

Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds

Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000

Volume III

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**Independent Evaluation of Expenditure
of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds
Phases I and II, April 1999 – January 2000**

The evaluation consists of three volumes, of which this is the third.
Volume I: Main Findings of the Evaluation
Volume II: Sectoral Sections (including a section on War-Affected
Populations and Beneficiaries)
Volume III: Individual DEC Agency Summaries



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*Cover: Waiting for a house to be re-built in Kosovo
Photograph taken by John Cosgrave during the Evaluation Fieldwork, March 2000*

Preface

This volume of the DEC Kosovo Evaluation contains summaries of each agency's DEC funded activities. Each agency section also looks at key issues relating to performance which the evaluation team felt merited comment.

This volume should be read in conjunction with Volumes I and II of the Report.

Volume I contains the main findings of the evaluation, together with overall conclusions and an executive summary.

Volume II contains sections on sectoral topics, such as food and nutrition, shelter and psychosocial assistance. It also looks at the experiences of war-affected populations and beneficiaries.

Table of Contents

Preface	i
Table of Contents	iii
Glossary	vii
SECTION 1: SUMMARY OF BRCS’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	1
1.1 Mission.....	1
1.2 Context.....	1
1.3 How the BRCS Works	1
1.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	1
1.5 What BRCS Did.....	2
1.6 Summary of BRCS’s DEC-funded Activities.....	3
1.7 Key Issues	5
1.8 School Reconstruction	7
SECTION 2: SUMMARY OF CAFOD’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	9
2.1 Mission.....	9
2.2 Context.....	9
2.3 How CAFOD Works.....	9
2.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	10
2.5 Summary of CAFOD’s DEC-Funded Activities	10
2.6 Key Issues	12
SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF CARE INTERNATIONAL UK’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	15
3.1 Mission.....	15
3.2 Context.....	15
3.3 How CARE International UK Works	15
3.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	15
3.5 What CARE International UK Did	15
3.6 Summary of CARE’s DEC-funded Activities	16
3.7 Key Issues	18
SECTION 4: SUMMARY OF CHILDREN’S AID DIRECT’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	25
4.1 Mission.....	25
4.2 Context.....	25

4.3 How CAD Works.....	25
4.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	25
4.5 Summary of Children’s Aid Direct’s DEC-funded Activities	26
4.6 Key Issues	28
SECTION 5: SUMMARY OF CHRISTIAN AID’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES.....	33
5.1 Mission.....	33
5.2 Context.....	33
5.3 How Christian Aid Works	33
5.4 Overall Response to Emergency.....	33
5.5 What Christian Aid Did	33
5.6 Summary of Christian Aid’s DEC-funded Activities	35
5.7 Key Issues	38
SECTION 6: SUMMARY OF CONCERN’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES.....	41
6.1 Mission.....	41
6.2 Context.....	41
6.3 How Concern Works.....	41
6.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	41
6.5 Summary of Concern’s DEC-funded Activities	42
6.6 Key Issues	44
SECTION 7: SUMMARY OF HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	47
7.1 Mission.....	47
7.2 Context.....	47
7.3 How HelpAge International Works	47
7.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	47
7.5 What HelpAge International Did	48
7.6 Summary of HelpAge International’s DEC-funded Activities	49
7.7 Key Issues	50
SECTION 8: SUMMARY OF MERLIN’S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	55
8.1 Mission.....	55
8.2 Context.....	55
8.3 How Merlin Works	55
8.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	55
8.5 Summary of Merlin’s DEC-funded Activities	56

8.6 Key Issues	57
SECTION 9: SUMMARY OF OXFAM GB'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES.....	61
9.1 Mission.....	61
9.2 Context.....	61
9.3 How Oxfam Works	61
9.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	61
9.5 Summary of Oxfam's DEC-funded Activities.....	62
9.6 Key Issues	67
9.7 The Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project (KERP).....	69
SECTION 10: SUMMARY OF SAVE THE CHILDREN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES	71
10.1 Mission.....	71
10.2 Context.....	71
10.3 How Save the Children UK Works.....	71
10.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	71
10.5 Summary of Save the Children's DEC-funded Activities	72
10.6 Key Issues	78
SECTION 11: SUMMARY OF TEARFUND'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES.....	83
11.1 Mission.....	83
11.2 Context.....	83
11.3 How Tearfund Works	83
11.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	83
11.5 Summary of Tearfund's DEC-funded Activities	84
11.6 Key Issues	86
SECTION 12: SUMMARY OF WORLD VISION'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES.....	89
12.1 Mission.....	89
12.2 Context.....	89
12.3 How World Vision Works	89
12.4 Overall Response to the Emergency	89
12.5 Summary of World Vision's DEC-funded Activities	90
12.6 Key Issues	92
References.....	95

Glossary

ACT	Action by Churches Together
ACTED	Agence d'Aide à la Coopération Technique et au Développement
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance (ODI)
AoR	Area of Responsibility
ARC	Albanian Red Cross
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BMI	Body Mass Index
BRCS	British Red Cross Society
CA	Christian Aid
CAD	Children's Aid Direct
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
CDC	Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DFID
CICH	Institute for Child Health
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CMO	Civil Military Operations (analogous to CIMIC)
Concern	Concern Worldwide
CoC	Code of Conduct
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn/Soya Blend
CSW	Centre for Social Work
DA	Diakonia Agape
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DEM	Deutschmark
DFA	Irish Government's Department for Foreign Affairs
DoD	United States Department of Defense
DPT	Diphtheria, Pertussis and Tetanus Vaccine
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Dutch Relief and Rehabilitation Agency
DRT	Disaster Response Team (Tearfund's direct implementation arm)
EC	European Commission
ECEN	East and Central Europe Network
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECU	European Currency Unit
EDA	Edinburgh Direct Aid
EHO	Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation
EMG	Emergency Management Group
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPC	Emergency Programme Coordinator (Oxfam)
EU	European Union
EVI	Extremely Vulnerable Individual
ExCom	Executive Committee (of DEC)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation (of the UN)
FYROM	Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HAI	HelpAge International
HDI	Human Development Index
HI	Handicap International
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centre
HoD	Head of Delegation
HPN	Humanitarian Practice Network (formerly RRN – Relief and Rehabilitation Network), ODI
HR	Human Resources
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IACU	Inter-Agency Coordination Unit
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IHE	International Health Exchange
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOCC	International Orthodox Christian Charities
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPH	Institute of Public Health
IRC	International Rescue Committee, a US NGO
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Network
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
IWPR	Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JEFF	Joint Evaluation Follow-Up Monitoring and Facilitation Network
JTF	Joint Task Force
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice
KERP	Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KRC	Kosovo Red Cross
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MCIC	Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MDM	Médecins du Monde
MEECA	Middle East, Europe and Central Asia Team (Christian Aid)
MERLIN	Medical Emergency Relief International
MoH	Ministry of Health
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
Mont RC	Montenegrin Red Cross
MRC	Macedonian Red Cross
MRE	Meals, Ready to Eat
MRT	Mobile Rehabilitation Team (BRCS-funded programme in Kosovo)
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MTS	Mother Teresa Society
MUP	Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova (Serbian Interior Ministry)
NAO	National Audit Office

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGHA	Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NOVIB	Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation
NFI	Non-food items
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NPF	'Help the Children' a Roma NGO in Albania
NRCS	National Red Cross Society
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
ONS	Operating National Societies
OPD	Out-Patient's Department
OPV	Oral Poliovirus Vaccine
OSC	Operational Sub-Committee of DEC
OSCE	Organisation of Security and Operation in Europe
PJA	Period of Joint Action
PLO	Protection Liaison Officer
PNS	Participating National Societies (Red Cross)
PSF	Pharmaciens Sans Frontières
R&R	Rest and Recreation
RedR	Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief
REACH	Rehabilitation for Elderly and Children
RC	Red Cross
ROCC	Regional Operation Control Center (a coordination structure in Bosnia)
RRN	Relief and Rehabilitation Network (ODI). Now known as HPN (Humanitarian Practice Network)
SBASHK	Kosovo Teaching Staff Union
SC	Save the Children
SCHR	Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNI	Shelter Now International
SRC	Serbian Red Cross
ToR	Terms of Reference
UCK	Ushtrisë Çlirimtare të Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army – KLA)
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, HCR
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNMACC	United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center
UNMIK	United Nations Mission in Kosovo
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VJ	Vojska Jugoslavije (Yugoslav Army)
VUSH	Vellazeria Ungjillore (Albanian Evangelical Alliance)
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

WV World Vision
WVI World Vision International
YRC Yugoslav Red Cross

SECTION 1: SUMMARY OF BRCS'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

1.1 Mission

The British Red Cross Society has a mission to be the leading provider of emergency help to people in need, anywhere in the world. Its staff and volunteers abide by the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity and universality.

1.2 Context

The National Red Cross Societies have been active in Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and FRY (Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro) since the early 1990s. Each National Red Cross Society has established networks of branches and volunteers, though there are variations in quality, coverage and effectiveness. Given their nationwide reaches, the Red Cross Societies have played important roles in the response to the Kosovo crisis, although like other agencies their preparedness and capacities to respond were severely tested.

The NRCS have been involved in distributing relief assistance to refugees and affected people during the 1990s following the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the 1997 emergency in Albania and the developing conflict in Kosovo itself. Prior to the NATO bombings, both the ICRC and IFRC had delegations in Belgrade, Tirana and Skopje, and sub-delegations in Pristina and Podgorica.

1.3 How the BRCS Works

The BRCS did not have an independent operational presence in the region before the crisis. As is normal procedure, it provided support in terms of cash, delegates and materials to the ICRC and IFRC operations. Its overall strategy was rather to address development and relief issues simultaneously, through support to the IFRC, ICRC and the National Societies in the region. The BRCS has placed particular emphasis on institutional capacity building of the National Societies and before the Kosovo crisis was spending approximately £5-6 million in the region.

1.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

The Kosovo crisis prompted the ICRC and IFRC to take the unprecedented step of mounting a joint humanitarian operation to implement the Seville agreement which had been approved by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in 1997 (ICRC & IFRC, 1997). An integrated regional Red Cross appeal was launched on 7 April 1999, to cover the period from April to June, requesting 150 million Swiss francs (approximately £62 million) for a beneficiary planning figure of 220,000. On 26 July 1999, there was a revised appeal for the period July to December for 325 million Swiss francs (approximately £134 million). Funds were allocated to Albania, Macedonia, FRY and Bosnia.

A Joint Steering Committee and a Joint Logistics Cell were set up in Geneva, and the ICRC and IFRC combined operational mechanisms in the fields of logistics, information and reporting. While the ICRC was the lead agency in countries party to the conflict (Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro), the IFRC took the lead in Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia.

The Red Cross joint operation expanded rapidly in the first month of the crisis. By May, the RC relief caseload stood at around 468,000 (including 260,000 in Albania and 148,000 in Macedonia), while the international Red Cross delegate presence in Tirana and Skopje increased from about 6 to 80 and from 4 to over 60 respectively.

In the first six-month phase, the Red Cross response concentrated on support to refugees, IDPs and people directly affected by the crisis (host families and ‘social cases’, particularly those in institutions). Assistance included:

- Emergency assistance (food, hygiene, shelter, water and sanitation equipment and logistics);
- Emergency medical supplies (field hospitals, support to local health facilities and essential medical supplies);
- Protection of the civilian population (message and tracing services, access to prisoners of war and provision of information to the vulnerable);
- Strengthening National RC structures.

An evaluation of the international RC response to the Balkans crisis was carried out and the report published in April 2000 (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000).

1.5 What BRCS Did

The BRCS received 16.78 per cent of the DEC appeal funds. It responded quickly to the crisis, in cash terms, pledging £50,000 to the IFRC and £232,000 to the ICRC on 27 March 1999 and a further £2,282,000 (donated by DFID) to the joint appeal within 3 weeks of its launch. Within the first 10 days of April, the BRCS had also provided material and logistical support to the joint RC operation by procuring and dispatching basic goods to Albania (blankets, sleeping bags, MREs, hygiene parcels and food parcels).

The initial strategy of the BRCS was to support the joint RC operation ‘*rather than undermine them through bilateral uncoordinated actions*’. The BRCS did not, therefore, set up any bilateral operational programmes, but channelled its funds and resources through the joint Red Cross operation.¹ After the return of the refugees to Kosovo, the BRCS modified its strategy. Whilst continuing to support the Red Cross joint operation through provision of goods and BRCS delegates, the BRCS decided to concentrate upon clear sectoral and geographic foci (rehabilitation, children and winterisation, especially in FRY and Kosovo) and to become more directly operational in Kosovo. This strategic change was prompted by a desire for higher visibility whilst allowing the BRCS to monitor and report directly to the donor (there is a delegated project manager in the field). In order to remain within the coordinated RC response, however, the BRCS opted to operate an ICRC delegated project in Kosovo.²

¹ In the UK, the BRCS supported an information service and reception centres for Balkan refugees.

² A delegated project is defined as one which forms part of ICRC’s operational planning and priorities and which ICRC would conduct even in the absence of a PNS. This means that the BRCS can utilise ICRC’s financial, logistics and field services.

The BRCS had three lines of funding for financing the Kosovo crisis (BRCS own funds, allocations from DFID and ECHO, and DEC funds) and has been a major contributor to the joint Red Cross appeals.

1.6 Summary of BRCS's DEC-funded Activities

BRCS DEC PHASE I				REGIONAL	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory notes
Food Hygiene Non-food	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Kukes Elbasan Durrës Tirana Fier Shkoder	Procurement and distribution of: - 42,240 MREs - 122,574 baby hygiene parcels - 34,000 blankets - 3,624 sleeping bags Beneficiaries: Refugees	25,337 1,070,943 82,059 29,880	Many of these goods arrived late. In ARC's disaster preparedness stock: - 3,430 MREs - 15,858 baby hygiene parcels - 3,221 blankets - 3,624 sleeping bags
Transport	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Tirana Durrës	Transport of donation of: - 8 Fiat minibuses [6 of the minibuses went to the ARC while the other 2 went to support IFRC operations in Durrës and Vasto (in Italy)].	15,201	FIAT minibuses were sent after consultation with the IFRC. Not being standard Toyotas (ARC runs a Toyota garage), there may be difficulty in getting spare parts.
Hygiene	IFRC/ ICRC	MACEDONIA Locations throughout Macedonia	Distribution of: - baby hygiene parcels Beneficiaries: - Refugees in host families	Part of Albania consignment	
Food Hygiene Non-food	IFRC/ ICRC	SERBIA, MONTE- NEGRO & KOSOVO Locations throughout FRY	Distribution of: - 42,017 food parcels - 409 baby hygiene parcels - 3,948 kitchen sets - 50 MT sugar Beneficiaries: - IDPs - 'social cases' (soup kitchens)	98,384 3,185 47,207 12,129	Although these goods arrived in June/July 1999, they were only distributed between September and March.
Community services		REGIONAL	BBC World Service transmissions of ICRC lists of tracing requests	23,244	
Management support			11 BRCS delegates seconded to help run RC operation	111,131	
Transport Admin support			Charter plane to Italy Admin charges	20,667 30,791	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,570,158	

DEC PHASE II				REGIONAL	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Education Social	IFRC/ ICRC	ALBANIA Kukes Elbasan Durrës Tirana Fier Shkoder	Procurement and distribution of: - 328 educational kits - 156 recreational kits Beneficiaries: - Students/school children in resident population	284,912	Recreational and educational kits were received in September and distributed in October 1999. Because most of the refugees had left they were distributed to children's kindergartens, schools, special schools, social institutions, student hostels and collective centres for remaining refugees.
		MACEDONIA Locations throughout Macedonia	Procurement and distribution of: - 330 educational kits - 156 recreational kits Beneficiaries: - Students/school children in resident population		
	KOSOVO Gjakova Rahovec Glogoc Malisheva Suhareke	Procurement and distribution of: - 1,682 student kits - 566 teacher kits - 287 recreation kits - 500 mine leaflets Beneficiaries: - Elementary schools			
Rehabilitation			Rehabilitation of 35 schools: - MRT assessment team kit - Rehab team flights/logs base - Construction material and equipment - Desks and chairs Beneficiaries: - School children aged 5-14 years	1,702,419	Original target of 58 schools reduced because of price increases and other agencies doing school reconstruction. By the end of Phase II, only 13 Category B and 16 Category C schools were renovated. Project will continue until late August 2000.
Winterisation	IFRC/ ICRC	SERBIA & MONTE- NEGRO Various municipalities	Distribution of: - 82,000 winter jackets and shoes Beneficiaries: - Refugee children aged 0-14 years	845,211	Because of problems with purchase, gift certificates, customs clearance etc, the goods only arrived in Nov/Dec 1999 and final clearance was not until 11 Feb 2000.
Water/ sanitation			Procurement and transport of: - 6 Generators Beneficiaries: - National Blood Institute, Belgrade; ICRC Belgrade; ICRC Pristina; Psychiatric Hospital, Nis 2 in stock, Belgrade & Zagreb	67,074	Water tankers remain in stock in Belgrade. Landing craft currently in Arnhem, Netherlands, awaiting a response from ICRC on whether they have any needs for its use. Due to problems and delays with the paper work for importation, there is no longer a need for a boat in the region.
			Procurement and transport of: - 4 water tankers - Landing craft and training of operative	27,646 47,737	
Management/ Admin. Support			10 BRCS delegates seconded to ICRC and IFRC operations	86,035	
			BRCS/ICRC admin charges	65,312	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,126,146	

Total DEC Income:	£7,192,123	
Expenditure Phase I:	£1,570,158	Returns (Phase I) November 1999: £2,295,934
Expenditure Phase II:	£3,126,146	Returns (Phase II) made April 2000 (inc. £42,548 tax returns): £199,885
Total Expenditure:	£4,696,304	

1.7 Key Issues

'Value added' of channelling DEC funds through a major agency operation

The integrated RC appeals (for an initial £62 million followed by £134 million) dwarfed the DEC appeal, and the joint RC operation was a major contributor of humanitarian assistance in the region. The BRCS channelled Phase I DEC funds through this giant joint operation. What was the 'value added' of using DEC funds in this way? Did the DEC funds make a significant contribution to the joint RC operation?

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the impact of the DEC-funded material aid as the goods went into a larger pot and even trying to track the final destination of goods was difficult. In certain strategic areas, however, the DEC funds did appear to 'add value' to the overall operation. These areas included provision of high calibre delegates, logistical support and support to information services. Examples of good practice and problem areas are given below.

Working through the ICRC/IFRC

On balance, it was better that the BRCS channelled DEC funds through the joint Red Cross appeal rather than setting up bilateral projects, particularly in the initial stages of the emergency when things were somewhat chaotic. Furthermore, as noted below, the DEC funds 'added value' in certain strategic areas. As this was the first joint Red Cross emergency operation, however, problems were encountered which also affected the impact of DEC funds. Despite the problems, the external evaluation (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000) of the RC joint operation came down firmly in favour of future joint operations. If the recommendations from the evaluation are addressed, it is hoped that future joint operations will be better.

The BRCS has also noted that its capacity to respond was slow and that it experienced problems in becoming operational during Phase II as the support systems had 'gone to sleep' over the years and needed to be woken up³. This has stimulated the BRCS to review its emergency response capabilities.

Working through the National Red Cross Societies

The Albanian Red Cross was disbanded in 1968 but since 1990 has been re-established and was, in the circumstances, considered by the IFRC and ICRC to be a small, well-trained organisation. The Macedonian Red Cross was viewed by the IFRC as a less effective

³ Interview with BRCS London, February 2000.

organisation. The Yugoslav Red Cross comprises of the Serbian Red Cross and the Montenegrin Red Cross. The Serbian Red Cross was further subdivided into the Vojvodina Red Cross and the official Kosovo and Metohija Red Cross (Kosmet RC). During the 1990s the Kosovo Albanians established a parallel non-recognised Kosova Red Cross.

The Yugoslav Red Cross has been accused by some donors of being close to the Milosevic Government and of diversion of aid. As a result, its activities have been intensively monitored and investigated. The view of most international humanitarian organisations, both UN and NGO, is that the YRC remains the most important nation-wide organisation in Serbia for reaching vulnerable populations (UN Humanitarian Coordinator FRY, 2000).

In Kosovo, the presence of two Red Cross bodies remains a problem closely linked to the ultimate political future of the province. In that situation the ICRC remains the channel for international Red Cross assistance.

Examples of good practice

The BRCS has generally been lauded by the ICRC and IFRC for having '*played by the rules*' and deciding to support the joint operation, rather than acting bilaterally.⁴ The positive aspects for the joint RC operation were:

Speedy response: DEC funds were pledged in April

Within the first 10 days of April, the BRCS had responded by dispatching basic goods to Albania (blankets, sleeping bags, MREs, hygiene parcels and food parcels).

Positioning of high calibre delegates

DEC funds paid for 11 delegates including four in senior posts (two HoDs) and a strategically placed liaison delegate in Albania. The mobilisation of experienced delegates was recognised as an important contribution by the external evaluators of the RC joint operation.

Logistical support

The BRCS has strong logistical capacity and DEC funds were used to bolster this capacity. This was particularly useful as the IFRC logistical capacity was limited, while IFRC and ICRC logistical systems were incompatible.

Good coordination and maintenance of standards

Channelling funds through the joint operation facilitated programme coordination although the lack of coordination of some PNS was a particular problem⁵. It also allowed RC standards to be applied. For example, the BRCS purchased Red Cross recommended food parcels and baby kits using DEC funds rather than developing its own parcels (as some PNS did).

⁴ This was contrasted with the actions of a number of other Participating National Red Cross Societies (PNS) which acted bilaterally, outside the umbrella of the joint ICRC/IFRC operation.

⁵ By Nov 1999 there were 18 PNS, 90 delegates and 40 projects, of which about 50 per cent were delegated projects in Kosovo. Interview with BRCS London, February 2000.

Examples of problem areas

The recent RC evaluation has highlighted a number of problem areas in the joint RC response (Stone, Anema & Wissink, 2000). Some of these constraints are applicable to the DEC funds and include:

Failure to meet the needs of refugees in host families in Albania during May

The RC signed an agreement with WFP, UNHCR and the authorities in Albania to address the relief needs of refugees in host families. The IFRC pipeline to Albania proved to be problematic, however. The pipeline was originally designed for 100,000 beneficiaries whereas the number of beneficiaries in host families exceeded 300,000. This, together with bottlenecks in the logistics pipeline via Ancona, resulted in a failure to deliver food parcels and other relief items in early May. The WFP had to come to the rescue of the RC and start to supply food.

Late arrival of assistance

There were various examples of DEC-funded goods procured and sent by the BRCS through the joint logistics pipeline arriving late. These included:

- September 1999: arrival of educational and recreational kits destined for refugees in Albania and Macedonia;
- May 1999: arrival of MREs for newly arrived refugees in Albania;
- February 2000: arrival of winter jackets and shoes sent to Serbia for refugee children;
- Landing craft (for Serbia) still in the Netherlands in May 2000 due to problems and delays with the paper work for importation. There is no longer a need for a boat in the region.

These timings reflect a number of difficulties, including overloaded logistical systems and, in the case of Serbia, the difficulties of getting customs clearances.

Lack of direct monitoring and reporting

As the BRCS did not have an operational presence, it could not carry out independent monitoring and reporting. As a result, it has been extremely difficult to track the final destination of goods and to assess their impact.

1.8 School Reconstruction

Over half of Phase II funds were allocated for the reconstruction of 35 schools in Kosovo. The decision was taken on the basis of an assessment mission, though BRCS had limited experience of reconstruction work. Was it wise for BRCS to opt for school reconstruction when it has limited expertise in this area? Examples of good practice and of problem areas in relation to the BRCS school reconstruction programme are listed below:

Examples of good practice

Correct identification of an essential area

The assessment mission correctly identified school reconstruction as a priority area.

Professionalism of the BRCS

The evaluation team was impressed by the professional approach adopted by the BRCS. The school reconstruction programme was professional, not just in technical terms, but in terms of

having a clear plan and on maintaining good relations with school directors and local authorities.

Examples of problem areas

Difficulty in getting suitably qualified staff

The BRCS did not have staff on its database with technical expertise in construction and difficulties were experienced in getting suitably qualified staff through other channels. Eventually the BRCS had to advertise in building trade magazines and take on construction delegates who had no previous RC experience and who received limited briefing. This was contrary to BRCS procedures. The initial rapid assessment team was replaced by two three-month operational teams, a less than ideal turnover for this reconstruction project.

Area covered by other agencies

Although the BRCS had identified school reconstruction as an area of need, a number of other agencies were involved in school reconstruction work in Kosovo and the proposed number of schools for reconstruction had to be decreased.

Slow delivery

By the end of Phase II, 13 Category B and 16 Category C schools had been renovated, slower than originally planned, partly due to the impact of winter on external work.

The option taken by the BRCS to have an operational presence in Kosovo and to opt for an area in which it has little previous experience, has been met with mixed success. Clearly school reconstruction is a niche area which other agencies have also recognised and addressed. The BRCS appear to have adopted a professional approach, however, and although the impact has been slower and coverage has been less than originally planned, the quality of the final work is good.

SECTION 2: SUMMARY OF CAFOD'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

2.1 Mission

CAFOD's mission is to promote human development and social justice in witness to Christian faith and Gospel values. To fulfil this mission CAFOD raises funds from within the Catholic community and beyond so that it can:

- empower people in need regardless of their race, gender, religion or politics to bring about change through development and relief programmes overseas;
- raise public awareness of poverty and injustice, increasing understanding of the worldwide inter-dependence of rich and poor, and creating the will to change unjust structures and lifestyles;
- act as an advocate for the poor, articulating a clear analysis of the underlying causes of poverty and challenging governments and international bodies to adopt policies which incorporate the principles of social justice.

2.2 Context

CAFOD began working with local partners in Eastern Europe in 1989, following the earthquake in Armenia. Since then, the Eastern Europe programme has expanded to cover Albania and the former Yugoslavia. CAFOD established CAFOD Albania, a local NGO, in 1993. In the former Yugoslavia, CAFOD has supported projects of Caritas and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia as well as two secular agencies in Serbia. During 1998, CAFOD funded the Caritas network to provide assistance to IDPs in Kosovo.

2.3 How CAFOD Works

CAFOD is a non-operational development and relief agency and is a member of Caritas and CIDSE, the worldwide networks of Catholic aid agencies. CAFOD works by supporting partner organisations whether secular, ecumenical or church-related, as well as those of other faiths. It has been CAFOD's practice to offer partners support in a variety of ways over a number of years, reflecting the multiple dimensions to programme quality. This support is based on an appreciation of the principles by which a partner organisation functions.

Among other aspects, this support includes:

- how the partner facilitates project design by and with the community;
- how project proposals are subsequently developed and monitored by the partner organisation;
- the process of reflection-action-reflection that the partner follows before, during and after project implementation.

CAFOD also has an Emergencies Section that provides operational support to programme staff in London and technical support to partners in the field. The Section has staff expertise in health and nutrition, shelter, water and sanitation and emergency programme management.

2.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

CAFOD received 5.4 per cent of DEC funds. Nearly all the DEC funds were spent in Serbia and Kosovo. In Phase I, over 90 per cent of DEC funds were spent on food-related programmes (a large portion was channelled through CRS). In Phase II, there was greater concentration on rehabilitation and shelter projects and a higher proportion of non-food material aid was distributed.

While CAFOD has not had an operational presence in the Balkans during the Kosovo crisis, it has a senior staff member and assistant based in Italy who provide support to partner programmes. CAFOD Emergency and Programme staff have also monitored and supported emergency projects since the crisis began, through dialogue with partners and visits to the region. An Emergencies Coordinator, based in Albania, was also appointed to support the (non-DEC funded) emergency programmes for Kosovo refugees managed by CAFOD Albania.

2.5 Summary of CAFOD's DEC-Funded Activities

CAFOD DEC PHASE I					
Sector	Partner Agency	Country & Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food	CRS	KOSOVO Prizren AOR 7 municipalities	Procurement and distribution of: - MRE food rations Beneficiaries: - 'vulnerable groups' (at home, in collective centres and in institutions)	699,518	Started distribution on 14 June. Covers both majority (Albanian) and minority groups. CRS uses local partners (e.g. Red Cross, MTS and village councils) to do the distribution. CRS Kosovo offices are supported by CRS Macedonian office
Food Non-food aid Health Psycho-social	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - medicines - blankets - women's workshops Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	111,982	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				811,500	

CAFOD DEC PHASE II					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
Shelter	IRW	KOSOVO Pristina Obilic	Augmented roof project: - Provision of dry, warm room packages Beneficiaries: - 273 families with homes in damage categories 4-5	65,762	
Rehabilitation	IRW	KOSOVO Podujeva	Rehabilitation of 3 schools Beneficiaries: - 840 school children aged 5-14 years	129,746	
Food Non-food aid Health Psycho-social	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - medicines - 2,000 blankets - 150 wood burning stoves - Women's workshops Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	239,858	
Non-food aid	CAFOD partner in Serbia	SERBIA Throughout Serbia	Distribution of: - winter jackets - winter boots Beneficiaries: - IDPs in collective centres	275,554	
Non-food aid	CRS	SERBIA In and around Belgrade	Procurement and distribution of: - firewood Beneficiaries: - Roma families in paper settlements	80,046	
			Phase I shortfall on CRS Emergency Assistance	300,482	
			Net exchange rate loss	1,260	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,092,708	

Total DEC Income:	£2,272,200
Expenditure Phase I:	£ 811,500
(Returns November 1999:	£335,475)
Expenditure Phase II:	£1,092,708
Total Expenditure:	£1,904,208
Outstanding DEC funds in May 1999:	£32,517

2.6 Key Issues

Emphasis on food aid

CAFOD spent a higher proportion of DEC Phase I funds on supporting food aid programmes than other DEC agencies.⁶ In DEC Phase I this amounted to over 90 per cent of the funds, mainly to CRS. The CRS programme aimed to pre-position supplies for refugees about to return to Kosovo. This enabled a rapid response at the time, based on an analysis that food availability for returnees was unclear. In retrospect, given the influx of food into the Balkans that followed, CAFOD acknowledges that it might have responded differently.

In Phase II about 34 per cent of DEC funds were used for food aid, reflecting requests made to CAFOD by its partners. Concentration on food aid had advantages and disadvantages.

Advantages

Food is a basic need and an essential component of aid in most emergencies. In the Kosovo crisis, the distribution of basic food items provided an important contribution to the humanitarian operation.

Channelling funds through CRS

CRS is a large relief and development organisation that specialises in food and nutrition. It was a major provider of food items (wheat flour, beans, oil, sugar and salt) in the Kosovo region. These basic items were the most appropriate forms of food aid and were more cost-effective than providing elaborate food parcels (refer to Section 1, Volume II).

'Value added' of channelling DEC funds through CRS

CRS noted that the DEC funds had particular advantages for the CRS Kosovo programme⁷. These included:

- Flexibility;
- Filled in gaps. For example, DEC funds could be used in Serb enclaves where Food for Peace food cannot be used according to Regulation 11;
- Available to fill in pipeline gaps – especially at the beginning when customs problems disrupted the pipeline.

Disadvantages

Abundance of food aid

There was no shortage of food aid sent to the Balkans during the Kosovo crisis. An opportunity was therefore missed to use DEC funds, with their potential flexibility in a more innovative way.

Inappropriate types of food aid

Donations channelled through less experienced food aid providers resulted in inappropriate forms of food aid being distributed. For example, one CAFOD partner's food parcel

⁶ CAFOD's portfolio of projects in the Balkans emergency included support to partners' non-food projects which were not funded with DEC money.

⁷ Interview with CRS Kosovo. March 2000.

contained milk powder. Several international guidelines stress that milk powder is an inappropriate type of food aid for an emergency situation, especially where hygienic conditions are poor (as in the Roma communities where these food parcels were distributed).

Implications of working with local partners

(i) Strengths of working with local partners

Established working relationship

CAFOD had well established working relationships with partners in the region, stretching back over several years.

Access to local knowledge

Local partners tend to know the local context (including potential local suppliers, distribution mechanisms and transport possibilities) and are well placed to 'hear' the views of local communities and beneficiary groups.

Linking relief and development

Local partners are likely to continue working in the region after an emergency and can link relief work to longer-term work. For example, a CAFOD partner in Serbia intends to continue working with the Roma.

(ii) Constraints of working with local partners

Lack of monitoring and evaluation

Considerable time and effort may be required to support partners in order to ensure that their own programme monitoring and evaluation is satisfactory. The funding agency also has to fulfil its own monitoring and evaluation requirements. CAFOD HQ noted that it was '*incredibly stressed last year and unable to carry out sufficient monitoring.*'⁸

Limited experience/knowledge of relief and rehabilitation work

Whilst CRS had considerable experience of working in relief and rehabilitation, some of CAFOD's other local partners had very limited experience. This lack of experience, particularly with regard to awareness of international guidelines and the Sphere standards, led to incidences of inappropriate aid being delivered. For example, one CAFOD partner in Serbia gave out food parcels containing milk powder to Roma families living in conditions of appalling hygiene.⁹ CAFOD had faxed guidelines on nutritional standards during emergencies to one of its partners in Serbia. These were more appropriate for developing countries — for example, emphasis on treatment of malnutrition — and so of limited use in the circumstances.

⁸ Reported in interview with CAFOD HQ staff. Staff monitoring visits were made to Serbia and Kosovo.

⁹ CAFOD staff also had concern about this practice and raised it with their partner. The partner, citing UNICEF reports, noted that breast feeding was reported to be on the decline in Serbia and that the practice of distributing milk powder was currently regarded as acceptable by some major international agencies. The evaluation team noted the complexities of the situation but disagreed and felt that the distribution of milk powder was unwise.

The fact that the guidelines were in English may also have been a problem. CAFOD has since appointed a health and nutrition advisor who visited its partner in March 2000.¹⁰

One of CAFOD's partners in Serbia reported that it was '*too busy*' to participate in the inter-sectoral coordination meetings (of UNHCR and WHO) and that coordination with Oxfam and CRS on programmes had been relatively recent.¹¹ This was a pity, as more experienced agencies in the field may have been able to provide them with essential information and support. However, it should be noted that local NGOs in Serbia also need to be cautious about attendance at meetings at which government representatives are present. This can be an obstacle to attending some coordination meetings.

Where funding is channelled to small, inexperienced local partners, it is imperative that adequate support, monitoring and evaluation of activities should be carried out. In cases where the local partner embarks on projects in an area outside its traditional area of competence, this is even more imperative.

¹⁰ Information in CAFOD's DEC Plans of Action and an interview with one of their partners in Serbia raised concerns about their distribution of antibiotics. However, subsequently the assurance has been given that antibiotics are always prescribed and given out by a qualified doctor.

¹¹ Interview with one of the CAFOD partners in Belgrade.

SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF CARE INTERNATIONAL UK'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

3.1 Mission

CARE International's mission is to serve individuals and families in the poorest communities in the world: *'Drawing strength from our global diversity, resources and experience, we promote innovative solutions and are advocates for global responsibility'*.

3.2 Context

Care International has had a presence in the Balkans since 1992, running programmes in Bosnia, Croatia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, including Serbia, Vojvodino, Montenegro and Kosovo. Prior to March 1999, CARE had a sub-office in Pristina, from where it supported Serb refugees from Krajina and displaced Kosovo Albanian populations. Prior to 1999 CARE had no offices in Albania or Macedonia, although it did support work there and in 1998 commissioned an emergency assessment in those countries.

3.3 How CARE International UK Works

CARE International is an association of ten national CARE organisations and is one of the largest relief and development organisations in the world. CARE worldwide supports relief and long-term development programmes, implementing them both directly and through partner organisations. CARE International UK works in 32 countries across the globe with a growing focus on urban poverty.

3.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Eight national CARE organisations participated in CARE International's response to the Kosovo emergency. CARE Canada took the lead in Albania and Bosnia; CARE Australia in Former Yugoslavia, Macedonia and initially in Kosovo; and CARE USA in Macedonia from June 1999 and in Kosovo from September 1999. CARE UK had no operational responsibilities during the emergency, but channelled DEC funds to CARE International.

3.5 What CARE International UK Did

CARE UK received 6.5 per cent of the DEC Phase I and II Kosovo appeal funds, amounting to £2,725,800. These DEC funds were allocated to Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo, with over 60 per cent spent in Kosovo.

In response to the refugee exodus CARE established refugee assistance programmes in Albania and Macedonia. Supported by contracts worth £11.7 million, CARE managed 7 refugee camps housing over 100,000 refugees. In Kosovo, CARE is one of the three largest NGOs with 50 international and 450 local staff. A budget of £15.6 million supports a portfolio of programmes in shelter provision and repair; health; food and non-food distribution; agricultural rehabilitation; mine awareness training and de-mining; and firewood provision (CARE International, 2000a).

3.6 Summary of CARE's DEC-funded Activities

CARE DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Camp Management Food & non-food distribution	UNHCR WFP	Elbasan Kukes Durrës (Spitalle) Rahzbull Korce Fier (Camp Hope)	Management of 5 refugee camps, collective centres and 4 way stations; secondary food distribution; mobile 'find and help' distribution to individuals missed by mainstream aid. Beneficiaries: over 35,000 refugees. DEC funds supported: - Food: purchase of bread for newly arrived refugees in camps and collective centres. - Hygiene materials. - Transport, storage, (includes purchase of 3 7.5 mt trucks and 6 rubbish halls £54,075) and office costs. - Personnel & personnel support costs: includes 50% country director; 30 per cent NATO liaison officer; salary for standards consultant; cost of a security coordinator.	7,213 847 114,511 74,738
Education		Korce	Renovation of Naim Frasheri school, Korce. A rehabilitation project in a refugee affected area, agreed with DEC. Beneficiaries: 500 children (95% Roma)	94,530
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				291,839

CARE DEC PHASE I				FYR MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Camp Management Relief Social services	UNHCR WFP INGOs	Stankovic II Cegrane	Camp management; upgrading of camp infrastructure; storage; distribution of food and non-food relief supplies; social services (including drama therapy); information. Beneficiaries: 68,000 refugees. DEC funds supported: - Procurement of complementary foods and non-food relief supplies. - Office supplies and communications - Personnel salaries and their support costs, including 3 Mother and Child Centre programme managers, part funding of senior managers, and 14 locally engaged staff.	481,576 18,947 91,305
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				591,828

Summary of CARE International UK's DEC-Funded Activities

CARE DEC PHASE I				KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Research	Ombudsman project	Kosovo	Research for modelling Humanitarian Ombudsman, undertaken in Kosovo after the return of refugees. Expenses and fees for two expatriate researchers.	14,948
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				14,948

CARE DEC PHASE I					UK
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Management support				6,761	Costs of UK monitoring, hire of UK Balkans assistant, and recruitment costs.
CARE UK				76,957	8.5% management fee.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				973,045	Less £9,288 from other donors.

CARE DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Agriculture	MTS FAO	Urosevac/ Ferizaj, Kacanik Lipljan	- Distribution of NPK fertiliser	108,269	
			- Distribution of urea fertiliser with particular emphasis on minority farmers. Beneficiaries: 3,687 households.	12,007	
			- Distribution of 800 MT cattle feed. Beneficiaries 3,585 households.	144,090	
			- Warehouse and logistics	30,225	
			- Personnel and personnel support	17,340	
Mine clearance	Mine Tech	Urosevac/ Ferizaj, Kacanik Lipljan	- Level 1 survey etc. - Clearance of mines - Mine awareness Beneficiaries: 11,000 houses and 13 schools surveyed and 167 villages visited.	909,060	Projected expenditure to 29 February.
Monitoring/evaluation				888	Costs of UK monitoring visit.
REACH Assessment			Assessment of state and non-state systems of social protection and welfare.	3,501	Costs of consultant and CARE UK staff time.
CARE UK				102,051	Management fee 8.5%, including projected expenditure to 29 February.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,302,655	

Total DEC income Phase I & II:	£2,725,800
Expenditure Phase I:	£973,045
Expenditure Phase II:	£1,302,655
Total Expenditure:	£2,277,496

In Phase II there is an underspend of £449,645, of which £373,509 will be rolled over to Phase IIb and £76,136 returned to DEC (CARE International, 2000b)

3.7 Key Issues

Additionality of DEC funds

DEC funds represented 10 per cent of the £27.3 million funds available to CARE during the refugee and return phase of the Kosovo crisis. CARE used little of the DEC funds for overheads as donors like OFDA were generous with these. The flexibility and rapid release of DEC funds enabled CARE to:

- transfer DEC funds allocated for Albania to Macedonia;
- to fill essential gaps in programmes that other donors would not fund, such as mine clearance in Kosovo;
- support innovative activities such as the salary of a Standards Consultant in Albania, research for the Humanitarian Ombudsman project and the REACH assessment in Kosovo.

Preparedness

CARE should have been better prepared for the crisis, having commissioned an 'Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan' for Albania and Macedonia in 1998 following the increase in hostilities in Kosovo (Fennell, 1998). The assessment alerted CARE to a pending disaster and recommended further assessments in Kosovo and Montenegro, the pre-positioning of supplies and the establishment of a presence in Macedonia. The report's recommendations were not implemented due to organisational and funding constraints, and in part due to the uncertainty of investing in an initiative that might not bring returns.¹² In the words of one CARE UK staff member, '*The alert was there but there were no resources*'. In addition, the winding down of CARE UK's emergency unit and CARE International's procurement capacity in Europe weakened CARE's capacity for rapid response.

The main lesson CARE UK has drawn from this is the need to better link analysis and response with lobbying within the CARE International structure.¹³ CARE is undertaking preparedness activities in several areas of the Balkans. In Albania, for example, it is providing emergency and preparedness training for local NGOs, concentrating on those areas which could be affected by a refugee influx from Montenegro, Macedonia or Kosovo.¹⁴

¹² Interview with CARE UK, London, March 2000.

¹³ Interview with CARE UK, London, March 2000.

¹⁴ Interview with CARE, Tirana, March 2000

Examples of good practice

The appropriateness and professionalism of CARE's response is apparent in several areas.

Preparedness

The commissioning of an 'Emergency Assessment and Contingency Plan' for Albania and Macedonia in 1998 was a good initiative, although it was not heeded.

Timeliness

In the view of CARE staff, the lack of emergency preparedness delayed the speed of CARE's response to the refugee outflow. However, CARE staff who evacuated from Kosovo were able to rapidly establish a presence in Macedonia and CARE was able to draw on its huge international capacity. By 1 April CARE had teams established in Serbia, Macedonia and Albania.

CARE, like other agencies, was taken by surprise at the suddenness and speed of the refugees' return to Kosovo, but responded quickly with the establishment of 'way stations' in Albania to assist returning refugees, and a mines awareness campaign in camps. CARE was equally quick in returning to Kosovo, re-entering the territory three days after NATO troops. By 25 June, two weeks after the cease-fire, CARE staff were distributing relief. Preparations were underway before the return. Forward planning for a programme in Kosovo was made easier once it had negotiated an Area of Responsibility (AoR) with UNHCR. Consultations with refugees in camps was used to design the agricultural programme in Kosovo.

Agency Competence

CARE utilised its considerable experience in camp management, food distribution, food security and mine clearance. CARE's camp management was considered effective and professional by collaborating agencies in Macedonia and Albania. The evaluation team found the quality of work in agriculture and mine clearance to be professionally implemented.

Assessment, monitoring, evaluation

Some good practice was evident in relation to needs assessments, monitoring and evaluations. This was apparent in the refugee camps, where refugees were consulted through camp structures, regular meetings and 'information desks' where refugees could go to seek information. Women were consulted through social services, such as the Mother and Child Centres supported by CARE.

Refugees were consulted in the Macedonian camps to design CARE's agricultural programme in Kosovo. Needs assessments in Kosovo have involved a number of groups — community groups, MTS, UN appointed civil administrations — although the level of consultation with women is unclear.¹⁵ Following the distribution of seeds and fertiliser in November, CARE undertook a post-distribution assessment of 5 per cent of households in 20 per cent of the villages in its AoR.

CARE has undertaken a livelihood security baseline survey (not DEC funded) among host families in Albania (CARE International, 1999). CARE International has also undertaken a lesson learning review of its response to the emergency. This review had not been made

¹⁵ Some women were present at the CARE seed distribution witnessed during the evaluation.

public at the time of the evaluation fieldwork, but a paper raising the general learning issues from the Kosovo crisis has been prepared (CARE International, 2000c).

Policy work

CARE used DEC funds to support research and assessments. This built on CARE UK's policy work on the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project, the Sphere Project, and its work on 'social protection' in Bosnia. The research to test and design a model Humanitarian Ombudsman has been considered a useful initiative.¹⁶ However, no links were made between these two initiatives and CARE UK's dissemination of the research has been poor.¹⁷

Protection

Although CARE did not articulate 'protection' needs in its proposals, awareness of protection needs is apparent in its work. For example:

- CARE maintained a 24-hour presence in refugee camps, employed security officers and lobbied UNHCR to increase their presence in the camps.¹⁸
- In Kosovo, CARE has developed strategies to address access constraints faced by minority farmers and other vulnerable groups. These include: recruiting national staff without local connections to avoid influencing beneficiary selection; employing Serbs to work in Serb villages; direct distributions by CARE; and positive discrimination in the allocation of some resources — for example, the distribution of urea fertiliser to Serb farmers to top dress winter wheat to increase their yields. This was considered necessary to increase their food security, given their limited access to markets.¹⁹ CARE opened an office in north Mitrovica to improve coverage. It notes: *'While such cantonisation of operations is not ideal, it is the only way of providing significant services without endangering our staff, given the current climate'* (CARE International, 2000a).
- CARE is a member of the Protection Working Group in Pristina, which meets to address issues related to protection, human rights and UNMIK policies.
- The REACH assessment funded by DEC funds has been used to inform work on social protection issues.

Coherence

CARE International in Kosovo is an example of the trend towards multi-national confederated programmes, with eight national CARE members participating. While generating huge resources, this way of working led to pressures of bilateralism which affected CARE's ability to ensure programme quality (CARE International, 2000a). The majority of CARE's funding came from donor governments, and with governments keen to channel resources to areas

¹⁶ Given the proposed establishment of a human rights Ombudsman for Kosovo, OSCE staff expressed interest in the Ombudsman research (Interview, OSCE, March 2000, Prizren.)

¹⁷ Interview with BRCS, March 2000, London.

¹⁸ Interview with CARE, April 2000, Serbia.

¹⁹ Blanket distribution of food may serve to weaken links between Serb and Albanian communities, by removing the need for Albanians to trade with Serb farmers who had wheat stocks. Although it may also have made Serbs more of a target.

where their military contingents were operating, this risked affecting CARE's independence and the '*Balkanisation of CARE Kosovo*' (CARE International, 2000a). The arrest of CARE employees in Serbia on spying charges also affected perceptions of CARE International's independence. Additional strains were caused by different administrative systems among the different CARE organisations. The appointment of a Balkans Coordinator helped ensure overall coherence and CARE International's own lesson-learning review (CARE International, 2000c) has sought to address some of these problems. To its credit, CARE UK is not accused of bilateralism. DEC funds removed the necessity of taking UK government funding and helped maintain its independence. One senior staff member noted: '*DEC funds kept us honest*'.²⁰

Standards

CARE used DEC funds to employ a consultant in Albania to evaluate standards in refugee assistance, including camp management (Kelly, 2000). The end product was practical guidelines for implementing standards, including Sphere Standards, in the management of refugee camps and collective centres and secondary food distribution.²¹ While there are Sphere Standards for refugee assistance, there are no guidelines on camp management, a largely political job.

Connectedness

In Albania and Macedonia, CARE continued working as the refugee crisis receded, cleaning campsites and initiating quick impact rehabilitation and longer term development activities. The latter include school rehabilitation and training with local NGOs in Albania and a permaculture farm in Macedonia. Lack of donor funding affected the choice of programming in Macedonia.²² Showing forethought, CARE held a strategic planning exercise in Albania in July 1999 and in Kosovo as early as September 1999, to set the direction for the following 18 months.

Examples of problem areas

Standards

In the Kosovo emergency 'maximum standards' was as big an issue as minimum standards. CARE notes in its DEC Phase I report '*the high expectations of refugees from a European society, which resulted in demands for greater provisions and more sophisticated camp infrastructure.*' In Albania, CARE arranged for refugees who complained about the quality of bread to consult with local bakers. In Macedonia, complementary foods provided by CARE included fresh chicken, and cereals, milk and fruit juice for children. CARE spent over £6,000 of DEC funds on Albanian newspapers for refugees in Macedonia alone. CARE's claim that the delivery of fresh food ensured a high nutritional status was maintained (DEC Phase II report) is exaggerated, given the general good health of the population and availability of foodstuffs. This level of assistance exceeded standards of assistance received by refugees

²⁰ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

²¹ Some CARE staff who had worked in Albania reported that the OFDA Field Operations Guide was a more useful field tool than Sphere guidelines (Interview with CARE Kosovo, March 2000).

²² Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

elsewhere. The necessity of some of the assistance provided and whether this level of assistance for refugees could have been sustained in the long-term is questionable.

Aid-military relations

As a major actor in refugee camp management, CARE was in direct contact with NATO forces, which raised issues of neutrality and impartiality. US Marines, for example, provided security in Camp Hope during the construction phase. In Albania, DEC funds were used to part-fund a CARE NATO liaison officer. Some CARE staff argue that the liaison officer made relations with the military more efficient. Others expressed concern at what they saw as militarisation of humanitarianism and military competition for humanitarian resources. In Korce one CARE office did draw up 'ground rules' for the distribution of relief assistance.²³ However, as with other agencies, lack of guidelines on aid-military relations was a weakness in the response and is recognised as such by the organisation.

Advocacy

CARE undertook advocacy in-country at an individual project or programme level, but seems to have steered away from addressing some broader issues.

CARE UK expressed uneasiness with British government statements during the emergency that '*British and military objectives are intertwined*' and considered the possibility of not taking British government money.²⁴ However, the availability of DEC funds meant the need did not arise and CARE took no public position on it.

CARE UK — which is a signature to the campaign against land mines and utilised DEC funds for a de-mining and UXO clearance programme in Kosovo — made no statement on NATO's use of cluster bombs (see Section 6, Volume II). CARE UK argues that it does not have the 'policy competence' to advocate on this issue, even though it has lobbied the US government on its failure to sign the convention on landmines.²⁵

CARE UK's ability to take an advocacy position may be constrained by being a member of a larger confederation. CARE International's sub-contracting relationship with donor governments may also limit the space for taking an independent position.

Furthermore, in a politically-charged environment like the Kosovo emergency, CARE International's sub-contracting relationship with donor governments limits its space for taking an independent position.

Connectedness

CARE recognises that the biggest challenge in Kosovo is the '*transition from relief to development*' and that this will be determined by the broader economic and political framework (CARE International, 2000a). The current 'stateless' situation impacts on CARE's work, for example in agriculture.

²³ Susanne Jaspars, May 2000, London.

²⁴ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

²⁵ Interview with CARE UK, March 2000, London.

Given the legal uncertainties over land ownership and the ownership of former state agricultural enterprises, problems of high land prices and restricted markets, CARE's aim to re-establish subsistence agriculture in Kosovo appears unrealistic. While there is awareness of these issues, CARE's ability to influence them is limited. One action it has taken is to cut seed distributions to Kosovo Albanian farmers to 30–40 per cent of their needs, in order to '*avoid creating dependency*', a policy supported by the FAO.²⁶ However, while aid, in some instances, may be replacing a reliance on remittances, reducing aid does not necessarily solve the problem as agriculture has always been subsidised by the state and through remittances. The reduction of CARE's subsidy could therefore lead to social problems and is something which CARE's household livelihood assessments should monitor.

Use of DEC funds

CARE asserts that the flexibility and speed of disbursement allowed for a 'truly rapid response' to the refugee crisis in Albania (CARE International, 2000d). However, a third of the DEC funds it allocated to Albania were not spent until October on the rehabilitation of Naim Frasheri school in Korce. CARE's stated rationale for this project was: to rehabilitate infrastructure affected by the influx of refugees; to support countries that host refugees; to prevent the movement of Albanians to Kosovo; and contribute to the '*general stability of the region*' (CARE International, 2000d). With DEC approval, the Phase I deadline was extended to allow the tendering process to be completed and Phase I money to be 'committed' by 15th October. Work was expected to be completed by December 1999 but had not been finalised at the time of the evaluation fieldwork in March 2000.

The project raises several issues on the use of DEC funds. The need of the Roma community is beyond doubt, although the advisability of encouraging separate education is questionable. The notion that this project could contribute to regional stability appears an exaggerated expectation. The standard of work was judged by the team to be below that of other school rehabilitations in Kosovo. Furthermore, there is little evidence that this school was especially affected by the refugee crisis, raising a question about the validity of using DEC money for this project.

²⁶ Interview with CARE, Ferezaj, March 2000.

SECTION 4: SUMMARY OF CHILDREN'S AID DIRECT'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

4.1 Mission

Children's Aid Direct seeks to make an immediate and lasting improvement to the lives of children and their carers who are affected by conflict, poverty or disaster. *'We aim to give practical help, responding to children's needs for Protection, Nutrition, Healthcare, Education and Recreation. We do this in innovative ways by empowering our beneficiaries and enabling our donors and volunteers to be involved in working for children.'*

4.2 Context

CAD had a well-established presence in the Balkans:

- Albania: since 1991 implementing food and non-food distributions, supporting education, health including structural rehabilitation and agriculture;
- Bosnia: 1993 – 1998;
- Kosovo: since 1995 (food and non-food distributions to refugees and rehabilitating water and sanitation systems);
- Macedonia: CAD opened an office and bank account in late 1998 as a preparedness measure against growing instability in the region.

4.3 How CAD Works

CAD usually implements programmes directly but in Macedonia the fact that it was not registered meant that it implemented initially through El Hilal. CAD does not have a separate emergency unit and implements both emergency and longer-term programmes through country office teams. CAD has a core expertise in distribution, especially of donated goods.

4.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

This was the first DEC appeal in which CAD participated. It received 1 per cent of DEC funds, £291,502 in Phase I and £148,268 in Phase II. In addition, in response to the crisis it has implemented projects to a value of over £9 million since March 1999.

CAD's pre-existing presence, experience and contacts in Albania and Kosovo made them well placed to implement emergency programmes. It was quick to scale up activities in Albania and soon provided a focus of support for other international agencies. In Macedonia its nascent office also stood it in good stead and it was one of the first agencies active at the Blace crossing. Upon the return to Kosovo, UNHCR chose CAD as the lead agency for food and non-food distribution based upon its previous good track record in the province.

4.5 Summary of Children's Aid Direct's DEC-funded Activities²⁷

CAD DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-food distribution		Kukes district Has district	Distribution of donated goods to 85,000 beneficiaries Distribution of children clothes and towels to 2 baby washing centres for three months	45,146 5537	Under-spend of 1,206 transferred to Kosovo
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				50,683	
<i>Non-DEC Funded</i>			<i>Food parcels, Hygiene kit distribution, kitchen kits, baby care centres in camps, educational materials.</i>	<i>2,054,250</i>	<i>Funds committed by other donors including DFID, OFDA, ECHO, UNHCR</i>

CAD DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-Food Distribution	El Hilal	Gostivar, Tetovo, Debar	Distribution of donated goods to refugees and host families	45,146	Distribution of donated aid to IDPs, refugees and host families in Albania
Community activities			Recreational equipment	1206	Transferred from under-spend in Kukes
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				46,352	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Distribution of: family hygiene kits, linen, kitchen kits, hygiene kits, children's underwear, school materials and equipment Emergency Rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities in schools</i>	<i>1,102,500</i>	<i>DFID, OFDA, UNICEF</i>

CAD DEC PHASE I				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Non-Food Distribution	MTS	Rural Pristina	Distribution of donated goods	45,146	Distribution of donated aid to IDPs, refugees and host families in Albania
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				45,146	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Distribution of food & non-food items in Rural Pristina</i>	<i>889,600</i>	<i>UNHCR</i>

²⁷ Because CAD received a small amount of money from the DEC but mounted some substantial programmes, the latter are also shown in the summary tables.

CAD DEC PHASE I					SUPPORT COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Procurement of aid items				135,440	DEC funds used to facilitate all CAD operations by covering core costs (office equipment, vehicles, staff salaries and support).
Admin				13,881	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				149,321	

CAD DEC PHASE II					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
<i>NO SPECIFIC DEC FUNDING USED</i>					
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Emergency support to education facilities, Rehabilitation of Playgrounds, Rehabilitation of schools, health and hygiene promotion</i>	929,000	<i>ECHO, DFID UNHCR/IRC</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Psycho-social		Macedonia	Action Van - play and recreational activities and training to children by visiting different locations regularly.	19,095	DEC Additional DFID funding £30,000
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				19,095	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Rehabilitation of and capacity building of schools and clinics health and hygiene promotion</i>	863,755	<i>UNICEF, ECHO, DFID</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Donated aid	MTS Direct distribution to minority groups.	Pristina Rural, Kosovo Polje, Obiliq, Lipjjan municipalities	59,243 Albanian beneficiaries in 111 communities 33,800 people from minority groups in 52 communities	18,055	DEC funds covered transportation and packaging of donated items also delivered during CAD's food and non-food distributions.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				18,055	
<i>Non-DEC funded</i>			<i>Food and non-food distribution; 3,500 shelter kits; 50,000 school kits; Mines awareness in rural villages; Emergency Rehabilitation of water and sanitation in schools 10 schools rehabilitated – 8 with water; health promotion.</i>	3,037,600	<i>ECHO, DFID, UNICEF</i>

CAD DEC PHASE II				SUPPORT COSTS	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food and non-food distributions		Support costs	- 4x4 wheel drive and forklift truck - communication equipment - Staffing costs - Office costs	111,118	Initial budget of £75,000 with £36,118 over-spend
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				111,118	

Total DEC Income: £ 439,771

Expenditure Phase I: £291,503

Expenditure Phase II: £148,268

Total Expenditure: £ 439,771

4.6 Key Issues

CAD received the second lowest amount of DEC funds. By contrast, its overall expenditure of £9 million during the evaluation period was one of the highest for any DEC agency. Facilitated by CAD's long history and well-established presence in the region, its programmes appeared to be of high quality and contained many examples of good practice. The impression is that CAD was better placed to spend DEC funds more effectively than some of the larger DEC agencies. The contrast between the small amount of DEC funding CAD received and its high capacity to spend money effectively offers an example of where the DEC apportioning of funds should take into account an agency's capacity in the specific emergency area.

Examples of good practice

Preparedness and timeliness

In comparison with most other agencies CAD were relatively well prepared at the start of the March 1999 crisis. It had offices in Tirana²⁸, Kukes²⁹, Skopje³⁰ and Pristina³¹ and an extensive knowledge of the area, including good contacts with haulier companies. Right at the start of the war it was able to divert a consignment of ECHO-funded food, originally bound for Kosovo, to Albania. This allowed them to begin distribution very shortly after the arrival of the refugees. Subsequently its overland pipeline performed well,³² delivering an

²⁸ Office since 1991.

²⁹ CAD were the only international agency with a permanent presence in Kukes before the crisis.

³⁰ As a preparedness measure, CAD had established an office and a bank account in Skopje in late 1998. Government restrictions had prevented them registering at that time.

³¹ Office since 1997.

³² CAD used hauliers from the Balkans. As many of these trucks would normally have been returning empty, CAD obtained reasonable low rates of approximately £2,650 for every 110 cubic metres to Pristina.

uninterrupted flow of non-food items at very competitive rates.³³ In both Albania and Macedonia, CAD quickly built up an experienced local team, in Macedonia extracting former local staff members from the Blace camp within a few days of the refugees entering no-man's land. CAD was therefore able to respond quickly and was one of the first agencies in both Albania and Macedonia to implement operational relief programmes.

Appropriateness, assessments and monitoring

The CAD programmes demonstrated several examples of good practice in both monitoring and assessment. It devoted considerable resources to these activities,³⁴ used systematic sampling frames³⁵ and a variety of methods and sources of data.³⁶ In Kosovo, CAD organised in-depth background assessments at the beginning of its programmes covering 50 villages with individual and community level questionnaires, interviews and group discussions. These assessments directed future programmes. In its school rehabilitation programmes in Macedonia, CAD implemented integrated reconstruction interventions, including structural rehabilitation and water and sanitation work. It collected baseline information concerning hygiene behaviours to guide implementation and is now repeating these surveys to assess impact.³⁷

Coverage

CAD has worked with all ethnic groups during the crisis. In January 2000, it set up an office in Gracinica, a Serbian enclave within rural Pristina, to deliver food and non-food items to 52 minority communities in its AoR. This office employed Serb staff. In Macedonia, it had safe motherhood programmes targeting Roma and the DEC-funded Action Van had a special circus club for Roma children. CAD has also developed links and work with a local NGO representing Serb refugees.

CAD programmes with refugees mainly targeted those living in host communities, with a focus on difficult and under-served areas.³⁸ CAD has always accompanied its distributions to refugees with assistance to host populations.

³³ The average time from the UK to the CAD warehouse in country was 7 days, comparable to the time taken to transport goods using a DFID-funded charter.

³⁴ In the rural Pristina AoR, CAD employed 28 full-time field monitors. This does not count the logisticians, distribution managers and information managers based at the central office. In addition, it has opened a second office serving 52 minority communities that is staffed by 7 local staff and 5 international staff. Almost all of these staff are involved in assessment and monitoring exercises.

³⁵ CAD aimed for a 5 per cent sample in their monitoring activities, carrying out both distribution monitoring and 'end use' monitoring, visiting families who had received goods to see what they had done with them.

³⁶ In Albania, where CAD targeted distributions based on other local authority/Red Cross distribution lists, CAD developed an elaborate computerised system for cross checking lists from several sources to look for double registration.

³⁷ CAD assessed basic knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) data before starting public health programmes in Macedonia. They are in the process of re-assessing KAP data in their project sites, thereby allowing them to assess some measures of impact.

³⁸ In North Albania, CAD was one of the few agencies delivering assistance to remote rural areas.

Connectedness

CAD continues to work in the same areas of Albania and Kosovo where it had a pre-existing presence. During the crisis in Albania, it tasked two expatriate project managers to continue its longer term programmes. Although this was not always possible, after July 1999, CAD resumed its pre-crisis support to the local health and educational infrastructure, working closely with local authorities. CAD's previous experience in Albania also helped make them sensitive to issues surrounding clans and it took active steps to try to ensure a balance between clans among their local staff.³⁹

In Macedonia, CAD is transforming its relief programmes into longer-term programmes, working closely with local authorities to rehabilitate schools and clinics.

Coherence/integration

CAD appears to have coordinated closely with other agencies and local authorities in all its programmes. In both Albania and Macedonia, CAD assisted other agencies to establish programmes offering logistic support and advice.⁴⁰ In Kosovo, on the strength of its past work, CAD was appointed as UNHCR's implementing partner for food and non-food in rural Pristina.

CAD have adopted an integrated approach to relief, combining food, non-food and structural rehabilitation with efforts to ensure that the systems to manage schools and health facilities were adequate. In particular, its efforts to work with communities in order to facilitate solutions appear to have resulted in well-integrated, appropriate programmes.⁴¹

Problem areas

Over-distribution of resources not based on assessed need

On occasion CAD appears not to have distributed according to identified need. In the baby centres in Kukes, it distributed a new towel every time a baby attended one of the centres, often every other day. This represented an over-distribution of resources.

Human resources and management

Despite its regional preparedness, CAD had certain difficulties scaling up to address the emergency. It appears that initially in Albania administration and financial systems were poorly set up. Later there was also confusion over line-management. In Kosovo, inter-agency competition for staff, the absence of salary scales and poaching of staff, particularly by the multilaterals and donors has resulted in many of CAD's experienced local staff leaving the organisation.

³⁹ For example CAD advertised for posts widely using TV and radio and ensured that a staff member from Tirana was present at all interviews in Kukes.

⁴⁰ For example, CAD facilitated assessment by HAI. Offered logistical and personnel support by seconding a member of staff, providing transport, office and warehouse space and allowing a deposit of money into CAD account.

⁴¹ For example, in Kosovo, in addition to providing food and non-food support, CAD rehabilitated 10 primary schools, improved the water and sanitation facilities in eight of these schools, addressed behavioural aspects of health and hygiene promotion and distributed 50,000 school kits.

Standards

Although CAD supports the principles of Sphere, the standards are not in all field offices and CAD has not taken steps to ensure that programmes meet the Sphere key indicators.

Reporting

This was the first DEC appeal that CAD has opted into. Its report to the DEC was reasonable and clearly identified all sources of funding and provided an adequate narrative account of the projects undertaken. However it did not differentiate between expenditure in different countries.

SECTION 5: SUMMARY OF CHRISTIAN AID'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

5.1 Mission

Christian Aid (CA) believes in strengthening people to find solutions to the problems they face. It works in over 60 countries helping people, regardless of religion or race, to improve their own lives and tackle the causes of poverty and injustice.

5.2 Context

Christian Aid has been working throughout the Balkans since the early 1990s with various partners including the Ecumenical Humanitarian Organisation (EHO), Diakonia Agape (DA), International Orthodox Christian Charities (IOCC), Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (MCIC) and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). The types of programmes implemented by Christian Aid range from income generation to agriculture and food security, women and youth programmes. In Bosnia, Christian Aid implemented a large housing rehabilitation programme, and in Kosovo the rehabilitation of homes.

5.3 How Christian Aid Works

Christian Aid is part of the Action by Churches Together (ACT), a worldwide network of churches and related agencies responding to emergencies based in Geneva. Christian Aid works through local partners (both church and secular groups) in the field and has an Emergency Unit at its HQ in London.

5.4 Overall Response to Emergency

Christian Aid received 8.5 per cent of DEC appeal funds and DEC funding represented the major part of Christian Aid's total funding during the Kosovo crisis (68 per cent in Phase I and 77 per cent in Phase II).

ACT launched an appeal for the Kosovo crisis in March 1999. This was subsequently revised in April. In July, a second appeal for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation in the Balkans was launched. A decision was also taken for ACT to have an operational presence in the region and a network of 5 agencies, who were already active in the region, was established. The 5 agencies were the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Dan Church Aid, MCIC, NCA and United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR). After the return of the majority of refugees to Kosovo, ACT set up offices in Kosovo from which to manage and coordinate its humanitarian response. A mid-term evaluation of the first appeal was carried out in August 1999 (Silkin & Bouman, 1999). A second evaluation of ACT was carried out in January 2000 (Silkin et al, 2000).

5.5 What Christian Aid Did

Christian Aid responded immediately to ACT's appeals and invitation to join the ACT programme. During the crisis, Christian Aid worked through the ACT network and through local partners including:

- DA in Albania;

- LWF in Bosnia;
- MCIC in Macedonia;
- EHO in Vojvodina;
- IOCC in Montenegro and Serbia.

In Albania, Christian Aid was semi-operational within the ACT network and seconded staff to support the ACT/DA programme.

After the return of the refugees to Kosovo, Christian Aid initially became semi-operational and then fully operational in Kosovo. Christian Aid staff managed the ACT/UMCOR programme in Rahovec which was subsequently taken over completely by Christian Aid. This adoption of an operational role by Christian Aid was partly stimulated by a desire for higher visibility as an implementing agency within ACT and because of the shortage of appropriate partners in the region.

The objectives of Christian Aid's Emergency Crisis Programme in the Balkans were:

- The provision of basic relief to refugees/IDPs in refugee camps and host families;
- The provision of psycho-social support;⁴²
- Support to local host families and their communities;
- The promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation and dialogue.

⁴² Four Week Plan p.9; DEC Phase I Kosovo programme – narrative and financial report p.7.

5.6 Summary of Christian Aid's DEC-funded Activities

Christian Aid DEC PHASE I					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Food Non-food Health Shelter	DA	ALBANIA Shkodra Gjirocaster 'Way stations' (on return to Kosovo)	Purchase and distribution of: - 5,500 clothing parcels - 150 tents - 400,000 water purification tablets - 20,000 ORS - 20 cholera kits - 6,000 MREs PLUS transport and admin. Beneficiaries: - 25,000 refugees in host families and host families	322,730	Distribution delayed until 20 May. Cholera kits, ORS and water purification tablets were donated to hospitals in Tirana and Elbasan when an epidemic failed to materialise and after the return of refugees to Kosovo.
Community services		Tirana Shkoder Gjirocastra Saranda Elbasan Durrës	One-off grants for 26 small Albanian community projects (maximum grant = £5,000).	100,000	
Management support			Assist in establishing the ACT/Albania management and coordination structure		DEC funds of £35,000 for support to ACT/Albania were never used and were returned to DEC
Food Hygiene	MCIC	MACEDONIA Skopje Tetovo Kumanovo Gostivar Debar Struga	Procurement and distribution of: - 4,740 food parcels - 10,000 baby food parcels - 10,000 baby hygiene parcels Beneficiaries: - refugees in host families - 'social cases'	294,000	MCIC used 19 local NGOs to do the distribution. This was part of a larger programme distributing food and hygiene parcels to refugees, host families and 'social cases' (about 50,000 beneficiaries) of which the DEC contributed 9% of total funds. The programme ran from May to October 1999.
Food Hygiene Non-food	LWF	BOSNIA Tuzla Canton Zenica Canton	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene kits - clothes parcels - bedding sets - other relief supplies PLUS staff, management costs Material items for Croatia Beneficiaries:		

			- 3,000 Kosovar refugees living in collective centres and shelters in Bosnia	275,320	
Non-food	IOCC/ Christian Aid	Bosanki Petrovac camp	Distribution of: - clothes - blankets - nappies	5,819	Goods delivered in June/July. Only about half of the budget was actually spent.
Food Hygiene Non-food	IOCC	SERBIA 31 municipalities in Central Serbia (urban and rural)	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - household items Beneficiaries: - IDPs and refugees living in 180 collective centres Staff, management costs	414,043	IOCC used 16 local NGOs (main local NGO used was <i>Philanthropy</i> , the humanitarian arm of the Serbian Orthodox Church) to do the distribution.
Food Hygiene Community services	EHO	Novi Sad and 45 parishes within Vojvodina	Distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - small cash grants Beneficiaries: - refugees - resident war-affected families	88,000	EHO worked with 5 partner organisations.
Admin. support			Christian Aid admin. charge in London	39,336	
TOTAL PHASE I EXPENDITURE				1,539,248	

Christian Aid DEC PHASE II					
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Wat/san	MCIC	MACEDONIA Debrese (Gostivar) Recane (Vrutok) Srbica (Oslomej)	Improvement of water supply in 3 villages.	333,655	Villages' water and sanitation systems had suffered due to extra demand by refugees. MCIC worked directly with Village Committees.
Food Hygiene Non-food	IOCC	SERBIA 48 municipalities in Central Serbia (urban and rural)	Procurement and distribution of: - food parcels - hygiene parcels - institutional cleaning kits - children's jogging suits Beneficiaries: - IDPs/refugees in private accommodation and collective centres	187,554	IOCC used 13 local partners for the distribution. IOCC targeted municipalities where it has previously established effective distribution partnerships.

Shelter	Christian Aid & UMCOR	KOSOVO Mitrovica Rahovec	Weatherproofing/roofing of 482 houses: - timber roof - clay roof tiles & ridge caps - windows (3 sizes) - doors (interior & exterior) - lime, cement, re-bar and blocks PLUS procurement of transport (4 Landrover defenders, 2 Bedford trucks and vehicle communication equipment). Beneficiaries: - Returnees in 4 target villages with Category 2, 3 or 4 damage.	934,167	Funds were not available to rehabilitate the houses according to initial assessments. Beneficiary expectations were raised because of this. However, Christian Aid maintains that no unfulfilled promises were made.
Agriculture	MCIC	KOSOVO 7 villages in: Gjakovica Orahovac Prizren 36 villages in: Dragash	Chickens for individual farmers. Distribution of: - 5,100 egg layers - 85 tons chicken concentrate - Salaries for mechanics and parts to repair 100 tractors and 3 combines Distribution to villagers of: - 300 sets of farm tools - 13 tons of fertiliser - 50 vineyard tools Distribution to livestock owners of: - 706 tons of livestock food Restoration of milk: - production in one milk factory	118,625	DEC Phase I funds contributed about 48% of funds for the project described here. Around 50,000 people received assistance. The most needy were targeted e.g. those with fewer livestock. Project assistance to a dairy was in the form of a loan which should be repaid in the form of milk products to be distributed to social institutions.
Shelter	EDA	Drenica	- Dry room/roofing of 672 houses - Temporary winter shelter for 400 vulnerable families Beneficiaries: - Returnees in target villages (houses with Category 4 damage)	357,500	
Admin. support	Christian Aid		8 grants for travel; programme support; 70% of senior programme officer's salary; salary of Kosovo programme officer; cost of closing out Albania programme; Kosovo field officer costs.	79,582	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				2,011,083	

Total DEC Income:	£3,585,332
Expenditure Phase I:	£1,539,248
Expenditure Phase II:	£2,011,083
Total Expenditure:	£3,550,331

5.7 Key Issues

Experience of Christian Aid as an operational organisation

Christian Aid chose to have a semi-operational presence in Albania (supporting the DA/ACT operation) and a fully operational presence in Kosovo (implementing a shelter programme). This experience has been a major ‘learning area’ for Christian Aid and there have been benefits and problems with the operational approach.

Examples of good practice

Delivery of appropriate and effective aid

The permanent rehabilitation of houses in the shelter programme in Kosovo was a more appropriate and effective form of aid than the warm room kits and plastic sheeting supplied under other programmes.

Examples of problem areas

*Logistical constraints in Christian Aid shelter programme in Kosovo*⁴³

- Delays in procurement and delivery of construction materials due to poor communication between field offices and suppliers.
- Absence of effective telecommunication system leading to poor coordination and communication.
- Lack of participation of field offices in initial procurement of materials and the need to place emergency order of materials resulting in purchase of inaccurate lengths of timber.

Beneficiaries’ raised expectations

As described in Chapter 3 of Volume II, assessments for the shelter programme in Kosovo raised beneficiary expectations about the standards of house rehabilitation which were not met, although Christian Aid is certain that no unfulfilled promises were made. There was also some confusion about whether Christian Aid would provide assistance with labour.

⁴³ UMCOR was the organisation with management responsibility for this programme, until Christian Aid took it over on 1/1/00.

High turnover of Christian Aid international staff

There were 3-4 Christian Aid managers in less than a year for the shelter programme in Kosovo. This led to disconnectedness, especially for beneficiaries who may have received different information from different managers.

Overstretching of staff in London

The demands of running a large, operational programme overstretched staff at HQ in London.

Christian Aid's experience at working operationally in a large-scale emergency has been mixed. Christian Aid report that this was a major '*learning area*'.⁴⁴ As a result of Kosovo, however, Christian Aid has now created a Strategy Working Group and a manual has been prepared involving all units. Furthermore, new personnel in ACT and Christian Aid may change and improve the approach in the future.

Implications of working with local partners

Christian Aid has largely worked through local partners during the Kosovo crisis, although it has also been semi-operational in Albania and Kosovo. There are advantages and disadvantages of adopting this approach.

(i) Strengths of working with local partners

Established working relationship

Christian Aid had well established working relationships with partners in the region, stretching back over 7 years.

Access to local knowledge

Local partners know the local context (including potential local suppliers, distribution mechanisms and transport possibilities) and are well placed to 'hear' the views of local communities and beneficiary groups.

Linking relief and development

Local partners are likely to continue working in the region after an emergency and can link relief work to longer-term work. For example, MCIC took developmental approach to its relief programme.

(ii) Constraints of working with local partners

Lack of monitoring and evaluation

Christian Aid admit that an observed weakness was the '*paucity of regular monitoring and reporting of progress*'.⁴⁵ Partners were not evaluated and monitoring was only done through monitoring visits.

⁴⁴ Reported in an interview with Christian Aid London. Christian Aid has noted that the shelter rehabilitation programme was under the overall management by UMCOR until 1/1/00.

⁴⁵ Cited from Phase I report.

Long chain of partnerships

Some partners work with their own partners. There is, therefore, a long chain from donor to beneficiary. For example, MCIC in Macedonia has a collective membership of 11 NGOs. Some of these are umbrella organisations themselves, so MCIC is an *'umbrella of umbrellas'*. Monitoring and reporting is thus more problematic when there are many agencies involved, some of whom do not have direct contact with Christian Aid.

On the positive side, MCIC's networks represented different ethnic and vulnerable groups including Albanian, Roma and women.

Limited experience/knowledge of relief and rehabilitation work

While some of Christian Aid's partners had considerable experience of working in relief and rehabilitation in the Balkans, others had more limited experience, for example, DA and MCIC. These partners required technical support (especially information on existing guidelines and Sphere standards). It appeared that this kind of support was limited leaving partners to work out their own standards on the ground. For example, MCIC established the contents of its food parcel in Macedonia, that were way above normal standards and contained milk powder which is not normally included in a general distribution.

While working with local partners in a large-scale emergency has its benefits, there are clearly drawbacks and it is imperative that adequate support, monitoring and evaluation of partners' activities should be carried out. This includes technical support and increasing partners' awareness of performance standards.

SECTION 6: SUMMARY OF CONCERN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

6.1 Mission

Concern Worldwide works to eliminate extreme poverty in the least developed countries of the world.⁴⁶ Its emergency, development and advocacy work contributes towards the eradication of poverty through building peoples' capacities to assert their basic rights to food, shelter, health and education.

6.2 Context

Concern had no operational programme in the Balkans prior to the crisis in 1999.

6.3 How Concern Works

Concern is head-quartered in Dublin, with offices in Belfast, London, Glasgow and an affiliate organisation in New York. It normally implements directly, but may do so in association with local partners or groups. Concern currently works in about 20 countries worldwide, mostly in Africa and Asia.

Concern does not have an Emergency Desk but does have an Emergency Response Unit, comprising a Rapid Deployment Team and Emergency Stores which is managed by the regional manager concerned with the emergency. Emergency response has always formed a strong part of the organisational ethos. About half of Concern's programmes are emergency programmes. It maintains small emergency stocks in Amsterdam. Because Concern has a relatively small and tightly-knit management team this approach has worked to date and it worked well in Kosovo. Concern is reviewing its emergency preparedness and response capacity.

6.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Concern participates in the DEC through Concern Northern Ireland. As the allocation of DEC funds is based on the amount of UK public fundraising spent on emergencies, DEC funding is a smaller proportion of Concern's income than it is for the UK-based agencies. For Kosovo, Concern received 1.98 per cent of DEC funds, £297,000 for Phase I and £534,600 for Phase II.

Concern sent a small experienced team into Albania in early April 1999 who carried out an assessment and then started the programme.

In Kosovo, Concern set up in Peje partly because this area was very poorly served by other NGOs when Concern entered Kosovo⁴⁷ and also because it had supported refugees from Peje in its work in Albania. Concern also considered opening an office in Mitrovica as it is its general policy to work at two different sites to spread the risk in unstable situations. Concern

⁴⁶ Although the Balkans is not one of the least developed areas of the world, Concern justifies its intervention as being intended to prevent refugees falling into extreme poverty.

⁴⁷ There were only three NGOs there then, as opposed to 50 to 75 in February 2000 (Interview with Concern, February 2000).

carried out an assessment in Mitrovica during which the Concern team were attacked. However, having fully considered the scale of the acute needs in Kosovo, and the limits on personnel and management resources, Concern decided to concentrate on Peje.

At the time of the evaluation visit, Concern was scaling back its programme in Kosovo and was planning assessment visits to Montenegro and Serbia in recognition that humanitarian needs were largely met in Kosovo.

6.5 Summary of Concern's DEC-funded Activities

CONCERN DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Camp management		Kukes	Camp management. Relief distribution including plastic, blankets, and household items for refugees and host families.	287,973	Charter flight with relief items arrived on 16April.
		Fazja		3,968	Chicken Farm and Fazja Camps.
Food Distribution		Kukes	Food for centres and host families, for both refugees and Albanians displaced by Serb shelling.	34,145	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				170,674	18,599 beneficiaries at peak.

CONCERN PHASE I				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	Concern	Peje (Urban and Rural)	Putting timber frame with plastic roofing on houses. Also providing warm rooms.	277,020	56 roofs completed and 116 under construction by start of Phase II funding.
Social Programme	Concern, Women's Forum, Dublin Rape Crisis Centre	Peje	Support for extremely vulnerable families with blankets, household items and livestock to vulnerables. Counseling for women.	48,570	MTS assisted with distributions and with a winter fair to sell handcrafts.
Clothing	Concern and MTS	Peje	Distribution of 40 containers of winter clothing to beneficiaries in Kosovo.	66,453	300t of clothing was collected from the public in Ireland.
Youth programme	Concern	Peje	Providing temporary youth centers in villages.	3,154	Used tents as centres.
School Rehab	Concern	Lubeniq and Rausiq	Rehabilitation of two village schools. Schools were repaired and ready for opening in Oct.	28,129	Concern also distributed school supplies.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				423,326	

CONCERN PHASE I					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Various		Albania	Camp Management and food distribution.	170,674	
		Kosovo	Shelter, reconstruction, and relief.	423,326	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				594,000	46% of total programme cost from DEC funds

CONCERN DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	Concern and MTS	Pristina Peje Gjakova	Distribution of winter clothing to beneficiaries in Kosovo.	Not shown for individual programmes	Continuation of Phase I programme
Shelter	Concern	Peje (Rural and Urban)	Putting timber frame with plastic roofing on 633 houses. Also providing warm rooms and assessing extremely vulnerable families for permanent roofing	Not shown for individual programmes	Continuation of Phase I Project. 699 houses roofed in all.
School Recons- truction	Concern	Raushiq Lubeniq Loxha.	Completion of rehabilitation of two village schools begun in Phase I. A third school was completed.	Not shown for individual programmes	Third school completed at request of UNICEF after first agency ran out of funds.
Youth Prog- ramme	Concern	Peje	Providing temporary youth centers in villages. Rehabilitating and managing a hall in Peje for activities.	Not shown for individual programmes	Youth centres were closed after schools re-opened.
Social Prog- ramme	Concern and Women's Forum	Rural Peje	Referrals to specialist agencies, skill training, income generation activities. Capacity building of Women's Forum.	Not shown for individual programmes	Social programme also worked closely with shelter project to identify vulnerable.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				237,600	22% of total cost of projects

Total DEC Income:	£831,600	
Expenditure Phase I:	£297,000	Returns (Phase I) Nil
Expenditure Phase II:	£534,600	Returns (Phase II) Nil
Total Expenditure:	£831,600	Plus £1,669,327 from other sources.

Note: Concern's project report treated the first tranche of Phase II funding as a tranche of Phase I funding. This doubled its reported Phase II funding to £594,000 and reduced its reported Phase II funding to £237,600. DEC funds have been allocated on a pro rata basis to Phase I expenditures, as the actual DEC component of each project's funding was not stated.

No details of the allocation of funds, DEC or overall, have been received for Phase II expenditures.

6.6 Key Issues

No Prior Presence in the Region

Concern did not have a prior operational programme in the Balkans. The Balkans is not a priority area and the Kosovo programme is being wound down. However, Concern was concerned that the refugees were vulnerable at the start of the crisis and there was a risk that people could be pushed into situations of extreme poverty. Also, like other DEC agencies, Concern's mandate included responding to major humanitarian crises. Its supporters expected Concern to respond.

Concern was not the only DEC agency without a prior operational programme in the Balkans but it was the only agency with no prior involvement either operationally or as a funder. The DEC Secretariat rightly questioned Concern's wish to become involved in the Kosovo Crisis response.

Concern was aware of its lack of knowledge in the Balkans but argued that local knowledge is only one of the four factors needed for success in emergency operations:

- Financial resources;
- Volume capacity (the speed at which an organisations can build its capacity);
- Skills (held by your human resources);
- Local knowledge.

Concern lacked local knowledge, but believed that it could add value through its experience of providing services to refugees and through its experienced staff. Concern put a lot of effort into learning as much as possible about the Balkans as quickly as possible. It arranged for presentations to senior management by experts on the regions and was careful to listen to agencies like CAD with good regional experience.⁴⁸

Concern left Albania after the bulk of refugees returned to Kosovo, as the acute humanitarian needs had been met. Concern's programme had been focused on the refugees and when they went, the reason for the work also went. One interviewee⁴⁹ noted that while some NGOs had been criticised for leaving Albania after the refugees left, this was perfectly reasonable if the refugee crisis was the purpose of their work in Albania and they were not interested in development work in Albania. Concern handed over its continuing programmes to the Red Cross when leaving Albania.

Concern demonstrated that it was possible to do good quality work in a region where an agency has no previous experience, provided that the agency is aware of this and is willing to learn.

⁴⁸ Concern listened to CAD when they proposed a baby washing room in the camps. This allowed women to meet and to discuss their particular problems. It was a new idea for Concern, but CAD had a great deal of regional experience.

⁴⁹ Interview with CARE Albania, March 2000.

Examples of good practice

Examples of good practice in Concern's well managed⁵⁰ programme included:

Good Personnel Management

Concern sent a very experienced manager to the region to manage the start of the programme in Kosovo. This manager not only brought vital skills with him but also gave the team space to do a proper assessment by resisting pressure from headquarters to start work immediately. The quality of both national and international staff met by the evaluation team was impressive. Good personnel practice applied to local staff. These were assigned outside their own areas so that they did not come under undue pressure from beneficiaries.

Putting the beneficiaries first

The German Red Cross (which did not coordinate with other shelter agencies) moved into a village where Concern had already begun work on roofs. The GRC was going to do permanent roofs instead of the plastic covered ones that Concern had started on. Concern not only left the GRC to do the work, but also gave it the social assessments and roof designs that Concern had already done. Concern also finished the work at Loxha school that another NGO had started but was unable to finish.

Beneficiaries also had real choices: either taking a cash payment or using a Concern contractor when replacing roofing plastic roofs with tiles. They also had the choice between having a hipped or gable roof.

The Concern staff knew the individual circumstances of the beneficiaries visited and the interventions seen were appropriate.

Good technical management

Concern designed each roof in the shelter programme individually. Treating each roof individually took a little more organisation than giving everyone a standard kit, but this led to large savings in wood as the timber lengths were chosen to fit and there was less waste from off-cuts. Concern used an external consulting engineer to review the technical aspects of the shelter project and to prepare a detailed specification of the engineering works to be carried out. Concern advised 40 Category 5⁵¹ beneficiaries what repairs they needed to make to their houses to qualify for a roof as a Category 4 house. All of this was backed up by good monitoring. Concern was the only DEC agency able to say exactly how many of the houses it roofed that were not occupied during the winter.

Principled programming

Fundamental principles lie at the heart of Concern programming and are reflected in internal reports (Boyle & Foley, 2000) and in comments by interviewees. Concern has been turning down offers of funding because it believes that the reconstruction of Category 5 housing should be done by construction companies, rather than NGOs (Frazer, 2000). Concern is phasing out its programme in Kosovo because it does not believe that the current needs there justify its presence.

⁵⁰ Concern demonstrated a coherent programme, appropriate delegation and good monitoring.

⁵¹ Refer to Box 5 in Volume II.

Problem areas

Sealing of roof spaces

Although most householders, when given the choice opted for gable rather than hipped roofs, they did not have the resources to close the gables themselves⁵². This meant that rain entered through the open gables. Plastic roofs with open gables like this were much more vulnerable to storm damage. It would have been better to close the gables temporarily with plastic (with a small vent near the apex for condensation) to avoid the problems seen with closed roof spaces.⁵³

Reporting

Although the Concern reports were well written they do not conform to the DEC standard format, nor do the reports contain all of the information in the DEC format. Financial reports for Phase II do not distinguish DEC from non-DEC expenditures by project or identify the costs of the different projects. This was a question of reporting as the information was available on request.⁵⁴

Overpaying roofing contractors

Concern was one of the agencies paying 20 DEM per square metre for roofing contractors in Peje. This was 5 DEM over the going rate.⁵⁵ The agencies in Peje⁵⁶ may have been the victims of a pricing ring among the roofing contractors.

⁵² Visits to Concern Urban and Rural Shelter Beneficiaries in Peje.

⁵³ Visit to shelter beneficiaries near Decani, April 2000.

⁵⁴ It appears that Concern was working from an older set of DEC reporting guidelines (e-mail from Dominic MacSorley 21/6/00).

⁵⁵ Interview with MedAir Kosovo, April 2000.

⁵⁶ Including Concern and MedAir.

SECTION 7: SUMMARY OF HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

7.1 Mission

HelpAge International (HAI) campaigns on behalf of the world's older population and provides expertise and grants to older people's organisations in 70 developing countries - assisting them to help the most disadvantaged lead independent lives. It is involved in direct programme implementation, research, advocacy, strengthening local organisations and contributing to the formulation of national strategies and legislation on ageing.

7.2 Context

Help the Aged, the DEC member agency, is a founder member of HelpAge International (HAI) and its international work is carried out through HAI. HAI has managed programmes in Croatia and Bosnia since 1991. It is also a member of the East and Central Europe Network (ECEN) that links age-care organisations in Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Croatia, Albania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Prior to 1999, HAI had no presence in Macedonia or in Kosovo.

7.3 How HelpAge International Works

HAI is a global network of not-for-profit organisations that works with and for disadvantaged older people worldwide, to achieve a lasting improvement in the quality of their lives and works with over 200 member/partner organisations in 70 countries. HAI's normal practice is to support national age-care organisations to implement projects and to advocate for the rights of older people, although the UK Secretariat does manage operational programmes in several countries. Where it has no local partners, HAI may decide to become operational and 'lead by example', in order to ensure that needs are met and to influence the practice of others.

HAI's emergency response capacity is small: the World Wide Emergency Desk was formed in the UK Secretariat three years ago. Based on its own research with older people, including in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, HAI has defined best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies (HelpAge International, 1999a; HelpAge International & UNHCR, 2000).

7.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

HAI received 1.6 per cent of DEC Kosovo appeal funds. The DEC funds have constituted almost 100 per cent of HAI's income for the emergency, and without them HAI would not have responded. All DEC Phase II funds have been spent in Kosovo and over half has been expended on the rehabilitation of the Cerentolovski Centre.

HAI's principal strategy from the start was to integrate its response with that of other agencies, providing advice and support on the specific needs and capabilities of older people, rather than to establish a separate programme. This approach was affirmed by an initial needs assessment in Macedonia (HelpAge International, 1999b). HAI did, however, establish a

small operational presence in Macedonia and Kosovo, noting: '*Kosovo was and will be exceptional ... it is not our preference or strength to be operational.*'⁵⁷

HAI's response drew on existing capacity in the region. The HAI Croatia Director was seconded to set up a programme in Macedonia before a representative was locally recruited. The current Director and Programme Assistant in Kosovo have previously worked in Croatia. In Macedonia, HAI shared office facilities with Children's Aid Direct. In Kosovo its offices are in the Cerentolovski Centre, the residential home for older people in Pristina.

7.5 What HelpAge International Did

HAI's response to the Kosovo emergency has focused on Macedonia and Kosovo. A proposed assessment in Albania did not take place due to the refugees returning home. HAI's response has combined relief assistance, protection, advocacy and policy work.

From mid-May to September 1999, HAI provided emergency assistance to older Kosovo refugees in Macedonia staying in private accommodation. In addition, HAI advocated with other agencies to ensure that the needs of older refugees in host communities and in the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme were met, to ensure they had access to the Macedonian health system and that suitable drugs were available. HAI continued to work with UNHCR in Macedonia after most refugees had returned to Kosovo, supporting the return of older refugees, and secured accommodation for eight older people in the Cerentolovski Centre in Pristina.

Since mid-July 1999, HAI has been operational in Kosovo, funding, equipping and managing the rehabilitation of the Cerentolovski Centre. In November, HAI in collaboration with the UN Civil Administration Secretariat for Health distributed a Cold Weather Warning and referral forms to all aid agencies and KFOR contingents throughout Kosovo, alerting them to the needs of older people. During the winter, clothing and hygiene materials were provided to older people in 9 municipalities referred to them by other agencies, including KFOR, the Centre for Social Work, INGOs, Yugoslav Red Cross and local NGOs. As of March 2000, 1,850 older people in 55 village, towns, cities have been assisted by HAI's programme in Kosovo. Advocacy work has taken two forms: lobbying for support from UNMIK for the residential centre, a former state-run institution, and advocating that the needs of older people are not neglected in other agencies' programmes.

⁵⁷ Interview, HAI headquarters, London, March 2000.

7.6 Summary of HelpAge International's DEC-funded Activities

HELPAGE DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Relief	Macedonian Red Cross UNHCR ADRA CAD Mercy Corps World Vision Macedonian Pensioners' Assoc.	Skopje	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provision of hygiene kits (£107,000) and bedding (£116,000) to older refugees in private accommodation. - Advice and support to other organisations on the needs of older refugees. - Worked with UNHCR, HAI and MRC to assist the repatriation of abandoned old and infirm to Kosovo. Beneficiaries: - 5,392 older refugees and 1,467 host families.	299,665
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				299,665

HELPAGE DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)
Relief and rehabilitation	UNHCR ADRA CAD Mercy Corps World Vision ACTED Handikos Finish KFOR Centre for Social Welfare (Lipljan) Mercy Corps	Pristina, Lipljan, Gracanica, Obiliq, Fushe, Kosovo, Gllgovc, Mitrovica, Shtimlje, Kamanica, Gjilan.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Renovation and re-equipped the Cerentolovski Centre, residential home for old people (£207,807) - Donation of an ambulance to the Centre. - Provision of winter clothing and household and personal hygiene kits to older people referred by other agencies (£92,529). - Production and distribution of cold weather warning leaflet with UNMIK health department. - Advocacy for the needs older people, including: placement of older people in the Cetentolovski Centre; securing pensions from UNMIK for residents at the Centre; securing stipends and salaries from UNMIK for workers at the Centre. Beneficiaries: 1,850.	406,528
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				406,528

Total DEC Income:	£697,200
Expenditure Phase I:	£299,665
Expenditure Phase II:	£406,528
Total Expenditure:	£706,183 ⁵⁸

⁵⁸ The additional funds over and above DEC monies came from HAI sources.

7.7 Key Issues

In the context of the massive international response to the Kosovo emergency, HAI's initial strategy to integrate its work with other agencies rather than establishing an independent programme was innovative. This distinctive approach reflected HAI's focus on a specific vulnerable group – older people – and a limited institutional capacity to manage a large operational programme. The DEC's OSC was supportive of this approach. In Kosovo, HAI has continued with this approach, maintaining a small team of staff and supporting other agencies to assist older people. It has not sought to use DEC funds to leverage additional funding.

Examples of good practice

Working with local partners

HAI's approach of working with local partners like the MRC in Macedonia and Centres for Social Work (CSW) in Kosovo has been positive. It avoids creating parallel structures, increases coverage and ensures longer-term continuity.

Protection

HAI's mandate is older people. In Kosovo, however, older people are vulnerable not just because of their age, but their 'nationality'. Albanian older people were targeted by Serb military during the war and since the end of the war older Serbs and Roma have been subjected to intimidation and violence (OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999a; OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Rights, 1999b). Cohesiveness in extended Albanian families also means that older Albanians may have better home care than older Serbs. HAI's needs assessments in Kosovo identified intimidation and violence against minorities as a key issue, and is one of the few DEC agencies to articulate the need for protection, noting:

Given that such a large number of remainees [in Kosovo] are older people, the issue of protection is of grave concern to HelpAge International.

HAI assists older people of all groups. In the Cerentolovski Centre, which is the only residential facility in Kosovo for older people unable to look after themselves, some 55 per cent of residents are Serbs. HAI has increased protection of minorities there by upgrading the security of the Centre. Elsewhere, HAI has distributed assistance to older people in minority communities through KFOR.

Advocacy

A central aspect of HAI's work has been to act as an advocate for older people's rights. In Kosovo, HAI has successfully lobbied UNMIK to secure stipends and salaries for staff and pensions for the residents of the Cerentolovski Centre.

Standards

For the 1999 UN International Year of Older Persons, HAI undertook research and drew up best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies (HelpAge International & UNHCR, 2000).⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Funded by ECHO and UNHCR.

HAI is in discussion on how to incorporate these in the Sphere Standards. The work coincided with the Kosovo refugee crisis. Although HAI may have missed the opportunity to undertake further research in Macedonia and Kosovo, it has used its experience there in its advocacy work (Zwi, 1999). A commitment to reflecting on such experiences and utilising it in advocacy work helps organisational learning and improves the effectiveness of the humanitarian system.

In addition, lessons from the operational limitations and challenges to the HAI Kosovo programme have been absorbed by the UK Secretariat, leading to improved emergency procedures in assessments, documentation, beneficiary participation and monitoring.

Cost Efficiency

HAI's policy to maintain a limited operational programme, to procure goods locally, to use local contractors and engineers and to share offices in Macedonia and Kosovo has kept overheads low.⁶⁰

Examples of problem areas

Timeliness of response

HAI was not monitoring the situation in Kosovo before the crisis and was therefore unprepared for the emergency. HAI acknowledges that its response to the refugee crisis was relatively slow. Its Macedonia office became operational on 17th May, seven weeks after the commencement of the NATO air campaign. Registration problems in Macedonia delayed the procurement of supplies so that HAI's bedding and hygiene kits were only ready for distribution by the week of 12th June, as NATO entered Kosovo. The Macedonian Red Cross was still compiling a list of older refugees with host families as refugees started to return home (Bush, 1999). Hygiene parcels for older refugees continued to be distributed up to December.

In Kosovo, although the Cold Weather Warning was issued in November, the first referral forms were not returned until January, by which time the winter had started.

Assessments

HAI's best practice guidelines for assisting older people in emergencies, emphasise the importance of assessments and, in particular, consultation with older people. In practice HAI's assessment work in the Kosovo emergency has been weak.

While HAI's initial assessment mission to Macedonia probably correctly concluded that HAI should focus on the needs of those older refugees in private accommodation who were less well supported than refugees in camps, there is no evidence that HAI consulted with refugees in private accommodation (HelpAge International, 1999b).

In Kosovo, HAI's strategy of working through other agencies means that it has not invested in its own capacity to do assessments and monitoring, relying instead on collaborating agencies. This strategy, while in keeping with HAI's overall approach, has risks:

⁶⁰ A high portion (74 per cent) of HAI's expenditure in Macedonia was on material assistance.

- The referral forms HAI issued provide no criteria for assessing vulnerability or guidelines for distribution partners.
- The lack of systematic independent assessments by HAI means some old people were possibly missed out or wrongly included. In a Serb village visited during the evaluation fieldwork, HAI materials had been delivered to one person referred by the Centre for Social Work (CSW) in Lipljan, but HAI staff were unaware if there were other older people in the village. In a Roma village visited by the evaluation team, HAI items had been distributed to two older people referred to by the CSW, while others not on the CSW list got nothing. All of the 28 older people referred to HAI by the CSW are former ‘social cases’ who used to receive State welfare benefits, and no new names have been added since the war ended.⁶¹ While HAI’s offers to assist anyone in need over 50 years, the CSW’s criteria for a ‘social case’ was people over 60/70 years who were unable to work. Consequently, some old people, who according to HAI’s criteria are in need, may have been left out.⁶²
- HAI’s own lack of assessments means that its staff may not consult adequately with older people about their needs. In two Serb homes visited, isolation and lack of information from relatives was of great concern to the old people. While HAI may not be able to respond to all articulated needs of older people, developing an understanding of those needs is basic ‘good practice’ according to its own guidelines.

Monitoring

Similarly, HAI delegated distribution and monitoring functions to partners. In Macedonia, distributions were based on lists compiled by the MRC, who reportedly built transparency into the distributions by telling the people what they were meant to get. In Kosovo, HAI distributed through a variety of organisations. HAI produced clear statistics on quantities of materials distributed, the referring agency, the recipients and their nationality. However, a lack of post-distribution and end-use monitoring makes it difficult to substantiate HAI’s claim that ‘*the winterisation materials have made a significant impact on the lives of the many beneficiaries*’ (HelpAge International, 2000). Old people visited by the evaluation team in Kosovo had not been visited by HAI since the first distribution four months earlier. While recipients expressed their appreciation of the assistance, the lack of follow up meant that there was no opportunity to learn about other needs.

Integration of activities

HAI’s emphasis on hygiene for older people through the provision of hygiene kits has not been linked to other activities such as hygiene promotion. The argument that there was no need for an integrated hygiene promotion strategy in Macedonia — because host families were not poor, had running water and toilets and good hygiene awareness⁶³ — was not necessarily sound for Kosovo where many utilities had been damaged by the war.

⁶¹ Interview with Centre for Social Work, Lipljan, April 2000.

⁶² The social welfare system is due to be re-assessed by UNMIK in May 2000.

⁶³ Interview with HelpAge headquarters, London, March 2000.

At the Cerentolovski Centre, HAI have made substantial infrastructural improvements to sanitation facilities. It has not, however, undertaken formal monitoring of residents in the Centre, although it does have plans to recruit a consultant to assess standards of care at the centre, and to provide staff training.

Coverage

An advantage for a small agency of collaborating with other agencies is to increase the coverage of its work. This has only been partially realised. In Macedonia, HAI's target was 15,000 older refugees living outside the camps. HAI assistance reached 5,392 older refugees and 1,467 host families (HelpAge International, 1999c), just over one-third of HAI's target and one-quarter of older refugees in private accommodation.⁶⁴ In Kosovo HAI's target is all people of pensionable age (age 55 for men, age 50 for women) and above.⁶⁵ As of March 2000, 1,850 people have received assistance from HAI in Kosovo (HelpAge International Kosovo, 2000), out of a potential older population of over 260,000.⁶⁶ HAI's ability to extend coverage has been limited by its own capacity for outreach work and a dependency on other agencies.

Protection

Although HAI identified the protection needs of older people from minorities in Kosovo, it is interesting to note that 77 per cent of its beneficiaries have been Albanian, 18.16 per cent Serb, 2.70 per cent Roma and 2.10 per cent others (HelpAge International Kosovo, 2000). It might be expected that a higher percentage would be Serbs, given that a large number of Serbs remaining in Kosovo are older people, along with the additional problems faced by minorities. Again, a reliance on others and a limited investment in assessment and monitoring makes it difficult to ascertain whether these statistics are an accurate reflection of need.

Advocacy

HAI's target group in Kosovo is all people of pensionable age and above. HAI's reliance on other agencies to refer the needs of older people to them has produced referrals from 13 aid agencies out of the several hundred agencies running relief programmes in Kosovo. HAI conclude that this limited response is the fault of other agencies⁶⁷, and may require HAI to place more pressure on agency managers to highlight the availability of HAI's support. However, HAI perhaps assumes a level of awareness about older people among other agencies that may not exist. The evaluation team's discussions with other agencies indicated that their field staff have not been pro-active about older peoples' needs, focusing on their own sectoral concerns and had little knowledge of HAI's work. In addition HAI's referral forms give no guidance on what type of items HAI was able to provide. This indicates a need for better explanation and communication from HAI.

⁶⁴ Based on WHO's estimate that 14 per cent of Kosovo's population is older than 50 and UNHCR's estimate that 60 per cent of the 250,000 Kosovo refugees in Macedonia were living outside the camps, there may have been up to 21,000 older refugees living in private accommodation.

⁶⁵ HAI's initial needs assessment in Kosovo covered most of the province (Gregory, 1999), and HAI asserts that its assistance is '*offered to the whole province of Kosovo, limited by only needs and logistics.*' (HelpAge International, 2000).

⁶⁶ Using WHO's estimate.

⁶⁷ Interview with HAI, Pristina. March 2000.

The evaluation team found a lack of coherence between HAI's policy work at a headquarter and field level. The HAI team in Kosovo, for example, received the best practice guidelines on assisting older people in emergencies only a week before they were published in UK.⁶⁸ These could have supported HAI's advocacy work in Kosovo. Furthermore, HAI's research for best practice guidelines concluded that older people have needs other than material assistance, a point stressed in its DEC four-week Plan of Action. To date, HAI's outreach work in Kosovo has focused on the distribution of material assistance.

Connectedness

In its four-week Plan of Action, HAI noted its intention to address the needs of older people on a longer-term basis. HAI's work in the Cerentolovski Centre has focused mainly on physical rehabilitation, with lobbying for financial support. While HAI has distributed assistance through local organisations, it has not provided support to strengthen skills and knowledge in the care for older people. Its work alongside the CSW in Lipljan municipality has not been replicated elsewhere in Kosovo. HAI expressed unease with the performance of Kosovo NGOs and, because of this, chose not to work with the Mother Theresa Society.⁶⁹ Such concerns are not uncommon among agencies, but the limited engagement with local organisations is surprising given HAI's usual approach.

The absence of formal agreements of cooperation with collaborating agencies is an oversight. Partner agreements that include guidelines on targeting, distribution and standards of provision should be standard practice, and are particularly important where there are any doubts about the performance of partners.

HAI is correctly concerned with the long-term sustainability of the Cerentolovski Centre in the absence of a functioning state to support it. Ultimately the protection and welfare system for older people will depend on the political future of Kosovo and future welfare policy. At the end of January, HAI secured additional funds from the DEC to extend its support for the Centre for six months. Given the uncertain environment in Kosovo, it is unlikely that sustainable support for the Centre can be put in place within this time frame. HAI will therefore need to consider how to continue support for the Centre beyond the six months.

⁶⁸ Interview with HAI, Pristina, March 2000.

⁶⁹ Interview with HAI, Pristina, March 2000.

SECTION 8: SUMMARY OF MERLIN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

8.1 Mission

Merlin believes that access to healthcare is a fundamental human right. To uphold this right, as an humanitarian organisation, it provides medical relief to people suffering as a result of conflict, natural disaster or epidemic disease anywhere in the world.

8.2 Context

Merlin first commenced humanitarian operations in 1993 organising a convoy of medical supplies to Bosnia. Subsequently Merlin discontinued its presence in the region apart from a medical programme during 1998 in Albania, distributing medical supplies with technical support to 27 laboratories. Despite a strategic desire to remain in Albania, an absence of funding forced Merlin to leave Albania during the second half of 1998. Merlin re-established its base in Tirana on the 3 April 1999.

8.3 How Merlin Works

Merlin is an humanitarian organisation, providing medical relief in the first phase of international emergencies, when the local infrastructure has broken down and people are at their most vulnerable. Its field teams are comprised predominantly of volunteers. Merlin always works within existing local health structures. Where appropriate, it also tries to work with other aid organisations to provide the most effective assistance. The priority is emergency relief .

8.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Merlin received 1.46 per cent of the total DEC funding for Phase I and II, but returned its Phase II funding because further feasibility assessments indicated that the proposed Phase II project was not achievable in the time frame given. Merlin adopted a strategic response to the emergency, attempting to fill gaps in service provision rather than compete with other agencies in well-covered areas and sectors. Consequently, much of its activities revolved around assessment and emergency preparedness (primarily in case of further large influxes of refugees from Macedonia).

In particular, Merlin tried to work with local authorities to minimise the negative impacts of the crisis on the local health infrastructure. Due to capacity restrictions it was not able to operate emergency programmes in both Kosovo and Albania and consequently took a strategic decision not to return immediately to Kosovo but instead to continue programmes in Albania. Merlin would like to keep a strategic presence in Albania in the future but current funding constraints mean that this may not be possible. Merlin used the DEC funds to cover core costs and therefore the DEC funds are related to all the projects it implemented.

8.5 Summary of Merlin's DEC-funded Activities⁷⁰

MERLIN DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Assessment		Nationwide	Rapid needs assessment.		
Health: Curative & preventative		Fier	Out-patient clinic – catchment 3,500, approx. 200 consultations/week Vaccination – 400 children (measles, DPT)		Outpatient clinic for Camp Hope: originally intended for 20,000, never contained more than 5,000.
Support to health structures		Korce and Pogradec	Structural rehabilitation; Donation of drugs & medical supplies; Clinics – 2 collective centres; Pogradec hospital pharmacy		Programme started on 9 April. Support to Albanian health structures that were treating refugee patients and clinics in 2 collective centres.
Public health assessments		Tirana	Assessment of EVI in Albanian institutions.		Identified 60 EVIs from Kosovo in Albanian hospitals who require special assistance for repatriation.
	WHO/MoH	Nationwide	Assessment - TB control/ laboratory facilities Assessment - Hospital and laboratories		Formed basis for later laboratory intervention (see below).
Public health surveillance	MoH/WHO/CDC/	Pogradec	Collected epidemiological data for CRISIS system.		
Mental health	Alternativa	Tirana	A one-off programme to reconstruct their building. They did not develop a long-term relationship.		Previous contact with Alternativa during the 1997 and 1998 programme.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				192,495	Funds used to cover core costs
Curative health		Fier, Korce Pogradec	Supply of essential drugs and equipment	140,000	DFID
Curative health		Fier camp	Refugee camp dispensaries	157,875	UNHCR
				743,750	OFDA
TB laboratories	MoH	Tirana Korce Skhodra	Supply of laboratory equipment to regional TB laboratories	125,000	WHO
Hospital laboratories rehabilitation	MoH	Tirana Korce Girokaster Permet Tepelene Saranda Skhodra	Supply of laboratory equipment and rehabilitation	(Remainder of the £743,750 OFDA budget)	OFDA
TOTAL NON-DEC FUNDS				1,166,625	

⁷⁰ In the light of the very small amount of DEC money used, this table also shows a summary of non-DEC funded programmes.

Total DEC Income:	£613,200	
Expenditure Phase I:	£192,495	£26,505 outstanding
Expenditure Phase II:	£0	Returned £394,200
Total Expenditure:	£192,495	

8.6 Key Issues

Merlin devoted much effort and many resources to assessment. This emphasis on assessment contrasts with the general environment in the Balkans, where the presence of funding rather than assessed humanitarian need drove programmes. As the resources Merlin put into assessments did not always provide returns in the form of operational programmes, Merlin appears relatively cost-inefficient. The evaluation team considers this unavoidable and identifies Merlin's emphasis on assessment as an important example of good practice.

Examples of good practice

Preparedness

Although Merlin had insufficient funding to maintain an operational presence in Albania at the end of 1998, it kept up contacts with ex-local employees and other operational agencies in Albania. These contacts facilitated Merlin's initial response, allowing it to become operational a week after arriving in the country on 9 April 1999. They also facilitated Merlin's access to basic medical supplies within Albania, at a time when other agencies were facing shortages of essential drugs.

From April to July 1999, Merlin attempted to maintain a strategic preparedness capacity in the east of Albania, in order to be able to respond to additional refugee influxes from Macedonia. This created some dilemmas for the organisation over the balance between committing limited resources to operational programmes, thereby giving the agency a larger operational presence, and reserving capacity in case of future emergencies. The impression is that Merlin managed this balance relatively appropriately; however keeping some capacity in reserve meant that they could not take on all the contracts that it would have liked. For all agencies, there is a minimum level of overhead required to become operational. For a small agency with a small programme, the ratio of overhead/programme is already higher than for a larger agency. Holding back capacity in reserve further decreases the overall cost-efficiency.

Appropriateness, assessments and monitoring

Merlin's programmes appear largely appropriate. It attempted to avoid parallel health structures where possible and instead strengthened local health infrastructure to cope with refugee referrals.⁷¹ As the Albanian health facilities supplied the majority of the health care to refugees, this emphasis was appropriate. Merlin also focused on sectors such as reproductive health that had been under-emphasised by the humanitarian response as a whole. This again appears to have been addressing weaknesses in the humanitarian response. In the light of the

⁷¹ Merlin implemented programmes in the American Camp Hope, in the Fier district. The camp was on an inappropriate site and its huge infrastructural inputs were frequently misguided and contrary to Sphere Standards. Merlin attempted to engage constructively with the camp contractors, tasking an engineer to work with them to improve design. Merlin also resisted the wishes of OFDA for a 24-hour in-patient unit and instead organised effective transfer and support of the local hospital.

high possibility that there would be additional refugees from Macedonia, Merlin's insistence on maintaining reserve capacity was probably appropriate. In the event, this did not materialise and the decision had a negative impact on Merlin's cost-effectiveness.

Merlin placed an emphasis on assessment and appeared to implement its programmes based upon a reasonable comprehension of the situation in Albania.⁷² The tactics of implementing so much assessment was in part forced upon them because other medical agencies had already filled obvious core niches in health. However, Merlin resisted pressure from donors and UNHCR to implement programmes that it felt had not been adequately researched.⁷³ Ultimately its emphasis on assessment paid off and Merlin appeared to find interventions that met real needs.

Merlin's support to the 'Crisis' health information system in their areas of operation, ensuring the effective collection of data from local clinics, appeared appropriate.

Merlin's emphasis on assessment has further resulted in it appearing relatively cost-inefficient, implementing relatively few activities amidst lots of assessment and emergency preparedness. Given the high competition for profile and the donor pressure to engage in programmes, this cost-inefficiency appears to have been an unavoidable consequence of Merlin's attempts to maintain a realistic emergency preparedness and implement relevant programmes.

Coverage

Merlin implemented programmes in the refugee camps and host health facilities, achieving a reasonable balance of assistance to refugees and Albanians. Merlin worked solely in Albania and had no programmes with ethnic minorities.

Connectedness and Coherence

In July 1999, Merlin did not have sufficient surplus capacity to implement large-scale programmes in both Albania and Kosovo, so decided to complete programmes already started in Albania. Merlin coordinated well with agencies and local authorities and attempted to add value by fitting its interventions around the edges of other actors, addressing needs that had been missed. Merlin now runs several projects to re-equip selected Albanian hospitals with essential, yet relatively simple and sustainable, laboratory equipment. The local health officials interviewed during this evaluation appeared happy that these projects had provided a longer-term benefit to the Albanian health infrastructure.⁷⁴

⁷² Its initial intervention consisted predominantly of conducting assessments in three regions of Albania.

⁷³ In the case of an offer from UNHCR of £250,000 to conduct a programme with EVIs throughout Albania, Merlin first insisted on conducting a needs assessment (funded internally) to establish whether the programme was necessary. The result was that they discovered only 60 EVI and funded its own assessment.

⁷⁴ For example, the TB assessments and the laboratory assessments.

Problem areas

Human resources

Merlin employs a large number of expatriate staff relative to the number of its local employees.⁷⁵ There is an impression that this high expatriate presence does not fit completely with the agency's strategy of working with local authorities and providing a strategic preparedness capacity.

Internal funding

An absence of funding for preparedness undermined Merlin's strategic design to maintain a continuity of presence in Albania. In 1998, Merlin had wanted to continue implementing programmes in northern Albania and maintain a strategic emergency presence but an absence of funding forced them to close operations in Albania in late 1998. Consequently, when the 1999 refugee influx started, Merlin had no operational capacity in the country. This reduced the speed with which it was able to implement programmes and, by the time Merlin was operational, other agencies had filled in most of Merlin's core areas of competence. In 2000, it again faces the same problem; the huge resources seen in the country during 1999 have disappeared and Merlin faces difficulty funding its presence beyond the summer.

Monitoring and evaluation

In contrast to its focus and expertise in assessment, Merlin does not have specific guidelines for monitoring programmes and, by its own admission, has a relatively weak internal evaluation process. It has not internally evaluated any of its projects in Albania.

⁷⁵ At times in Albania, Merlin had 15 expatriates to implement a relatively small portfolio of programmes. At present it has four expatriate and seven local staff.

SECTION 9: SUMMARY OF OXFAM GB'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

9.1 Mission

Oxfam GB works with others to overcome poverty and suffering. It is a development, relief and campaigning organisation dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world.

9.2 Context

Oxfam has developed a regional programme in the Balkans, being active in Bosnia, Serbia, and Albania since 1993. Oxfam had an office in Montenegro from 1993 to 1995 and opened an office in Kosovo in 1995 following an assessment in 1994. This was under the Oxfam office in Belgrade. Oxfam has not previously had an office in Macedonia, but had twice sent managers, including the emergency coordinator, to contact UNHCR and try to buy into contingency planning there.⁷⁶ Oxfam's work in the region was underpinned by a regional management centre in Sarajevo. Overall programming during the crisis was guided by regional strategic plans which were revised at intervals. During the Kosovo crisis, Oxfam continued with its existing development programmes, trying to ensure that these were not prejudiced by the emergency effort.

9.3 How Oxfam Works

In development situations and emergencies, Oxfam works both directly — implementing projects itself — and through partners. Relationships with partners can vary from a funding-only role to a full institutional development role with funding, advice and training. Oxfam is part of the Oxfam International group whose members include Oxfams in America, Canada, Quebec, Belgium, Ireland, Hong Kong, New Zealand, as well as Community Aid Abroad, Novib and Intermon.

Able management of the Albania programme assisted in this difficult task, as did the allocation of management resources to the emergency team to make sure that its core work with poor communities in Albania was not sidelined.

9.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Oxfam received the largest proportion of DEC appeal funds: 30.55 per cent. It has the largest emergency response system of any of the DEC agencies, managed by the Emergency Department at the Oxford headquarters. The department can call on specialist emergency support personnel for an immediate response to emergencies. Oxfam maintains large stocks of emergency water equipment, tents and clothing etc. and these can be airlifted around the world. Oxfam has a well-established expertise in emergency water supply and has supported the development of the RedR register that allows the speedy recruitment of engineers and other relief staff in an emergency. Oxfam used these strengths to get significant resources into Albania and Macedonia by early April 1999.

⁷⁶ Oxfam was heavily involved in contingency in Albania for more than three years prior to the crisis.

9.5 Summary of Oxfam's DEC-funded Activities

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and public health	Oxfam		Immediate provision of water, sanitation, and health promotion.		DEC funds as a per cent of cost
		Tirana Area	14,050 beneficiaries	273,884	57%
		Kukes area	42,600 beneficiaries	232,198	42%
		Shkodra area	11,645 beneficiaries	111,283	42%
		Korce area	7,762 beneficiaries	99,653	45%
		WatSan total	76,087 beneficiaries	717,018	47%
Hygiene items and services to the disabled		WGAA, WRV and others.	Distribution of hygiene kits and social support for 8,027 refugees and 843 host families	86,899	69.4%
Programme support	Oxfam		Programme support costs	170,910	61.5%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				974,828	50.2%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and hygiene promotion	Oxfam	Stankovic 1 & 2 refugee camps	Airlift of emergency water equipment, construction of emergency water and sanitation systems in refugee camps. Over 40,000 beneficiaries	298,829	% of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 38.0%
		Cegrane Camp	Over 42,500 beneficiaries	138,926	32.3%
		All camps after June	Over 70,000 beneficiaries (duplicates some of those above)	60,398	23.5%
Community services in camps	Oxfam	Refuge camps and local support groups	Provision of social equipment and facilities. Centres for women. Over 40,000 beneficiaries (including duplicates)	29,854	60.0%
Disability services	Oxfam	Refugee camps	Distribution of orthopaedic equipment. 698 beneficiaries.	40,683	30.0%
Disability network	Handicap	Tetovo	Not known	2,726	25.0%
WatSan and HP in Host Communities	Oxfam	Gostivar and Struga	Rehabilitation of water systems and Hygiene Promotion in communities hosting refugees. Over 12,055 beneficiaries.	48,230	39.0%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				619,646	32.0%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and hygiene promotion	Oxfam	Country-wide	Emergency water supply installations for hospitals, collective centres and towns. Distribution of hygiene materials. 200,000 beneficiaries	1,067,628	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 56%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,067,628	

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan	Oxfam	On border with Serbia.	Identification of emergency sites for up to 100,000 together with planning and preparedness refugees. No beneficiaries as yet	105,587	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 100%
Relief distribution	Local partners		Distribution of hygiene and household items to 4,500 refugee families.	121,665	100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				227,252	100%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief Distribution	Oxfam, Local NGOs, Yugoslav Red Cross	Central and Southern Serbia	Distribution of Hygiene kits and blankets to 10,000 beneficiaries. Distribution of disability items to 3,000 disabled. Distribution of household items to 1,800 beneficiaries.	224,712	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds 100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				224,712	62.9%

OXFAM DEC PHASE I					REGIONAL AND HQ COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Regional and Head Office running cost	Oxfam	Sarajevo and Oxford	The costs of supporting the emergency programme from Oxford's head office in Oxford and the regional office in Sarajevo	182,146	Percentage of total expenditure paid from DEC appeal funds = 100%
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				182,146	

OXFAM DEC PHASE I				SUMMARY	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
WatSan		Albania	WatSan and health promotion	974,826	
		Macedonia	WatSan, Community and Disabled	619,646	
		Kosovo	Emergency Water Supply	1,067,628	
Relief goods		Bosnia	Relief Goods and WatSan Preparedness	227,252	
		Serbia	Relief Goods distribution, incl. disabled	224,712	
Support		Support Offices	Running Costs	182,146	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,296,210	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and Public health	Oxfam	Lushne Kukes Korce Shkodra	Rehabilitation/replacement of old water systems ranging from small schemes serving a single village to schemes serving several village over a broad area. Health promotion is part of the overall approach.	126,859	Money used for costs not covered by a large grant (£2.8M) from ECHO.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				126,859	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Water Supply, Maintenance and Hygiene Promotion	Oxfam	Stankovic 2 refugee camp	Water supply and Hygiene promotion for the approx. 2,750 Roma refugees remaining in Stankovic 2 camp until it closed on 10 December 1999.	201,664	Refugees from Stankovic 2 were moved to collective centres throughout Macedonia.
Community Services		Stankovic 2 refugee camp	Provision of soup and hot drinks in social areas. Adult literacy, tailoring and hairdressing courses.	40,615	Concentrating on Roma people.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				242,279	About 2,750 beneficiaries

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Disability	Oxfam/Handikos	Countrywide	Centres and networking facilities with disabled. (Handikos also worked with Oxfam in the camps in Macedonia in Phase I)	180,869	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
Gender	Oxfam	Countrywide	Provide centres for women.	30,383	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
	Oxfam/UNH CR/ Women's groups	Countrywide	Start-up funds for initiatives by women's groups. (Part of a larger US\$10 million project funded by USAID)	34,901	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan

Summary of Oxfam GB's DEC-Funded Activities

Relief	Oxfam/ Handikos/ Local NGOs	Countrywide		38,816	Not a DEC funded project in Oxfam's 4-week Plan
Education Rehabilitation Programme	Novib, SBASHK, DRA, Education International.	Throughout Kosovo	Pay a one-time £30 allowance to 26,000 teachers. Purchase desks, school-bags, notebooks, and teachers equipment. Repairing village schools.	3,000,000	Oxfam gave a grant to Novib, as part of a larger Novib managed programme.
Public and Environmental Health Programme	Oxfam	Pristina	To guarantee a minimum pumping capacity in urban areas not served by others. Well cleaning and rehabilitation. Rehabilitation of small-scale rural water supplies. Solid waste disposal. Health Promotion and education.	263,072	
		Mitrovica		151,205	
		Prizren		202,882	Amount on report £202,822 corrected by S. Ridley e-mail.
		Ferezaj		134,678	Originally for Viti
		Rest of Kosovo	Concentrating on solid waste and sewage disposal	335,849	
Programme Support	Oxfam	All Kosovo	Overhead costs	597,799	Not shown in the original 4-week plan.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				4,970,454	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan	Oxfam	Near Yugoslav border.	Building up contingency stocks of water equipment and planning for any possible refugee influx form Montenegro or Serbia.	70,194	This is preparedness work for potential emergencies in this unstable region.
Relief Distribution	Local partners	Refugee impacted areas	Distribution of Hygiene, Household and other non-food-items for the winter	275,974	
Returnee assistance	Local partners	Drvar	Reconstruction of homes for vulnerable Bosnian Serbs who have returned to Drvar. Grants for agriculture and job creation.	562,948	
Capacity Building	Six local organisations	Republika Srpska	Organisational development training. Support for community service provision.	0	Included in 4-week plan but funded from other funds
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				909,116	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Multi-sector: WatSan Health Relief	Oxfam and local partners	Throughout Serbia	Rehabilitate WatSan for Collective Centres and host families. Supporting immunisation. Hygiene education, distribution of hygiene kits and household items.	1,696,939	DEC funds paid for 75% of this project against a planned level of 50%.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				1,696,840	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II				REGIONAL AND HQ COSTS	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Support	Oxfam	Oxford	Cost of support by Head Office for Emergency operation in Balkans	179,026	100% of this project funded by DEC
		Sarajevo	Cost of support by Regional Office for Emergency operation in Balkans	170,826	100b of this project funded by DEC
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				349,852	

OXFAM DEC PHASE II					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
WatSan		Albania	Part of larger ECHO water project	126,859	
		Macedonia	WatSan, Community and Disabled	242,279	
		Kosovo	Emergency Water Supply, Gender	4,970,455	
Relief goods		Bosnia	Relief Goods and WatSan Preparedness	909,116	
		Serbia	Relief Goods distribution, incl. disabled	1,649,939	
Support		Support Offices	Running Costs	349,852	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				8,248,500	

Phase	Paid by DEC	Reported Expenditure	Returned	Balance
DEC Phase I	4,582,500	3,296,210	1,000,000	286,290 ⁷⁷
DEC Phase II	8,248,500	8,248,500	313,290	(313,290)
Total received	12,831,000	11,544,710	1,313,290	(27,000)

⁷⁷ DEC Figures show these funds as having been returned in the Phase II period. This illustrates a general problem that it is often not clear to the DEC Secretariat to which phase the returns relate to. The amount returned is £27,000 more than the accounts suggest. Perhaps this represents interest earned on the DEC funds.

9.6 Key Issues

Best practice

There are many examples of good practice in the work that Oxfam has done that could be emulated by others. Oxfam's emergency programme in Albania was generally regarded as an effective and professional response. Oxfam reports that *'The Macedonian Government held up Oxfam as the model NGO for the way their response here to the Kosova crisis has recognised the capabilities and needs of Macedonia'*.⁷⁸ Oxfam showed a very wide range of best practice in the first stages of the emergency. Some examples of best practice identified by the evaluation team include:

Transparency

Oxfam was by far the most transparent of the DEC agencies, supplying the evaluators with internal critical reports without being asked and supplying all information (even detailing individual expenditures) when requested. Oxfam staff also frankly discussed problems in the implementation of their projects.

Good emergency management

Oxfam set up relatively autonomous offices in Albania in Kukes, Skodra and Korce. This decentralisation reduced the load on the Tirana office, while making Oxfam's response faster and more appropriate. Finance and administration staff were sent to the field at an early stage to support the emergency response. Oxfam made good use of national human resources in Albania, including the employment of the leading expert on Albanian hydrology. Oxfam also used resources within the refugee community, using the staff of NGO partners who had worked with Oxfam in the camps. Oxfam also used a relatively flexible financial system to ensure that staff on the ground could respond to needs. Emergency teams were provided with their own management structure so that existing programmes and partners could still be supported without all resources being diverted to the emergency.

Preparedness

Despite the concern that Oxfam was *'slow out of the blocks'* voiced by some staff (Porter, 1999), Oxfam was very fast off the ground. The first international water team was in Tirana on 29 March, more than a week before the launch of the DEC appeal. Oxfam was able to draw on its emergency stocks in the UK and on its in-house emergency service personnel. RedR reported that, of the DEC agencies participating in the appeal, Oxfam was the fastest to mobilise personnel from the RedR database.

Oxfam not only responded quickly but had also committed resources to preparedness before the crisis. Oxfam had been involved in contingency planning in Albania for more than three years prior to the influx. The international staff evacuated from Kosovo just before the air-strikes, was given the job of planning for the contingency of a refugee influx into Macedonia and for a return to Kosovo.

Oxfam continued to show its commitment to preparedness during the crisis by building the emergency response capacity of the local partners it worked with in Kosovo. Oxfam's policy

⁷⁸ HM Ambassador to Macedonia, quoted in Oxfam - Macedonia Debrief Report - Fergus Boyle

of recruiting staff with little emergency experience to work alongside experienced emergency staff allowed it to increase the pool of experienced staff for the next emergency.

Promoting good practice

Oxfam measured its own work against the Sphere Standards and also disseminated these through the other agencies. Even in the areas where Oxfam was not directly responsible, Oxfam pressured other agencies to adhere to standards. This was not always successful, but success included the proper design of a number of camps. In water supply work in Kosovo, Oxfam has been trying to develop as many standard drawings and designs as possible and then sharing these with others. In the camps Oxfam promoted the concept of providing services that were accessible to the disabled and demonstrated that it was possible to provide latrines accessible to the disabled at reasonable cost. Oxfam has continually promoted coordination mechanisms and advocated greater support of UNHCR.

Equity

Oxfam spending in Serbia has increased dramatically in response to the growing humanitarian needs there.⁷⁹ Oxfam reduced its original budget for Kosovo in recognition that too many emergency resources were flowing there instead of to other needy areas of the world. The pattern of Oxfam's DEC spending between Phase I and Phase II shows its commitment to other countries in the Balkans and how this has changed between the phases to reflect humanitarian need.

Problem areas

Whereas Oxfam's work in Phase I in response to the refugee emergency showed many examples of best practice, Oxfam's work in Phase II, including its own operational work, was more problematic in terms of quality. The degree of seriousness of these problems varied, but the frequency with which such faults were found in the Phase II projects suggests that there was a basic problem of quality control.⁸⁰

Disabled access

While access by people with disabilities to education is an Oxfam priority, the toilets being built at Rahovac were not accessible to the disabled at all. The number of toilets provided at the schools seems to have no relation to the number of students. Typically the same number of WCs were provided for boys as for girls. Urinals (which are cheaper and more space-efficient) were not used for boys. Toilets for the disabled were locked.⁸¹ In one school one disabled child had one toilet reserved for her use with only five toilets for the other 1,300 pupils.

⁷⁹ Oxfam's total budget for 2000 is larger for Serbia than for Kosovo (Interview with Oxfam in Pristina)

⁸⁰ Oxfam has taken steps to remedy this problem area by forming an expanded programme support team which will clear the design and appropriateness of all water and sanitation projects and undertake quality control checks.

⁸¹ While the locked toilet doors were strictly out of Oxfam's control, it was not evident that there was adequate staff awareness to ensure that the issue was raised with the school authorities.

Poor quality work

Oxfam installed a toilet and a shower for an elderly woman who hosted refugees in Macedonia. However, Oxfam did not provide a tap for anal cleansing (as is the norm in this area) even though her toilet was equipped for one. Moreover, the soak-away for her septic tank was not properly installed so effluent was leaking out in front of her house. At Zdunje School, the connection from the septic tank to the soak-away was faulty and the septic tank was leaking into the surrounding soil. In Anton Zako Caip primary school in Vustrri, Oxfam installed a water pump, but failed to mount it correctly so that it was just hanging off the pipe work.

On a broader scale, despite previous poor experience with large scale piped-water infrastructure projects, Oxfam is carrying out the Lushnje scheme in Albania without any guarantee that the system will be sustainable (Cosgrave, 2000).

Dangerous work

In Vustrri, Oxfam placed a 6,000 litre water bladder on top of what can only be described as a gerry-built structure of hollow clay blocks and planks. The structure is a danger to the water-users. The bladder was not safely secured and the tapstand area was not properly drained.

Integration problems

Oxfam was the most transparent of the DEC agencies and the fastest to openly identify problems in its work. Unfortunately, in Kosovo, this awareness did not seem to translate into changes in strategy. Water, sanitation and public health education were poorly integrated⁸², although the evaluation team acknowledges the difficulties of dealing with issues which were not always directly within the agency's control.

At the collective centre in Malishevo, Oxfam installed an emergency water and sanitation system. The work was of a reasonable quality, but Oxfam failed to notice that sanitary provision (by another NGO) was totally inadequate with only three bathrooms (with one shower and one toilet each) for forty families. The Anton Zako Caip school in Vustrri got cleaning materials from Oxfam and wheelbarrows for removing rubbish from the school. However, all the rubbish has been dumped in the school grounds but Oxfam health promotion staff seemed unconcerned by this.

9.7 The Kosovo Education Rehabilitation Project (KERP)

Oxfam gave a grant of £3 million to NOVIB (the Dutch member of the Oxfam International network) for KERP.⁸³ In principal this funding arrangement is no different from that made by other DEC agencies — for example, by the BRCS to the ICRC and IFRC. In this case, the evaluation team did have a concern about the size of the grant⁸⁴ in relation to NOVIB's apparent lack of experience of managing large operational projects and its lack of any prior involvement in Kosovo. The team also had a concern about the capacity of SBASHK, the

⁸² Water, sanitation and public health were not integrated at management level. A typical example was seen at Shkoroshnek village, where wells were being rehabilitated without any visit from the public health promoters. Best practice would be for health promotion work to be far more closely integrated into the physical work of well repair with visits before, during and after the work in order to gain the maximum impact.

⁸³ For more information about this project see Section 5, Volume II on school and education rehabilitation.

⁸⁴ In DEC Phase II, only three DEC agencies received more than £3million in all.

teachers' union, to handle such activities as the large scale purchase of school desks and equipment. This very large grant is far more than many of the other DEC agencies received.

To a certain extent, the evaluation team was reassured by explanations and clarifications received from Oxfam and NOVIB. These included: the involvement of DRA in the project, with its specific focus on the execution of reconstruction projects and its previous experience in the region; and the capacity building work that has been undertaken in support of SBASHK.

The team was also reassured by the fact that a mid-term review of the project was being carried out in mid-2000 that would ensure that if any major problems were identified within the project, these would be rectified.

In spite of these reassurances, the team remains unsure whether the potential risks in the project warranted Oxfam making such a substantial one-off grant with DEC funds.

An additional concern with this project was the question of overheads, given the involvement of a number of different partner agencies. This issue is dealt with in more detail in Volume II.

SECTION 10: SUMMARY OF SAVE THE CHILDREN'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

10.1 Mission

Save the Children (SC) works for the benefit of children on the basis of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child. During emergencies, it aims to *'respond to children's and families' immediate needs in an emergency while giving priority to long-term recovery and development. We emphasise long-lasting, sustainable solutions.'*

10.2 Context

SC-UK programme in FRY began with the opening of a country office in Belgrade in 1993. Programmes in the region expanded with the opening of a project office in Montenegro in 1994 and an office in Bosnia in 1996. SC also started a small programme in Kosovo in 1996 that was expanded with the opening of a larger office in Kosovo in the summer of 1998 in response to the worsening situation.

During this period, SC implemented emergency programmes in Bosnia and Serbia and by 1998 had offices in Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia (with Norway) and Kosovo (summer 1998) with a regional office in Bulgaria. In Albania and Macedonia, SC started from scratch in April 1999. (N.B. SC Denmark had a small project Skhodra).

10.3 How Save the Children UK Works

Save the Children UK is one of the 26 members of the International Save the Children Alliance. Five of these were active in the Balkans during 1999 — SC Sweden, Norway, Denmark, US and UK. In Albania and Kosovo these different sections worked together for the first time under a unified 'Alliance' management structure. The UK regional director, supported by the regional programme officer (both based in the London) headed the executive management and a Kosovo steering group consisting of the Regional Directors of the five active alliance countries provided strategic direction. The following sections are now active: Albania (US and Norway); Macedonia (US & UK with a north-south split with UK taking South); Bosnia (UK); Serbia (UK); and Kosovo (all five sections).

SC implements both direct and indirect programmes, aiming to increase indirect implementation and increase the capacity of local partners as programmes develop. At the time of the crisis, Save the Children UK had a very small emergency unit based in London with only one full time emergency advisor. It has since expanded this unit.

10.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

SC received 17.7 per cent of DEC funds — £3,036,384 and £3,768,705 in Phases I and II — and is the second largest recipient of DEC funding. The DEC has been the largest funder of SC during the crisis.

The type and quality of SC's response to the 1999 emergency varied. In Serbia, where SC had good connections and a substantial capacity, the agency remained active throughout the war and successfully implemented large-scale programmes. At the other end of the spectrum,

in Albania, where SC had almost no prior presence, the initial programmes appeared to be of poor quality. In Kosovo, the evaluation team's impression is that the programmes have been mixed. Finding sufficient numbers of suitable staff has continually proved to be a major constraint to operations.

10.5 Summary of Save the Children's DEC-funded Activities

SC DEC PHASE I					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme		9 locations in Albania	1006 clothing/hygiene kits	201,000	No report available. Figures differ in narrative report and Phase I financial report to DEC
NFI		Fier Korce Kukes	Distribution of primary & pre-school and toy kits		\$63,652 in Phase I report. SC administrator in Tirana informed evaluation team only \$22,288 financed by DEC, the rest by OFDA. The kits funded by the DEC transported to Kosovo in July
Primary & pre school education		Fier Kavaja Korce	Pre- and primary school activities 6,371 children 287 teachers		8 camps, including Camps Hope, UAE, Kukes 2, Cap Anamur camps. 5 collective centres
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				392,469	From Phase I report. Does not include £125,625 spent on the family kit programme?
<i>Total other funding</i>			<i>Distribution of primary & pre/school kits</i>	<i>21,680</i>	<i>OFDA</i>

SC DEC PHASE I					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
NFI Material assistance programme	El Hilal	Tetovo, Kicevo Stankovic 2 Neprostena Tetovo Radusa	800 mother and child clothing/hygiene kits +/- 70 part kits nappies Clothes and shoes		Nappy supplies in Macedonia ran out and SC supplied 6 trucks from the UK with nappies. Trucks later formed part of SC's input into the repatriation of refugees and were later used in Kosovo
Complimentary food	MRC		Baby food to host families in Gostivar and Kisevo vegetable & fruit		
Telephone communication programme			100 mobile phones donated free, together with \$100,000 of air-time		
Non-formal education					

Community services			Stankovic I/II, Cegrane		
Health			Clinic at Radusa - also M&C health		
			Support to the hospital in Gostivar		
			Training for host families in health care through MCH		
	PSF El Hilal, MRC		Drugs to Macedonia central pharmacy Drugs to partners in Tetova and Gostivar municipalities and Gostivar hospital		PSF operated the central pharmacy in Macedonia
	El Hilal		Mother/child kits host families through a local NGO. Purchased baby food locally		
Community development	SC Macedonia		Support to local SC partner to implement sports programmes	5370.97	SC Macedonia working with Serbian Macedonians
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				816,350	
<i>Total other funding</i>				<i>100,000</i>	<i>DFID</i>
				<i>60,000</i>	<i>SC Norway</i>

SC DEC PHASE I					KOSOVO	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
Protection				4,168		
Health		Decan	Protection of children against vaccine-preventable diseases	8,744	Planned activities such as safe motherhood and reproductive health service, child nutrition monitoring Develop new health authorities management capacity	
		Pristina	Influencing health policy via participation on various policy committees.		Task for EPI, family doctors training	
Education	ACT	Decan	Rehabilitate the structure of 12 schools	12,530	First school opened in November	
		Country wide	Assessment of education system		Recommended education specialist for SC Kosovo.	
Material assistance programme			Items purchased and distribution plans drawn up. Distribution ongoing at end of Phase I	313,289		
Tracing		Pristina Djakova Peje Prizren Decan	84,446 calls to reunite families separated by the war Tracing parents of 69 separated children	62,586		

Shelter			Planned for 500 houses. 323 houses for rehabilitation identified, all materials ordered and 75% delivered to site.	4,090	
Social policy		Pristina	Providing carers and attempting to trace the parents of 20 abandoned babies	2,565	Provided route for SC to influence social policy on children
Safe places for children		Djakova Peje Decan Prizren	36 safe areas set up	8,998	
Social policy				2,507	No report available
Support costs				211,450	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				630,932	

SC DEC PHASE I					SERBIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (DM)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme	70% YRC 25% local NGOs (52) 5% direct	82 municipalities	To IDPs living in private accommodation		
			19,600 hygiene packs	215,600	
			13,000 pairs of shoes	271,400	
			10,000 winter boots	128,375	
			10,000 winter jackets	295,000	20% distributed by Jan 2000
			10,000 set of underwear	118,400	
			10,000 medical packages	127,000	
			School materials	301,139	
			10,000 mattresses and blankets	351,000	
			4,000 school bags	38,000	
4,000 disposable nappies	40,000				
Compliment-ary food		82 municipalities	19,600 complimentary food parcels	1,300,000	
			18,000 kg canned meat	126000	
Health materials		Country-wide	9 types of epilepsy and anti-psychotic drugs to 7 psychiatric institutions 300 community cases	174726	Specific request from Serbian ministry of labour, veterans and social welfare
Local partners project			Variety of 'social' interventions.	323124	Attempting to build group of partners with child focus. Emphasis on working with Roma
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				3,809,764	

SC DEC PHASE I					BOSNIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Assessment	'Be my friend'		Assessment of 157 families		
Material assistance programme			1,000 hygiene kits – refugee children in host families. Once a month for 4 months Winterisation good - Roma 1,000 winter clothing kits - one off distribution 150 nappies		Money for Roma winterisation came late.
Food			1,000 complementary food parcels for children		
Recreation education	'Be my friend', Club of Albanians, Our children Zenica				Lead agency for education and community sectors (in Regional Operations Coordination Centre - ROCC); focus on host families; Roma (often semi derelict/ dismantled accommodation)
Information dissemination			Targeting refugees in private accommodation about the availability and location of material assistance		
<i>Rep Srpska</i>					
Health materials	PSF	5 hospitals	Funded supply of 6 essential drugs for children		Purchased by PSF in France, PSF did monitoring.
NFI	Rep. Srpska RC		Hygiene parcels for 5,578 children. 1,500 nappies 5,000 toys		Targeted refugee children in host families with locally purchased products & Roma refugees in Banja Luka.
			95 food parcels and jerry cans		To Roma in Banja Luka.
Community recreation	Hi Neighbour EVA, Golden Autumn Youth theatre	10 towns	4,000 refugee children plus 5,000 resident children.		Lead agency for education and community sectors (in ROCC). Projects concentrated on social/educational activities.
Information dissemination			15,000 information pamphlets – information on registration, accessing humanitarian assistance		
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				197,204	3,335 carried over to Phase II⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Figure taken from actuals in Phase I narrative report. Figures in consolidated financial report for Phase I = £91,925

SC DEC PHASE I <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Notes
Material assistance				98,127	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				98,127	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Education		Tirana	1 SC-UK staff member to Alliance	109,123	Data from evaluation spread sheet
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				109,123	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>					MACEDONIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Programme support		Tirana	Logistics support to Kosovo	157,348	Data from evaluation spread sheet
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				157,348	

SC DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Protection			60,000 booklets on the rights of the child	15,124	
Health		Djakova Decan	Supported vaccination activities in- coverage 90%	144,970	Failure to recruit country health coordinator undermined SC's ability to influence health policy
		Pristina	Influencing health policy via participation on various policy committees.		
Education	ACT		Rehabilitate the structure of 12 schools in Decan	423,129	DEC 48% of total SC rehabilitated school structures, ACT related water and sanitation.
			Materials to schools covering: - 40,000 primary school - - 10,200 pre-school children - 16,000 additional children - 13,822 school bags for other agencies		661 primary school supply kits 328 primary school set-up kits 340 pre-school set up kits 87 pre-school supplies kits
Material assistance programme	MTS		- 30,000 winter clothing for children - 20,000 family kits	499,701 754,557 1,345,977	
Tracing		Pristina Peje Prizren Djakova	- 84,446 calls to reunite families separated by the war - Tracing parents of 69 separated children	122,481	DEC covered 94% Same activities covered in both Phase I and II reports
Shelter			- 533 warm rooms 4,000 beneficiaries	448,882	

Summary of Save the Children's DEC-Funded Activities

Social welfare			- 22 babies placed in foster/adoption or parents traced	13,349	
Safe areas for children	KFOR, HI, NPA, ACT	Prizren Peje/Decan Djakova	- 36 safe areas created 10,000 children have benefited - Toys for guns exchange	71,580	DEC covered 44% 30,000 toys distributed 5,000 toy guns collected
Social policy			Support to health policy	9,274	
Support costs				359,298	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				2,954,064	

SC DEC PHASE II <i>DUPLICATES PHASE I REPORT</i>				SERBIA	
Sector		Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE			924,575⁸⁶		

SC DEC PHASE II <i>NO REPORT AVAILABLE</i>				BOSNIA	
Sector		Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE			220,268⁸⁷		

SC DEC PHASE II					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory notes
Material assistance programme	Montenegro Red Cross	South of country	Family kit distribution (children clothing, baby parcels, bed linen, blankets & toys) 12,750 IDP children 2,250 local vulnerable children		Staff salaries, purchase of 1 vehicle to support project
Non-formal education/recreation		Podgorica, Ulcinj, Tivat	Three children's and youngsters' centres: sewing, English, computers, media workshops, art.		Southern part of Montenegro
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				625,000⁸⁸	

Total DEC Income: £7,729.664

Expenditure Phase I: £ 3,036,384

Expenditure Phase II: £ 4,693,280

Total Expenditure: £7,729.664

⁸⁶ Figure from actuals in Phase II financial report.

⁸⁷ Figure from actuals in Phase II financial report.

⁸⁸ Figure taken from Phase II narrative report, actuals from Phase II compiled financial report = £526,028.

10.6 Key Issues

Appropriateness

The appropriateness of SC programmes varied. The impression is that the programmes implemented by SC from established operational bases were more appropriate than those in Albania and Macedonia.

The SC shelter (warm room) programme in Kosovo was appropriate, as the oncoming winter was probably the biggest threat to life faced by the returnees to Kosovo. SC also appeared to have coordinated reasonably well with other agencies to ensure that houses with SC warm rooms also received roofs when necessary. Accompanying this programme with family kits and winter clothes made sense.

The SC material distribution programmes were variable. The design and packaging of the family kits used in Macedonia and Albania (some later transported to Kosovo) were inappropriate. The kits came in cardboard boxes that fell to pieces if they became wet. The kits were not palletised and could not be loaded on to the cargo plane as planned because their size and weights were incorrect. These problems resulted in the air carriers leaving many on the tarmac. A number of kits arrived damaged and disordered. They also contained glass jars of baby food that broke frequently, further damaging other contents. The kits used in Kosovo appear to have been much more appropriate. SC reverted to a tried and tested design for family kits that it had used in Kosovo in 1998. The kits came in strong, large plastic barrels that the evaluation team witnessed being used for storage several months after the initial distribution. The contents appeared useful and most of the beneficiaries interviewed appreciated them.

The SC tracing programme made an imaginative use of cellular phones to provide a useful and highly appreciated service to refugees and returnees. The education and safe area programmes appeared appropriate, combining implementation with policy work. There were however, some problems over the standardisation of schools and their futures once reopened. It is unclear whether SC intended them to be pre-school classes, safe areas or sports areas. This made their future uncertain.⁸⁹ Standards of supervision between them varied, with some having several teachers per 40 children and some having trained teachers while others had untrained teachers. It appeared there are no safe areas for minorities.

SC health interventions in Kosovo were broadly appropriate. The combination of 'hands on' support to infrastructure, combined with policy-level intervention on central planning committees, produced a synergy. This added value to both individual elements. Unfortunately, SC's difficulties in recruiting suitably qualified health coordinators to represent the agencies at a central level, somewhat undermined this strategy. In Djakova, the flexible coordinated nature of the SC approach in health was impressive. Programmes appear to have addressed well identified needs in a coherent manner and local health officials interviewed were highly appreciative.

Assessment and monitoring

The quality of SC assessment, targeting and monitoring was variable. In Albania, the evaluation team saw no evidence of assessments or monitoring reports for the family kits that

⁸⁹ Although there is some attempt to link this to national policy to make pre-school formally part of the education system.

SC distributed in April and May.⁹⁰ There is no evidence of any impact from these kits. In Macedonia, SC and several other DEC agencies relied upon El Hilal distribution mechanisms. They do not appear to have independently verified El Hilal targeting or distribution. In Serbia, SC attempted to monitor the YRC distribution of non-food items, however there is an impression that there were insufficient people allocated to this monitoring.

In Kosovo, SC adopted different monitoring and assessment strategies. In Djakova, it allowed MTS to target and distribute non-food items according to pre-agreed criteria and then employed several monitoring teams to check distributions. In Prizren, SC and MTS worked together more closely, distributing items together. SC carried out little additional monitoring. In the future, SC are planning a combination of the two tactics, working more closely with MTS on planning and distributing but also carrying out more independent monitoring. The team feels that this move to increase monitoring capacity is appropriate. In Kosovo SC did not monitor the impact of the toys for guns or the safe area programmes.

Coverage

Throughout the region, SC programmes appeared to have covered a range of beneficiaries. SC worked solely with Albanians in Albania and Macedonia, and with only very few Serbs and Roma in Kosovo. SC worked with all ethnic groups in Bosnia and Montenegro, and with Serbs and Roma in Serbia. SC focused on refugees in camps in Albania and on those living in private accommodation in Macedonia and Serbia.

Most reports state that SC targeting was based upon socio-economic vulnerability criteria. The reality in Kosovo was that MTS usually employed a geographically-based system of targeting. MTS prioritised villages according to the amount of destruction they suffered during the war and villages at the top of the list of priorities appear to have received blanket distributions of family kits and winter clothes. MTS reported that targeting using socio-economic criteria had the potential to create tensions and conflict within villages. For this reason, the MTS field officer in Prizren usually preferred to give something to everybody within the village.

During the evaluation team's visit there was an impression that targeting was not always very good. In two of the sites visited near Prizren, people had received barrels from SC and CRS. The MTS activist came from one of these villages. The village in question was prosperous and untouched during the war

Standards

SC sees Sphere as more of an organisational culture than a rulebook to follow. In theory, all programmes are vetted with Sphere in mind. The checking of proposals by HQ technical advisors and managers provided another 'Sphere check'. There is a Sphere handbook in each office and, in principle, all expatriates have orientation in Sphere as part of their briefing. In practice, problems with recruitment meant that during the early phases of the emergency briefings were often insufficient. National staff do not appear to have been adequately exposed to Sphere.

⁹⁰ SC ordered and transported the kits before its UK team arrived in the region. Although this might have been acceptable in order to have start-up material at the beginning of programmes, problems with the design, packaging and transport of these kits nullified this potential advantage.

Although project proposals mentioned Sphere Standards and indicators, SC does not appear to have evaluated or monitored according to these indicators. It has not assessed the degree to which its programmes conform to the Code of Conduct.

Examples of good practice

Connectedness

SC programmes usually appeared well connected both in terms of SC's continuity of presence and its connections with local actors.⁹¹ SC implemented creditable emergency responses in Montenegro and Serbia entirely with local staff. These successes were the results of its commitment towards developing local staff capacity. In Kosovo, SC also appeared to have a realistic attitude to working with MTS, attempting to work with them and not regarding them merely as local contractors. There is, however, little evidence that it has given MTS much support to build its capacity. In Serbia, SC used 10 per cent of its DEC funds, divided between 52 local NGOs, in an imaginative attempt to develop child-focused local partners.

Coherence

SC coordinated well with other agencies and local authorities. In Peje and Djakova where HCR leadership was weak, it was one of the leading NGOs in improving coordination. It was also alert in its responses to gaps in service provision unfilled by other agencies. The close coordination with officials, local NGOs and other NGOs in Djakova, appears to be one of the factors determining the success of the programmes there. The agency also had an integrated approach in Kosovo, providing returnees with a range of interventions including warm rooms, family kits and clothing. To increase synergy, SC coordinated well with other agencies to provide other support (roofing, water etc). This added value above the sum of the individual items and reduced duplication.

SC's appointment of a protection officer with a specific aim to liaise with other actors and promote a coherent response to protection issues appears to have been positive. Although this is an example of good practice, again SC had problems filling the post after the first three months.

In Bosnia, SC played an important role as lead agency for education and community sectors.

Advocacy

SC was one of the most active agencies in international advocacy. It was the only DEC agency to call publicly for humanitarian access to the population in Kosovo during the NATO bombing. In addition, it lobbied hard to improve child feeding practices, supporting this with scientific research to highlight problems. This work appears impressive and SC was successful in raising infant feeding onto the international agenda and improving the way the problem was addressed.

SC was active at a local policy level, supporting this advocacy with its practical work in the field. Its failure to recruit a health programme manager for four months undermined this strategy.

⁹¹ The programmes in Albania and to an extent in Macedonia are an exception to this general rule.

Evaluation lesson learning

SC evaluation and lesson learning since the emergency appears to have been very good. It has conducted two reviews/evaluations of its response and have made many changes in response to the findings. It has strengthened its emergency department, clarified regional responsibility and improved emergency capacity in region. In addition it has completed an in-depth emergency response strategy/contingency plan for the region.

Problem areas

Preparedness

SC's ability to implement an emergency programme varied depending on whether it had a pre-existing presence in a country. In Albania and Macedonia, SC did not have a prior presence and its initial response was poor. Particularly in Albania, SC was slow to arrive, struggled to find a niche and had difficulties in scaling up. It had problems finding useful roles, recruiting experienced expatriate staff and was slow to develop adequate logistics and management systems.⁹² By contrast in Serbia, Montenegro⁹³ and Bosnia, where SC-UK had pre-existing programmes, it was able to implement appropriate programmes quickly and efficiently.

There were several factors behind SC's poor performance when coming into Albania and Macedonia. These problems related to both a weakness in SC's overall ability to implement emergency programmes from scratch and to problems specific to the Balkans. The SC strategy for the Balkans was predominantly developmental and it had run down its emergency capacity.⁹⁴ SC's institutional capacity to respond to emergencies was also limited without an emergency unit and with only one emergency advisor who had no authority or capacity to take autonomous action. It had neither an in-house pool of experienced emergency staff on standby, nor an effective register of emergency personnel. Its emergency systems and modular responses were under-developed.

SC has reacted positively to the problems experienced in the Balkans. The agency commissioned two external reviews and has implemented many changes. It has strengthened the emergency department, widened its recruitment of staff, deployed regional sectoral advisors and formalised a regional contingency plan.

⁹² Quote '*SC-UK continues to deploy personnel in emergency situations ill-equipped with radio and other communications facilities, first-aid kits, stationary, vehicles to adequate specifications and other essentials*' (Turner, 1999).

⁹³ For example, from August 1998, SC expanded its Montenegro office when more than 30,000 IDPs from Kosovo arrived in the country. SC also developed a Federal level preparedness plan, part of which was to rely on SC-US in Sarajevo for material assistance rather than place contingency stocks in Montenegro. In March 1999, all SC international staff left leaving two national programme managers to run the office. The national staff were able to start material distributions to IDPs ten days after the bombing began with materials from SC-US in Sarajevo. DEC fund were used to pay back money borrowed from SC-US.

⁹⁴ SC appears not to have acted on recommendations from an emergency preparedness visit to the region in April 1998. Even in Serbia, where SC responded fast and effectively to the 1999 crisis, emergency capacity had been run down.

Reporting and Transparency

SC's reporting to the DEC has been very poor. The agency did not submit any Phase I reports for Macedonia and Montenegro; its Phase I report for Albania consisted of only three sides of paper and did not differentiate between DEC and non-DEC funded projects. There were no Phase II reports from Albania or Macedonia. The Phase II reports from Bosnia/Republica Srpska and Serbia were re-writes of the activities documented in Phase I reports. Many of the reports sent to the DEC were field reports covering all SC programmes and did not differentiate the programmes funded by the DEC. These reports contained very different formats and included varying degrees of detail. Many of the internal reports from the field were not dated or signed.

Because of the poor reporting, it has been very difficult for the evaluation team to obtain a clear picture of SC-UK programmes in some countries. For example, in Albania during 1999 the narrative report submitted to the DEC contains reference to \$225,828 of expenditure and describes programmes similar to those proposed in the 48-hour plan. The 4-week plan contains reference to different activities and the compiled financial spreadsheet reports different expenditures. The evaluation team received conflicting information during interviews in its attempt to establish the content of the Albanian programmes funded by the DEC.

Management

SC had several management problems in the Balkans. These particularly occurred in the countries where SC started from scratch. Initially it found enough experienced expatriate managers. However, these people could only stay for a few weeks and subsequently SC had problems recruiting experienced managers who could stay for longer. As a result there were problems of continuity. In Albania, the implementation of a unified management structure for the five alliance sections compounded these problems. The impression is that SC's attempts to introduce this new management structure in Albania were a mistake. The emergency was large and fast moving and SC faced many constraints. It may have been better to institute such a profound new structure in a less intense crisis and one where SC had more of a grounding in the country. The evaluation team appreciates, however, the motives behind this change: to coordinate alliance members and avoid the problems of duplication seen in Bosnia.

Human Resources

SC's recruitment of expatriate emergency staff appeared weak. It had frequent problems finding appropriate staff, experienced emergency managers who could stay for more than a few weeks and skilled technical staff. These difficulties even applied to core sectors such as tracing. The impression is that SC recruitment was reactive and unimaginative. It did not access REDR, did not advertise positions on its web site and did not have well developed staff registers. In its Macedonia health programmes, SC eased its recruitment problems by making extensive use of GPs without experience of emergencies. This appeared appropriate given the spectrum of diseases encountered in the Balkans.

The development of local staff capacity appears generally to have been strong. SC in Kosovo did not, however, recruit any non-Albanian staff. In one case it did not recruit a qualified Roma driver because its local staff objected.

SECTION 11: SUMMARY OF TEARFUND'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

11.1 Mission

Tearfund is an evangelical Christian relief and development charity working in partnership to bring help and hope to communities in need around the world. Its purpose is to serve Jesus Christ by enabling those who share evangelical Christian beliefs to bring good news to the poor. In partnership with other evangelical Christian groups and churches around the world, Tearfund proclaims and demonstrates the gospel.

11.2 Context

Tearfund had previously worked with a local partner in Albania trying to build the emergency capacity of the churches there, and with MedAir in meeting the needs of the 1998 Kosovo refugees. Tearfund's operational arm, the Disaster Response Team, had not previously worked in the region.

11.3 How Tearfund Works

Tearfund works both directly, through its own Disaster Response Team and also through local and international partners. In 1999 Tearfund supported over 500 projects in nearly 100 countries. At present, about one-third of Tearfund's money is spent through the Disaster Response Team with the rest through partners.

11.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

Tearfund received 4.68 per cent of DEC appeal funds, £702,000 in Phase I and £1,263,600 in Phase II (£401,500 of Phase I money was returned). Tearfund sent an assessment team to Albania at the end of March 1999. The Disaster Response Team began operations in Albania dealing with sanitation and camp management.

Tearfund was slower than the other DEC agencies to mobilise in Kosovo but it both executed its own shelter programme there and supported the shelter programmes of two international partners. Unlike the other smaller DEC agencies which left Albania with the refugees, Tearfund remained working in Kukes to clean up after the refugees in Kukes and won high praise from the local authority for doing so.⁹⁵

Sadly, two Tearfund international staff were killed during the relief operation in an air accident at Pristina Airport.

⁹⁵ Interview with Mayor of Kukes, March 2000.

11.5 Summary of Tearfund's DEC-funded Activities

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				ALBANIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
WatSan and Public health	Tearfund DRT	Kukes	Provision of more than 500 latrines. Collection and disposal of sewage and solid waste. Public health education focused on women.		69% funded by the DEC. About 1/3 of the budget was spent on vehicle, radios and computers
		Elbasan	Technical advice on provision of water at Fushe Labionot site and public health education	242,268	
Relief	VUSh (Local church association)	Tirana	Supporting local partner by seconding relief coordinator to VUSh during the crisis. VUSh concentrated on working with refugees in host families.	27,002	Tearfund had an earlier project to build VUSh's emergency response capacity.
Distribution and Field Kitchens	MedAir (International NGO)	Kukes and Tirana	Mobile kitchens providing over 110,000 hot meals. Distributing eating kits, household kits and hygiene kits.	62,500	MedAir is a Swiss based NGO that was already working in Albania.
Refugee shelter	Agrinas	Erseke	Providing four winterised collective shelters for 500 refugees.	25,000	Not all the original grant was used, but the surplus is now being used for rehabilitation.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				356,770	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Water	Novi Most International	Novi Most	Installing water supply for old refugee centre now housing Kosovar refugees. Project due to start after end of Phase I.	9,000	Project not completed in Phase I and never reported on by Tearfund
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				9,000	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I				MACEDONIA	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	Shelter Now International	Tetovo	Purchase and distribution of food and non-food-items for 5,000 Kosovar refugees living with host families	60,330	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				60,330	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE I					TOTALS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief WatSan Collective Centres	Tearfund MedAir VUSh Agrinas	Albania	Relief Distribution, Water and Sanitation, Collective centre outfitting and management. Supporting Coordination	356,770	
Water supply	Novi Most Int.	Bosnia	Water supply to refugee centre	9,000	
Food and NFI	SNI	Macedonia	Distribution to refugees in Host Families	60,330	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				426,100	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	DRT	Gjakova Decani	Full replacement roofs and other repairs: 364 houses in all repaired for the winter.	200,000	Also had small public health programme.
	SNI	Junik	Repairs for 478 houses in all categories	199,333	This area was very heavily destroyed in the war
	MedAir	Peje Decani	Full replacement roofs: 501 houses re-roofed and 91 other houses repaired. Over 1,000 warm rooms built	99,605	The shelter project was substituted for a MedAir project with Bread of Life in Belgrade.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				498,938	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp.(£)	Explanatory Notes
Psycho-social	Mitigation International	Albania	Training the staff of local churches in Albania in counselling skills	30,358	Continues a longer programme of building local church capacity in Albania
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				30,358	

TEARFUND DEC PHASE II					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	DRT, SNI, MedAir	Kosovo	Repair of houses to allow use for the winter.	498,938	
Psycho-social	Mitigation Int.	Albania	Training counsellors for local churches	30,358	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				529,296	

Total DEC Income:	£1,965,600
Expenditure Phase I:	£417,100
Expenditure Phase II:	£529,296
Total returns:	£401,500
Total Expenditure and returns:	£1,347,896
Expenditure on Phase I in Phase II:	£50,900 (included £9,000 for the Novi Most project)
Expenditure on Phase II in Phase Iib:	£312,800
Unreturned Balance:	£295,904 (see discussion on reporting below)

11.6 Key Issues

Examples of Good Practice

There are many examples of good practice by Tearfund and its partners. These included:

A Very Professional Approach

Tearfund and some of its partners took a very professional approach to the work in hand. Tearfund tested different roofing designs to test their resistance to snow loading before deciding against plastic and in favour of tiles. In the solid waste project in Kukes, Tearfund took leachate samples for testing, to check that the land-fill site was working as planned. T-shirts used to promote the public health message in Kukes made no mention of Tearfund, an unusual example of agencies putting the message ahead of self-promotion.

A Commitment to Collaboration

Tearfund seconded its water engineer to UNHCR until their Water and Sanitation coordinator arrived. Tearfund worked together with HCC and Malteser to house far more people than Tearfund could have done on its own (this was a DEC-Funded Phase IIB project). This cooperation was particularly impressive given that neither humanist HCC nor Catholic Malteser are the sort of organisations that Tearfund would normally work with.

Project Monitoring and Listening to Beneficiaries

Tearfund monitored the affects of its public health programme in Kukes. MedAir held focus group discussions with its beneficiaries to evaluate its programmes in previous years and to plan for the future.

An Integrated Approach

Tearfund's approach to solid waste was a good example of an integrated approach. Tearfund not only provided funds for improving the dump site, it also trained the pickers (who scavenge the dump for saleable items) so that they were aware of how to minimise the health risks in its work. Tearfund supported incinerators at the health facilities so that needles would be less of a problem on the dump and also attacked solid waste through an innovative campaign.

Support for Preparedness

Tearfund invested resources before the crisis in developing capacity within VUSh, one of its partners in Albania, to respond to any crisis. Tearfund has also invested in scenario planning so that it would be better prepared for any new crises following on from the changes in Kosovo.

Focus on the Poor

More than any other agency visited, Tearfund was very aware that shelter assistance in 1999 had missed out those in Category 5 houses, who were often the poorest. Tearfund's 2000 programme seeks to redress that by rebuilding Category five houses. As Kosovo is not the poorest part of the world, Tearfund, like Concern, will be scaling down its programme this year, with direct implementation due to come to an end.

Problem Areas

Despite the general high quality of the Tearfund projects seen, there were a number of problem areas:

Insufficient Support for Some Partners

Tearfund works both directly through the DRT and partners. Partners can range from very experienced and professional partners like MedAir to local partners like VUSh, which have a low level of preparedness. Tearfund acknowledged that it still has to learn how to better manage the interface between working through partners and its own direct operations. Tearfund funded SNI to assist refugees in Macedonia, but the SNI frankly acknowledged that this was a new experience for it and that it had to learn on the job. SNI would have been better placed to help if Tearfund had supplied an experienced relief worker (possibly from Tearfund's own DRT) to guide the SNI staff through the initial stages.

Tearfund needs to consider whether its normal mandate of only working with like-minded partners is always the best way of reaching the poor. In Kosovo, using non-traditional partners allowed Tearfund to execute an effective shelter programme.

Reporting

Tearfund narrative reports were among the best reports submitted by the agencies. They were clear, relatively short and easy to understand. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the financial reports. While they were internally consistent, they did not match the figures provided to the evaluation team by the DEC Secretariat.

PHASE I	Income from DEC	Expenditure or transfers of DEC funds	
DEC grants in Phase I	702,000		
Expenditure reported by Tearfund		417,100	Includes Agrinas project for which about £8,000 remained unspent
Novi Most project		9,000	Work not reported on in either Phase I or 2 reports, but confirmed as spent in Tearfund email.
Retained by Tearfund for Phase II		41,900	The DEC Secretariat refused permission for such transfers for CA
Returned to DEC		234,000	DEC records show this together with £167,500 below
BALANCE	NIL		

PHASE II			
Advanced by DEC Phase II	1,263,600		DEC records
Retained from Phase I	41,900		See Phase I expenditure above
Advanced by DEC Phase IIb	187,200		DEC records
Returned to DEC Phase II		167,500	Shown by DEC as a Phase I return
Expenditure reported by Tearfund for Phase II		529,296	From Tearfund report
Expenditure reported by Tearfund for Phase IIb		500,000	From Tearfund report
BALANCE	295,904		Not reflected in DEC records

While there are no suspicions of any wrong-doing, it would be best practice for Tearfund to ensure that its financial reports are reconciled with the records of the DEC Secretariat. However, it is acknowledged that this problem was not unique to Tearfund. Other agencies also provided financial reports that did not reconcile with the data from the DEC Secretariat.

Personnel Management

A number of interviewees commented that some Tearfund staff were ‘burned-out’ in the emergency phase due to the stress they were under. Tearfund is aware of this problem and are taking steps to prevent it from happening in future.

Cost of Housing

Tearfund funded shelter work by its own DRT, MedAir and SNI in Kosovo. While none of the housing projects are directly comparable, the DRT’s initial housing project was far more expensive than those of its partners. The danger of such comparisons is that they do not always compare like with like, as the costs quoted by NGOs for a specific project may not include the core and overhead costs.

Tearfund have given a reasonable explanation of why these costs were so high in the first phase and why they were so much better in the second phase. However, the evaluation team still considers the costs to have been high when considering the shelter interventions of other partners. On a positive note, Tearfund seems to have learned from its experience and its later housing in Phase IIb⁹⁶ was marginally cheaper than the housing provided by SNI or MedAir in Phase II.

⁹⁶ Phase IIb activities were not formally covered by this evaluation, but the intertwining of Tearfund’s Phase II and Phase IIb operations meant that they should be considered to get a better picture of the Phase IIb work.

SECTION 12: SUMMARY OF WORLD VISION'S DEC-FUNDED ACTIVITIES

12.1 Mission

World Vision is a Christian relief and development agency. *'Our commitment to the world's poor arises from our desire to follow the teachings of the Bible and the example of Jesus Christ. We are supported by and work with a wide range of churches and individuals from different traditions but we are not affiliated to any particular denomination. We also work closely with members of other faiths and non-religious organisations in many parts of the world and our assistance is always given without any form of discrimination'*.

12.2 Context

World Vision has good knowledge of population and culture from work in Kosovo since 1998 and Bosnia from 1994/95. The Kosovo crisis was unusual for World Vision in that there are relatively few crisis countries now where World Vision does not have development programmes in place before the crisis.

World Vision had no programmes in either Albania or Macedonia before the crisis. It now has a programme in Albania and plans to remain there.

12.3 How World Vision Works

World Vision has about 90 national offices worldwide. Some are independent (with their own trustees etc.), but Romania is the only independent programme in Eastern Europe. The Balkans Programmes are managed by the Middle East and Eastern Europe office in Vienna. World Vision works directly but may also fund local partners. At the time of the Kosovo crisis, World Vision drew emergency staff from its programmes and offices around the world.⁹⁷

12.4 Overall Response to the Emergency

World Vision received 3.66 per cent of the DEC appeal funds, £549,000 in Phase I and £988,200 in Phase II. World Vision's initial response to the emergency was concentrated in Montenegro. It took some time for World Vision to set up in Albania. The Phase I programme concentrated on meeting immediate needs of displaced in Montenegro and of the refugees in Albania. During the NATO bombing World Vision sent food into Kosovo. One consignment was back-packed in for distribution among the displaced; the other went by truck for distribution by the Yugoslav Red Cross.

World Vision recognised that its response in Albania was slow, but its staff accompanied NATO back into Kosovo. World Vision has a large programme in Kosovo, for which shelter and agriculture are very large components.

⁹⁷ WV has now set up emergency teams for each of its three main geographical regions.

12.5 Summary of World Vision's DEC-funded Activities

WV DEC PHASE I					ALBANIA
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter	World Vision	Sarande	Renovating and equipping a disused fish factory as a collective centre. Also assisting 260 refugees in empty houses in Sarande.	72,480	Refugees returned to Kosovo before project was completed.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				72,480	

WV DEC PHASE I					MONTENEGRO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Relief	World Vision	Berane	Provision of food kitchens, food, and non-food items to displaced		Provided monthly food voucher to refugees
Public health	Institute of Public health	Berane	Printing a training booklet on basic health for use by care workers with the displaced. Clearing up rubbish dump on edge of camp. Mobilising children to collect rubbish. Distributed hygiene kits		Also provided vehicles for health care workers and built a clinic at the site.
Shelter		Berane	Construction of 30 cottages for displaced. Cottages were ready before the first snow.	460,050	Beneficiaries complain that they were not consulted about design.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				460,050	

WV DEC PHASE I					UK COSTS
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Overhead	Self	UK	Headquarters Admin Costs	16,470	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				16,470	

WV DEC PHASE I					SUMMARY
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Shelter and relief	Self	Albania	Fish Factory Conversion	72,480	
	Self	Montenegro	Cottages and relief food	460,050	
Overhead	Self	UK	Headquarters Admin Costs	16,470	3% of the sub total.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				549,000	

WV DEC PHASE II					KOSOVO
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Mine Action	Mines Advisory Group	Various	Checking area for mines and booby traps	614,913	Includes £55,535 for MAG's UK overhead.

Shelter	World Vision	Mitrovica	Supplementary materials for shelter kits from UNHCR and USAID.	192,600	To supplement inadequate UNHCR and USAID shelter kits.
		Various	Shelter material for about half the WV staff. Allocation of grants decided by staff committee.	36,276	To allow staff to begin repairs on damaged homes
Support	World Vision	Various	Purchase of trucks and generators	97,340	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				941,129	

WV DEC PHASE II				OFFSHORE OVERHEAD	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Support	World Vision	UK	World Vision Administration	33,047	
		Not given	World Vision Recruitment services	3,401	
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				36,448	Does not include £55,535 for MAG's UK support.

WV DEC PHASE II				SUMMARY	
Sector	Partner Agency	Location	Activities	Exp. (£)	Explanatory Notes
Mine action and shelter	MAG and World Vision	Kosovo	Mine clearance, shelter kits and support services.	941,129	
Support	World Vision	Offshore	Admin and personnel service costs.	36,448	Just over 3% of sub-total.
TOTAL EXPENDITURE				977,577	

Total DEC Income:	£1,537,200
Expenditure Phase I:	£549,000
Expenditure Phase II:	£ 988,200
Total Expenditure:	£1,537,200

12.6 Key Issues

Good Practice

World Vision demonstrated a number of examples of good practice:

Learning lessons

As a result of slow mobilisation in a number of crises, including Kosovo, World Vision has now set up Emergency Response Teams of 7 to 8 people, able to deploy at a moment's notice. Before deciding on its approach to emergency preparedness, World Vision analysed its emergency response over the previous three years.

Personnel Management

World Vision has allocated funding for developing the capacity of its own staff in the field. It has already canvassed all departments to identify training needs. The grants for staff to repair their houses were another example of best practice. These were decided by a staff committee drawn exclusively from local staff. World Vision also employed a full-time security officer to visit all sites in Kosovo and advise WV on security. This is particularly important given that World Vision is working in Mitrovica.

Winterisation

Although the Sarande Fish Factory was never needed, it was best practice for World Vision to begin developing this as a winterised structure so that it would be ready for the Balkans winter.

Problem Areas

Despite these good points, there were a number of issues of concern in the World Vision programme:

Overhead Costs

The draft DEC handbook allows agencies to charge 7.5 per cent of their actual costs for administrative costs.⁹⁸ World Vision only charges 3 per cent for its UK overhead costs but MAG charged about 10 per cent of its total programme cost⁹⁹ for UK overhead.

In all about 45 per cent of World Vision's Phase II funding went on capital items and overhead.¹⁰⁰ The whole advantage of DEC funds is that they are flexible and can be used for the costs that other donors do not cover, such as overhead and capital items. However, such a large proportion of the funds going on these items seems disproportionate.

⁹⁸ Confusingly, the Handbook allows funding agencies to add 8.5 per cent of their overseas programme cost for the calculation of the total cost of their overseas programmes for the capacity indicator calculation.

⁹⁹ It was only 7 per cent of the original budget, but expenditure was significantly less than originally estimated, partly because only three Mine Action Teams were fielded instead of four.

¹⁰⁰ The shelter materials for WV staff is treated as an overhead cost because this was intended in part to improve the retention of staff at a time when World Vision was having problems retaining staff. It was essentially a type of staff bonus, and not directly related to the DEC funded programme activities.

Insufficient own resources to properly supplement inadequate kits from the donors

World Vision took on a very large shelter commitment but despite the best efforts of its staff, it proved difficult to meet all the needs for roofing timber.¹⁰¹ Many agencies commented on the inadequacy of the roofing kits provided by the major donors. Supplementing inadequate donor provision is one of the features that separate NGOs from contractors. It might have been better for World Vision to limit its roofing programme to the level where it could meet these additional needs from its own resources.

Cottages in Montenegro

World Vision constructed cottages in Berane for Serb IDPs from Kosovo. This work will continue in Phase III with cottages for Roma IDPs. The cottages are intended to last five to ten years and are expensive compared with shelter work in Kosovo. But it seems likely that these IDPs will not be returning home in the near future and, indeed, there is an argument that permanent accommodation would have been more appropriate. However the unit cost would have been even higher and this approach might not have been acceptable to the local authorities and UNHCR, although the cottages are next door to much better permanent accommodation for earlier Serb refugees from the Krajina and Bosnia.

Again on the grounds of cost, the cottages do not have individual bathrooms — there are communal blocks. The beneficiaries were not consulted about the design of the accommodation and it was noted that many came from urban or town situations in Kosovo.¹⁰²

The cottages, which are of timber construction, have been built very close to each other and there seems no doubt there is potential fire risk.

This project underlines the dilemmas of providing shelter for long-term IDPs in the region.

Discrimination against the Roma?

World Vision is providing special classes for children (both displaced and local) at a community centre in Berane. However only one Roma child has been registered, even though there are many Roma IDPs. The evaluation team was told that this was because '*Roma children were not interested*' and that '*Roma children can only attend if they are clean*' (Watson, 2000). This raises the question of the impartiality of this project, but should be seen in the light of World Vision's wider commitment to working with the Roma in Montenegro and issues such as language, which inhibit school attendance.

Recovery of Capital Assets from Mine Action programme

Under the terms of its contract, MAG was obliged to return all the vehicles, radios and computers purchased for the Mine Clearance Programme to World Vision at the end of the six month project. World Vision agreed an extension to the end of June 2000 to allow MAG to implement an ECHO-funded mine action project, but are insisting that the assets be handed over then for use on other (unspecified) World Vision projects in Kosovo.^{103,104} MAG

¹⁰¹ World Vision Shelter Report

¹⁰² WV has pointed out that the deadlines of oncoming winter and DEC expenditure within six months made consultation impracticable.

¹⁰³ Interview with MAG Kosovo, April 2000.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with World Vision Kosovo, March 2000.

understood from World Vision that such a recovery of capital assets from partners was a DEC requirement.¹⁰⁵ The UN's mine coordination center is concerned that the removal of capital assets from MAG will severely restrict mine action in Mitrovica, as MAG is the only mine action agency now working there.¹⁰⁶ When the evaluation team queried World Vision about this matter, it was told that the plan had changed and MAG would be able to retain the assets for use in mine action¹⁰⁷. However, it subsequently emerged that MAG were informed that it would still have to surrender the assets at the end of June.¹⁰⁸ A further query from the evaluation team yielded the information that World Vision intended to recover the capital equipment, but stated that if that happened World Vision would make sure that the recovery of any assets did not unduly reduce MAG's capacity.

MAG entered into the agreement with World Vision fully aware of the requirement to return the assets at the end of the project, but may have expected that the project would continue. World Vision is completely free to impose such conditions on the partners it funds as it see fit.

MAG did very little clearance during the first six-month project. It took some months to train the teams and they were not working long before winter set in, further limiting the work that could be done. CARE's approach to Mine Action (bringing in a contractor) was much more effective in the short term, but World Vision's approach (using MAG to build local mine action capacity) could be more cost-effective in the long run. World Vision gave this as the reason for deciding to use an NGO rather than a contractor. However, recovering the capital assets from MAG now, at a stage when donors are starting to lose interest making it very difficult for MAG to find funding to cover such capital items, threatens the continued existence of the mine action capacity that has been developed by MAG.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ Interview and later telecon with MAG UK.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with UNMACC Kosovo, April 2000.

¹⁰⁷ E-mail from World Vision, UK

¹⁰⁸ Telecon with MAG, UKSS

¹⁰⁹ World Vision has informed the evaluation team that the question of assets has been settled to the satisfaction of both parties (e-mail 23/6/00).

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Please also refer to Appendix 11 in Volume 1 for a list of background documents.

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