

Conclusions

Delays in the implementation of the project occurred mostly in the procurement process. The problems with the sewing kits were largely that it was an unusual product and therefore difficult to elicit bids. The problem is not with the procurement procedure, but with the particular circumstances of this project, and many of the delays were beyond World Vision's control.

Recommendations

A more generous time frame for the project would allow for repeated advertising, giving increased opportunity for more bids, and would thus give the potential for finding a more reliable supplier. This would also allow for any delays beyond WV's control.

6.1.2 Logistics

The sewing kits arrived packed in boxes of 40 which were easily transported to warehouses and then onward for distribution. The fabric came in rolls of approximately 50m, but none of the rolls were exactly the same length. Each recipient was intended to receive 1.4m of fabric but in order to ensure no excess it was necessary to give slightly different lengths from each roll. Thus from the rolls that were slightly longer than 50m, recipients were given 1.41m or 1.42m each, while from the rolls that were slightly shorter they would receive 1.38m or 1.39m.

As the vendors were not considered suitable to cut the cloth accurately, other people were brought in, these being former textile workers who had suitable scissors and the expertise to cut the cloth accurately. 10 people were brought in, of whom four were IDPs.

In the event, cutting of the cloth took only 10 days but the work did not begin until the kits had been received. This was partly because the delays in supply meant that the arrival of the goods coincided with a change in WV Azerbaijan internal organisation, with logistics management moving from Ganje to another office in Mingechevir. However, once cutting began it was completed efficiently and the material was packaged with the kits. Lorries were hired to transport the kits and material from Baku to the warehouse in Ganje, with World Vision's own vehicles being used for distribution to the field. Distribution began on the 17th April and is due to be completed on 4th June.

Conclusions

Once procured, the logistics of the project presented only minor problems due to the varying lengths of cloth and the restructuring of the Azerbaijan offices. The logistical procedures were followed accurately and efficiently.

6.1.3 Distributions

Distribution procedures were documented in some detail. Distributions were made to IDP heads of families. WV used a Commodity Control Card (CCC) that served as a record of registration and of all commodities received by the IDP family from WV. CCCs were only issued to IDP families that were on the official lists and whose documents verified their

(End p 10)

identity and place of origin. The CCC was kept with the IDP passport and had to be presented, together with all the documents for each member of the family, at each distribution. It recorded the number of people in the family, the passport/document number, a list of all commodities received, and the site number where the IDP resides. At an inter-agency meeting of NGOs and UN agencies in Baku on 3 March 1995, the WFP Director praised the use of the CCC and its associated system, saying that it had significantly reduced the incidence of distributions to persons other than legitimate IDPs and that other NGOs were now adopting such systems.

Items were distributed on a site by site basis, bringing them directly to each shelter, where feasible, rather than operating with large scale general distribution points. At sites with few IDPs, however, they were distributed at a nearby site to which the IDPs would travel. This process had several advantages: it allowed WV to reach a larger percentage of the population; it eased the burden and cost for IDPs having to travel to collect the aid; it ensured that IDPs were more accurately informed about distribution times and requirements; it allowed WV to control the distribution process more effectively; and, by providing WV with a more intimate knowledge of the actual residents of an IDP shelter, it reduced the possibility of people fraudulently acquiring a CCC.

WV directly distributed all items, with no IDP Committee members being allowed to assist. The on-site control of distributions was by two locally hired distribution monitors. They oversee a team of distribution staff. Distribution of kits was observed in one location in Xanlar on 5th of May 1997, and the monitors were asked to describe the distribution and monitoring process. The following process was explained and was easily observed.

Before distribution the IDPs' representatives were informed verbally, and posters were put up at least four days in advance. The information given included what goods were to be distributed, how much, and for whom, and the posters listed the items accepted as identification. On the day of the distribution, the team set up tables for receiving and stamping CCCs, and roped off the area. The distribution truck, when it arrived was located with its back door opening into the roped off area so that only people within the area could approach the truck for a kit. Teams were provided with an alphabetical list of each registered IDP family at each shelter, complete with passport number, family name, and number of men and women, broken into age groups, per family. The team leader used a numbering system, which organised the order in which IDPs collected their kit during the distribution. Beneficiaries queued behind the rope in a very orderly way, presented their CCCs and received their packages from the lorry. Staff explained that in previous distributions there had been some disorderly scenes. They responded to this by immediately packing up and informing the people that they would return the next day. This was very effective, and

they reported some beneficiaries have remarked on how much they appreciate receiving their goods quickly and calmly.

When setting up the distribution site, the team placed by the lorry a board displaying in English and Azeri that the donor of the kits was the ODA, thus advertising that they were provided from contributions of the people of the United Kingdom. This did have one adverse side-effect; staff reported that some beneficiaries had been disappointed to find that the material they received were not imported from the UK. This, in fact, had been noticed in the 1995 evaluation of clothing distributions, where a similar problem had occurred.

(End p 11)

At one distribution site in Ganje this problem was particularly apparent as the IDPs blockaded the truck, preventing it from leaving, though this was the first time in the sewing kits distribution that there has been a problem at the sites. Having seen that the donations were funded by the UK, beneficiaries expected higher quality material than the local material they were given and assumed that local World Vision staff were cheating them by keeping more valuable cloth and replacing it with local fabric. The trouble at this particular site was instigated by one individual who used the occasion to stir up unrest with the hope of influencing distributions; however, the suspicion of cloth having been swapped was also reflected by a number of the IDP families interviewed elsewhere. The situation was resolved with the help of the police and the IDP Executive Committee, but it was decided that for the remaining distributions in Ganje the ODA board would not be displayed, in case it sparked a similar disturbance. Appropriate publicity to the ODA's support will continue to be given, but methods likely to provoke unrest will be avoided.

It is worth noting that the site at which trouble occurred was in an area where WV does not carry out food distributions (these are covered by ADRA in the Ganje and Xanlar areas). Regular WV site visits to carry out food distributions help to establish and maintain relationships with the IDPs, making communication easier and reducing mistrust.

Reaching the distribution sites has been a greater problem as certain sites have not been readily accessible. In some cases this has been due to the site being near the occupied areas and consequently the military have designated it a restricted area into which even humanitarian supplies cannot enter. In other cases, while the site has been open to visits it has been considered too dangerous to carry out distributions due to increased military activity, and consequently the schedule has been altered with the intention to distribute in these areas when it is possible. At present, the security situation is quite unpredictable, making planning difficult. As an example, at one site visited by the evaluation team which had been considered safe when planning the evaluation schedule, artillery and machine-gun fire could be heard and the team was told that two people had been killed the previous day.

Conclusions

The distribution and monitoring procedures are efficiently implemented, allowing

rapid distribution of kits with a minimum of fuss and including good controls to prevent fraud. The removal of the sign indicating the donor should help to prevent misinterpretation of the source of the kits and should thus preclude further disturbances during distributions. Distributions to restricted or unsafe areas will be carried out as soon as is possible.