

- These focused on beneficiaries (male and female groups separately) and staff (SWOT). These interviews followed a loose structure but were deliberately kept relatively open and exploratory.
- Observation:
 - This involved site visits, transect walks and visits to households within communities chosen at random. The aim was to visit at least two areas where each sector activity had been applied.
- Project documentation and secondary supporting data:
 - For example watsan baseline, nutritional and KAP surveys

The general findings were discussed with the team on site before leaving the field and adjustments were made in response to their observations.

Although it was not possible to randomly select a sample of the communities in which Tearfund is working, it did prove possible to visit four sites: Fugo North and South, Dar-es-Salaam, Amar Jidid and sites within Garsila town and the Garsila IDP camps. Dara-es-Salaam is a nomad community. In each of these sites interventions were observed, and discussions held with groups of beneficiaries, male and female, community leaders and some members of the Village Development Committees (VDCs). Government and INGO representatives were also interviewed in Garsila.

Presentation

The reporting has followed closely the objectives and indicators set in the project proposal's log frame, particularly in the assessment of 'effectiveness' (Appendix 2).

The findings have been presented by sector. With regard to each sector the issues of effectiveness, impact, appropriateness, efficiency, coverage, sustainability and co-ordination have been addressed. For each issue a score on a scale of 1 to 5 has been given where 1 = very weak and 5 = very strong.

A summary of the overall findings is presented at the end and in the executive summary.

The main recommendations have been listed separately. However, various specific recommendations are imbedded in the text following the discussion of the aspect they refer to. These recommendations are identified by underlined and italicized text.

Findings

Community Development

Effectiveness (3/5)

Outcome objective and indicator:

- Increased capacity of 15 targeted communities to manage and sustain social structures
 - 100% of communities have an active village committee to manage water, health and development issues by November 2006

The main method of achieving this objective was to form and train Village Development Committees in each of the 15 communities Tearfund intended to work. The VDCs were initiated to encourage eventual community ownership of the different development initiatives, thus helping ensure longer term sustainability of the development achievements and provide Tearfund with the basis for an exit strategy.

In all during 2006 18 VDCs were established and trained. These involved 203 people of which 43 were women.

Impact (3/5)

The general level of actual involvement in taking initiative and helping manage community developmental processes beyond acting as the bridge between Tearfund and the community was difficult to ascertain. On the one hand very positive feedback was expressed in Dar es Salaam, where they were beginning to use the VDC combined with the local leadership to resolve problems for themselves. On the other hand comments were heard from various sectors including VDC members that they did not really understand what the committees were for. This was particularly noted amongst women.

In generally there was little evidence of the VDC taking responsibility for some of the sector issues, e.g. well head maintenance. It is understood that the VDCs have appointed officers to be responsible for the different sectors the Tearfund programme addresses. However, there were a couple of positive exceptions where the VDC was taking responsibility in the absence of Tearfund, e.g. Dar es Salaam.

Generally, it appears that many of the community members feel that the VDCs were formed to help Tearfund mobilise the communities for Tearfund's projects. The persistent request for incentives by VDC members throughout the year seems to support this assumption.

Tearfund appears to have forced the pace of the development of these committees. The inclusion of women and initial reported attempts to exclude the traditional community leadership from taking senior roles seems to suggest this¹. In fact Tearfund appear to have backed off the recommendation that the traditional leaders should not preside over the VDCs, which has led to an improvement. The issue of women taking leadership roles has and will demand a significant cultural shift, which is unlikely to be achieved in a matter of months.

Tearfund have achieved a lot in a relatively short time. However, the developmental and cultural changes that some of the initiatives demand will take time. It appears that Tearfund has approached a development process with a relief timeframe.

From Tearfund's own reports it is clear that many people in the communities are still suspicious of Tearfund and this has been reflected in the reluctance of some to be seen to be too closely associated with the agency.

Therefore, although the basic structure has been established in the communities and training has taken place it will take longer than a year before the VDCs really meet Tearfund's expectations.

One of the unplanned secondary benefits of the VDC development process was the creation of a neutral forum through the training workshops in which the different ethnic groups and communities had opportunity to interact and learn about each other. It is felt that this process if continued could create a basis for possible local conflict mediation.

The workshops which focused on gender role divisions and daily work calendars helped many men appreciate the workload of the women for the first time.

One of the concerns associated with the VDCs is that Tearfund staff may be losing contact with the more vulnerable elements of the communities. It appears that Tearfund relies quite heavily on the VDCs for the co-ordination and monitoring of its interventions with very limited direct beneficiary consultation and monitoring at field level by Tearfund staff.

¹Some of the committee members indicated that at first they were discouraged from appointing traditional leaders as chairmen of the VDCs. However, Tearfund staff claim this was not the case. From field observations it is very clear that traditional leaders such as Umdas and Sheiks, were taking the leadership positions in the VDCs.

Appropriateness (4/5)

The concept is highly appropriate. However, the speed of implementation and level of expectation may be a little optimistic.

It is important that Tearfund does encourage community mobilisation, organisation and ownership of their own development process. In helping the community to achieve this, the agency is stimulating a true development process. The important factor is that it is community's agenda and not Tearfund's that (eventually) takes precedence, i.e. the fostering of a true participative process 'within' the community.

Coverage (5/5)

The fact that a VDC has been established in all 18 communities where Tearfund is working is a significant achievement.

Sustainability (2/5)

The real test will be if the VDCs prove willing to continue to operate without Tearfund's prompting or provision of incentives.

In some of the communities it is clear that they have already come to appreciate the potential and added advantage the VDC structure can provide (see field notes Appendix 3). Once this state has been reached, and local traditional leaders give the structures their blessing, the basis for the VDC's future sustainability will have been established. However, it is still too early to judge their potential sustainability. Tearfund will need to keep facilitating and encouraging the process over the next couple of years at least.

It is important that Tearfund enable the VDC to define their own initiatives and to help them in the achievement of these. It is important to foster the VDCs' independent initiatives without Tearfund assuming responsibility or creating dependencies.

Health Promotion (for women and children)

Effectiveness (4/5)

Output Objectives and indicators

- 5,000 women and 20,000 children making improved health behavioural decisions
 - 60% of target population will demonstrate at least 2 improved health practices by November 2006
 - 60% of target population have access and are using new sanitation facilities and safe water by November 2006
 - 5,000 households have access to and use improved number and variety of seeds and tools by November 2006
 - 4 schools benefit from improved school Health Promotion services and watsan facilities by November 2006
 - 100% of communities have an active village development committees to manage water, health and development issues by November 2006
 - 5,000 women and 10,000 out of school children voluntarily attending weekly health clubs and taking action on health issues by November 2006.
 - 10,000 children in 10 schools receiving at least one Health Promotion lesson per month by November 2006
 - 60% of Health Promotion participants demonstrate at least 2 improved hygiene practices by November 2006.
 - 90% of the distributed items (soap, mosquito nets, buckets, hand-washing vessels, potties) are being appropriately used by the beneficiaries by November 2006
 - 8 recreation centres embraced by community by November 2006.

- A contextually appropriate HIV/AIDS awareness project implemented by November 2006
 - Increase number of children regularly washing their hands with soap/ash after defecation from 24% to 80% by November 2006
 - Reduction of children who have had diarrhoea in the past 2 weeks from 60% to 30% by November 2006
 - Increase number of women treating diarrhoea with ORS from 10% to 70% by November 2006
 - Increase number of children under five years sleeping under a mosquito net from 22% to 80% by November 2005
- Measuring behaviour change is difficult. However, there is evidence that people are implementing improved hygiene practices. Tearfund conducted a KAP survey in November 2006; the report was not finalised at the time of the evaluation but the data shows that > 90% of women and > 90% of children surveyed are using latrines and washing their hands with soap afterwards. However, the frequency of these behaviours is not mentioned. The value of this survey is also limited in other respects; it was conducted only in Kordol area and the sample size was very small for the population (interviews with women and children, 75 each, direct observations 75 from a population of 15,227).
 - No beneficiary interviewed or their children had suffered diarrhoea in the previous two weeks (the same finding as Tearfund's survey).
 - Verbally, Tearfund's HP Coordinator reported that 20 latrines in two schools have been built but in their final programme report Tearfund mentions '4 schools were assisted with improved sanitation services'. At the schools visited (2) a third of the latrines were locked (for use by teachers) and the remainder filthy, with faeces scattered both inside and out. The teachers said that children from outside are responsible, they scale the high perimeter wall in order to pick mangoes and use the latrines. The water drums for hand washing installed by Tearfund were all empty and some of the taps broken. There was no evidence of any hand washing facilities or soap. (Tearfund supply schools 100 bars per month).
 - At one beneficiary meeting with > 200 women, no one had any idea about the function or activities of VDCs; 3 female VDC members were present but they could not enlighten the group (there was much shrugging of shoulders).
 - Tearfund report that 'on average 14,030 children attend weekly health clubs across 16 locations... 1,481 women attend weekly health clubs in 6 communities'. Tearfund does not enrol individuals as club members (because of the large numbers involved) but only records attendances (which are totalled monthly and divided by four, to arrive at an average weekly attendance), these figures are not verifiable.
 - HP activities are being conducted in 11 schools (11,300 pupils). The evaluator was present in two schools for the awarding of prizes to the winners of a HP poster drawing competition. The standard of the drawings was high; depictions included fenced water pumps, covered plates of food and drinking water vessels, latrines (in use!), hand washing and people sleeping under mosquito nets. The children questioned knew that 'safe' water and other hygiene practices prevented 'disease', diarrhoea was not specifically mentioned. However, no-one could explain the purpose of a mosquito net (despite its name!).
 - The latter may relate to the fact that Tearfund did not distribute mosquito nets as per log frame objectives. The evaluator was told that the nets 'were in the cupboard' but had not been distributed because of insecurity and limited field access. However, in their final programme report, Tearfund write that UNICEF failed to provide mosquito

nets as promised. However, in response to UNICEF's failure, nets were bought in early 2007 (i.e. beyond the BUZA reporting period) with outstanding money from HP activities in 2006 and will be distributed as soon as possible when current HP project manager gets back from leave.

- Hygiene related NFIs were distributed to households in line with log frame objectives. Plastic kettles (although not necessarily distributed by Tearfund) are widely seen around compounds but no potties were seen during field visits. This raises a question about their cultural appropriateness or their value for other purposes i.e. as storage containers.
- During a schools visit in Garsila town, NFIs that had been donated by Tearfund (such as plastic buckets with lids and drinking cups) could not be traced. Waste paper baskets and jerry cans were seen. Children continue to drink water from traditional large clay pots but these did not have covers. However, many of the children's drawings showed this style of traditional pot with covers.
- Tearfund report that 3 recreation centres have been built (rather than 8 in the log frame) but these were not visited during the evaluation, although the frames for swings were seen under production at welders in Garsila town. Whether these recreation centres are 'embraced by the community' remains to be seen. During one meeting with beneficiary children there was much giggling, pushing and shoving until eventually a spokesperson² emerged, 'we want to ask for something, we want a ball. We have leisure time at about 4 pm and we want a ball'. Later, when this was mentioned to Tearfund staff, the response was 'haven't they seen the swings that we are making them?'
- Tearfund staff and then the HAC commissioner, Locality Commissioner, representatives of the MoH and MoE and community leaders were first given HIV/AIDS awareness training. Once these opinion leaders gave their approval, 72 Imams and religious leaders, the Drivers' Union, Market Traders' Association, secondary school children and health club members then received HIV/AIDS awareness training. Apparently the Imams agreed to include AIDS education in their Friday sermons.
- Home visits are made to identify disabled children in the community and encourage them to attend health clubs. Several have been assisted with crutches and wheelchairs from Nyala

Impact (4.5/5)

- Many informants from all sectors said that since Tearfund came, people and the environment are much cleaner³ and health has generally improved. Health club members were very enthusiastic and claimed to have learnt a lot. Certainly, all the women and children interviewed could explain how to make ORS (and sing the 'Tearfund Song'). Women clearly articulated the importance of latrine use in reducing diarrhoea (and malaria).
- However, three groups of female beneficiaries and one group of children interviewed said that the priorities for using soap are a) washing clothes and b) washing children. Only one group mentioned hand washing, as a third priority.
- Three groups of women beneficiaries were asked to rank Tearfund's interventions. Results are tabulated below:

² A girl, about 12 years

³ One informant commented that it is now possible to walk about without having to watch where you put your feet, there used to be faeces on the street.

Table 2: Women's ranking of Tearfund's interventions

Settled (Host) (>200 women present)	Nomadic (about 50 women)	Camp (IDPs) (about 50 women)
Seeds and tools	Water	Water
Water and latrines	NFIs	Latrines
Women's health clubs	Latrines	Children's health clubs
Children's health clubs	Health clubs	Seed and tools ⁴ .
VDC training		
50% of women present said that they had bought a mosquito net.	No-one present had a mosquito net	No-one present had a mosquito net
Main needs:- Bags and equipment for the traditional midwives. A milling machine for the community to operate.	Main needs:- More water points. Medical services and support to local midwives.	Main needs:- Food. Plastic sheeting. Clothes (for children).

Relevance / Appropriateness (4/5)

- HP is most relevant when beneficiaries have the means to put health messages into practise. HP activities have generally coincided Tearfund watsan interventions and NFI distributions. The only disconnect is the issue of mosquito nets (mentioned above).
- By extending HP to men (in 'focus groups' rather than clubs) the relevance to the community is increased. Women beneficiaries varied in their responses to questions about their ability to implement HP messages without the involvement of men but the nomad community and Tearfund staff feel the uptake of latrines is better when men are sensitised.
- Involving men in HP may increase the number of women attending clubs (which is lower than log frame objectives) since some women stated they cannot attend clubs without their husband's permission.
- Conducting HP activities for the Imams and building mosque latrines was a good strategy to increase relevance.
- HP messages have also been reinforced by community clean-up campaigns.

Efficiency (4/5)

- The health club methodology seems a very efficient way of disseminating health messages to large numbers of community members. Materials are relatively inexpensive (laminated A4 pages of pictures) and incentives (food for facilitators and soap for the children and mothers) are donated.

Sustainability (3/5)

- Health club facilitators receive food as a monthly incentive and soap is given to club attendees. It will be difficult to sustain these inputs. However, many women said that even without soap they would still attend clubs; children unanimously stated 'no soap, no clubs'. A number of club facilitators expressed dissatisfaction with the food incentive wanting money instead.

⁴ Not everybody benefited from this intervention. Some claimed that the Sheikhs who received the seeds did not give them out.

- Sustaining HP outcomes is more important than sustaining the clubs themselves. If communities habituate more hygienic practices then reinforcing messages through schools may be sufficient. The MoE is including HP messages in the curriculum.
- Targeting existing social groups (Drivers' Union, Market Traders' Association) for HP activities may be more sustainable than setting up new groups (clubs). Facilitators could be trained from within those groups; maybe the teachers involved in HP might extend their role outside the schools.

Co-ordination & coherence (4/5)

- Tearfund in Garsila clearly had good links with authorities; the HAC Commissioner praised their contribution to the community. HP has also built a strong relationship with the MoE and the teachers in the schools where they are working.
- Coherence is enhanced by making HP messages practicable by measures such as the provision of latrines, 'safe' water, and soap and clean-up campaigns.

Additional observations:

- Tearfund's methodology of using health clubs for HP has been sensitively shaped to community realities in Wadi Salih. For example, by finding ways to engage with men and wider groups in the community, working through schools and the Imams. This approach seems to have enabled the team to make more progress with HIV/AIDS awareness than in the other two Tearfund operational areas in Darfur. It may be relevant that Tearfund's only male HP Co-coordinator works in Wadi Salih.
- Organisation of the health clubs at some locations was weak. Large numbers of women huddled on plastic sheeting, many with their backs to the facilitators, could not hear or see the presentation so chatted and attended to their babies. At one location, the club facilitator whisked through her picture cards (which were hard to see being only A4 size laminated sheets) in about 10 minutes and then repeated her performance from the other end of the groundsheet without engaging with the women, most of whom were chatting among themselves.
- Some club facilitators showed their pictures upside down (and no one called out to correct them). This raises a question about how printed images are perceived by the community. In some cultures⁵, where interpretations are very literal, magnified images (of flies or mosquitoes) are not understood ... 'we do not have mosquitoes that big here'.

Watsan report

Effectiveness (4/5)

Objectives and indicators

- 25,000 beneficiaries have reliable access to adequate quantities of safe water and sanitation facilities.
 - 45 new or rehabilitated water points provided by November 2006 (5 new hand dug wells, 10 new boreholes, 30 rehabilitations).
 - 80% of water points managed by committees in target communities by November 2006
 - All water points have a minimum faecal coliform count of 10 per 100ml (but aiming for 0 in line with SPHERE) by November 2006.
 - 100% of hand pumps are maintained by trained mechanics by November 2006

⁵ For example in Zambia and Uganda

- Minimum of 10 litres per person per day (aiming for 15 litres) per hand pump.
- 36 VIP latrines are constructed in up to 4 schools by November 2006
- 1,000 household latrines provided to households expressing a desire for a latrine by November 2006
- 80% of latrines remain structurally sound and are maintained to a clean standard by November 2006
- 80% of latrine covers and hand-washing vessels to be in use by November 2006
- 1 water yard rehabilitated in Garsila

Overall it is estimated that the watsan programme achieved between 70% and 80% of the set objectives, a significant achievement given the deteriorating security situation.

Tearfund reported that the 2006 water and sanitation programme had covered 15 of the 18 communities they now operate in.

Water provision

In all 47 water points were either developed or rehabilitated, two of which were still in process. These consisted of 5 hand-dug wells and a further two in process, 35 hand pump rehabilitations and 5 new boreholes with hand pumps. The boreholes were drilled for Tearfund by NCA. Tearfund also rebuilt the central water yard in Garsila. The water yard was handed over to the Government and is managed by WES. A gift of 28 hand pumps from UNICEF assisted this process.

An outbreak of 'Acute Watery Diarrhoea' in the region led to Tearfund helping seal 9 open wells in and around Garsila. In these cases the agency has mounted two hand pumps on each well to help reduce queuing and to reduce the introduction of contaminants into the sealed wells. This initiative was carried out in conjunct with the MoH and WES.

The NCA were the only agency in the region with available rigs. In all 7 holes were drilled, two of which were dry holes. Other prospective sites proved to have unreliable geophysical survey results.

Tearfund did not conduct water quality tests. It is questionable whether the types of open and sealed hand dug wells can be kept free of contaminants without introducing chemicals.

- The concept of introducing chemical purifiers is not advisable given this was a possible reason for the security incident. The community were persuaded that agencies were attempting to poison their water sources, which led to a violent reaction and the death of one of Tearfund's drivers and two of WES staff. Tearfund have therefore not promoted water testing or purification.

Although water committees have been set up in Garsila and VDCs in the other rural communities, it appears that Tearfund's water teams are still looked to repair the pumps albeit with the participation of the committees' mechanics. Training has been conducted in wellhead maintenance and pump repair for both men and women. However, the ability to put into practice some of the training has been hampered by Tearfund's failure to secure and distribute the necessary tools and parts.

The only water points witnessed that showed evidence of community management were of two sealed wells and one of the boreholes in Garsila plus one of the boreholes in Dar es Salaam⁶. In these cases people using the water points were able to identify those responsible for maintenance and there was evidence of the recommended fences around the wells to prevent animal access.

It is the opinion of the evaluator that where a sense of ownership for the well does not exist, e.g. in IDP camp contexts, it will be difficult to achieve public responsibility, especially while Tearfund is present. Many mentioned that they felt Tearfund was responsible for

⁶ Approximately 25 water points were observed by the evaluator

maintenance. In rural communities the Government is also reinforcing this concept, especially with regard to the school VIP latrines. The alternative is where a local sheik has claimed responsibility and is controlling access, which appears to be the case with some of the water points in the IDP camps.

Sphere recommends a daily access to 15 litres per person per day. Tearfund's own water consumption study indicated that the average consumption was 12 litres per day. However, the evaluators own random checks at the wells visited indicated that it could be near 20 litres per person per day.

Latrines

20 VIP latrines were provided for two schools. These were observed by the evaluators. This falls short of the 36 units that were targeted. However, 4 units were built for two mosques in the area.

Tearfund report that 909 of the intended 1000 latrine slabs were delivered. It is estimated that 780 of these latrines have been successfully completed by the respective households, i.e. the walls surrounding the latrines had been erected, usually made of grass and brush. This is much more difficult for the IDPs as they do not have the same access to local materials and the need for fuel often takes precedence over the use of available materials, especially before the harvest when millet stalks become available.

The failure to achieve the intended number of latrines was due to the increased insecurity and restrictions on the watsan teams' access to the different communities. The rainy season is also another serious restriction on village access, the roads becoming impassable during the rains.

During the year Tearfund decided to construct the dome slabs on site once the household had dug the hole in readiness. Although this was a positive process it did lead to many more people digging latrines in expectation of slabs than the agency was able to respond to. The Health Promotion activities had raised the awareness and demand for latrines beyond the agencies original targets. This evidently led to some dissatisfaction being expressed by those that had not had their expectations fulfilled and does raise questions regarding projections, coverage and the integration of Health Promotion and watsan targeting⁷.

Problems of latrines collapsing due to the delivery of slabs after the rains had begun were observed. However, this represented a relatively small percentage (<3%).

The care of latrines in the rural villages was high. Household latrines were randomly selected and inspected by the evaluators in Dar es Salaam and Amar Jidid. These were all found to be well kept with the lids in place⁸. In fact in many cases the lids had been improved on to help reduce flies. Hand washing containers were observed near the latrines, although no potties were seen in the rural villages.

The care of the VIP school latrines was a problem. (See observations in the Health Promotion section earlier in this report.) Of the two schools observed the one in Garsila was the worst. The school in Amar Jidid was attempting to resolve the care of the latrines. They had been instructed by the MoE that it was not appropriate to ask children to clean the school latrines. They had chosen to employ a woman to provide this service. However, the MoE had declined to recognise this additional cost instructing the school that the latrine maintenance was the responsibility of Tearfund. Children were generally continuing to use the bush. The hand washing water tanks at the Amar Jidid school were being used and in relatively good condition. However, the same cannot be said of the Garsila schools.

⁷ For instance some claim they are having to wait two to three years for a slab, although they had dug the hole in the first year.

⁸ The same standard was not observed in the IDP camps in Garsila. In these camps many still did not have latrines and some that had slabs were not using these, often because the surrounding walls had not been constructed.

Tearfund have planned to build a new slaughter yard in Garsila. Although the materials for this project have been acquired, it was not possible to build this new yard within the project period. This was due to land ownership disputes and the inability of the Garsila's authorities to propose an alternative site before the end of the year. The intention is to complete this project during 2007.

Impact (4/5)

The water and sanitation interventions of Tearfund have been generally highly appreciated. The water yard rehabilitation has made a significant contribution to the inhabitants of Garsila Town's access to a reliable supply of safe water.

Most of Tearfund's approach to water has been to rehabilitate existing hand pumped wells and the digging and capping of open wells.

The hand dug wells, particularly those with mounted hand pumps, were especially appreciated and mentioned by several of those interviewed. This was in part because of the impression of improved access and the safer or cleaner water now being drawn from these hand dug wells. The rural people indicated a preference for the hand dug wells over boreholes as they are not as susceptible to pump breakdowns. The hand dug well, even if capped offers the option of drawing water by bucket. This gives the beneficiaries, especially in the outlying rural communities, a greater sense of security even if the introduction of rope and bucket compromises the water's quality. For most in these villages security of access tends to take precedence over quality.

Tearfund have tended to cede space to NCA in the provision of water in Garsila IDP camps. However, Tearfund has played a very important role in maintaining water points in the IDP camps around Garsila. The evaluator visited all the wells servicing the camps and found that all were operating, due in large part to the maintenance provided by the Tearfund watsan team. This is an impressive achievement given the heavy use and normal failure rates experienced.

The improved access to both water and latrines are credited by most of the communities visited with a noticeable improvement in health and ambient hygiene (See group discussion notes Appendix 3).

The women in Amar Jidid were critical of Tearfund's watsan initiatives in their village, claiming that insufficient resources were applied, particularly with regard to improving their access to water. One of the concerns of the Amar Jidid community was the seasonal pressure that the nomads placed on their water resources and therefore the need to expand the level of access, although it might not be needed all year round. Greater access would help reduce the likelihood of conflict. This was related to the issue of where to locate the additional water points. It was felt that if these were away from the village and surrounding fields it would limit the damage caused by cattle movements.

A walk through Amar Jidid demonstrated that several latrines were under construction and that those that had acquired latrines (men) felt that they had made a significant impact on their household's health and to the cleanliness of the community. The religious leader mentioned that he could now walk down the street without worry where he was putting his feet. However, one of the key impacts of the household latrines in both the villages and camps is the sense of improved security. This is because they no longer have to venture into the surrounding bush, particularly at night.

The nomadic community (Dar es Salaam) mentioned that by completing the intended open well they would be able to more effectively manage their stock and not be forced to migrate south as early in the year as usual. It was noted that these communities were demonstrating tendencies to become more sedentary and dependent on agriculture (notes on Dar es Salaam Appendix 3).

The VIP latrines in the schools appear to have had limited impact to date.

Tearfund mentioned that due to the withdrawal of MSF there was now no means of accurately tracking the impact of the watsan and HP programme on morbidity. It was therefore difficult to verify the actual impact on health. (As mentioned, it was felt that the KAP survey sampling process was flawed and therefore the claims of impact were of questionable reliability.)

Appropriateness (4/5)

The improved access to water and latrines are generally the most highly ranked needs expressed by the communities (see Table 1 in the Health Promotion section). The water point rehabilitation and provision of latrines are therefore highly relevant interventions.

As indicated elsewhere in the report, the focus on improving hand dug wells was particularly appropriate. Also the focus on rehabilitating existing hand pumps has helped Tearfund have a wide and appreciated impact.

The approach adopted, which required that the households dig the latrine before making the slab on site, has proved effective. However, many more people tended to dig holes in preparation than Tearfund could respond to. This relates to two issues:

- The wider awareness and demand raised by the HP programme that could not be matched by the targeted spread of the latrines across the different communities.
- Tearfund should have aimed for a more comprehensive coverage in the communities it targeted.

The team has adjusted its approach effectively to the changing situation and is continuing to do so. This is witnessed in:

- Placing an increasing focus on capping and improving open wells
- The change to producing the slabs on the site of the beneficiary household
- Currently changing the method of operating in the field to reduce the relatively high level of risk associated with frequent travel

Although the capped hand dug well with two mounted hand pumps and a door for bucket access, is considered highly appropriate, there were initial problems with the design. The pump mounting on the roof of the capped wells have proved inadequate and were breaking up leaving the pump to rock freely. The trapdoor was placed directly under the feet of those pumping. The rather thin metal of the door was tending to bend and open under the constant pounding, posing a hazard to those pumping. The trap door was placed flush with the roof of the well leading to significant runback into the well, especially when the trapdoor starts to give way. These problems have been recognised and are being addressed in the more recently completed wells. However, Tearfund needs to remount the other initial pumps.

The dome slab has proved appropriate and has reduced the need for wooden beams, a resource that is very limited in the area, particularly around the IDP camps.

Tearfund has made a deliberate effort to encourage the inclusion of women in the VDCs and in the pump maintenance training. However, this runs counter to the culture and it has been difficult for some of the men to accept this cultural imposition. It will be interesting to see what happens once Tearfund withdraws.

Efficiency (4/5)

The cost of operating in this context and under the necessary security precautions is expensive when all related costs are taken into account. This tends to drive up unit costs. Given the uncertainty of the operational situation it is difficult to make valid unit cost comparisons. However, the objectives have been achieved within the budget. This includes the purchase of materials for outstanding projects to be completed, e.g. the building of a new slaughter yard for Garsila. This is a significant achievement given the problems faced during the year.

The programme has been visiting most communities on a day visit basis. This has meant that when travel and setup time is taken into account each day, the operational time is relatively short, increasing the unit cost. Tearfund have decided to change their form of operating, sending the teams to a community for several days or weeks at a time. Though this suggested change was based on reducing the need to travel so frequently for security reasons, it should also lead to a more efficient operation.

Where possible, Tearfund should seek to maximise the scale of the intervention at a particular site so as to help further improve the unit costs of the operation. This needs to be set against the need to spread the operation across several sites. If budgets do not permit, increased efficiencies of scale may be achieved by reducing the number of sites addressed in a projected period.

Tearfund have taken a very developmental approach to their response to the needs within the Garsila / Deleige area. Given the context, this is a relatively expensive method of conducting community development. However, one of the key and most appreciated contributions made by Tearfund's repeated and wide spread presence in the area is the perceived protection this offers to the villages. This is an outcome that was not taken into account when planning and justifying their operation or budget. However, if the issue of protection is taken into account, it more than justifies the expense of the current operational approach.

Coverage (4/5)

Generally the watsan programme has managed to cover the initially targeted communities. However, this did not cover all the 18 communities where VDCs have been established and seeds distributed.

The water interventions provided an estimated 17,750 people with improved access⁹.

The latrine programme focused on 8 communities covering on average 69% of the resident households. However, if the figure of 780¹⁰ households is used the effective coverage drops to 59%. As noted above it appears that the latrine programme did not manage to meet the expectations raised. (The reader needs to be aware that the current 2006 project represents one year in a multi year strategy aimed at the 18 communities).

As indicated earlier, the targeting of a larger proportion of the households in the specific communities might improve the effective coverage. However, it would be wrong to expect that every household offered a latrine will accept it.

Sustainability (3/5)

Tearfund's sustainability strategy across all sectors is based on the development of the VDCs and their ability to appropriately sustain the improvements achieved. As such this also provides the basis for the agency's exit strategy.

Given the technologies applied, it should be within the capacity of the VDCs. However, the actual involvement of the VDCs in caring for the well heads was not very evident, particularly in the IDP contexts. This is also the case with regard to the school VIP latrines. Therefore there is a question regarding the independent commitment and initiative of the VDCs. The perception of many of those interviewed is that the VDCs were formed to help Tearfund implement its programmes. This is a concern as it could suggest that some of the VDCs are responding to Tearfund rather than as independent representative bodies. (See Appendix 3 and comments in the HP section above.) However, in the case of Dar es Salaam the VDC appears to have correctly appreciated its role and is taking its responsibilities seriously, e.g. the care of the water point.

⁹ The estimate is based on 250 people per hand pump (47) and 5,000 people benefiting from the rehabilitated water yard.

¹⁰ Those households that had actually completed the construction

It is clear that communities still expect Tearfund to carry the responsibility for maintenance, particularly in the case of the IDP camps and it will be difficult to change this until the organisation begins to withdraw.

The hand dug well is the most sustainable option regarding water. However, the mounted pumps may not be maintained.

The water yard was already showing signs of serious deterioration even though the WES operatives were constantly present. Several taps were broken and left to run leading to the pump having to run more constantly than should have been needed, thus shortening the life of the plant.

It would appear that the latrines will be maintained and renewed when needed by the individual households, particularly in the rural villages.

Co-ordination and dissemination (5/5)

Tearfund have co-ordinated effectively with the local WES and MOH regarding the provision of water. Generally, this is one of the strengths of Tearfund. The organisation appears to have formed and maintained good relationships with most of the other agencies involved in responding to the humanitarian needs in the area, especially those specifically focused on the watsan sector such as NCA.

Other observations

Security has deteriorated over the year, including the attack on Tearfund staff by one of the communities with which they were working. However, the local personnel were able to regroup and reach reconciliation with the community that had attacked them and have continued to cooperate with them. The agency's position of being prepared to work with the different factions including nomadic Arab communities has in fact led to them achieving a level of acceptance that other agencies have not achieved.

The issue of protection needs greater attention. By its presence in the different communities Tearfund has provided a degree of protection. This is particularly appreciated by the communities although Tearfund itself seems to have been relatively unaware of the importance of this outcome of their programme.

The team have managed the crisis they were faced with well, and applied the lessons learnt. However, the issues of protection and conflict resolution are specialist fields. The team does need further structured support regarding these issues.

Food Security and environment

Effectiveness (2/5)

Outcome Objective and indicators

- 25,000 people (5,000 families) with improved food security and sustainable measures introduced to protect the environment
 - Seed and tool follow-up reveals 90% of farmers report an increased yield by November 2006
 - 1,000 vulnerable households targeted and growing vegetable gardens by November 2006
 - 90% of 50 donkey-ploughs distributed used to increase land under cultivation during 2006 planting season
 - 50% of farmers trained in environmental protection
 - Establishment of 2 tree nurseries, with 5,000 healthy saplings by November 2006

General effectiveness

- Tearfund's food security and environmental activities in Garsila are making a significant contribution to quality of life by supporting the livelihoods of vulnerable households. For example, by providing seeds and tools to newly arriving IDPs.
- The Food Security and Environmental programme is based on needs assessments. However, since Tearfund takes a rather developmental approach it would have been helpful if the organisation had undertaken a vulnerability and capacity analysis to be better positioned to also build on the people's capacities in addressing their vulnerabilities.
- Though hard to substantiate during the course of the evaluation it appears that Tearfund has been able reach the vulnerable people in the community. In doing so Tearfund relies quite heavily on the VDC's for the co-ordination and monitoring of its Food Security interventions with very limited direct beneficiary consultation and monitoring at field level by Tearfund staff.

Effectiveness of specific activities

Seed and tool distributions – 2.5 on a scale of 1 to 5

- During 2006 over 5,000 sedentary farmers and nomadic people received seeds (either for the cultivation during the rainy season or in vegetable gardens during the dry season or both) and tools.
- Technical staff of the agricultural bank certified the seeds and performed germination tests¹¹.
- Seeds were bought at the local market in Garsila based on availability and meeting minimum quality standards, short term varieties were preferred.
- Tearfund provide seeds with the aim of enabling people to cultivate (e.g. new IDP arrivals) or expand on their capacity to do so (the more vulnerable amongst the population).
- In various reports Tearfund claims that there is a risk that vulnerable households either consume or sell their seeds and that therefore the organisation wants to address this by establishing a community based seed store. Communal seed stores in post-conflict societies in general have met with very mixed results and Tearfund is advised to seek the opinion of vulnerable households regarding this issue. Households might not easily handover their seeds without a guarantee to receive good quality seeds prior to the onset of the rains (quality control will be a key issue for the stores to have success).

Dry season vegetable gardens – scale 3 on a range of 1 to 5.

- Well over 1,500 households have been targeted for dry season vegetable garden, far more than the planned 1,000 households.
- Tearfund has introduced a new type of tomato and watermelon seed as well as some other new crops which have been highly appreciated because of their high market value.
- In some villages the location of the dry season gardens (which depend on fertile soils along the main wadis and a high sub-surface water table) is a critical factor regarding the success of Tearfund's intervention. However, in the more remote villages such as Amar Jidid, gardens are destroyed by people breaking the fences to feed their cattle

¹¹ Germination rates: sorghum 90% (96.7 and 83.3%); millet 93% (96 and 90%); groundnut 76% (80 and 72%) and sesame 79% (78 and 80%).

during the night. In other localities, such as the IDP camps on the edge of Garsila, men stay overnight at the gardens to prevent cattle from feeding on the crops.

Distribution of donkey ploughs – scale 2 on a range of 1 to 5

- The donkey ploughs have been far too thinly spread as a relief intervention to increase the area under cultivation by the target communities.
- The distribution of a small number of ploughs (70 divided between 18 communities) has led to serious tensions in the communities, which have been managed in various ways. For example, in the nomadic village of Dar es Salaam the sheik decided to store the ploughs rather than having them used as the resulting tension and possible conflict would be beyond his control. In one of the sedentary villages, Fujo, the sheik has been handing out the three donkey ploughs as per request. Most of those interested missed out on the opportunity and some of them will be given priority for the 2007 season.
- As a relief intervention Tearfund's projection fell far short of the demand for the donkey plough (too few ploughs donated for each of the communities in combination with the very short period for land preparation). However, Tearfund's intervention has had an unplanned and more developmental impact as farmers have realised the advantage of the donkey plough. The more resourceful have purchased ploughs of their own at the Garsila market (before Tearfund's intervention people had heard about donkey ploughing but it was not practised in the area and ploughs were not available at the market).

Agricultural extension (including a topic on environmental protection) – scale 2 on a range of 1 to 5

- Tearfund has not given agricultural extension the attention it deserves. The one-day workshop given to selected community members is not sufficient to cover the wide range of topics. During the evaluation not one of those questioned could list a topic that had affected the way they are doing things.
- Environmental protection was ranked by the VDCs as an important activity with Tearfund requested to provide assistance. Tree planting appeared to be the main idea here.

Tree nurseries and tree planting – scale 1 on a range of 1 to 5

- The tree nurseries were not implemented. However, this was beyond the control of Tearfund as FAO delayed its funding decision. The intervention was dependent of FAO funding.

Impact (3/5)

- It appears that Tearfund's interventions have benefited the more vulnerable segments of the target communities, which has been achieved by seeking consultation and involvement of both traditional community leaders and the VDCs.
- Tearfund is underestimating the likely impact of the introduction of the donkey plough as this is likely to favour the more resourceful over the vulnerable members of, notably, the displaced community.
- The impact of the seed and tool distribution on increased production levels for the rainy season has yet to be determined by Tearfund (at the time of the evaluation harvest data were being put into the computer for further analysis). Increased production levels do not suffice as a programme indicator of Tearfund's success as farmers indicated that the amount of rain is the dominant factor defining agricultural

production levels. (The area under cultivation would have been a better diagnostic factor.)

- Beneficiaries indicated that the dry season garden seed distribution has been instrumental in growing a larger variety of marketable vegetables (notably tomatoes, water melon and onions) which has increased their income earning capacity.
- As a relief intervention seeking increased cereal production, the donkey plough distribution has been too thinly spread creating tension and conflict in the communities to the extent that the ploughs have not been used in some of the communities. It has had a developmental impact as more resourceful households have acquired their own donkey ploughs shared between 2 to 3 households.
- Tearfund has established good working relations with communities of various ethnic backgrounds and it appears from anecdotal evidence that by bringing together traditional leaders trust may be developed between them. This interaction potentially could create the space in which they could begin to address local grievances and to promote local conflict resolution, a process which could be supported by Tearfund's interventions ('a peace dividend'). Local conflict resolution might create more space for sedentary farmers to substantially increase the area of land under cultivation thus increasing overall output.
- Tearfund should be aware that its food security and environmental interventions can make agriculture a more attractive option, not only for the displaced, sedentary farmer but also for the agri-nomadic communities. By demonstrating how to make the farming process more efficient and productive, it could also encourage a greater competition for farmland, especially around areas of current settlement.

Relevance (4/5)

- Tearfund's Food Security and Environmental project appears to be in line with local needs and priorities as it aims to target the vulnerable households amongst hosts, returnees and IDPs. However the most vulnerable households, particularly those amongst the IDPs might not have access to land and therefore only marginally benefit from Tearfund's intervention.
- Food Security interventions were all relevant but there are concerns regarding the way and modality by which agricultural training is provided and extension organised.
- Tearfund is advised to monitor the impact of the introduction of the donkey plough in sedentary African communities and its impact on the more vulnerable households in terms of their livelihood strategies.

Efficiency (4/5)

- For most activities Tearfund has met its targets. These were considered to be relatively modest targets. The relative stable security situation during the first six months of 2006 resulted in a reasonable level of access to most of the communities during a critical period of the year.
- Tearfund has managed a substantial Food Security project with a minimum of staff involvement but the organisation could improve on its efficiency and cost effectiveness by adding a fuel efficient stove project which is relatively easy to manage and will bring substantial benefits to the target communities.

Sustainability (3/5)

- Free distribution of large quantities of seeds beyond a one to two year period to the same beneficiaries is not sustainable and the organisation should look into ways to

address this issue. The idea of community seed banks is questionable with Tearfund being advised to build on traditional/indigenous ways to preserve seed stocks in times of distress.

- With some villages reporting that lands have lost up to 80% of their soil fertility over the last twenty years Tearfund is advised to look into ways to maintain and increase soil fertility, e.g. by promoting intermixing with nitrogen fixing crops.

Co-ordination (2/5)

- Tearfund has placed too much reliance on the VDCs as the responsible bodies to co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of its interventions with too little focus on direct beneficiary contact and consultation by Tearfund staff.
- Tearfund's food security and environmental project in Wadi Salih would benefit from a closer co-ordination with FAR's food security programme in Darfur's South West Corridor.

Summary and conclusions

Overall, the programme has led to an improvement in the quality of life for members of at least 18 conflict affected communities within the Wadi Salih area of West Darfur. This has included improvements in both health and food security.

It is difficult to verify the actual impact on the health of these communities given that lack of reliable monitoring systems. However, the beneficiaries' own reports and the agency's KAP surveys indicate that there has been a significant change in both awareness of preventative health measures and a notable reduction in the incidence of diarrhoea over the past year. This is mainly due to improved access to 'safer water', latrines and effective health and sanitation promotion. As such the programme is judged to have successfully addressed its goal.

The programme reports that that 51,509 people directly benefited from at least one of the three sector programmes. Although, it was difficult to verify the accuracy of this overall total, the numbers of direct beneficiaries reached by each sector is more evident. The attributed scores regarding the evaluative categories such as effectiveness, impact and appropriateness are presented by sector in the following Table. The scores are based on a five point scale where 1 = very weak and 5 = very strong.

Table 3: Summary of objective categories scores attributed to by sector

Objective category	Community development	Health Promotion	Watsan	Food Security & environment
Effectiveness	3	4	4	2
Impact	3	4.5	4	3
Appropriateness	4	4	4	4
Efficiency	?	4	4	4
Coverage	5	4	3	2
Sustainability	2	3	3	3
Co-ordination	?	4	4	2