# actalliance

# **TOGETHER WE ARE STRONGER**



"Yon sel dwèt pa manje kalalou"
You cannot eat kalaloo with one finger

### **FINAL REPORT**

An Independent Final Evaluation of the Action of Churches Together
Alliance Haiti Appeal HTI-101 (Jan 2010 – Dec 2011)

12 January 2012





### **Authors**

This evaluation was carried out by Channel Research and P-FiM (People First Impact Method) under commission by ACT Alliance - Sean McGearty (Team Leader), Paul O'Hagan (Core Consultant) and Melanie Montinard (National Consultant) who with her young family survived the earthquake after each member sustained serious injuries and entrapment under the rubble.

The report represents the analysis and findings of the authors and is not necessarily those of the ACT Alliance.

# **Acknowledgments**

The evaluation team would like to thank all of the contributors to this evaluation, particularly the 52 Haitian staff and volunteers from 34 organisations and communities who conducted the discussions with representative groups in the field and brought substantial Haitian insight into the evaluation. This was a powerful experience for all of us involved. Further special thanks go to the community members who generously gave their time often at short notice; 74 key informants; members of the Haiti Forum/ACT and partners who made the process possible. Every effort was made to support the smooth execution of the evaluation – openness to suggestions, availability of staff, administrative and logistical cooperation and access to all necessary information. We would like to express sincere thanks to ACT and its partner's for their warm hospitality and the positive team atmosphere. It has been a real pleasure to undertake this evaluation and we would like to wish ACT and its partners every success in their continuing work.

### **Abbreviations**

ACT Action of Churches Together

CA Christian Aid

CDAC Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities

CRWRC Christian Reformed World Relief Service

CWS Church World Service
CSO Civil Society Organisation

DAC Development Assistance Criteria
DKH Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe

DINEPA Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement

ECBII Emergency Capacity Building Project II

FCA Finn Church Aid

FGD Focus group discussion

GARR Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et aux Réfugiés

GBV Gender-based violence

HAP Humanitarian Accountability Partnership

IDP Internally displaced person

IOM International Organisation for Migration

INGO International NGO

LWF Lutheran World Federation
KII Key informant interview

MINUSTA United Nations Mission in Haiti

MISSEH Mission Sociale des Eglises Haitiennes

NCA Norwegian Church Aid

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAP Port-au-Prince

PLWA/H People Living With HIV/AIDS
P-FiM People First Impact Method

PIA People in Aid

RNDDH Reseau National De Defense Des Droits Humains

SCH Service Chretien D'Haiti

SSID Dominican Churches' Social Services

TOR Terms of Reference
UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

WASH Water, sanitation and hygiene

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# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This evaluation of the ACT Alliance<sup>1</sup> response to the Haiti earthquake was carried out in October and November 2011. It reviewed the work of the Alliance over the period from the earthquake to November 2011 taking in both the immediate crisis and the post crisis phase.

The overall goal of the ACT Haiti Appeal was to enhance the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake (through access to the basic necessities of life and fulfilment of basic rights in rural and urban areas). The evaluation aimed to assess the achievements, quality and overall impact of the ACT response with a strong emphasis on learning. It focused on the work of the seven implementing members: FCA, LWF, NCA, DKH, CRWRC, CA and CWS and their local Haitian partners. The final appeal target was just over US\$ 46m and to date almost \$35m (75%) has been pledged and received.

The ACT appeal was an effective and responsive mechanism for the provision of support to the victims of the Haiti earthquake and the cholera outbreak. It was developed by ACT members in Haiti and based on the needs on the ground with sufficient flexibility to respond to the changing context in Haiti. While there were some challenges and delays in the early stages and a level of frustration on the ground, the appeal mechanism managed to raise and distribute a considerable sum of money in a timely manner. It enabled ACT Alliance members and a range of national partners to provide support to the most vulnerable people in the population. The assistance reached over 500,000 people and the effort was sustained over an 18 month period. Overall this assistance was appropriate and provided in a dignified way. The duration of the appeal, its structure and the fact that it has been integrated into more long term recovery and development activities are also significant factors in its overall effectiveness. The people affected by the earthquake want to rebuild their lives and for them there is no distinction between emergency, recovery and long term development.

ACT members remain active on the ground as the second anniversary of the earthquake approaches. Significantly there is a solid foundation in place for a sustained recovery effort by ACT and its partners and a willingness to support both Haitian partners and the Haitian Government in the process. Despite the scale of the disaster and the huge constraints faced, the ACT Alliance has made an important and significant contribution to the Haiti response.

An assessment of "success" needs to be viewed primarily through the lens of the Haitian people and the many challenges that still plague the country. The scale of the disaster and the legacy of decades of poverty and poor governance mean that there are still enormous challenges facing the people of Haiti. Many of the substantial criticisms of the global international humanitarian earthquake response pointed to lack of a people centred response - contextual understanding,

Federation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>ACT works with and for people of all faiths and none. The ACT Alliance is a member of the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP). ACT is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and is committed to the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response and the Global Humanitarian Platform's Principles of Partnership. It is related to the World Council of Churches and Lutheran World

connectedness and integration with Haitian capacity. In ACT operational areas, these substantial criticisms of the overall humanitarian response were largely alleviated from the outset by the connectedness to context of ACT with its pre-existing partnership approach, member organisational values and relationships on the ground.

ACT members and partners have made mistakes but demonstrated that once aware of errors they have acted quickly to review and amend interventions. Consistently across partners and members there has been a strong community engagement. This has been a key factor in the effectiveness of the response and has led to a high alignment between what communities feel are their priorities and what is working for them and what ACT Partners supported by ACT members are doing. This is encouraging as it indicates high degrees of agreement about what the key challenges are and the level of collaboration at local levels.

Against a background of stinging criticism of the global humanitarian response, in the view of the external evaluation team the ACT response stands out as a model of an integrated and holistic one based on clear principles of human dignity and respect within the framework of a long term engagement in the country. Considering the major revision of the 2011 Sphere Handbook with new additional emphases on protection and psychosocial aspects of disaster response, the ACT response in ways has been cutting edge in its spontaneous attention to these aspects of people's needs and rights.

The ACT Secretariat Geneva responded well and co-ordinated a major appeal effort - the largest ever administered by ACT. There are some important lessons for the Secretariat regarding the operation of future appeals and the need to develop a more coherent vision regarding its role in future emergencies — over and above that of raising and distributing funds for members (how ACT brings distinctive and added value to future humanitarian responses). The evaluation found that the priority should have been to get resources to trusted partners immediately both in Haiti and the Dominican Republic to enable them to sustain their spontaneous relief efforts; bureaucratic delays in the distribution of funds in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake delayed the ability of some key partners to act.

The aftermath of the earthquake was a challenging time for both members and partners and the support of the Haiti Forum was critical in the shift to emergency relief and scaling up. The Haiti Forum is constituted of ACT Member agencies in a given country and exists to provide a focus for communication, information sharing, planning and coordination. The evaluation found that the Haiti Forum played a vital role and was a focal point for most activities. It additionally provided moral support, solidarity and collaboration. The ACT Co-ordination Office established in Haiti after the earthquake played a central role in the operation of the Forum.

The evaluation highlights the importance of having a strong country Forum and on-going preparedness and capacity building. There were missed opportunities where greater coordination of effort across the members and partners and between these and the Haitian government could have brought added value and an even more effective and sustained response. With increased synergy and a more active advocacy role the Haiti Forum can be a force for change at different levels – increased collaboration with the Haitian Government - advocating for reform of wider humanitarian strategies and for enhanced participation by Haitians in these structures. In hindsight, building on its own programme interventions and experience, this advocacy could have

been done earlier and more vocally in the response and these are lessons learned for future international ACT humanitarian appeals.

Despite the challenges it has faced, the Haiti Forum has emerged as a credible, stronger and more cohesive structure. Over and above emergency response it can play a central role in ACT work in the recovery and development phase. Forum members need to maintain this post emergency momentum and to further define the role and function of the Forum. Linked to this is the current decision around whether to maintain a long term ACT co-ordination office and to define its future role.

### **Key Recommendations**

The main recommendations regarding the work of ACT Alliance in Haiti are:

ACT Alliance should continue to provide assistance in key areas (psychosocial support, livelihoods shelter and education) by integrating these into recovery and long term development strategies.

In particular it should:

- Develop its own co-ordinated responses to the provision of psychosocial support as well as advocating for increased focus and resources for this work.
- Advocate for further research on the situation in rural areas and work with other humanitarian agencies and the Government of Haiti to map out the nature and extent of the challenges in rural areas where ACT members and partners are active.
- Put increased emphasis on sustainable livelihood strategies for both rural and urban communities and invest in a comprehensive programme of capacity building in this area.
- Sustain its cholera awareness, prevention and control efforts around existing programmes, working closely with the Haitian Government and making better use of the communication and social/behavioural influence of local leaders including religious leaders.

ACT Alliance should develop more co-ordinated approaches in key areas and strengthen its advocacy role including;

- Developing a more cohesive shelter strategy using its expertise and experience to shape wider policy decisions around shelter.
- Developing a strategy to strengthen collaboration with government agencies and to influence and shape government policy and decision making.

Building on its Advocacy strategy to strengthen the next phase of the humanitarian response particularly around increased and genuine Haitian participation at all levels, and for sustained support to the Haitian Government.

 Develop a shared definition of and common approaches to DRR and Climate Change working in close consultation with local communities and relevant Government agencies.

Specific recommendations on the future role of ACT Alliance and the development of the Haiti Forum.

### ACT Alliance should:

- Develop a more coordinated and strategic partner centred approach with increased emphasis on networking, learning and capacity building and joint programmes between partners.
- Develop a more coherent vision regarding its role in future emergencies which maximises the resources of the members, facilitates co-ordination and brings added value to responses.
- Develop regional strategies and responses which build on the experience of the Haiti response including the establishment of a regional mechanism in the Caribbean, which would be the focal point for future emergency responses in the region.
- Provide on-going capacity building work in cross cultural communication and cross cultural leadership with members and partners.
- Strengthen the capacity of the Haiti Forum to ensure that these local structures have the skills, resources and systems in place to respond effectively to large scale humanitarian disasters.

### The Haiti Forum:

- Should build on the success of the emergency response and develop a strategy for the future including defining the role of the forum in the recovery and development phase.
- Should take time together with partners to reflect on the learning from the evaluation and to develop new approaches and ways of working and build in regular opportunities for joint review and reflection.

# Section 1: Background and Context

### 1 INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Report structure

This report sets out the main findings of the evaluation and comprises four main sections:

**Section I**: An overview of the evaluation methodology, context and summary of the ACT Alliance response.

**Section II**: Analysis of the four identified pillars of the response, main findings and assessment of the implementation of the response.

**Section III**: Findings of the participatory field research using the People First Impact Method (P-FiM) which was carried out in rural and urban area during the evaluation fieldwork phase.

**Section IV**: Summary of the main findings and recommendations.

Examples of good practice and the main learning points from the ACT Alliance response have been collated into a separate report "Building on Experience – Learning from the ACT Alliance Haiti response."

The evaluation assessed the achievements, quality and overall impact of the ACT humanitarian response to the Haiti emergency based on the following objectives:

- Assess the achievement of results of the Haiti ACT appeal in contributing to improving the recovery of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake and cholera.
- Establish the performance of the Haiti ACT appeal in the context of management, coordination, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, visibility, communication and dissemination of information and partnership with local actors.
- Determine if and how the ACT response supported the local structures (state, local NGOs, churches) to be better prepared to respond to any disaster.

The evaluation scope covered achievements, program design, implementation approaches, ACT policies, coordination and humanitarian principles and capacities for implementation.

### 1.2 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation adopted a goal free approach that prioritises participation of affected populations and recognises the importance of the wider context around a programme in order to determine impact and the degree to which ACT and other actors are aligned with what is working and what is not. The OECD DAC criteria, Quality and Accountability initiative standards (Sphere, ALNAP, HAP, PIA, ECBII) and standards beyond these, formed key reference points for the findings. The experience of the people of Haiti is the starting point of the evaluation approach and provides the foundation to work back from, to consider whether humanitarian standards were being met or not and whether the ACT Alliance response was accurate or not. In this way impact differences attributable to ACT and its partners were verified. Community Impact Statements and Key Informant Interview responses were set out in excel spread sheets to form a systematic and

objective foundation on which this report is based. The leadership of ACT member agencies in Haiti self-selected the following evaluation approach in order of priority 1) Participatory Field Work 2) Key Informant Interviews 3) Project Site Visits 4) Background Reading. In addition focus groups and learning workshops were conducted with ACT Alliance members, national partners and community members.

### 1. Participatory Field Work:

The field work approach and methodology was the People First Impact Method (P-FIM<sup>©</sup> 2011 <a href="www.p-fim.org">www.p-fim.org</a>). 52 Haitian staff and volunteers from 34 primarily Haitian national organisations including community based organisations and 4 international NGOs conducted participatory field work on an inter-agency basis (these included but was not limited to ACT members and Partner staff). This gave people impacted by disaster and humanitarian action a voice and to determine from their perspective what long term positive and negative differences have occurred in their lives and to what and who these are attributable to. The starting point was people and not projects or organisations (including ACT).

Participants received 2 days training and were deployed in teams of 3 as facilitators, reporters and observers from different organisations in order to show communities that different agencies are working together and to ensure the objectivity of the findings by reducing single agency bias. Training was essential to support field staff to be able to feel comfortable with and identify the different stages and quality of interpersonal communication within focus groups and in order to be able to recognise and record declarations of impact.


Both urban and rural contexts were sampled. Between 14-19 October 2011, 30 Haitian staff from fourteen organisations conducted field work in urban areas of the Western Region. Between 21-25 October 2011, 21 Haitian field workers from 16 organisations conducted the field work in the rural Central Plateau Region.


A total of 16 Focus Groups were conducted in both areas with groups representing Haitian society including the most vulnerable. They were Displaced Families, Orphans, Homeless, Physically challenged, Young Girls who were pregnant, Children, PLWH/A (TB), Farmers, Parents of students, Shoe shiners, Youth/Students, Local Authorities, School Directors/Teachers, Community Based Organisations. 283 people participated in these inter-active and free discussions on the greatest impact differences they considered had occurred in their lives since the earthquake and to who or what these positive, negative and neutral impacts were attributable to. The majority of participants of varying ages including adults, youth and children were 54% female and 46% male.

Qualitative statements made by representative groups who were both beneficiaries and non beneficiaries of ACT member and partner assistance (counter factual), forms a core component of the report and its findings and recommendations. These qualitative statements have been substantiated quantitatively through a systematic and rigorous grouping and ranking by their frequency of occurrence. To ensure the reliability and objectivity of the findings and recommendations, scoring and ranking criteria/exercises were an integral component throughout in field debriefings and the validation workshops. Objectivity was further ensured by the interagency nature of field work and feedback in plenary in order to accurately record group statements and test assumptions and findings.

### 2. Key Informant Interviews:

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were carried out with 74 individuals the majority of which were one to one interviews during the fieldwork phase in Haiti. KIIs were drawn from across the spectrum and included beneficiaries in both rural and urban locations, managers and staff of ACT members, ACT partners, government and UN. The majority of those interviewed (75%) were Haitians (See Annex 5 for a list of KIIs). The purpose of these KIIs was to gather as much perspective as possible from all stakeholders and to compare/contrast these with the views of affected people and local communities.





### 3. Project Site Visits

These were carried out in 12 locations across 6 districts within the ACT Programme area – both urban and rural in Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, Petit Goâve, Jacmel, Grand Rivière and Lascahobas. This corresponds to the main operational areas of ACT Alliance members and partners (site visit details provided in Annex 5).

### 4. Document Review

Internal ACT member and Alliance Secretariat documentation too numerous to list was reviewed. All the major publically available external documentation within the humanitarian sector on Haiti was consulted and key issues emerging were taken into consideration in the evaluation approach. Cf. Annex 4).

### 1.3 Limitations, Utilisation, and Validation

It was felt by the evaluation team that this was a very thorough evaluation enabled and encouraged by the ACT Secretariat, ACT members and partners in Haiti - we were very happy with the process.

The evaluation is intended to promote learning and enhance ACT's commitment to accountability. It identifies lessons learnt and best practices which may benefit communities in their recovery and in sustaining the impact of ACT interventions and enable ACT members to improve future emergency response strategies. It also sought to determine impact of the global humanitarian response in Haiti in order to inform and advocate for best practice in Haiti and internationally.

The findings, recommendations and initial learning points were considered during a series of three learning workshops held in Port-au-Prince towards the end of the evaluation process (29 Nov - 1

Dec 2011). These brought together staff from ACT members, partners and community members as well as from the ACT Secretariat and external agencies. The workshops provided an opportunity for key stakeholders to critically reflect on and deepen understanding of the key findings and recommendations and to explore and agree actions on the learning. There were no major queries about the findings or recommendations - people were challenged by how prominent psychosocial needs were in the urban field findings – this was no surprise to Haitians or to people who had lived for many years in the country. There was broad consensus among both ACT members and partners that the evaluation findings are accurate, captured the work carried out during the response and that the recommendations reflect the challenges and achievements of the ACT response. The main request was to make the recommendations specific and focused on the Haitian context. Participants from partner organisations focused on the need to enhance the role of partners and to strengthen cross partner learning and collaboration.

The key learning points from the three days of workshops have been incorporated into the evaluation report. There was a strong sense that both ACT members and partners were integrating the learning and taking on board the findings and recommendations of the evaluation - ACT members and partners were already examining possible strategies to address issues raised in the evaluation. It is important that this momentum is maintained and that a process is put in place to give ACT members and partners adequate time to reflect further on the findings and recommendations and to develop more integrated strategies for the recovery and development phase.

### 2 Context

### 2.1 The Haiti Earthquake



The strongest earthquake in Haiti in more than 200 years - magnitude 7.0 struck on January 12 at 1653hrs. With the epicentre located 15 km south west of the capital Port-au-Prince, the nearby cities of Carrefour and Jacmel, as well as other areas to the west and south of Port-au-Prince, were also affected. Due to poor and inadequate building standards prior to the earthquake which lasted approximately 39 seconds, it had devastating and high impact with large loss of life and severe damage to property and livelihoods. 222,570 people were killed with over 200,000 people injured. More than 1.5 million people sought refuge in temporary settlements and an estimated 600,000 people left Port-au-Prince for other areas.

The emergency phase has been declared over and

Figure 1 Office of the President after the earthquake the country is formally in transition. While things have not improved substantially for many people, agencies are running out of funds and scaling down their programmes with plans under way to handover functions and activities to the government and local authorities. While the tented camps of displaced in urban areas are the most visible signs today of the earthquake's impact and remains a critical challenge in the face of increased forced evictions, the issues go beyond these: large scale psychosocial trauma, fundamental changes in social dynamics, impact of humanitarian aid and the new relationships between the rural and urban contexts.

The number of people in temporary shelters has fallen below 600,000 but is still a major issue facing the country. "The absence of a uniform resettlement policy has stymied promised progress on decentralisation, economic renewal and reducing the vulnerability of existing overcrowded urban communities. Neighbourhoods victimised by decades of anarchic construction and weak to non-existent land titles and zoning remain highly vulnerable to natural disaster. Evictions — without due process or tenable housing alternatives — have forced massive unplanned returns, including to Port-au-Prince slums where tents and shacks have been set up on or near old residences and new, spontaneous camps created. Close to half the displaced have remained in the original camps, with no clear understanding of the future and rising unhappiness at increased violence. Responding to those vulnerable tent camps is a core reconstruction challenge, with serious implications for peace, stability and security<sup>2</sup>".

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Post-quake Haiti: Security Depends on Resettlement and Development International Crisis Group Briefing N°25 28 Jun 2011

### 2.2 Operational context

The earthquake accentuated pre-existing weaknesses in the capacity of the Haitian State and wider infrastructure. Government offices and the UN headquarters were themselves direct victims and severely affected. The main sea port was damaged and the airport was closed in the immediate aftermath. Much of the international search and rescue effort was initially focused on search for expatriates and high profile leaders. The vast majority of lives saved were rescued by Haitian themselves – they knew where people were. There was a short deployment of the US military which Haitians felt to be like an occupation.

The humanitarian situation received substantial international media coverage and the effect was a massive outpouring of solidarity and a huge international response was mobilized. For the first time in decades US military flights were allowed over Cuban airspace. There was a large influx of NGOs and other well-intentioned support met by already weakened UN coordination structures which were overwhelmed.

Haitians for the first 3-6 months of the response were genuinely touched by the support they received and there was substantial good will on all sides. Severe challenges then emerged – a response dominated by an international character which excluded Haitian participation in shaping the response; lack of support and integration with existing Haitian capacity at all levels and the unwitting further weakening of the state by humanitarian action. The global response was undermined by a lack of connectedness to and knowledge of the Haitian context. There was a complex political context as the earthquake struck during a year of Presidential elections and much decision and policy making was delayed in the run up to elections which were marred by violence.

In October 2010 the first case of cholera marked the beginning of a major epidemic (commonly attributed to the Nepalese MINUSTAH Battalion at Mirebalais). Environmental and social conditions created ideal circumstances for the spread of the highly contagious and lethal disease. According to October 2011 OHCA reports, 439,604 known cases of cholera were reported and 6,266 known deaths occurred since the outbreak with the disease peaking throughout the rainy season. The highest mortality has been among children and elderly. It is predicted that it will be 2-3 years before cholera stabilizes as an endemic problem.

Food security is a significant challenge across the country and OCHA reports that 4.5 million people do not have access to sufficient quantities of nutritious food on a regular basis<sup>3</sup>.

## 3 The ACT Haiti Appeal

### 3.1 Overview of the Appeal

The ACT Members issued a full Haiti Earthquake appeal on 19 February 2010 with a target of US\$31,661,350. The overall goal was to enhance the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake (through access to the basic necessities of life and fulfilment of basic rights in rural and urban areas).

Specific objectives for the crisis phase were:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Humanitarian Bulletin (19 August – 20 September 2011) OCHA Haiti

- Ensure access to shelter, food, water, and basic non-food-items needed for daily living, safety and security.
- Ensure access to basic shelter materials necessary for building transitional houses capable of withstanding the coming rainy season.

For the post crisis phase the objectives were to:

- Ensure access to housing in which households have a core home which is built at or above SPHERE standards with a specific focus on resilience to natural disasters.
- Improve access to safe and reliable water and hygiene.
- Provide psychosocial support through the staff care program & youth groups in the communities.
- Increase resilience of communities to likely natural hazards.
- Ensure access to education for children.
- Create sustainable livelihood and income opportunities.

A revised appeal was issued by ACT on 30 September 2010 with an appeal target of US\$45,875,664 and a further appeal was issued on 28th July 2011 (amended on 23 August 2011). The final appeal target was US\$46,012,134. The original appeal was for an 18-month period up to 31st July 20114. In the follow up appeals the completion dates for four ACT members CWS, DKH, were extended to 31 August 2011 and 31 October 2011 respectively, while both the FCA and LWF programme were extended to 31 December 2011. The appeal mechanism was the key component of the ACT response to the Haiti earthquake and represented a substantial contribution to the emergency (additional details of the appeal are provided in Annex 7).


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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The exception was Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe which issued a 9 month appeal up to 31 October 2010

### 3.2 Financial summary

ACT Member	Target	%	Pledged & received	%
Christian Aid	2,144,805	4.66	1,638,835	76
CRWRC	7,683,754	16.7	6,825,849	89
CWS	2,552,910	5.55	2,428,240	95
DKH	3,258,890	7.08	3,231,568	99
FCA	2,539,676	5.52	1,395,878	55
LWF	18,207,103	39.57	12,522,082	69
NCA	8,901,170	19.35	5,676,541	64
Coordination	501,189	1.09	445,814	89
RST	106,637	0.23	47,614	45
Evaluation	116,000	0.25	116,094	100
Unallocated			323,158	
Subtotal	46,012,134		34,651,673	75

**Table 1 Appeal Fund Targets** 



The LWF was the largest recipient of Appeal funds and accounted for over US\$ 12.5m (36% of the total amount received). CRWRC and NCA were the next biggest recipients accounting for 20% and 16% respectively. The total amount received under the appeal was over US\$ 34.5m which is 75% of the original target.

The Appeal itself involved church organisations from across the world and was a real example of Action of Churches together. Over 70 different Churches or relief organisations linked to churches plus some individuals contributed to the Appeal.

Around three quarters of the appeal (US\$26m) was made up of 11 donors with the balance made up of over 60 smaller donors and some individual contributions. ICCO & Kerk in Actie and Norwegian Church Aid were the largest donors with each contributing over US\$ 4m (12%). Other large donors were Dan Church Aid (almost US\$ 3m) and Diakonie Katastrophehilfe (US\$ 2.4m)

Donor	Contribution \$US % of total	
	appeal	
Church of Sweden	2,422,931	7.1
CRWRC, Canada	2,000,000	5.8
DanChurchAid - Denmark	2,941,652	8.6
Diakonie Katastrophehilfe	2,408,898	7
Evangelical Lutheran Church America	1,750,000	5
Finn Church Aid	2,377,390	7
ICCO & Kerk in actie	4,136,681	12
Lutheran World Relief USA	1,058,911	3
Norwegian Church Aid	4,013,214	12
Presbyterian W.Ser.Canada	1,398,336	4
United Church of Canada	1,579,644	5
Others	8,177,361	24
Total	34,265,017	100

**Table 2 Appeal donors** 

### 3.3 Overview of the ACT Alliance Response

The appeal projects were implemented in the wider Port au Prince area and in Léogâne, Gressier, Carrefour, Petit and Grand Goâve, Jacmel and Bainet, Petit and Grand Goâve and Les Cayes, Lascahobas. The activities were implemented by 7 members, Christian Aid (CA), Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC), Church World Service (CWS), Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Finn Church Aid (FCA) and their Haitian partners. A number of ACT members who were part of the appeal process were also involved in other emergency response initiatives in parallel.

With almost one third of the Haitian population directly or indirectly affected, the Haiti earthquake represented a significant disaster that required a comprehensive multi-sectoral international response. It was a test-case for a large scale humanitarian response from ACT members. The members work with national partners such as Service Chrétien d'Haiti, KORAL, GRAMIR, VETERIMED, Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), KROS, Viva Rio, MISSEH and MOFECS. In total, about 40 local organisations are involved with the work of ACT in Haiti. Size and capacity range from nationally known organisations to local cooperatives and community based organisations. Other key ACT members such as Church of Sweden (CoS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) & Kerk in Actie and International Orthodox Church Charities (IOCC) and Dan Church Aid contributed with staff and resources to support the work of ACT members in Haiti. The Dominican Churches' Social Services (SSID) logistically supported the response from the Dominican Republic.

### Quantitative overview of the ACT response

This section provides a snapshot of some of the work undertaken by ACT members and partners in key sectoral areas. It does not cover the entirety of the ACT response. There were some difficulties in providing a detailed quantitative analysis of the response due to the fact that it was implemented by a range of ACT members and partners using different reporting systems. These reporting systems for future ACT Appeals need to be tightened up without becoming too complicated or burdensome, so that it is possible to accurately identify the overall number of people assisted. The situation is further complicated by the fact that ACT partners were implementing similar emergency response programmes which were outside the appeal funding mechanism. In view of these discrepancies the total number of disaster affected people supported by the ACT programme is conservatively estimated to be over 500,000. Following is a sample of the work undertaken by some ACT members (often implemented by partners).

### **SSID**

The logistical support provided by SSID supported food assistance to over 50,000 people and NFI for up to 250,000.

### **CWRC**

CRWRC provided for over 136,000 affected people of which over 50% (almost 72,000) were within the appeal. This included:

- 10,000 supported with NFIs
- 11,655 supported with cash assistance
- Over 4,000 supported with cash assistance (50% outside the appeal)
- 10,821 received livelihood support (all outside the appeal)
- 17,500 households supported with emergency shelter = 87,500 beneficiaries)
- 11,255 houses or semi-permanent shelters provided (over 70% within the appeal)
- Over 7,000 people supported with psychosocial counseling (245 within the appeal)

### SCH

The overall number of people supported was almost 3,000 – 50% of which were within the appeal with the others outside the appeal. This included:

- Cash assistance provided to 1,200 people with disabilities
- Livelihood support provided to 300 PWD
- 765 people reached with Cholera prevention activities

### LWF

- NFI provided to over 50,000 beneficiaries
- More than 80,000 children catered for through education provision
- 612 teachers and 158 trained in psychosocial support
- Livelihood support provided to over 10,000 people

- 1,500 goats distributed to 500 beneficiaries
- Cash for work provided to over 5,000 people to implement a range of sustainable projects including:
  - 7 km of road rehabilitation in Oranger
  - 4 km of road rehabilitation in Tete à Boeuf
  - 1 km of road rehabilitation in Palmes 9/10
  - 200 meters of road rehabilitated in Vaudreuil
  - 7 hectares of embankments protected in Palmes 9 / 10
  - 3 hectares of embankments protected in Bino
  - 15,000 trees planted on embankments
  - 8 nurseries implemented in Palmes and Bino

### **Christian Aid**

- 8,720 individuals from 1,744 families (992 in Port-au-Prince and 752 in the border areas) received dry food ration or a cash voucher to purchase food for one month
- 1,934 families received \$60 cash each for a month's food ration (PaP and border areas)
- 1,200 families received survival kits and kitchen kits (Delmas 33, Christ Roi, Lilavois, border areas)
- 5,000 hygiene kits distributed (PaP and border areas)
- A total of 572 individuals benefitted from psychosocial support
- 520 fodder plots established. 126 cows, 640 goats and sheep and 15,000 hens purchased and distributed

#### **Finn Church Aid**

- FCA erected 83 transitional schools in Leogane, Gressier and the Grand Goave area
- Building 10 permanent schools per year with an overall target of 40 permanent schools over a four year period
- Provided a school feeding programme catering for 7,000 children in 33 schools
- Delivered cholera awareness programmes and distributed cholera kits in 83 schools


### DKH

- DKH constructed 300 homes in the Jacmel area and erected public latrines
- Provided NFIs to 3,000 beneficiaries in Camp Wolf
- Rehabilitated 3 schools including the Evelyn Leavy school in Jacmel which caters for 1,400 students

### NCA

- Working in partnership with MISSEH and Viva Rio NCA provided WASH facilities for 70,000 beneficiaries in camps in Port au Prince
- Viva Rio provided 511 emergency latrines and almost 200 toilets with biogas digester systems
- Viva Rio has over 1,300 people working on clearing debris and collecting solid waste

Based on the sample of sectoral response above the combined work of the ACT members above without counting the SSID figures, results in the following spread of sectoral support that the ACT appeal funded. This is an illustration graph and may not fully reflect the entirety of ACT's sectoral support – for example support on cholera prevention (fundamentally related to WASH) and other sectors may have been higher.




# SECTION II: HAITIAN PERSPECTIVES: IMPACTS SINCE THE EARTHQUAKE

The section following presents the most important impact differences since the earthquake both positive and negative, from the perspectives of disaster affected people within the sample met in the urban and rural field work. It then goes on to attribute to what and who these people see as the causes of these changes in their lives. These drivers of impact are those caused by humanitarian intervention and by wider events and factors within the context of people's lives. The drivers of impact are attributed according to the most commonly understood actors within a humanitarian response: Communities, Government, UN, Red Cross, NGOs, business and wider events (in this case the earthquake and cholera epidemic). In this way the evaluation process draws linkages between what worked and did not work from the perspective of the affected populations; the reality of what the ACT Alliance spent the appeal funds on; and how well these two are aligned.

### 4 Positive Impacts

### 4.1 Positive Urban impacts



In terms of positive impact in urban areas since 12 January 2010, Haitians consulted in the focus groups highlighted the following in order of priority a) Basic Service Assistance b) Strengthened Social and Personal Values c) Reestablishment of Livelihoods. These three categories are based on a grouping of common areas of qualitative community impact statements and attributed quantitatively (cf. Operational Context 2.2). In summary, the basic provision of services particularly by NGO action has been appreciated by the sample of Haitians met. The power of factors within the

community itself has played a key positive role in meeting the full integrated spectrum of human needs related to meaning and belonging and expressed as strengthened social and personal values. Finally re-establishment of livelihoods has been the third most important impact - although at a significantly lower level than the other impacts.

### (a) Provision of basic services

Provision of basic service assistance included the following kinds of support: payment of housing, scholarships, cash for work, psychosocial support, drinking water, health, hygiene kits, food kits, latrines, cholera prevention activities and provision of solar lighting at camps. These services formed the largest number of positive impact statements in the urban areas and are highly appreciated by those assisted. ACT was involved in meeting some of these needs within the context of the global humanitarian response. More than 500,000 people have been assisted by ACT with water, sanitation, shelter, regular food supplies/meals, relief items, cash, family kits or

hygiene sets. Medical assistance and supplies to health clinics have also been part of the ACT intervention.


### (b) Strengthened Social and Personal Values

Positive social changes have taken place within Haitian society independently of what humanitarian agencies have done. Some of ACT's partner responses did recognise and support these trends within the Haitian community to various degrees. For the area of strengthened social and personal values people strongly mentioned issues such as increased understanding of the fragility of life, joy, courage, people with no hope finding a house, social support, social promotion and creation of new organizations (for the physically challenged). Initial external reports after the earthquake expressed a strong sense of social solidarity following the earthquake and that this then decreased. This exercise found a continuing strong sense of social solidarity which is noticeable as a long term positive impact two years after the event. For example one focus group was made up of twenty five (25) people facing physical challenges. Only two members of the group had been physically challenged before the earthquake and the rest had sustained injuries during it. They felt that there is a major change of attitude in the society to people with disabilities from previous stigmatisation and marginalisation, to greater respect and inclusion. Among the physically challenged sample there was a strong and well organised solidarity that did not previously exist.

### c) Re-establishment of Livelihoods

For the re-establishment of livelihoods in urban/peri-urban areas some groups mentioned distribution of agricultural kits and support to small businesses. These are areas where ACT members have provided clear support. While there was clear appreciation for cash support it should be noted that one focus group strongly felt that cash for work was having a neutral impact in that it was not moving things forward.

### 4.2 Positive rural impacts



There was a clear impression gained from the rural field work that the current post disaster situation is viewed as a major opportunity for rural Haiti to benefit from the development investment that it has never received. In order of priority the focus groups viewed the main positive changes in their lives as a) Improved housing access and quality b) Increased social solidarity c) Increased education access and quality d) Improved livelihoods and Increased health access. These are all tangible positive impacts that people feel have occurred since January 2010. ACT members and partners have been substantially involved in these changes and this was stated by community members.

### (a) Rural Improved housing access and quality

People noted the increased availability of rental accommodation compared to urban areas. While there remain people living in unsatisfactory housing conditions, people met, overall felt that their access and rights to housing had resulted in improved living and sanitation conditions and that their housing needs had been met in rural areas. It is important to note that this finding was stated by six different focus groups and only two of which were direct beneficiaries of housing projects. ACT members realising that the so called "transitional shelter" designs would de facto end up as permanent shelter solutions, opted to build permanent structures early on and skip the transitional shelter option in areas where this was agreed with local authorities. This is viewed as a very wise and strategic decision by the evaluation team and ACT experience could benefit wider humanitarian debates in Haiti on shelter.

### (b) Increased social solidarity

Following the earthquake and to date there has been a strong solidarity and sense of hospitality in receiving and welcoming those displaced by the earthquake by those less affected in rural areas. People talked about a prior situation where every family aimed to have members working in Portau-Prince in order to send remittances to family in the rural areas. For the first time ever this has been reversed and it is now the responsibility of rural families to support their urban members. This was felt to be extended to behaviour change in terms of fundamental attitudes between perceptions of the urban/rural populations. Among vulnerable groups such as the physically challenged they felt that their mobility had been facilitated and that they had increased organisational capacities as a social group.

### (c) Rural Increased education access and quality



Figure 2 ACT member built school, St. Matthews School, Leogane

People were very happy about what they felt to be increased access to and quality of education including support with payment of school fees, availability of teaching materials and other logistical support. Haitians place a premium on education and there is a strong impetus on sending children to school. Focus groups indicated that in the areas where schools had been supported,

improvements were significant and they were satisfied. While these improvements were strongly evident, attention should be paid to areas where support coverage has been limited or non-existent and where needs still exist. The long term sustainability of this support should also be carefully considered.

### (d) Rural Improved livelihoods


Focus groups identified impacts relating to the support they had received from ACT partners/members in terms of agricultural tools, seeds, cash and livestock. This had benefitted

overall food security and agricultural production. People felt that there were increased resources available such as materials and seeds etc and some groups were benefitting from increased salaries e.g. school teachers.

All of the above sectoral areas are ones that ACT members and partners have worked in and we can deduct that there is a close alignment between what Haitians felt had worked for them and what ACT had supported with the appeal funds. ACT members and partners were repeatedly and spontaneously positively mentioned by focus group participants.

### 5 Negative impact issues to be addressed

### 5.1 Negative Urban impacts



In order of priority on-going negative impacts since the earthquake relate to a) psychosocial difficulties b) livelihood challenges c) homelessness d) poor agricultural production e) poor agency targeting.

### (a) Psychosocial Difficulties

For the greatest negative long term change still felt since the earthquake, participants spoke deeply about psychological problems, loss of parents and loved ones, deep sadness and pain,

lack of affection for orphaned children, mental health issues, trauma, increased level of fatalism and frustration, depression and hopelessness. People also spoke about the fact that their families were now split up with members living in different places and adolescents becoming independent much earlier than previously as a result. The scale of negative impacts relating to on-going psychosocial difficulties struck a deep chord among participants when this finding was presented at the validation and learning workshops at the end of the evaluation process.

### (b) Livelihood Challenges

People expressed that they had a lack of means to survive and that their lives are very difficult. They are also concerned about rising indebtedness due to loss of business and unemployment. Some had worries that microfinance support was increasing their levels of indebtedness and that they were living at the expense of others in their communities.

### (c) Homelessness

Homelessness emerged as an issue that has led to a wide range of secondary negative impacts. The loss of people's businesses was considered a factor in rendering people homeless. The situation of living in tents particularly those in camp situations was reported to have increased sexual harassment and the vulnerability of young girls.

### (d) Poor Agricultural Production


In areas of Leogane for example, farmers said that they had lost land due to the establishment of camps and that their areas for agricultural production had been reduced. They spoke of the lack of

irrigation that hindered year round production, dependence on rain fed agriculture and poor agricultural mechanisation. All of these factors are leading to a decline of local production e.g. potatoes, maize, cassava, cow pea etc. These are long term development, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation issues present before the earthquake that have been further aggravated.

### (e) Poor Agency Targeting

While some of the most vulnerable groups have clearly received timely, appropriate and relevant support by ACT members and partners, some people strongly commented on the poor distribution of resources by the wider humanitarian community and the continued wider lack of access to schooling.

### 5.2 Negative rural impacts



In order of priority people remarked that the greatest single change in their lives since 12 January 2010 was the increase of population in the Central Plateau region (where field work carried out). The population who participated in this work ranked it as the highest continuing impact on their lives closely followed by lack of access to and quality of health services. The third highest impact was deterioration or lack of livelihoods followed by continuing social exclusion of challenged people (unlike in Port-au-Prince).

### (a) Population Increase

Increase in local population numbers fits with the initial observation of the humanitarian community in Haiti following the earthquake - that 604,215 (OCHA) people left Port-au-Prince. An unclear situation exists in Haiti currently among the humanitarian community regarding the degree to which displaced people remain in the rural areas. Whatever the actual fact of the situation, it clearly remains the biggest felt issue by the people met. They also attributed increased insecurity (theft, incidents), degradation of living conditions and poor infrastructure to this change.


### (b) Rural Livelihoods


People remarked at what they felt was a reduction in local agricultural production attributable to the negative effect of food distribution which appeared to be on-going by some agencies (not ACT members or partners) creating dependency.

### (c) Lack of access and quality of health services

In addition to the impact of trauma on health the cholera epidemic has had a huge impact on access to and quality of health services. Some groups remarked that the scale of the Cholera epidemic compared to behaviour change at community level and the prevention, control and treatment capacity of the health actors made any prevention impact negligible.

### 5.3. Analysis of the drivers of impact






Each of the positive and negative rural and urban impacts (declarations of impact by representative Haitian groups) were attributed in the field work to what or who people perceived as the cause or driver of that change in their lives. These results show the position of ACT within the global humanitarian response - all agencies are commonly perceived as one and only by sharing information and collaborating effectively can the humanitarian community support Haitian people effectively - the essence of humanitarian reform, quality and accountability. The results above show who and what people feel are responsible for these impacts. The situation on the ground is very dynamic and not static in terms of long-term changes. The earthquake and cholera epidemic while catastrophic are only part of the overall context of people's lives which this exercise reveals. In this regard the graphs provide a clear connection to the context within which humanitarian action is taking place which is changing rapidly. The attribution results alert agencies to trends that they may not be aware of and increase the need for self-reflection within the humanitarian community and strengthen the need for accountability to the disaster affected population and how they see the impact of humanitarian action within the global realities of their lives.


A review of the positive urban and rural attribution results above clearly demonstrates the substantial humanitarian space occupied by all NGOs in the weeks after the earthquake until now. In some cases people do not know the difference between the Red Cross, UN agencies and NGOs – there can be confusion here and UN agencies are in some cases funding NGO activity. These 2011 attribution results show that the earthquake is also attributable for some positive social changes as viewed by Haitians. A 2010 evaluation<sup>5</sup> found that 10 months after the earthquake that the most negatively viewed actor after the government by Haitians at that time were NGOs. This was because people overall did not feel listened to by the global response, or felt that the global assistance was inappropriate and not making them stronger and the scale of needs were so high that humanitarian agencies with large funded budgets were viewed as having responsibility to meet these. The ACT response appears as an exception within this overall context and the reasons for this are explored in the next section.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> O'Hagan, Love, Rouse, An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response (SCF, CARE, ECBII 2011)

What is very powerful is the increased attribution in 2011 of positive impact to initiatives and forces within the community. The role of the Haitian community especially - followed by the Government, United Nations Agencies and Red Cross Movement – has taken on an increased significance as a driver of positive impact over the past year in urban areas and NGOs are being seen much more positively. The learning from the attribution results raises the question about how ACT members and partners can better support the decrease of positive attribution to NGOs and the increase of positive attribution to national actors.






The negative view of Government and international humanitarian action has declined over the past year in urban areas (although it is clear that tensions exist between community members and agencies particularly in Leogane which has been exacerbated by the draw-down of some agencies and their activities, which makes people feel that they need to benefit, before agencies scale down completely). In the rural area sample, the lack of or limited government support was viewed as the greatest driver of negative impact, followed by the earthquake itself and forces within the community. NGO action was attributed negatively when for example people felt a lack of access to and quality of health services. The UN was viewed as directly responsible for the Cholera outbreak.


# **SECTION III: COMMON THREADS**

## 6 The four pillars of the ACT Alliance Response



The overall response from ACT was wide ranging both in terms of its geographic scope and the type of assistance provided as illustrated in the map above.

The response has been a sustained one with ACT members working firstly on emergency relief and then shifting to recovery and more long term development. The evaluation identified four pillars which offer a synthesis of the assistance; working with partners, assisting the most vulnerable, recognising human dignity, capacity and preparedness.



### 6.1 Working with partners

One of the features of the ACT response has been the strong emphasis on partnership and the commitment to work with local Haitian partners. The partnership approach permeates the overall ACT response and extends beyond the formal Haitian partners. It also underpins how ACT members worked with the Haitian authorities, disaster affected people and the wider

The first external relief to Haiti was provided by SSID (a Dominican National NGO) who sent a plane with medical, food and basic supplies into Haiti within 27 hours of the earthquake.

humanitarian sector. The importance and value of partnership is recognised by ACT members, partners, government and all key informants many of whom referred to the strengths and benefits of a partnership approach.

### **Partnership with Haitian CSOs**

"We learned that the partners have the capacity - they proved their capacity to intervene in emergencies. Partners have the will and the capacity to work in such a difficult situation. We can rely on the partners to help the communities and improve lives."

ACT member staff

ACT members have worked in Haiti for decades and established good working relationships with Haitian organisations. Examples of this are CWRC, CWS and LWF who have been supporting local partners since the 1950s. These long term relationships have played a positive role in supporting a number of national partners such as SCH and MISSEH to develop into strong national oganisations. These longstanding relevant partnerships have proved to be very effective in facilitating the ACT emergency response; including early action, the delivery of appropriate assistance, targeting the most vulnerable, implementing coherent and sustainable responses, and they will be equally important as the response shifts to the recovery phase.

There is clear evidence that the initial response to the earthquake came from Haitians themselves and that local CSOs and church groups played a vital role in the immediate response. This is clear in the P-FiM methodology findings on solidarity in both rural and urban field exercises. A number of ACT partners were very active at this phase initially working on their own initiative and then developing more co-ordinated responses with the relevant ACT members.

The first external relief to Haiti was provided by SSID (a Dominican National NGO) who sent a plane with medical, food and basic supplies into Haiti within 27 hours of the earthquake from the DR. SSID continued to provide critical assistance over the first few months as

50 water distribution points were set up on the first day after the earthquake.

most assistance was coming through the DR. They established an extensive logistics system which facilitated the arrival and transportation of ACT personnel and supplies and became a critical element in the overall ACT response. They also facilitated a range of other international actors who needed to transit personnel and supplies. In Haiti SSID worked closely with MISSEH.

The national lack of preparedness has been identified as one of the factors which contributed to the scale of the disaster. One example of where there was preparedness is Viva Rio which has a programme in the Bel Air district of Pap. Viva Rio had already set up and trained 70 *Community* 

Brigades with over 3,000 people before the earthquake. These brigades were mobilised quickly

and worked in critical areas - rescuing people from the rubble, taking people to the clinic in Kay Nou for first aid and on to hospital, distributing water and setting up latrines. The brigade structure enabled Viva Rio to respond immediately and cater for the immediate needs of the population in Bel Air. An example of this is water distribution - 50 water distribution points were set up on the first day after the earthquake.

CROSE - the local partner of DKH in the South East — also played a key role and mobilised 700 people to co-ordinate work in the camps. GARR was also able to respond quickly and used its experience of working with refugees and migrants to support victims. GARR set up a camp, carried out food distribution and ran programmes for parents and children.

These and other examples demonstrate that there was a capacity and a willingness among Haitian CSOs to respond immediately in an

"When the partners work in the same areas - where they always worked - it builds confidence in the community and makes it easy to start (the response) quickly. As well as improving the participation of beneficiaries - leading to greater impact."

ACT member staff

effective and appropriate manner. These CSOs formed critical bridgeheads into devastated communities and provided a substantial foundation for more sustained assistance from ACT members. The relevant ACT members moved quickly to assist these partners on the ground and as a result the response was well connected and timely. NCA worked to get supplies and support in to assist Viva Rio, CA worked with GARR and CWS worked with SSID. It is clear that without the expertise, experience, local knowledge and quality of local relationships of these partners the ACT response would have been considerably restricted and much less effective.

The value of the partnership approach is also evident in the on-going implementation of the response. How to provide relevant and appropriate assistance has been one of the main challenges encountered by the wider humanitarian community. The local Haitian partners were in

"The relationship has worked well - key ingredients - it is respectful, no problems with reports. They asked "what do you want - we have money - what do you think? They didn't impose things - there was discussion, dialogue and communication. They observe the work in the field. We are really happy when our partners are involved and understand the work."

Partner staff on the relationship with ACT members

tune with the communities, trusted and accepted by them and could respond to their needs more effectively than larger humanitarian organisations. There are several examples where partners detected problems and responded quickly to provide more appropriate assistance.

- GARR realized that food distribution was a problem and switched to cash distribution and the use of vouchers.
- SCH initially set up a direct cash distribution programme for people with disabilities but switched to using a bank when the original plan proved to be problematic.
- CWRC changed its house design on the advice of the Community Advisory Committee in Leogane.

These issues appear to have been identified mainly though the connectedness of informal contacts and direct

communication with affected people rather than though structured agency complaints

mechanisms. The relationship with communities and affected people is one of ACTs strengths and would provide a good basis for such complaints mechanisms (i.e. people need to have some confidence in the agency before they will use the system). This meant having Haitian staff out in the field engaging face to face with people.

Working with local partners has given greater ownership to the local communities and structures and reduced the potential for conflict between humanitarian agencies and communities. When some agencies relied on the US military to distribute food, ACT Partners had a level of acceptance in the communities to safely distribute food without the need for military escort and the negative perceptions this brought with it.

ACT members have a firm commitment to community development approaches and to building local capacity. This approach has underpinned the work with national partners and communities throughout the response. Working in partnership with local organisations (CSOs, CBOs and government agencies) is also critical to the long term recovery of Haiti. Building capacity and supporting them to develop appropriate responses will strengthen these organisations and institutions and generate more sustainable development.

While the partnership approach is regarded as one of ACTs core strengths it is also an area where there is considerable scope for improvement. This is recognised by both the partners themselves and ACT members. Respondents identified a number of areas where ACT can strengthen the overall partnership approach.

### Specific issues highlighted include:

 Bureaucratic delays in distributing funds to partners especially in the early stage of the emergency caused difficulties. In some cases the ACT response to partner requests for support was slow and did not take into account the realities in the field. There is frustration among a number of partners regarding how they were treated by ACT members particularly during the emergency phase when there was an influx of new staff. Partners felt that their experience was not adequately recognised and that their issues were not given sufficient priority.

"They don't understand the reality and don't have Haitian employees. International organisations should not be active in the field. They don't know the reality and culture even if they have good will. To leave something for the country you have to work with local partners - visibility is not the primary objective or impact."

ACT Partner Staff

There are different approaches to working with partners among ACT members which is
particularly problematic where an organisation is partnering more than one ACT member. This
can result in heavy and varied demands from the different members (reporting, evaluations,
visits etc) with confusing and even conflicting messages that can lead to misunderstanding and
conflict. There is a need for more consistency and coherence in this area.

- There were no Haitian full members of ACT during the emergency<sup>6</sup>. This was seen as a weakness and overall there is a need for greater involvement of Haitian organisations in the Haiti Forum.
- There are limited opportunities for partners of different organisations to network and to share information and approaches. There is need for increased synergy and communication both between ACT Members and Partners and also critically between Partners.

There is scope for more support for partners to ensure that they can implement long term policies and a shift in how some members support their partners. The emphasis needs to be more on recognising complementarity of strengths and on creating relationships of synergy both for future emergencies and long term development work.

The importance of trust and respect in the relationships between ACT members and partners was highlighted repeatedly with some concerns that these elements were lost sight of during the emergency stage — especially in relation to the importance of and challenges of cultural awareness, language and inter-personal communication skills. There are concerns among a number of partners that some ACT members are too engaged in implementation and need to step back and work more with Haitian partners.

The ACT Alliance and ACT members in Haiti faced a major dilemma when developing their response i.e. whether to work with existing partners and channel the response through them or whether to move to direct implementation so as not to overburden and possibly do long term damage to the partners. Prior to the earthquake ACT partners were involved in a range of development programmes and were not necessarily geared to respond to an emergency. It was evident that a major response was required and that partners would have to shift their focus from development to emergency relief and at the same time scale up their activities. There were risks in this especially for smaller partners with limited capacity. CRWRC, LWF and FCA adopted a more direct implementation approach but with strong community engagement while CA and CWS worked entirely through partners. NCA and DKH had a combination of the two with some direct implementation but with a substantial element being done with partners. All members are committed to working with and supporting their partners - the scale of the disaster and the need to scale up and deliver assistance in a timely manner meant that direct implementation was seen as the best approach in the circumstances by some though not all the partners. The evaluation found that some members and partners have different perspectives on the most effective approach. What is essential however is that the quality of response has been significantly better when shaped by relationships with good Haitian leadership input wherever that has been found whether within members, partners, government, communities or civil society organisations - a critical characteristic has been talking to the right people, at the right time, in order to shape and inform wise decision making.

### Partnership with Haitian Government agencies

A consistent theme in the discourse on the global humanitarian response is the lack of government capacity and the challenges of working with a government which was weak or non-

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This situation changed in Sep. 2011 when SCH and MESSIEH became members of ACT

existent. As the humanitarian effort is scaled down and agencies are leaving or reverting back to development activities there is increasing pressure on the government to step into the breach and to implement the transition/recovery programme. There are two things emerging in current humanitarian planning a) emergency through to transition stage b) the wider exit strategy of agencies (who seem to be using the lack of funds as a basis for scaling down, resulting in dumping the whole problem on government and local civil society). This can distort the real picture of needs on the ground and

"If there is no reinforcement of authorities and their capacity, there will always be problems. The less they understand the less they will work with humanitarian organisations and the beneficiaries will pay the price."

Local Authority Official

actually be a cause of harm - undermining the do no harm principle. The first moment of transition/recovery exists in the first moment of the disaster response as experienced by the people. NGOs are occupying a high degree of humanitarian space in Haiti and need to seriously consider steps to ensure and support community and government efforts to take increasing prominence. The compelling argument is that long term commitments should be relevant and supportive of local structures and local government from the outset, so that an appropriate exit strategy is intrinsic to the overall response.

"There is a growing conceptual and operational focus on local and national responses with the awareness that affected populations must be consulted and the response capacities of the crisis-affected state and national agencies and institutions must be reinforced."

(Sphere Handbook 2011)

ACT members and partners also faced challenges in this regard and a number of them expressed frustration. There is clear evidence that ACT members and partners did not simply follow the line that there is "no government capacity" and have made genuine efforts to work with the Haitian government at both local and National level with success. However in most cases this did not develop into functional co-

ordination or joint initiatives largely due the lack of an overall ACT Alliance framework for such a partnership. There are a number of opportunities emerging where ACT members are collaborating with the Government at local level and this would benefit by the development of a framework to guide such relationships, while allowing sufficient scope for members to respond and work flexibly. These efforts of ACT members are appreciated by government officials who see the importance of collaboration and the need for additional and sustained support and capacity building by the humanitarian sector.

Some examples of where ACT members have developed good working relationships with government agencies include:

- NCA working with DINEPA on WASH initiatives.
- DKH working with the Civil Protection Dept. in the South East on preparedness.
- SCH working with the Ministry for the Integration of People with Disabilities.
- CRWRC working with the Mayor's Office in Leogane on shelter projects.
- GARR working with the Mayor's Office in Lascahobas on shelter projects.

### Partnership with local communities

"The paradigm is still viewing the affected population as "pawns" (passive individuals) and the international community as "knights" (extreme altruists). This approach costs. Local capacities are not utilised, the beneficiary is not involved enough and the quality of delivery is lower than it should be."

DFID Humanitarian Emergency Response Review January 2011

While the bulk of the emergency response was implemented with local partners a sizable element of the response has been implemented more directly by ACT members. In these cases there is a strong emphasis on working in partnership with local communities and engaging people in the work. FCA has been involved in a school construction programme and works closely with the Episcopal Church of Haiti - one of the main providers of education in the country and with the Organisation des Ecoles victim du TdT which provides assistance to schools destroyed by the

"It is ours and we put it there - it is a community school"

Community representative referring to a new school built with the support of FCA Amboucher, Grand Reverie

earthquake. Decisions regarding the schools to be constructed are taken by these two local organisations and FCA then provides the resources and expertise to carry out the construction. This approach is evident



**ACT Member built school Amboucher** 

in how FCA works with communities. Recruitment of participants and payments for community work<sup>7</sup> are carried out by the community rather than FCA. The result is that communities are more actively engaged in the process and projects are more likely to be sustainable.

CRWRC is implementing a large shelter project and WASH programme in the Leogane area. The shelter element will involve the construction of 2,600 transitional shelters. CRWRC decided not to work through their existing partners as they feared that this scale of a project would put too much pressure on them. Instead they set up a local Development Assistance Committee with representatives of the local communities in the area where they are working. This committee has a good level of engagement in the project including input into decisions on the allocation of shelter and the location of WASH projects. This has created good connectedness with the local community and helped prevent any potential conflict with local communities. Other examples of this approach can be seen in the work of CRWRC and DKH on shelter. Beneficiaries are involved in construction through "sweat equity" and provide labour and basic material (rocks, sand water) while the agency provides other material and skilled workers. This approach is extended by CRWRC to households painting the houses with the beneficiaries selecting the paint for the house.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> FCA uses the term "community work" rather than "cash for work" as communities prefer this title.

These steps substantially increase the ownership and emotional engagement of families which meets good practice standards

### 6.2 Assisting the Most Vulnerable

Women, children, older people, persons with disabilities or people living with HIV may be denied vital assistance or the opportunity to be heard due to physical, cultural and/or social barriers.

Sphere 2011

The primary objective of the ACT Haiti appeal was "to enhance the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake" This section will assess the extent to which this objective was achieved and review how ACT and its partners worked to assist the most vulnerable.

Given the level of destruction there were enormous needs in all areas and challenging demands on the humanitarian community. While the response was substantial there were inevitable problems and widespread dissatisfaction among the affected population about delays in distribution, inappropriate assistance being provided and the fact that many people were missed or excluded from the large scale assistance programmes. The strong foundation and pre-existing solid relationships with partners were to prove vital in enabling ACT to provide a more focused relief effort which was geared towards the most vulnerable groups. In many cases ACT partners were the very first responders in some areas within hours or days of the earthquake. Action was characterised by a strong community approach that paid particular attention to vulnerable groups and the psychosocial needs of people.

The evaluation found that ACT – working with its partners – was able to target assistance efforts at specific vulnerable groups and to make a substantial difference to living conditions. It also found that this assistance was delivered in a way which recognised and valued people's dignity.

In many cases ACT partners were the very first responders in some areas within hours or days of the earthquake. The key factors which facilitated this approach were the culture and values of the ACT members and partners and connectedness with communities. There is a strong Christian worldview underpinning the work of ACT members and partners — this emphasises community driven development based on the intrinsic value of the

person and lays the foundation for a philosophy of solidarity with the Haitian people and a long term commitment to be present in times of crises and to work with the most powerless in society. It was intuitive that this approach would underpin the earthquake response. Two of the partners, RNDDH and GARR work in human rights and have a long track record in supporting the voiceless. Both SCH and MESSIEH are church based organisations and have been working to support the most vulnerable communities for decades.

It is important to note that many of the staff in both ACT members and partner organisations were themselves earthquake victims and had direct experience of the devastation and the struggle for "We go into the community and camps and look for the most vulnerable – they lost everything in the earthquake so we support them so they can start over."

SCH staff

survival. The response was real and grounded in the experience of staff themselves and their families in communities. ACT members and partners were "starting from scratch" and were therefore aware of the challenges faced by those who were also "starting from scratch."

In the aftermath of the earthquake there was a risk that the most vulnerable would be missed by the wider humanitarian response which was struggling to cater with the demands of assisting up to 2 million people. ACT partners were in a position to see the challenges on the ground and to gear their efforts towards the most vulnerable.

What is significant about the focus on vulnerable groups is that the partners appear to have responded independently and focused their efforts where they could be most effective in a flexible and responsive way. They were on the ground and had the confidence of the communities – they understood the context and had existing established relationships with communities with whom they took time to communicate. The emphasis on the most vulnerable can be seen in four main areas

- 1. Programmes that targeted vulnerable groups
- 2. The provision of psychosocial support
- 3. The focus on protection
- 4. Adaptation to and awareness of local context

### **Programmes targeting vulnerable groups**

"I was doing nothing before this
- thanks to this I have
something and I am not
discouraged, when you have a
small business you have hope"

*SCH livelihood programme* 

Service Chretien D'Haiti (SCH) was already working in conjunction with Churches to promote and facilitate greater integration of people with disabilities (PWD). SCH decided to use its existing expertise and knowledge and to focus its efforts on this group. It provided 3 types of support to PWD - cash payments, psychosocial support and livelihoods. The programme targeted 6 communities and provided assistance both to those with disabilities before the earthquake and

those left physically challenged as a result if it. Critically it worked with the family of the person with the physical challenge to facilitate integration within the family. The SCH programme with PWD is a good example of an integrated response – it aimed to have a social, economic and psychosocial impact and was connected with wider initiatives supporting PWD, with strong working relationships with the Ministry for the Integration of PWD at national and local levels.

Over the course of the site visits the evaluators saw other examples of where the ACT response sought to assist the most vulnerable such as putting a water tap beside the house of a blind person and making buildings more accessible to people with disabilities etc.

There are a number of other examples of how Act partners geared their assistance:

CORAL developed a micro credit programme - which focused mainly on women and which
prioritised IDPs and host families in the rural areas. CORAL used vulnerability criteria to target
priority groups 1) those directly affected by the earthquake 2) older people 3) physically

challenged and 4) vulnerable families. There was also a focus on those who were planning to stay in the rural areas – in order to support decentralisation of families away from PAP.

- GARR developed projects to assist children with trauma by providing emotional support and food until the schools re-opened. It also worked with youth who had lost family members providing training and a small grant to a group of 40 young people to enable them to start a business.
- LWF has been heavily involved in the education sector in collaboration with FCA and local structures such as the Education Bureau of the Episcopal Church (BAEH), the NGOs CESVI, PIN and MLAL (through the education cluster) and Conseil des Directeurs d'Ecole de Gressier (CODEG). In the early crisis phase, LWF provided 26 school tents to 5 schools in Leogane, Petit Goave and Grand Goave. Three other tents were donated by Handicap International to organize temporary learning spaces for children living with disabilities (at PaP). By March 2011 60 temporary school buildings (hangars) were built in Leogane, Gressier, Petit Goave, and Grand Goave and 26 new school tents were installed in areas of difficult access. LWF trained 612 teachers to provide post-trauma assistance to children. Two staff members from the psychosocial team worked closely with the education team to follow up the psychosocial activities in the schools. The schools managed by BAEH and CODEG received grants to cover their expenses in terms of salaries of staff (teachers and support staff), school materials. This avoided the need for the schools to charge fees to the children or refusing those who could not pay.
- All beneficiaries targeted by both KORAL and GARR were individuals who were directly
  affected by the earthquake those who were injured, lost their homes/businesses or were
  voluntarily displaced, as well as host families. GARR, in its capacity as a human rights
  organisation, observed distributions of basic items by other organisations and noted that
  women, children, the elderly and people with disabilities were often excluded as beneficiaries.
  This awareness informed the design of this project.

In most case the ACT members developed their own vulnerability criteria which enabled them to effectively target their resources towards vulnerable groups in the affected populations. These exercises were critically important to ensure that vulnerability was defined according to the Haitian context. This could have been improved if ACT members had done this jointly and fed their debates on vulnerability into the wider humanitarian community. The fact that these were drawn up independently by the members means that there was no co-ordinated approach around vulnerability with possible differences as to who was targeted. There is need to review the existing criteria for both the recovery phase and for other emergencies and to ensure that the criteria are effective in targeting all vulnerable groups. There are challenges in doing this and ACT members and partners need to be committed to defining effective criteria that reflect the local realities and are workable rather than applying standard criteria.

#### The provision of psychosocial support

"These meetings have a big impact on the lives of the beneficiaries - We visit people just to help them to understand and to talk about their problems - it is important for them to gather and to become a family with them"

**SCH Monitor** 

The provision of psychosocial support to victims has been a positive feature of the ACT response. The trauma caused by the earthquake was recognised and the need to address mental as well as physical scars. This was crucial in getting individuals and communities functioning and back to some

sense of normality. In different ways and in different locations ACT members and their partners tried to provide psychosocial support to victims. In some cases this was simply creating space and providing a listening ear for people to talk about what had happened to them and to try to come to terms with the reality of what they had experienced.

The evaluation identified a number of initiatives where ACT members and partners sought to address the psychological impact of the earthquake and the stresses of being displaced in the camps.

- MISSEH mobilised and trained 52 psychosocial monitors mainly University students to work
  with communities. The role of the monitors was to organise focus groups and to allow
  communication with people and expression of their feelings. "To give hope and to bring back
  the smile." The monitors worked with 3 main groups Men and women (separate) youth and
  children. They also organised distribution of clothes and wash kits to children and ensured that
  these groups got access to supplies.
- CRWRC trained 18 people and provided psychosocial support to 1,686 people (mainly women but also men and children). This was "a chance to talk about the past and what happened and to think about the future".
- MISSEH was aware of the importance of local churches in times of crises but also recognised
  that these churches and the pastors were victims themselves and needed support before they
  could assist others. To deal with this MISSEH organised a conference of pastors to provide
  support to them and empower them to go out and work with and assist their communities.
- ACT itself also recognised that its staff in Haiti were victims and sent a psychosocial counsellor
  to provide support to staff of both members and partners who were affected. This is
  appreciated by the members as it enabled the staff to recover and to deal more effectively
  with the challenges facing them.

There are limitations to both the quality and the extent of psychosocial support which ACT members and partners provided and in many cases this involved giving people the opportunity to talk openly about their experiences, what they had suffered and how it affected their lives. The value of this basic support should not be underestimated. ACT members and partner staff talked about giving people an opportunity to talk. ACT Alliance can learn from these experiences and provide further training to partners to facilitate on-going and low cost psychosocial support to communities which is still substantially required as evidenced in the urban field findings. There is strong evidence that different types of psychosocial support aimed at different sectors of the affected community are critical to both the response itself and to long term recovery. It is unrealistic to expect that such profound trauma could be healed in the space of months and there is evidence that significant problems remain as a result of trauma experienced. The Haitian Government and Humanitarian agencies – including ACT alliance needs to think in terms of years rather than months when addressing trauma on this scale.

#### The focus on protection

There were a number of initiatives which focused on the protection of vulnerable groups and ACT played a key role in supporting and driving these initiatives. A number of training programmes were delivered by ACT and by individual members to raise awareness among partners on issues relating to protection.

Viva Rio recognised the dangers of increased conflict and the lack of security in the camps in their area and set up a mediation programme. The protection situation in the camps raises particular risks related to rape and GBV. VR trained a panel of 11 mediators to work in communities and facilitate community dialogue, mediation, legal advice and where possible to refer people on to other support systems. The Viva Rio brigades also carried out awareness training on protection.

# 6.3 Recognising Human Dignity

"Acting in ways that respect, empower and protect the dignity, uniqueness and the intrinsic worth and human rights of every woman, man, girl and boy".

# ACT Code of Conduct

One of the distinctive features of the ACT response has been the emphasis on respecting individuals and treating people with dignity. Respecting the rights of the individual is one of the core principles of ACT. This was a huge challenge in the aftermath of the earthquake and a lot of the wider humanitarian response has been criticised on these grounds. While the ACT response was not perfect, it is clear that every effort was made to ensure that the beneficiaries were respected and that assistance was provided in ways that were culturally appropriate and likely to respect people's dignity. The key elements which contributed to this were participation of affected people and connectedness with communities.

#### Participation by affected people

"How can you help people unless you know what help they need agencies are providing things that are no longer needed."

> Community Representative Leogane

Given the scale of the disaster with more than 1.2 million people seeking refuge in temporary settlements there were huge challenges for all actors to try to engage in a meaningful way with people. The sheer scale of the problems and the lack of co-ordination on the ground meant that there were significant communication gaps: at a minimum consultation and at a maximum participation. Poor communication with beneficiaries on some occasions resulted in conflict and violence. There is evidence that the ACT response was

different and that there was a serious commitment to participation. ACT took the lead on this issue and advocated for accountability. This approach is articulated in the ACT code of conduct<sup>8</sup> and it is evident that ACT members and partners worked to ensure that it was translated into reality on the ground.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> One of the operational principles of the ACT is to "Listen to, and incorporate into all stages of programmatic work, the perspectives of those women and men whose lives are affected by crises, poverty, exclusion, rights deprivation and injustice and support them as they claim their human rights and work to improve their situation and overall wellbeing".

ACT requested training on HAP and Sphere Standards after the earthquake and this was valued by partners. ACTs role in promoting the HAP and Sphere joint deployment extended well beyond the work of the members and partners. ACT members have been very active in the CCO and through this structure were instrumental in promoting quality and accountability standards.

The engagement of ACT partner staff to communicate with people was exceptional and highly regarded by communities – it helped to ensure real participation, ownership and appropriate adjustment of the response. There has been considerable frustration among communities and in local government regarding the lack of information about the assistance and this is becoming more acute in some areas as the response winds down. This could have been avoided by better and more integrated communication at the outset by a wider range of actors. The CDAC initiative was an attempt to address this. The importance of having local staff who understand the culture and language and the importance of taking time to communicate with the people cannot be underestimated.

There are examples across the response of ACT members and partners engaging in 2 way dialogues with communities - directly with affected people and increasing ownership of decisions. One of the challenges encountered by humanitarian groups was related to camp committees as some of these were self-selected and not considered representative of the community. ACT members and partners used different approaches to address this problem and to ensure that the wider camp population had a voice.

- In Jacmel DKH worked to strengthen the camp committees and to build accountability through these committees.
- GARR adopted a consensual approach and did not go over the committees but did not give them full control. Staff worked with children and then with parents to build confidence and through this built links with the wider community and brought in new people to work on distribution.

While the overall picture is positive at this current stage of the response, there are indications that the early phase was more problematic. Some members and partners have developed complaint mechanisms but there are questions as to how well these are working on the ground. Genuine participation of communities and

"Donors choose to give food and water but the women wanted cash for other items (soap and personal items). They were not used to food distribution – this gave them choice"

ACT partner staff

accountability to them could be further developed and improved, as this is central to the on-going effectiveness of ACT's work and approach. While ACT has been good on promoting the overall concept of accountability and introducing training in this area this has not been translated into a strong ACT policy or co-ordinated approach to accountability across the Alliance. ACT is seen as being proactive in this area and has credibility in the sector. More could have been done by ACT to advocate for increased accountability across the sector and ACT can play a vital role in this area in the next phase. This works as long as it refers to agency accountability to communities. However, if not managed properly it can seriously undermine local existing complaints procedures and so ACT is encouraged to avoid evolving a 'one size fits all' approach to complaints management as each context is different.

#### **Connectedness with communities**

"How the support is given is just as important as what is done".

Decoville Community Member

One of ACTs key strengths is its work with local partners which gives a genuine connection with local communities. The profile of the partners and their reach into communities gave ACT a solid foundation on which to build its response. There were difficulties in these relationships especially in the early stages and a sense among some

partners that ACT was not listening to the voices of the people. ACT did not bypass its partners and has sustained these relationships through the crises. This has ensured that the connections with local communities have endured and can now be built on in the recovery phase.

"Although we were in an emergency situation we took time to explain what was going on - we explained why everyone could not be assisted."

A key component in accountability mechanisms is consultation with local government structures and ensuring that local officials are involved in decision making. ACT members and partners have established good working relationships and consult extensively with local government officials in the provincial areas (Leogane, Jacmel and Petit Goave). However it is not

"Although we were in an emergency situation we took time to explain what was going on - we explained why everyone could not be assisted - and the people were very patient then ..... We started well - We had a vision and we had the confidence of the community. We took time to communicate with the people"

**ACT Partner staff** 

clear if the same level of co-ordination has been developed in PaP. Haitians respect agencies that work with them, give them a voice and a role in their own recovery and development.

# 6.4 Capacity and Preparedness

"As we have learned again and again, no country or city - rich or poor - is immune . . . By our actions, we can either compound disasters or diminish them. The difference is in preparedness".

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon Third Session of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction, Geneva May 2011

NCA recognised and supported our role in the community and we were in a better position to cope.

We are not an emergency organisation and didn't know how to access funds from the UN etc. NCA recognised our strengths and our weaknesses. The partnership worked well -using our strengths. NCA could source materials – Viva Rio could work on the ground - without conflict."


(Viva Rio)

One of the key themes which emerged was the emphasis which ACT has placed on local Haitian capacity – both on utilising existing capacity and on building and strengthening this. This has been a core element of ACT member's on-going work in Haiti and the effectiveness of the ACT response is largely due to earlier capacity building with partner organisations - this working approach paid off substantially.

ACT members have a firm commitment to community development approaches and to igniting the power of local capacities. This approach has underpinned the work with local partners and communities throughout the response. The initial response was hampered by logistical challenges and a lack of immediate access to funds for some partners. However there is evidence that ACT

members and partners have the capacity to shift more seamlessly from development into humanitarian response and to make a high impact in the lives of affected populations.

Working with local partners, building relationships of synergy and supporting them to exercise creative leadership in developing appropriate responses will strengthen these organisations and generate a more meaningful contribution to the development of Haiti. Part of this appreciation for local capacity should include proper and respectful engagement with the national cultures of Haiti including proponents of voodooism in the spirit of <a href="inter-religious dialogue and cooperation">inter-religious dialogue and cooperation</a> espoused by the World Council of Churches and wider current theological reflection from Latin America in particular.



There are examples of how ACT members were able to draw on local capacity during the response:

The CRWRC project in Leogane is located in a former trade school which trained people in construction skills. CRWRC recruited the trainer and former trainees of this school as the basis for their shelter programme. CRWRC has also been able to use a reliable local supplier for most of its materials thereby supporting local business.

NCA was able to build on the existing capacity in Viva Rio to implement a number of projects in the Bel Air district of PaP.

The capacity of SSID to respond quickly and to establish a logistics system was critical to the ACT response. This highlights the value of a regional response to large scale disasters and the need for ACT to build on this and to put in place formal processes and structures to facilitate this in case of future emergencies.

ACT members were conscious of the need to build capacity across all sectors of Haitian society and there are examples of where they have implemented or supported capacity building interventions which have the potential to have long term impacts. Some examples of this relate to the work of FCA, LWF and CRWRC to improve construction standards and to "build back better" These organisations have developed approaches which focus on building awareness and capacity among engineers, contractors and construction workers. The work of FCA in building permanent and green schools in partnership with NCA is a good model. Developing

"The project with FCA was good as it aimed to prepare people. In particular it provided training for teachers. The reason so many people died is because they didn't know what to do. Education is the first thing to help the people people need to know what they should and should not do."

(RNDDH)

appropriate models of earthquake and hurricane resistant houses and schools and disseminating these methods and skills is an important contribution to preparedness.

Figure 3 Acacia nursery for reforestation and agroforestry



Another project in Leogane between FCA and RNDDH has been using education to build capacity among teachers and students to promote preparedness.

In the response to the earthquake emergency, LWF looked for ways to effectively respond to the needs of the population affected by the crisis, but keeping in line with its long-term intervention in the country that focuses particularly on sustainable livelihoods, environmental protection and

disaster preparedness. Therefore, three sectors were identified as key for intervention: livelihoods, shelter and education. These were chosen by taking into consideration the prioritization of the needs of the affected population, the gaps in the response by other actors, and the link to the long term LWF work in the development program. Some examples of this can be seen in the work undertaken through cash for work described earlier in the report.


Christian Aid supported the construction of 12 grain silos. Each one was delivered to the management committees set up by the local organizations. These committee members (10 per locality) were trained on business management. Funds have been distributed to the organizations in order to buy different kinds of seeds (maize, beans and millet) for storage.

A good example is the establishment by KORAL of a revolving credit fund for 150 women for small business activities. Advice has been provided on potential small business activities and 252 women have received funds. A further 178 women will receive funds. Another example is the development of 3 community shops in Torbeck, Chantal and Camp Perrin. This includes the establishment and training of management committees.

Christian Aid worked with its main partners GARR and KORAL to implement participatory

vulnerability and capacity analysis (PVCA). This includes the delivery of a 5 day training programme with 7 partners and 14 community members in Camp Perrin and the south Dept. GARR and KORAL progressed this initiative by developing community risk management plans with target communities.

ACT Alliance members have invested in capacity building from the outset of the response as part of an overall developmental approach. From early on members and partners were engaged in a range of activities aimed at building



Haitian capacity both to deal with the immediate disaster and equally importantly to develop some level of preparedness. The approach of integrating cholera prevention into the overall response was good practice and should be sustained.

The work on preparedness and disaster risk reduction is a priority in both rural and urban areas and ACT members and partners need to increase their effort in key sectors. The cholera epidemic is a major current threat. ACT members and partners need to strengthen cholera prevention and continue to integrate it into all programme activities.

ACT members have developed good models for schools, which are earthquake resistant and double up as hurricane shelters. They have also developed green schools. More needs to be done to raise awareness of these models and to disseminate the technological know-how so that these models can be replicated. Developing livelihoods around preparedness and DRR is also good practice and should be replicated wherever possible.

ACT has developed in some instances good working relationships with government agencies particularly at local level and has made this a priority. There are good examples of this in Jackmel between DKH and local government, in Leogane between FCA, CRWRC and the Mayor's office and between LWF and the Mayor of Gressier. Given the limited capacity and resources within the government system at all levels there is now a recognition that more should have been done by the humanitarian sector to build government capacity. ACT Alliance was well placed to make a bigger contribution in this regard as it had relationships on the ground with local Government. However there was no overall approach in place around support for Government and this is an area which ACT Alliance needs to invest in during the recovery phase.

# 7 Review of implementation of The Haiti Appeal

This section reviews the performance of ACT over the course of the response and assess how effective it was in leading, co-ordinating and supporting the response to the Haiti earthquake.

It will examine a number of key areas including the role of the ACT secretariat, the role of the Haiti Forum and the effectiveness of existing ACT structures in an emergency situation. For many of the ACT members the Haiti response was the largest programme they had implemented and Forum members had to both take on new work; shifting from development to emergency response on a larger scale. The analysis and recommendations are not a criticism of individuals or organisations but offered in a spirit of learning and improvement.

"A lot had to happen to create the current dynamic in the Forum - commitment, trust, accountability, follow through and relevance. A key point is that it has remained strong despite changes in leadership."

ACT member staff

#### 7.1 The Haiti Forum

The Haiti Forum was established to co-ordinate the on-going development work of the ACT members in Haiti. Prior to the earthquake the Forum had 8 members. ACT members have been active on the ground in both long term development and in emergency relief for several decades and have developed partnership with local Haitian CSOs. These CSOs range from larger national

organisations such as SCH, RNDDH, GARR and MISSEH to local co-operatives and CBOs. In total ACT members work with around 40 Haitian partner organisations and these local partners formed a key element in the ACT response.

There is a clear view among both ACT members and partners that the Haiti Forum played a vital role in the response and general consensus that the response would have been much less effective and more fragmented without the co-ordination and support of the Forum. The strengths of the Forum include the sense of family, moral support and solidarity it provided, information sharing, co-ordination and collaboration and that it provided a focal point and a valuable platform for other initiatives. These points emerged strongly in the interviews with consensus that the Forum had played a very positive role.

"The office promoted coordination at a level that made sense. Not imposing co-ordination. It provided a support function - information sharing - found a balance between the needs of all members and ACT."

Forum member

There is a strong sense that the shared experience of the earthquake - that most members had to move and share the LWF offices and the close working relationships in the first phase of the response were — seminal and created a unique bond between forum members which enabled it to develop into a strong and coherent structure. Despite high staff turnover at short term technical levels the forum members were able to maintain senior staff continuity — this is very impressive and includes very high calibre Haitian staff.

There are specific areas where the forum was particularly effective. There was a lot of experience and a good level of capacity within the Forum at the time of the Earthquake and the leadership and co-ordination provided by these country representatives was very significant. As a result of this capacity ACT was able to mobilise quickly and respond in a timely manner.

The forum became a focal point and reference point as new staff arrived both from the ACT Rapid Response Team (RST) and from member organisations.

The in-country co-ordination unit has been identified as playing a critical role — it became a focal point and "the glue that held ACT together". A number of factors were highlighted as important in this regard; the composition of the team (a Haitian plus internationals); the fact that the co-ordinator had worked with the ACT Secretariat and was familiar with systems and procedures; the continuity within the team and the style of leadership. A number of those interviewed commented on the leadership style — the facilitative approach which promoted information sharing and communication was identified as being appropriate to the Forum. This enabled co-ordination to happen rather than imposing it.

The MOUs among forum members were noted as being useful as they set out how members should work together.

Member organisations have committed and dedicated staff with particular sectoral specialisms as well as different histories and experiences of working in Haiti. Each member brought something unique to the table and this range of skills, approaches and experience which considerably strengthened the response.

The earthquake created enormous logistical challenges for all humanitarian actors and which severely hampered the overall response. While Forum members and their partners were seriously affected by these challenges the joint efforts of the members, particularly CWS and SSID overcame some of the problems and was a critical factor in the timeliness of the response. In many ways this was

"You are part of a group that knows each other and this creates a dynamic of accountability that is healthy for all of us."

ACT Member Staff

an ideal connection in an extremely adverse situation. Without the logistical support of SSID in the Dominican Republic and the existing relationships with partners in Haiti it is likely that the early response would have been limited and the overall ACT response seriously restricted. The power of these partnerships and the complementarity of strengths is second to none and provides an excellent model for humanitarian response that builds on and strengthens local capacities.

The Forum enabled joint initiatives to take place between members - The shift to this joint implementation was seen as an important step in moving the response to a new level. Examples of this are joint projects between FCA and NCA and between FCA and LWF.

The Forum played a role in promoting accountability among members – with members feeling a sense of responsibility to maintain standards and to be accountable to each other.

The Forum played an important role with regard to external relationships and co-ordination. Membership of the Forum/ACT gave weight and there has been growing brand recognition of being "ACT". The Forum was critical in sharing information regarding the wider response, the work of the clusters and co-ordination efforts such as the CCO. Increased joint representation could have been higher (rather than individual members attending the same meetings) to reduce the burden of the volume of meetings many of which, especially the early cluster meetings, had limited value. The involvement of ACT in the CCO is also seen as significant and a valuable contribution to the overall co-ordination of the response.

# Internal working of the Forum

Although communication and collaboration are now recognised as key strengths, this was not always the case as outlined earlier in the report. A number of contributory factors were identified including turnover of staff in key positions, the arrival of new short term personnel without adequate briefing, differences in approaches among members and the lack of strong co-ordination and leadership. Some of these issues were addressed with increased co-ordination and the setting up of a full time co-ordination office. However there is a view that this office was not sufficiently robust and that there was need for more decisive leadership and more direction over the course of the response - particularly in the early phase.

"Partnership did not go much beyond partnership of ACT members. Not much going on beyond that - an opportunity missed for getting the perspectives of partners together - Haiti is a divisive place and there is risk of adding to that otherwise. ACT could facilitate bringing partners together".

ACT Member Staff

There are concerns that a number of members are involved in shelter without sufficient coordination or sharing and that this sector could be strengthened considerably by a more strategic approach from ACT. There is also a view among partners that some ACT members have been too involved in implementation and need to bring in more local partners and work in partnership in order to get things right on the ground - particularly communication with communities.

There are considerable differences among forum members and to a certain extent a lack of clarity around terms and their meaning – for example partnership, co-ordination, vulnerability, sharing etc. There would be value in members bringing clarity to these in order to enhance and strengthen effectiveness. Similarly members and partners use different terminology for broadly similar terms e.g. disaster risk reduction, preparedness and again it would be important for members to lead a process which brought clarity to this. Aligning this with Haitian Government terminology and connecting ACT activities into government strategies would go a long way towards building greater connectedness with the government at different levels. DRR has been identified as a possible approach which could be integrated within all programmes in order to strengthen co-ordination and to create the necessary linkage between emergency, recovery and development.

#### **External co-ordination**

External co-ordination was quite strong and a number of external informants commented on the role played by ACT. There are a number of areas where ACT could have done better including co-ordination with the clusters, supporting the Haitian government and using the resource of the Haitian churches to greater effect.

"We had both feet in the clusters and felt it was a mistake – the cluster approach is not well oiled and still an experiment. Haiti was still a sovereign nation and we made the mistake of not consulting with local authorities/mayories - we were talking to the wrong people. We needed to respond through the Haitian authorities".

ACT Member

The clusters were particularly problematic and in many cases have been seen as a failure. The number of meetings and the amount of time required to participate was a huge issue for everyone. One of the main weaknesses was the lack of Haitian involvement with many Haitian organisations feeling excluded from this process. A number of ACT members feel that ACT could have adopted a more strategic approach to the clusters with more sharing of information about what was going on – demonstrating commitment to the humanitarian reform process and the principle of coordination - without getting bogged down in its ineffectiveness evident in Haiti. A more entrepreneurial and pragmatic approach could have been adopted earlier. The Forum could have acted on behalf of all ACT members in liaising with Clusters and National Government.

ACT has developed good working relationships with government agencies particularly at local level and has made this a priority in

some instances. Given the lack of overall capacity within the government system at all levels, there is now a recognition that more should have been done by the humanitarian sector to recognise and support development of government capacity where opportunities existed. ACT members have a long term commitment to Haiti and could have been more active in this area in including and collaborating especially with the local authorities. This should be a priority for ACT in the next phase of the response.

There is a view both within ACT and among external actors that ACT may not have been assertive enough and may have underplayed its capacity to influence how things were done more widely by

sticking to what it knows intuitively is good practice. It is seen as an influential body with existing resources that carried weight ("it comes with money and is not networking in order to look for it") and has important things to contribute to the recovery of Haiti and should therefore play a more strategic role in the future - It should "punch above its weight."

ACT members and partners relied more on CSOs and CBOs rather than the formal church during the response. ACT members and partners have strong links with the churches and a number of respondents felt that this substantial social resource was under used and could have been a platform for action - particularly in advocacy.

ACT members - particularly CRWRC and LWF - have been very active in shelter provision through direct implementation approaches where the houses are constructed directly by the agency with advice from local community structures and the direct involvement of beneficiaries through the provision of labour. A different approach to the provision of shelter is the use of shelter grants to households with advice and technical support. This approach is advocated in the ALNAP report on Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations and is seen as being more effective than having agencies build the houses directly<sup>9</sup>."

There are still enormous shelter needs in Haiti and agencies involved in the recovery phase need to examine all options in order to meet this need. ACT Alliance members should investigate the potential for using shelter grants and develop agreed procedures and guidelines among members if this is seen as a viable option. Improved housing has many direct and indirect benefits that should be explored e.g. local labour market, local building and related trade e.g. in household items, focus on work rather than handouts etc.

#### 7.2 The ACT Secretariat

The role of the ACT Secretariat is seen as central to the response and a number of key elements were identified as significant in this regard. ACTs primary role was to promote and co-ordinate the appeal mechanism. This was done successfully and ACT members acknowledge that the response to the appeal and the distribution of funds was in general effective and efficient.

The second key role was in facilitating the emergency response through the RST and a number of points were made regarding this component of the ACT response;

- The decision to send psychosocial support to assist member/partner staff in dealing with post-traumatic stress was appreciated it also doubles as training.
- Getting the first co-ordination team on the ground early in the response and the presence of a communications and security expert was important.
- The decision to set up a full time co-ordinating office and the composition of the co-ordination team was considered as critical.

The assessment of the Forum and ACT was characterised by a high level of analysis and a willingness among members to be open and self-critical. During interviews with staff at different levels in member organisations and in the ACT Secretariat a range of issues were identified and a considerable number of gaps and areas for improvement highlighted. In many cases these are

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Responding to earthquakes 2008; Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operations: ALNAP 2008

connected to the strengths identified in the previous section and were frequently referred to as "areas where we could have been done better" or "missed opportunities."

There were several issues relating to the appeal and the distribution of funds already highlighted - a rapid relief fund would facilitate early response. Some members were able to draw on their own resources but the knock on effect was felt by partners who engaged early and were hampered unnecessarily by lack of funds. Some members did not receive all the funds committed and had to curtail their programmes — while having had excellent immediate responses (the right things to do) - sometimes involving temporary staff who worked for months without pay.

The early response also appears to have been curtailed and slowed by an overemphasis on the structure of the appeal mechanism, bureaucracy and slow decision making on the part of some members. There are lessons to be learned here on balancing donor demands for procedures, systems, proposals and reports and the making most of the obvious social capital and irreplaceable good will that manifested itself spontaneously. Valuable time was lost through both these processes and there is room for improvement in the overall system of managing and distributing funds quickly and coming in behind good initiatives that have already started.

There is a view that more could be also be done on the pooling of funds to facilitate a more coordinated and strategic effort. There were a lot of positive comments regarding the sharing of resources and staff both by members involved and ACT members who were outside the appeal. This would require a considerable shift by ACT members and would necessitate a much greater degree of co-ordination. Ultimately it would represent a significant move towards more strategic action by churches together.

"The RST could have done more in terms of leadership, as Forum members we were busy with our own organisatios and the response."

(ACT Member Staff)

The RST was established in 2009 with the first training for the RST members was held in autumn of that year. The Haiti emergency was the first test of this new mechanism and the magnitude of the disaster inevitably created some challenges. A number of issues were highlighted on this front.

The RST personnel who arrived did not seem to be informed or fully aware of the role of the Haiti Forum or

the existing structures that were in place. There appears to have been an assumption that there was nothing in place and limited capacity among members and partners. As a result there is a sense of frustration that existing systems, knowledge and experience were ignored <sup>10</sup>.

One of the primary weaknesses of the RST response was the lack of a logistics expert or team. While the forum members with the assistance of SSID did a good job on logistics, many feel that the overall effort would have been more effective with stronger logistics input. There was also a lack of co-ordination among members regarding the deployment of specialists with an over emphasis on engineers and a shortage of psychosocial support workers. There was also need for more emphasis on leadership skills and experience and people with a global view rather than sectoral expertise. Those agencies that had stability of overall empowered senior leadership in the field managed these challenges better.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This appears to have been a common issue the humanitarian response as large numbers "experts" arrived with limited knowledge of language and context and inadequate induction.

There appears to have been a perception among some members at the time that "Geneva was taking over" and was putting pressure on members to increase visibility. This perception allied to issues around the RST did create a certain level of tension between the field and Geneva. However it is important to note that these issues were resolved and the relationship between the Haiti Forum and the Secretariat has been identified as one of the strong points of the later phase of response.

The ACT Haiti Appeal was well supported with over 70 different agencies contributing. A number of the major ACT Alliance members (ICCO and Kerk in Actie, Dan Church Aid, Finn Church Aid and Norwegian Church Aid) contributed substantial sums to the appeal. The Haiti emergency was high profile and there were challenges for these donors to manage expectations of the back donors, the general public, politicians and the media. There are often unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in emergencies and the negative coverage of the Haiti humanitarian response regarding delays and the lack of co-ordination caused problems for donors. There are inevitably some tensions between donors and the implementing agencies. The implementing agencies need to respond to the situation on the ground and require a high degree of flexibility and scope to allocate funds in a timely manner. On the other hand donors require that funds be allocated and accounted for in a systematic manner. This is an on-going challenge in emergency contexts but was exacerbated in the case of ACT Alliance where there were multiple donors and seven implementing agencies. ACT Alliance should learn from this experience and develop systems which can accommodate the different requirements of the donors and those implementing the response.

# SECTION IV: MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

# 8 Summary of Findings

#### 8.1 General findings

The ACT appeal was an effective and responsive mechanism for the provision of support to people affected by the Haiti earthquake and cholera epidemic. While there were some problems and delays in the early stages and a level of frustration on the ground the appeal mechanism did manage to raise and distribute a considerable sum of money in a timely manner. Traditional funding structures are often based on donor guidelines which can limit flexibility and responsiveness. The Appeal was independent of these constraints and was based on the real situation on the ground and ACT member proposals to respond to these needs. As a result the assistance was more people centred, flexible and responsive.

The duration of the appeal, its structure and the fact that it has been integrated into more long term recovery and development activities are also significant factors in its overall effectiveness. The victims of the earthquake want to rebuild their lives and for them there is no distinction between emergency, recovery and long term development. The ACT Appeal was for 18 months and was structured around two phases (crises and post crises). These two factors enabled ACT members and partners to sustain the effort and to engage in recovery and more long term activities such as livelihood support early. ACT members remain active on the ground as the second anniversary of the earthquake approaches.

Many of the substantial criticisms of the global international humanitarian earthquake response outlined in key reports (<u>DFID HERR</u>, <u>OCHA RTE's</u>, ECB II supported <u>SCF-CARE Joint Evaluation</u>, <u>Haiti Earthquake Response</u>: <u>Mapping and analysis of gaps and duplications in evaluations</u>"; <u>Haiti Earthquake Response Emerging Evaluation Lessons</u> etc) point to a lack of a People Centred Response - contextual understanding, connectedness and integration with Haitian capacity. These were largely alleviated from the outset by the connectedness to context of ACT with its pre-existing partnership approach and long-standing relationships on the ground a) experienced Haitian partner organisations b) pre-existing working relationships c) solid knowledge of the context in its entirety d) existing relationships of trust and acceptance with Haitian communities. It also benefitted from ACT member staff retention, recruitment and deployment of Haitian staff on international deployments who returned to work in Haiti immediately after the disaster.

ACT members and partners have made mistakes but demonstrated that once aware of errors they have acted quickly to review and amend interventions e.g. initial shelter designs, food and cash distribution approaches etc. Consistently across partners and members there has been a strong community engagement down to participation in house designs etc. This is good practice that should be applied globally as standard practice within the humanitarian sector and which remains a substantial challenge – getting participatory communication and relationships right with people impacted by catastrophe.

The impact findings showed that the biggest drivers of both positive and negative change in Haiti are national actors i.e. communities themselves, government, local and regional business and civil society actors. The random sample provides a powerful indication of deep social changes taking place in Haitian society since the earthquake - any disaster brings about major social change and this is clearly evident in Haitian society as stated by the people of Haiti themselves in the field work.

The 26th Annual ALNAP Meeting focussed on "The Role of National Governments in International Humanitarian Response." The Haiti earthquake response has been often quoted as an example where international humanitarian response risked a further weakening of already weak government structures. Against this background the attribution to who and what Haitians attributed positive, negative and neutral change to, provides ACT and other actors, with an assessment of the way all actors are perceived and the degree of humanitarian space international agencies occupy and highlights the need to considerably reduce the level of conventional INGO activity and influence and to balance this with a sustained and integrated building of Haitian government and civil society capacity and influence. Within this wider impact context ACT's emergency response appeal programme has had a clear, visible and positive impact since the earthquake which was highly appreciated by Haitian people.

The evaluation team judged that there is a high alignment between what communities feel are their priorities and what is working for them and what ACT Partners/Members are doing. This is encouraging as it indicates high degrees of agreement about what the key challenges are. In the external evaluation team's view the ACT response stands out as a model of an integrated and holistic response based

"We must keep in mind and protect the personality of the victims and their families. They are not things - they are people; they have dignity. We have to provide them with support and help to maintain their dignity".

ACT member staff

on clear principles of human dignity and respect for the Haitian people. Considering the major revision of the 2011 Sphere Handbook with new additional emphases on protection and psychosocial aspects of disaster response, the ACT/Haitian partner response in ways has been cutting edge in its spontaneous attention to these aspects of people's needs and rights.

There are however a number of areas where the evaluation has found that the ACT Alliance and its response was not as effective or strategic as it should have been and where there were clearly negative impacts on the ground. The priority was to get resources to partners immediately to enable them to sustain their efforts and delays in the distribution of funds in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake caused some serious problems on the ground. There was an overly bureaucratic approach in the early stages and again this restricted the response in a number of areas. The initial response from Geneva and HQ members was welcomed but there was a lack of co-ordination on this front and the influx of experts many without sufficient briefing caused considerable problems for Forum members and put a huge strain on existing systems at the beginning of the response.

The ACT response was strengthened by a number of factors which are to a certain extent coincidental, namely the presence and capacity of SSID in the Dominican Republic, the fact that ACT was able to deploy a member of staff from Geneva on a long-term basis to act as co-ordinator and the fact that most of the ACT members were operating from the LWF office in the immediate aftermath. ACT Alliance needs to have more strategic disaster management plans in place particularly in logistics, networking and coordination.

Assessing value for money is particularly difficult in an emergency situation and the unique context in Haiti makes this even more difficult. However it is possible to highlight a number of factors in the ACT Alliance response which have contributed to a more cost effective approach. Working with partners and using existing structures and resources and Haitian staff meant that ACT was able to be more efficient. SSIDs role was critical in this regard as it was able to get in supplies more efficiently by using its networks and systems. ACT members and partners made extensive use of volunteers, cash for work/community work and where appropriate "sweat equity" in its projects. Therefore the response was reasonably efficient and provided good value for money given the challenging context in which it was implemented.

Despite the effectiveness of the appeal and the achievements on the ground, providing an overall assessment still presents some challenges. Firstly the scale of the disaster and the legacy of decades of poverty and poor governance means that there are still enormous problems facing the people of Haiti. Any assessment of "success" needs to be viewed through the lens of the Haitian people and the many problems which still plague the country. Secondly, it is difficult to isolate the appeal as it was part of a wider and more long term response - and this is in fact one of its principal strengths (where the ACT approach may well set a standard for recovery and development interventions which would be a significant unintended positive outcome). Thirdly the appeal itself was not the key driver of the response. This came organically from the ground with both members and ACT partners in Haiti doing whatever they could to respond immediately. However the appeal was critical in operationalizing, structuring and sustaining these initial efforts.

The appeal enabled ACT Alliance members and a range of national partners to provide on-going support to the most vulnerable people in the population. The assistance reached approximately 500,000 people and the effort was sustained over a two year period. In the main this assistance was appropriate and provided in a dignified and timely manner. Significantly there is a solid foundation in place for a sustained recovery effort by ACT and its partners and a willingness to support both Haitian partners and the Haitian Government in the recovery process. Important lessons have been learned<sup>11</sup> over the last 18 months and the ACT Alliance appears to be willing to take on board these lessons and to provide long term assistance to vulnerable communities in Haiti. Despite the scale of the disaster and the huge constraints faced, the ACT Alliance has made an important and significant contribution to the Haiti response and in the opinion of the evaluation team it has on balance been a success.

#### 8.2 Findings relating to the OECD/DAC criteria

The evaluation applied the OECD/DAC criteria (relevance/appropriateness. connectedness, effectiveness, coherence, coverage and impact) as well as cross cutting themes of protection and participation of primary stakeholders. The ACT members who were on the ground before, during and after the earthquake had a comprehensive understanding of the local context and a high level of cultural sensitivity. In addition there is a culture of respect towards partners and a tradition of drawing on the skills, capacity and knowledge of these partners. The fact that many of the ACT

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> A parallel publication "Building on Experience – learning from the ACT Alliance Haiti appeal" has been produced by ACT Alliance

members had been active in development programmes in Haiti combined with these strong links with local partners ensured a high degree of **connectedness** in the ACT response. It is to the credit of ACT members that they did not forget this in the aftermath of the crises and that they worked with and supported partners throughout the response. In an assessment of the level of connectedness of the response 50% of ACT member staff felt that it was satisfactory with 25% of the view that it was highly satisfactory. Several ACT members moved quickly into recovery initiatives and ACT is in the process of developing its recovery programme – these factors have contributed to a good level of **connectedness by** linking the emergency response into long term development.

The knowledge, understanding and cultural sensitivity of both ACT members and partners was also central to the relevance of the response. Given the scale of the disaster and the lack of preparedness at all levels it was inevitable that there were some inappropriate elements in the overall ACT response. However the responsiveness of the members and partners to the local context enabled them to refine the assistance provided and to develop more appropriate responses. The response was effective and achieved its primary objective despite the enormous challenges it faced, a lack of preparedness for a disaster on this scale and a lack of capacity in key areas. Overall it has assisted up to 500,000 people and has provided this assistance in a timely and appropriate manner. However the overall effectiveness of the response was hampered by delays in allocating funds and in streamlining the RST response. The response utilised existing resources and capacity among ACT members and partners in Haiti and drew on the extensive resources of ACT members around the globe to target the resources at the most vulnerable groups in the population. The level of connectedness allied to strong partners who have a good understanding of the context has ensured that the bulk of the response has been directed towards these vulnerable groups in both rural and urban settings. The strong emphasis on assisting the most vulnerable was highly appropriate, particularly the provision of psychosocial support. There are however a couple of areas where the evaluators feel the response was not appropriate, namely the provision of livelihood support for businesses which are not viable or sustainable such as petty trading and the continued construction of transitional shelters nearly two years after the earthquake.

The most significant weakness of the ACT response is that of **coverage** and this factor is recognised by ACT member staff – (50% felt that coverage was weak). There is evidence of beneficiary participation across the response although there is an acknowledgement that this was not very strong in the initial emergency phase. ACT has been good on promoting HAP standards but there is a clear view among ACT member staff that more could be done in promoting **accountability** – with 50% of the view that the participation of primary beneficiaries was only moderately satisfactory. Despite this the emphasis on accountability has the potential to have a more long term impact as it has influenced how ACT partners work and has the potential to influence the wider humanitarian response.

The emphasis on partnership and on building Haitian capacity marks out the ACT response as one which may have some more long term **impacts.** ACT members have worked in different ways to build capacity in disaster preparedness, livelihoods, cholera prevention and sustainable development. The fact that ACT members are committed to long term work in Haiti provides scope to build on and reinforce the capacity that has been developed during the response. However there were missed opportunities to support capacity building with Haitian government institutions and more needs to be done in this regard.

Other areas where more could have been done to sustain the impact is through building capacity in the Haiti Forum and expanding the work with partners. While partnership is a core strength it needs to be developed and ACT Alliance and the Haiti Forum need to be even more inclusive of Haitian partners and to do more to promote and facilitate real ownership by partners. The relationship needs to move beyond a donor-partner one to a more equal one based on best practice in partnership work.

# 8.3 Findings relating to the implementation of the Haiti appeal

The aftermath of the earthquake was a challenging time for both members and partners and the support of the Haiti Forum was critical in the shift to emergency recovery and the scaling up of the response. The evaluation found that the Forum played a vital role in the response and was a focal point for most activities. It provided moral support and solidarity, information sharing, coordination and collaboration and the co-ordination office played a central role in the operation of the Forum. The evaluation identified a number of issues relating to the role of the Forum in the early days of the response and these highlight the importance of having a strong country Forum and the importance of on-going preparation and capacity building.

ACT members played a constructive and supportive role in external co-ordination despite serious limitations and problems in the overall co-ordination of the response. While ACT did co-ordinate well with Haitian government agencies there was scope to do more in the area of capacity building of government structures at all levels and this should be a priority in future programme activities. One of the most significant elements of the ACT response was the logistical support provided by SSID which was critical to the work of members and partners. This points to the need for greater regional coordination to prepare for future emergencies.

The ACT Secretariat responded well and co-ordinated a major appeal effort - the largest ever administered by ACT. The secretariat also responded effectively by deploying the RST and establishing a full time co-ordination office in Haiti. There are some important lessons for the Secretariat regarding the operation of future appeals. Delays in distributing funds caused serious problems and frustration for partners attempting to respond on the ground. There were also issues with the RST and the deployment of experts and a lack of co-ordination among members in the early phase. There is need to review how ACT operates and for ACT to develop a more coherent vision regarding its role in future emergencies — over and above that of raising and distributing funds for members focusing in particular on how ACT can bring added value to future responses within a proactive DRR focus. The evaluation identified missed opportunities where greater co-ordination of effort across the members and partners and between these and the Haitian government could have brought added value and an even more effective and sustained response.

The Haiti Forum played a central role in the response and was critical to its overall effectiveness. The Forum was the lynch pin which connected the ACT Alliance appeal with Haitian members and partners who were well placed to distribute assistance to vulnerable communities. The Forum has been effective in terms of information sharing but there is a need for increased opportunities for learning and for an exploration of how learning can be integrated into future programming. These learning opportunities should involve members, partners and local government officials.

Forum members are extremely busy and work in difficult circumstances where there is limited time for reflection. However being busy can limit effectiveness and there is need for members to regularly take time and to invest resources in reflection and review processes. There are concerns that important issue have been missed or not acted on in the past - for example the Advocacy strategy appears to have been neglected and the mid-term review carried out by ACT Alliance appears to have been largely ignored.

There are differences among Haiti Forum members and to a certain extent a lack of clarity around terms and their meaning — for example partnership, co-ordination, vulnerability. Similarly members and partners use different terminology for broadly similar terms — disaster risk reduction, preparedness etc. There would be value in members bringing clarity to these in order to enhance and strengthen effectiveness. Aligning this with Haitian Government terminology and connecting ACT activities into government strategies would go a long way towards building greater connectedness with the government at different levels.

DRR has been identified as a core theme which needs to be integrated into programmes across all sectors. Building recovery and development programmes around this agenda would create a natural link and continuity between the emergency phase and more long term strategies. It would provide a central platform and bring coherence to the work of members and partners in the next phase.

The Haiti Forum faces a choice at this stage of its development. Despite the challenges it has faced over the last two years it has emerged as a stronger and more cohesive structure. However the Forum is more than an emergency response structure and plays a central role in the recovery and development phase. Forum members need to maintain this momentum and to define the role of the Forum, what co-ordination and co-operation means for Forum members and how the Forum can be strengthened. Linked to this is the decision around the establishment of a long term co-ordination office and the future role of this office.

There are gaps with regard to monitoring of the assistance programme and a need to move towards a joint monitoring system. This would require work to establish agreed criteria but would strengthen accountability and enhance moves towards joint implementation. The Forum needs to address these and other issues which have emerged over the course of this evaluation, including developing overarching approaches and protocols for working with partners, strategic cooperation and alliances with the Haitian government and reviewing and updating the contingency plan. The Haiti Forum has established its credibility and with increased co-ordination and a more active advocacy role can be a force for change at different levels. This evaluation has already highlighted the need to work with the Haitian Government but equally important will be advocating for change in how the government implements its recovery and development strategies. The Forum can play an important role in advocating for reform of humanitarian systems and for enhanced participation by Haitians in these structures.

### 9 Recommendations

#### 9.1 ACT PROGRAMMING IN HAITI

# Recommendation 1 Integrate the core elements of the response into the recovery and development phase

ACT Alliance should continue to provide assistance in key areas - shelter, education, livelihoods and psychosocial support with a continued focus on the most vulnerable - both in the recovery phase and by integrating these areas into long term development strategies.

### Recommendation 2 Psychosocial Support

People are still suffering severe trauma and the overall recovery of Haiti and its people requires a sustained effort to address the trauma suffered during the earthquake. ACT Alliance should develop its own co-ordinated responses as well as advocating for increased focus and resources for this work both from the government of Haiti and the humanitarian community. ACT Alliance should learn from the experiences of its members and partners to date and provide training and capacity building to facilitate on-going and low cost psychosocial support to communities.

# **Recommendation 3** Rural Support

There is a lack of clarity about the situation in rural areas and the impact of IDPs in these areas and not sufficient hard information on the scale of population return to PAP. It is therefore critical to listen to people in the rural areas before making programme decisions to reallocate resources from rural programmes. ACT Alliance advocate for further research on this issue and should work with other humanitarian agencies and the Government of Haiti to map out the nature and extent of the problem in areas where ACT members and partners are active.

#### Recommendation 4 Support both Rural and Urban Livelihoods

ACT members and partners should put increased emphasis on sustainable livelihood strategies for both rural and urban communities and should invest in a comprehensive programme of capacity building in this area.

#### Recommendation 5 Support access to and quality of rural health services

The cholera epidemic presents an on-going threat to the Haitian population and any further disaster where there is displacement of people will create the conditions for an even more serious epidemic. ACT should redouble its Cholera awareness, prevention and control efforts around existing programmes, work closely with the Haitian Government and make better use of the communication and social behavioural influence of local leaders including religious leaders.

# Recommendation 6 Continued engagement with the shelter sector

The provision of shelter will present enormous on-going challenges to all stakeholders for the foreseeable future. ACT members should develop a more cohesive shelter strategy and use their expertise and experience to shape wider policy decisions around shelter. ACT members should consider using shelter grants and/or advocate for the use of this approach in order to develop a more effective response to the huge needs in this sector.

#### **Recommendation 7 Working with Government**

There are widespread concerns about the impact of the humanitarian response on the capacity of the Haitian Government at all levels. ACT Alliance is well placed to address some of these issues and greater inclusion and building the capacity of government structures should be a central component of the next phase of the response. ACT Alliance should develop a strategy to strengthen co-ordination with government agencies and allocate resources to support a comprehensive programme of capacity building at different levels - especially with the local authorities. This should be based on a solid understanding of relevant government plans, using a local mediator or local partners and the involvement of local government officials in training and networking events. Where feasible this should include joint needs assessment and planning, cofinancing of projects with local government and joint monitoring and evaluation

#### **Recommendation 8** Advocacy

ACT members have established a profile and credibility, among the Haitian population, with the Haitian Government and with the humanitarian sector. ACT should use this to build on its Advocacy strategy to strengthen the next phase of the humanitarian response. In particular ACT should advocate for increased and genuine Haitian participation at all levels, for increased accountability and enhanced communications and dialogue with affected populations and for sustained support for the Haitian Government

# Recommendation 9 Church Leadership Development

Religious leaders and institutions have a high level of influential power in Haiti. ACT should use its unique position within the religious arena and build on this social capital in order to more actively engage church leaders and their congregations in the recovery phase while also strengthening accountability and the participation of communities. There is also scope to use these structures to communicate key messages and behaviours particularly around cholera and preparedness.

### Recommendation 10 Integration disaster risk reduction into recovery and development

ACT members should develop a shared definition of and common approaches to DRR and integrate these into all future recovery and development strategies. This should be done in close consultation with relevant Government agencies and where feasible joint action developed with the Government

#### 9.2 ACT ALLIANCE STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

#### **Recommendation 1** Working with national partners

The singular success of ACT's Haiti response has been the relationships and connectedness to communities of its Haitian partners. ACT Alliance should develop a more coordinated and strategic partner centred approach with common protocols. Increased emphasis should be placed on networking, learning and capacity building and joint programmes between partners. This should include local authorities as integral parts of a sustainable platform.

### Recommendation 2 Defining a vision for ACT Alliance in emergency responses

There is need for ACT to develop a more coherent vision regarding its role in future emergencies – over and above that of raising and distributing funds for members. ACT Alliance should review the role of ACT members in large scale emergencies and develop a vision for future co-operation which maximises the resources of the members, facilitates co-ordination and brings added value to future responses. This should include systems to facilitate the pooling of funds, greater

flexibility regarding the distribution of funds and the establishment of a substantial rapid response fund. ACT may find research on federal organisational models useful in order to define what the parameters are and where they can work with maximum autonomy while connected to the whole.

#### Recommendation 3 The role of the Forum in the recovery and development phase

Haiti Forum members should build on the success of the emergency response and develop a strategy for the future including defining the role of the forum in the recovery and development phase, how the skills and resources of members can be maximized and how the Forum can be strengthened including increased Haitian participation in the Forum. Linked to this is the decision around the establishment of a long term co-ordination office and the future role of this office. ACT Alliance should examine how joint monitoring systems could be developed in conjunction with the Haiti forum and partners

#### Recommendation 4 Regional dimensions of humanitarian response

One of the learning's from the Haiti response has been the importance of the Dominican Republic in the response to a disaster of this magnitude. ACT should take into account the regional dimensions of many humanitarian emergencies and look for opportunities to develop regional strategies and responses which build on the experience of the Haiti response. Considerations could include establishment of a regional mechanism in the Caribbean which would be the focal point for future emergency responses in the region. This should build on existing experience and expertise in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, enhanced co-ordination between ACT Alliance Members in Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the establishment of a regional RST.

#### Recommendation 5 Inter-cultural communication and understanding

ACT is made up of members who have a global trans-cultural and trans-national vision of humanity that transcends inter-agency differences while recognising uniqueness and varied roles. Appreciation of cultural diversity and different ways of working needs to be further engrained in the membership. On-going capacity building work in cross cultural communication and cross cultural leadership with members and partners should be invested in and there should be minimum coverage of the basics in cross cultural communication and social/cultural bias for any rapidly deployed short term personnel.

### Recommendation 6 Coordination

ACT Alliance should strengthen the capacity of the Haiti Forum to ensure that these local structures have the skills, resources and systems in place to respond effectively to large scale humanitarian disasters. A full time co-ordination office should be maintained for the foreseeable future with increased emphasis on joint implementation strategies, more co-ordinated and harmonised support to local partners, better sharing of sectoral expertise across members as well as increased co-ordination with and capacity building of Haitian government structures.

# Recommendations 7 Conflict sensitivity

Haiti has been negatively affected by conflict and aid can easily exacerbate these conflicts. ACT Alliance should ensure that all assistance is not just based on the principles of "do no harm" but that it proactively works to address divisions and conflict at different levels.

### **Recommendation 8 Reflection and Learning**

The evaluation has identified a range of learning across the response and a range of issues which the Forum members and its partners need to address. The Haiti Forum should take time together with partners to reflect on this learning and to develop new approaches and ways of working. The Forum should build-in regular opportunities for review and reflection and widen the circle of engagement in these events by drawing in other key stakeholders (Haitian Government, churches, communities and the humanitarian sector).

#### **Annexes**

#### **Annex 1: Terms of reference**

#### **Final Evaluation**

ACT Haiti Appeal HTI-101 (Jan 2010 – Dec 2011)

#### 1. BACKGROUND

The strongest earthquake in Haiti in more than 200 years, of magnitude 7.0 struck Haiti on January 12 at 16h53, with the epicentre located 15 km south-west of the capital Port-au-Prince. The nearby cities of Carrefour and Jacmel, as well as other areas to the west and south of Port-au-Prince, were also affected. It left 222,570 people killed and the number of injured estimated at 200,000 people. More than 1.2 million people sought refuge in temporary settlements and 467,701 people have left Port-au-Prince for other departments. More than a million people were left without appropriate shelter and remain in camps 8 months later.

Since the earthquake hit parts of Haiti on January 12, ACT has assisted more than 500,000 people. People have been provided with water, sanitation, shelter, regular food supplies/meals, and relief items such as cash, family kits or hygiene sets. Medical assistance and supplies to health clinics have also been part of the intervention.

Location for the ACT members' response include the wider Port au Prince area, Leogane, Gressier, Carrefour, Petit and Grand Goave, Lascahobas and the border area, Jacmel and Bainet, Petit and Grand Goave and Les Cayes.

With almost one third of the Haitian population directly or indirectly affected, the Haiti earthquake represented a significant disaster that required a large-scale multi-sectoral international response. As such, it was a test-case for a large scale humanitarian response from ACT members.

#### 2. ACT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

#### 2.1 Implementing ACT Members

A preliminary appeal was issued on 23 January 2010 and the full appeal was issued on 19 February 2010 with projects from Christian Aid (CA), Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC), Church World Service (CWS), Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) etc. FinnChurchAid was included in the revised appeal issued on 30 September 2010. Journalists, communicators and photographers were also part of the RST (Rapid Response Team) and did an excellent work in giving visibility to the ACT Response. Following the departure of the RST end February 2010, a Coordinator (from 23 March 2010), Communicator/Advocacy Advisor (from 1st April), and Security Advisor (From 1st February 2010) were seconded to the Forum to support joint efforts of ACT members (while the Communicator/Advocacy Advisor position terminated on 31 December 2010, the positions of Coordinator and Security Advisor have been extended toward the end of 2011.

The members work through national partners such as Service Chrétien d'Haiti, KORAL, GRAMIR, VETERIMED, Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), KROS, Viva Rio, MISSEH and MOFECS. In total, about 40 local organisations are involved with the work of ACT. Size and capacity range from nationally known organisations to local cooperatives and community based organisations.

Other key ACT members such as Church of Sweden (CoS), Lutheran World Relief (LWR) Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) & Kerk in Actie and International Orthodox Church Charities (IOCC), DanChurchAid are contributing with staff and resources to support the work of ACT members in Haiti for this emergency. The Dominican Churches' Social Services (SSID supports the response with logistics in Dominican Republic (DR) and Haiti.

The Haiti appeal was revised and issued on 30 September 2010 as further assessments had been done resulting in revised figures for the various activities and some slight changes in collaborative arrangements were made between some ACT members. With the current appeal ending in July 2011, an external evaluation is planned; however, the timing for this evaluation is subject to the consideration of the implementing agencies for a further extension of the appeal in the effort to address recovery conditions and resumption of normalcy in Haiti.

#### 2.2 Objectives and summary of ACT emergency response

The ACT Haiti appeal aims to enhance the living conditions of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake (through access to basic necessities of life and fulfilment of basic rights in rural and urban areas).

# Objectives

The ACT response addresses both crises and post-crises conditions through the following objectives;

#### Crisis Phase

- Ensure access to shelter, food, water, and basic non-food-items needed for daily living, safety and security.
- Ensure access to basic shelter materials necessary for building transitional houses capable of withstanding the coming rainy season

#### Post Crisis Phase

- Ensure access to housing in which households have a core home which is built at or above SPHERE standards with a specific focus on resilience to natural disasters.
- Improve access to safe and reliable water and hygiene.
- Provide psychosocial support through staff care program & youth groups in the communities
- Increase resilience of communities to likely natural hazards
- Ensure access to education for children
- Create sustainable livelihood and income opportunities

#### Programme summary by implementing member

**Christian Aid** is working with local partner GARR in Port au Prince to provide families with cash/food for work and shelter, and in the border areas with, in addition to the previous, water and sanitation, livelihood and psychosocial support. With KORAL, CAID supports individuals with livelihoods, including livestock, in the region of Les Cayes.

**CRWRC** is working in the region of Leogane / Petite Riviere to provide communities with Non-Food Items (NFIs), transitional shelter, trauma counselling, and WASH. Additionally, construction of semi-permanent core houses is planned for the most vulnerable families.

**CWS** with Service Chrétien d'Haiti supports people with disabilities affected by the earthquake in Port-au-Prince. In addition, together with its partner SSID, CWS provides logistical support to the appeal in Dominican Republic and in Port-au-Prince.

**DKH** has been treating injured people and working on prevention of diseases, distribution of shelter materials including tents and non-food items, public toilet blocks and public shower blocks and the rehabilitation of houses and schools in Jacmel and Bainet.

**FCA** is targeting the reconstruction of five schools, three in Leogane and two in Grand Goave, covering a total number of 6,000 children and 200 teachers. The earthquake and hurricane resistant planned buildings will also provide safe shelter for the surrounding communities. A water and sanitation component is included to provide children and teachers with safe drinking water, as well as a school kitchen functioning on biogas.

**LWF** Haiti is working in the urban Petion-ville area of Port-au-Prince and has provided short term relief supplies such as NFIs (jerry cans, plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, kitchen kits, and blankets), food distribution, latrine and WASH facilities and water supplies. In the rural communes of Gressier, Leogane, Grand Goave and Petit Goave LWF is providing immediate and longer term recovery support as above and in addition transitional shelter support and provided with FCA and Episcopal Church, emergency schools. It will further also provide more permanent core shelter. Psychosocial support and Agricultural Recovery activities are also in place. LWF has also provided host families in Thiotte and Macaya with immediate relief support including cash for work, seeds and tools.

**NCA**, together with its partners MOFECS, Viva Rio, MISSEH, Fondation Le Berger and GARR is assisting women, men and children in Port au Prince and the surrounding communes affected by the earthquake, ensuring that they have safe and equitable access to sustainable water and sanitation facilities. NCA is also delivering information on public health risks (Hygiene Promotion), and community based psychosocial support. NCA has been coordinating with Christian Aid to ensure that there is no duplication of assistance as GARR is also their partner.

A great number of members support the appeal either directly with funds and staff secondments and/or they assist the affected population through activities outside this appeal. Further information on these actions is displayed in the background chapter.

#### 3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

#### 3.1 Objectives

#### a. Objective of the evaluation

The evaluation is intended to promote learning and establish our commitment to accountability. The evaluation aims to assess the achievements, quality and overall impact of ACT humanitarian response to the Haiti emergency based on the following specific evaluation objectives:

- i) Assess the achievement of results of the Haiti ACT appeal in contributing to improving the recovery of the most vulnerable groups impacted by the earthquake and cholera
- ii) Establish the performance of the Haiti ACT appeal in the context of management, coordination, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, visibility, communication and dissemination of information and partnership with local actors.
- iii) Determine if and how the ACT response supported the local structures (state, local NGOs, churches) to better prepared to respond to any disaster.

# b. Objective of documenting lessons and good practice

To identify lessons learnt and best practices which may benefit communities in their recovery and sustaining the impact of ACT appeal as well as enabling ACT members to improve future emergency response strategies.

It is expected that documentation and sharing of lessons learnt will provide a chance for communities in Haiti to retain lessons on humanitarian good practices. This would further build local capacity and contribute to sustainability and supporting conditions for recovery. The lessons learnt will also inform improvement in humanitarian action within ACT.

# 3.2 Guiding questions for the evaluation and documentation of lessons learnt and good practices

a. The evaluation will be guided by a number of questions set below:

#### **Achievements**

- To what degree were expected results achieved against set objectives and extent of quality?
- How did implementation strategies, process and results meet or fail to meet high/satisfactory quality standards?
- What promoted or undermined the achievement of results?
- What impact has the implementation of Haiti ACT Appeal created in the lives of affected population (both female and male) and local institutions?
- Were there any unintended benefits and/or harms resulting from the Haiti ACT response?

#### Program design

- Did the design and implementation of the programme target the people who were most in need of support? Were procedures used for needs identification and targeting appropriate and transparent?
- Were the interventions relevant to the local context? Were the intervention choices the most appropriate in meeting the desired results, given the context?

# • Implementation approaches

- Did the affected population (both female and male) have adequate space for informed and adequate participation during the design and implementation stages?
- How did the programme adapt to the changing humanitarian conditions from earthquake to cholera? Were the strategies employed to respond to each and cross-emergency scenarios appropriate?
- Was the response timely and employed the most efficient approach in achieving results?
- How effective and efficient was the role of RST in ensuring a well-developed and quick response to Haiti emergency?
- Was there a planned, appropriate and timely transition from crises phase to post-crises phase?
   What mechanisms have been planned and incorporated in the implementation to ensure further linking of relief to rehabilitation and to development?

# ACT policies, coordination and humanitarian principles

- How did ACT Haiti programme optimize the value of ACT's joint appeal system to create greater impact? Were appropriate synergies, institutional platforms and existing national strategy appropriately used to leverage ACT response?
- Was coordination enhanced, supported and managed in a way that contributed to the effective and timely delivery of emergency support to affected population?
- Were the needs and priorities of the affected population (both female and male), ACT donors and the policy standards of ACT met?
- What measures did the ACT Forum or ACT organizations put in place to ensure the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse?
- How effective was the ACT Secretariat and ACT Forum in facilitating and coordinating the response efforts?
- How cost-effective was the Haiti ACT humanitarian response? How have the funds been used in the most efficient way? Were the funds available sufficient for the response plan or was there any danger of overfunding, for example, the national partners?
- Did the programme comply with the principles of the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief (e.g. in terms of impartiality, non-discrimination, independence, participation) and the Sphere minimum standards? Were accountability 1 issues (including HAP standards) given due consideration?

# • Capacities for implementation

- Did implementing ACT members and partners have adequate technical expertise to match the complex humanitarian conditions of Haiti? How did capacity affect or influenced implementation and impact? Were the issues of staff capacities identified and addressed appropriately?
- Has the recruitment and staffing (e.g. deployment speed and staff turn-over/retention) constrained or enhanced the response efforts and affected impacted the overall programmes?
- What impact did the Haiti response have on local capacities local NGOs, churches and the state?
  - b. The documentation of lessons and good practice shall be guided by the following aspects:
- The evaluator will identify and document key lessons and good practices with elaborate and concise explanations in a separate document of "lessons and good practice" of the Haiti intervention. The identification of "lessons and good practice" shall explore on key learning

points throughout project cycle management – from design to evaluation, in relation, but not limited to, the following key areas:

#### • Wider humanitarian environment

- Unique implications of large-scale humanitarian disaster/response on ACT's approach
- Strategies for linkages: crises to post-crises, recovery, rehabilitation and development
- Leveraging ACT response within the unique political and the wider humanitarian space in Haiti
- Complex emergency condition from earthquake to cholera: strategic review, ACT response flexibility and implications for capacity and resources

#### • ACT policies and humanitarian practices

- Opportunities and challenges for strengthening commitment and compliance to key humanitarian principles and code of conduct
- ACT visibility in a multi-actor ACT response: strengths, weaknesses and opportunities

#### • Replication and adaptation

- Ability to learn and replicate past lessons in emergency response
- Significance of adaptation to changing humanitarian conditions
- Funding flow in relation to escalating humanitarian situations
- Project design and planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation and implications for results
- Inter-sectoral linkages and synergies
- Managing partnership in challenging context of low capacities of local partners and competing humanitarian needs of international agencies
- Impact of ecumenical approach in a large-scale multi-actor emergency response
- Documenting good practice and lessons will be simultaneously managed along with the evaluation process

#### • 3.3 Methodology

#### a. Evaluation:

• The evaluation will use the following OECD/DAC evaluation criteria to establish the overall performance and results of ACT response to Haiti humanitarian emergency:

# Relevance, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability

• The evaluation will assess the individual implementation of ACT members and their partners as well as their collective results of Haiti ACT appeal. The evaluation will be conducted in a participatory manner through a combination of methods including a review of key project documentation and relevant Haiti Country Strategy guidelines, interviews with different stakeholders/counterparts, beneficiary consultation and site visits to ACT members' projects sites as sampled by both the evaluator and the implementing members. Sampling of locations and interviewees shall be based on a clear listing of the various categories, scales and characteristics identified jointly by the consultant and implementing agencies.

- Based on the understanding of this ToR, the evaluation team shall propose in the inception report the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies that best suit the program and local conditions.
- The team shall triangulate and validate information, assess and describe data quality in a transparent manner. Data gaps and shortfall in evaluation design shall also be highlighted in the evaluation report. ACT guidelines for evaluation report shall be used for reporting. In order to benefit from the many lessons learned and positive experiences of the ACT Haiti earthquake emergency response, the evaluator will have the task to specifically identify lessons and good practice for documentation and facilitate a lessons learnt workshop.
- Overall, the evaluation will employ the UNOCHA cluster-based objectives in the assessment
  of results and ALNAP Quality Proforma to ensure coherence with assessment and reporting
  of humanitarian practice (copies are available at ACT Secretariat).
  - b. Lessons and good practice
- The process for documenting and sharing lessons and good practice will involve both the
  evaluator and the staff, with the later playing a crucial role in fleshing out and illuminating key
  learning points together with the community. This shall be guided by a process plan and simple
  tools for capturing lessons.
- Lessons and good practice information shall be presented in the most appropriate manner aimed at utilization. Particularly, excerpts, pictures and verbatim shall be used to reflect lessons more clearly. The consultant shall package this information to allow for both analytical discussion in the wider stakeholders' learning workshop and practical/operational discussion in the follow-on learning workshop for partners and communities.
- Two workshops will be held with different audiences and focus. The first workshop will focus its learning on strategic humanitarian issues, funding as well as broader quality and accountability issues and attended mainly by funding and implementing agencies, ACT Secretariat, UN agencies and other organizations both in and outside Haiti. The second meeting, on the other hand, will be attended by partners, communities and implementing members and the learning will be focused on more practical and operational issues. The consultant will combine the feedback from the two workshops into a lessons and good practice document as well as for finalizing evaluation report.
- Stakeholders for evaluation debriefing and learning workshop

Main workshop ( 2 days)	• Follow-on workshop (1 day)
•	•
- ACT implementing	- ACT implementing
members	members
- Few implementing	<ul> <li>Implementing partners</li> </ul>
partners	<ul> <li>- Community leaders</li> </ul>
<ul> <li>- ACT funding members for</li> </ul>	- Beneficiary
Haiti appeal	representatives

•	- Government	
	representatives	
•	- UN and INGO	
	representatives	

# 3.4 Main steps for the assignment

- Briefing with evaluation team both at ACT Secretariat and in Haiti
- Literature review: Given the floods of evaluations and related studies conducted by various agencies in Haiti, the consultant and the Forum shall ensure only a few pertinent selection of existing reports for literature review
- Development and pre-testing of evaluation and documentation tools
- Field work
- Analysis
  - Drafting evaluation report and "lessons and good practice" document
  - Facilitating the main evaluation debriefing (1st day) and learning workshop (2nd day) total 3 days
  - Facilitating a follow-on evaluation debriefing and learning workshop (1 day) with partners and communities
  - Incorporating comments on draft report and draft document on "lessons and good practice"
  - Finalizing evaluation report and document on "lessons and good practice"

# 3.5 Evaluation and learning exercise outputs

Both the evaluation report and "lessons and good practice" document shall be simultaneous outcomes of this assignment. The consultant will present/facilitate the discussion of these 2 main documents in a debriefing meeting and learning workshop respectively. Specifically, the evaluation and learning process shall deliver the following results:

- i) Inception report
- ii) Evaluation report
- iii) Lessons and Good practice document
- iv) Learning Workshop with external stakeholders (facilitating)
- v) Learning workshop with implementers and communities (facilitating)

#### Annex 2: The People First Impact Method (P-FiM)?

P-FIM is a simple low cost methodology that fully allows communities to speak for themselves, in identifying impact changes in their lives and what the drivers of impact difference are attributable to. In this way the starting point is people and communities and not organisations and projects. It is a powerful tool that highlights issues humanitarian and development agencies may often be poorly aware of. P-FiM as a mainstream approach and tool directly complements aspects of Sphere, the Good Enough Guide, Participatory Impact Assessment (Tufts) and HAP etc. P-FiM enables humanitarian actors to accurately 'take the temperature' in order to properly align interventions with local priority issues, ensure they are engaging properly and where they can have the greatest possible impact. P-FiM simply recognises the primary driving force of people and communities at all stages of an intervention as essential. It adds value to existing collaborative and inter-agency initiatives. The method has been used in multiple inter-agency exercises (four days per exercise) e.g. in 2010/11 in South Sudan, Haiti, Sudan (West Darfur) with excellent results and high spontaneous buy-in by participants and agencies.

#### **Potential P-FIM Benefits to Agencies:**

- (i) Impact measured *in the context* where a programme or programmes are delivered
- (ii) The action doubles **as P-FiM Training** for participating local agencies and agency personnel
- (iii) A series of P-FIM actions will provide a basis for advocacy/mainstreaming of *people first* approaches.

P-FIM takes a representative geographical area (e.g. 1-5 year programme) of people and communities who are getting on with their lives. Local people are trained on P-FiM who have basic development skills, understand language and culture and are trusted locally. The method (i) enables a qualitative process where primary changes are openly discussed with representative groups making up a community - whether positive, negative or indifferent - and recorded (ii) the method then works backwards to determine in a quantitative way where change is attributable to e.g. leadership in the community, government actions, local business, NGO, UN etc. The method makes no assumptions about impact and what drives it - with often surprising impact results revealed. It is community owned and driven. P-FiM fundamentally asks "So what?" questions . . . "So what difference has that made to people's lives?" and "who is really responsible for the change or impact?"

There are two biases that often colour project and organisational impact evaluation approaches:

- What impact are we actually having? Typically organisations and their programmes are the focus of impact/ evaluation measurement to meet standard quality, accountability and donor requirements.
- How can we know the actual impact of a project/programme if we only consider projects and organisations?
   What about the depth and breadth of what is around the project or organisation in terms of change impacts? P-FIM measures impact in the context of the project and as such, the impact of the project can be tested.

While participatory approaches and accountability at community level are given increased importance, the standard organisation/project focus is still emphasised by donors and agencies. A typical end of project impact evaluation involves external (sometimes local) evaluators who carry out desk and field exercises to determine the positive or negative qualitative and (mostly) quantitative impact achieved by a project (which in itself is important). However, by over focusing on the organisation and project and the role of external consultants - the full honest views of local people and communities on what is working or not working (or whether correct or needed in the first place) and what other factors (often not actions of the project) have caused impact - are typically unheard or not considered.

Why People First Impact Method (P-FIM)? Our fundamental question is "Are we doing things right and are we doing the right things?" To put this into a programme/project context, the assumption column of a logframe requires that donors and agencies fully consider the wider context to ensure that proposed programmes are relevant. In this way it can be said that 'impact lives in the assumptions' - weak assumptions lead to inappropriate responses. P-FIM references 'project cycle approaches' and effectively links with other evaluative / impact tools in humanitarian and development contexts. It is a simple methodology that can bridge an essential gap within existing approaches.

The knowledge base and pedigree underpinning P-FiM draws on key concepts from Existentialist and Personalist Philosophy, Psychosocial Methods and beyond. It is an integrated and holistic view of human nature freedom and potential - people's needs and rights. Key concepts are: people come first; local relationships of trust are fundamental; people have a right to life with dignity; a non agency centric and non project approach facilitates objectivity and honesty; an integrated holistic appreciation of human development is vital; quality and depth of respectful communication with people is essential.

### Annex 3: List of researchers on Participatory research exercises

# **Urban Exercise Field Exercise Participants**

	Nom et Prénom	Organisation	Zone de provenance
1.	Atus Théodore	ADPPG/FLM	Petit-Goave
2.	Muscadin J. Nahum	SCH	Port-au-Prince
3.	Toussaint Olgens	SCH	Cx-des-Bouquets
4.	Michel Sheila	SCH	Port-au-Prince
5.	Lemy Jean Donald	SCH	Port-au-Prince
6.	Petit Yvon	SCH	Pétion-Ville
7.	Micheline D. St-Vil	FLM	Port-au-Prince
8.	Lucien Lepsom	OJPM	Léogane/Masson
9.	Hector Rosiana	OJPN	Léogane/Masson
10.	Decayette nahomie	OJPM	Léogane/Masson
11.	Jean Jean Pierre Paul	Recad/Pril/CRWC	Léogane/Macombe
12.	Plancher Rolnick	FLM	Port-au-Prince
13.	Joseph Lemès	Actalliance FCA	Léogane/l'Acul
14.	Lundi Mrie Esther	Recad-Pril	Léogane/Macombe
15.	Desrivières Georgy	FCA	Pétion-Ville
16.	Cleeford Dalce	CRWRC	Léogane
17.	Kestia Michel dalce	FEL	Léogane
18.	Janvier Rosemond	OHDIF-LH	Léogane
19.	Console Jn Eriel	OHDIF-LH	Léogane
20.	Valcin Jonel	Recad-Pril	Léogane/Macombe
21.	Charles Jean Claudy	Recad-Pril	Léogane/Macombe
22.	Pierre Fabiola	CRWRC	Léogane/Flon
23.	Consolé Hodson	CRWRC	Léogane/Macombe
24.	Etienne Lamarre	AJDEL	Léogane/Macombe
25.	Bien-Aise Jn Claude	VIVA RIO	Grand-Rue
26.	Beauvais Marjorie	VIVA RIO	Grand-Rue
27.	Morisset Guenson	VIVA-RIO	Boul Jn J Dessalines
28.	Nicolas Bethsaida Ketleen	VIVA-RIO	Boul Jn J Dessalines
29.	Badio Jean René	FAPEDS-GG	Grand-Goave
30.	Louis Remy	FLM	Port-au-Prince/Leogane

# **Rural Exercise Field Exercise Participants**

No.	Noms et Prénoms	Institution/Organisation	Poste
1	ANTONIO PRESUME	COLLABORATEUR GARR	
2	DESERNE MICHAEL	MPDDP/DECOVIL	
3	FEQUIERE KLEBERT	WORLD VISION	PEPINIERISTE
4	PIERRE NADEGE	SOCIETE CIVIL	
5	GRACIA GARNISE	RFJS	PROMOTRICE
6	ANGER TECHELET	GARR	ANIMATEUR
7	JOSEPH ESAIE	GREFOS	MEMBRE
8	MOLIERE CARLTZ HENRY	JUSTICE ET PAIX/ P AU P	MEMBRE
9	JOSEPH FREDELINE	GREFOS	MEMBRE
10	DUVERNE MARIE MICHELLE	KORAL	ANIMATRICE
11	DUBREVIL WILLY	KORAL	ANIMATEUR
12	PETIT-PHAT SANIECE	GARR	ANIMATRICE
13	GASPARD JONATHAN	COOP. LOGEMENT LACOLLINE	PRESIDENT C.A
14	LUBERICE VICLINE	ZANMI LASANTE	NEC
15	PLAISIR BENICE	COSADH	ENCADREUR
16	SYLVAIN FRED	GARR	ANIMATEUR
17	VILLARSON JOSEPH JONIDES	CHRISTIAN-AID	OFFICIER PROGRAMME
18	ANTOINE JEAN GARRY	ZANMI LASANTE	NEC
19	MURAT WIDEMAELLE	SOFA	COORDONNATRICE
20	BAPTISME JEAN WILNER	KORAL	COORD.REGIONAL SUD
21	RATEAU DINOIS	JUSTICE ET PAIX/LASC.	COORDONNATEUR
22	GENEVIEVE CYVOCT	ACT	COORDONNATRICE

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# Annex 5: Site visits

No.	Location	District	Name of organisation
1	St Matthews School	Leogane	St Matthews School
2	Leogane	Leogane	Schools
3	Anbouchur	Grand Riviere	Community
4	Kay Nou	Bel Air/Port au Prince	Viva Rio
5	Ajidel (Macombre)	Leogane	Community
6	Luithor	Leogane	Community
7	Les Palms	Petit Goave	Community
8	Jacmel	Jacmel	Evelyn Levy School
9	Jackel	Jacmel	Shelter projects
10	Decoville Housing	Lascahabos	Community
11	La Colline	Lascahobas	Community
12	Delmas	PaP	Livelihoods
13	Camp Ecra	PaP	Livelihoods

# Annex 6: List of key informant interviews

1	Christian Aid	Adrian Ouvry
2	CRWRC	Cleeford Dalce
3	CRWRC	Philip Westra
4	CRWRC	Ing. Construction Allandes Charles
5	Beneficaire Leogane	
6	Dir. School Masson/Leogane	Pasteur Fanfan
7	CWS	Aaron Tate
8	FCA	David Korpela
9	FCA	Sari Kaipainen
10	FCA	Shane Copp
11	MISSEH	Clement Joseph
12	MISSEH	Rilbert Joseph
13	OCHA Cont. Planning	Esteban Sacco
14	UNDP	Henri Morand
15	CCO	Aurélie Proust
16	Care	Beat Rohr
17	Concern	Anne O'Mahony
18	CRS (and previously HAP)	Emily Rogers
19	GARR	Colette Lespinesse
20	GARR	Patrick Camille
21	Viva Rio	Daniel Delva
22	Viva Rio	Meta Alcindor
23	Viva Rio	Pedro Penna
24	Viva Rio	Fachini
25	Org. des Ecoles victimes du TdT Leogane	Pasteur Milien Jn Henri
26	Episcopal Church in Haiti	Rev. Père Jean Phanord
27	Anbouchur (Grand Riviere)	Benoit Bernard
28	Anbouchur (Grand Riviere)	Obligesse
29	Anbouchur (Grand Riviere)	Balange
30	Anbouchur (Grand Riviere)	Louis Semerite
31	Anbouchur (Grand Riviere)	Rev. Jonas Beauvoir
32	Luithor (Leogane)	Pastor Farfan Michel
33	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Jean Eriel Consolé
34	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Pasteur Rosemond Janvier
35	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Alcius Miguel
36	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Valcin Jonel
37	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Jean Jean Pierre Paul
38	Community Advisory Committee (Leogane )	Decargette Nahomie
39	NCA	Anne Caroline
40	LWF	Plancher Rolnick
41	LWF	Agronome Noe
42	LWF	Ingénieur Despagne Joseph Omy
43	Mayor of Gressier	Paul Jean Michel

44	ASEC les Palms (Petit Goave)	Cetoute Maxo
45	Dir. school les Palms (Petit Goave)	Zamy St Hilaire
46	RNDDH	Pierre Esperance
47	Priv. Sect.	Garaudy Laguerre
48	Christian Aid	Harold Paul
49	Christian Aid	Prospery Raymond
50	Christian Aid	Ronald Labady,
51	DINEPA	Paul Christian
52	Direction de la Protection Civile Dept du Sud Est	Jean Michel Sabbat
53	DKH	Jacques-Philippe Mondesir
54	CROSE	Jim Jacob Pierre
55	SCH	Ernst Abraham
56	SCH	Jacques Muscadin
57	SCH	Evyon Petit
58	SCH	Guistine Leburn
59	SCH	Manouchka Louis
60	Community	Julenne Remome
61	Community	Jean Nicholas Aubourg
62	Community	Bonnard Posy
63	Community (Jackmel)	Luc David
64	Community (Jackmel)	Nadge
65	DKH	Lizaire Dieuvestersom
66	LWF	Louis Dorvillier
67	Act Alliance	Geneviève Cyvoct
68	Architect/Politician	Leslie Voltaire
69	CA	Nigel Timmins
70	Act Alliance Secretariat Regional Programme Officer for Latin America and The Caribbean	Carlos Rauda
71	ACT Alliance Secretariat Planning, Monitoring & Evaluation and Learning Officer	Wilfred Kibwota
72	Act Alliance Secretariat Assistant Regional Programme Officer for Latin America and The Caribbean	Alexander Sugura
73	Act alliance Secretariat Secretary General	John Nduna
74	SSID, Dep. Director	Jose Alcantara
75	UMCOR	Elizabeth Pethoe
76	ОСНА	Philip Verstraeten

Annex 7: Financial details of the ACT Alliance Appeal (Based on available information as of 18/12/2011)

Donor	TOTAL
	US\$
ACT For Peace	693,732
AngliCORD Australia	89,055
Australian Lutheran World Service	447,500
Canadian Engineering Co.	179,200
Canadian Lutheran World Relief	554,829
Christian World Service New Zealand	95,910
Church of Sweden	2,422,931
Church World Service, USA	577,953
Churches of Christ in Australia	43,230
Council of Church.Malaysia	24,576
CRWRC, Canada	2,000,000
DanChurchAid - Denmark	2,941,652
Diakonia Sweden	3,058
Diakonie Auslandshilfe	403,651
Diakonie Katastrophehilfe	2,408,898
Diakonie Netherlands	12,128
Disciples of Christ, USA	149,925
Dorcas Aid (SHO) USA	888,452
EECMY Ethiopia	8,186
Ev. Lul. Ch. in Argentina	2,000
Ev. Ch. Augsburg, Slovakia	25,169
Eva. Luth Ch. Guyana	4,130
Eva. Luth Ch. Zurich	1,107
Evang. Lut. Church Geneva	188
Evangelical Lutheran Church America	1,750,000
Evangelical Church Chile	1,316
Federation of Protestant Churches in Italy	84,815
Finn Church Aid	2,377,390
First Presbyterian Church	1,435
Hong Kong Christian Cou.	243,580
Hungarian Interchurch Aid	33,978
ICCO & Kerk in actie	4,136,681
Icelandic Church Aid	366,450
IELCO Colombia	1,180
Iglesia Ev. Lut. Brazil	29,000
Iglesia Evang. Española	15,188
Individual Donors Canada	99
Individual Donors New Zealand	72
Individual donors Netherlands	34
Individual Donors Finland	15,324
Individual Donors Haiti	373
Individual Donors Hungary	63
Individual Donors Switzerland	7,174
International Orthodox Christian Charities	283,242
Japan Evangelical Lut. Church	23,897
Kinki Evan.Lut. Church	1,097
Lutheran World Relief USA	1,058,911

	34,265,016
ZOA Refugee Care	108,556
YWCA Canada	447
YTB Indonesia	2,776
YCARE International	349,964
World Council of Churches	2,416
Wider Church Ministries / United Church of Christ, USA	340,000
WEB Donors	33,570
Wakachiai Project Japan	5,000
United Methodist Committee on Relief	50,000
United Church of Canada	1,579,644
United Church of Christ in Japan	197,403
Solidarite Protestante	32,619
Religions for Peace USA	10,500
Primate's World Relief & Development Fund Canada	720,428
Presbyterian W.Ser.Canada	1,398,336
Presbyterian Disaster As.	415,090
Other Donors USA	208
Other Donors Netherlands	76,066
Norwegian Church Aid	4,013,214
All Saints Nigeria	1,980
National Christian Council in Japan	163,486
National Council Churches in Korea	148,170
Methodist Relief & Development Fund, UK	151,229
Manitoba Council, Canada	55,159