d'urgence et le reste dans les régions par les Bureaux régionaux (BR). Aucun processus centralement coordonné n'a été mis au point pour faire de ce fichier un outil stratégique au service du déploiement dans les situations d'urgence, à l'exception d'une courte période de 2006 à 2008 quand la Division des ressources humaines disposait d'un groupe Situation d'urgence.
- *Le domaine des situations d'urgence n'est pas le cheminement de carrière préféré à l'UNICEF* : au sein de l'UNICEF, le travail dans les interventions en situation d'urgence n'est pas considéré comme une carrière à long terme. Comme la plupart des opérations d'urgence se déroulent dans des pays où les lieux d'affectation ne permettent pas la présence de la famille, il y a très peu de motivation pour le personnel de les choisir pour des déploiements à long terme.
- *L'Examen des programmes et du budget (Programme and Budget Review - PBR) est une procédure lourde* : pour Haïti, cet examen a été lourd et prolongé.
- *Un réservoir interne de personnel limité* : finalement, le réservoir de personnel ayant une expérience des situations d'urgence au sein de l'organisation est relativement limité, ce qui contraste fortement avec le nombre considérable de situations d'urgence auquel il doit répondre.

### ***Direction de l'action humanitaire et responsabilisation***

- Après le séisme d'Haïti, l'UNICEF a manifestement échoué à remplacer sa pratique de la prise de décision consultative par une chaîne de commandement bien définie. D'une façon générale, on peut parler de vide et d'absence de direction pour les premières semaines de l'intervention, vide qui a été en partie compensé par des prises de décision et une action de coordination *ad hoc* à de nombreux niveaux différents. Dans ce contexte, divers forums se sont organisés semi-spontanément – tous empiétant dans une certaine mesure les uns sur les autres ou même se faisant concurrence, aucun d'entre eux n'établissant de relations complètement dénuées de problème avec les autres.
- La stratégie d'intégration et de prise en compte généralisée adoptée par l'organisation semble avoir bien fonctionné dans un contexte d'instabilité chronique où les programmes de pays doivent traiter des questions de développement et des besoins humanitaires. Cependant, le cas d'Haïti illustre le fait que la différenciation des rôles entre le Siège, le Bureau de pays et le Bureau régional continue de poser un problème majeur dans les cas de « méga-catastrophes » à déclenchement rapide.
- Les rôles spécifiques respectifs des diverses instances clés impliquées dans l'intervention en Haïti – comme le Bureau de pays d'Haïti, le Bureau de pays de la République dominicaine, le Bureau régional, le Bureau des programmes d'urgence et la Division des programmes – sont restés flous. Comme l'illustre le cas d'Haïti, dans un paysage de l'action humanitaire mondiale où s'impose aujourd'hui une responsabilisation directe accrue des organisations, et où médias et donateurs exigent plus strictement qu'auparavant une cohérence des actions entreprises, le Cadre de résultats et de responsabilisation existant de l'UNICEF laisse persister l'incertitude sur la question des responsabilités dans une intervention en réponse à une catastrophe majeure.
- A l'UNICEF, la structure, les rôles et les attentes par rapport aux résultats sont officiellement conçus d'une manière qui ne permet de placer explicitement dans aucune instance précise de l'organisation la responsabilité pour une intervention dans une situation d'urgence de niveau 3 (comme le séisme d'Haïti). Cela dit, vu le manque de claires exigences de responsabilité *de jure* existant sur le papier, des tentatives ont été faites dans les premières semaines de l'intervention par les instances de direction (Bureau régional, Bureau du Directeur général) pour assigner de telles responsabilités *de facto* – par des réunions régulières des cadres de direction impliquant tous les directeurs de division du Siège concernés au cours desquelles les actions à entreprendre et les décisions à arrêter étaient assignées. Dans la mesure où certaines de ces actions et décisions ont abouti à des succès et d'autres non, comme l'expose en détail le présent rapport, le bilan de l'UNICEF au chapitre de la manière dont l'organisation a rempli ses responsabilités est mitigé.

### ***Le déclic organisationnel***

- Le séisme haïtien a clairement présenté un cas où un déclenchement de la réponse au niveau global de l'organisation (baptisée « *trigger* » (gâchette) en anglais au sein de l'UNICEF) était nécessaire dès le départ. Il aurait dû être évident dans les heures qui ont immédiatement suivi le séisme que l'envergure de la catastrophe, des besoins humanitaires et des responsabilités que l'UNICEF devait endosser au niveau mondial allait créer une grande confusion, submerger les capacités de n'importe quel Bureau de pays ou Bureau régional quelles que soient leurs vues. L'incapacité de l'UNICEF à activer la procédure de réponse aux situations d'urgence à l'échelon global de l'organisation après le séisme d'Haïti a affaibli sa réaction et créé la confusion.

### ***Bien-être du personnel***

- Déployer un personnel sans même le minimum de soutien de base pendant des semaines, sinon des mois, a sévèrement affaibli son efficacité et miné son moral.

### ***Soutien opérationnel***

- Le soutien aux opérations est resté faible pendant les trois premiers mois de l'intervention et n'a pas bénéficié de la priorité nécessaire, spécialement dans les domaines de l'informatique et des finances ; dans le domaine de l'informatique en particulier, le personnel déployé n'avait pas d'expérience suffisante des responsabilités et on ne pouvait donc pas s'attendre à ce qu'il puisse efficacement gérer la phase de démarrage d'une opération d'une telle complexité.

### ***Planification, suivi et rapports***

- Étant donné l'absence d'une évaluation correcte des besoins, les plans mis au point relevaient largement d'ambitions non réalisables. La nature très générale de la planification a abouti à un système de comptes rendus qui était irréaliste, peu pratique et incapable d'assurer correctement le suivi des résultats. Les cadres supérieurs ayant négligé de faire clairement du suivi et évaluation une priorité, l'UNICEF a été incapable de suivre l'évolution de ses résultats à partir de données concrètes ou d'aider ses partenaires à mettre eux-mêmes en place un système de suivi et évaluation et de rapports adéquat.
- Le dispositif de comptes rendus opérationnel de l'UNICEF pour cette intervention est resté faible du fait de son incapacité à recueillir, rassembler et analyser systématiquement des données sur ses propres opérations. Bien que l'organisation dispose de bons mécanismes pour contrôler le déploiement de ses ressources — les données administratives — et que ses systèmes et ses procédures soient fortement orientés vers cette tâche, elle n'a obtenu que des résultats médiocres dans le suivi des réalisations ou des résultats ultimes de son action.

## **3. Amélioration des résultats – culture organisationnelle et enseignements**

### ***Résumé des conclusions***

L'intervention à Haïti a été entravée par une culture profondément ancrée, au niveau de l'action individuelle comme au niveau des systèmes sur lesquels elle s'appuie, qui pousse à éviter de prendre des risques plutôt qu'à les gérer. L'organisation a continuellement échoué à absorber les enseignements des situations d'urgence antérieures qui ont refait surface à cette occasion, ce qui indique une réticence institutionnelle à mettre en œuvre les changements radicaux nécessaires si l'UNICEF prend au sérieux la tâche de se placer au premier rang des organisations humanitaires au niveau mondial.

### **Conclusions détaillées**

#### ***Enseignements***

- Le rôle, la structure, les dispositions concernant la responsabilisation et les méthodes de travail de l'UNICEF, tous ces éléments fait l'objet de remarques antérieures à l'occasion de graves situations d'urgence, mais il existe encore une réticence institutionnelle à mettre en œuvre les changements indispensables qui sont requis pour prendre efficacement la tête de l'action humanitaire.

#### ***Esquive du risque par opposition à orientation sur les résultats***

- Il existe dans l'organisation une forte culture d'esquive du risque – plutôt que de gestion du risque. Combinée avec une culture prédominante qui favorise les procédures par rapport aux résultats, cette tendance entrave la nécessité de mettre en œuvre une intervention rapide et efficace. Aussi longtemps que les procédures sont considérées comme sacro-saintes, les résultats ou les réalisations ne figureront pas au premier plan du suivi de la performance.

## **Recommandations : se placer au premier rang au niveau mondial**

Le présent rapport comprend 20 recommandations, dont les 9 rassemblées sous le titre « A. Rôle moteur dans le secteur humanitaire et gestion stratégique » sont les plus cruciales. Les 11 autres recommandations concernent des aspects opérationnels et sont importantes, mais elles n'auront par elles-mêmes qu'un effet durable limité, à moins que l'organisation n'agisse pour mettre en œuvre les recommandations stratégiques.

### **A. Rôle moteur dans le secteur humanitaire et gestion stratégique**

#### ***Pilotage des groupes sectoriels***

- R1 : Les défis particuliers présentés par le secteur de l'assainissement illustrent le besoin pour le groupe sectoriel WASH de mettre au point des approches mieux adaptées aux contextes urbains (comme recommandé par l'évaluation inter-agences effectuée en temps réel<sup>1</sup>), de réviser les méthodes diagnostiques conçues pour appréhender les conditions locales, et d'identifier et de mettre en œuvre des solutions plus rentables aux problèmes qui se présentent. *(Voir Paragraphe 2.1.)*
- R2 : Les Coordonnateurs des groupes sectoriels au niveau mondial et les Représentants de pays doivent s'assurer que les Coordonnateurs de groupe sectoriel ont le niveau d'ancienneté et d'expérience adéquat, en particulier dans la période initiale, et qu'ils soient traités de la même manière que les Administrateurs de programme. *(Voir Paragraphe 2.9.)*
- R3 : Dans le cadre des programmes de formation continue, le Bureau du Directeur général/le Bureau des programmes d'urgence/la Division des programmes/la Division des ressources humaines doivent assurer que tous les Administrateurs de programmes et Directeurs des opérations, y compris les Représentants de pays et leurs adjoints, maîtrisent complètement le concept d'agence « chef de file » dans un groupe sectoriel, ainsi que les procédures inter-agences qui se rapportent aux exigences de comptes rendus dans le cadre de ce groupe. *(Voir Paragraphe 2.9.)*
- R4 : L'UNICEF devra se doter de responsables parfaitement formés aux questions d'information qui pourront être déployés rapidement dans toute situation d'urgence avec la capacité d'apporter leur soutien à ses programmes ou aux groupes sectoriels que l'organisation pilote. Une perspective s'offre de transformer cette tâche en option de carrière ouverte aux cadres compétents ; le personnel formé et ayant l'expérience de la gestion des besoins complexes en information suscités par les situations d'urgence de grande ampleur, et ayant acquis une bonne expérience dans ce domaine, sera à l'avenir très demandé même dans les périodes normales et dans tous les pays. *(Voir Paragraphes 2.1-3, 2.1.5 et 2.1.9.)*

#### ***Les responsabilités dans le cadre des interventions humanitaires***

- R15 : L'UNICEF définit trois niveaux<sup>2</sup> d'intervention d'urgence correspondant à l'échelle de la situation d'urgence et aux capacités du Bureau de pays d'en assurer la gestion. Le Bureau du Directeur général doit clarifier que si tous les Bureaux de pays doivent posséder les capacités pour faire face à une situation d'urgence de niveau 1 par eux-mêmes et dans le cadre des processus de programmation pour le pays, l'organisation ne s'attend pas à ce que des urgences de niveau 2 et 3 soient confrontées dans le cadre des programmes normalement planifiés, et des procédures d'urgence spéciales s'appliqueront à ces situations d'urgence. *(Voir Paragraphes 3.4.1-3.4.2 et 3.4.4.)*
- R16 : En ce qui concerne les situations d'urgence de niveau 3 et quelles que soient les capacités du Bureau de pays ou du Bureau régional, le Bureau du Directeur général prendra la direction générale des opérations et fournira l'orientation stratégique nécessaire pour favoriser une intervention impliquant l'ensemble de l'organisation. Cette disposition, baptisée « Procédure organisationnelle d'urgence » (*Corporate Emergency Procedure- CEP*), sera activée dans une

période de 2 à 12 heures après le début d'une catastrophe à déclenchement rapide. Le Bureau du Directeur général autorisera immédiatement le Directeur du Bureau des programmes d'urgence à agir à titre de « Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence » (*Corporate Emergency Coordinator - CEC*) pour organiser l'intervention. Des décisions opérationnelles devront cependant continuer à être prises au niveau du pays, et à cette fin le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence désignera un Directeur des opérations pour le pays (un cadre supérieur d'échelon D1 au minimum et ayant une expérience de l'intervention humanitaire). La mise en œuvre de la Procédure organisationnelle d'urgence comportera les dispositions suivantes :

- Cette procédure sera initialement mise en œuvre pour une période d'au moins trois mois, avec révision de la situation à la fin de cette période ; elle s'appliquera uniquement aux opérations d'urgence à court terme. Pour une intervention d'urgence impliquant des opérations à long terme (comme relèvement et reconstruction, urgences chroniques, etc.), le recours normal sera de les gérer dans le cadre des procédures de planification applicables aux programmes de pays, et il sera de la responsabilité du Bureau de pays de solliciter tout soutien nécessaire auprès du Siège et du Bureau régional.
- Le Directeur des opérations rendra compte des aspects opérationnels de l'intervention au Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence, et au Représentant de pays pour ce qui concerne (a) toutes les questions relatives à la représentation auprès du gouvernement du pays ; (b) tous les plans et les engagements qui dépassent le terme des six premiers mois ; (c) les communications au public et les activités de plaidoyer.
- Cette procédure comportera un mécanisme intégré garantissant que le Bureau de pays puisse graduellement assumer toutes les responsabilités nécessaires pour gérer le programme d'intervention à partir du quatrième mois (disposition assujettie à des réexamens périodiques). Tous les programmes de relèvement et les programmes à long terme découlant de la situation d'urgence seront gérés par le Représentant de pays ; le Directeur des opérations n'aura pas autorité pour prendre des décisions concernant ces programmes à moins d'y avoir été autorisé par celui-ci. Si un des réexamens périodiques permet de penser que le Bureau de pays est capable d'assumer la responsabilité intégrale des opérations, le Directeur des opérations concerné n'aura plus à rendre compte de ses activités au Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence ; pour sa part, le Représentant de pays déterminera si les services du Directeur des opérations sont toujours nécessaires. Afin de rendre possible cette transition, ce dernier devra travailler dès le départ en étroite collaboration avec le Bureau de pays.
- Pour toutes les situations d'urgence de niveau 3, une visite du Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence ou d'une personne qu'il ou elle aura désignée sera obligatoire. Cette mission permettra au Bureau du Directeur général et au Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence d'obtenir en temps réel une évaluation de la situation, et de s'assurer qu'ils sont à même de prendre les décisions appropriées relativement à la mobilisation des ressources et aux crédits à affecter ainsi que de fournir l'orientation stratégique requise au Bureau de pays, au Directeur des opérations et au Directeur régional.
- Dans une intervention concernant une situation d'urgence de niveau 3, le rôle du Bureau régional sera déterminé par le Bureau du Directeur général en consultation avec le Directeur régional et le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence, en fonction de ses capacités de mobilisation. Les rapports hiérarchiques entre le Représentant de pays et le Directeur régional resteront dans le cadre normal et le Bureau régional jouera son rôle normal de contrôle vis-à-vis de tous les programmes et des processus de planification concernant les activités de relèvement et les opérations à long terme. Il doit être clair qu'aussi longtemps que la Procédure organisationnelle d'urgence est appliquée, le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence dirige les activités d'intervention ; le Directeur régional reste chargé de la responsabilité d'assurer que le Bureau de pays soit

capable d'intégrer l'intervention dans son propre processus de planification et d'assumer aussitôt que possible la responsabilité opérationnelle de l'intervention.

*(Voir Paragraphes 3.4.1–3.4.2 et 3.4.4.)*

R17 : En ce qui concerne les situations d'urgences de niveau 2, la situation souhaitée est que le Bureau régional joue le rôle de chef de file, mais étant donné les capacités limitées de ces bureaux (et le fait que les divers Directeurs régionaux ont des niveaux d'expérience et de compétence inégaux dans le domaine des situations d'urgence et que l'expérience des urgences n'est par ailleurs pas une compétence clé exigée lors de leur recrutement), le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence aura un rôle de contrôle vu que les situations d'urgence de niveau 2 peuvent parfois évoluer vers le niveau 3 (voir par exemple le cas des inondations catastrophiques du Pakistan). Pour cette raison, une évaluation conjointe, dirigée par une équipe de haut niveau ou un cadre supérieur désigné par le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence en collaboration avec le Directeur régional (ou un membre du personnel qu'il aura désigné), doit être entreprise dans les meilleurs délais. Le but de cette mission conjointe d'évaluation sera de s'accorder sur les modalités de l'intervention. Si le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence a le sentiment que les capacités du Bureau régional sont trop faibles pour gérer globalement l'intervention, et que la situation d'urgence concernée risque d'évoluer vers le niveau 3, il ou elle déterminera en consultation avec le Bureau du Directeur général les rôles respectifs du Bureau régional, du Siège et du Bureau de pays. *(Voir Paragraphes 3.4.1–3.4.2 et 3.4.4.)*

### **Culture**

R19 : La direction de l'UNICEF doit clairement indiquer qu'une situation d'urgence de niveau 3 n'est pas une situation pendant laquelle « les affaires suivent leur cours », mais qu'il est au contraire essentiel de passer à la vitesse supérieure et de résister à la tentation de retomber dans une culture du consensus au niveau de la prise de décisions. Le processus doit être allégé le plus possible. Bien que des tentatives doivent être faites pour consulter quiconque a besoin d'être consulté, la responsabilité ultime de la définition de l'orientation stratégique dans une situation d'urgence de niveau 3 (c'est-à-dire la forme, l'envergure et la nature de l'intervention) doit être de la seule responsabilité du Bureau du Directeur général appuyé par le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence, le facteur temps est en effet le facteur crucial dans les situations d'urgence. Les responsabilités au plan opérationnel des différentes instances de l'organisation (Représentant de pays, Directeur régional, Directeur des opérations) seront déterminées par le Coordonnateur central des interventions d'urgence (avec les conseils du Bureau du Directeur général) à différents moments et en fonction des capacités de chacune d'entre elles. *(Voir Paragraphes 3.2–3.4 et 4.1.1.)*

R20 : Le Bureau du Directeur général et les Directeurs régionaux doivent s'assurer que l'appréciation de la performance des Représentants de pays comprend une évaluation de leurs compétences à répondre aux priorités définies au niveau central de l'organisation, y compris les Procédures opérationnelles d'urgence. *(Voir Paragraphes 3.4, 4.1.2, 4.1.3 et 4.2.)*



## **B. Gestion opérationnelle**

### ***Déploiement et capacités en ressources humaines***

- R7 : Pour les déploiements futurs, les responsables du recrutement devront imposer des missions d'un minimum de neuf semaines pour toutes les mobilisations de personnel de renfort ; particulièrement dans le cas du personnel destiné à jouer un rôle d'encadrement, de gestion ou à assumer la prise de décision dans le cadre des opérations. *(Voir Paragraphe 3.2.1.)*
- R8 : Le Bureau des programmes d'urgence et la Division des ressources humaines doivent investir sérieusement dans la mise au point et la gestion d'un fichier pour la mobilisation du personnel de renfort et dans la création d'équipes d'intervention rapides multidisciplinaires et autonomes.<sup>3</sup> L'UNICEF doit prendre exemple, pour les imiter dans tous les déploiements d'urgence, sur les dispositions mises en place par la Division des approvisionnements pour améliorer ses capacités de déploiement de son personnel et d'administration de ses ressources humaines ; le Bureau des programmes d'urgence devant d'autre part disposer d'effectifs adéquats et une étroite collaboration être engagée avec la Division des ressources humaines. *(Voir Paragraphe 3.2.1.)*
- R9 : L'attribution de contrats de service spéciaux et de contrat de mission temporaire à partir des fichiers de personnel externe présélectionné doit être accélérée par la Division des ressources humaines dans les cas où la mobilisation de personnel de renfort s'avère nécessaire, plus particulièrement dans les cas de recrutement pour une durée inférieure à 90 jours et pour une année.<sup>4</sup> *(Voir Paragraphe 3.2.1.)*
- R10 : La Division des ressources humaines et les Directeurs régionaux doivent s'assurer qu'à l'avenir et dans toutes les situations d'urgence, plutôt que de procéder à un laborieux Examen des programmes et du budget (*Programme and Budget Review - PBR*), un accord se fasse sur une liste de personnel essentiel missionné pour un an et mobilisé dans un délai de quatre semaines après le début de l'intervention; un Examen des programmes et du budget détaillé sera ensuite effectué après trois mois pour examiner la question des recrutements supplémentaires. *(Voir Paragraphe 3.2.1.)*
- R14 : Afin de démontrer que l'UNICEF reconnaît la valeur du travail et de l'expertise humanitaires au sein de l'organisation, les responsables du recrutement doivent s'assurer que les compétences relatives à l'encadrement des interventions humanitaires soient effectivement prises en compte dans le recrutement pour les postes de haut niveau, plus spécialement pour les postes de Représentant de pays et de Représentant adjoint.<sup>5</sup> *(Voir Paragraphe 3.4.3.)*

### ***Soutien aux opérations***

- R11 : La Division des approvisionnements devra mettre en place des capacités spécifiques (à l'aide d'accords à long terme avec les fournisseurs et les partenaires en disponibilité) afin de pouvoir rapidement offrir des moyens d'hébergement et des locaux pour les bureaux.<sup>6</sup> Étant donné la difficulté et les délais nécessaires pour obtenir des locaux préfabriqués, ces dispositions doivent impérativement être en place pour les futures situations d'urgence. La situation d'urgence qu'a connue Haïti souligne également la nécessité de disposer des services d'une équipe de la Division des approvisionnements formée à l'organisation de l'hébergement du personnel et des bureaux de l'organisation. *(Voir Paragraphe 3.2.1–3.2.2.)*
- R12 : En collaboration avec la Division des approvisionnements, le Bureau des programmes d'urgence doit assurer que l'UNICEF dispose d'équipes d'intervention rapide spécialisées dans les opérations de soutien et qui puissent être déployées immédiatement après une catastrophe majeure. *(Voir Paragraphe 3.3.)*
- R13 : Dans les situations d'urgence de grande ampleur qui exigent une expansion rapide des systèmes informatiques, les Directeurs régionaux et les responsables des services informatiques devront

assurer dans les huit premières semaines le déploiement d'un personnel de haut niveau expérimenté, recruté dans les Bureaux régionaux et au Siège. (Voir Paragraphe 3.3.)

### **Procédures administratives et financières**

R18 : En collaboration avec la Division de la gestion financière et administrative (*DFAM*), le Bureau de la vérification interne des comptes et les Bureaux régionaux, le Bureau des programmes d'urgence doit continuer à simplifier les procédures de fonctionnement et harmoniser les manuels courants définissant les procédures administratives et financières à suivre dans les situations d'urgence. (Voir Paragraphes 3.3 et 4.1.1.)

### **Suivi et rapports**

R5 : Dans une situation d'urgence, et malgré la révision des directives concernant les Accords de coopération au titre des programmes (*Programme Cooperation Agreement – PCA*) qui incluent des exigences plus rigoureuses en matière de rapports, l'UNICEF est largement dépendante de ses partenaires de réalisation, de ses partenaires pré-existants comme de ses partenaires prospectifs. Pour mener à bien la distribution des données « jusqu'au dernier kilomètre », l'UNICEF doit simplifier ses modèles de rapport et mettre au point des mécanismes qui donnent à ses partenaires la capacité de recueillir des données et qui permettent également à l'organisation de collecter des données auprès de ses partenaires. (Voir Paragraphe 3.1.2.)

R6 : Les directions des Bureaux de pays doivent donner dans leurs rapports la priorité à l'usage des points de référence contenus dans les Principaux engagements pour les enfants en situation d'urgence (*Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies – CCC*), les cadres supérieurs devant pour leur part s'assurer que ces rapports sont basés sur les réalisations (effets directs) plutôt que sur les ressources (intrants). (Voir Paragraphe 3.1.3.)

## RESUMEN EJECUTIVO

Esta “Revisión independiente de la respuesta operacional de UNICEF al terremoto de enero 2010 en Haití” fue encargada por la Oficina del Director Ejecutivo (OED) y se llevó a cabo entre noviembre de 2010 y febrero de 2011. Aunque estaba basada en un enfoque centrado en la evaluación, no se trataba de una evaluación a gran escala destinada a documentar exhaustivamente los resultados que UNICEF logró alcanzar o no en favor de los niños y las mujeres en Haití, o en los numerosos factores que han afectado su respuesta desde que se produjo esta extraordinaria catástrofe. Más bien, en su calidad de examen, se centró sobre todo en determinar cuáles fueron los factores internos del sistema que contribuyeron o dificultaron la respuesta colectiva institucional de UNICEF en los tres primeros meses después del terremoto. Sus recomendaciones, por lo tanto, se centran en el funcionamiento operativo del sistema interno de UNICEF a la hora de responder a una situación de emergencia.

En general, el equipo encargado del examen encontró que la respuesta de UNICEF estaba marcada por una reacción rápida en el período inmediatamente posterior al terremoto, seguida después de un rendimiento irregular. Los grupos temáticos dirigidos por UNICEF se activaron de inmediato, pero, con la excepción del grupo de Agua, saneamiento e higiene (WASH), su liderazgo fue poco firme y sin claridad. Desde el punto de vista de la programación, algunos sectores realizaron rápidamente intervenciones fundamentales –aunque no completamente a escala– incluso en esferas en que la labor de UNICEF había sido poco significativa anteriormente. Entre los principales ejemplos cabe destacar la movilización oportuna en el suministro de agua y un papel clave en la reapertura de las escuelas y en la labor de asegurar que estuvieran bien abastecidas de provisiones. Por el contrario, las soluciones de saneamiento fueron caras e ineficaces en un desastre que en gran parte hay que considerar como urbano, una situación en la que la mayoría de los organismos humanitarios tenían poca experiencia previa.

Además, la posición de UNICEF sobre la protección de la infancia en Haití, amplia y franca antes del terremoto, se hizo confusa en el período inmediatamente posterior, y la organización fue incapaz de cambiar esta situación desde el principio y de sacar partido del debate. Una acción eficaz contra la violencia de género se vio obstaculizada por el hecho de que esta cuestión todavía no está suficientemente integrada en la labor de UNICEF en todos los sectores del programa. Aunque se llevaron a cabo intervenciones en materia de nutrición, no había una idea clara de cuáles eran las necesidades más prioritarias, y ha resultado difícil documentar de forma sistemática los logros en el sector de la salud.

En la búsqueda de explicaciones sobre el desempeño desigual de UNICEF en la obtención de resultados en Haití, el informe pone de relieve una serie de factores relacionados tanto con los sistemas como con la cultura. Los elementos clave en los que se basan los logros positivos de la organización incluyen una acción sistemática de la División de Suministros, con el apoyo de procedimientos claros, para posicionar reservas de suministros y distribuirlos rápidamente. Además, el establecimiento de la Operación Salvavidas para Haití en la vecina República Dominicana fue un elemento vital para garantizar la respuesta de UNICEF en medio de una destrucción física sin precedentes en el país. El estudio también toma nota de una cultura institucional que a veces asume riesgos de forma apropiada con el fin de lograr resultados, aunque no se trata en ningún modo de la regla general. Por último, se encomia a UNICEF por incorporar activamente al Gobierno de Haití en grupos temáticos seleccionados, una apertura que resultó esencial para dar una respuesta coordinada en los sectores en los que esta participación se llevó a cabo.

Las explicaciones de por qué y de qué modo UNICEF no actuó sistemáticamente con agilidad y eficacia en Haití apuntan hacia una serie de obstáculos importantes en sus sistemas internos y en su cultura. Curiosamente, muchas de estas deficiencias parecen ser algunas de las ventajas clave de UNICEF en situaciones de emergencias de menor escala y en entornos que no son de emergencia. Entre ellas cabe destacar las siguientes:

1. En el marco de la estructura altamente descentralizada de UNICEF había una falta fundamental de claridad sobre quién estaba a cargo, y era difícil determinar las responsabilidades oficiales. A pesar del esfuerzo de la OED para presionar en favor de una respuesta más rápida, la cultura institucional llevó a que se insistiera en apoyar a la oficina del país para que dirigiera la operación (independientemente de su capacidad real de cumplir con esta responsabilidad), en lugar de explorar alternativas más viables, y de someter las decisiones a un consenso basado en la “cadena de consulta” en lugar del tipo de cadena de mando que se requería en estas circunstancias.
2. La infraestructura para un aumento del personal de UNICEF se había disuelto. Esto condujo a una intensa actividad para desplegar rápidamente personal –en su mayoría empleados internos de la organización– por períodos muy cortos de tiempo y con objetivos y cadenas de mando insuficientemente claras como para ser plenamente eficaces.
3. Las amplias reglas y regulaciones de UNICEF –fundamentales para una organización responsable que funcione adecuadamente en circunstancias normales– no fueron lo suficientemente simples o flexibles como para facilitar una respuesta eficaz a la escala necesaria. Por lo tanto, con algunas excepciones, el personal se mostró por lo general reacio a asumir riesgos, debido a que fue mayor el temor a recibir sanciones por no respetar los procedimientos que por asumir riesgos bien intencionados que podrían no dar resultados.
4. En casi todos los sectores y grupos, la planificación en los primeros tres meses se llevó a cabo en un vacío, sin prácticamente ninguna evaluación sistemática de las necesidades que podría haber servido de base para coordinar posteriormente los grupos temáticos y el diseño del programa, así como para ayudar a los administradores a supervisar los avances de la gestión de UNICEF a través del tiempo, o mantener informadas a las partes interesadas con datos precisos y confiables acerca de la situación de las mujeres y los niños sobre el terreno. (El informe señala, no obstante, que la exactitud y fiabilidad de la información mejoró después del período inmediato de la respuesta que se examina.)

En general, los desafíos a los que tuvo que hacer frente UNICEF en Haití representan subrayan una posición actual de la organización que los encargados del examen consideraron como “humanitarismo reacio”: una organización muy interesada en abordar sus responsabilidades en casos de emergencia, pero carente de algunos de los elementos esenciales para hacerlo con eficacia.

El objetivo de este examen fue generar recomendaciones fundamentales que ayuden a UNICEF a asegurar la respuesta más oportuna, previsible, eficaz y eficiente en las situaciones futuras de emergencia. En este sentido, el informe descubrió que muchas de las conclusiones y recomendaciones que aparecen aquí (al menos las relacionadas con el desempeño) se han expresado ya en exámenes, evaluaciones y valoraciones anteriores de la acción de UNICEF en otras situaciones de emergencia. Parece que la organización ha identificado repetidamente las mismas o similares lecciones, pero no ha sabido incorporarlas.

Las conclusiones más precisas del examen y sus recomendaciones específicas se presentan a continuación.

## **Conclusiones del examen**

### **1. Lograr resultados en los tres primeros meses**

#### ***Resumen de la conclusión***

Las partes interesadas externas y la evaluación interinstitucional en tiempo real reconocen las contribuciones de UNICEF en esferas clave de la asistencia de socorro inmediata como el suministro de agua y la provisión de artículos no alimentarios a las comunidades afectadas en Puerto Príncipe. UNICEF estuvo en condiciones de comprometerse con las instituciones del gobierno y movilizarlas, y de proporcionar una dirección razonablemente eficaz para el Grupo temático WASH desde el principio. Sin embargo, su capacidad de liderazgo en otros grupos temáticos fue insuficiente en los primeros tres

meses, y los resultados del programa en esferas tales como la nutrición, la protección de la infancia y la violencia de género estuvieron por debajo de lo normal, debido a la falta de personal tanto a nivel de los programas y como de los grupos temáticos.

## **Conclusiones detalladas**

### **WASH**

- De conformidad con sus compromisos básicos, UNICEF pudo poner rápidamente en funcionamiento el grupo temático WASH, colaborar con el organismo homólogo del gobierno y desplegar plenamente al personal del grupo, gracias a sus acuerdos de alianza de reserva con varias ONG que se especializan en WASH. Esto facilitó que UNICEF garantizara el abastecimiento oportuno de agua a las comunidades afectadas a partir del quinto día y luego a lo largo de la respuesta. Sin embargo, el saneamiento fue –y sigue siendo– un problema en el contexto urbano densamente poblado de Puerto Príncipe.

### **Protección de la infancia**

- Antes del terremoto, el programa de protección de la infancia de UNICEF en Haití era deficiente, y después del terremoto no se estableció con rapidez una firme base programática. Esto socavó los esfuerzos de UNICEF para proporcionar los ejemplos que promovía (como la reunificación familiar y la atención en la comunidad) como alternativa a las soluciones hacia las que los haitianos gravitaron de forma natural: la institucionalización y la adopción, o el abandono virtual (el sistema *restavek*). Si hubiera habido un programa sólido sobre el terreno antes del terremoto, sería posible decir que UNICEF habría sido mucho más eficaz en el tratamiento de las cuestiones de protección de la infancia que surgieron.

### **Nutrición**

- El grupo temático y la sección de nutrición siguió careciendo de empleados suficientes en términos de cantidad y calidad del personal durante la mayor parte de la respuesta; esto afectó la capacidad de UNICEF para proporcionar una respuesta estratégica en relación al programa y al grupo temático. Se entiende que, a diferencia de lo que ocurre con el grupo temático WASH, el uso de aliados de reserva y contratos institucionales con organizaciones especializadas como un enfoque para un despliegue rápido, no está lo suficientemente desarrollado en el grupo temático de nutrición (ni en los programas).

### **Violencia por razones de género**

- No está claro para el equipo de examen como se dio un carácter prioritario a la violencia de género en todo el programa. La conclusión general del equipo es que, aunque situar de manera conjunta la violencia de género y la protección de la infancia, como ocurre en los Compromisos Básicos Revisados para la Infancia en la Acción Humanitaria (CCC), tiene un sentido lógico, la violencia de género no está suficientemente integrada en otras labores sectoriales de UNICEF.

### **Educación**

- La respuesta del programa de UNICEF en materia de educación es generalmente eficaz en la reapertura de las escuelas, junto a las presiones que ejerce sobre el Gobierno y el Banco Mundial. Esta respuesta sirvió para proporcionar suministros rápidos de materiales escolares. Sin embargo, la capacidad de liderazgo del grupo temático fue insuficiente debido a un despliegue inadecuado de personal, así como la incapacidad para aclarar las funciones y responsabilidades entre UNICEF y el otro codirector, Save the Children.

### **Salud**

- El examen no llegó a una conclusión definitiva sobre el desempeño de UNICEF en el programa de salud en los tres primeros meses, ya que no hay datos para este período que se puedan verificar de manera independiente.

### **Medios de difusión y comunicación**

- UNICEF gestionó bien su perfil en los medios de comunicación. Sin embargo, debido al retraso en el despliegue de personal adecuado, la comunicación estaba retrasada en materia de contenido relacionado con su trabajo sobre el terreno y la producción de historias de interés humano sobre personas y comunidades reales en Haití, que los comités nacionales y los encargados de la recaudación de fondos necesitaban para lograr un máximo impacto. La capacidad de UNICEF y el despliegue sobre el terreno no demostraron que pudiera generar información precisa acerca de las repercusiones de la situación sobre los niños y las mujeres, destinada a los Comités Nacionales y el público en general a través de los medios de comunicación locales e internacionales, de conformidad con sus obligaciones en virtud del CCC.

### **Promoción**

- Los CCC revisados son relativamente ambiciosos en materia de promoción, que constituye “una parte integral de la acción humanitaria”, debe estar “basada en pruebas concretas” y ha de llevarse a cabo “en asociación con otros”. Aunque la tarea de promoción de UNICEF parece haber tenido éxito en el tema de la reapertura de las escuelas, su voz fue débil en los temas cruciales del saneamiento y la violencia por razones de género.

### **Capacidad de liderazgo de los grupos temáticos**

- UNICEF logró iniciar las reuniones de grupo temático desde el principio; sin embargo, excepto en el caso del grupo temático de WASH, sin embargo, la capacidad de liderazgo fue insuficiente en el primer trimestre debido a: (a) la falta de claridad de la relación entre las funciones de los jefes de programas y los coordinadores de grupos temáticos; (b) la falta de recursos de algunos grupos (escasa capacidad de gestión de la información, los coordinadores desplegados tenían un nivel bastante inferior), y (c) la falta de orientación del personal clave de la oficina de país de Haití sobre la función de UNICEF en la dirección del grupo temático, y la falta de comprensión acerca de cómo funcionaba la alianza de reserva para los grupos temáticos.

### **Alianzas**

- Las alianzas de reserva de UNICEF le permitieron dar una respuesta oportuna y una mayor cobertura en diversas esferas, especialmente en el grupo temático WASH y la protección de la infancia en los primeros tres meses, cuando pudo hacer frente a las necesidades de los aliados de una forma oportuna y flexible.

## **2. Factores organizativos que afectan los resultados**

### **Resumen de la conclusión**

UNICEF movilizó una respuesta de toda la organización tras el terremoto de Haití. Sin embargo, las insuficiencias en la implementación de un aumento del personal y el apoyo a las operaciones, los procesos institucionales laboriosos, la falta de una clara cadena de mando y los malos resultados en materia de seguimiento menoscabaron la eficacia de la respuesta en los primeros tres meses.

## Conclusiones detalladas

### ***Los factores sistémicos que afectan a la capacidad de aumento del personal***

- *Predominantemente el aumento interno solamente:* el aumento de personal de UNICEF es principalmente interno, lo cual tiene la ventaja de que las personas desplegadas están familiarizados con sus sistemas y procesos. Sin embargo, la lentitud de los procesos ordinarios de contratación y la falta de protocolo para la ampliación de la escala implican que el proceso de aumento de personal se prolongó demasiado (casi seis meses). Esto, a su vez, significa que UNICEF agotó rápidamente su capacidad interna mundial y careció de medios para restaurarla mediante la contratación externa. Después del terremoto de Haití se desalentó la contratación basada en los acuerdos de servicios especiales (SSA), lo que significó que las asignaciones temporales (y las alianzas de reserva) fueron las únicas maneras de ofrecer contratos para un aumento de los candidatos externos. Pero a pesar de que se identificó y se aprobó al personal necesario en dos semanas, la División de Recursos Humanos (DHR) tardó hasta dos meses para finalizar la contratación. El idioma se convirtió en otra limitación que demoró las contrataciones en este lugar de destino de habla francesa.
- *Ubicación de la función de aumento de personal de emergencia:* UNICEF no ha invertido de manera uniforme en la elaboración de una lista para un posible aumento del personal, excepto de una manera muy particular. En los últimos años, parte de la lista estuvo a cargo de Departamento de Recursos Humanos, otra parte de la misma a cargo de EMOPS y otra parte en las regiones a cargo de las oficinas regionales (OR). No ha habido ningún proceso de coordinación central para elaborar la lista como una herramienta estratégica para el despliegue en situaciones de emergencia, excepto durante un periodo corto de 2006-2008, cuando existía una unidad de emergencia en DHR.
- *Las situaciones de emergencia no son una carrera preferida en UNICEF:* Dentro de UNICEF, la respuesta de emergencia no se considera como una posibilidad de carrera a largo plazo. Como la mayoría de las operaciones de emergencia tienden a estar concentradas en los países que son lugares de destino sin familiares, hay muy pocos incentivos para que el personal escoja un despliegue a largo plazo en los países donde se producen situaciones de emergencia.
- *Un proceso complicado de examen de la programación y del presupuesto:* Esta actividad en UNICEF fue complicada y prolongada.
- *Una reserva interna limitada:* Finalmente, la reserva de personal dentro de la organización que tienen experiencia en situaciones de emergencia es relativamente reducida, en contraste con el gran número de situaciones de emergencia a las que responde.

### ***La capacidad de liderazgo y la rendición de cuentas a escala humanitaria***

- De una forma conspicua, UNICEF no logró después del terremoto de Haití sustituir su práctica tomar las decisiones en un proceso de consulta de toma de decisiones con una clara cadena de mando. En términos generales, hubo un vacío de liderazgo en las primeras semanas de la respuesta, que se colmó en parte por una toma de decisiones adaptadas a las situaciones concretas y la coordinación a muchos niveles diferentes. En este contexto, surgieron distintos foros de manera semiespontánea; todos en cierta medida se superpusieron o incluso compitieron entre ellos y ninguno de ellos dejó de tener problemas en sus relaciones con los demás.
- La estrategia de integración adoptada por la organización parece funcionar bien para las situaciones de inestabilidad crónica en que los programas de país tienen que responder a las necesidades de desarrollo y humanitarias. Sin embargo, el caso de Haití muestra que la diferenciación de las funciones de la Sede, las oficinas regionales y las oficinas de país en tiempos de megadesastres imprevistos sigue siendo un gran desafío.

- Las funciones específicas de las distintas entidades clave que participaron en la respuesta de Haití – como la oficina de país de Haití, la oficina de país de la República Dominicana, la oficina regional, EMOPS y la División de Programas– siguen sin estar claras. Como ilustra el caso de Haití, en un contexto humanitario mundial alterado en el que ahora hay una mayor rendición institucional directa de cuentas, y los donantes y los medios de comunicación exigen una respuesta más coherente que en el pasado, el marco de rendición de cuentas existente de UNICEF difumina la responsabilidad en la respuesta a los desastres de gran magnitud.
- La estructura, las funciones y las expectativas de desempeño en UNICEF están formalmente configuradas de una manera que no ubican explícitamente la respuesta de emergencia de nivel 3 (como el terremoto de Haití) en ningún lugar dentro de la organización. Dicho esto, en vista de esta falta de claridad *de jure* en la rendición de cuentas sobre el papel, los directivos superiores realizaron tentativas durante las primeras semanas de la respuesta (por ejemplo la oficina regional, la OED) para asignar responsabilidades *de facto*, como por ejemplo por medio de reuniones de gestión superior programadas sistemáticamente en las que participaron todos los directores de división pertinentes de la sede, durante las cuales se asignaron las acciones y las decisiones que se debían tomar. En la medida en que algunas de estas acciones y las decisiones se tomaron con éxito y otras no, como se detalla en el presente informe, el registro de UNICEF en el cumplimiento de sus responsabilidades es desigual.

#### ***Desencadenante institucional***

- El terremoto de Haití fue un caso claro en el que se necesitaba desde el principio una respuesta institucional (o “desencadenante”, como se denomina en UNICEF). Debería haber sido evidente en las horas inmediatamente posteriores al terremoto que la magnitud de la destrucción, las necesidades humanitarias y la responsabilidad mundial de UNICEF podrían generar confusión. UNICEF podría desbordar la capacidad de cualquier oficina de país o regional, con independencia de sus opiniones. La incapacidad de UNICEF para activar el procedimiento para una situación de emergencia a nivel institucional después del terremoto de Haití afectó su respuesta y generó confusión.

#### ***El bienestar del personal***

- El despliegue de personal sin apoyo básico durante semanas, incluso meses, menoscabó gravemente la eficacia y la moral.

#### ***Apoyo a las operaciones***

- El apoyo a las operaciones se mantuvo insuficiente durante los tres primeros meses de la respuesta y no se estableció su carácter prioritario en la implementación, especialmente en las esferas de la tecnología de la información y las finanzas; en la esfera de la tecnología de la información en particular, el personal desplegado se hallaba a un nivel inferior, y por tanto no se podía esperar que gestionara la fase de puesta en marcha de una operación compleja.

#### ***Planificación, seguimiento y presentación de informes***

- Debido a la falta de una evaluación adecuada de las necesidades, los planes articulados fueron en gran parte una aspiración. El carácter amplio de la planificación sentó las bases para un sistema de presentación de informes que no era realista, práctico y que no realizó un seguimiento adecuado de los resultados. La ausencia de un carácter prioritario para el seguimiento y evaluación por parte de los directivos superiores dio como resultado que UNICEF no pudiera registrar su rendimiento a partir de datos sólidos o apoyar a los aliados en la puesta en marcha de un seguimiento y evaluación adecuados y un sistema de presentación de informes.



- La presentación de informes operacionales de UNICEF sobre su respuesta siguió siendo insuficiente debido a su incapacidad para recoger, compilar y analizar datos sistemáticos sobre su propio funcionamiento. A pesar de que tiene mecanismos adecuados para el seguimiento de su despliegue de recursos, o “datos administrativos”, y los sistemas y los procedimientos están fuertemente orientados en esa dirección, la organización mostró insuficiencias con respecto al seguimiento de las consecuencias por los resultados finales.

### **3. Mejora del rendimiento – cultura y aprendizaje institucional**

#### ***Resumen de la conclusión***

Una cultura profundamente arraigada en la prevención de riesgos en lugar de la gestión de riesgos, tanto en la acción individual como en los sistemas que le sirven de apoyo, obstaculizó la respuesta en Haití. La organización sigue sin absorber las lecciones de otras situaciones de emergencia anteriores que reaparecieron en esta última, lo que indica una resistencia institucional para realizar los cambios radicales necesarios para que UNICEF muestre con seriedad que quiere convertirse en una organización humanitaria líder a escala mundial.

#### **Conclusiones detalladas**

##### ***Aprendizaje***

- La estructura de UNICEF, sus funciones, su rendición de cuentas y sus métodos de trabajo han supuesto antes un problema en las situaciones de emergencia de gran escala, pero existe aún una resistencia institucional para llevar a cabo los cambios necesarios a fin de ofrecer un liderazgo humanitario eficaz.

##### ***Evitar riesgos en lugar de orientarse hacia los resultados***

- Hay una sólida cultura basada en evitar los riesgos -en lugar de gestionar los riesgos- en la organización. Combinado con una cultura predominante que prima los procedimientos sobre los resultados, todo esto actúa en contra de la necesidad de una respuesta oportuna y eficiente. Mientras los procedimientos sigan siendo sacrosantos, los resultados o los productos no figurarán de manera importante en el seguimiento de los resultados.

### **Recomendaciones: convertirse en un líder mundial**

En este informe se formulan 20 recomendaciones, de las cuales las más importantes son las 9 agrupadas bajo el subtítulo “A. Liderazgo humanitario y gestión estratégica”. Las otras 11 recomendaciones se refieren a aspectos operativos y son importantes, pero por sí solas tendrán escasas repercusiones duraderas a menos que la organización tome medidas con respecto a las recomendaciones estratégicas.

## **A. Liderazgo humanitario y gestión estratégica**

### ***Liderazgo de los grupos temáticos***

- R1: Los problemas particulares que plantea el saneamiento ilustran la necesidad de que el Grupo temático WASH establezca enfoques que se adapten más a los contextos urbanos (según las recomendaciones de la evaluación interinstitucional en tiempo real<sup>1</sup>), revisen sus metodologías de evaluación para comprender los contextos locales, y determinen y desplieguen soluciones más rentables a los problemas. *(Véase la sección 2.1.)*
- R2: Los coordinadores mundiales de los grupos temáticos y los representantes de los países deben asegurarse de que los coordinadores de los grupos tengan el nivel adecuado de antigüedad y experiencia, sobre todo al principio, y deben recibir el mismo tratamiento que los jefes de programas de UNICEF. *(Véase la sección 2.9.)*
- R3: En el marco de los programas existentes de formación, la Oficina del Director Ejecutivo (OED)/Oficina de Programas de Emergencia (EMOPS)/División de Programas (PD)/División de Recursos Humanos (DHR) tienen que garantizar que todos los directores de programas y operaciones, incluyendo los representantes de los países y sus adjuntos, reciban una orientación completa con respecto al concepto de organismo director de grupo temático y los procesos interinstitucionales en relación con la rendición de cuentas de estos grupos temáticos. *(Véase la sección 2.9.)*
- R4: UNICEF necesita establecer un equipo de gestores de información altamente capacitados que puedan desplegarse rápidamente en cualquier situación de emergencia y sean capaces de apoyar los programas de la organización o los grupos temáticos que ésta dirige. Hay una oportunidad para establecer esta función como una carrera para los administradores competentes, ya que habrá una gran demanda todos aquellos que hayan recibido capacitación y tengan experiencia para abordar las complejas necesidades de gestión de la información en las grandes situaciones de emergencia de cualquier país, e incluso en tiempos normales. *(Véanse las Secciones 2.1-3, 2.1.5 y 2.1.9.)*

### ***Responsabilidad humanitaria***

- R15: UNICEF define tres niveles<sup>2</sup> de respuesta humanitaria, que corresponden a la magnitud de la emergencia y la capacidad de la oficina de país para gestionarla. La OED tiene que aclarar que si bien todas las oficinas de país deben tener capacidad para abordar el nivel 1 por su cuenta como parte del proceso de planificación de país, la organización no espera que las emergencias de nivel 2 y 3 se aborden como una parte normal de los planes del programa de país, y a estas situaciones de emergencia se aplicarán los procedimientos especiales de emergencia. *(Véanse las secciones 3.4.1-3.4.2 y 3.4.4.)*
- R16: Para las emergencias de nivel 3, independientemente de la capacidad de las oficinas de país o la oficina regional, la OED asumirá la dirección general y ofrecerá una dirección estratégica a fin de facilitar una respuesta de toda la organización. Este acuerdo, denominado Procedimiento de Emergencia Corporativa (CEP), se declarará de 2 a 12 horas después de un gran desastre de inicio rápido. La OED autorizará de inmediato al Director de EMOPS para que actúe como Coordinador de Emergencia Institucional (CEC) para la respuesta. Sin embargo, las decisiones operativas todavía tendrán que adoptarse a nivel nacional. Para ello, el CEC designará un Director de Operaciones (por lo menos un D1 superior con experiencia humanitaria) para el país. La declaración de CEP incluirá lo siguiente:
- El acuerdo será inicialmente por un período de al menos tres meses, y será revisado al final de este período. El CEP se aplicará únicamente a las operaciones de emergencia a corto plazo. En cualquier respuesta de emergencia que requiera una respuesta a largo plazo

(como en las tareas de recuperación y reconstrucción, las emergencias crónicas, etc.), la norma será gestionarla por medio de los procesos de planificación establecidos en los programas de los países, y dependerá de la oficina de país procurar cualquier tipo de asistencia de la sede o la oficina regional.

- El Director de Operaciones informará al CEC sobre los aspectos operativos de la respuesta y al Representante en el país sobre (a) todos los asuntos relativos a la representación ante el gobierno nacional; (b) los planes o compromisos que vayan más allá de los primeros seis meses; y (c) la comunicación y promoción públicas.
- El acuerdo tendrá incorporado un mecanismo de trabajo para asegurarse de que la oficina de país pueda asumir gradualmente todas las responsabilidades de la gestión del programa a partir del cuarto mes (sujeto a revisiones periódicas). Todos los programas de recuperación y a largo plazo que se establezcan como consecuencia de la situación de emergencia serán administrados por el Representante en el país; el Director de Operaciones no tendrá autoridad para adoptar decisiones en este sentido, salvo autorización expresa del Representante. Si después de una revisión periódica de este acuerdo se considera que la oficina de país es capaz de asumir toda la responsabilidad de las operaciones, el Director de Operaciones ya no tendrá que informar al CEC, y el representante en el país determinará si los servicios del Director de Operaciones son necesarios. Para que esta transición ocurra, el Director de Operaciones tendrá que trabajar estrechamente con la oficina de país desde el inicio.
- Para todas las emergencias de nivel 3, será obligatorio que el CEC, o alguien designado por éste, realice una visita temprana al país. Esto ayudará a la OED y al CEC a obtener una evaluación en tiempo real de la situación y facilitará que puedan tomar decisiones apropiadas sobre la movilización y las asignaciones de recursos y proporcionar la necesaria dirección estratégica a la oficina de país, al Director de Operaciones y al Director Regional.
- La función de la oficina regional en una respuesta de nivel 3 será determinado por la OED, en consulta con el Director Regional y del CEC, en función de su capacidad de movilización. La cadena de mando entre el CR y el Director Regional seguirá siendo normal y la oficina regional desempeñará la función de supervisión normal con respecto a cualquier recuperación o programa y planificación a largo plazo. Tiene que quedar claro que mientras que el CEP esté en funcionamiento, el CEC ofrece su capacidad de liderazgo para la respuesta; el Director Regional es responsable de asegurar que la oficina de país sea capaz de integrar la respuesta en su propio proceso de planificación y asumir la responsabilidad de liderazgo y operativa de la respuesta lo más pronto posible.

*(Véanse las secciones 3.4.1-3.4.2 y 3.4.4.)*

R17: R17: Para las emergencias de nivel 2, la situación ideal es que la oficina regional desempeñe el papel principal, pero dada la limitada capacidad de las oficinas regionales (y el hecho de que cada Director Regional tiene experiencias y competencias diferentes en la respuesta ante una situación de emergencia, y que la experiencia en situaciones de emergencia no es una competencia clave en el proceso de su contratación), el CEC tendrá que supervisar la situación porque a veces emergencias de nivel 2 (las grandes inundaciones en el Pakistán, por ejemplo) pueden convertirse en emergencias de nivel 3. Por esta razón, debe llevarse a cabo tan pronto como sea posible una evaluación conjunta dirigida por un equipo de respuesta a emergencias superior designado por el CEC con el Director Regional (o un representante de éste). El propósito de la misión conjunta de evaluación será acordar las modalidades de la respuesta. Si el CEC considera que la capacidad de la oficina regional es insuficiente para la gestión de la respuesta global, y que la emergencia podría pasar a nivel 3, consultará con la OED y determinará cuáles deben ser las funciones respectivas de la oficina regional, la sede y la oficina de país *(Véanse las secciones 3.4.1-3.4.2 y 3.4.4.)*

## **Cultura**

- R19: R19: Los directivos de UNICEF tienen que comunicar con claridad que una emergencia de nivel 3 no es “una situación normal”, sino que es esencial para cambiar de velocidad y resistir la tentación de volver a una cultura de consenso en la toma de decisiones. El proceso debe mantenerse lo más simple posible. Aunque se debe tratar de consultar a quien tenga que ser consultado, la responsabilidad final para determinar la dirección estratégica en un nivel 3 de emergencia (es decir, la forma, el tamaño y la naturaleza de una respuesta) debe recaer exclusivamente en la OED con la asistencia del CEC, debido a que el tiempo es esencial en una situación de emergencia. El CEC determinará la responsabilidad de las diversas entidades (Representante en el país, Director Regional, Director de Operaciones) en materia de operaciones (con la orientación de la OED), en diferentes etapas y en función de la capacidad de cada entidad. *(Véanse las secciones 3.2-3.4 y 4.1.1.)*
- R20: La OED y los Directores Regionales deben asegurarse de que las evaluaciones del desempeño de los representantes de los países incorporen una evaluación de sus competencias para establecer un compromiso efectivo con las prioridades institucionales, incluido el CEP. *(Véanse las secciones 3.4, 4.1.2, 4.1.3 y 4.2.)*

## **B. Gestión operacional**

### ***Despliegue y capacidad de los recursos humanos***

- R7: En las futuras operaciones de despliegue de personal, los gestores de la contratación tienen que hacer que sea obligatorio que todos los procesos de aumento de personal duren por lo menos nueve semanas, en especial para el personal que va a desempeñar funciones de supervisión, dirección o toma de decisiones en la operación. *(Véase la sección 3.2.1.)*
- R8: EMOPS y DHR tienen que invertir seriamente en la elaboración y la gestión de una lista de personal para un posible aumento de efectivos y en la creación de equipos multidisciplinarios autónomos de respuesta rápida<sup>3</sup>. Siguiendo las lecciones de la División de Suministros en la manera en que ha desarrollado la capacidad de despliegue y de administración de recursos humanos, UNICEF necesita reproducir un sistema similar para todas las intervenciones de emergencia, dotando a EMOPS de un personal adecuado y trabajando en estrecha colaboración con DHR. *(Véase la sección 3.2.1.)*
- R9: DHR debe acelerar el uso de acuerdos de servicios especiales y de contratos de asignación temporal a partir de listas externas de candidatos preseleccionados para todos los casos de aumento de personal, en especial para todas las contrataciones por una duración de menos de 90 días y por un año<sup>4</sup>. *(Véase la sección 3.2.1.)*
- R10: En futuras situaciones de emergencia, DHR y los Directores Regionales deben asegurar que, en lugar de un examen minucioso del presupuesto por programas (PBR), se llegue a un acuerdo durante las cuatro primeras semanas después de la respuesta en torno a una lista de personal de base para un año, con un PBR detallado después de tres meses para contrataciones adicionales. *(Véase la sección 3.2.1.)*
- R14: Para demostrar que UNICEF valora la labor humanitaria y la experiencia técnica dentro de la organización, los gestores de la contratación deben garantizar que se tengan en cuenta las competencias en materia de liderazgo humanitario en la contratación para puestos de responsabilidad, especialmente de los representantes de los países y de sus adjuntos<sup>5</sup>. *(Véase la sección 3.4.3.)*

### **Apoyo a las operaciones**

- R11: La División de Suministros debe desarrollar una capacidad específica (a través de acuerdos a largo plazo con los proveedores o aliados de reserva) para establecer con rapidez alojamientos e instalaciones de oficina<sup>6</sup>. Esto debe estar ya en marcha para aplicarlo en futuras emergencias, teniendo en cuenta la dificultad y el tiempo que se requiere para organizar instalaciones prefabricadas. La situación de emergencia en Haití también puso de relieve la necesidad de que haya un equipo de la División de Suministros capacitado para instalar alojamientos. (Véase la Sección 3.2.1–3.2.2.)
- R12: El colaboración con la División de Suministros, EMOPS debe garantizar que UNICEF disponga de equipos de respuesta rápida especializados en prestar apoyo a las operaciones que se puedan implementar inmediatamente después de un desastre grave. (Véase la sección 3.3)
- R13: En las grandes emergencias que requieran la rápida ampliación de los sistemas de TI, los directores regionales y directores de TI deben asegurar que durante las primeras ocho semanas se utilice personal superior con gran experiencia de la Oficina Regional y la sede. (Véase la sección 3.3.)

### **Procedimientos administrativos y financieros**

- R18: El colaboración con la División de Finanzas y Administración (DFAM), la Oficina de Auditoría Interna y las oficinas regionales, EMOPS tiene que simplificar aún más los procesos institucionales clave en caso de emergencia y sincronizar los manuales actuales sobre los procedimientos administrativos y financieros en situaciones de emergencia. (Véanse las secciones 3.3 y 4.1.1)

### **Seguimiento y presentación de informes**

- R5: En una respuesta de emergencia, UNICEF estará en gran medida en manos de sus aliados en la ejecución, tanto preexistentes como potenciales, a pesar de las directrices revisadas del acuerdo del programa de cooperación (PCA) que incorporan exigencias más estrictas de presentación de informes. Para los datos de distribución de última hora, UNICEF necesita simplificar los formatos de presentación de informes y desarrollar mecanismos para que los aliados recopilen datos o los aporten. (Véase la sección 3.1.2.)
- R6: Los directivos de las oficinas de país deben dar prioridad al uso de los puntos de referencia de los Compromisos básicos para la infancia en la acción humanitaria para la presentación de informes, y los directivos superiores deben garantizar que los informes se basen más en los resultados que en los insumos. (Véase la Sección 3.1.3.)



# 1. THE REVIEW: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

## 1.1 Introduction

The devastating earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010 stretched the international humanitarian system to its limits and beyond. This was not just due to the scale of destruction and damage in a densely populated capital city, but also because the damage to the Government of Haiti (GOH) and key humanitarian agencies, as well as the pre-existing chronic humanitarian situation marked by a lack of access by the population to basic services, complicated the response significantly.

As an agency with a mandate to protect children and women and relieve their suffering, UNICEF responded to the Haiti emergency on an enormous scale, mounting a complex humanitarian operation in an extremely difficult context. This review, commissioned by the Evaluation Office of UNICEF at the request of the Office of the Executive Director (OED), assessed the organization's initial operational response to the Haiti emergency in order to draw lessons for performance and accountability in future emergencies. As outlined in the terms of reference (TOR), given here in Annex I, the review aims to learn from the Haiti response in order to chart ways UNICEF can improve its capacity, structure, systems and processes for delivering emergency responses in the future.

## 1.2 Background

Following the earthquake, the humanitarian community launched a massive relief and recovery operation in Haiti. The UN Flash Appeal, launched within 72 hours, requested US\$575 million for an initial six-month period that was later revised to US\$1.4 billion for a one-year period of relief and recovery. The Flash Appeal included US\$223 million for UNICEF's immediate response. In addition, UNICEF, through its annual Humanitarian Action and Recovery (HAR) appeal, requested over US\$127 million for its work linking preparedness, recovery, disaster risk reduction and residual humanitarian needs for the medium-term response in Haiti. It raised nearly US\$265 million for two years for its Haiti response against a total requirement of just over US\$286 million.<sup>7</sup>

The scale of the humanitarian response required UNICEF to significantly step up its own capacity to support this. Before the earthquake, the Haiti Country Office (CO) had an annual budget of about US\$12 million and a staff of 64; this multiplied in six months to US\$243 million (a nearly twentyfold increase) and a staff of 229 (an almost threefold increase). Following the earthquake, the emergency unit in the Division of Human Resources (DHR) was restructured to provide full-time support to Haiti, and during the first half of 2010 over 400 surge-capacity assignments were requested.<sup>8</sup> Through UNICEF's Copenhagen-based Supply Division, the organization provided extensive humanitarian support and set up a new logistics pipeline. UNICEF has delivered critical life-saving interventions such as water and sanitation, nutritional support, vaccination, medical care and more since the earthquake struck. As part of its response, it provided children with a sense of safety and normalcy through designated spaces and materials for education, recreation, and early childhood development.<sup>9</sup> UNICEF also bears significant inter-agency coordination responsibility in its capacity as lead or co-lead agency in 4 of the 12 clusters and sub-clusters active in Haiti.<sup>10</sup>

## 1.3 An independent review

### 1.3.1 Purpose

The aim of this independent review was to make an objective and independent assessment of UNICEF's response to the January 2010 Haiti earthquake. In doing so, it sought to identify key organizational mechanisms and systemic factors that served to help or hinder the response, and generate recommendations in the most critical areas of emergency response to ensure timely, predictable, effective and efficient responses in the future.

### **1.3.2 Scope and focus**

UNICEF has invested a great deal over the past few years in developing its capacity, systems and processes for delivering on the Core Commitments to Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs), which are central to its mandate. At the same time, it has also endeavoured to learn from all major operations and continuously fine-tune its organizational systems<sup>11</sup> to improve operational capabilities through reflection and lessons-learned exercises after emergency responses. Despite the continuing improvement in its ability to respond to emergencies, every crisis seems to raise new challenges that affect outcomes for children and women. Taking the complex operational context in the Haiti response as a point of reference, UNICEF management sought to critically examine the success factors as well the blockages that still exist, especially in the key period of the first three months after the earthquake, as outlined in the TOR.

The review focused on internal more than external factors – that is, on those factors within the organization itself, rather than the many factors outside UNICEF's control, that influenced its ability to respond to this emergency in the best possible way. Focusing on both enabling and disabling factors, the review took an evidence-based approach to assessing the Haiti response and used the testimony of key internal stakeholders, external interlocutors and documentary evidence<sup>12</sup> to analyse and diagnose factors that either helped or hindered the operation.

#### ***1.3.2.1 Time horizon***

The review focused on the first three months after the day of the earthquake (as per the TOR) since this is the most critical period of any emergency operation. Performance during this period reflects the state of institutional preparedness and how well systems are geared to shift from normal operations to emergency mode. The review took place from November 2010 to February 2011.

#### ***1.3.2.2 Broad focus***

In the early stages of the review process, the consultants carried out a scoping mission. This preliminary exercise pointed to the need to narrow the focus of a potentially expansive review to the most critical systemic factors that had a bearing on the response in Haiti after the quake. A review such as the present one is not a programme evaluation of the response – either the real-time or impact variety – that focuses on the programmatic results UNICEF has delivered for children and affected communities. Instead, the main value-added of this review was seen in identifying critical enabling or hindering internal structural factors, including accountability issues, that affected programme and operational results (as defined in the CCCs and/or operational plans) in Haiti. However, this being an independent review, some element of judgment on overall performance was necessary as a point of departure for answering questions about such institutional factors. Therefore, the review focuses squarely on UNICEF as an organization, with Haiti serving as a case study to illustrate systemic strengths and weaknesses. It is this systemic focus that explains why the vast majority of the review's recommendations are clustered in Section 3 of the report rather than in Section 2.

Insofar as this exercise was focused on systemic internal issues, the review also took stock of lessons from other current and previous disasters in addition to Haiti. This analysis was limited to desk research and key informant interviews.

### **1.3.3 Objectives and key questions**

#### **Specific objectives**

The specific objective of the review was to make an independent assessment of UNICEF as an organization as it responded to the Haiti earthquake by answering the following broad questions:<sup>13</sup>

1. How timely, effective and efficient was UNICEF overall in achieving results in the first three



months of the Haiti response?

2. What aspects of the organization's operations facilitated or hindered successful achievement of results in Haiti?
3. How successfully has UNICEF identified what has and has not worked well before and during the Haiti response, reflected on this information and incorporated this learning into decision-making to improve its operations and performance during early response and beyond?

## Key themes

In order to answer the above questions, and following the scoping exercise,<sup>14</sup> the review team identified the following key themes as the focus of data gathering and analysis:

- Performance tracking in humanitarian operations; CCC benchmarks; results monitoring (UNICEF sectoral programme response, needs assessment, programme plans and advocacy);
- Roles and responsibilities (i.e., accountability); relations among the CO, Regional Office (RO) and Headquarters (HQ); decision-making; internal coordination mechanisms/task forces;
- Switch from 'normal' mode to emergency mode after the 'corporate trigger' is pulled; leadership in major emergencies; streamlining internal coordination and decision-making in emergencies;
- Rapid deployment and human resources (including staff welfare);
- Administration, finance, IT and supply;
- Cluster leadership; and
- Organizational culture: result-orientation; performance improvement and learning culture; risk-taking; adaptability to rapidly evolving situations.

## 1.4 Methodology

### 1.4.1 Overall approach

The review's methodology was based on both inductive and deductive approaches, using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below. A more detailed methodology is provided in the inception report attached as Annex II.

#### 1.4.1.1 Key steps

The review followed these steps in its research, data collection, triangulation and analysis, and reporting:

1. A scoping mission consisting of a background document review, coupled with a range of semi-structured one-on-one interviews with UNICEF staff in New York, Geneva, Copenhagen, Panama and Haiti, as well as telephone interviews with UNICEF staff outside HQ who had been deployed in Haiti during the first three months of the response;
2. Preliminary analysis of data gathered through the scoping process and preparation of an inception report, which was agreed with the Evaluation Office and informed by comments from the OED focal point, a Group of Readers (i.e., three senior managers) charged with reviewing the document from a strategic policy perspective, and an Ad Hoc Reference Group charged with assessing it from an operational, practical and technical perspective;

3. The main data collection mission, which included the culling of further documentary evidence (see *Section 4.1.2*), along with semi-structured and structured key informant interviews and focus group discussions<sup>15</sup> with key UNICEF staff selected carefully for their role in the first three months of the Haiti response and possibly the Pakistan flood response;
4. Semi-structured and structured interviews, both face-to-face and by telephone, with a range of external agencies including cluster members, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), partners, donors, international organizations and governments;
5. Data collection missions to Haiti, the Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (TACRO) offices in Panama, the Dominican Republic CO and UNICEF HQ, including site visits and hard data gathering as well as interviews;
6. A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data on the Haiti response, as well as policies and frameworks relevant to the organization's emergency response;
7. Review team workshops to analyse data and collate findings; and
8. Exit debriefs and briefings to the Haiti CO and OED to test and validate preliminary findings.

#### ***1.4.1.2 Key methods, informants and sources of data***

The data collection for this review was mainly done through key informant interviews and focus group discussions with purposively selected interlocutors, extensive document research and the culling of specific data points from various operational units within UNICEF. This use of both perceptual and documentary evidence is pivotal to bolstering the level of confidence with which the conclusions of this report are stated.

Key stakeholder groups included the following:

- Key directors and managers who were involved in managing/overseeing the response;
- A sizeable number of staff deployed in the first three months;
- Support staff and technical specialists in HQ and Geneva who were directly involved in the response in the first three months; and
- External stakeholders such as UNICEF's donors, National Committees, UN agencies, other humanitarian organizations (local and international NGOs), partners and cluster members. In Haiti, the review team interviewed representatives of the Government, donor agencies including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), key local and international NGOs and UN agency focal points.

A breakdown of key informants (some of whom were interviewed in both the scoping and the main review phase) and interviews conducted for the review is as follows:

Stakeholder group	Key informants (per cent)	Interviews (per cent)
UNICEF staff: HQ, Geneva, Copenhagen	99 (41.4)	140 (47.6)
UNICEF staff: Haiti and the Dominican Republic	66 (27.6)	68 (23.1)
TACRO	15 (6.3)	22 (7.5)
National Committees	6 (2.5)	8 (2.7)
Other UN agencies	16 (6.7)	17 (5.8)
NGOs, partner agencies	19 (7.9)	19 (6.5)
Government agencies	11 (4.6)	11 (3.7)
Donor agencies	7 (2.9)	9 (3.1)
<b>Total</b>	<b>239 (100)</b>	<b>294 (100)</b>

With respect to documentary evidence, the review team examined over 700 documents, pieces of correspondence and reports. Some of the key documents analysed were:<sup>16</sup>

- Haiti operational plans (90-day plan, 180 day-plan, 365-day plan)
- Staff debriefing notes
- Reports on lessons-learned exercises carried out by various sections of the Programme Division (PD) as well as by the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS)
- Revised Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, April 2010
- UNICEF Accountability Framework, 1998
- Documents on cluster accountabilities made available by the Humanitarian and Transition Support Unit (HATIS)
- Organizational Review, 2007
- Review of the Supply Function, 2006
- Joint UNICEF-Department of International Development (DFID) Evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency, March 2005
- Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Cooperation on Humanitarian Capacity Building, 2006 and 2010
- Tsunami evaluation reports
- Booz Allen Hamilton management study, 1994
- *Children of Haiti – Milestones and Looking Forward at Six Months*, UNICEF, July 2010
- Daily and weekly conference-call minutes on Haiti response
- Management responses to earlier evaluation reports
- Appeal documents
- Relevant corporate directives
- *Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake*, Global Public Policy Institute, 2010
- Further documents of a more specific nature (e.g., emails, memos, agendas, and so on).

#### 1.4.2 Triangulation of data

To ensure data integrity and factual accuracy throughout, the team engaged in a number of processes that enabled comparison and effective triangulation. These included individual team members taking a lead on specific issues within the review to ensure a comprehensive oversight of documentation and in-depth analysis, documentation on key issues from each interview, focus group discussions circulated

among team members, and the 'buddying' of team members to ensure that pertinent technical expertise was properly allocated to the specific issues at hand.

Triangulation is a core principle in mixed-method data collection as it ensures that results link up into a coherent and credible evidence base. The review relied on:

- *Source triangulation.* Team members compared information from different sources and at various management levels in different UNICEF functional units, other UN agencies, UNICEF partners (e.g., Government of Haiti, NGOs) and donors.
- *Method triangulation.* Team members compared information collected by different methods such as key informant interviews, focus group discussions and documents reviewed.
- *Researcher triangulation.* Information collected by different team members during desk research was compared and collated.
- *Context triangulation.* The review triangulated findings from other large emergencies to help distinguish those that are potentially relevant to UNICEF global systems from those that are specific to the Haiti context.
- *Preliminary findings triangulation.* Debriefing presentations were made to the Haiti CO and senior directors at UNICEF HQ and their initial feedback obtained before producing the first draft of the report.

#### **1.4.3 Limitations of the review**

The review has four key limitations:

- The review focused on internal systemic issues and aimed to provide credible findings on how UNICEF's internal systems and processes affected the response, not make definitive statements about the impact of its programmes in the way that a full-scale evaluation would.
- Since the review took place almost a year after the earthquake and covered the first three months after the event, the data and evidence gathered is either based on UNICEF documents or is anecdotal. In this sense, the evidence is not informed by direct observation by the review team. Where the review has relied on data from internal documents, effort has been made to triangulate these with interviews with external and internal key informants. There were also no external evaluations or other independent assessments of performance that could have informed the review.
- For most programme sectors, data on the delivery of assistance to affected communities during the initial months of the response remain sparse due to a combination of lack of office infrastructure and high staff turnover, and available reports do not clearly distinguish between what UNICEF did alone and what was achieved by the clusters it leads. Hence discussions on overall performance in programme sectors sometimes overlap UNICEF programme and its clusters.
- The review team could not find sufficient evaluative data on UNICEF's health response in the first three months – whatever information the team could obtain from external sources was related to performance of the Health cluster (led by the Pan-American Health Organization/World Health Organization); hence the limited observations made on this sector in the report are based on UNICEF's internal reports only.

## **1.5 Format of the report**

Section 2 presents findings (and the corresponding evidence base underlying these) on the first key question articulated in Section 1.3.3 above on overall performance during the first three months – i.e., How timely, effective and efficient was UNICEF in achieving results? In Section 3, findings and evidence on the second key question on organizational factors, including UNICEF's internal systems as well as other important areas such as humanitarian leadership and accountability, are examined. Section 4 presents the review's findings and evidence on the third key question: organizational culture and learning. Each section is broken down into sub-sections that discuss the themes and issues identified at the end of Section 1.3.3 above. While doing so, the review draws conclusions (key findings) at the end of each sub-section and, where relevant, makes recommendations. It may be noted that recommendations are only made in critical areas where the review team believes realistic actions are possible and will make a significant difference to future emergency responses. The review does not attempt to make recommendations on all areas as some are endemic to the Haiti response and the team could not point to systemic challenges beyond this single emergency response.

## 2. PERFORMANCE: TIMELINESS, EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

Questions/issues examined were (i) How did the sectors and UNICEF-led clusters fare as part of its response? (ii) How successfully was UNICEF able to deploy adequate capacity to fulfil its cluster responsibilities? and (iii) How effectively was UNICEF able to undertake advocacy, communications and other upstream activities, especially on the vital issues of child protection and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)?

UNICEF's Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs) provide the framework as well as the performance benchmarks for the organization's humanitarian operations in large-scale crises such as the Haiti earthquake. First developed in 1998 and revised in 2010,<sup>17</sup> the CCCs now incorporate UNICEF's cluster responsibilities in these benchmarks. The following sub-sections present the review findings on key elements of the CCCs that were identified as crucial in the inception report.

### 2.1 Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

#### Overview

##### *Complex context*

WASH services in Haiti were poor even before the earthquake, with total coverage of sanitation and drinking water at 17 and 63 per cent respectively, rendering it the lowest-coverage country in the region.<sup>18</sup> The piped water network provided household connections to only a small proportion of Port-au-Prince's population. For access to water, the vast majority of people relied on bottled water, private kiosks or trucked supplies. Household sanitation was through latrines and flush toilets linked to rudimentary septic tanks requiring de-sludging or discharging into open sewers. Overall, sanitation practices and infrastructure were poor, with the use of 'flying toilets' (i.e., plastic bags) and defecation in the open being commonplace.

##### *UNICEF's initial response*

UNICEF had virtually no WASH programme in Haiti prior to the earthquake, although this had started on a small scale with its response to the hurricanes that hit the country in 2008. The National Directorate of Potable Water and Sanitation (known by its French acronym DINEPA),<sup>19</sup> the government agency responsible for this sector, was restructured in 2008 and, in contrast to most other government entities, was largely unaffected by the earthquake. The WASH Cluster first met the day after the earthquake on 13 January to take stock of the situation and plan its response. The cluster was fully functional under UNICEF's leadership with the arrival of surge capacity personnel as of 16 January, when water trucking began. A plane from Panama landed in Port-au-Prince on 19 January with UNICEF tents, WASH items and staff support goods.<sup>20</sup>

UNICEF reports and documents on WASH do not clearly distinguish between its own and the overall cluster response, and the review's findings reflect this intermingling of the two.

#### What worked well

##### *Cluster leadership*

In addition to activating the cluster and working with its government partner immediately, UNICEF was able to deploy its standby partners rapidly in the WASH Cluster. The first cluster coordinator arrived within three days, followed by others. By February, UNICEF had 17 staff working in the WASH Cluster, and three in the WASH section. Stakeholders, including external stakeholders, acknowledge this rapid response, with the WASH Cluster being widely seen as one of the most effective ones.<sup>21</sup>

There was clear leadership from the WASH Cluster in setting standards, and it developed a cluster strategy for the response early on (i.e., by the end of the fourth week). The revised appeal delineated two main phases: the period to May, providing 1.1 million people with five litres a day of safe drinking water, one emergency latrine for 50 people and one emergency bathing facility for 100; then a second phase lasting a year from the quake, ensuring that WASH provisions were closer to Sphere standards.

### ***Water provision***

A month after the earthquake, the WASH Cluster reported that over 900,000 people received approximately five litres of safe water per person per day in Port-au-Prince, Léogâne and Jacmel. Corroborating UNICEF's self-reported success, an inter-agency real-time evaluation<sup>22</sup> independently concluded that, while the volume of water was small, the overall achievement in terms of coverage was critical. By early March over 6,500 cubic meters of potable water, on average, reached more than 340 sites in these three cities and the two Goâves.

### ***Co-lead with DINEPA***

UNICEF ensured that the cluster was 'co-led' with DINEPA right from the outset, in keeping with the Paris Declaration principles of national ownership in humanitarian response wherever possible. In order to ensure that local authorities had the capacity to support the WASH response at the municipal level, UNICEF funded a municipal support project that started on 19 February. A year later, the WASH Cluster has two staff sitting in DINEPA to facilitate coordination with the municipal authorities, one of whom is dedicated to information management.

### ***What did not work well***

#### ***The challenge of sanitation***

In an urban context with over a million people living in temporary camps, sanitation was bound to be one of the biggest challenges facing the humanitarian community. UNICEF situation reports show that concern about the sanitation situation was being raised from 16 January. However, UNICEF struggled to accurately and realistically assess – and, together with the cluster members under its leadership, meet – the needs, a challenge that persisted even at the time of the review team's visit. Although some temporary and portable toilets were installed,<sup>23</sup> it appears that neither UNICEF nor the cluster was able to come to grips with this complex issue until early February. The situation report of 3 February<sup>24</sup> mentioned for the first time that a Sanitation Working Group had been activated by the WASH Cluster; the overall target was initially set at 25,000 toilets for 500,000 people in Port-au-Prince (or a ratio of 1:20), but subsequently revised downward to 12,950 latrines for 650,000 people (or a 1:50 ratio).

Even this revised target was unrealistic, as subsequent progress revealed. As of 17 February 2010 over 2,600 latrines had been completed by WASH Cluster partners for 130,250 people (still a ratio of 1:50). However, a monitoring exercise supported by UNICEF, the US Centres for Disease Control, Oxfam, DINEPA and USAID, undertaken at the end of February and covering 133 of the 300 sites, revealed that 25 per cent were deemed 'red' for sanitation and 4 per cent for water. In some of the red sites, no WASH Cluster partners were reported to be working.

Over a year after the earthquake, sanitation remains the biggest challenge, especially in the crowded camps of the capital where some 800,000 people remain.<sup>25</sup>

#### ***Consideration of more cost-effective alternatives***

With regard to water supply, emphasis for several months continued to be placed on trucking, which is always an expensive option. Other options, such as rehabilitating water kiosks run by private suppliers and drilling, were slow in being explored.

In sanitation, different options should have been thought of rather than just highly expensive portable toilets that need constant maintenance. Had a proper assessment of prevailing sanitation practices, cultural practices and geophysical contexts been carried out, a very different approach to sanitation could have been taken. WASH actors typically use pit latrines with various technical designs that are not applicable in a city like the Haitian capital, which sits on hard rock. Use of flying toilets and open defecation were common, and the response could have designed a strategy to build on these practices. Instead, some traditional latrines were provided as they are often used in rural areas, but these rapidly got blocked. Portable toilets require regular de-sludging, but the municipal capacity to manage solid waste is non-existent and there is no solid-waste treatment facility in the country.

USAID provided 20 de-sludging trucks about eight months ago. At the time of the review team's data-collection mission, these were still sitting idle in a UNICEF warehouse as neither UNICEF nor DINEPA has been able to get customs clearance from the Government.

### Key finding

UNICEF was able to rapidly get the WASH Cluster functioning, team up with its government partner and deploy cluster staff in strength,<sup>26</sup> which was aided by its standby partnership agreements with several NGOs specializing in WASH. This enabled UNICEF to ensure timely provision of water to the affected communities from the fifth day onwards, a feat that continued throughout the response. However, addressing sanitation needs was – and remains – a challenge in the densely populated urban context of Port-au-Prince.

### Recommendation

R1: Particular challenges posed by sanitation illustrate the need for the WASH Cluster to develop approaches better suited to urban contexts (as recommended by the inter-agency real-time evaluation) and revise their assessment methodologies to understand local contexts and identify and deploy more cost-effective solutions to problems.

## 2.2 Child protection

### Overview

One of the key foci of UNICEF's child protection work in Haiti before the earthquake was that of addressing the issues of children abandoned in 'orphanages' and crèches and those who might be subjected to the more insidious effects of the *restavek* system.<sup>27</sup> Though modest in scope, through its programmatic supports UNICEF had been exploring ways of preventing the institutionalization of children, and finding permanent solutions for children in need of care – solutions that were both appropriate within the local context and consistent with international standards as well as that of key national and international child protection actors.<sup>28</sup> Toward this end, UNICEF had been providing support to the justice and social welfare sectors.

In the *restavek* tradition in Haiti, in which children are sent to live and work for extended family members, exploitation and abuse of children was common, and the local mode of family 'care' was considered potentially hazardous. It was also known that children were used as child labour in foster homes. After the earthquake, therefore, UNICEF was caught in a dilemma: It considered institutional care and private orphanages as a last (least preferred) option; at the same time, given traditional institutions that exploited children, the family care option was not an obvious choice either.

When earthquake struck, UNICEF therefore faced a significant dilemma – how to provide direct assistance to orphanages, fearing that this might serve as a pull factor encouraging many parents to abandon their children in these institutions – a practice that pre-dated the earthquake.<sup>29</sup> At the same time,



the immediate reaction from sections in the international community was to move them from Haiti to 'safe' places in other countries through inter-country adoption. The Government of Haiti, consistent with international standards in post-disaster settings, deemed that children would not leave the country undocumented, and before attempts were made to re-unify separated children with their families.<sup>30</sup>

The post-disaster child protection response had to evolve from a very small programme<sup>31</sup> prior to the earthquake to one that was able to take on these complex challenges. Broadly speaking, the humanitarian agencies' child protection response focused on residential centres because of their high visibility and what one UNICEF specialist described as "the need to show rapid results". UNICEF focused on family tracing and reunification of separated children, child-friendly spaces and provision of psychosocial support. With regard to family tracing and reunification, the majority of children who were separated from their parents were being cared for by neighbours and, in some instances, by extended family.

The child protection sub-cluster was the first within the overall Protection Cluster to get up and running. UNICEF deployed a child protection specialist the first week of the emergency fully dedicated to coordinating this area; she was later replaced through a secondment from Save the Children Sweden. In addition, a more senior (P5) dedicated coordinator arrived in week six. There was also support provided to the inter-agency working group on mental health and psychosocial support. UNICEF co-chaired the working group with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP). Two staff were attached to the inter-agency working group, one to co-lead and the other an information management staff person.

## **What worked well**

### ***Separated children***

Immediately following the earthquake, the Haiti CO mobilized a multi-pronged strategy to ensure that children were protected, including from secondary separation; in particular the undocumented movement of children outside the country. This included strong advocacy through various avenues and parallel work coordinated with the Dominican Republic CO. Under UNICEF's leadership, an inter-agency common registration procedure and mechanism to document separated children was in place within two weeks of the emergency and the most vulnerable cases were referred to care networks/facilities. A Brigade de Protection des Mineurs (Haitian police unit to protect children whom UNICEF had helped to train prior to the earthquake) was quickly mobilized and supported to begin monitoring at the airport and at border points.

### ***Cross-border protection programme in the Dominican Republic***

As a number of children, accompanied or unaccompanied alike, started to arrive at the Jimani border post to cross into Dominican Republic, the UNICEF CO there established a joint programme with the Government in collaboration with the Haiti CO. Nearly 360 children injured in the earthquake arrived in Jimani and were brought to Santo Domingo for medical treatment. A protocol – the first of its kind – was developed in collaboration with CONANI, the government agency responsible for child protection in the Dominican Republic. Although it was developed exclusively for Haitian children, the child protection sub-cluster in the Dominican Republic is now working with CONANI to draw lessons from the current protocol and lobby the Government for a general protocol on child protection.

### ***Making the best of a difficult situation***

The picture of Haiti painted by the international media in the first few weeks after the earthquake<sup>32</sup> was of a country awash with 'orphans' – 380,000 of them to be exact, a figure attributed to UNICEF – usually without the rider that, in the Haitian context, 'orphan' might refer to a child who had lost only one parent. Yet the English word, like the French *orphelin*, is quite unambiguous: an orphan is a child whose mother and father are both deceased. Whatever else might have been going on, and whatever the political

buffeting it received because of the controversy centred on inter-country adoption, it is difficult to see now why UNICEF allowed this simple linguistic ambiguity to continue in the public forum. According to UNICEF's 25 January 2010 'Statement of Concern on Child Protection in Haiti':

*"While published figures of 380,000 orphans in Haiti is [sic] technically correct, the number is misleading. The number of orphans (children who have lost both parents) before the earthquake in Haiti was 50,000. This higher number refers to children who have lost one or both parents."*

The figure of 380,000 'orphans' was not then and never had been 'technically' correct. The idea that 4 per cent of the entire Haitian population was orphaned was never credible, but the massive publicity given to Haitian orphanhood opened the door, at one end of the spectrum, to inter-country adoption agents, and at the other end to groups that were no more than child abductors.

Once the perception of mass orphanhood took hold, UNICEF – with its perfectly reasonable pre-existing position that irreversible inter-country adoption should be a last resort (especially in the immediate aftermath of a major disaster) – began to be confronted with what one child protection specialist described as "palpable hostility". Against this understanding that large numbers of children were without family, through private diplomacy and proactive communications and advocacy, including the despatch to Haiti of a senior communications adviser, UNICEF successfully turned the inter-country adoption around and "re-framed" the issue, as one senior communicator put it.

In this scenario, UNICEF remained forthright – if not outright effective – in advocating for a solution in which unaccompanied children would be kept safe, initially with caregivers who had provided them with shelter, or in separate tents (and eventually in schools) until unified with one of their birth parents or another suitable caregiver.

### **What did not work well**

#### ***Slow practical response on the ground***

Although its policy position was clear and consistent, UNICEF's practical response was slow to get off the ground: Setting up child-friendly spaces, providing tented accommodation for the orphanages that were destroyed and ensuring adequate supplementary feeding for children in orphanages all took up to four weeks to get started. The child protection results in the UNICEF one-month report could not give a definitive number of residential care facilities that had been surveyed, saying only that nearly 230 of them had received child protection kits. It was only able to record that, with UNICEF support, the Brigade de Protection des Mineurs<sup>33</sup> and L'Institut du Bien Être Social et de Recherches (IBESR)<sup>34</sup> were "in the process of closing" three centres where abuse had been discovered; and it said only that 33 child-friendly spaces had been set up by child protection sub-cluster 'partners', without specifying the exact contribution from UNICEF, the sub-cluster leader. As no assessment was done on the ground, the question of the scale of the response is difficult for the review team to determine. Information management in the sub-cluster remained weak due to lack of proper assessment data before or after the earthquake.

#### **Key finding**

UNICEF's child protection programme in Haiti prior to the earthquake was weak and a strong programme base was not created speedily after the quake. This undermined the organization's efforts to provide examples of the alternatives it advocated (family reunification and care in the community) to the remedies Haitians gravitated toward naturally after the disaster: institutionalization and adoption, or the *restavek* system.<sup>35</sup> Given the complex nature of child protection issues that arose following the quake, UNICEF's advocacy outpaced its programmatic response. Had there been a strong programme on the ground, UNICEF would have been far more effective in dealing with the child protection issues that arose in Haiti.

## 2.3 Nutrition

### Overview

The Nutrition Cluster was activated within one week of the earthquake and its first meeting was held in Haiti on 20 January. Initially UNICEF sent in a number of consultants to coordinate the cluster who were unfamiliar with the organization. The first cluster coordinator deployed was new to UNICEF, had not yet received training on cluster coordination and did not speak French. At the global level there was no global Nutrition Cluster coordinator in place when the earthquake struck, and UNICEF HQ's Nutrition section also had two vacant posts.

UNICEF's own nutrition programme capacity in the country prior to the earthquake was rudimentary. A senior nutritionist from HQ was sent to Haiti whose presence helped in initiating the first cluster meeting.

It was identified early on in the Nutrition Cluster situation reports<sup>36</sup> that key nutrition issues to be addressed by UNICEF and the cluster were interventions to prevent and treat acute malnutrition through blanket supplementary feeding, infant and child feeding, controlling infant formula distribution and use, supporting pregnant and lactating mothers and addressing micro-nutrient deficiencies.

UNICEF's operations in the initial couple of weeks<sup>37</sup> after the earthquake focused on organizing a mass campaign to allow the distribution of prophylactic vitamin A to children 6–59 months,<sup>38</sup> therapeutic nutritional supplies for pregnant and lactating women, de-worming medication and therapeutic zinc for diarrhoea treatment.

### What worked well

#### *Effective partnering to meet identified needs*

UNICEF was acknowledged by its government counterpart as one of the first agencies to provide supplies in January. The Nutrition Cluster was co-led by the Director of the National Nutrition Programme from the onset. Action Contre la Faim seconded a full-time staff member for nutrition surveillance and infant and young child feeding programming to the cluster, who worked with the Cluster Coordinator and Information Manager.

Another critical intervention UNICEF was able to facilitate jointly with Save the Children and the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance was on the sensitive issue of infant formula. Distribution of breast milk substitutes is normally a taboo in humanitarian response. Nutritional assessments of a number of infants, however, showed that there was an urgent need to procure appropriate breast milk substitutes, with feeding practices tightly managed. The Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance and UNICEF worked together and hired a specialist in infant feeding in emergencies. This sensitive issue was facilitated through the cluster meetings.<sup>39</sup> The response involved establishment of community management of acute malnutrition (CMAM) programmes to treat severe and moderate acute malnutrition in all earthquake-affected areas. Baby tents were already put in place in the second week after the earthquake to ensure safe places for breastfeeding as well support for and counselling on infant and young child feeding.

### What did not work well

#### *Nutritional surveillance*

The foundation of nutritional programming is good surveillance. Even as late as March there was no systematic surveillance system covering children under five and other vulnerable groups. Whatever planning and response was taking place was instead based on anecdotal evidence and sporadic reports from various camps brought to the cluster meetings. In April 2010 UNICEF initiated a nutrition survey that found that malnutrition was at roughly the same level as before the quake – 5 per cent – suggesting that overall nutritional status was not a priority, but concurrently NGOs and cluster members found significant pockets of malnutrition among infants. This prompted the recognition in UNICEF of the need for more robust monitoring of infants. The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP), World Health

Organization (WHO), World Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF started a programme to prevent severe malnutrition in infants and children living in makeshift shelters across Port-au-Prince.

### ***Confusion over cluster mandate***

The confusion over UNICEF's cluster mandate and its own response that played out in other sectors affected the organization's nutrition response as well. The Nutrition Cluster identified the elderly as a particularly vulnerable group for supplementary nutritional intervention. However, as UNICEF's mandate is focused on women and children, there was initial resistance from senior UNICEF staff and its Nutrition Section to the cluster prioritizing the elderly.<sup>40</sup>

### **Key finding**

The Nutrition Cluster and Nutrition Section remained understaffed – in terms of both number and quality – for most of the response. This shortfall affected UNICEF's ability to provide a strategic response in the area. It is understood that within the UNICEF system there are only a small number of nutrition specialists, which affects its ability to deploy in rapid-onset emergencies. Moreover, unlike the WASH Cluster, use of standby partners and institutional contracts with specialist organizations as an approach to rapid deployment is not well developed in the Nutrition Cluster (or programme).

## **2.4 Gender-based violence**

### **Overview**

Before the quake, according to the clear but largely anecdotal professional consensus reported to the review team, Haiti had one of the highest national baselines for gender-based violence. Yet the subject was and is surrounded by an even stronger taboo there than in many other societies.

Specialists in gender-based violence told the review team of a "steady but moderate increase" in cases in the aftermath of the quake, in which most victims were girls under 18 who knew their attackers – an issue with which the UNICEF emergency response does not appear to have been commensurate. The review team was told, albeit anecdotally by one external interviewee, that UNICEF appeared to have "paid little or no attention to women in camps. WFP was better prepared", a sentiment which was echoed by several interlocutors. The review team was unable to conclude, based on the evidence provided, precisely what UNICEF was and was not able to accomplish in the area of GBV.

### **What worked well**

The review found no evidence of concrete actions to address gender-based violence, especially with regard to UNICEF data pertaining to the first three months, except to note that an inter-agency Gender Standby Capacity (GenCap) Adviser worked with various clusters including the child protection sub-cluster and the issue was flagged up early on in the response.

### **What did not work well**

#### ***Confusion over leadership of the sub-cluster***

There was confusion over the leadership of the gender-based violence sub-cluster<sup>41</sup> in the first month of the response. Globally, UNFPA and UNICEF are co-lead agencies for the sub-cluster and UNICEF's humanitarian mandate also requires it to focus on gender-based violence as part of its child protection programming. However, neither organization could provide much leadership on the issue as neither had adequate capacity in the country. UNFPA was designated as the country lead agency in Haiti for the

gender-based violence sub-cluster, and UNICEF provided human resources and technical and material support for gender-based violence coordination.

The new CCCs give as the top 'Response' item in the section on child protection to:

*Establish, activate and support coordination mechanisms for child protection, gender-based violence and MHPSS [Mental Health and Psychosocial Support] in consultation with the government and other partners to coordinate rapid assessment, mapping, funding, strategy development and involvement of affected populations.*<sup>42</sup>

However, in the early months of the response UNICEF had only one gender-based violence focal point (it took a month for the organization to deploy a gender-based violence specialist), and to this day it remains unclear where the issue sits within child protection. This was despite the emergence of rape in the camps as an issue before the end of January 2010, initially as an apparent consequence of the escape of thousands of convicted criminals from the national penitentiary.<sup>43</sup> It was reported by UNICEF surge staff that it had taken up to four months to install lighting for toilet areas in some camps using UNFPA materials – a key security precaution that might have helped combat sexual violence.

### **Prioritization issue**

In the interviews with child protection and senior programme staff in UNICEF, the review team observed that compared to child rights and protection issues, gender issues – and most of all gender-based violence – did not figure prominently in the discussions.<sup>44</sup> It could be simply that as UNFPA is the lead agency on the gender-based violence sub-cluster and IOM is the lead agency on camp coordination, Haiti CO staff assumed that these two agencies would take the lead in developing plans to address issues of gender-based violence. Or it could also be that gender analysis still does not figure prominently in humanitarian programming – something this limited study can only surmise. The review cannot draw firm conclusions on whether or not it remains a systemic issue, as was noted in a study in 2007.<sup>45</sup> Within child protection itself, gender-based violence was largely treated as a siloed issue and not a cross-cutting dimension of programming.

### **Key finding**

It is unclear to the review team how gender-based violence was prioritized in the entire programme. The team's overall conclusion is that while placing gender-based violence and child protection together as they are in the revised CCCs makes logical sense, the former is not yet sufficiently integrated/mainstreamed into UNICEF's other sectoral work (e.g., washing facilities for women in displaced camps were set up without any privacy; tents were to be shared by two families).

## **2.5 Education**

### **Overview**

The Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnel d'Haïti (MENFP) concluded that some 80 per cent of schools in the most severely affected Ouest province and up to 40 per cent in Sud-Est province were destroyed in the quake – as many as 5,000 separate institutions in total. The Education Ministry was one of those that lost its main building in Port-au-Prince, and five senior officials and a number of other key advisers died.<sup>46</sup>

The revised CCCs require UNICEF to ensure that “education is integrated in flash appeals, donor briefings, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and other funding proposals in order to guarantee that the sector is given adequate attention.”<sup>47</sup> The spirit of the CCCs places education squarely within the emergency response.

As in other programme areas, education too suffered from delayed deployment of staff in both UNICEF's response as well as in its co-leadership of the Education Cluster with Save the Children.

## **What worked well**

### ***Reopening of schools***

A success for UNICEF advocacy in the first three months of the response was the reopening of schools that began on 5 April. (See *Section 2.8 Advocacy*.) Haiti's Education Minister is quoted as saying<sup>48</sup> that, but for UNICEF, schools would not have re-opened before the following school year in September 2010.

The significance of this achievement was immense for both the affected communities and the Government. According to government officials and UNICEF staff interviewed, the huge cultural importance of education in Haiti made the reopening of schools key to generating at least the feeling of momentum toward recovery – especially given the almost complete absence (in early April 2010) of any other such signals such as rubble removal or large-scale transition shelter construction.

Most schools in Haiti are privately run. After the earthquake, affected communities were unable to pay the fees for children and in many cases children had been left orphaned. The proprietors who ran these schools were also affected by the earthquake and unable to bear the running expenses. If the Government wanted them reopened, at least six months' worth of salary had to be guaranteed and the schools (indirectly students) had to be subsidized. Through joint advocacy with other humanitarian actors, UNICEF succeeded in getting the World Bank to step in with contributions to the Government to fund the cost of teachers' salary.

### ***Rapid delivery of school supplies***

By the end of the first month, by its own account, UNICEF schools-in-a-box or early childhood development kits for 250,000 children were en route or being distributed by partners; the organization planned to have school tents equipped with educational materials set up in 20 quake settlements; 540 kits had been distributed to residential child-care centres and a further 800 kits and boxes were being distributed for some 10,000 children in areas not directly affected by the quake.

In the 90-day report, UNICEF was able to report that it was:

- Continuing to facilitate the re-opening of 120 priority schools, which began on 5 April.
- Supplying water and sanitation facilities and doing other repair work at 28 of 120 priority schools identified by the Education Ministry.
- Distributing 200,000 kits containing essential school supplies for 600 schools to support enrolment and attendance.

The organization had also completed the distribution of 870 schools-in-a-box; 1,495 development kits and a further 2,226 recreation kits; and 1,400 tents for temporary classrooms. Some 4,000 schools had been surveyed and mapped by a team of 54 UNICEF enumerators.

The education sector in Haiti appears to have been one of the main beneficiaries of UNICEF's newly streamlined Supply Division, whose relative success in the Haiti response is noted elsewhere in this report. (See *Section 3.3 Operations support*.)

## What did not work well

### ***Co-chair responsibility for Education Cluster***

Staffing issues were identified as a critical weakness of the early response in Haiti.<sup>49</sup> A Haiti CO Education Chief arrived only after a month. In the first month there was only one international education staff member for both the UNICEF programme and cluster, working with one local staff member. For most of the first three months there was no separation within UNICEF between its cluster role and programme, which created confusion among cluster members and government authorities.

There was also a lack of clarity between Save the Children and UNICEF on their respective roles and responsibilities as co-leads, which resulted in tensions – a finding echoed in a recent independent review of the two organizations' co-leadership of the cluster, which found this to be a more far-reaching global challenge for UNICEF.<sup>50</sup> Information management remained weak throughout the response. A lessons-learned exercise by the cluster in July 2010 found there was some duplication of effort with other clusters, particularly psychosocial support, which sits between the education and child protection (sub-)clusters.

### **Key finding**

UNICEF's programme response in education was generally effective in reopening the schools, assisted by its lobbying with the Government and the World Bank, and the organization provided rapid supplies of school equipment. However, the cluster leadership was weak due to inadequate staff deployment as well as an inability to clarify roles and responsibilities between UNICEF and the other co-lead, Save the Children.

## **2.6 Health<sup>51</sup>**

### **Overview**

The Health Cluster was led by the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and attended by UNICEF health staff. Due to the damage to the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and loss of key health staff, there was only one representative in the Ministry for UNICEF to work with. The primary focus of the health programme<sup>52</sup> in the first month of the response was on:

- Emergency immunization activities;
- Re-establishment of routine Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI), including cold chain assessment and rehabilitation;
- Support for the re-establishment of primary care through support for level 1 and level 2 health facilities (mainly supplies);
- Exploring UNICEF's role in maternal and neonatal health within the H4<sup>53</sup> partnership; and
- Re-establishing HIV services.

UNICEF's health staff were involved in wider planning processes, including the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), the Transformative Agenda and the Government's strategic advisory groups such as maternal health. UNICEF's annual plan outlined a series of key health outcome areas, support to ensure immediate access to basic health care for women and children and support to emergency immunization activities. These outcomes related to UNICEF's support to re-establishing decentralized public health system for maternal, neonatal and child health services (including HIV services) at community and health facility level.

### **What worked well**

The three-month report noted that UNICEF had provided vaccines, injection devices and cold chain materials for the emergency vaccination campaign, with over 104,000 children aged 9 months to 7 years having been vaccinated and over 134 Emergency Health Kits and health basic units supplied to provide

the minimum package of health services to approximately 134,000 people for three months. UNICEF was further acknowledged for its support in rehabilitating health facilities that were damaged by, for example, re-establishing cold chain and providing vaccines. UNICEF also worked with the MSPP on health messaging on HIV/AIDS and breastfeeding, delivering messages through loudspeaker on trucks from February onwards.

### **What did not work well**

The challenge within the health programme, as with other programmes, was that the rapid turnover of staff caused delay in signing of partners' contracts. The high turnover also hindered the ability to distribute health services and materials to the population, as new staff brought new focus for the programme.

UNICEF gave less attention to the Health Cluster initially as the responsibility for leading it did not rest with the organization. This lack of involvement was linked to a lack of clear understanding of what UNICEF's role in the cluster was in the beginning. The Transformative Agenda enabled greater clarity around the health programme focus.

### **Key finding**

The review is inconclusive on UNICEF's performance in the health programme in the first three months due to lack of independently verifiable data for this period.

## **2.7 Media and communications**

### **Overview**

#### ***Haiti: a media crucible***

To a greater extent than most other major disasters, the Haiti earthquake was a media crucible. This contributed to the uniqueness of this event.

Haiti has long been one of the most accessible, coverable newsworthy countries in the world. There have not been any visa restrictions for journalists at least since the days of François ('Papa Doc') Duvalier; reporters, including TV crews, are free both to come and go as they please and move around once in the country. Haiti is also situated on the doorstep of the largest and most advanced media market in the world, the United States, which is home to a significant Haitian diaspora and a short flight away from the unfolding story for the media.

The outside world displayed a higher degree of emotional involvement with Haitians after the earthquake than they were to subsequently with, for example, the victims of Pakistan's 'superflood'. Haiti is widely perceived to have a tragic history to which was added, in the years immediately before the quake, the curse of repeated, destructive climatic disasters, especially the hurricanes of 2008. Yet equally its people are regarded as unusually heroic, long-suffering, innocent and deserving of outside sympathy and assistance. Emblematic of this pathos is the rapid, massive outpouring of private and public donations to the Haiti response, spurred on by - numerous media vehicles.

It has been demonstrated time and again in recent years that seismic disasters triggered by natural events that begin and end in minutes, if not seconds, get proportionately more media coverage and attention than 'slow-onset' floods or droughts. Earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions also generate discrete anniversaries that provide focal points for extended coverage: in Haiti, the one-month, three-month, 100-day, six-month, 10-month and one-year anniversaries of 12 January 2010 have all been marked by journalists to some degree or other with additional coverage and, often, return visits.



For these reasons and others, the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake was always certain to be “one of the most closely scrutinized in modern times,” as one senior UNICEF communicator put it, with reputations of responding humanitarian agencies on the line as rarely before.

## **What worked well**

### ***Media interviews***

Against this backdrop, it cannot be entirely a coincidence that the first item recorded in the minutes of the first emergency teleconference by senior managers on 13 January 2010 was that “Communication with media needs to be tackled as soon as possible”. Those minutes also note that the TACRO Regional Communication Specialist was asked to travel to Haiti immediately.

Yet the Communication Specialist did not arrive in Haiti until Friday 15 January, some 48 hours after many media crews had already flown in from the United States (the BBC, for example). Even then, although she had been given basic clearance to go by TACRO, her success had more to do with her own determination (she managed to reach Port-au-Prince by hitching a ride on a helicopter) than with any clear organizational preparedness driving emergency communications in the immediate aftermath. Part of the ‘personality’ of the Haiti disaster, according to another senior UNICEF communicator interviewed by the review team, was that “the journalists got in first”. What became a written commitment in the 2010 CCCs to disseminate information to the media, the public and National Committees “within 24 hours” of disaster striking does not seem to have been reflected in any effort on UNICEF’s part to get media officers into Haiti on 13 January by the most obvious available air routes – including direct flights from the United States and search-and-rescue charters.

The picture of UNICEF’s emergency communications the review team has gathered is rather one of broad success with interview work, much of which was carried out for about the first 10 days after the earthquake by media officers at HQ and later on by senior communications staff who arrived in Haiti on 20 January. The quarterly media monitoring carried out for the Division of Communications (DOC) in New York illustrates this: reporting on UNICEF surged immediately after the earthquake, peaked during the first full week after the disaster – partly due to media attention to fundraising activities like the ‘Hope for Haiti Now’ telethon – and then gradually fell for the rest of the quarter.

In terms of raw profile in the retail media generated by (mainly telephone) interviews, UNICEF did well in the early stages of the emergency response. Assessed on a purely quantitative basis,<sup>54</sup> the UNICEF communications effort was a success: Many of the early interviews may have been conducted from HQ, but there were hundreds of them nevertheless. It was only when UNICEF was able to report in strength from inside Haiti itself after 20 January (when a communications team was deployed in the country) that it began to be given prominence in major international outlets. At a time when the humanitarian community collectively was arguably under greater pressure to show results than ever before in its history, and despite some difficulty over the issue of inter-country adoption, UNICEF was not targeted by any particular media company as several other major organizations were.

In addition, key advocacy meetings were convened in New York and Geneva with broad participation of UN missions representing different countries, and these meetings provided opportunities for clear communication on adoption issues.

## **What did not work well**

### ***Rapid-response communications surge***

It took nearly 10 days to deploy senior communications staff with experience of emergency media management in Haiti. In the aftermath of the earthquake, UNICEF communicators found themselves engaged in essentially the same debate that is often held in big humanitarian agencies after major disasters – one that revolves around the question, ‘How can we be quicker?’

Although this debate is not unfamiliar after a sudden onset mega-disaster (also called a Level 3 emergency in UNICEF), new arguments can now be adduced in support of the very rapid deployment of communications assets – ideally matching the speed at which the commercial media themselves deploy. From UNICEF's point of view, the revised CCCs very clearly prioritize “accurate information *about the impact of the situation on children and women* [review team's emphasis] [for] National Committees and the general public through local and international media”.

In the revised CCCs, UNICEF seems to be consciously seeking to become a point of first reference for information-seekers of all kinds in the aftermath of a disaster. To some extent it is now trying, within its mandated area of responsibility, to actually supplant the media; however, it has yet to develop the procedures – or what one senior interviewee called the necessary “organizational reflex” – to do so.

The review team noted that new standard operating procedures for emergency communications have been approved by the OED in order to “ensure that rapid response communication surge support is provided within 48 hours of the onset of a sudden, large-scale emergency by the deployment of ... senior communication officers for an initial period of three to four weeks”.

### ***Servicing National Committees***

The evidence and testimony gathered by the review team suggests that UNICEF was much less successful in another important area: servicing the National Committees in at least the first days after the disaster, the most critical period for fundraising. In the immediate aftermath of a Level 3 disaster such as the Haiti earthquake, National Committees instantly found themselves in an intensely competitive situation, with domestic media turning to them for interviews and content. Five National Committee executives interviewed by the review team all said essentially the same thing: The organization was too slow to provide them with the information, human interest stories and audio-visual content (i.e., still photos and video) from the field that they needed to service their own markets.

When discussing the National Committees, it is important to be clear that they are speaking about the first few days after a disaster – even what many consider to be the vital first 24 hours. Again, from a merely corporate point of view, this gap can be covered (and initially was for UNICEF) by agile media officers fielding calls and meeting interview requests from their desks in New York, Geneva and Panama. But the National Committees need the kind of content for which the super-rapid field deployment typical of the modern commercial media is essential – but still beyond the capacity of UNICEF and indeed most humanitarian agencies and NGOs.

At this distance in time, it is difficult to be sure exactly what content was first made available by UNICEF, when and by what means – whether through its own website, or possibly thenewsmarket.com (its online content wholesaler) or another UN or social-media platform. A freelance photographer hired by the organization did manage to get into Haiti overland on Saturday 16 January, as is recorded in the minutes of the senior management teleconference of that day. In any case, the earliest the photographer's content could have been potentially available for National Committees would have been Monday morning 18 January – too late for maximum impact.

### ***Operational data for media***

As mentioned above, while media interviews were generally successful, for many weeks operational reporting data from the field (i.e., data on programmes) was far from adequate, and in some cases less than credible – a scenario that makes the job of humanitarian press officers exceedingly difficult. (See Section 4.)

### **Opportunity for the future**

In relation to media and communications, the review noted an interesting issue that is emerging and will play a significant role in future emergencies for all organizations: social media. The review is unable to

make clear recommendations based on lessons from Haiti alone; however, the issue is briefly outlined here as opportunity for UNICEF to consider for future response.

### ***Social media playing an increasing role***

An important aspect of the Haiti earthquake alluded to by several of the communicators the review team interviewed was the exponential rise in the importance of social media. The Twitter group '#relativesinhaiti' was instantly flooded with traffic after the quake, while '#rescuemehaiti' was used both to direct rescuers to trapped survivors and as a valuable tool for reporters. The writer of one anonymous debrief made available to the team pointed out that "UNICEF needs to develop a social media strategy for the organization in general and for emergencies in particular. Haiti was the first major 'digital/online' emergency UNICEF had dealt with. UNICEF used Facebook, Twitter, etc., for communicating during the response, but the impact could have been stronger if UNICEF had a clear strategy for social media." At the moment, it seems it does not.

It is also important to note that the Haiti earthquake was the first disaster in which the Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities (CDAC) network – a loose coalition of UN agencies, NGOs and the Red Cross and Red Crescent set up by the media NGO Internews – became operational. It aims to coordinate messaging and to ensure best use of resources, but it might also be described as an attempt by the humanitarian community to remain relevant as the era fast approaches, some believe, when individual beneficiaries will communicate directly with individual private donors via social media.

### **Key finding**

UNICEF managed its media profile well. However, owing to late deployment of appropriate communications staff, UNICEF was relatively late with content related to its work on the ground and the human-interest stories about real people and communities in Haiti that the National Committees and fundraisers needed for maximum impact. Equally importantly, UNICEF's capacity and deployment on the ground did not demonstrate that it was in a position to generate accurate information about the impact of the situation on children and women for National Committees and the general public through local and international media, as per its commitments in the CCCs.

## **2.8 Advocacy**

### **Overview**

#### ***Key issues in the early weeks***

Any discussion of UNICEF advocacy in Haiti will centre on child protection and in particular the issue of inter-country adoption, made especially awkward because in some countries, for a while at least, the organisation found itself at odds with public opinion, as crystallised by the mainstream media.

The leading message in UNICEF's first quarter coverage was that children in Haiti "need to be found, fed and kept healthy and safe". This message appeared in 13 per cent of all reports<sup>55</sup> and 20.5 per cent of reports focusing on emergencies.

Apart from child protection, there were three other central issues that needed advocacy at various levels to complement programmatic response on the ground: (a) reopening of schools, (b) challenges of sanitation and (c) gender-based violence.<sup>56</sup> These are discussed below.

## **What worked well**

### ***Statement on inter-country adoption***

Child trafficking and the *restavek* system have long been key protection issues in Haiti. The internal UNICEF country report for 2009 spells out the dangers very clearly – especially the key point that children in Haitian ‘orphanages’ were not necessarily orphans:

*“Due to poor regulation, children are placed in institutions (orphanage, crèches) irrespective of the survival of their parents, thus leaving a large number of children with living parents in orphanages for unlimited periods of time. These children are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse, illegal adoptions and trafficking. Though no estimates exist, it is widely felt the 2008 natural disasters could have increased exposure of affected children to violence, abuse, exploitation and illegal adoption, especially for those separated/or at risk of separation from family.”*

Nothing that happened in Haiti in the child protection area in the second half of January 2010 – and certainly not the sudden increase in dubious inter-country adoptions – should have come as a surprise to anyone familiar with UNICEF's own recent report on the country.

Accordingly, a 19 January statement by then-Executive Director Ann Veneman made it clear UNICEF believed that only if efforts to reunite children with their families failed, “and after proper screening has been carried out, should permanent alternatives like adoption be considered by the relevant authorities. Screening for international adoption for some Haitian children had been completed prior to the earthquake. Where this is the case, there are clear benefits to speeding up their travel to their new homes.”

The UNICEF position – consistent with international standards, including the Hague Convention and those of International Social Service (ISS), was in the record as of that day, and the Veneman statement would have been enough for press officers in the field to make it clear to journalists where the organization stood. UNICEF was able to manage its profile through its advocacy efforts, and through its consistent corporate messaging developed in collaboration with the field and the New York HQ and shared with all communications officers around the world.

### ***Reopening of schools***

Another success for UNICEF advocacy, as discussed in Section 2.5 above, was the reopening of schools that began on Monday 5 April within three months of the earthquake.

It is important to note here that the advocacy case that schools should re-open as soon as possible was not entirely uncontroversial in early 2010. Most schools in Haiti are private businesses, run for profit, and they reopened for commercial reasons as much as any, in some cases – allegedly – without worrying too much about what might happen to the quake-affected people who were camping out on their property. It was, of course, an insoluble dilemma – all the more so given the cultural centrality of schooling in Haiti. But UNICEF spoke out when it might have been more comfortable to hedge.

## **What did not work well**

### ***Lack of a proactive stand***

It is not clear to the review team why UNICEF's early stand on the inter-country adoption issue that featured prominently in the headlines in the early days of the response did not produce more proactive public communication on the subject. Although the statement by the then-Executive Director came out on 19 January, what remains at issue here is not so much the existence of a ‘line’ but whether UNICEF was prepared to reaffirm it loudly and publicly – and in time to stop some children incorrectly believed to be

orphans from being taken out of Haiti for adoption. Instead of proactively putting out UNICEF's own message, the 'line' was issued on an 'if asked' basis – in other words defensively, not to be volunteered. A senior National Committee manager noted the sensitivity of the issues at hand, and the desire of the organization to communicate conservatively in this regard.

In the end the organization's case was helped by events, namely the arrest of 10 members of a US-based church group trying to take a group of more than 30 Haitian children into the Dominican Republic in a suspected illicit adoption scheme.

In its report on those arrests, the Reuters news agency said Haitian authorities feared legitimate aid groups might have flown earthquake 'orphans' out of the country for adoption before efforts to find their parents had been exhausted – surely an example, if ever there was one in the emergency phase of the Haiti response, of the commercial media preparing the ground for humanitarian advocacy.

### ***Advocacy for more sensible, cost-effective sanitation solutions***

On some issues, the international community might have reasonably looked to UNICEF for guidance, and perhaps the most important of these was the question of sanitation, described by one senior interviewee as "one of the toughest challenges in Haiti" and by another as "impossible". It could be argued now that UNICEF, as the cluster leader for WASH, could have advocated for a more realistic appraisal of the true situation and done so more prominently than, for example, the throwaway mention of the vital underlying issues buried on page 26 of its three-month progress report: "The construction of latrines is a challenge due to the lack of availability of space, the shallow water table and lack of permission to dig by government and land owners. As an interim strategy, UNICEF is distributing and maintaining portable latrines – but this is also not sustainable." The report might also have mentioned that, as noted earlier, much of the Haitian capital is built on hard sedimentary rock into which it is difficult if not impossible to dig latrines.

The point here is not that UNICEF failed to advocate for a particular course of action on sanitation but that it failed to accurately and fully detail the 'challenge' of the sanitation issue in Haiti and allowed unrealistic expectations of what the humanitarian community could do to grow. It was cholera, not accurate assessment and public advocacy that illustrated to the outside world just how abysmal the level of sanitation in Haiti was before the quake and remains to date.

### ***Gender-based violence***

A similar point might be made about the issue of gender-based violence, including the horrifying issue of rape in the quake camps that has had more publicity than almost any other over the past year. Rape and domestic violence are, in the first instance, law enforcement issues; humanitarians cannot directly provide security and are not asked to, but they can advocate for it. It is difficult to quantify the organization's advocacy effort as a whole or to, for example, aggregate and assess the impact of all the various interviews conducted by press officers in the field or from HQ. But it was not clear to the review team, based on the available data, that UNICEF really rose to the challenge of speaking out on gender-based violence.

### **Key finding**

The revised CCCs are relatively ambitious for advocacy, which they say constitutes "an integral part of humanitarian action", should be "evidence based" and undertaken "in partnership with others". It is difficult to say that in Haiti UNICEF advocacy comfortably passed muster on any of these counts. While UNICEF's advocacy appears to have succeeded on the issue of reopening of schools, its voice was weak on the crucial issues of sanitation and gender-based violence.

## 2.9 Clusters

### Overview

The inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti examined the performance of clusters. Additionally, UNICEF's internal discussions<sup>57</sup> on mainstreaming the cluster approach took on board several important lessons coming out of the Haiti experience and hence are not repeated here.

Broader issues about clusters that have arisen in the past<sup>58</sup> resurfaced in Haiti: What does leading a cluster mean? Is it coordination or leadership? Does UNICEF really have the authority to lead? Do cluster members understand what their roles and responsibilities are and what the extent of UNICEF's authority is? What is the range of expectations of donors regarding clusters? Is it possible to coordinate hundreds of agencies that appear for a few weeks, many with no idea about clusters or basic humanitarian principles? Should clusters concentrate on maximizing the collective impact of only those who have the capacity, resources and capability rather than try to achieve the impossible – 'coordinating' every actor that arrives on the scene? How does UNICEF separate its cluster leadership from its own programme delivery?

UNICEF has been raising these issues at inter-agency forums, and discussions are on-going at the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in order to clarify responsibilities and accountabilities of cluster lead agencies and cluster members.

The main issues that arose internally were a lack of clarity about the level of resources necessary for effective cluster coordination, UNICEF's responsibility toward supporting the clusters it is leading, and a lack of understanding of the need to separate the organization's cluster functions from its own programmes.

### What worked well

#### *Timeliness*

UNICEF-led clusters were generally compared favourably by external interlocutors with those led by other agencies. The WASH Cluster met the day after the earthquake. The Nutrition Cluster was active within about a week and the Education Cluster was up and running by the second week after the quake.

#### *Working with the Government*

UNICEF made considerable efforts to ensure that the clusters they led also had government leadership. This worked well in WASH (with DINEPA), but less so with Education and Child Protection because the government focal points and institutions in these areas were either destroyed or otherwise directly affected by the earthquake.<sup>59</sup> In the WASH Cluster, there was a Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) mechanism in collaboration with the Government that encouraged agencies to hold each other to account and provided management oversight. It had the participation of a limited number of agencies and donor representatives that could contribute to strategic discussions.

### What did not work well

#### *Lack of understanding in UNICEF about the cluster lead agency role and mandate*

The roles and responsibilities of the clusters were not understood by Haiti CO staff or regular cluster members. This was demonstrated at various levels: Cluster staff were deployed in Jacmel to oversee UNICEF operations; cluster programmatic results were reported as UNICEF results; there was confusion over when to involve UNICEF HQ programme staff support and when to engage global cluster support; and UNICEF staff questioned the Nutrition Cluster's decision to prioritize elderly people for food distribution.

UNICEF is still struggling to balance its cluster lead agency accountabilities and its mandate for promoting and protecting children's and women's rights in humanitarian situations. Many senior managers, section chiefs and representatives were not trained in clusters and had no experience of working with them.<sup>60</sup> In some clusters (Education in particular), for most of the response the UNICEF programme head doubled as cluster coordinator, creating confusion among cluster members and government officials. In clusters where the roles were separated, cluster coordinators were often treated as subordinates by heads of programmes and staff.

### ***Cluster staff de-prioritized in operations support***

All cluster staff in Haiti had to endure a systemic lack of telecommunications facilities, office space, accommodation, vehicles and IT support, as senior in-country UNICEF staff initially thought clusters were self-contained units outside the Haiti CO. A senior CO staff member acknowledged that in the allocation of accommodation in Camp Charlie, cluster staff were considered last as they were under the impression that clusters were the responsibility of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This might have been compounded by the fact that some cluster support staff also asserted independence from UNICEF<sup>61</sup> by refusing to cooperate on matters such as vehicle sharing when there was a shortage of vehicles.

### ***High staff turnover and poor deployment***

UNICEF-led clusters suffered from high staff turnover from the early days of the response, especially in the Education and Nutrition Clusters and child protection sub-cluster. Too many cluster coordinators came and went after spending between two and four weeks and this "made it difficult to build relations," according to one of the CEOs of a member of the child protection sub-cluster. "Most of our time in cluster meetings was spent on briefing and educating the cluster coordinators, and by the time this is done, we don't see this person in the next meeting – someone else will have replaced him."

As discussed in previous sections, deployment remained weak in numbers and quality in all clusters except WASH. Although UNICEF deployed about 45 specialists from standby partners, there was often a lack of understanding as to how to manage them. Standby partner staff were deployed for cluster roles but additionally assigned to work as security focal points for UNICEF in Jacmel, for example; a senior WASH specialist was kept in the Dominican Republic for over a month when he could have been deployed in Haiti on 16 January.

### ***Weak information management capacity***

Information management, a critical function of all cluster lead agencies, remained under-resourced in all clusters. Efforts in this area were not synchronized across different clusters, contributing to gaps in inter-cluster coordination and leading to inadequate capacity deployment for geographic information systems (GIS) mapping and even for setting up functioning websites for the clusters. Overall information management was generally poor for several months into the response, and clear standard operating procedures had not been established for gathering, collating and analysing vital information, according to cluster coordinators as well as external key informants.

### **Key finding**

Although UNICEF was able to start the cluster meetings early on, in all but the WASH Cluster leadership capacity remained weak in the first three months due to several key factors:

- a) A lack of clarity in the relationship between the roles of heads of programme and cluster coordinators.
- b) Inadequate resourcing of some clusters (poor information management capacity, high staff turnover, coordinators at junior level).
- c) A lack of orientation of key staff (in the CO as well as at HQ) on UNICEF's role as cluster lead agency, coupled with a lack of understanding of how stand-by partnership on clusters worked.

## Recommendations

R2: Global cluster coordinators and country representatives should ensure that cluster coordinators are at the right level of seniority and experience, especially early on, and they should be treated on par with UNICEF programme heads.

R3: As part of ongoing training programmes, OED/EMOPS/PD/DHR need to ensure that all programme and operations managers, including country representatives and their deputies, are fully oriented on the concept of cluster lead agency and interagency processes in relation to cluster accountabilities.

R4: UNICEF needs to develop a cadre of highly trained information managers who can be deployed rapidly in any emergency and are able to support either its programmes or the clusters it leads. There is an opportunity to develop this as a career path for competent managers, as those trained and experienced in dealing with complex information management needs in large emergencies will be in high demand even in normal times in all countries.

## 2.10 Partnership

### Overview

UNICEF envisions the CCCs being realized through close collaboration with partners, including host governments, civil society organizations, national and international NGOs, other UN agencies, and donors. This is seen to be consistent with the organization's commitments under inter-agency humanitarian reform, including the Principles of Partnership. UNICEF has recently undertaken a review and consultation on its partnership with NGOs that identified areas for strengthening its partnership through the following modalities:<sup>62</sup>

- A prequalification system
- Institutional contracts
- Long-term agreements
- Fast-track policies and procedures
- Letters of intent

UNICEF deployed around 45 partner staff to Haiti under standby agreements. Part of the relationship entailed asking for support and part entailed partners offering supplies. UNICEF currently has 18 standby partners globally, both government agencies and NGOs, of which CANADEM (Canada's Civilian Reserve) and MSB (Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) were particularly large players in Haiti. A review of the standby agreements by UNICEF found that successful partnerships contributed to a cost-effective, quick, flexible and predictable response and built on partners' strengths and their comparative advantage.<sup>63</sup> It also found that, over time, these agreements in some cases resulted in a strategic alliance and development of shared standards.

### What worked well

Partners interviewed said that UNICEF Haiti had generally demonstrated a flexible and timely approach to administrative processes during the first three months, applying fast-track processes to programme cooperation agreements (PCAs) so that they were being processed in 2–3 weeks (they are now taking months). Standby partners were particularly prominent in the WASH Cluster during the first three months, when all three rapid response team members were deployed. In the later phase, a UNICEF WASH Cluster coordinator who had substantial experience of managing standby partnerships proved useful in advising the Haiti CO on how best to use these partners like rapid response teams.



## What did not work well

High staff turnover made it difficult to build relations. (To be fair, this was not unique to UNICEF but was reportedly a problem with some partners as well.) Since the earthquake, Heartland Alliance had to deal with more than six chiefs of the Child Protection Section in UNICEF. This was compounded by the fact that UNICEF had no proper handover process.

While a considerable amount of flexibility was demonstrated during the first three months, UNICEF's management processes in the later phase were not adapted to quick decisions on partners' proposals.<sup>64</sup>

### Key finding

UNICEF's standby partnerships enabled it to respond quickly and increased coverage in several areas, especially in the WASH Cluster and child protection in the first three months, when UNICEF was able to deal with partners' requirements in a timely and flexible manner.

### Box 1: Summary of key findings on overall performance

UNICEF's overall performance in the Haiti earthquake response in the first three months is a story of mixed achievements and missed opportunities. Its successes in key areas of immediate relief assistance – namely, water supply to affected communities in Port-au-Prince and provision of non-food items, as well as in providing reasonably effective leadership to the WASH Cluster from early on – are widely acknowledged by external stakeholders and in the inter-agency real-time evaluation. Its ability to engage with and mobilize government institutions contributed to successful advocacy for the reopening of schools in Haiti sooner than would have otherwise been possible as well as the development of a child protection protocol in the Dominican Republic focusing especially on Haitian children brought into that country.

Underlying the success in these areas were two key factors: timeliness of action and responding to scale. In several other areas where UNICEF ought to have done equally well or better, its inability to act fast enough, flexibly enough and at scale prevented the organization from realizing a predictable response. UNICEF's results in areas such as nutrition, child protection and gender-based violence were sub-optimal due to understaffing at both programme and cluster levels. Although UNICEF was able to start cluster meetings early on, leadership capacity remained weak in the first three months except in the WASH Cluster.

## 3. FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE

Questions/issues examined: (i) How relevant and effective were the plans drawn up to facilitate the response and how was the implementation of the plans monitored and reported on? (ii) What mechanism was in place to track performance of the overall response at the institutional and country levels and how were accountabilities enforced? (iii) In instances where targeted results were not achieved, what factors were responsible and how were managers held accountable for the delivery of results? (iv) How timely and efficient were the administrative, financial, IT and logistics/supply systems that were put in place to support the response and to what extent did UNICEF's pre-existing guidelines, policies and procedures prove relevant and effective? (v) To what extent were UNICEF's human resources systems and capacity able to respond to the demands of a rapid and effective response as per the CCCs? (vi) How well did the internal management and decision-making processes work together to support the various programmes to achieve results and (vii) How clear, coherent and effective were internal coordination mechanisms (meetings, task groups, etc.) and decision-making processes at all levels?

### 3.1 Planning, monitoring and reporting

#### 3.1.1 Planning

##### Overview

The main planning documents developed in the first three months were the one-month plan, the three-month plan and the one-year Transformative Agenda. All of these were directly related to the CCC benchmarks and were supported by indicators and targets. Cluster coordination responsibilities were incorporated into the individual sectoral targets.

##### What worked well

The process of development of the Transformative Agenda was started early, in week three after the earthquake, and this helped Haiti CO staff gradually develop a coherent shape to the response over the following months, according to senior staff working in the office at the time.

##### What did not work well

##### ***Lack of realistic planning against which progress could be gauged***

Despite the overall coherence of the planning process, a lack of assessment data resulted in a lack of direct linkage of these plans to an accurate assessment of context.<sup>65</sup> Attention was focused on Port-au-Prince at the expense of adequate attention to the humanitarian needs in Léogâne and Jacmel. Owing to these gaps in assessment data, the work plan had a decreasing level of detail for each quarter and so was supplemented by a rolling three-month plan. This resulted in the planning documents being largely aspirational as they were not based on realities on the ground in terms of the identification of the most vulnerable and their needs.

The review team's analysis of planning documents revealed a number of gaps and challenges. First, they contain an excessive number (i.e., around 140) of generic indicators. These indicators should have laid the foundation for the performance-monitoring framework, but their number and vagueness made reporting against them unrealistic and impractical. This imprecision led to difficulties in establishing an appropriate system for collecting and analysing data that could provide decision makers with information in a timely manner.

## **Key finding**

Owing to the lack of proper needs assessment, plans were largely aspirational. The general and broad nature of planning laid the foundations for a reporting system that was unrealistic, impractical and caused difficulty in tracking the results set out in planning documents.<sup>66</sup>

### **3.1.2 Monitoring**

#### **Overview**

##### ***Reports from partners***

To help monitor and track the progress of the response, the Haiti CO's monthly work plan outlined a mechanism for a monthly review of work in each sector, as per the CCC benchmarks for coordination and delivery of programme outcomes in each sector and sub-sector.

The performance monitoring data in the situation reports came from a number of sources: extrapolated data provided in the planning documents, reports from partners and feedback through cluster meetings. Only limited baseline data existed and it was difficult to collate due to the scale of the emergency.

UNICEF relied on partners for information to track its own results. Partners were monitored through quarterly reports, but reports were not systematically received. There was very little quality assurance to verify information from partners, nor were partners supported to carry out monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities. Partners' reports were not linked to UNICEF plans, which meant that reporting against related indicators and targets did not happen. This created numerous challenges for UNICEF, most notably the inability to track the number of families that were supported by its programmes. This lack of valid and reliable data made credible reporting on results to donors and others difficult. This remains an ongoing challenge for UNICEF.

#### **What worked well**


The review could not identify any specific examples of success in this regard.

#### **What did not work well**

##### ***Tracking of results not prioritized***

The first M&E staff<sup>67</sup> were deployed in Haiti in the third week of February – that is, almost six weeks after the earthquake. The first round of the surge staff's focus was on UNICEF project monitoring, as shown in Figure 1 below. This involved prioritizing the CCC indicators that were in the plan and on which a monitoring framework could be based. Parallel to this was linking the programme cooperation agreement (PCA) reporting requirement with the prioritized CCC indicators, which meant coming up with a revised project proposal document that would then incorporate monitoring requirements and CCC indicators as an annex to the main PCA.

**Figure 1: Haiti Country Office M&E Strategy, April 2010**



With the arrival of the second round of surge and other support staff there was a shift in focus from project monitoring to surveillance. This resulted in rolling out the Multi-cluster Rapid Assessment Methodology (McRAM). Other plans included a five-year nationwide household survey, which was later postponed due to operational constraints. Additional consultants were brought in to carry out a rapid survey in camps, but it was later realized that the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as camp-management cluster leader, was already carrying out a similar survey and the planned UNICEF exercise was dropped.

The shift in focus from project/programme monitoring to situational monitoring in the first couple of months meant that tracking of results was not prioritized and programme managers were not held accountable for reporting against these results. In addition, the system itself had no quality assurance mechanism in place to validate any of the information that came to UNICEF from its partners. It was often a challenge to receive reports from partners, and those that were received were taken at face value without vetting of any kind.

As an agency that operates mainly through partners, UNICEF must also derive 'last-mile' distribution and activity data from those partners, which may be difficult in the emergency context. In the absence of these data, UNICEF personnel in Haiti defaulted to reporting on what is referred to as 'admin data' – about material procured, warehoused or delivered to partners, which were more easily gathered but in humanitarian terms gave no indication of outcomes – or even partner outputs.

***Inconsistency in reporting on results***

Inconsistency in the figures reported and a lack of concrete data available from programmes on results of implementation were noted by the Haiti CO early in the response. At the time of three-month review, it was stated that, as no PCA reports had been received, the M&E unit was not able to analyse the results of programme implementation and provide quality assurance on the results framework or monitoring

systems being put in place with NGO partners. It was decided that UNICEF would increase field monitoring of partners and M&E would support a programme to strengthen tools and mechanisms for PCA monitoring and reporting.

The present review did not examine in detail whether the situation improved in the latter phase of the response. However, staff interviewed indicated that getting programme teams and managers to prioritize monitoring still remains a challenge.<sup>68</sup>

### **Key finding**

The lack of prioritization of M&E by senior leadership resulted in UNICEF not being able to track its performance using hard data or to support partners in establishing adequate M&E and reporting systems toward this end.

### **Recommendation**

R5: In an emergency response UNICEF will to a large extent be in the hands of its implementing partners, both pre-existing and prospective, despite the revised PCA guidelines that incorporate tighter reporting requirements. For last-mile distribution data, UNICEF needs to simplify reporting formats and develop mechanisms for data gathering by and from partners.

## **3.1.3 Reporting**

### **Overview**

Solid reporting data is the raw material from which successful communications, advocacy and fundraising flow. UNICEF commits itself in the CCCs to providing this general information about the disaster “within 24 hours” (‘Response’, point one), whereas information about the “humanitarian response” must be conveyed to the external audience only “in a timely manner” (‘Commitment 2’) and/or “while media attention is at its peak” (‘Response’, point five) – which, in the case of Haiti, would have meant at the latest within about two weeks.

A clear implication of the CCCs is that UNICEF is now committed to ensuring assessment-based data on the humanitarian situation, within its mandated area, of a kind that was either absent or unsuccessful in Haiti. The inter-agency needs assessment was largely a failure and, according to several interviewees, UNICEF did not have good analysis and data on the situation of children and women.

Progress data on various activities were unavailable or unreliable for most of the first three months, as mentioned in the previous sub-section. The ‘End of April Review of the 3-Month Plan’, for example, noted inconsistency in the figures reported and a lack of concrete data available on results of implementation of the WASH programme.

### **What worked well**

#### ***Early deployment of reporting staff***

One success seems to have been the degree of staffing stability that was achieved relatively early on with the arrival in Haiti, just over two weeks after the quake, of an experienced, committed reports manager who was able to bring a degree of continuity to the material emanating from the country. This might have been the result of someone somewhere recognizing the importance of reporting or it might have been fortuitous; the review team did not unearth evidence on which to base a judgment. Either way, for M&E, there now exists in the Haiti CO a continuity of institutional memory stretching back to late January 2010.

### ***Ninety-day report***

In its public 90-day report UNICEF was able to record solid achievements including, in the crucial area of WASH, the unambiguous and valuable statement that “UNICEF’s contribution to the sanitation coverage achieved by the WASH Cluster is around 40 per cent.” (However, generally disaggregating what were UNICEF’s and what was the cluster’s achievements had been a recurrent problem in the UNICEF-led clusters.)

Broadly speaking, the further one stretches beyond the period under examination, from 12 January to the end of the notional three-month emergency phase under review here, the better the picture on operational reporting appears. However, the review team’s TOR obliges it to focus on the first three months, and here the picture is much more mixed – especially given the importance of reporting, as noted above, for communications and fundraising in the first half of that phase.

### **What did not work well**

#### ***Situation report data***

Situation reports were provided daily until early March, then every other day, then twice a week and finally weekly from June.<sup>69</sup> There was a large measure of consensus among those the review team interviewed – including National Committee executives, communicators and donors, who might regard themselves as ‘clients’ for reports – that operational reporting was an area of weakness overall.

Several National Committee interviewees said the first proper situation report was not available until 18 January; other national agencies were putting out better information than UNICEF. One major donor said UNICEF reporting was “patchy”. Another told the review team UNICEF reports contained “questionable” data. One senior communicator said he did not have sufficient confidence in the information coming out of the Haiti CO in the early stages of the response to warrant UNICEF sharing it with the media.

Possibly the most serious criticism of UNICEF reporting data the review team encountered came from a senior executive of a National Committee, who said that there had been great concern about the accuracy and consistency of the operational data coming out of Haiti from UNICEF: “The UNICEF figures on immunization especially varied and even went down sometimes – in the end we stopped handing them on to [the] media.” One senior interviewee told the review team that the content of UNICEF’s operational situation reports have long been a serious concern, while a Haiti-based interviewee said the early ones that came out of Haiti were of “no use” to donors.

Clearly, absence of data is one thing; putting out false data, even in good faith, is another.

#### ***“The higher the reports go, the more successful we are”***

Senior figures the review team spoke to alluded to the pressure – which is extreme in the early stages of a Level 3 response – to “say *something*” in the words of one (interviewee’s emphasis). It is very difficult to track the process by which it happens, but in extremis ‘something’ can morph into ‘anything’. One relatively junior interviewee said aptly: “The higher the reports go up the chain of command, the more successful we are.”

However, the review team did not come across any evidence of deliberate wholesale invention or massaging of figures. At one level, confusing data can find its way into official reports merely through insufficient care in the use of language. The mixing of tenses – jumbling up what is planned, what is underway and what is fully accomplished – is endlessly confusing to the consumers of humanitarian reports in general, including internal stakeholders. The use of the present continuous and future tense, especially, provides hostages to fortune.

For example, the situation report of 3 February reports that 12 prefabs from Panama were “being erected”. Then the one for 22–26 February reports that three 20-person office blocks have been

erected for Child Protection, Education and WASH and “will be ready for entry on 2 March”. The situation report of 2 March again notes that “three 20-person office blocks have been erected for Child Protection; Education; WASH – and will be ready for entry on 2 March”. The same report (2 March) continues, “12 two-room housing units (with bathrooms) are being erected, with the capacity to house 48 staff by the end of the week. An additional 12 housing units and two gender-segregated ablution blocks have been ordered.”

Only in the conference call of 10 March was it noted that all prefabs (six each for accommodation and offices) that were brought into the country had been erected by this date; as to the 12 housing units that were being erected as of 2 March, it is gathered from interviews with staff that these were actually ready around 25 March.

### **Progress reports**

*“Reporting by the UN family in general is evasive; it’s not extremely precise. The key elements are just not there. It’s a style of writing that fits their information management system.” – A donor representative in Haiti*

Some reports consisted mostly of general description of the disaster with very little data, liberally embellished with the continuous tense, such as this extract from the 90-day review for donors:

*“UNICEF’s global response to this rapid-onset emergency has been unprecedented. UNICEF has taken extraordinary measures to mobilize some 300 staff and consultants from around the world to work on the Clusters’ response, programmes and operations.... UNICEF, in line with its Core Commitments for Children and with its partners, has been delivering life-saving assistance to Haitian children in the sectors of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), nutrition, and health. As part of its commitments, UNICEF has been providing children with a sense of safety and normalcy through designated spaces and materials for education, recreation, and early childhood development. UNICEF has also been working towards building and strengthening systems to protect girls, boys and women from violence, exploitation, abuse and neglect.”*

The six-month report<sup>70</sup> is a slight improvement over the 90-day report and uses some data, although most of the programme data do not distinguish between UNICEF programme and cluster achievements:

- 500,000 children deemed extremely vulnerable and require child protection assistance.
- 90 per cent of schools in earthquake-affected areas affected, representing 23 per cent of all schools in the country, while over 1,500 education personnel died in the earthquake.
- Only one latrine available for 145 people on average in spontaneous sites.
- 333,000 people reached daily with safe water.
- More than 275,000 children immunized against major vaccine-preventable diseases.
- 126 outpatient therapeutic feeding programmes provide life-saving care to malnourished children.
- 185,000 children reached with basic education materials and 1,297 school tents for 155,000 learners.
- 62,800 children benefiting from 225 UNICEF-supported child-friendly spaces.

### **Key finding**

UNICEF’s operational reporting on its response, as required under the CCCs, remained weak due to its inability to collect, collate and systematically analyse data on its own operation. The organization has good mechanisms to track its resource deployments, or ‘admin data’, and systems and procedures are heavily geared towards this. However, it is weak when it comes to tracking outcomes or end results.

## Recommendation

R6: The use of the CCC benchmarks for reporting needs to be prioritized by CO management, and senior managers need to ensure that reports are based on outcomes rather than inputs.

## 3.2 Rapid deployment, human resources and staff well-being

### 3.2.1 Rapid deployment and human resources

#### Overview

#### *Capacity to support emergency deployment dismantled*

At the time of the earthquake, UNICEF did not have dedicated capacity within its Division of Human Resources (DHR) to deal with large-scale emergency deployments. The capacity that had existed within DHR to deal with surge in times of emergency was dismantled in late 2008 in the course of an internal restructuring of the Division and this affected UNICEF's ability to identify, recruit and process contracts. In the days following the earthquake, it was evident that the organization had no preparedness to deal with rapid deployment and human resources issues in a major disaster.

As a temporary measure, a staff member from Programme Division (PD) was assigned to work alongside DHR in dealing with Haiti recruitments. The surge roster, which was comprised mostly of internal staff, was not up to date. Even when staff were identified and approved within two weeks, it took up to two months for approval by DHR,<sup>71</sup> which delayed the rapid deployment process.

Moreover, it took nearly six months to develop a system to fast-track recruitment. These new fast-track measures were approved by the Deputy Executive Director (DED) for Management to speed up deployment for Haiti. The memo setting out the fast-track measures stated, "The organization is facing unprecedented challenges to respond to Haiti and requires extraordinary measures at corporate level to ensure Haiti country office has the capacity it needs to deliver the programme.... The recent risk audit for Haiti singled out human resources as the highest risk area not only for the Haiti country office, but for the organization."<sup>72</sup>

Two further factors affected recruitments for the Haiti response: (a) UNICEF's readily deployable emergency response team comprises only four people; and (b) the requirement of French language further restricted the pool of available candidates for deployment.

#### *Panic deployment*

All of these factors contributed to an intense flurry of deployments from different parts of HQ, resulting in them being made without any central coordination and sometimes without any TOR. As one staff exit debriefing note commented, "The tensions and conflicts created on account of a lack of TOR was significant. There was no clear channel of reporting and no idea of who people were and what they were supposed to do." This resulted in the Dominican Republic CO asking New York as early as 19 January to stop all deployments until arrangement for their accommodation and office infrastructure could be made.



## What worked well

### *Large volume of deployment*

The revised CCCs outline the following benchmarks for UNICEF to measure its performance on timeliness and effectiveness within the first eight weeks:

*“Appropriate and experienced staff and personnel with relevant deployment training are provided and rapidly deployed, primarily through internal redeployment of staff. This is complemented by external recruitment and standby personnel to allow for recruitment of possible longer-term posts, as needed.”<sup>73</sup>*

If measured only in terms of the sheer number of deployments, Haiti would certainly be considered a success story. Despite all the challenges with its roster and human resources system, the fact that a large number of staff (and standby partners) were deployed owes a great deal to the humanitarian spirit and commitment of individuals in an extremely difficult situation in Haiti. As of 7 April, the Haiti CO had 220 staff of which 111 were international professionals and 109 general services staff.<sup>74</sup> By any measure, this was a sizeable quantity. The number of people that went on surge to Haiti in 2010 was greater than the total number of deployments made during the whole of 2009.<sup>75</sup>

UNICEF deployed three highly experienced senior staff (D1 and D2) at different points in time to work alongside the Country Representative to advise and provide support to the latter in managing operations. These deployments were made for a significant length of time (6 to 10 weeks) starting in mid-February. They reportedly made a profound contribution to the management of the response, although in hindsight one wonders why they were not made earlier.

## What did not work well

The surge concentrated on numbers: getting a large number of people into the Dominican Republic and Haiti. This soon became counter-productive as several aspects of the process undermined the very purpose of rapid deployment: to deliver an effective and timely response. The following specific issues arose:

- ***Lack of continuity:*** Staff being deployed for a very short time led to a lack of continuity. This caused major problems later on as staff who went to Haiti for two to four weeks, especially in a supervisory or managerial role, initiated projects and other activities that were not followed through.<sup>76</sup> Some sections had up to five heads in the first three to four months. An official document noted, “The high turnover of UNICEF technical staff and management has slowed down negotiations with partners, and left emergency response proposals and supply orders pending for too long.”<sup>77</sup>
- ***Lack of proper TOR:*** Most people deployed in the early weeks did not have a proper TOR, creating confusion in the Haiti CO among existing staff as to who was doing what.
- ***Inadequate emphasis on deploying operations staff:*** While the emphasis on deployment was on programme staff, very few deployments were made for operations support – administrative, finance and IT in particular.
- ***Poor working conditions:*** A lack of adequate operational staff capacity also meant that office infrastructure and staff facilities failed to match the requirements of incoming staff. “Poor working conditions and accommodations were cited as real impediments to the response, all of which but especially accommodation and office space were far too slow to improve. There were staff members still living in their own tents 100 days into the response. Such conditions undermine the efficiency of the response and had implications for the staff morale,” recorded one internal document.<sup>78</sup>

- ***Need for functional teams instead of 'throwing individuals' at Haiti:*** The deployment was focused on sending individuals rather than ensuring that deployment took into account the need to have functional teams. This meant that several people who were deployed into particular roles could not perform them as there was no one to carry out complementary tasks. For example, a camp manager was sent weeks before UNICEF could get an engineer to start commissioning the prefabs and set up living accommodation for staff.
- ***Delayed recruitment of long-term staff:*** The programme budget review (PBR) process, which is the formal mechanism for establishing new regular posts, was protracted and delayed UNICEF's ability to replace surge staff. The PBR was led by the Regional Director, with the involvement of DHR, EMOPS and the Haiti CO.<sup>79</sup> The first PBR meeting was held in Panama on 9 April and the Haiti CO proposed a total of 288 posts.<sup>80</sup> However, it took almost another month for the PBR to formally approve 60<sup>81</sup> of these and another month to approve one international post (4 June). On 25 June, the PBR approved another nine international posts and rejected four. Six months after the earthquake, 70 posts were approved while another 18 posts, which Haiti CO requested DHR to recruit against, remained unapproved by the PBR. Overall, the PBR has been a frustratingly slow and cumbersome process that has affected the ability of the Haiti CO to recruit staff.

### Key findings – systemic factors affecting UNICEF surge capacity

1. **Predominantly internal surge only:** UNICEF's surge is primarily internal, which has the advantage that people deployed are familiar with the organization's systems and processes. However, the slow regular recruitment processes and lack of protocol for scaling up the response meant that the surge capacity period was severely protracted (i.e., for nearly six months). This, in turn, meant that UNICEF quickly depleted its internal global capacity with no means to replenish it with external recruitment.<sup>82</sup> The delay in regular recruitment generates the problem that since managers know that the surge can go on for longer than eight weeks (due to UNICEF's inefficient recruitment process), they are often not prepared to release their staff for any longer than six weeks. Special service agreement contracts<sup>83</sup> for external recruitment were discouraged after the Haiti earthquake, which meant that temporary assignments (and standby partnerships) were the only ways to provide contracts for external surge candidates. However, even though staff were identified and approved within one or two weeks, it took one or two months to go through the process with DHR.

The DHR Haiti surge review<sup>84</sup> identified several flaws that slowed down recruitment. It noted that UNICEF is now streamlining the system for recruitment and staffing in emergency situations<sup>85</sup> to make the process more nimble and timely.

2. **Location of emergency surge function:** UNICEF has not invested consistently in developing its surge roster except in a very ad hoc manner. In the last few years part of the roster was managed by the DHR, part by EMOPS and part in the regions by the ROs. There has been no centrally coordinated process to develop the roster as a strategic tool for deployment in emergencies, except during a short period when the DHR emergency unit existed from 2006–2008. Emergency surge capacity is not a purely human resources function. In most comparator organizations, management of surge is housed in the emergency department, with human resources providing services in terms of issuance of contracts and completion of necessary legal formalities.

3. **Emergency not a preferred career path in UNICEF:** Within UNICEF, emergency response is not seen as a career track for the long run. As most emergency operations tend to be concentrated in countries that are non-family duty stations, there is very little incentive for in-house staff to opt for long-term deployments in emergency countries.

4. **Cumbersome PBR process:** PBR as used in Haiti is cumbersome and protracted for an emergency response that evolves over a time period.

5. **Limited internal pool:** As the pool of staff within the organization with experience of responding to emergencies is relatively small in the context of the large number of emergencies to which UNICEF responds, COs tend to be resistant to the idea of 'giving up' their best people. In the case of Haiti, this was further limited by the language requirements. It is noted from a recent Executive Directive on staffing in emergency situations that provisions are now being made to provide greater incentives to offices to second staff for emergency deployments outside their country of posting.

### **Recommendations**

R7: In future deployments, recruiting managers need to make it mandatory for all surge deployments to be for at least nine weeks, especially for staff who will play supervisory, managerial or decision-making roles in the operation.

R8: EMOPS and DHR need to seriously invest in the development and management of a surge roster and in the creation of self-contained multi-disciplinary rapid response teams. Taking lessons from the Supply Division on how it has developed deployment and human resources administration capacity, UNICEF needs to replicate similar arrangements for all emergency deployments, with adequate staffing located in EMOPS and working closely with DHR.

R9: The use of special service agreements and temporary assignment contracts from pre-screened external rosters should be fast-tracked by DHR for surge, especially for all recruitments for a duration of under 90 days and for one year.

R10: DHR and Regional Directors should make sure in future emergencies that, instead of an elaborate PBR, a list of core staff is agreed for one year within four weeks of response with a detailed PBR to follow after three months for additional recruitments.

### **3.2.2 Staff well-being**

#### **Overview**

The second CCC benchmark under human resources requires UNICEF to ensure the well-being of staff deployed in emergencies.

Besides the process of deployment, the biggest challenge in Haiti was providing adequate support to staff on their arrival in terms of accommodation, office systems and infrastructure. All agencies faced the same problem in that there were no proper living facilities for anyone for the first three or four weeks and staff had to fend for themselves. However, for UNICEF this problem persisted for much longer than for many other comparator organizations. (See *Section 3.3 below*.)

#### **What worked well**

There were a number of local staff who suffered badly in the earthquake, either through loss of family members or colleagues or damage to their property. UNICEF provided financial support to them and allowed them to take days off to look after their family matters, which was highly appreciated by these staff.

#### **What did not work well**

##### ***Delay in providing basic facilities***

All agencies had to operate with less than bare minimum infrastructure and facilities in the weeks following the earthquake as office and residential facilities had to be created from scratch. During the first two months, 200 UN and UNICEF staff had to make do with one shower and two toilets. The majority of the debriefing notes for staff reflect that, compared to other organizations, UNICEF's support for the well-being of staff was weak at the beginning of the earthquake response.

As reported in the Lessons Learned document.<sup>86</sup>

*“Poor working conditions and accommodations were cited as real impediments to the response, all of which but especially accommodations and office space were far too slow to improve. There were staff members still living in their own personal tents 100 days into the response. Such conditions undermined the efficiency of the response and had implications for staff morale. There were a number of key issues underlying this. UNICEF deployed one camp manager with no expertise in plan and set up living spaces – this points to a clear lack of expertise to size the problem and bring in the right resources at headquarters and this left the CO with the same gap.”*

### **Arbitrary handling of staff welfare issues**

Around a month into the response, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) gave two weeks' leave to its staff. The UNICEF Representative decided at the time that UNICEF international staff were not entitled to a break. Staff had not had much sleep for several weeks and were exhausted and angry that they were not permitted time off. By 3 February WFP had commissioned its camps (Camp Charlie and boat accommodation) and UNICEF was allotted a few places there, but selection was seen as arbitrary and caused a great deal of anger. A mix of an international, surge and national UNICEF staff got together and went to see the MINUSTAH counsellor, indicating that they were starting to have real difficulties coping with the working and living conditions.

### **Delays in procurement of materials for office and accommodation facilities**

There were delays in procuring prefabs and supplies: containers ordered after a week arrived two weeks later and were installed six weeks later. UNICEF got six prefabs into the country by 1 February but it took another three weeks to get these set up.<sup>87</sup> The situation report of 22–26 February reported that in order for offices and staff to be adequately accommodated, six large containers were required (and being ordered) for office and meeting space requirements. Presumably these would have taken another four to six weeks to arrive and be ready. These delays could have been averted with forward operational planning. One reason could be that the operations side of the response was inadequately staffed compared to programme functions.

The IT infrastructure (Internet, WiFi) and telecommunications were also inadequate for the staff deployed, even as late as early March. The situation report of 2 March reported that VSAT was installed, which improved communications capacity to a degree.

### **Key finding**

Deploying staff without even basic support for weeks if not months was counter-productive and severely undermined efficiency and staff morale.

### **Recommendation**

R11: The Supply Division should develop dedicated capacity (through long-term agreements with suppliers or standby partners) to quickly set up accommodation and office facilities. This must be in place for future emergencies, considering the difficulty and time needed to organize prefabs. The Haiti emergency also highlighted that there needs to be a team from Supply Division trained to set up accommodation.

### **3.3 Operations support: administration, finance, IT, supply and logistics**

#### **Overview**

The CCCs require that effective financial, administrative, IT and telecommunications capacity is established to support implementation of the CCCs.

UNICEF was quick to realize the operational challenges of Haiti. On 13 January, less than 24 hours after the earthquake, the Regional Director and the Country Representative in the Dominican Republic CO decided to use Santo Domingo as the operational support hub (later called 'Lifeline Haiti') and deployed the Regional Operations Manager in Santo Domingo.

This was indeed a lifeline to Haiti, insofar as it provided a corridor for surge deployments and supplies. With all office records and data lost in the earthquake, the Haiti Programme Management System (PRoMS) was re-established using the Santo Domingo server and the PRoMS database from Haiti was fully operational by 17 January, according to the situation report of that date. As banks in Haiti were closed, a cash-on-hand account was set up in the Dominican Republic CO for Haiti operations and the Operations Manager sent in cash with senior staff travelling to Haiti.

#### **What worked well**

##### ***Supply of relief materials***

The interviews and debrief notes gathered by the review team point almost unanimously to the relative success of supply of relief materials in the response. Despite a lack of preparedness at country level for a disaster of this magnitude,<sup>88</sup> UNICEF was rapidly able to dispatch 250,000 non-food item kits following the earthquake, which arrived with the initial surge before the end of the first week. This continued throughout the response, with supplies generally arriving quickly in Haiti.

##### ***Flexible application of procedures within norms of accountability***

As mentioned above, a cash transfer mechanism was developed between Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince. Despite a general complaint that UNICEF's administrative and financial procedures are bureaucratic, DFAM administrative procedures allowed some flexibility for the Haiti CO to obtain approval quickly from the controller for increasing the ceiling for authorization by the Contracts Review Committee for PCAs. Despite a complicated procurement process, the Haiti CO could decide to award a contract for school construction to meet deadlines for delivery in a commitment made to the Government. Several such examples were noted. "It is not the systems or procedures that are bureaucratic; it is the staff who apply procedures and rules in a bureaucratic way,"<sup>89</sup> one senior staff member argued.

#### **What did not work well**

##### ***Delayed deployment of operations staff***

A senior operations manager arrived only in the third week after the earthquake. The Finance Officer (P4) and Administrative Officer (P4) arrived in the second month after the earthquake. It took almost two months to get a full complement of staff for the IT requirements, and it took nearly three months for IT to develop a UNICEF Haiti shared drive to make all important documents and information accessible to all field staff. Prior to this, the dissemination of information was between personal laptops and thus a great deal of important information disappeared with the fast rotation of staff.

##### ***Delay in reinstalling PRoMS in Haiti***

The agility and efficiency that UNICEF demonstrated at the outset of the response by establishing PRoMS and payments systems out of Santo Domingo was not matched when it came to reverting the

system back to Haiti. Banks in Haiti reopened almost 10 days after the earthquake, but the UNICEF bank account remained frozen well into the fourth month, reopening only after nearly 100 days. It is understood that following a visit by the DED for Emergencies, UNICEF undertook a risk assessment, whereupon it was decided to delay the transfer of PRoMS to Haiti.<sup>90</sup> In the intervening period, a series of measures were reportedly introduced to make the arrangements as speedily as if PRoMS were actually operational in the Haiti CO. The review team learned that despite this, however, UNICEF procedures for payments were slow and proper budget management was difficult to achieve. Making payments to partners took up to six weeks.

### ***Last-mile distribution and logistics***

A problem that UNICEF faced – and still faces – is that once supplies arrived in the warehouse in Port-au-Prince, their onward delivery to the point of distribution failed to keep pace, overwhelming warehousing capacity. Hired trucks for transporting goods were kept waiting for hours as UNICEF's procedure required four signatures for materials to be released from warehouses, slowing down the distribution chain. When ordering supplies, programme staff did not plan the distribution schedule to indicate the phasing of relief supplies, which clogged up the warehouse system.

### ***Lack of standardization of supplies for office infrastructure and staff accommodation***

While relief supplies generally arrived in time, there were serious gaps in supplying basic survival kits for setting up offices and living quarters for staff. As discussed under Staff well-being above (Section 3.2.2), the surge teams that arrived had few provisions and were left to find their own means of survival.<sup>91</sup> UNICEF had little or no preparedness in terms of staff deployment kits and office infrastructure, which was a major weakness affecting the response for the first three months. Within the country, planning of operations support was ad hoc as there was inadequate staff capacity deployed for these and procurement of operational supplies took time.

UNICEF has not standardized its procurement of emergency office infrastructure and deployment kits. Some of the supplies that came were technically inappropriate; prefabs sent from Europe, for example, did not have the appropriate electric fittings and were therefore unusable. Several other agencies sourced urgent supplies from Miami, which made procurement faster and cheaper, but UNICEF did not use this route.

### ***Lack of standardization of IT supplies***

Provisioning of IT equipment remained inadequate for the first two months as junior IT staff (one P2) deployed in the early weeks found it difficult to figure out the scale of the need and decide which equipment would be appropriate. The supply requisitions that were coming were inappropriate; an order had to be cancelled and reissued, which wasted time. UNICEF does have an off-the-shelf IT requisition package for emergencies, but this was not used as staff in Haiti had no knowledge of it. Procurement of equipment took a long time. Laptops, satellite dishes, radios and servers were ordered in one lot. But the Dominican Republic CO, TACRO and New York could not agree what standard equipment was needed, and this discussion went on for about 10 days before anything was finalized. With four different operations officers in New York, Geneva and the Haiti and Dominican Republic COs, this confusion was bound to arise. The problem was that most of the initial discussions happened at a very junior level. In February, following the visit of the DED, the Chief of IT visited the Haiti CO and only then were these issues resolved.

## **Key finding**

Operations support remained weak for the first three months of the response and was not prioritized in deployment, especially in the areas of IT and finance. In IT in particular, staff deployed were at a junior level and could not be expected to manage the start-up phase of a complex operation.

## **Recommendations**

R12: Working with the Supply Division, EMOPS needs to ensure that UNICEF has rapid response teams specializing in operations support that can be deployed immediately after a major disaster.

R13: In large emergencies that require rapid scaling up of IT systems, Regional Directors and IT managers must ensure that highly experienced senior staff from the RO and HQ are deployed in the first eight weeks.

## **3.4 Humanitarian leadership and accountability**

### **3.4.1 Decision-making**

#### ***Multiplicity of decision-making forums***

As per UNICEF procedures, unless a Level 3 emergency is declared by the Executive Director, the accountability to manage any emergency response lies with the CO, supported by the corresponding RO and EMOPS. Given the magnitude of the disaster and response needed, UNICEF's senior management moved swiftly to put in place various coordination groups and ad hoc decision-making forums to assist the CO. It is clear from the email correspondence and decisions of the meetings that these forums, while effectively identifying major bottlenecks in the response, were unable to adequately surmount them. The existence of multiple forums, moreover, created confusion over decision-making processes, as was noted in the Lessons Learned report<sup>92</sup> on UNICEF's response to the Haiti earthquake.

Immediately after the disaster the Regional Director, who happened to be in New York at the time, established a system of daily conference calls. The calls were convened by EMOPS and involved senior managers from all three levels of the organization. They included a large number of participants, and managers representing individual divisions and offices often changed from one day to the next. Issues that could have been discussed bilaterally, leading to faster decision-making, were sometimes brought to the forum. Participants from Haiti CO found most of these conference calls focused mainly on information exchange – or, more precisely, HQ obtaining information from the Haiti CO, according to one of the Haiti CO staff who participated. The conference call minutes show that these contained action points during the first two weeks or so but no longer did so from February onwards. While providing a good platform for information exchange, they yielded little in the way of rapid, concrete decisions or actions as decision-making was still the domain of the Country Representative.

In week six of the response the DED for Emergencies replaced these meetings with twice-weekly calls (i.e., every Monday and Thursday), chaired by herself and involving all HQ division directors as well as the Regional Director, Country Representative and their senior staff. The first such meeting was held on 22 February. Their explicit purpose, in light of the lack of forward movement in the previous daily meetings, was to ensure faster organization-wide mobilization, supported by senior-level direction and oversight, by more pointedly agreeing on actions and decisions to address the operational bottlenecks that had been mounting several weeks into the response.

Besides these, ad hoc Division Directors' Meetings were held from time to time, as were the regularly scheduled weekly HQ Senior Staff Meetings. The latter produced 'Action Notes,' with most of the list of Action Points having multiple (some up to 4 or 5) 'Office/Focal Points'. While it is clear that multiple units needed to be involved in follow-up, it is not really helpful from an accountability perspective to designate: (a) multiple units as 'focal points' and (b) units rather than individuals (positions) as being responsible for action.

#### ***Lack of clear chain of command***

With decision-making and coordination taking place at different levels involving multiple forums, lack of clarity around accountabilities added to the confusion. This was made more complicated at CO level by high staff turn-over leading to frequent changes in Haiti CO leads on different issues. Moreover, there

was also lack of clarity on whom to communicate with at HQ and in the RO. The synthesis of lessons document noted the following particular issues (which were also highlighted by a number of key informants during this review) related to decision-making in the early weeks of the Haiti response:

- A strong perception among New York staff that there was lack of clarity on coordination in the first two weeks at working levels within HQ.
- In some cases where issues were very high profile, decision-making around programme strategy was undertaken at high levels in HQ outside of their technical areas – for example, for sanitation and around the focus on residential centres for response activities.
- Decision-making processes were further confused where HQ and RO staff were deployed to the Haiti CO and both during deployment and afterwards it was unclear which 'hat' they were wearing (e.g., decisions taken in parallel communications with HQ while in CO; decisions taken while in HQ as if still part of CO programme team).
- Decision-making around supplies was confusing due to division of accountabilities between Lifeline Haiti, Haiti CO, New York-PD, SD and the RO and unclear communication channels.

It is evident from the interviews that the meetings convened by the DED gave a renewed push and urgency to the need to act faster and solve some of the bottlenecks — including a call from the DED for better staff welfare after her visit to Haiti. However, while perceived as useful for helping move the complex response forward, these meetings failed to supplant the existing UNICEF doctrine of decentralization with a structure that might have helped achieve results for the affected population more quickly, effectively and efficiently. Lacking official directive from the Executive Director that Haiti constituted a Level 3 emergency, any mandated action points from HQ-convened meetings or emails to act faster remained in fact mere 'guidance'. For example, the email from the DED to all corners of the organization to release staff quickly was sent out three times, yet release of staff for critical positions in Haiti still did not happen as quickly as the situation demanded.

Meeting minutes and emails show that the question of accountability between HQ, the RO and the CO was on the agenda from the very early DED-led meeting (26 February). However, nearly a month later on 23 March the item remained on the agenda as 'ongoing' and was still unresolved. Even then it was only agreed that the RO would have 'oversight' of the Haiti and Dominican Republic COs, while EMOPS/HQ would continue their 'facilitative role' – an arrangement that at best seems to have only partially eased the general confusion about who was in charge. The actions by the DED represented a significant step in initiating a command structure from the top. However, lack of adequate follow-through on the decisions taken in these meetings resulted in a continued 'chain of consultation' rather than quicker action.

### ***Time-critical decisions delayed***

In the first two weeks of the Haiti response decision-making on surge capacity was confused, slow and sometimes paralyzed for days. At week two the Director of EMOPS established an ad hoc procedure to address this bottleneck, allowing approval of HQ-RO proposed surge capacity based on non-objection by the Haiti CO in a 24-hour period. However, initially within HQ and later in the Haiti CO when decision-making shifted back to Port-au-Prince, there was considerable confusion as to who was involved in identifying and taking final decisions on prioritization of surge capacity needs. Communication channels between HQ and Haiti CO were unclear and often ad hoc for some weeks even after DHR re-established surge management capacity and procedures.

Interviews with staff who were deployed in the Pakistan floods response later in the year indicate that decisions on surge got delayed there as well. Time was lost as the UNICEF CO took nearly three weeks to decide whether or not to use surge capacity offered by the HQ, indicating that what happened in Haiti was not unusual in the organization.

At the CO level, UNICEF had weak management in the first five weeks and there was no established mechanism for decision-making. 'Too many generals' and high turnover of staff, especially at the senior



level (programme heads, senior programme officers), led to ad hoc decisions that changed as new staff came in.

It is only after the first six weeks or so that decision-making in the CO began to be streamlined as a new Country Representative took charge, assisted by two highly experienced senior directors in support role.

### **Key finding**

After the Haiti earthquake UNICEF conspicuously failed to replace its chain of consultation with a clear chain of command. Broadly speaking, there was a leadership vacuum in the early weeks of the response that was partly filled by ad hoc decision-making and coordination at many different levels. Against this backdrop different forums arose semi-spontaneously – all to some extent overlapping or even competing and none entirely unproblematic in its relations with others.

### **Recommendations**

See Recommendations associated with Section 3.4.3 on Humanitarian leadership.

## **3.4.2 Humanitarian accountability**

### ***Overview***

The highest-level issue was that in a major emergency of this scale – with HQ, the RO and two COs all involved collectively in the response – greater clarity was needed on a process for reassessing, reconfirming or adjusting existing accountabilities as needed and communicating this effectively through to all staff engaged at all three levels. This is not a new lesson and relates to longstanding discussions around triggers for shifting accountabilities as CO capacity and possibly RO capacity is surpassed by the scale and complexity of response required.<sup>93</sup>

Of more than 25 questions the review team asked, the one to which it found no clear answer was, “*Who was in charge of this response?*”

### ***Dispersed accountability***

UNICEF is a decentralized organization, with primary responsibility for delivery of emergency response lying with the CO at hand, management oversight provided by the corresponding RO and back-up oversight provided by the HQ through support from various divisions such as EMOPS, PD, PARMO and DHR from New York and Geneva.

After the earthquake, the Haiti CO was nearly paralyzed. Apart from the devastation that overwhelmed the office, the Country Representative was less than a month into the job and a Deputy Country Representative was yet to join. As the Regional Director tried to take charge from New York, where he was located at the time, the response soon stumbled into disagreement between the Haiti CO and HQ over the scale of deployment, with the CO blocking several key deployments while the OED and PD were pushing for more. This is a generic problem in most major emergency responses in UNICEF: Haiti, the Pakistan floods and Darfur (2004–05) all witnessed cases in which COs underestimated deployment needs and resisted surge in the most critical early weeks of the response. A state of confusion persisted in Haiti for at least five weeks until the Country Representative was replaced.

Staff deployed in the early weeks were not clear as to whether it was the RO, Dominican Republic CO, Haiti CO or New York in charge overall. For the first couple of weeks, the RO thought the Regional Director was in charge. But very soon the entire RO felt completely cut out of the decision-making process. To this day, the RO's role in shaping the emergency response remains unclear to all the staff there interviewed by the review team, as well as to the Haiti CO.

As had happened in Darfur in 2004, UNICEF's decentralized organizational structure did not simplify its handling of the crisis in Haiti.<sup>94</sup> As a result of the division of responsibilities among the CO, RO and HQ, it has at times been challenging to know who should be accountable for different aspects of the response. The increased role of ROs in humanitarian response, while welcome, has also made the task of assigning accountabilities for response within the organization even more complex. This means that accountabilities for humanitarian action remain dispersed at different levels,<sup>95</sup> and this left its mark on the Haiti response.

### ***The Accountability Framework 1998***

The current Accountability Framework, which dates back to 1998,<sup>96</sup> reaffirms the role of UNICEF Country Representatives as one of leading, implementing and monitoring the progress of country programmes. Through a process of decentralization that formed the cornerstone of the framework, key programmatic, budgetary, support and oversight functions were transferred from HQ to the regions.

This has the advantage that decisions are made closer to the field and theoretically allows rapid and flexible action when a situation warrants. The framework reflects the approach adopted at the time of mainstreaming humanitarian preparedness and response as part of the regular country programme process. Section 11 lists the key accountabilities of a UNICEF CO. Among the 20 accountabilities – which include Country Programme Recommendations, Country Programme and Management Plans, UNDAF, representation to the government, advocacy, and so on – there is no mention whatsoever of humanitarian action or emergencies, particularly any situation that temporarily derails the regular country programme and plans. Only in the case of RO accountabilities is there a reference to its responsibility “to define and prioritize regional strategies and plans in functional areas, including strategies for emergency situations”.

### ***Humanitarian accountability has become increasingly global***

It bears noting that the humanitarian landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade. The changes in the international humanitarian architecture brought about through the humanitarian reforms of 2005, and the way in which 21<sup>st</sup> century corporate and social media have put a spotlight on humanitarian response globally, have also altered the locus of accountability for humanitarian action. As lead agency for several clusters, UNICEF is accountable directly or indirectly to the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs or Emergency Relief Coordinator – first at country level through the Humanitarian Coordinator<sup>97</sup> and then at corporate level (through global cluster coordinators). UNICEF's conventional wisdom about its current Accountability Framework, namely that it is the responsibility of the CO alone to deal with emergencies in its territory, does not fit this altered humanitarian landscape, at least in mega-emergencies where UNICEF's global accountabilities as cluster lead agency and its need to present a coherent and unified brand message in dealing with the global media in real time become paramount.<sup>98</sup>

### ***Lack of coherence***

As the 'UNICEF Organizational Review'<sup>99</sup> highlighted, the lack of adequate coherence between HQ and the field sometimes leads to confusion within the overarching accountability issue, something that blurred the lines of responsibility in the Haiti response according to lessons documents and scoping interviews. A similar situation occurred in the latter part of 2010 in the Pakistan flood response where, incidentally, the CO had much greater capacity: after a confusing start, UNICEF took weeks to launch a proportionate response. This blurring of responsibility does not necessarily arise from a decentralized structure per se. The problem arises – as appears to have happened in the case of Haiti in the early weeks – when one of the elements in this structure of accountability (most notably the CO) faces difficulties in addressing its responsibilities due to internal or external factors.

The confusing accountability relationship between HQ and the field is further compounded by the fact that the cluster responsibilities are located in the PD while overall coordination and support on humanitarian response is supposed to come from EMOPS. In addition, EMOPS is the focal point at the level of representing UNICEF in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee.

### **Key finding**

The existing Accountability Framework and how it is interpreted within the organization causes a blurring of responsibility in times of major disaster response, particularly within the context of an altered humanitarian landscape where there is now far greater direct corporate accountability and demand for coherent response to media and donor pressures.

### **Recommendations**

See Recommendations associated with Section 3.4.3 on Humanitarian leadership.

### **3.4.3 Humanitarian leadership and mainstreaming**

The Accountability Framework and how it is interpreted within the organization is only part of the story, however. There is another crucial missing link that explains why UNICEF has faced a Haiti-like situation in several previous disasters where relying solely on the CO, with support from RO, led to a sub-optimal response, an issue repeatedly raised in various evaluations over the past decade or so (Darfur, 2005; the Indian Ocean tsunami, 2004; the 'DFID-UNICEF Cooperation on Humanitarian Capacity-Building' evaluation, 2006).

#### ***Interpretation of 'mainstreaming'***

The key strategy for improving performance in humanitarian action within UNICEF has been one of mainstreaming, as described in the original Martigny framework. What mainstreaming meant in the context of humanitarian action was set out in a memo from the then-Executive Director.<sup>100</sup> Programming in unstable situations was to be situated within the overall context of the country programme; it was not to be 'verticalized' but was to provide a "predictable humanitarian response driven by strengthened programmatic capacity". This position is perfectly valid for the purpose stated: "programming in unstable situations", which, in the interpretation of this review, refers to situations of chronic complex emergency in unstable or transition countries. However, it has also been applied in the context of sudden-onset mega-disasters, which tend to bring normal programming to a standstill and push everyone back to the drawing board, at least temporarily.

#### ***Emergency response is no one's core responsibility***

The review's examination of current job descriptions of the key UNICEF officials (Country Representative, Regional Director, EMOPS Director and Deputy Director, Regional Emergency Specialist)<sup>101</sup> who were supposedly responsible for emergency response in Haiti revealed that, going by the job purpose and major duties and responsibilities, none of them is actually responsible for delivery of emergency response. (See Box 2.) Except for the two EMOPS officials and the Regional Emergency Specialist positions (all of which are only advisory in nature), none of the jobs requires any qualification or experience whatsoever in emergencies of any nature. Most of the competencies and skills sets emphasize "managerial, development administration of social development programmes ... and management of ... resources".

In the mainstreaming approach, the responsibility for emergency response lies with the Country Representative. However, s/he is not required to have any experience to operate in an emergency, as was noted in the DFID-EMOPS phase III evaluation.<sup>102</sup> UNICEF's management response to this evaluation rejected the recommendation that this experience should be required and instead opted to build capacity through a management training programme.

The responsibility and accountability for dealing with mega-disasters get further blurred by the fact that the major duties and responsibilities outlined in job descriptions for the Country Representative and Regional Director ignore the fact that such extraordinary situations require actions and measures that go beyond the scope of the normal country programme of cooperation that forms the fulcrum of CO capacity. The few emergency specialists (EMOPS, Regional Emergency Specialist) who do exist in the organization merely play an advisory and support role.

## **Box 2: Key elements of job descriptions**

### ***EMOPS Director (2003)***

Job purpose: "Lead effort to ensure UNICEF's role in complex emergencies and natural disasters is clearly defined and that the organization is fully equipped to fulfil that role." Major duties and responsibilities are defined in terms of contributing and supporting policy development, strategy, quality assurance, coordination, etc.

### ***EMOPS Deputy Director (redrafted 2009)***

Added, "provides leadership in developing and maintaining interagency partnerships in humanitarian response." The section on type of decisions made includes reference to humanitarian policy and operational programme issues, "mainly for the deployment of financial and human resources toward strengthening humanitarian action and meeting CCC commitments."

### ***Haiti Country Representative (2008)***

The purpose of the post emphasizes the country programme of cooperation as approved by the Executive Board; it also refers to advocacy. In the 12 major duties and responsibilities section, which are listed in descending order of priority, the eleventh refers to emergency response. In the section on work experience and qualifications, there is no reference to emergencies or humanitarian response. In the competencies section, of the seven requirements (including computer skills), there is none on emergency/humanitarian programming.

### ***Regional Director – TACRO (May 1998)***

The purpose of the post is to advise and assist in matters of policy and implementation of policy guidelines, and provide guidance to and coordinate the work of UNICEF Representatives in the region. Of the 12 major duties and responsibilities listed – which include advocacy, policy, capacity building, M&E, fundraising, human resources, etc – there is none that refers to emergency programming. Likewise there is no reference to emergencies anywhere in the qualifications and experience section.

### ***Regional Emergency Specialist – TACRO (2005)***

The job purpose is to advise COs in implementation of emergency activities, especially in the process of elaboration of CAP, EPRP, etc., and planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of regional EPRP. The person specification requires 10 years of experience in the emergency sector.

## **Key findings**

1. The 'mainstreaming' strategy adopted by UNICEF for dealing with emergency programming works well in chronic unstable situations where country programming needs to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. However, in times of rapid onset mega-disasters (such as the Indian Ocean tsunami 2004, Pakistan earthquake 2005, Myanmar cyclone 2008, Haiti earthquake 2010, Pakistan 'superflood' 2010), the role differentiation between the HQ, RO and CO continues to be one of the most difficult aspects of response within UNICEF and a major challenge to the mainstreaming strategy.<sup>103</sup>
2. The structure, roles and performance expectations are formally configured in a way that does not locate Level 3 emergency response anywhere in the organization.
3. In the Haiti response, the specific roles of different entities such as the Haiti CO, Dominican Republic CO, RO, EMOPS and PD in different stages of the response remained unclear.

## **Recommendations**

See Recommendations at end of this section.

### 3.4.4 The corporate trigger

An oft-repeated comment heard by the review team was that the CO did not clear deployment of surge staff for several days following the earthquake, which delayed rapid deployment, and it took UNICEF several weeks before it could set up a functioning office or provide basic living space for staff. In the early weeks, Haiti for UNICEF was almost a *déjà vu* of what had happened in several emergencies previously (Darfur 2004, tsunami 2005). The CO tried at first to deal with the response in relative isolation; it initially conveyed that it could handle the situation, blocked rapid deployment of key staff and resources for days and did not take up offers of support.<sup>104</sup> Despite the RO having direct supervisory responsibility over the CO, neither the RO nor HQ felt in a position to engage with and challenge the CO in its management of the crisis for at least the first ten days.

This recurring challenge raises the issue of a corporate trigger, one repeatedly brought up in discussions and in documents on Haiti submitted to the review team. Scoping interviews revealed confusion among staff as to whether there was even a corporate trigger at all; if there was, whether it was 'pulled' in the Haiti response; and, if so, what the implications were.

Documents indicate that the first time UNICEF activated the corporate trigger was on 20 May 2004, declaring Darfur an organization-wide emergency.<sup>105</sup> Subsequently, this was also activated after the tsunami of 2004. Until the corporate trigger was activated, UNICEF recruitment processes could not support the emergency response. In the case of Haiti, it was not activated. The only communication in this regard was in the form of memos that went out from senior directors. The first communication to COs was on 18 January 2010 from the EMOPS Director "requesting [their] support to release staff for immediate deployment for the Haiti response for a duration of up to three months".<sup>106</sup> Subsequently, another memo from the DED for Emergencies at the end of February 2010 asked COs "to treat requests for staff to be deployed on mission with the utmost priority and urgency".<sup>107</sup>

While these might have encouraged offices to send staff on deployment, the lack of a corporate trigger, as had happened in response to Darfur or the tsunami, left a gap in clarity as to who was in charge of UNICEF's global response in Haiti – and what *modus operandi* was to govern the response. Lack of clarity created a leadership gap that led to an ad hoc approach to deployment (*see Section 3.2.1 Rapid deployment*), to people being sent in without being requested and without a TOR or clear role, and to no one having a strategic overview of what would be the shape and size of the response.

#### Key finding

The Haiti earthquake was a clear case in which a corporate response – or 'trigger', as it is called at UNICEF – was needed from the outset of the response. It ought to have been evident in the hours immediately following the earthquake that the scale of the destruction, humanitarian needs and global accountability of UNICEF would overwhelm any CO or regional capacity, regardless of the views of the latter. That UNICEF did not decide in favour of activating a corporate emergency procedure adversely affected its response on the ground and created confusion at all levels.

#### Box 3: Summary of key findings on organizational factors

UNICEF is generally recognized for the quality of its work but is also often perceived by government authorities and partners to move at a slow pace. Its surge deployment, human resources systems and operations support were not effectively geared for rapid response. At the level of management, the specific roles of the Haiti and Dominican Republic COs, the RO, EMOPS and PD remained unclear. The existing Accountability Framework and the way it is interpreted within the organization blurred responsibility. The review concluded that the mainstreaming strategy adopted by UNICEF for dealing with emergency programming works well for chronically unstable situations, where country programming needs to respond to both development and humanitarian needs. However, in times of rapid-onset, mega-disasters such as the Haiti earthquake, the role differentiation between the HQ, RO and CO continues to be a major challenge.

While its stated intent has consistently been to play a leadership role in the humanitarian arena globally, UNICEF's business processes, structure and 'performance compact' remain geared towards development programmes.

### **Recommendations: Humanitarian leadership and accountability**

R14: To demonstrate that UNICEF values humanitarian work and expertise within the organization, recruiting managers need to ensure that humanitarian leadership competencies are taken into account in recruitment to senior positions, especially Country Representatives and their deputies.

R15: UNICEF defines three levels of emergency response, corresponding to the scale of the emergency and CO capacity for managing it. The OED needs to clarify that while all COs need to have capacity to deal with Level 1 on their own as part of the country planning process, the organization does not expect Level 2 and 3 emergencies to be dealt with as part of normal country programme plans, and special emergency procedures will apply in these circumstances.

R16: For Level 3 emergencies, regardless of the capacity of the CO or RO, the OED will take overall leadership and provide strategic direction in order to facilitate an organization-wide response. This arrangement, called Corporate Emergency Procedure (CEP), will be declared within 2–12 hours after a major rapid-onset disaster. OED will immediately authorize the Director of EMOPS to act as Corporate Emergency Coordinator (CEC) for the response. However, operational decisions will still need to be taken at the country level. For this the CEC will designate an Operations Director (at least a senior D1 with humanitarian experience) for the country. The declaration of CEP will involve the following:

- The arrangement will initially be for a period of at least three months, to be reviewed at the end of this period. The CEP will only apply to emergency operations of a short-term nature. In any emergency response that involves a long-term response (as in recovery and reconstruction, chronic emergencies, etc.), the default will be to handle these through established country programme planning processes, and it will be up to the CO to seek any assistance from HQ/RO.
- The Operations Director will report to the CEC for operational aspects of the response and to the Country Representative for (a) all matters relating to representation to the national government; (b) any plans or commitments that go beyond the first six months; and (c) public communication and advocacy.
- The arrangement will have a built-in working mechanism to ensure that the CO can gradually take over all responsibilities for managing the programme from the fourth month onwards (subject to periodic review). All recovery and long-term programmes that arise from the emergency will be managed by the Country Representative, and the Operations Director will have no authority to take decisions in this regard unless authorized by her/him. If after a periodic review of this arrangement, it is felt that the CO is able to take over full responsibility for the operations, the Operations Director will no longer report to the CEC and the Country Representative will determine whether the services of the Operations Director are needed. For this transition to happen, the Operations Director will need to work closely with the CO from the start.
- For all Level 3 emergencies, an early visit to the country by the CEC or someone designated by him/her will be mandatory. This will help the OED and the CEC get a real-time assessment of the situation and ensure that they can make appropriate decisions about resource mobilization and allocations and provide necessary strategic direction to the CO, Operations Director and Regional Director.
- The role of the RO in Level 3 response will be determined by the OED, in consultation with the Regional Director and CEC, depending on its mobilization capacity. The reporting line between the Country Representative and Regional Director will remain as normal and the RO will play its usual oversight role vis-à-vis any recovery or long-term programme and planning. It needs to be clear that while the CEP is in operation, the CEC provides leadership for the response while the Regional Director remains responsible

for ensuring that the CO is able to integrate the response into its own planning process and take over leadership and operational responsibility for the response as soon as possible.

R17: For Level 2 emergencies, the desired state will be for the RO to play the lead role, but given the limited capacity of ROs (and the fact that individual Regional Directors have varied experience and competencies in emergency response, and that emergency experience is not a key competency for their recruitment), the CEC will have an oversight as sometimes Level 2 emergencies (the Pakistan 'superflood', for example) can escalate to Level 3. For this reason, a joint assessment led by a senior emergency response team/designate of the CEC with the Regional Director (or his or her designate) must be undertaken as soon as possible. The purpose of the joint assessment mission will be to agree the modalities of the response. If it is felt by the CEC that RO capacity is weak for managing the overall response, and that the emergency could evolve into a Level 3, s/he will consult with OED and determine the respective roles of the RO, HQ and CO.

## 4. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEARNING

Questions/issues examined: (i) What evidence exists to indicate that, with the learning that has taken place during the period of the response, the organization has taken steps to address bottlenecks that arose, and what management oversight exists to ensure that once systemic issues are identified through reviews and evaluations, they are addressed and do not recur as a pattern? (ii) How were the lessons from other disasters and recommendations from previous reviews and evaluations followed up, tracked and internalized within the organization, and is there evidence that some of these lessons were used in the Haiti response? (iii) In instances where lessons were internalized at an institutional level, what factors contributed to this? Alternatively, what were the reasons for not addressing major issues and lessons that were brought out in successive reviews and evaluations over a long period of time? (iv) To what extent does UNICEF encourage a culture of responsible risk-taking by managers in ensuring timely delivery of results? How is the balance between compliance with established procedures and accountability for results managed?

### 4.1 Institutional culture and learning

#### 4.1.1 Consultation and consensus

##### *Consultations as practical alternative to decision-making*

In the Haiti response, a familiar culture of consensus at senior levels seems to have snapped into place rigidly from the start. (See Section 3.4.1.) "Conference calls tended not to produce decisions," said one interviewee, who stated that the calls appeared to be a substitute for leadership and decisions, adding that she would not have known who was even theoretically in charge of the Haiti response. As one external interviewee put it: "People in UNICEF are afraid of taking decisions. They go on endless consultations." In other words, just taking a decision and being seen to take a decision is perceived as a form of risk; by contrast, if everything is decided in meetings by consensus, no one is ever held to account for anything and it is by far the safer course.

One experienced manager who returned to the organization to assist with Haiti wrote in April 2010, "UNICEF has discussed, but never agreed on, how to override 'normal' decision-making."<sup>108</sup> The review team was told by interviewee after interviewee, during both the scoping and the main review stages in New York, Panama, Haiti, Geneva and elsewhere that the primary problem in the early stages of the response was total confusion over who was in charge.

#### 4.1.2 The phenomenon of silo-ism

Many interviewees also spoke of the prevalence of 'silo-ism' at UNICEF – a culture in which specialist professional departments operate with quasi-autonomy and without much regard to the wider corporate implications of their actions. In programmes, different sections would develop their own plans independently of others and interact with the external world (partners, governments, inter-agency forums) almost as autonomous organizations.<sup>109</sup> Child-friendly spaces planned by the Child Protection and Education Sections without reference to each other, and school reconstruction plans drawn up without consultation with the WASH Section/Cluster are two examples of this silo approach in programming in Haiti. This lack of inter-sectoral planning and strategy creating duplication and inefficiency appears to be a systemic problem in UNICEF and was also noted in the organization's response to the Pakistan earthquake.<sup>110</sup>

#### 4.1.3 Learning culture

*"We collect lessons, but do we really learn them?" – UNICEF staff member*

It is recognized extensively by UNICEF staff that the organization is reflective in terms of its ability to document successes, challenges and issues that need to be addressed, but the overarching concern was



its continued inability to change. This is seen in UNICEF's evaluation database of recommendations and lessons learnt, which shows a number of issues being revisited time and again in different emergencies.

A review undertaken in 2005 commented that although the organization conducted numerous evaluations, it had not yet developed a culture of learning.<sup>111</sup> As one interlocutor stated during this review (an underlying sentiment echoed by numerous stakeholders): "We collect lessons, but do we really *learn* them?"

The review team could not have put it more succinctly.

During the process of data-gathering for this review, the review team found it hard to obtain management responses to several recent evaluations; and when some of the 'management responses' were obtained, during interviews with senior management it came out clearly that there was no senior management oversight of this. An internal note on follow-up of evaluation recommendations<sup>112</sup> stated that the performance of UNICEF management in responding to the findings and recommendations of evaluations has been mixed due to its lack of responsiveness and lack of Evaluation Office staff time to prompt management to prepare a response as well as act on recommendations. This situation has resulted in limited uptake/learning from evaluations and re-emergence of the same issues in different evaluations.

It was therefore no wonder that even after a year the Haiti response has not seen an independent programme or real-time evaluation – except for an inter-agency real-time evaluation carried out in April 2010 – but only this review, which has its main focus on identifying systemic factors that affected the response in the first three months.

Learning is a dynamic process and requires a willingness to change, adopt new ways of working and take risks where necessary.

## **What worked well**

### ***Knowing when to take risk***

Within the context of a generally risk-averse culture, there were several instances where a small number of individuals broke the mould. In Haiti, the review team found, the conscious taking of risk by operational managers often involved some sort of calculation weighing this against the moral consequences of not doing anything.

Who if anyone would have been blamed, for example, had any of the various cash transfers transported to Haiti from outside the country by hand gone wrong – at a time when this was the only way to get money in and keep the operation going?

One senior manager, in authorizing a key subordinate to move around in-country in defiance of a Department of Safety and Security advisory, knew that he was (as he put it) "putting his job on the line"; he also believed it was indisputably the right thing to do, and part of the reason senior managers get large salaries is that they occasionally have to take such risks; "but it cannot be a policy," he added, "then you would have a lot of accidents."

### ***Taking responsibility***

Some staff also found that in the Level 3 context, 'the system', as it stood, allowed them more flexibility than they had thought was available. One operational manager wrote to DFAM to ask for an increase in the ceiling on the value of contracts the manager was allowed to authorize; this request was granted. It is not the systems or procedures that are innately bureaucratic, this manager argued, but staff themselves, who – especially in more normal times – apply them in a bureaucratic way: "We have a culture of not taking responsibility. There is no risk-taking."

The need to leave detailed paper trails to all money spent is often blamed on external auditors in both private and public sectors, but this too may have been exaggerated: "As long as you are seen to be making a genuine effort to achieve results and not actually caught stealing," this manager argued, audit notes mean little. "Comments about audit preventing people from taking judicious risks are nonsense. It's a mindset."

The review team came across a number of instances where staff closely involved with the emergency phase acted first and did the paperwork later. "During the first three months, I myself took risks," said a logistician interviewee. "When NGOs came with a requisition for non-food items and asked for water bottles in the warehouse, I handed them over and settled the paperwork later." PCAs took only about two weeks to approve in the first couple of months after the earthquake; with the same procedure in place it now takes anything between two to six months.

It might also be noted that the freelance surge staff who paid for their own air tickets and flew down to Haiti without a contract or any firm guarantee of reimbursement (as reported to the review team by a DHR interviewee) were also taking a risk.

The conclusion the review team has been able to come to is that when faced with the exigencies of a uniquely serious, game-changing Level 3 emergency, some staff learned through experience that a business-as-usual approach would not work and therefore were prepared to take risks and push the 'system' to be flexible. This was especially true of the general management of logistics and operations in or for Haiti. Changes in the Supply Division were a notable example of UNICEF learning as an organization. The Supply Division undertook an independent evaluation in 2007 that resulted in a number of changes being initiated. With re-allocation of resources and filling up vacant positions with staff experienced in emergencies, they were able to ensure better delivery of results. This kind of a performance compact has not yet been a standard practice across the organization.

## **What did not work well**

### ***Heaviness of business processes***

Despite some examples of taking responsibility for speeding up decisions and actions during the response, the issue of complexity and heaviness of business processes came up repeatedly in interviews and debriefing notes as factors that inhibited performance. Excessive administrative burdens and complexity contribute negatively to the efficiency and optimal performance of the organization. Time-consuming PCA processes, delayed funds disbursement to partners and procurement of vehicles for partners taking over six months are results of complicated and cumbersome business processes. Accountability is hampered by a weak performance management regime where managers feel more accountable for compliance with business processes than results.

As discussed in Section 1.3, UNICEF has good mechanisms to track its resource deployments, or 'admin data', and systems and procedures are heavily geared towards that. A 2008 'Strategic Review of Human Resource Management' called this phenomenon of focus on inputs rather than results "form over substance",<sup>113</sup> which made the organization bureaucratic and slow. "A preoccupation with administrative procedures crowds out time that would be better spent on programmatic work in COs," noted an organization-wide review of UNICEF systems and procedures undertaken in 2007.<sup>114</sup> That review stated that a "proliferation of management and consultation mechanisms" inhibit CO performance – something the current review saw happen in the Haiti response as well.

Because of this emphasis on inputs instead of results, there is a "deep-seated cultural unwillingness to confront and discipline poor performers or to develop the evidence base that could allow for tough management choices."<sup>115</sup>

#### **Box 4: Different procedures used by different individuals**

A large number of staff and managers interviewed for this review complained that UNICEF has the same system for emergencies as it does for development, which does not allow speedy response. However, there were also several examples where some managers were able to work around bureaucratic procedures, indicating that the system is more flexible than it is believed to be. There is a lack of consistency in guidance. The current version of the *Emergency Field Handbook: A Guide for UNICEF Field Staff (2005)* states that, "Financial regulations and procedures remain unchanged in emergency circumstances". However, the 2008 version of *Financial and Administrative Management for Emergencies: A Guide for UNICEF Field Staff*, which took into account the CCCs, put in place operational systems and resources for rapid delivery of supplies, technical (and cash) assistance, attempted to "[establish] an efficient financial management structure...within an environment of sound financial accountability" and proceeds to give detailed guidance about risk management approaches in emergencies.

While the 2008 guidelines are more in tune with field realities, they appear to be little known.

*"UNICEF staff are not trained in their own admin procedures. If one staff says something, there will be three others who will say just the opposite." – CEO of a partner agency in Haiti*

#### **Risk aversion vs. risk management**

As described above, there were instances when individuals applied good judgment and took calculated risks to ensure efficient outcomes for the response. What is much less clear to the review team is that the system itself showed any capacity at all to react to the uniqueness of Haiti, to quickly turn de facto best practice into de jure best practice, or to protect people who were clearly making not just the best decision but the only decision that could be made under the circumstances from the perception or the reality of risk.

In its discussion of UNICEF's approach to risk, the review team is anxious not to give the impression that it is, even by implication, advocating the simple abandonment of safeguards and regulations – least of all in the area of security. It has been more concerned with highlighting the issues and trade-offs involved; not discussing the rights and wrongs of particular Department of Safety and Security rulings.

Yet several Haiti-based donor interviewees told the review team that they repeatedly said in open meetings that blanket UN security restrictions were hampering the response. While many UNICEF interviewees said that security seriously impeded their own effectiveness, other agencies including UN agencies were able to move about – within certain restrictions in red zones – from the second day onwards. The UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team in the country was carrying out assessments in Port-au-Prince and WHO was able to move between Log Base and Pétionville, but UNICEF staff stayed put in Log Base for days on the grounds of security.

To emphasize the point: the review team is not seeking to assess whether the Department of Safety and Security advisory was overly cautious or not. Rather, it is suggesting that, in the light of the evidence it has gathered, UNICEF considers whether the advisory was interpreted too tightly or not. For example, for a while at least, staff working for other agencies were allowed to drive themselves while UNICEF staff were not, apparently because of a CO ruling, making the UNICEF operation vulnerable to the more or less perennial shortage of Haitian drivers.

**Box 5: Perfect inaction is better than imperfect action**

The Heartland Alliance was approved a grant for a child protection project that included a budget for the purchase of three vehicles. At the time of approval, UNICEF informed the NGO that it would procure the vehicles but this might take a couple of months. Meanwhile, Heartland was asked to hire three vehicles, with the costs to be covered by UNICEF. It has been over six months that Heartland has been waiting for the vehicles while the monthly rental is \$12,500.

The review team heard from several NGO partners about the long-drawn-out process (in the later phases) involved in getting PCAs approved. Worse still, once approved, if the situation on the ground changes and some adjustments to the PCA become necessary – even without going beyond the original budget – the process can be more onerous as even the senior programme staff sometimes do not know what is involved.

But insisting on the strictest possible interpretation of Department of Safety and Security rulings (to the extent that they are open to interpretation) is the safest course of action, however injurious to effective emergency response this might be. Similarly, in the case of purchase of vehicles (see Box 5), following the procedure is the preferred option even though it cost the organization an extra US\$70,000 (and possibly more, depending on when the vehicles arrive) and over six months of waiting. Delays in PCA approvals are also due to similar reasons – procedure requires that each PCA be signed off at different levels before it is finally approved. Form becomes more important than substance – to interpret a ruling liberally, let alone take responsibility for ignoring it, involves making a decision.

In addition, professionals working in divisions such as human resources, finance, IT and security, to some degree or other, try to insulate the organization against all potential risk in their own areas of operation. “Our role is to protect the organization from financial and legal risk,” said one of the HQ-based internal interviewees the review team spoke to. In other words, the performance benchmark becomes one of reducing risk. The combined effect of all the individual efforts to reduce risk or eliminate it altogether, whatever else it may achieve, is unlikely to be conducive to rapid response in the humanitarian arena.

When the predominant culture is one of risk avoidance and safety in consensus, conformity is the norm. A prevailing risk avoidance mindset breeds a culture where people feel it is safe to carry on business as usual. Poor uptake of UNICEF's numerous recommendations from previous evaluations partly bear witness to this phenomenon.

**Key findings**

1. There is a deeply embedded culture where staff perceive their primary role as one of compliance with business processes over results, and this creates a snowball effect where business processes expand as there is a tendency to create new rules or manuals when something goes wrong.<sup>116</sup>
2. There is a strong culture of risk avoidance, rather than risk management, in the organization. Combined with a predominant culture of procedures-over-results, this works against the need for timely and efficient response. As long as procedures are held sacrosanct, results or outcomes do not figure prominently in performance tracking.

**Recommendations**

See Recommendations at end of this section.

**4.2 Global humanitarian leadership**

UNICEF's role in humanitarian response globally has expanded dramatically, and it now has the added role of providing leadership to the international humanitarian community in three clusters and at least one sub-cluster. UNICEF is thus the only agency that plays a cluster lead role in almost a quarter of the total

number of clusters (12) that were deployed in Haiti. This means that, besides managing its own response operations, UNICEF plays a pivotal role in these additional areas, with institutional accountability to the Inter Agency Standing Committee as well as to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.

While UNICEF's stated intent has consistently been to play a leadership role in the humanitarian arena globally, its business processes, structure and 'performance compact' remain heavily geared towards its development-oriented programme of bilateral cooperation with governments. Lessons and recommendations from evaluations of several major emergencies in the past decade or so have all pointed to the same challenges that do not appear to have been adequately addressed, indicating a reluctance to undertake the radical changes that are required if UNICEF is serious about developing itself into a leading humanitarian player globally. Without addressing fundamental issues about the structure, roles and performance expectations as configured in the organization, its ability to respond effectively to Level 3 emergencies will continue to be challenged.

### **Key finding**

While UNICEF remains committed to humanitarian action, organizational inertia about issues related to its structure, roles, accountability and ways of working that have come up in this review as well as in several previous major emergencies indicate an institutional reluctance to undertake the much-needed changes required to play an effective humanitarian leadership role.

### **Recommendations**

See Recommendations at end of this section.

### **Box 6: Summary of key findings on organizational culture and learning**

UNICEF initiated several exercises to capture learning through staff debriefing and lessons-learned sessions in the early weeks of the Haiti response. The lessons and recommendations from the evaluations of several major emergencies in the past decade or so have all pointed to the same challenges. These still do not appear to have been addressed. This suggests a reluctance to undertake the radical changes necessary if UNICEF is serious about developing itself as a leading humanitarian player globally.

There is a deeply embedded culture of risk avoidance, rather than risk management, in which staff perceive their primary role as one of compliance with business processes, which become ends in themselves. This seriously affects the timeliness, efficiency and effectiveness of emergency response.

### **Recommendations: organizational culture and learning**

R18: Working with DFAM, the Office of Internal Audit and ROs, EMOPS needs to further simplify key business processes in emergencies and synchronize current manuals on administrative and financial procedures in emergencies.

R19: UNICEF leadership needs to clearly communicate that a Level 3 emergency is not 'business as usual', but rather it is essential to change gear and resist the urge to revert to a culture of consensus in decision-making. The process needs to be kept lean. While attempts should be made to consult with whoever needs to be consulted, ultimate responsibility for determining the strategic direction for Level 3 (i.e., the shape, size and nature of a response) should rest solely with the OED assisted by the CEC as time is of essence in emergencies. Responsibility of various entities (Country Representative, Regional Director, Operations Director) for operations will be determined by the CEC (with guidance from the OED) at different points in time and depending on the capacity of each entity.

R20: The OED and Regional Directors should ensure that performance appraisals of country representatives incorporate an assessment of their competencies for effectively engaging with corporate priorities, including the CEP.

## Annex I: Terms of Reference

### UNICEF Evaluation Office

#### Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti

#### Terms of Reference – FINAL

8 September 2010

### I. Introduction

1. On 12 January 2010, an earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter scale – the strongest in over 200 years – rocked the impoverished nation of Haiti. According to Government of Haiti (GoH) estimates, the quake has led to the deaths of over 230,000 people (or 2% of the population of Haiti), with 300,572 reported as having suffered injuries of various kinds. The total affected population is estimated at 3 million (or 30% of the population of Haiti), of whom over 1.2 million are displaced and in need of shelter support. Some 1.5 million children are thought to have been affected by the earthquake.<sup>1</sup>
2. The initial relief efforts in Haiti were thwarted in an unprecedented way, as much capital infrastructure was damaged or destroyed in the earthquake. Every significant entry point into Haiti that was expected to function in the relief effort was damaged, and an extensive augmentation of the logistics infrastructure was required. Many other significant obstacles had to be overcome in order to initiate the emergency response.
3. A unique feature of the crisis was its impact on the very entities that would otherwise have been best positioned to respond: the GoH, the United Nations, and the numerous non-governmental organizations undertaking humanitarian work in the country. The level of casualties sustained by the GoH civil service and damage to public buildings severely constrained national capacity to lead and coordinate the early response. In addition, 102 UN staff members lost their lives in the earthquake. For UNICEF as for other agencies, the collapse of its office building and the impact of this on staff members further impeded the Organization's on-the-ground capacity for immediate response.
4. Responding to humanitarian crises is central to the mandate of UNICEF to protect children in emergencies. Toward this end, considerable time, attention and resources have been devoted over a number of years to defining benchmarks for UNICEF's performance in emergencies and identifying and filling critical capacity gaps in the Organization's

<sup>1</sup> *Children of Haiti: Three Months after the Earthquake. Progress, Gaps and Plans in Humanitarian Action: Supporting a Transformative Agenda for Children. UNICEF Situation Report April 2010.* UNICEF, April 2010.

operations to better respond in large-scale crises such as the Haiti earthquake, and ensuring that lessons from previous emergencies are harnessed and fed into subsequent UNICEF responses.<sup>2</sup> The present review of UNICEF’s operations during the response takes these significant measures as its point of departure in framing its scope and overall approach, while at the same time bearing in mind the aforementioned factors that hampered UNICEF’s and other organizations’ response capacity.

## II. Background and Rationale

5. Despite the magnitude of the destruction and the significant mobilization challenges that ensued, the humanitarian community managed to mount a massive humanitarian response that is on-going, and will likely continue for months if not years. Within this scenario, UNICEF has played a central role in the earthquake response. As a responding agency with a mandate to protect children and women in emergencies, UNICEF has delivered critical life-saving interventions, such as water and sanitation, nutritional support, vaccinations and other medical care, and more, since the earthquake struck. It has also undertaken a number of “upstream” activities focused on forging a better enabling environment for the relief effort and making Haiti a more conducive place for children to live and thrive in the future. Furthermore, UNICEF bears significant inter-agency coordination responsibility in its capacity as lead or co-lead agency in four of the 12 clusters and sub-clusters activated in Haiti.<sup>3</sup>
6. UNICEF endeavours to promote a culture of organizational learning. By systematically and candidly identifying its challenges as well as its accomplishments, UNICEF seeks to continually improve its ways of realizing its mandate and achieving results for children and women.<sup>4</sup> The experience in Haiti presents an opportunity to engage in critical self-reflection on its response and the operations surrounding the response – both what was and was not achieved, and what systems and functions within the Organization were pivotal in affecting its organizational response. To date, UNICEF has received \$245.2 million in funding commitments for its Haiti response. UNICEF’s commitment to exercising fiduciary

<sup>2</sup> This includes the development of the Core Commitment for Children in Emergencies, recently revised and renamed the Core Commitment for Children in Emergencies in Humanitarian Action). In addition, recent evaluations have pointed to key areas in need of institutional strengthening in responding to emergencies (including, notably, a three-phased *Evaluation of the DfID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation to Strengthen UNICEF Programming As It Applies to Humanitarian Response*, spanning from 2000 to 2009, an *Evaluation of the UNICEF Learning Strategy to Strengthen Staff Competencies for Humanitarian Response*, and response-specific evaluations.)

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF, in close partnership with GoH ministries, is leading the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, the Nutrition Cluster, and the Child Protection Sub-Cluster, and is co-leading the Education Cluster together with Save the Children. It is also working with the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Ministry of Health on resuming and expanding primary health care services.

<sup>4</sup> UNICEF Evaluation Policy. E/ICEF/2008/4. See also: *Programme Policy and Procedure Manual. Programme Operations*. UNICEF. Revised February 2007. (Further revision forthcoming in 2010.)

responsibility for these funds thus provides further impetus for examining its organizational response to this emergency.

### III. Objectives and Purpose

7. It is before this backdrop that the Office of the Executive Director (OED) has requested the UNICEF Evaluation Office (EO) to undertake an independent review to assess UNICEF's collective operational response as an organization during the first three months of the crisis in Haiti.<sup>5</sup>
8. The objective of this independent review is to assess, as systematically and objectively as possible, what in UNICEF's response to the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti worked well, what worked less well, and what key organizational factors at various levels of the Organization served to help or hinder the response. The review will generate recommendations identifying concrete actions for UNICEF to take to strengthen its operations, so as to ensure the most timely, effective and efficient response possible in future emergencies.<sup>6</sup>

### IV. Review Questions

9. The review will focus on four overarching questions, each entailing a series of specific subquestions. These are as follows:
  - ***How timely, effective and efficient was UNICEF overall in achieving results in the first three months of the Haiti response?***

#### Subquestions

- Prior to the earthquake, how well prepared was UNICEF to respond to a disaster of this scope and scale (e.g., through adequate pre-positioning of supplies, development of adequate business continuity and contingency plans, a clear and functioning cluster activation system, existence of standard operating procedures, rapid resource mobilization mechanisms)?

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF customarily defines "operational" as denoting those organizational functions not directly involved in programmatic activities but that contribute to the organization's day-to-day functioning. These include, for example, human resources, security, finance, administration, and so on, as opposed to the interventions the Organization undertakes or supports on the ground. In the present document, however, a broader definition of "operational" is used, one that encompasses both these *programmatic activities* as well as *organization-wide functions*. This definition comports more closely to broader definitions used elsewhere, and with the focus of the present review on results achieved and not achieved and why, regardless of whether on the ground or at other levels of the Organization.

<sup>6</sup> It is understood that some recommendations emanating from the review might reinforce and in some cases reiterate those emerging in other evaluations. Wherever the review team is in a position to flag those recommendations known to target on-going, "chronic" areas of vulnerability, they will be encouraged to do so.



- Which results (including but not limited to the revised CCCs) did UNICEF achieve and not achieve in an adequate and timely manner, be it in its delivery of interventions, its upstream activities, or in its coordination role as cluster lead or co-lead agency?
  - What if any unintended consequences, positive or negative, occurred as a result of UNICEF's response (e.g., opportunity cost to other emergencies as a result of the surge, weakening rather than strengthening of organic sources of individual and community resilience, and so on)?
  - How effectively did UNICEF harness the financial, human, and physical resources at its disposal to achieve results in an adequate and timely fashion?
- ***What aspects of the Organization's operations helped facilitate the successful achievement of results in Haiti?***

#### **Subquestions**

- In instances where targeted results were achieved, what Operational CCCs, as well as other systems such as institutional policies and procedures, structural features (including functional roles, overall organizational structure, inter-linkages among various levels of the Organization, and so on), governance arrangements, management practices, partnerships, advocacy activities, cultural factors, and other aspects of UNICEF's operations, were instrumental in facilitating success?
  - To the extent that unintended positive results occurred in the response, what aspects of UNICEF's operations helped facilitate these?
  - To what extent were positive results, whether intended or unintended, achieved *because* of these organizational features or *despite* these organizational features (i.e., owing instead to individual innovation, leadership, initiative, and so on)? If the latter, at what expense to individual staff members were results attained?
- ***What aspects of the Organization's operations hindered the adequate and timely achievement of results in Haiti?***

#### **Subquestions**

- In instances where targeted results were not achieved, what Operational CCCs, as well as other systems such as institutional policies and procedures, structural features (including functional roles, overall organizational structure, inter-linkages among various levels of the Organization, and so on), governance arrangements, management practices, partnerships, advocacy activities, cultural factors, and other aspects of UNICEF's operations, were instrumental in impeding success?

- To the extent that unintended negative results occurred in the response, what aspects of UNICEF's operations contributed to these?
- To what extent might the performance framework embodied in the revised CCCs, had it been in place at the time of the earthquake, have potentially enhanced the Organization's preparedness and response capacity?
- ***How successfully has UNICEF identified what has and has not worked well before and during the Haiti response, reflected on this information and on UNICEF's own performance, and incorporated this learning into decision-making so as to shift course and improve its operations and performance during the early response and beyond?***

#### Subquestions

- How swiftly and effectively were the most relevant lessons from previous disasters consolidated and deployed, both prior to and at the outset of the emergency, to those involved in the response who stood to benefit most from these lessons at various levels of the Organization?
  - How swiftly were the most relevant lessons from the Haiti response itself, as well as monitoring data, consolidated and deployed to those involved in the response who stood to benefit most from these lessons (e.g., in the form of general guidance and lessons learning exercises, handover notes from individual out-rotating staff to their successors, and so on)?
  - How user-friendly and comprehensible was the messaging surrounding these lessons so that they could be easily understood?
  - How rapidly were specific sub-audiences for specific lessons identified and targeted?
  - How appropriate were the fora, media and channels chosen for conveying relevant lessons to appropriate audiences in the most effective and efficient manner?
  - To what extent were lessons, both from the Haiti response itself and from previous disasters, received, understood, discussed, and translated into action?
  - To the extent that lesson-learning occurred, what if any effects did these lessons have on subsequent decision-making during the first three months and beyond? To what extent has the response improved as a result of these processes?
  - What aspects of UNICEF's operations helped or hindered this process of critical self-reflection and effective feedback into decision-making?
10. The first set of these overarching review questions examines *how successful UNICEF was* in delivering results for children, women and other vulnerable populations in the aftermath of the earthquake. This line of inquiry represents a necessary first step toward seeking explanatory factors within the Organization's operations that help elucidate *why this was*

*the case*, an area that is covered in the second and third sets of questions. The final question, meanwhile, speaks to *how effectively UNICEF has sought to learn from the experience of what has and has not worked* so as to improve over time.

11. In answering these questions, the review will seek to pinpoint specific and concrete changes in the way UNICEF “does business” in order to better meet the needs of children and women in emergencies. Toward this end, the selected consultants will be invited to refine and expound on the review subquestions outlined above in their inception report, along with markers and a data collection plan for answering them.

## V. Scope

12. This review will look at the collective response of the Organization at all levels, as well as the inter-linkage among these levels, in its exploration of what worked in the case of Haiti, what did not, and why. The Evaluation Office recognizes that a full-scale evaluation is not feasible at this time, given the short timeframe proposed, juxtaposed with its broadly framed questions. The present exercise is thus construed as a review, entailing a narrower focus than a standard evaluation would afford. As such, it aims to answer the broad questions enumerated above in a timely yet thorough manner.
13. The selected consulting team will be expected to develop a methodology that strikes a balance between the dual need for speed and the need for thoughtful and thorough analysis. One option the Evaluation Office sees as viable for addressing this vital scoping issue is for the selected team to undertake a brief yet rigorous scoping mission at the outset of the project, the aim of which will be to rapidly identify those areas of greatest criticality to the Organization so as to focus the bulk of its inquiry on exploring these critical areas in depth (i.e., as opposed to documenting evidence for those areas widely recognized to have worked well). The team will then draft an inception report which outlines various options for the Executive Director’s consideration in light of his information needs, along with the timeline associated with each. (See “Review Outputs” section below.)
14. This exercise, as a review rather than an evaluation, will further aim to balance the need for thoroughness and breadth with the concomitant need for speed and focus in the following ways.
  - **Dual Focus on Results and Enabling/Disabling Factors.** As borne out in the review questions outlined above, the purpose of this exercise will be to identify what in the Organization’s operational response worked well and what did not before and during

the first months of UNICEF's response in Haiti.<sup>7</sup> As such, the review will explore those factors that helped or hindered UNICEF in undertaking the most timely, effective and efficient response possible. However, in order to answer these “how” and “why” questions<sup>8</sup>, it is first necessary to determine what specific results were and were not achieved in a timely fashion (i.e., the “what” and “when” questions). The point of departure for establishing performance benchmarks will be the revised Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action (CCCs), UNICEF's cluster responsibilities and the goals of its upstream work. However, the review will go beyond these and look more generically to what and what was not achieved without these targets *a priori*, particularly as these were only finalized in April 2010 (i.e., several weeks after the earthquake struck).<sup>9</sup> Rather than engage in a thorough data collection effort to garner data on each and every CCC, however, the selected consultants will curtail this arm of data collection by (a) obtaining and verifying any data already collected on the CCCs (i.e., secondary data analysis); (b) collecting first-hand data for any remaining CCCs for which direct measurement is possible (i.e., primary data analysis); and (c) eliciting triangulated perceptual data for all other CCCs for which neither primary nor secondary data analysis is possible. (The Methodology section below speaks to this approach in greater depth.) It is envisioned that this arm of the data collection will occur early on in the review so as to quickly answer this “what” question and thus proceed to the more in-depth analysis of the “why” question and thus zero in on recommended changes.

- **Emphasis on Internal Rather than External Factors.** It has already been well established, both anecdotally and through evaluative work conducted to date, that a number of external factors have hindered the Humanitarian Country Team's response. These include the unprecedented scope and scale of the emergency, the physical destruction of the very organizational infrastructure charge with the response (i.e., the GoH, humanitarian agencies), the urban nature of the disaster, the depth of pre-existing vulnerabilities in the affected population, insufficient capacity of local partners, and more. While remaining mindful of these significant challenges, the present review will focus not on further rehashing these external factors, but rather on exploring those

<sup>7</sup> This focus suggests a narrower range of assessment criteria than a standard evaluation would entail, thus limiting the scope to effectiveness (including timeliness) and efficiency and foregoing in-depth analysis on other established evaluation criteria. The OECD-DAC evaluation criteria include: Relevance/Appropriateness, Connectedness, Coherence, Coverage, Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Impact.

<sup>8</sup> It is additionally reasonable to ask the “who” question of whether functional roles within the Organization, as currently construed, represent a necessary and sufficient set of functions for the Organization to be optimally effective – and where these roles are clear, adequately linked to other roles, and so on. These “who” questions are a common thread throughout all of the review questions, articulated as “functional roles” in para 9 and para 14 (bullet 3).

<sup>9</sup> It is not presumed, for example, that the revised CCCs are now comprehensive. Rather, the present exercise could include the revised CCCs as one target of its recommendations (e.g., which need to be refined, what further benchmarks should be added, and so on), based on the findings associated with this analysis.

internal factors surrounding UNICEF's operations that affected UNICEF's response for the better or the worse. In this regard, key subquestions to explore are: (1) Given the many challenges that marked this disaster, how institutionally prepared was UNICEF – both with respect to the organizational systems it has in place to fulfil its responsibilities and to its management of these systems – to respond to unforeseen contingencies to ensure that results were achieved *despite* the attendant challenges? (2) Where results were achieved, to what extent was this *owed to a conducive enabling environment* or, conversely, to particularly individuals who were able to find a way to function *despite an unfavourable enabling environment*?

- **UNICEF Systems as Units of Analysis.** The review's examination of explanatory factors affecting the response in Haiti will, in a similar fashion as the assessment of results, be rooted in the revised CCCs. Specifically, the Evaluation Office views the revised CCCs' Operational Commitments as a starting point for understanding the main systems, or institutional areas, that affect the Organization's ability to respond.<sup>10</sup> However, the Operational Commitments are both outcomes in themselves and enabling factors intended to facilitate the achievement of the Programme Commitments.<sup>11</sup> Thus, other key aspects of UNICEF's way of "doing business" that are not enshrined in the revised CCCs but nonetheless intimately affect both the Operational and Programme Commitments – e.g., accountability frameworks, structural features (including including functional roles, overall organizational structure, inter-linkages among various levels of the Organization), partnerships, advocacy activities, cultural elements, specific elements of UNICEF's cluster responsibilities, and so on – will be as central a focus as the Operational Commitments in seeking explanatory value in the response. Accordingly, while the review will need to ascertain what results were and were not achieved at country level, it is important to underline that the primary focus of this review will *not* be on Country Office accountabilities for results achieved. Rather, owing to the numerous external factors affecting this particular response, it is understood that UNICEF's Country Office was operating under unprecedented constraints. Thus, in keeping with the review's emphasis on internal operational factors affecting UNICEF's response, the review will focus on those institutional factors endemic to UNICEF itself as an organization – e.g., its policies and procedures, structural arrangements, governance, management practices, cultural factors, and so on – that helped and hindered the timeliness, effectiveness and efficiency of the response. It is nonetheless necessary,

<sup>10</sup> The Operational Commitments fall into the following categories: Media and communications, Security, Human resources, Resource mobilization, Finance and administration, and Information and communication technology.

<sup>11</sup> The Programme Commitments fall into the following categories: Performance monitoring; Rapid assessment, monitoring and evaluation; Nutrition; Health; Water, sanitation and hygiene; Child protection; Education; HIV and AIDS; and Supply and logistics.

however, that in seeking such explanatory information, it will be necessary to ascertain what the CO was and was not able to achieve on the ground.

- **Timeframe under Analysis.** The review, in assessing results achieved and not achieved, will focus first and foremost on first three months of response. However, on certain critical issues it will be necessary to look at UNICEF systems related to the period predating and following this earliest phase of the response. It is noteworthy that key elements of the Organization's capacity to respond predate the response itself and are more closely associated with preparedness – e.g., ensuring adequate surge capacity and pre-positioning of supplies, and so on. Thus, the analysis of explanatory factors affecting the response will focus on factors independent of time. Likewise, as humanitarian action in the UNICEF context includes early recovery (including the Organization's involvement in the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, and more broadly issues of UNICEF's engagement with the Recovery Framework and national planning), results achieved and not achieved in this critical area will constitute a legitimate dimension of the outcomes examined in the response. As with pre-disaster preparedness, medium-term issues such as these will likely require a review of the period extending beyond the three-month response timeframe, as well systems *affecting* UNICEF's ability to engage effectively in the medium to longer term, such as its management of human resources for the medium term as well as the initial surge. Finally, in answering the final review question related to harnessing knowledge for organizational improvement over time, the review will not merely look to *pre-earthquake* systems for consolidating and quickly deploying lessons learned at the outset this emergency – and using these to inform decision-making. Rather, it will also explore the extent to which UNICEF has sought to learn from its own organizational performance *during* the Haiti response itself, and to change course as necessary in light of this knowledge.<sup>12</sup>
- **Coordination with Related Initiatives.** The Evaluation Office is aware of a number of other initiatives currently underway to assess UNICEF's work in Haiti to date. These include: (a) the inter-agency real-time evaluation (IA-RTE) of the Haiti response<sup>13</sup>, co-managed by UNICEF and currently moving from its first phase focused on the early response to its second phase focused on recovery and transition; (b) audit exercises under the auspices of the Office of Internal Audit (OIA); (c) a pilot by EMOPS of the

<sup>12</sup> This emphasis on organizational learning since the first three months of the response implies that the review team should examine any progress made since these first three months. The selected review team will be encouraged to uncover data sources to support such progress where such data are available and where this will not detract from the main focus on the first three months of the response. These data sources include, among others, the Improvement Initiatives.

<sup>13</sup> *Inter-agency real time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake.* Draft. François Grunewald (Groupe URD), Andrea Binder (GPPi), and Yvion Georges. 14 June 2010.

performance monitoring system for the revised CCCs; and (d) a review of the Haiti response led by OCHA. Every effort will be made to avoid duplication with these efforts, to achieve economies of scale (e.g., by verifying rather than repeating data collection already undertaken on the CCCs), and to seize on complementarities wherever possible. The review will not, however, place such process-related activities as participatory methods and coordination above its primary aim of generating evidence-based, actionable recommendations to the Executive Director on necessary organizational changes at UNICEF.

## VI. Methodology

15. The review's methodological approach, like its scope, will aim to balance the simultaneous need for timeliness and thoroughness. While no sacrifice will be made in the methodological rigour of the exercise – UNEG norms and standards being no less central to this inquiry than to other exercises managed by UNICEF's Evaluation Office, and the inquiry will employ the most appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods to amass the soundest evidence possible – a number of measures will be taken to strike this balance. These balance-promoting measures are as follows:

- **A Two-Phased Approach to Data Collection.** In order to trouble-shoot those areas in greatest need of addressing and how to do so, the Evaluation Office proposes that a two-phased approach to data collection take place. In the first phase, the selected review team would conduct a brief but thorough *scoping exercise*, aimed at rapidly identifying what results are thought to have been achieved and those not, and why, and gathering evidence for exploration during the second phase of the review. The end result emanating from this first stage would be a brief Inception Report, outlining the following:
  - (a) what results were found to have been achieved overall (and will thus require validation as opposed to in-depth analysis in the second phase) and those that fared less well overall (and will thus require more in-depth analysis in the second phase);
  - (b) an indication of factors endemic to UNICEF that were preliminarily found to be instrumental in helping or hindering the response, and in engaging in learning – through official monitoring as well as other means of tracking progress – and critical self-reflection so as to improve the response;
  - (c) a proposed methodology for conducting the second phase of the review, including an overview of existing data and materials already received, those found to be available but not yet received, and those the review team sees as being critical but knows to be unavailable and how it plans to address this in the second phase;
  - (d) a stakeholder analysis delineating what groups (and potentially individuals) will be targeted in phase two and with what methods; and

(e) a proposed timeline and budget associated with phase two.

Phase one would chiefly rely on preliminary interviews with key stakeholders, coupled with a desk review of core internal and external documents. Phase two would consist of the *formal review*, focused on systematically documenting what results were and were not achieved, exploring why, and strategically identifying aspects of the Organization to be repeated and brought to scale and what actions and decisions need to be taken to ensure an improved response in future. Here, too, the Evaluation Office recommends employing stakeholder interviews, coupled with a systematic analysis of existing documentary evidence and the generation of evidence through other means, as the review team sees fit to propose in its Inception Report.

- **A Modified Mixed-Method Approach.** As borne out in the two-phased approach advocated here, the review, rather than utilizing the full complement of data collection tools associated with standard evaluations, will rely on a narrower range of tools in order to answer the key questions within the timeframe allotted. This approach in no way jeopardizes the methodological rigour with which the review will be conducted, and in fact will help advance it by limiting the analysis to those methods most likely to generate the best information as quickly as possible. Thus, the Evaluation Office sees the review as chiefly relying on interviews and documentary evidence (the former serving mainly to highlight issues of greatest criticality, the latter to pinpoint “hard” evidence for results achieved or not achieved and why), rather than surveys or direct observations (the former of which is costly, labour-intensive, and time-consuming, and latter of which is far less relevant in light of the “post mortem” nature of the review). The selected consulting team might wish to strengthen its analysis with these other tools as time permits, however.
- **Efficient Use of Perceptual Data and Documentary Evidence.** In much the same way that the review will focus on those methods most likely to capture the realities of UNICEF’s response in the speediest yet most methodologically rigorous manner possible, within each method it will also seek efficiencies wherever these are possible – notwithstanding the need for reliability and validity of data. Overall, the review will gather all documentary evidence possible to support its conclusions, rather than relying solely on perceptual data. However, with respect to perceptual data alone, *the Evaluation Office advises that the review use surveys only if necessary, one-on-one interviews wherever possible, and focus groups wherever preferable.*<sup>14</sup> With respect to

<sup>14</sup> Surveys, though a useful source of comparative perceptual and behavioral information in a quantitative manner that cannot be gained through other means, are costly, labor-intensive, time-consuming to develop and administer. Moreover, in UNICEF as in many agencies, surveys are prone to low response rates. Interviews, for their part, are good ways of gathering grounded perceptual information in a confidential and candid forum, but are challenging to square against each other without others



documentary evidence, wherever existing data are present (e.g., monitoring data, OPSCEN reports, SitReps, decision-making timelines, and so on)<sup>15</sup>, the review will focus on verifying these data as opposed to duplicating this data collection. In addition, in its Inception Report the review team will be asked to indicate what further materials, documents and other data it would like to requisition from UNICEF in order to answer key questions in the most economical manner possible, rather than undertaking a generic and unstructured desk review.

## **VII. Management and Governance Arrangements**

16. The chief purpose of this review, as indicated above, is to pinpoint concrete actions to be taken within the Organization so as to ensure the most timely, effective and efficient response possible in future emergencies. In order for the review to maximize institutional impact in this manner, it will therefore be necessary for the Evaluation Office manager and the review team to proceed with an optimal level of independence. The review will seek to balance this independence with provisions for consultation, however, so as to ensure the relevance and credibility of the review, its findings and recommendations. This section describes the proposed management and governance arrangements for striking this balance.

### ***Management Arrangements***

17. The review will be managed by the Evaluation Office’s Senior Evaluation Specialist for humanitarian evaluations. In keeping with the Evaluation Office’s customary role in managing evaluations, the review manager’s role will be to manage the selected review team with a view to ensuring (a) adherence to these terms of reference; (b) adherence to established norms and standards for evaluation (and specifically evaluation of humanitarian action); and (c) the independence of the review. The review manager will present a list of prospective candidates to the Executive Director and make a recommendation for the candidate of choice.

18. The Executive Director will be asked to appoint a focal point within his office to assist the review manager in ensuring the timely and satisfactory completion of the review. The focal point will be tasked with the following activities, albeit on as as-needed, “last-resort” basis in the event the review manager faces obstacles in doing so alone:

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present to offer contrasting interpretations. Focus groups offer an opportunity to narrow information gaps and differing stakeholder interpretations, but are often less conducive to candid information-sharing, particularly on sensitive topics.

<sup>15</sup> Some of these materials have already been requisitioned for the Haiti IA-RTE evaluation team, which has been asked to provide feedback on those materials it found to be most and least useful. These could serve as a starting point for the review team, but further documentation will no doubt be requested from divisions and offices.

- Promoting full compliance and cooperation throughout the Organization (e.g., in requisitioning documents and data, obtaining information, gaining access to staff, and so on);
- Offering the review manager an initial round of inputs and feedback on key project outputs so as to strengthen their validity from an “aerial” perspective on the organization and its operations;
- Helping to safeguard the independence of the review;
- Facilitating internal and external communications pursuant to the Executive Director’s internal consultations on key project outputs;
- Ensuring access to the Executive Director as requested by the review manager;
- Identifying adequate resources for the exercise, as necessary; and
- Filling ad hoc information requests by the review manager.

19. Each Headquarters-level division, as well as relevant units within the relevant regional and country offices, will be asked to appoint a focal point to assist with coordination and support of staff members as necessary. This will entail the following:

- Providing all documents and information requested by the review manager, the OED focal point, and the selected review team in a timely fashion;
- Ensuring access to all stakeholders within their respective operational units, and to other key stakeholders outside the Organization as necessary; and
- Coordinating all necessary administrative and logistical assistance for data collection missions as well as other data collection activities.

***Governance***

20. The review manager will work directly with the OED focal point appointed by the Executive Director. Key project outputs (e.g., these ToR, Inception Reports, draft report, and so on) will be shared with the Executive Director, who will consult internally, as he sees fit, to garner comments on each output.

21. The review manager will additionally form a group of three readers to comment on each of these same outputs, helping to ensure optimal relevance, credibility and quality of the exercise. Two of these readers will consist of individuals internal to UNICEF and one will be an external reader knowledgeable of UNICEF. The Executive Director will appoint the two internal readers based on the recommendation of the review manager.

## VIII. Deliverables

22. The review will generate the following outputs, to be presented to the Executive Director, which he will disseminate for comment however he sees fit:

- A brief Inception Report outlining the selected review team’s understanding of the review, along with its proposed action plan (methods, schedule, budget and timeline) for conducting phase one of the review (i.e., the scoping exercise);
- A second Inception Report, also brief, that delineates what results appear to have been achieved and those not achieved, a preliminary sense of the emerging issues or factors affecting UNICEF’s response, a proposed methodology for phase two (i.e., the formal review), a stakeholder analysis, and a proposed timeline and budget associated with phase two;
- A data collection toolkit for both phases (for review by the Evaluation Office only);
- A draft report generating key findings and recommendations for concrete action, underpinned by clear evidence; and
- Debriefs and presentations, as the Executive Director sees fit, to the OED, the Management Leadership Group, and in other fora as the Executive Director sees fit, including a possible presentation to UNICEF’s Executive Board.

## IX. Risks and Challenges

23. The Evaluation Office anticipates several potential risks associated with this review. One key risk is that the selected review team will fall short of fully grasping UNICEF and its operations, leading to factual inaccuracies and possibly findings and recommendations that are irrelevant or inactionable within this organizational context. The Evaluation Office plans to manage this risk in a number of ways. First, the EO review manager will construct a review team whose members are highly knowledgeable of the Organization and its work in humanitarian action – without being so intimately connected to UNICEF so as to pose a conflict of interest.<sup>16</sup> Second, the EO review manager will work closely with the selected review team on a virtually full-time basis, not only fulfilling its standard roles detailed in para 17 above but rather also seeing to it that all relevant materials and individuals are accessed in a timely manner so as to mitigate this risk. Third, as indicated in para 18 above, the EO review manager will work with an OED focal point to ensure that the review proceeds as planned in these ToR and that all relevant information is requisitioned. Finally, as mentioned in para 21 above, the EO will form a group of readers, two of whom will be internal UNICEF staff members.

<sup>16</sup> This risk is heightened if the most suitably qualified consulting team cannot be engaged on short order and during the summer months. See para 26.

24. A key challenge will be to maintain an acceptable level of independence in this sensitive review, the associated risk being that there might be considerable internal resistance to the exercise. To manage this risk, it will be essential for the OED to issue strong, clear communications that explain the review, the process that will be followed, and why, and that unequivocally call for full cooperation and what this entails. In addition, it will be essential that the EO review manager have access to the Executive Director as necessary in the event that full cooperation is not forthcoming.
25. One hypothetical risk associated with any independent evaluative exercise is that unpalatable findings about the Organization's performance will emerge, thus jeopardizing relations with donors and others. The Evaluation Office is not of this view. On the contrary, it views an initiative such as the review proposed as sending a positive signal to donors that UNICEF is a mature organization, willing to critically reflect on what is working and what is not – and to take action accordingly. In this sense, the Evaluation Office sees far greater risk in *not* conducting such candid, self-reflective exercises.

#### **X. Timeline**

26. The review was originally slated to take place at an inopportune time of the year for conducting such exercises, i.e., during the summer months. During this period, it is exceedingly difficult not only to access staff members, most of whom take leave from July to September, but rather also to quickly find a suitably qualified consulting team for this important and sensitive exercise. The Executive Director therefore chose to commence the review in fall 2010.
27. Figure 1 proposes a plan for commencing the review in October. It assumes that a suitably qualified consulting team will indeed be rapidly identified and recruited to undertake the exercise. It conveys the overarching timeline proposed for the review, pending further discussion with the Executive Director and Deputy Executive Directors and the Inception Reports to be received from the selected review team.

**Figure 1 – Proposed Review Timeline**

Action	End Date
Evaluation Office sends ToR to Executive Director	Tuesday, 29 June
ToR finalized by Executive Director	Tuesday, 13 July
Executive Director nominates OED focal point for review	Friday, 16 July
Recommendation of group of readers sent to Executive Director	Friday, 27 August
Executive Director nominates internal UNICEF readers	Wednesday, 1 September
Executive Director finalizes selection of consulting team	Wednesday, 15 September
Consulting team commences Phase 1 work	Monday, 4 October
Consulting team produces Phase 1 Inception Report	Friday, 22 October
Evaluation Office sends Phase 1 Inception Report to Group of Readers	Monday, 25 October
<b>Evaluation Office sends Phase 1 Inception Report to Executive Director</b>	<b>Friday, 29 October</b>
Review team compiles materials for desk review and interviewee lists	Monday, 1 November
Executive Director finalizes Phase 1 Inception Report	Friday, 5 November
Review team completes Phase 1 data collection and analysis	Friday, 26 November
Consulting team produces Phase 2 Inception Report	Friday, 26 November
Evaluation Office sends Phase 2 Inception Report to Group of Readers	Monday, 29 November
<b>Evaluation Office sends Phase 2 Inception Report to Executive Director</b>	<b>Friday, 3 December</b>
Executive Director finalizes Phase 2 Inception Report	Friday, 10 December
Consulting team commences Phase 2 work	Monday, 3 January
Consulting team produces draft Review Report	Friday, 4 March
Evaluation Office sends draft Review Report to Group of Readers	Friday, 11 March
<b>Evaluation Office sends draft Review Report to Executive Director</b>	<b>Friday, 18 March</b>
Executive Director finalizes Review Report	Friday, 2 April
Review team conducts presentations and debriefs on review	TBD

28. This timeline thus foresees the initial two months being devoted to and conducting phase one, the lighter scoping exercise, with the bulk of the formal review commencing thereafter.

## **XI. Consultant Team Profile**

29. Three senior-level consultants will be recruited to comprise the review team, assisted by a fourth team member who will conduct back-office activities (e.g., administrative tasks, data analysis). A ToR detailing the desired team profile is being developed in parallel to these ToR, but tentatively it is proposed that the team be composed of the following individuals:

- A Team Leader, responsible for shepherding the review from start to finish, and responsible for the bulk of data collection and analysis as well as report drafting;
- A Senior Humanitarian Expert, familiar with the humanitarian system and the operational aspects of running humanitarian operations from various organizational levels;
- A UNICEF Expert intimately familiar with UNICEF and its internal systems, not least of all in relation to its humanitarian action; and
- An Analyst capable of analyzing complex organizations using a variety of qualitative and quantitative data collection modalities.

30. It is foreseen that the Team Leader and the back-office team member will be devoted to the review full-time, whereas the Senior Humanitarian Expert and Systems Analyst may be committed to the review part-time. A team will be constituted that is collectively qualified to make recommendations on concrete actions that UNICEF should take to strengthen its response in future. It is envisaged that, in making its recommendations, the team will be conversant with other humanitarian organizations' operations so as to suggest possible alternative systems and arrangements at UNICEF.

## **XII. Resource Requirements**

31. The budget for this review is currently under development, subject to further refinement upon finalization of these ToR and the Inception Reports delivered by the selected consultants.

## Annex II: List of Interviewees

### Scoping Phase

#### UNICEF New York, Geneva & Copenhagen

1. Afshan Khan, Director, PARMO
2. Akhil Iyer, Deputy Director, EMOPS
3. Andrew Colin Parker, Senior Advisor, WASH, PD
4. Atilla Hercioglu, Senior Advisor, MICS, DPP
5. Ayalew Abai, former Comptroller (retired in September 2010: coordination of DFAM response 8 February to 21 April)
6. Barry Wentworth, Deputy Director, Finance and Accounts, DFAM
7. Betel Tassew, Senior HR Manager, Business Partnerships Emergencies, Director's Office, DHR
8. Bettina Tucci Bartsiotas, Deputy Director Budget, DFAM
9. Brendan Doyle, Chief, HATIS, PD
10. Chayavat Pukchareon, Assistant Financial Management Analyst Officer, DFAM
11. Chris De Bono, Chief of Media Section, DOC
12. Chris Tidey, Consultant, DOC
13. Christine Knudsen, Chief, Inter-Agency & Humanitarian Partnership, EMOPS
14. Christine Lloyd, Director, DHR
15. Dermot Carty, Deputy Director, EMOPS
16. Eiman Barr, Director, Change Management Office
17. Mellissa Fernandez, Organisational Improvement Specialist, Change Management Office
18. Elizabeth Gibbons, Senior Adviser, DPP
19. Ellen Tolmie, Photo Editor, DOC
20. Eric Mercier, Senior Adviser, HIV/AIDS, PD
21. Faika Farzana, Humanitarian Fundraising Officer, PARMO
22. Gabriella Buenscher, Senior Adviser, HATIS, PD
23. Hai Kyung Jun, Sr. Adviser, UN & Intergovernmental Affairs Office, GMA
24. Hamish Young, Deputy Director, OIA
25. Hani Shannak, Chief of IT Operations, IT Division
26. Hilde F. Johnson, Deputy Executive Director
27. Isabel Candela, Senior Early Recovery Specialist, EMOPS
28. Janet De Grasse, HR Specialist, Global Service Centre, DHR
29. Jaroslaw Chomanczuk, Deputy Director, Administration, DFAM
30. Jean-Cedric Meeus, Chief, Supply in Emergencies, Supply Division
31. Jeremy Hartley, Chief Communication, PFP
32. John Winston, Senior Relationship Manager (Relation Team IV), NatComs, PFP
33. Jordan Naidoo, Senior Adviser, Scaling Up and Reconstruction, Education Section, PD
34. Jose Banda, Business Analyst, DFAM
35. Joselito Nuguid, Deputy Director of Operations, Supply Division
36. Josephine Ippe, Senior Adviser, Global Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, PD
37. Jude Nwaokolo, Assistant Finance Officer, DFAM
38. Karolina Wozniak, Consultant, Emergency Specialist, EMOPS
39. Kate Alley, Knowledge Management Specialist, EMOPS
40. Kent Page, Communication Specialist, DOC

41. Krishna Belbase, Senior Evaluation Officer, Evaluation Office
42. Lisa Doughten, Senior Humanitarian Focal Point, PARMO (deployed to MINUSTAH for 6 weeks from end of January until early March)
43. Lola Galla, Assistant, Emergency Section, DHR
44. Louis-Georges Arsenault, Director, EMOPS
45. Lucia Elmi, Chief, Humanitarian & Field Support Unit, EMOPS
46. Maria Calivis, Chief of Staff
47. Maria De La Costa, Budget Manager, DFAM
48. Marianne Kelley, HR Specialist for TACRO, Recruitment/Staff Focal Point, DHR
49. Nicholas Alipui, Director, DP
50. Nurper Ulker, Senior Adviser, Early Childhood Development, PD
51. Omar Abdi, Deputy Executive Director
52. Patrick McCormick, Senior Communication Specialist, Emergencies, DOC
53. Pierre Poupard, Senior Coordinator, Humanitarian Field Support Section (HFSS)/Emergency Response Team, EMOPS
54. Ravi Karkara, Specialist, Child & Adolescent Participation, DPP
55. Richard Beighton, Fundraising Manager – Market Development (Central Fund-raising), PFP
56. Richard Morgan, Director, DPP
57. Robert McCouch, Senior Evaluation Specialist, Evaluation Office
58. Robert Pashayan, Finance Officer, DFAM
59. Robin Nandy, Senior Adviser, Health, PD
60. Roger Keczkas, International Fundraising Manager – Southern Europe, Relation Team II (NatCom Relations), PFP
61. Rose Gibe Brown Bickel, Chief, Classification, Compensation & Organization Design, HRSS/CCOD, DHR
62. Roshan Khadivi, Consultant, DOC
63. Runar Holen, Manager Emergency Telecommunications, IT Division
64. Saad Houry, Deputy Executive Director
65. Samuel Bickel, Senior Evaluation Specialist, Evaluation Office
66. Sara Bordas Eddy, Emergency Specialist and Haiti Focal Point, EMOPS, and member of Haiti HQ/TACRO Task Force
67. Shanelle Hall, Director, Supply Division
68. Shannon McGuire, Surge Capacity Manager, DHR
69. Stephen Cassidy, Chief, Internet Broadcast and Image Section, DOC
70. Tamara Zgonjanin-Li, Assistant Administrative Officer, DFAM
71. Tania McBride, Communications Officer, Media Section, DOC
72. Tanya Turkivich, Assignment Manager, Internet Broadcast and Image Section, DOC
73. Ted Maly, Senior Adviser (Fundraising Focal Point for US, Ireland, Korea & Japan and Humanitarian Funding), PARMO
74. Tserha Petros, Accountant, DFAM
75. Vassilina Dikidjieva, Facilities Services Specialist, DFAM
76. Wivina Belmonte, Deputy Director, DOC

## **TACRO**

77. Bernt Aasen, Regional Director, TACRO
78. Debora Comini, Deputy Regional Director, TACRO
79. Gianluca Buono, Regional Emergency Adviser, TACRO
80. Heidi Peugeot, Regional Emergency Specialist, TACRO
81. Maria Elena Solano, Regional HR Specialist, TACRO



82. Nadine Perrault, Regional Child Protection Adviser, TACRO
83. Tamar Hahn, Communications Officer, TACRO

### **Haiti Country Office**

84. Carel De Rooy, Country Director, Bangladesh (deployed in Haiti from 19 Feb to 30 April)
85. Giovanni Riccardi Candiani, deployed as Emergency Specialist in Santo Domingo, Life-Line Haiti
86. Guido Cornale, Country Director, Niger (Haiti Country Representative on 12 January 2010)
87. Jaques Boyer, Deputy Representative, Nigeria (Haiti Deputy Representative at the time of the quake)
88. Sebastien Laplanche, Logistics Manager, HCO
89. Silvia Danailov, Senior Recovery Adviser, HCO

### **National Committees**

90. Gerard Bocquenet, Executive Director, French NatCom
91. Robert Thompson, Senior Vice President, US NatCom

### **External Stakeholders**

92. Andy Bastable, Public Health Engineering Coordinator, Oxfam
93. Christopher Loan, OIC Haiti Disaster Response, CIDA
94. Jesper Lund, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
95. Kevin Tokar, Strategic Analysis Policy Unit, CIDA
96. Serge Kosaikene, Manager, National Disaster Unit, CIDA

## **Main Review Phase**

### **UNICEF New York, Geneva & Copenhagen**

1. Afshan Khan, Director, PARMO
2. Ainya Razafy, Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Field Support Section (HFSS)/Emergency Response Team, EMOPS
3. Amanda Melville, Child Protection Specialist, Child Protection, PD
4. Anders Petterson, Executive Director, Swedish NatCom (seconded to DHR during the response)
5. Andrew Colin Parker, Senior Adviser, WASH, PD
6. Anne Golaz, Senior Health Advisor, EMOPS
7. Anne Veneman, Former UNICEF Executive Director
8. Maria Calivis, Chief of Staff
9. Antony Spalton, Disaster Risk Reduction Specialist, EMOPS
10. Ayda Eke, Consultant, Child Protection, PD
11. Barry Wentworth, Deputy Director, DFAM
12. Bintou Keita, Deputy Director, DHR
13. Blerta Aliko, Recovery Specialist, EMOPS
14. Brendan Doyle, Chief, HATIS, PD

15. Caroline Hardy, Deputy Director, NatCom Relations, PFP
16. Christine Lloyd, Director, DHR
17. Dermot Carty, Deputy Director, EMOPS
18. Eimar Barr, Director, Change Management Office
19. Ellen Van Kalmthout, Senior Adviser, Education Cluster, PD
20. Eric Mercier, Senior Advisor, HIV/AIDS, PD
21. Erin Boyd, Nutritional Specialist, Nutrition, PD
22. Gabriella Buescher, Senior Adviser, HATIS, PD
23. Genevieve Boutin, Chief, Humanitarian Policy Section, EMOPS
24. Hanne Bak Pedersen, Deputy Director, Supply Division
25. Hanni Shannak, Chief, Operations and Services, ITSS
26. Hapnes, Svein, Shipping Manager, Supply Division
27. Heffinck, Philippe, Consultant
28. Henrik Jensen, Supply Specialist, Supply Division
29. Ivan Donoso, Chief, Programme Support Unit, PD
30. James Elrington, Haiti Fundraising Coordinator, PFP
31. Janet De Grasse, HR Specialist, Global Service Centre, DHR
32. Jean Cedric Meeus, Chief, Supply in Emergencies, Supply Division
33. Jens Grimm, Emergency Logistics Specialist, Supply Division
34. Jordan Naidoo, Senior Adviser, Scaling Up and Reconstruction, Education Section, PD
35. Julien Temple, Manager, Emergency Surge Capacity, EMOPS
36. Karolina Wozniak, Consultant, Emergency Unit, DHR
37. Kate Alley, Knowledge Management Specialist, EMOPS
38. Kent Page, Communication Specialist, DOC
39. Khaled Mansoor, Director, DOC
40. Leika Pakkala, Director, PFP
41. Louis-George Arsenault, Director, EMOPS
42. Marc Savail, Senior Emergency Specialist, Humanitarian Field Support Section (HFSS)/Emergency Response Team, EMOPS
43. Marianne Kelly, HR Specialist, DHR
44. Mellissa Fernandez, Organisational Improvement Specialist, Office of Change Management
45. Michel Le Pechoux, Chief, Early Warning & Preparedness, EMOPS
46. Nazih Achkar, Operations Specialist, Humanitarian Field Support Section (HFSS)/Emergency Response Team, EMOPS
47. Patrick McCormick, Senior Communication Specialist, DOC
48. Pierre Poupard, Senior Coordinator, Humanitarian Field Support Section (HFSS)/Emergency Response Team, EMOPS
49. Ravi Kartara, Child Development Specialist, DPP
50. Rebecca Fordham, Communication Specialist, Child Protection, DOC
51. Richard Morgan, Director, DPP
52. Robert Jenkins, Associate Director, Policy and Programme Guidance, DPP
53. Rose Gbeu Brown Bickel, Chief, Classification, Compensation & Organization Design, HRSS/CCOD, DHR
54. Rundar Holen, Manager Emergency Telecommunications, IT Division
55. Saad Houry Deputy Executive Director
56. Shanelle Hall, Director, Supply Division
57. Silvia Castillos Rodriguez, HR Specialist, Emergencies, DHR
58. Silvia Uneddu, Emergency Logistics Manager, Supply Division
59. Simon White Lawry, IASC Secretariat, EMOPS
60. Stephane Pichette, Child Protection Specialist, PD

61. Stephen Cassidy, Chief, Internet, Broadcast, Communication, DOC
62. Susan Bissell, Associate Director, Child Protection, PD
63. Tamara Zgonjanin-Li, Administrative Officer, DFAM
64. Tanya Accone, Chief of Planning and Operations, DHR
65. Werner Schultink, Associate Director, Nutrition, PD
66. Witold Smyk, ERP Manger, Change Management Office

#### **UNICEF Haiti CO / UNICEF Dominican Republic CO**

67. Ariel Higgins-Steele, Knowledge Management Specialist, HCO
68. Asako Saegusa, M & E Manager, HCO
69. Bayard Rony, WASH Specialist, Former Emergency Focal Point, HCO
70. Cecilie Modvar, Junior Professional Officer, Child Protection, DRCO
71. Christian Popotre, Database Administrator, HCO
72. Christina Torsein, Child Protection Specialist, HCO
73. Dorina Lopez, Child Protection Officer, DRCO
74. Elizabeth Augustin, Communications Officer (Haitian), HCO
75. Eric F. Rozon, IT Assistant, DRCO
76. Francoise Gruloos-Ackermans, Country Representative, HCO
77. Galia Ngamy, Education Specialist (Haitian), HCO
78. Guillaume Sauval, Programme Specialist, Field Coordination Unit, HCO
79. Indiana Gonzales, Chief of Operations, HCO
80. Jeremy Shusterman, Reporting Specialist, HCO
81. Jorge Quintela, Chief of Operations, DRCO
82. Jules Hans Beauvoir, Child Protection Officer (Haitian), HCO
83. Leonar Cruz, Finance Assistant, DRCO
84. Leonard Rosard, Finance Assistant, DRCO
85. Maria Elena Asuad, Child Protection Officer, DRCO
86. Maria Jesus Conde Zabala, Country Representative, DRCO
87. Marie Elena Asoud, Child Protection Officer, DRCO
88. Marie-Claude Desilets, Nutrition Specialist, HCO
89. Marie-Helene Boisson, HR/Admin Officer, HCO
90. Mark Henderson, Chief of WASH Section, HCO
91. Matteo Perrone, Former UNICEF Emergency Coordinator, HCO
92. Michael Zahardi, Logistics Specialist, HCO
93. Michelle Trombley, GBV Specialist, HCO
94. Mohamed Malick Fall, Chief of Education & Education Cluster Coordinator, HCO
95. Nelson Medina, M & E Officer, DRCO
96. Olivier Thonet, WASH Specialist, Cluster Coordination Unit, HCO
97. Patricia Lucia, Communications Officer, DRCO
98. Roseline Araman, Operations Manager (pre-earthquake), HCO
99. Sandra Lattouf, Chief Field Coordination, HCO
100. Sara Mevindez, Child Survival and Development Officer, DRCO
101. Sebastien Laplanche, Logistics Manager, HCO
102. Sergio Alvarez, Disaster Risk Reduction Specialist, DRCO
103. Silvia Danailov, Senior Recovery Adviser, HCO
104. Stefano Fedele, Nutrition Cluster Coordinator, HCO
105. Stephanie Kleschnitzki, Reports and Contributions Manager, HCO
106. Tameko Donatien, M & E Specialist, HCO
107. Zaid Jurji, Deputy Representative, HCO

## **UNICEF Staff (Current and Former) from Other Offices Deployed in Haiti**

108. David Delienne, Regional Adviser WASH, ESARO
109. Douglas Ravenstien, Canadem (deployed as Information Management Specialist)
110. Erich Fellmann, Operations Manager, UNICEF Nicaragua
111. Giovanni Riccardi Candiani, deployed as Emergency Specialist in Santo Domingo, Life-Line Haiti
112. James Shepherd-Barron, Senior Regional Emergency Specialist (Haiti surge WASH Cluster Coordinator), EAPRO
113. Jean McCluskey Emergency/WASH specialist
114. Katharina Imhof, Chief Education Section, UNICEF Bolivia
115. Leonardo Gonzales, IT & Communications Officer, UNICEF Bolivia (deployed in Dominican Republic)
116. Marc Vergara, Chief of Communications, UNICEF Cambodia
117. Mariana Muzzi, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF Mozambique
118. Martin Porter, Consultant, EMOPS
119. Mervyn Fletcher, Chief of Communication, UNICEF Sri Lanka
120. Paulo Sassarao, Deputy Representative, UNICEF Paraguay
121. Souleymane Sow, Global WASH Cluster Rapid Response Team, ACF
122. Vanya Berrouet, Education Specialist, UNICEF WACRO (deployed in Haiti after 1 month)

## **Other UN Agencies**

123. Alphonsine Bouya, Programme Officer, WFP
124. Andre Bouchard, Chief Security Officer, UNDSS
125. Brian Lander, Division of External Relations, WFP
126. Bruno Lemarquis, BCPR, UNDP
127. Dario Alvarez, Regional Disaster Response Adviser, OCHA
128. Douglas Reimer, Regional Disaster Response Adviser, OCHA
129. Gerard Gomez, Head of Office, OCHA
130. Henri-Francois Morand, Head of Early Recovery Unit, UNDP
131. Igor Bosc, Representative, UNFPA
132. Kim Bolduc, former RC/HC in Haiti and currently UN System Resident Coordinator in Panama
133. Lea Matheson, IASC Focal Point, IOM
134. Michelle Doura, HIV/TB unit, WFP
135. Mitchell Carlsson, Emergency Response Officer, MINUSTAH
136. Nigel Fisher, DSRSG
137. Paola Dos Santos, Head of Nutrition and HIV/TB Unit, WFP
138. Pauline Comtesse, Operations Manager for Logistics Cluster, WFP

## **National Committees**

139. Christian Schneider, Executive Director, German NatCom
140. David Bull, Executive Director, UK NatCom
141. Ken Hayami, Executive Director, Japan NatCom
142. Kimberely Moran, Acting Executive Director, Canada NatCom
143. Robert Thompson, Senior Vice President, US NatCom
144. Veronique Lonnerblad, Executive Director, Swedish NatCom

## **TACRO**

145. Anna Lucia D'Emilio, Consultant, TACRO
146. Bernt Assen, Regional Director, TACRO
147. Debora Comini, Deputy Regional Director, TACRO
148. Edgar Gonzalez, Assistant, Focal Point for Supplies, TACRO
149. Enrique Pas, Regional Health & Nutrition Adviser, TACRO
150. Gianluca Buono, Regional Emergency Adviser, TACRO
151. Heidi Peugeot, Regional Emergency Specialist, TACRO
152. Jesus Trelles, WASH Officer (in Haiti), TACRO
153. Lara Vu, Private Sector Officer, TACRO
154. Lydia Lopez-Friedman, Consultant, TACRO
155. Maite Onochie, Regional Education in Emergency Officer, TACRO
156. Maria Elena Solano, Regional HR Specialist, TACRO
157. Maruja Zlatar, President of the Staff Association for the Region, TACRO
158. Nadine Perrault, Regional Child Protection Officer, TACRO (Haitian international staff)
159. Rosa Mota, Regional Operations Officer, TACRO
160. Ruth Custode, Regional Education in Emergency Officer, TACRO
161. Tamar Hahn, Regional Communication Specialist, TACRO

## **NGOs**

162. Alberto Monguzzi, Disaster Management Specialist, IFRC
163. Aurelien Barriquault, Nutrition Manager, Save the Children,
164. Berengere Tripon, Programme Coordinator for Cholera, ACF
165. Cedric Perus, Humanitarian Programme Manager, OXFAM
166. Chris Man, Chef de Base, ACTED
167. Christian Popotre, Information Manager, Save the Children
168. Madame Germaine Pierre Louis, Haitian Red Cross Coordinator
169. Margareth Mallet, Director, FONDEFH (Fondation pour le Developpement et l'Encadrement de la Famille Haitienne)
170. Martin Morand, Logisitics Manager, ACTED
171. Stefano Zannini, Chef de Mission, MSF-OSB
172. Murielle Sonostro, Nutritionist, Save the Children
173. Nelson Casano, Disaster Risk Management Coordinator, IFRC
174. Ramsey Ben-Achour, Country Director, Heartland Alliance
175. Raphael Mutiku, WASH Coordinator, OXFAM
176. Roland van Hauwermeiren, Country Director, OXFAM
177. Serginiow Rogene, Child Protection Manager, Save the Children
178. Sophie Perez, Former Country Representative, CARE
179. Tim Forster, Former WASH Cluster Coordinator, OXFAM
180. Xavier Casteo, Director, Zone de las Americas, IFRC

## **Government of Haiti / Government of the Dominican Republic**

181. Angel Louis Alvarez, In-charge Planning and Projects, CONANI, Government of DR
182. Fontaine Ernest, Pharmacien Department Sud-Est, MSPP, Ministry of Health
183. Franz Pierre Louls, Ingenieur UTE, DINEPA

184. Greguy Regis, Jacmel Coordinator, Institut du Bien-etre Social et de Recherches, IBESR, Ministry of Social Welfare
185. Guillaume Andolphe, Consultant with the IBESR, Ministry of Social Welfare
186. Marjorie la Douceur, Brigade de Protection de Mineurs, BPM
187. Paul Christian, Coordinator, Municipality Support Project, DINEPA
188. Philippe Germain, Inspecteur de District, Jacmal, Government of Haiti
189. Roberto P. Albuez, Vice Minister of Health, Government of DR
190. Yves Gaston, Director Department Sud-Est & President of the Haitian Red Cross in Jacmel, MSPP, Ministry of Health

## **Donors**

191. Bernard Smolikowski, Attaché Humanitaire, Ambassade de France, Haiti
192. Cecile Petereit, Charge de Mission de Cooperation, Ambassade de France, Haiti
193. Daniel Barrendorm, ECHO Haiti
194. Olivier Brouant, Humanitarian Expert, ECHO Haiti
195. Phil Gelman, Senior Humanitarian Adviser, OFDA
196. Raymonde Chantigny, Deputy Director, CIDA Haiti
197. Sandra Berberi, Emergency Focal Point, CIDA Haiti
198. T. Ota, Third Secretary, Japan Embassy, Haiti

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## **UNICEF Lessons Learned Series (2010)**

1. Education Lessons Learned
2. Lessons Learned, WASH
3. Selected Lessons Learned from Humanitarian Action and Post-Crisis Recovery – Capacity Development
4. Child Protection Programme Lessons Learned
5. Health Programme Lessons Learnt
6. Nutrition Programme Lessons Learned
7. Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response -- First extract from debriefings of key surge support staff, DRAFT, 25.04.2010
8. Lessons Learned Work Streams Relating to the Haiti 2010 Earthquake Response
9. Synthesis of Lessons on UNICEF response to the Haiti earthquake, January – July 2010, EMOPS/PD, 4 October 2010

## **Staff Debriefing Notes**

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Jean McCluskey, WASH Cluster Coordinator, Haiti, CO

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of James Shepherd-Barron, WASH Cluster Coordinator, Haiti CO.

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Eric Mercier, Haiti CO.

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Jennifer Hofmann, Education Cluster Coordinator, Léogâne

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Andrea Berther, Education Specialist

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Patrick Laurent WASH Cluster Coordinator, Haiti CO.

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Arnaud Conchon, ECD

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Ainga Razafy (Emergency Logistics Specialist, EMOPS) and Silvia Uneddu (Emergency Logistics Specialist, EMOPS)

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake emergency response – Debriefing of Runar Holen, CO Haiti

[Draft] Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake Nutrition emergency response – Debriefing of David Delienne, Senior Advisor, CO Haiti

Lessons from the Earthquake Response in Haiti – Debriefing of Elizabeth Augustin, Communications Officer, Haiti CO, 12 October 2010

Lessons from the Earthquake Response in Haiti – Debriefing of Mark Henderson, Chief WASH, Haiti CO

Lessons from the Earthquake Response in Haiti – Debriefing of Marie-Claude Desilets, Nutrition Specialist, Haiti CO

Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake Nutrition emergency response – Debriefing of Robin Nandy (Health), Maya Vandenant (Health), Arnold Timmer (Nutrition) and Andrew Parker (WASH).

Lessons on Haiti post-earthquake Nutrition emergency response – Debriefing of Mija Ververs, Nutrition Cluster Coordinator.

Annex IV: UNICEF Management Response to the Review

**UNICEF Evaluation Management Response Template**

**Evaluation title: Independent Review of UNICEF’s Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti**  
**Year: 2011**  
**Office and person in charge for management response: Office of the Executive Director**

UNICEF welcomes the findings of the Independent Review of UNICEF’s Operational Response to the Earthquake in Haiti during the first 90 days. In the management response we address each of the recommendations of the review, with specific actions and timelines. To date, we have already addressed some of the key recommendations while others will be completed by 2012. A mechanism to monitor and review the progress made is also in place.

**RECOMMENDATION AREA 1: HUMANITARIAN LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT**

**Cluster Leadership**

**Review Recommendation 1:**  
 Particular challenges posed by sanitation illustrate the need for the WASH cluster to develop approaches better suited to urban contexts (as recommended by the inter-agency real-time evaluation), and revise their assessment methodologies to understand local contexts and identify and deploy more cost-effective solutions to problems. (See report Section 2, Subsection 1.)

**Management Response (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree**

**If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:**  
 Urban sanitation represents a complex challenge requiring a combination of multi-pronged and multi-disciplinary coordinated approaches, and UNICEF agrees that improvements are needed to bring a greater urban focus to the sector. Currently there exists a Technical WASH Forum where the complex programmatic issues of the sector are more broadly discussed. Thus, in our cluster lead role, we will strengthen our collaboration to facilitate appropriate solutions to urban sanitation challenges.

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
1.1. Review work being undertaken by the WASH Technical Forum and cluster partners, and identify any specific gaps that the global WASH cluster project could fill within its mandate (e.g.,	Global Cluster Co-ordinator (GCC)WASH	December 2011	Underway		

adapting technologies and finding solutions etc.).					
1.2. Together with IFRC, develop a document titled “Tools and Operational Guidance on Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas.”	EMOPS	End 2011	Underway	Draft under review, completion expected in September.	<a href="http://www.icva.ch/doc00003526.html">http://www.icva.ch/doc00003526.html</a>
<b>Review Recommendation 2:</b> Global cluster coordinators and country representatives should ensure that cluster coordinators deployed are at the right level of seniority and experience, especially early on, and they should be treated on par with UNICEF heads of programme. (See report Section 2, Subsection 9.)					
<b>Management Response (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree</b>					
<b>If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:</b> Agree that cluster coordinators should be deployed at the right level of seniority and with the appropriate level of experience/training. In addition, also agree that UNICEF must put in place mechanisms to ensure better collaboration and clearer accountabilities between cluster coordinators and UNICEF programme heads. These arrangements for effective co-ordination should be context-specific and take into account country realities.					
<b>Actions planned</b>	<b>Responsible Office/Person</b>	<b>Expected completion date</b>	<b>Implementation stage:</b> Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	<b>Actions taken</b>	<b>Supporting documents</b>
2.1 Develop and disseminate: - “Quick facts” on Cluster Lead Accountability at the CO Level; - Develop and disseminate programme guidance on the cluster approach for COs (targeted at CO/RO management); - See also Actions 15.2 and 16.1 on Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs) for Level 3 and 2 emergencies.	EMOPS (lead), PD, DHR	Quick facts (End 2011)  Programme Guidance (Mid 2012)	Underway	- Quick facts on Cluster Lead accountability being drafted by PD and EMOPS. - First draft of guidance document prepared by PD, to be finalized once Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals decide on the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the Cluster Lead Agency (CLA). In each “new” emergency setting, guidance on Cluster Co-ordination (CC) is provided to COs. - Draft SSOPs for Level 3 Emergencies developed, which includes a	

				section on cluster coordination.	
2.2.Strengthen and expand the number of suitable candidates available for Cluster Co-ordination (CC) deployments: - GCCs to work with DHR to identify suitable CC candidates to include on roster; - GCCs to work with cluster partners to train existing CCs.	EMOPS, DHR, PD	Ongoing	Underway	- A process for the ongoing identification of candidates for the CC roster has been established with DHR, PD Sections and Regional Sector Advisors. - CC training materials have been developed for many areas where UNICEF is cluster/Area of Responsibility (AOR) lead agency.	
<b>Review Recommendation 3:</b>					
As part of ongoing training programmes, OED/EMOPS/PD/DHR need to ensure that all programme and operations managers, including country representatives and their deputies, are fully oriented on the concept of Cluster Lead Agency (CLA) and interagency processes in relation to cluster accountabilities. (See report Section 2, Subsection 9.)					
Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree					
If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
3.1. Include briefings on cluster accountabilities in all organizational trainings and network meetings, including: - Senior Leaders Training; - New Representatives orientations; - Human Resources (HR) Regional Network meetings; - Deputy Representatives and Operations Officer (DROPs) meetings; - Regional Management Team (RMT) meetings;	DHR (lead), EMOPS, OED, ROs, DPP	June 2012	Underway	Briefings on cluster roles and responsibilities have been integrated in: - Sector emergency training materials (WASH in Emergencies, Nutrition in Emergencies, Child Protection in Emergencies, Education in Emergencies, Early Childhood Development in Emergencies); - Core Commitments for Children (CCC) e-learning; - Revised draft PPP training; - Revised draft EPR training.	

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- New staff inductions;</li> <li>- Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) training;</li> <li>- Programme Planning and Policy (PPP) Training.</li> </ul>					
<p>3.2 Update and ensure sustained dissemination of other training materials.</p> <p>See also Action 2.1 on guidance and information on cluster co-ordination.</p>	EMOPS, DHR, PD	Dec 2011	Underway	Capacity in place to develop intranet resource materials including cluster materials.	
<p><b>Review Recommendation 4:</b>  <b>UNICEF needs to develop a cadre of highly trained Information Managers (IM) who can be deployed rapidly in any emergency and are able to either support UNICEF programmes or UNICEF-led clusters. There is an opportunity to develop this as a career path for competent IM managers, as those trained and experienced in dealing with complex IM needs in large emergencies will be in high demand even in normal times in all countries. (See report Section 2, Subsections 1-3, 5, 9.)</b></p>					
<p><b>Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree and some actions already implemented.</b></p>					
<p><b>If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:</b>          Agree with the recommendation in terms of recognizing the importance of Information Management (IM) functions and the need for UNICEF to strengthen these functions.</p>					
<p><b>Actions planned</b></p>	<p><b>Responsible Office/Person</b></p>	<p><b>Expected completion date</b></p>	<p><b>Implementation stage:</b>            Not Started            Underway            Completed            Cancelled</p>	<p><b>Actions taken</b></p>	<p><b>Supporting documents</b></p>
<p>4.1 Develop a learning strategy to strengthen Information Management (IM) and humanitarian Performance Monitoring (PM) competencies as part of M&amp;E specialists' professional development.</p>	EMOPS, DHR (co-lead), DPP, EO	First Quarter 2012	Not Started	<p>Cluster Information Manager post created on core funds for the biennium. The function is responsible for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Developing tools to strengthen IM/M&amp;E for cluster functions,</li> <li>- Supporting COs and ROs,</li> <li>- Facilitating deployment of IM to emergencies as needed.</li> </ul>	



4.2 Create IM surge roster, including: - Identifying and screening of potential IM candidates; - Training a pool of IM surge capacity candidates (internal and external).	DHR (lead), EMOPS	Mid 2012	Underway	Screening of IM candidates currently in the Global Web Roster.	
4.3 Continue to develop and maintain the Humanitarian PM roster by: - Identifying and screening potential humanitarian PM candidates; - Training a pool of humanitarian PM surge capacity (internal and external).	EMOPS (lead), DHR	Ongoing (will be continuous given considerable capacity needs)	Underway	- 25 internal candidates identified, tested and trained (out of 160 candidates screened). A list of trained candidates on the informal roster provided to ESARO in the context of response to the Horn of Africa (HoA) crisis. - Training of external candidates completed in early September.	<a href="http://www.internet.unicef.org/emops/emopssite.nsf/root/PageCCCPM1">http://www.internet.unicef.org/emops/emopssite.nsf/root/PageCCCPM1</a>

## Humanitarian Accountability

### Review Recommendation 15:

OED to take the lead to establish corporate emergency procedures to ensure organization-wide mobilization in response to Level 3 emergencies. (NB: This recommendation language synthesizes the lengthier narrative in the report's Recommendations 15, 16, 19 for ease of comprehension and action. For full recommendation language, see report's Executive Summary, coupled with report Section 3, Subsection 4.1-4.2, 4.4.)

Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree and some actions already implemented.

If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
15.1. Develop and implement Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure (CEAP) for Level 3 emergency.	OED (lead), GMT & EMOPS as technical focal point	N/A	Completed	Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure (CEAP) issued as an Executive Directive on March 21, 2011.  Corporate Emergency Activation Procedure	Global Broadcast 21 July 2011.

				(CEAP) implemented in the context of the Horn of Africa (HoA) crisis.	
15.2. Finalize and endorse the proposed Level 3 Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs).	EMOPS (lead), all divisions	End 2011	Underway	Draft SSOPs for Level 3 emergencies developed.	
15.3. Establish mechanism for the Immediate Response Team (IRT).	EMOPS (lead), all divisions, concerned ROs/COs	N/A	Completed	3 IRTs established following the first Brindisi Simulation Exercise in June 2011. IRT members deployed in support of response to the HoA crisis.	- List of IRT members - Simulation program
15.4. Establish IRT maintenance plan to: - Ensure IRT administrative readiness; - Ensure ongoing learning plan to maintain technical readiness.	EMOPS, DHR	End 2011	Underway		
15.5. Build on IRT and Brindisi experience to ensure adequate response capacity to: - Identify next pool of IRT members; - Prepare and conduct next IRT training; - Develop emerging talent pool.	DHR, EMOPS	Mid 2012	Underway	Next IRT training planned for Q2 2012.	
<b>Review Recommendation 16:</b> OED to take the lead to establish and revise emergency procedures to ensure timely, effective response in Level 2 emergencies. <i>(NB: This recommendation language synthesizes the lengthier narrative in the report's Recommendation 17, 18, 19 for ease of comprehension and action. For full recommendation language, see report's Executive Summary, coupled with report Section 3, Subsection 4.1-4.2, 4.4.)</i>					
<b>Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree</b>					
<b>If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:</b>					

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
16.1 Finalize and endorse the proposed Level 2 Simplified Standard Operating Procedures (SSOPs).	EMOPS (lead) with GMT	Mid 2012	Underway	SOPs (Rapid Response Mechanisms) for HR surge have already been adopted by most regions through the approval of the RMT.	

## Culture

### Review Recommendation 20:

The OED and Regional Directors should ensure that performance appraisals of country representatives incorporate an assessment of their competencies for effectively engaging with corporate priorities, including the Corporate Emergency Procedure (CEP). (See report Section 3, Subsection 4; Section 4, Subsections 1.2, 1.3, 2.)

Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree and already implemented.

If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons: This is already being done. The performance assessment of Country Representatives and Regional Directors reflect the contributions and support provided to respond to an emergency.

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents

## RECOMMENDATION AREA 2: OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

### Deployment and HR Capacity

#### Review Recommendation 7:

In future deployments, recruiting managers need to make it mandatory for all surge deployments to be for at least nine weeks, especially those who will play supervisory, managerial or decision-making roles in the operation. (See report Section 3, Subsection 2.1.)

Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree

If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:

UNICEF agrees on the benefits of longer-term surge deployments for supervisory, managerial and decision-making roles. However, DHR recommends that a

timeframe of 4-12- weeks be established, recognizing that in some cases, it might be necessary to have a surge assignment for shorter duration depending on the context and needs of the requesting country.

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
7.1. Incorporate 4-12-week surge duration timeframe into SSOPs for Level 3 and Level 2 emergencies, with the flexibility depending on contexts.  See Actions 15.2 and 16.1.	DHR (lead), EMOPS, ROs		Completed	This is taken into account in all draft SSOPs for Level 3 and the drafts for Level 2.	

**Review Recommendation 8:**  
EMOPS and DHR need to seriously invest in the development and management of a surge roster, and in the creation of self-contained multi-disciplinary rapid response teams (RRTs). Taking lessons from the Supply Division on how it has developed deployment and HR administration capacity, UNICEF needs to replicate similar arrangements for all emergency deployments, with adequate staffing located in EMOPS and working closely with DHR. (See report Section 3, Subsection 2.1.)

**Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree**

**If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:**  
Agree on the need to improve the management of the surge roster and to establish multi-disciplinary rapid response teams. Toward this end, three Immediate Response Teams (IRTs) have been set up since June 2011. The DHR Emergency Unit is managing the surge roster and deployments during an emergency. However, in order to ensure the correct application of Human Resources rules and regulations, our experience has shown that this function needs to be located within DHR, working closely with EMOPS and other divisions.

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
8.1. Develop a strategy to ensure the sustainability of DHR Emergency Unit.	DHR, EMOPS (co-lead)	Mid 2012	Underway	DHR emergency unit re-established in February 2010.	
8.2. Complete the initial phase of the global web roster.	DHR	End 2011	Underway	Since 2010, PD sections have been working with DHR-Emergency unit to review	

				potential candidates for the emergency roster.	
<b>Review Recommendation 9:</b>					
The use of Special Service Agreement (SSA) and Temporary Assignment (TA) contracts from pre-screened external rosters should be fast-tracked by DHR for surge, especially for all recruitments for a duration of under 90 days and for one year. <i>(See report Section 3, Subsection 2.1.)</i>					
Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree					
If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
9.1 Fast track the recruitment of pre-screened TAs and SSAs for emergencies.  See Actions 8.2. on the global web roster.	DHR (lead)	End Dec 2011	Underway		
<b>Review Recommendation 10:</b>					
DHR and regional directors should make sure that in future emergencies, instead of an elaborate Programme Budget Review (PBR), a list of core staff needs to be agreed for one year within four weeks of response, and a detailed PBR can follow after three months for additional recruitments. <i>(See report Section 3, Subsection 2.1.)</i>					
Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree					
If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:					
While agreeing on the importance of shortened and streamlined PBR process, we disagree with the specific actions and timelines in the recommendation. Guidance on PBR process for countries in emergencies already exists, and ad hoc PBR by mail polls are in place since 1998. In addition, UNICEF should be cautious about making policy based on a single experience. The Haiti experience was different to that of Pakistan, and the current situation in the Horn of Africa further reinforces this.					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
10.1 Ensure consistent application of	OED, with	As and when			

existing guidance on PBR for emergencies.	support from DFAM	required			
<b>Review Recommendation 14:</b> To demonstrate that UNICEF values humanitarian work and expertise within the Organisation, recruiting managers need to ensure that humanitarian leadership competencies are taken into account in recruitment to senior positions, especially country representatives and their deputies. (See Humanitarian Leadership.) (See report Section 3, Subsection 4.3.)					
<b>Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree</b>					
If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons: Agree that humanitarian leadership competencies should be taken into account when recruiting for senior positions, especially country representatives and deputy representatives. This practice is in place for emergency countries. As not all Country Offices require the same competency profile, the organization provides support to senior managers of an office in responding to a crisis. As a result, a number of modalities are in place to help to strengthen humanitarian leadership, including training on humanitarian leadership competencies, support to CO leadership during humanitarian crisis (e.g., IRT and surge deployment), and investments in emergency preparedness exercises.					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
Refer to Action Points 3.1, 8.2, 15.2, 15.3, 16.1					

## Operations Support

<b>Review Recommendation 11:</b> The Supply Division should develop dedicated capacity (through long-term agreements with suppliers or standby partners) to quickly set up accommodation and office facilities. This must be in place for future emergencies, considering the difficulty and time needed to organise prefabs. The Haiti emergency also highlighted that there needs to be a team from Supply Division trained to set up accommodation. (See report Section 3, Subsection 2.1-2.2.)					
<b>Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree</b>					
If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents

11.1 Explore the use of Long Term Agreements (LTAs) for pre-fab buildings (office and accommodations) established by other UN agencies.	SD	End 2011	Underway	SD already has access to the UN Humanitarian Response Depot/WFP LTAs for pre-fab buildings and will request other UN agencies to access to their LTAs.	
11.2 Issue a new tender for prefab office and living accommodation to complement existing UN partnerships.	SD	End 2011	Underway	Preparatory work for request for proposal completed and issued.	

**Review Recommendation 12:**

Working with the Supply Division, EMOPS needs to ensure that UNICEF has rapid response teams specializing in operations support that can be deployed immediately after a major disaster. (See report Section 3, Subsection 3.)

**Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree**

**If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:**

Agree with recommended action. This is led by DHR, working in close collaboration with EMOPS, DFAM, SD and others.

<b>Actions planned</b>	<b>Responsible Office/Person</b>	<b>Expected completion date</b>	<b>Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled</b>	<b>Actions taken</b>	<b>Supporting documents</b>
12.1 Include Operations capacity in the IRT teams.	DHR	Ongoing	Completed	Each of the three IRTs established includes an Operations Chief, a supply specialist, a logistics specialist, an IT specialist and an HR specialist.  In May 2011, HR Managers in large scale emergencies were briefed on Level 3 emergencies (Haiti & Pakistan).	

**Review Recommendation 13:**

In large emergencies that require rapid scaling-up of IT systems, regional directors and IT managers must ensure that highly experienced senior staff from the RO and HQ are deployed in the first eight weeks. (See report Section 3, Subsection 3.)

**Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree**

If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:					
Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
See actions under Recommendation 15.				ITSS nominated HQ and field staff for IRT inclusion.	
See actions under Recommendation 8.	DHR (lead), DFAM, SD, ITSS, EMOPS	2012	Underway	IT capacity was deployed for the Horn of Africa Emergency.	
13.1. Organize Annual ICT emergency response training workshops for UNICEF and standby partner ICT staff.	ITSS	Yearly activity	Underway (next session scheduled for November 2011)	Regional ICT Advisers have nominated 40 ICT staff to be trained.	

## Administrative and Financial Procedures

### Review Recommendation 18:

Working with DFAM, the Office of Internal Audit and the RO, EMOPS needs to further simplify key business processes in emergencies and synchronise current manuals on administrative and financial procedures in emergencies. (See report Section 3, Subsection 3; Section 4, Subsection 1.1.)

Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree

If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons: We recognize the need to simplify key business processes in general and specifically for emergencies. However, this is being addressed as part of the consolidation of UNICEF Regulatory Framework which will simplify and ensure that all policies, procedures and guidance are risk informed and available in a user friendly platform accessible to all staff.

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
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Develop and finalize Regulatory Framework  See Action 15.2 – finalization and endorsement of the SSOPs.	Change Management	End 2013	Underway	“Financial and Administrative Management for Emergencies – A Guide for UNICEF Staff” has been developed and in-use since 2008.  Process underway to review and consolidate regulatory content on IPSAS/VISION.	
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## Monitoring and Reporting

### **Review Recommendation 5:**

In emergency response, UNICEF will to a large extent be in the hands of its implementing partners, both pre-existing and prospective, despite the revised Project Co-operation Agreement (PCA) guidelines that incorporate tighter reporting requirements. For last-mile distribution data, UNICEF needs to simplify reporting formats and develop mechanisms for data gathering by and from partners. (See report Section 3, Subsection 1.2.)

**Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Agree**

**If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:**

Actions planned	Responsible Office/Person	Expected completion date	Implementation stage: Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	Actions taken	Supporting documents
5.1 Disseminate the PCA addendum for humanitarian contexts defining priority indicators for reporting by partners.	EMOPS (lead), DPP, PD	Continuous	Underway	PCA addendum finalized and posted on-line.	<a href="http://www.internet.unicef.org/emops/emopssite.nsf/root/PageCCCPM4">http://www.internet.unicef.org/emops/emopssite.nsf/root/PageCCCPM4</a>
5.2 Organize consultation with UNICEF partners on the PCA addendum for humanitarian contexts to ensure its use in all emergencies.	EMOPS, DPP, PD	Mid 2012	Not Started		

5.3 Simplify and streamline the management and application of PCAs for Level 3 and Level 2 emergencies.  See Actions 15.2 and 16.1.	EMOPS (lead), DPP, PD	End 2011 for L3, Mid 2012 for L2	Underway	Draft SSOP on PCA management for L3 emergency has been developed, reflecting good practices.	
<b>Review Recommendation 6:</b>					
The use of the Core Commitments for Children (CCCs) benchmarks for reporting needs to be prioritized by CO management, and senior managers need to ensure that reports are based on outcomes, rather than inputs. (See report Section 3, Subsection 1.2.)					
<b>Management Response: (Agree, Partially Agree, Disagree): Partially Agree</b>					
<b>If recommendation is rejected or partially accepted, report reasons:</b>					
UNICEF supports the need to focus on results and agrees with the thrust of this recommendation. While an outcome focus is no doubt important in the longer run, in the short run it is also important for UNICEF to monitor inputs and outputs. Thus, it is necessary to focus on inputs, outputs and outcomes and their links.					
<b>Actions planned</b>	<b>Responsible Office/Person</b>	<b>Expected completion date</b>	<b>Implementation stage:</b> Not Started Underway Completed Cancelled	<b>Actions taken</b>	<b>Supporting documents</b>
6.1 Based on lessons learnt, simplify SitRep templates.  See Actions 4.2 and 4.3	EMOPS (lead), DPP	June 2012	Underway	- Draft SitRep templates are being used in the Horn of Africa crisis. - Humanitarian PM surge capacity deployed to Ivory Coast combined with EMOPS distance support. Support provided to the HoA crisis as well. - SSOP package for Level 3 includes a section on Planning and Performance Monitoring.	
6.2 Strengthen support to the field on Humanitarian Performance Monitoring (HPM) through: - finalization of HPM toolkit - support from EMOPS on HPM as	EMOPS (lead), RO	Ongoing	Underway	- Draft HPM Toolkit available on-line (June 2011) to be simplified based on lessons learnt - HPM Community of Practice established (April 2011)	

part of general field support function - HPM Community of Practice activated by EMOPS - Webex training sessions targeting ROs and HAC countries  See Actions 4.3 on the HPM roster				- HPM webex Training series ongoing - On-site raining planned for Haiti CO on HPM in early September 2011.	
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## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Grünewald, François, Andrea Binder, and Yvio Georges, Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake, Groupe u.r.d. and Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin, June 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Level 1: the scale of the emergency is such that a CO can respond using its own staff, funding, supplies and other resources; Level 2: the scale of the emergency is such that a Country Office needs additional support from other parts of the organization (HQ, RO, other COs) to respond; and Level 3: the scale of the emergency is of such dimension that an organization-wide mobilization is called for.

<sup>3</sup> Similar to Field Assessment Coordination Teams (FACT) deployed by International Federation of Red Cross, or United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) deployed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

<sup>4</sup> For temporary assignments under 90 days it should be possible to waive the medical test – only a self-certified statement is necessary – but this is not consistently applied.

<sup>5</sup> Key performance standards need to be made explicit in the job descriptions of Country Representatives – for example, cluster lead agency accountabilities should be incorporated into generic job descriptions.

<sup>6</sup> See United Nations Children's Fund, 'Lessons on Haiti Post-earthquake Emergency Response: First extract from debriefings of key surge support staff' (Lessons Learned document), draft, 25 April 2010. This notes that UNICEF, subsequent to the Haiti earthquake, now has an agreement with WFP/United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) for prefab units for living/ accommodation and offices.

<sup>7</sup> UNICEF Haiti funding analysis.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Humanitarian Action and Recovery Mid-Year Review', UNICEF, New York, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> Executive Summary from External Donor 90-day Report.

<sup>10</sup> UNICEF is the cluster lead agency for two clusters, Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Nutrition, co-leads the Education Cluster and is the lead agency for one of the 'Areas of Responsibility', child protection, under the Protection Cluster.

<sup>11</sup> 'Systems' here is used to denote organizational systems, i.e., institutional policies, procedures, structural features, decision-making processes, governance arrangements, management practices and organizational culture.

<sup>12</sup> It is a review based on an evaluative approach, not an evaluation as such that gathers data from beneficiary communities using field surveys to measure programmatic impact. The evidence base on which the review's eventual conclusions and recommendations are founded are anecdotal and documentary, not based on primary data-gathering in the field.

<sup>13</sup> 'Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti: Terms of Reference', 6 September 2010. (See *Annex I*.)

<sup>14</sup> These issues and other aspects of the review team's approach were articulated in an inception report, which was reviewed and commented on by a range of internal stakeholders, including OED and the Evaluation Office as well as a Group of Readers and an Ad Hoc Reference Group. (See *Section 4.1.1*.)

<sup>15</sup> Four focus-group discussions were held, three in New York and one in Port-au-Prince, with mixed group participants from among the interviewees. The issues covered were silos, organizational learning and factors affecting humanitarian performance.

<sup>16</sup> A full list of key documents is provided in Annex IV.

<sup>17</sup> Though formally approved in April 2010, key elements of the revised framework have been around in the organization since early 2009.

<sup>18</sup> 'Haiti Earthquake Cluster / Programme Response Update', 22 February 2010.

<sup>19</sup> Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement.

<sup>20</sup> Situation report of 19 January 2010.

<sup>21</sup> The other was the Logistics Cluster, headed by WFP.

<sup>22</sup> Grünewald et al., *op. cit.*

<sup>23</sup> The situation report of 3 February stated that about 750 latrines were completed by WASH Cluster partners in Port au Prince, Jacmel and Leogane and about 100 portable toilets were installed.

<sup>24</sup> This was immediately after the visit of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, and after his email to cluster lead agency heads went out on 29 January 2010.

<sup>25</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) situation reports, February 2011.

<sup>26</sup> Issues around rapid turnover and information management are discussed separately in Section 2.2.9 Clusters.

<sup>27</sup> UNICEF Haiti Annual Report 2009 states that "... the roles of the agents of protection have been to reinforce IBESR [l'Institut du Bien Etre Social et de Recherches] monitoring, control and reporting about the situation of children in care institutions", p. 21.

<sup>28</sup> As in the foster care system, within the *restavek* tradition, in which children are sent to live with and work for extended family members, exploitation and abuse of children had been reported. After the earthquake, therefore, UNICEF was caught in a dilemma: It considered institutional care and private orphanages as a last (least preferred)

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option; at the same time, however, given traditional institutions that exploited children, the family care option was not an obvious choice either.

<sup>29</sup> While plans had been in place to register such institutions before the quake, there was no such registry. The entire system of alternative care in Haiti, pre-quake, was fraught with issues related to a lack of transparency, fraudulent adoptions, etc. UNICEF's hesitation regarding the so-called orphanages was therefore multi-faceted and complex.

<sup>30</sup> In an article appearing shortly after the earthquake, for example, Haiti's Minister of Social Affairs said that, "No children can leave Haiti without proper authorization and these people did not have that authorization" (30 January, 2010.) See: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/30/us-quake-haiti-arrests-idUSTRE60T23I20100130>.

<sup>31</sup> In 2009 UNICEF had six staff in child protection; by two months after the earthquake this had gone up to nearly 20, including three cluster staff.

<sup>32</sup> The social definition of orphanhood in countries affected by HIV/AIDS refers to the increased likelihood that both parents have HIV/AIDS, fear that the remaining parent is HIV-positive, stigmatization of widows and widches and the impoverishment of AIDS-affected households has resulted in fewer remaining parents remarrying. Therefore, the term orphanhood is applied. See: [http://www.kit.nl/-/INS/14224/\(57698\)-ILS/KIT-ILS-Dossiers.pdf](http://www.kit.nl/-/INS/14224/(57698)-ILS/KIT-ILS-Dossiers.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> The Haitian police child protection unit.

<sup>34</sup> The Government of Haiti's adoption authority.

<sup>35</sup> A female officer from La Brigade de Protection des Mineurs told the review team that the problem of abandoned children worsened significantly after the quake, when parents "gave away their children".

<sup>36</sup> Situation reports from 19 and 22 January 2010.

<sup>37</sup> Situation report from 22 January 2010.

<sup>38</sup> Vitamin A capsules donated by the Canadian-Micronutrient Initiative/Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

<sup>39</sup> Dolan, Carmel and Mija Ververs, 'The Haiti Earthquake: Country and global level cluster coordination experiences and lessons learnt', *Field Exchange*, 39, 10 September 2010.

<sup>40</sup> United Nations Children's Fund Office of Emergency Programmes/Programme Division, 'Synthesis of Lessons on UNICEF's response to the Haiti earthquake' (draft), UNICEF EMOPS/PD, October 2010.

<sup>41</sup> Technically, gender-based violence is an 'Area of Responsibility' under the Protection Cluster.

<sup>42</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, UNICEF, New York, May 2010.

<sup>43</sup> 'Criminals in Haiti "raping quake survivors and trafficking children"', *The Times*, 29 January 2010, <[www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us\\_and\\_america/article7007400.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_america/article7007400.ece)>.

<sup>44</sup> While child protection issues came up in most of the interviews even without prompting, gender-based violence did not draw any in-depth and passionate response most of the time even with prompting.

<sup>45</sup> This was noted as a systemic weakness of UNICEF's humanitarian programming in (a) a 2007 evaluation of gender policy implementation globally ; (b) United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office, 'Evaluation of DFID-UNICEF Programme of Cooperation: Investing in Humanitarian Action, Phase III (2006–2009)', UNICEF, New York, 2010; and (c) United Nations Children's Fund Office of Emergency Programmes/Programme Division, op. cit.

<sup>46</sup> The husband of UNICEF's education programme chief was also lost in the quake.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, *Core Commitments*, op. cit., p. 38.

<sup>48</sup> A senior government official met by the review team, as well as senior education staff of UNICEF.

<sup>49</sup> Debriefing note of a senior education staff deployed in Haiti, as well as interviews.

<sup>50</sup> United Nations Children's Fund and Save the Children, 'Review of the Global Education Cluster Co-Leadership Arrangement between UNICEF and Save the Children', UNICEF and Save the Children, October 2010.

<sup>51</sup> Due to poor data collection and an inadequate health information system, the review could not report on UNICEF's performance in the health programme in the first three months as independently verifiable data are lacking for this period. The impact of health interventions needs "more than three months to be shown", according to a note submitted to the review team by the Haiti CO.

<sup>52</sup> Internal situation report, 22 February 2010.

<sup>53</sup> A partnership on health issues involving four agencies: WHO, UNFPA, UNICEF and the World Bank

<sup>54</sup> Ninety-one per cent of stories analysed by CARMA for the Division of Communications "depicted UNICEF favourably", compared to just 1 per cent that portrayed it "unfavourably", suggesting that the political pressure on the organization over the vexed question of transnational adoption may not have been fully reflected in the retail media. UNICEF benefited from "frequent slightly positive attention mentioning its work in Haiti", according to the CARMA report, and significantly from "considerable highly positive coverage" detailing its efforts to prevent child trafficking there.

<sup>55</sup> CARMA Report

<sup>56</sup> Other issues that came up in the later stages relate to recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation, which are beyond the scope of this review.

<sup>57</sup> UNICEF meeting, New York (16 April 2010) on mainstreaming the cluster approach.

<sup>58</sup> In 2009 UNICEF started a series of discussions on cluster mainstreaming that pulled together the lessons from several emergencies.

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- <sup>59</sup> Both of the government counterparts in the Education and Protection Clusters had died in the earthquake. The house of the government co-lead for the Nutrition Cluster was destroyed. At the time of writing she still lives in an IDP camp and has often been absent due to ill health or busy mobilizing assistance for her family and community.
- <sup>60</sup> Lessons Learned document, op. cit.
- <sup>61</sup> In a number of incidents cluster support staff refused to share vehicles with “UNICEF programme staff” and demanded independence at a time when the office was expecting maximum cooperation.
- <sup>62</sup> Report of the UNICEF Consultation with NGO Partners in Humanitarian Action (Geneva, 13-14 December, 2010)
- <sup>63</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund, *Enhancing the Dialogue Between UNICEF and Non-governmental Organizations in Humanitarian Action*. L. Sida, 2009.
- <sup>64</sup> See ‘Organizational culture and learning’, Section 4 of this report.
- <sup>65</sup> UNICEF waited for the inter-agency needs assessment report, which came out in mid-February; however, this was then found to be inadequate for planning purposes.
- <sup>66</sup> This problem was also noted in an internal audit report on other emergency responses in UNICEF. See Office of Internal Audit, ‘Audit Report on the management of internal performance indicators (2005-07)’.
- <sup>67</sup> Pre-earthquake there was one international staff member focusing on M&E in the CO, but he was deployed to Jacmel for six weeks to support oversight of the response there.
- <sup>68</sup> It is understood from documents reviewed that some of the gaps in the Haiti performance monitoring system were addressed in the performance monitoring framework set up in the Pakistan floods response. For example, the situation reports were using CCC benchmarks to track progress. This progress was based on overall leadership support and the presence of surge staff from HQ who were already working on the CCC performance monitoring, coupled with a stronger M&E team in place in the country prior to the emergency.
- <sup>69</sup> The situation report format has been revised since by UNICEF based on some of the lessons from Haiti.
- <sup>70</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund, *Children of Haiti: Milestones and looking forward at six months*, UNICEF, New York, 12 July 2010.
- <sup>71</sup> The review team was unable to verify this as the staffing table made available to the team only showed the timeline from the date when formal offer was made by the DHR to the date of entry on duty (EOD), which gave a partial story. An HR deployment table dated 16 July showed 66 deployments till 12 April; of these 33 (50 per cent) were processed within under three week (date of offer to EOD) and only 13 (20 per cent) took longer than 30 days.
- <sup>72</sup> Lloyd, Christine, ‘Fast-track Measures for UNICEF Haiti in Areas of Human Resource Management’, memo dated 19 July 2010.
- <sup>73</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund, *Core Commitments*, op. cit.
- <sup>74</sup> In the first six months a total of 326 people were deployed to the UNICEF Haiti CO and Lifeline Haiti in Santo Domingo. Of these, 275 were UNICEF staff sent on mission from 76 different country offices. There were also 36 deployments from standby partners (See UNICEF, *Children of Haiti*, op. cit.).
- <sup>75</sup> Over 325 staff were deployed in the first six months. By contrast the total number of deployments during 2009 was 259.
- <sup>76</sup> Lack of an adequate handover process also contributed to this.
- <sup>77</sup> UNICEF Haiti 90-day plan.
- <sup>78</sup> Lessons Learned document, op. cit.
- <sup>79</sup> Email communications between the Regional Director and the Haiti CO after the first six weeks following the earthquake show that the RO had been recommending to hold an ad-hoc PBR as early as possible, while the CO was requesting to wait for the results of the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment exercise.
- <sup>80</sup> 106 International Professional posts; 73 National Officer posts; 108 General Service staff posts.
- <sup>81</sup> 53 International Professional posts; 3 National Officer posts; 4 General Service staff posts.
- <sup>82</sup> According to the 2010 DHR Review (see note below), external recruitment constituted about 50 per cent of all deployments in the past, but in the Haiti response it only made up 28 per cent in the first six months; in contrast, normally 25 per cent of all surge capacity would be internal redeployments of UNICEF staff, but for Haiti this category constituted 63 per cent.<sup>82</sup>
- <sup>83</sup> Special service agreement contracts apply for external recruitments only.
- <sup>84</sup> United Nations Children’s Fund Division of Human Resources, ‘The Haiti 2010 Earthquake: Lessons from the emergency response in surge capacity and human resources’, UNICEF DHR, New York, 2010.
- <sup>85</sup> Lake, Anthony, ‘Recruitment and Staffing in Emergency Situations’, UNICEF Executive Directive, CF/EXD/2010-005, 30 December 2010.
- <sup>86</sup> Lessons Learned document, op. cit.
- <sup>87</sup> The situation report of 16 January noted that UNICEF decided to ship 12 prefab units from Panama to Port au Prince the following week to be used as offices/accommodations. The conference call of 3 February reported that these were being erected. According to the conference call of 23 February, these were still being erected on this date. The conference call of 10 March noted that all prefabs (6 living quarters and 6 office accommodation) that were brought into the country had been erected by this date.
- <sup>88</sup> At the time of the earthquake, UNICEF had a small supply of non-food items in warehouses in Jacmel, which were distributed in the first few days.

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- <sup>89</sup> This issue is examined in greater detail in Section 4 Organizational culture and learning.
- <sup>90</sup> UNICEF states that the continuous operation of the ProMS Server would have been put at risk by a move back to Port au Prince (due to power cuts, risk for flooding, etc.). The possible answer would have been to build a fortified server room. As that would have required an assurance that the office was going to stay in camp for some time, and it was clear that this was only temporary, no funds/effort were put into creating secure conditions.
- <sup>91</sup> Some procurement of tents and basic equipment was undertaken in Santo Domingo, but this was small in quantity. Prefabs were ordered late and arrived late, only five vehicles ordered in the first week had arrived after six weeks and the procurement of servers and notebooks took over a month.
- <sup>92</sup> United Nations Children's Fund Office of Emergency Programmes/Programme Division, op. cit.
- <sup>93</sup> Lessons Learned document, op. cit.
- <sup>94</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Joint UNICEF-DFID Evaluation of UNICEF Preparedness and Early Response to the Darfur Emergency', UNICEF, New York, March 2005
- <sup>95</sup> United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office, op. cit.
- <sup>96</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Accountability Framework 1998: The organization of the United Nations Children's Fund', UNICEF, New York, 1998.
- <sup>97</sup> This was clarified in a memo from the heads of cluster lead agencies to COs (October 2009), which stated that while the cluster coordinators were responsible for day-to-day running of the clusters, it was the Country Representative/Directors who were "ultimately accountable to the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator".
- <sup>98</sup> This was recognized by UNICEF management by the second week of the operation. The ad hoc Division Directors' Meeting of 21 January 2010 ('Haiti: Moment of reflection on the way forward') noted that a number of functions such as security, humanitarian and recovery financing and engagement with integrated presences require linkages to HQ and wider interagency coordination structures and therefore an HQ lead, with dedicated human resources.
- <sup>99</sup> Giving Works, 'UNICEF Organizational Review', Giving Works, Falls Church, VA, 2007.
- <sup>100</sup> Bellamy, Carol, 'Martigny Follow up and DFID Funding', United Nations Children's Fund, New York, 1999.
- <sup>101</sup> Job descriptions were made available by DHR at the request of the review team.
- <sup>102</sup> United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office, op. cit.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>104</sup> Interestingly, this phenomenon seems to have persisted within UNICEF for almost two decades, if not longer. The 1994 Booz Allen Hamilton Management study identified this as an issue even in those days.
- <sup>105</sup> Bellamy, Carol, 'Directive F/EXD/2004-15', 27 August 2004.
- <sup>106</sup> Arsenault, Louis-George, 'Haiti Emergency: Organizational support for surge capacity needs', memo dated 18 January 2010.
- <sup>107</sup> Johnson, Hilde F., 'URGENT Haiti Emergency: Organizational support for surge capacity needs', memo dated 27 February 2010,
- <sup>108</sup> Pettersson, Anders, 'UNICEF Rapid Response to the Haiti Earthquake: A brief memo on early surge capacity and human resources,' Stockholm, 12 April 2010, unpublished document.
- <sup>109</sup> The review heard numerous examples of staff from one programme section interacting with government authorities and NGOs without even realizing that the latter might already have a PCA approved by UNICEF. The Education Section made plans for rehabilitation of schools without any discussion with WASH on WASH facilities required. Even within sections, different specialist areas mirror a similarly compartmentalized approach. This was also noted in the 'Summary Report of the Haiti Programme Planning Meeting', 20 April 2010.
- <sup>110</sup> Education Lessons Learned, 2010.
- <sup>111</sup> United Nations Children's Fund Evaluation Office, 'Review of DFID/UNICEF Partnership to Strengthen UNICEF's Humanitarian Capacity', UNICEF, New York, November 2005.
- <sup>112</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Management Follow-up to Evaluation Recommendations: Note as requested by Directors' Meeting',
- <sup>113</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Strategic Review of Human Resource Management', UNICEF, New York, 2008. See also United Nations Children's Fund, 'Tsunami Evaluation: Synthesis report', UNICEF, New York, 2006.
- <sup>114</sup> Giving Works, op. cit.
- <sup>115</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>116</sup> United Nations Children's Fund, 'Strategic Review of Human Resource Management, op. cit.