

# FINAL REPORT

Maputo, OCTOBER 30, 2020

## EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF CYCLONE IDAI & KENNETH RESPONSE IN MOZAMBIQUE



Water buckets placed at every household in the Mutua resettlement center for handwashing to prevent the spread of Covid19

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## *Disclaimer*

*The contents and conclusions of this evaluation report reflect strictly the opinion of the author, and in no way those of Oxfam, its implementing partners or those of the Government of Mozambique.*

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## ACRONYMS

<b>AP</b>	Affected People
<b>AAP</b>	Accountability to Affected Population
<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
<b>CAT 1</b>	Category 1 cyclones
<b>CHS</b>	Core Humanitarian Standard Quality and accountability
<b>CTGC</b>	Technical Council for Disaster Management
<b>COSACA</b>	Care save the Children and Oxfam
<b>ERT</b>	Emergency Response Team
<b>EKQ</b>	Evaluation key questions
<b>DEC</b>	Disaster Emergency Committee
<b>EFSL</b>	Emergency Food Security & Livelihoods
<b>FGD</b>	Focus group Discussions
<b>GHT</b>	Global humanitarian team
<b>HCT</b>	Humanitarian Country Team
<b>IASC</b>	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Person
<b>IOM</b>	International Organisation for Migration
<b>IP</b>	Implementing partners
<b>MEAL</b>	Monitoring, Evaluation, Accountability & Learning
<b>INGC</b>	National Institute for Disaster Management
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organisation
<b>NFI</b>	Non-food Items
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>OECD/DAC</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's/ Development Assistance Committee
<b>PDNA</b>	Post-disaster needs assessment
<b>RTE</b>	Real Time Evaluation
<b>SMART</b>	specific/single, measurable, achievable, result-oriented and time-bound
<b>ToR</b>	Terms of reference
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nation Children Fund
<b>WASH</b>	Water Sanitation and Hygiene

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**PURPOSE AND SCOPE:** This report outlines Oxfams' *External Evaluation of Cyclone Idai & Kenneth Response in Mozambique carried out in the provinces of Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado*. The response was implemented in two phases: phase one March -September 2019 and phase two October 2019-March 2020. The evaluation was designed based on the requirements stated in the Terms of Reference (ToR), whose purpose is to take stock of Oxfam and its implementing partners (IP) response to CAT 1 emergency and provide feedback based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of (i) relevance; (ii) efficiency; (iii) effectiveness; (iv) impact; (v) sustainability in alignment with the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) criteria for evaluating humanitarian action, such as (i) coherence; (ii) coverage; and (iii) connectedness. The evaluation team also assessed to what extent the response complied with the Core Humanitarian Standard for Quality and accountability (CHS).

**COUNTRY CONTEXT AND OXFAM OPERATIONAL CAPACITY:** In March and April 2019, Mozambique was hit by two consecutive tropical cyclones that left trails of death, damage, and destruction in their path. In March, the Tropical Cyclone Idai weather system's impact came in three waves: in early March, the low-pressure system caused flooding in Zambezia and Tete. On 25 April, Tropical Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Cabo Delgado province, flattening entire villages. This is the first time in recorded history that two strong tropical cyclones have made landfall in Mozambique in the same season and the first time that a cyclone – Kenneth – made landfall in the northern region of the country, Cabo Delgado. Overall, it is estimated that close to 2.2 million people needed urgent assistance following the cyclones and floods (374,000 people from Cyclone Kenneth and 1.85 million people from Cyclone Idai). On top of the cyclone affected people, there were an additional 1.78 million people affected by food insecurity throughout the country, according to the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) and Mozambique's Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN 2018).

Oxfam, as a humanitarian organization operating in Mozambique, developed its comprehensive strategy and plans to respond to the cyclones in Mozambique, immediately after the cyclone Idai in March of 2019. The overall objective of Oxfams' cyclone response was "to provide life-saving assistance, protection, dignity, cooking equipment, cash transfers for food and essentials, and organisation of awareness-raising sessions on gender equality to help prevent a spike in gender-based violence which often happens after a disaster and provide safety for people affected by Cyclone Idai and Kenneth".

**METHODOLOGY, APPROACHES AND TOOLS USED:** This evaluation triangulated quantitative and qualitative/anecdotal information at multiple levels (international, national, provincial and districtlevel). The process started with an inception phase that included a desk review and interviews with a total of 34 key informants including local authorities (8), implementing partners (9), Oxfam country office (7), regional (2), global (8) staff. In addition to the methods mentioned above the evaluation team also put in place the following approaches: (i) In-depth discussions with former Oxfam cyclones Idai and Kenneth Managers, technical staff, who also aided in producing stakeholder Mapping, (ii) Stakeholders satisfaction, (iii) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker, (iv) Focus Group discussions and Interviews with Key Informants and (v) Case Study/Field Visits.

During the data collection phase, the team conducted field visits and household surveys reaching out to a total of 180 households in Dondo (37), Nhamatanda (30) and Buzi (26) Districts in Sofala between October 07-13. In the Zambezia province, particularly in Maganja da Costa, (43) household surveys

were conducted District in Zambezia between October 14-17. The team that carried out the evaluation consisted of 4 people in Sofala and 3 in Zambezia.




Figure 1: Illustration of the total number of households (women and men) engaged in the survey.

**MEETING THE OBJECTIVE OF THE RESPONSE:** The humanitarian projects implemented in the central and northern regions of Mozambique included protection, WASH, Emergency Food Security and Sustainable Livelihoods (EFSL). These projects were assessed by key informants and household surveys as appropriate, and of good quality. Key informants also referred to the interventions, particularly WASH and protection, as lifesaving, provided protection, and dignity to the affected populations. These interventions were complemented with the supply of cooking equipment, promotion of awareness-raising on gender equality, interventions that prevented a spike in gender-based violence which tends to be recurrent in disaster situations.

Oxfam and its IPs also strived to provide safety for people affected by both Cyclone Idai and Kenneth. In relation to OECD/DAC criteria, key informants stated that on a scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 – very good, 2-good, 3-satisfactory, 4-Poor, and 5 very poor) Oxfam performed **GOOD** under relevance, MEL, efficiency and **SATISFACTORY** under coordination, timeliness and flexibility. The criteria scored satisfactory are the areas where the organization and its IPs will need to pay more attention in the future (*see details in graphic below*).




Figure 2: KY assessment of Oxfam and its IP performance under DAC criteria

**SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS:** The Government of Mozambique led the response even before cyclone Idai made landfall and was quick to determine that external support would be required to meet humanitarian needs. While the Oxfam country office had recently updated their contingency plan and put in place an emergency response team (ERT) it became clear that the country offices (CO) Contingency Plan (CP) did not include the potential for a large emergency (cat 1). The CAT 1 event was new for the country in general, for the majority of the humanitarian organization, including for Oxfam and its implementing partners (IP). This had an impact on how Oxfam and its implementing partners (IP) positioned themselves in both the acute phase of the response and during the early recovery, as summarized below:

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## Oxfam Operational Strengths and Weaknesses

### *Oxfams' strengths during the category one cyclone*

Oxfam globally is an integral part of the WASH platform and the global network of Humanitarian organizations. As one of the key actors in this sector, Oxfam continues to invest and develop WASH standards. Oxfam is also part of the global coalition of WASH which enabled the board of Directors recognition of its work. Oxfam's international role and responsibilities constitute strengths that informed its intervention during Idai and Kenneth, as summarized below:

- **Timely delivery of surge capacity** - During cyclone Idai and Kenneth, and given that Oxfam is part of the network of humanitarian partner, Oxfam was able to timely deliver surge capacity and foster WASH standards in the ground. Being part of WASH internationally was fundamental to delivering needed technical expertise in the ground and to meet the humanitarian needs of the affected population (AP).
- **Flexibility of the management structure** - The management structure was flexible in deploying technical expertise (protection, gender and safeguard specialists) to advance one of the Country Office Strategic Plan Pillar – prevention of gender based violence and foster protection on the ground.
- **Delivery of needed life-saving service** - Timely delivery of water and sanitation supply helped prevent the outbreak of cholera and other water borne diseases. As the intervention sites became flooded the threat of cholera outbreak increased especially when people moved into accommodation centers (AC). Oxfam quickly mobilized and shipped in WASH supplies, which included collapsible water reservoirs (bladder) and other supplies to the affected areas.
- **Advocacy for policy change** - Through the network of in-country humanitarian partners, especially COSACA, Oxfam was able to release several policy statements raising concerns around gender, protection, and lobbied for the non-militarization of the response. Oxfam also advocated with donors to allocate more resources to fund the often-overlooked areas, during the response to emergencies.
- **Prepositioning of emergency stock on site**- Oxfam had prepositioned emergency stock on site that was quickly delivered to assist people affected in the Buzi areas. This is an area that the organization will need to scale up and consolidate as it elevated the Organizations relevance and positioning on the ground.
- **Active communication with donors** -the organization maintained active communication with donors about the ongoing projects and strived to respect the wishes of some donors who did not want the resources planned for long term development activities to be diverted for emergency response.
- **Country office management active role** - the dedication of the CO management team was very good, they worked overtime for 3 months, including ensuring logistics, support functions to mobilize funds.
- **Work in the field of safeguarding**-This was a new topic for the country, and it was received very well. It consisted in putting in place mechanisms to identify potential safeguarding risk and mitigate against it. The safeguarding was also a system that helped assess Communities' satisfaction with the response provided. In a nutshell, this helped to operationalize the principle of do no harm.

## *Oxfam's weaknesses during the category one cyclone*

**System bureaucracy.** Oxfam is part of a huge global network of partners that is well positioned to timely respond to cat 1 emergency. However, the disaster (cat 1) that affected Mozambique was faced with bureaucracy that slowed down the response. For instance, it was challenging for Oxfam to work with affiliated organizations to mobilize resources and deliver response on time in Mozambique. It limited the organization work during the acute phase of the disaster.

**Limited role in recovery and resilience.** Oxfam's work in recovery was loose and the organization could have done more due to the links they have in recovery and in building people resilience. For instance, a lot of recovery work was taken over by other partners in Zambezia, Sofala and Cabo Delgado.

**Government restriction on cash assistance.** The restriction imposed by the Government of Mozambique in relation to cash assistance slowed down the speed of response on the ground. While this could have quickly provided capacity and choice for affected populations, it seemed that the timing for its negotiation, during the acute phase of the emergency, was not appropriate.

**Invest in country office capacity.** There is need to invest on a country office capacity of its own. When it is faulty then it becomes a huge challenge for the country.

**Increase attention to business support.** As a humanitarian organization that deals with different aspects to operationalize the humanitarian machine, there is need to place more attention on the business support service.

**Confederation with different procedures.** Each affiliate has different procedures but when mobilized must work together. Then, the conflict emerges as the affiliate must follow own procedures which takes a lot of time,

trying to harmonize them and to find a way to better work together. Moreover, this can create problems for those who must manage finance, given that the finance systems were different, etc.

**One Oxfam team.** In case of an emergency to require deployment of staff, the perception of national, regional, and global team should be eliminated to be become only one Oxfam. These staff members should work closely together and towards the same goal of saving people's lives and providing aid without any kind of discrimination. This will reduce the tendency of mistrust between the country office and surge team that is supporting the response.

**Short term deployment of surge capacity.** The surge capacity deployed was very important for the country response. However, most of the time they did not provide continuity and actually caused chaos, particularly, when the hand over process was not properly done and affected the local staff capacity to follow up. This is a big threat for the organizations commitment mainly with the donor that trusted the organizations financial resources.

**Joint programming within the consortium.** There is need to advocate for expanding the scope of work of the COSACA consortium moving forward for the joint programming so that in a future situation, like the cat 1, the consortium is ready with adequate means to respond. This will prevent the competition for funding.

**Preparedness.** The preparedness and preposition of stock on site demonstrated to be crucial. It facilitates the response and support to partners. With regards to this this, different issues from internal systems could have been better set up for a response to a cat 1 event. This includes also addressing the link around the ownership of the response by the region and the country in terms of agreeing on the ways of collaboration and coordination of issues.

**Country vulnerability and recurrence of disaster.** To be able to better complement the surge capacity deployed, the Country Office needs to be better prepared, i.e., the country office needs to have in-country humanitarian capacity with the right skill to rapidly start the response including liaise with the deployed international staff and follow up when they leave the country.

## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE CAT 1 EMERGENCIES.

### 1. Emergency preparedness

**Conclusion 1.** Mozambique is one of the most vulnerable country to disasters in the Southern African Region and the third most vulnerable to climate-related impacts which are projected to increase in intensity, frequency, and magnitude. Cyclones idai and kenneth are an elucidative example.

**Lesson 1.1** The country offices slow response to the affected population needs is a clear demonstration that it was not ready and or well prepared to deal with the disasters. Though the events magnitude was unpredictable, Oxfam is by nature a humanitarian organization and could have done more, based on its large international experience, in preparedness. Its implementing partner immediate intervention is a clear demonstration that preparedness pays off.

**Recommendation (R) 1.1.1** If Oxfam intends to continue relevant in the humanitarian field, and given the countries' vulnerability, Oxfam will need to invest and maintain a core team of qualified multidisciplinary humanitarian staff that is ready to timely initiate a response.

**R1.1.2** The CAT 1 event that affected the country elevated the need for the Country Office and its IP to have multi-hazards and up to date Contingency Plan that is well known, tested, and adequately funded. And the timing to do so is when the Southern Africa Regional Climate Forecast (SARCOF) releases the forecast.

**R1.1.3** Under the localization agenda and in alignment with the organizations approach to strengthen local partners capacity, Oxfam is encouraged to establishment new Memorandum of Understand (MoU) or update the existing one in alignment with the revision and update of the organization Contingency Plan.

### 2. Coordination, collaboration and information sharing

**Conclusion 2.** Oxfam had a strong coordination and collaboration role with other partners including the UN, and the government in the acute phase of the emergency. This increased the organizations and its partner reputation and trust.

**Lesson 2.1** Oxfam should, throughout the emergency cycle, strive to maintain a meaningfully collaboration and coordination with local, national, and international partners including taking part in relevant coordination forums as this serves as an information sharing and accountability forum.

**R2.1.2** Oxfam should ensure meaningful participation in coordination forums, share reports and other relevant strategic information including its management approach. It will clear the confusion of having the "a team coach which is simultaneously also a player".

**R2.1.3** The introduction of new topics that may imply structuring of an organization's management approach and style may cause inertia for its acceptance. If, on the hand, the topics do not imply change in the management style, such as the safeguarding theme, which will be easily accepted. For instance, the Oxfam emergency cash component was new for the government and it implied capacity to monitor the process. Therefore, as the government at provincial and districts was not ready, the cash component did not proceed.

**R2.1.4** While crisis creates opportunity to test new tools and approach, organizations are encouraged to work during preparedness phase, which coincide with revision and

update of key documents such as Contingency Plans to introduce new themes/topic. Preparedness seems to be a good timing to negotiate, familiarize with target stakeholders with the topics and lobby to introduce sensitive topics such as cash availability.

**Conclusion 3.** *COSACA consortium played an important role in information sharing, advocacy, fundraising, and had a seat in the HCT. This was crucial for the reputation and trust of the consortium partners including in delivery of relevant services for the affected population.*

**Lesson 3.1** The consortium was not designed for large scale emergencies. The COSACA Manifesto” was developed during the response to help clarify a number of points, but it is widely acknowledged that COSACA needs to expand its scope in light of the learning from a big emergency.

**R.3.1.2** The COSACA partners need to review its scope in a light of a large-scale emergency to include aspects such as joint planning, and programming, and clear division of roles and responsibilities, and geographic locations.

### 3. Management structure

**Conclusion 4.** *The value added of surge capacity deployed from the regional and GHT level was decreased by their short-term contracts. The gap created between deployments, had negative impact on teamwork, increased transaction costs for Oxfam, created inconsistencies/ fragilities in relationships with partners and communities.*

**Lesson 4.1** Geographic localization refers to the principle of locating responsibility or action at the level nearest to which it is required, i.e., facilitating the assumption of larger roles by local actors in the provision of aid to their own population (in addition to the effectiveness and sustainability arguments.) In these cases, local actors will be best placed to respond directly to specific situations and needs.

**R4.1.2** One Oxfam team. In case of an emergency to require deployment of

international staff, the perception of national, regional, and global team should be eliminated to become only one Oxfam. These staff members should work closely together and towards the same goal of saving people’s lives and provide aid without any kind of discrimination. When the country accepts to respond to a crisis, such as a CAT1, they need to be flexible and open doors. This will reduce the tendency of mistrust between the country office and surge team that is supporting the response. It is urgent to find ways to make these teams work better together.

**R4.1.3** Oxfam confederation. At global level Oxfam should establish an operational procedure document needed for business support that is applicable under all affiliates to provide guidelines for approved derogations that can be used in an emergency. It should also include aspects related to partnerships (e.g. business capacity of partners, partner audits, etc.).

### 4. Transition to recovery

**Conclusion 5.** *Oxfam’s work in recovery was loose and the organization could have done more due their link in recovery and building people resilience. For instance, a lot of recovery work was taken over by other partners in Zambezia, Sofala and Cabo Delgado.*

**Lesson 5.1** The slow start of response to idai contributed to a latter IP intervention. Therefore, the intervention project suitable for acute phase of emergency lost relevance in recovery phase.

**R.5.1.1** Oxfam should invest more in preparedness including pre-positioning of emergency stock on site to ensure that its interventions are aligned with the emergency context.

**R.5.1.2** The thought given to response in terms of speed in life saving assistance should be balanced with the thought of transition to recovery, as this phase is critical to build resilience and reduce community vulnerability to the future disasters.

## 5. Ips specific capacity building needs

Given the country's vulnerability to disasters and the need for IPs continued preparedness for disasters, and above all, to complement the government's efforts, the following areas were pointed out as requiring Oxfam assistance.

### Local emergency preparedness

- Support IP to development of Contingency Plans to better complement the government's efforts during emergency situations.
- Technical support and training for IP for the development of emergency projects alignment with donor language.

### Emergency connection and recovery

- Technical assistance to create sustainability in humanitarian organizations including maintaining the organization's institutional memorial/including key positions given the country's vulnerabilities to disasters.
- Technical assistance to develop small projects that make a link between emergency and recovery phases.

### Training in technical skills for specific areas

- Oxfam has demonstrated extensive technical experience/expertise to quickly establish and operate systems especially in the WASH sector to deliver clean water during emergency. Transferring these technical skills and competency to IP would be an asset for future events.
- Production of simple brochures on the lessons learned from the response to idai.
- Production of simple brochures that include skills and techniques to implement preparedness, response and recovery actions following international standards.
- Improve technical capabilities including equipping IP with technological means (eg. drones) to conduct rapid assessments specially to reach isolated locations.
- Assist the IP to establish relevant financial system that will allow them to take regular audit, as this seems to be fundamental to build the organization sustainability.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

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### 1.1 Background

This report outlines Oxfams' *External Evaluation of Cyclone Idai & Kenneth Response in Mozambique carried out in the provinces of Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado*. The response was implemented in two phases: phase one March -September 2019 and phase two October 2019-March 2020. The design of the evaluation is based on the requirements in the Terms of Reference [(TOR) attached as an Annex to this report.]

In line with the evaluation ToR, the purpose of the evaluation is to: (i) assess the performance of the organization in terms of cyclone response across the different sectors and components in relation to the objectives set in the revised cyclones response strategy and (ii) generate key lessons learnt that will be applied in future responses in Mozambique and similar category 1 (CAT 1)<sup>1</sup> responses for Oxfam. And it places emphasis on both learning opportunities and accountability to different stakeholders affected and or interested in Oxfam's response and its implementing partners.

This evaluation followed two Real Time Evaluation (RTE) conducted during the acute phase of the response. The first **one** commissioned by Oxfam in July 2019 aimed at capturing feedback, learning, and produce recommendations from Oxfam staff, local partners, community members, other humanitarian actors. The **second** was commissioned by Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) in August 2019 and was aimed at collecting reflections and learning in a participatory manner while the projects were being implemented in response to the cyclones idai and kenneth. Cyclone Kenneth made landfall six weeks after Cyclone Idai in northern region of Mozambique and added pressure to an already overstretched capacity of in-country humanitarian agencies and the Government of Mozambique (GoM).

### 1.2 Evaluation purpose and objectives

In accordance with the ToR, the purpose of this evaluation is to take stoke of Oxfam and its implementing partners (IP) response to CAT 1 emergency and provide feedback based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria of (i) relevance; (ii) efficiency; (iii) effectiveness; (iv) impact; (v) sustainability in alignment with the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance (ALNAP) criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian action: (i) coherence; (ii) coverage; and (iii) connectedness. The evaluation team assessed also to what extent the response complied with the Core Humanitarian StandardQuality and accountability (CHS).

To complement the two objectives, the evaluation team identified strengths and weaknesses of both Oxfams' direct response and the one of its IP operational processes (i.e. governance and decision making process for fund allocations); and reviewed the standard evaluation criteria including cross-cutting issues (such as gender and vulnerable groups) to Identify any improvements that would help

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<sup>1</sup>The cat 1 cyclone is equivalent to a humanitarian system-wide emergency activation, known as a Level 3 (L3) emergency response. This is an exceptional measure to an exceptional large-scale humanitarian crisis such the cyclone idai and requires mobilization of the entire humanitarian system to ensure an effective response. The L3 mechanism is about the need to rapidly ramp up the response effort so that it is fit-for-purpose, i.e. has the appropriate leadership, and coordination mechanism to deliver assistance and facilitate protection as the scale, complexity and urgency of a crisis develops. As per this protocol, the IASC Principals are required to meet within 48 hours after the onset of the crisis to decide on L3 activation. It should follow the five criteria: scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk.

strengthen the future CAT 1 response and areas working particularly well, which might be systematized and applied in the future.

Affected population including (women and men, boys and girls) in target districts, Oxfam staff, IP, donors and Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) clusters include government entities were at the center of the evaluation process. The evaluation team counted with their insights to highlight Oxfam's response, operational strengths and areas for improvement while also noting anecdotal evidence on results that may be directly attributed to Oxfam' or its contribution to the overall in-country humanitarian response.

## 1.3 Methodology: Approaches and Tools Used

### 1.3.1 Methodology

This evaluation triangulated quantitative and qualitative/anecdotal information at multiple levels (international, national, provincial and districts level). The process started with an inception phase and a desk review. This was complemented with in-depth discussions with a total of 34 key informants (KY), including former Oxfam cyclone Idai and Kenneth Managers (7), regional (2) and global (8) staff, local authorities (8), and implementing partners (9) (*See list of stakeholder interviewed in annex 7*).

During the data collection phase, the team conducted field visits, observation and household survey reaching to a total of 180 households in the Sofala districts between October 07-13, of which Dondo (37), Nhamatanda (30) and Buzi (26). In Zambezia province concretely in Maganja da Costa (43) household surveys were conducted between October 14-17. The team that carried out the evaluation consisted of 4 people in Sofala and 3 people in Zambezia (*See details in the section FGD and HH survey section below*).

In addition to the methods mentioned above the evaluation team also employed the following approaches: stakeholder Mapping developed in close collaboration with Oxfam CO, (ii) Stakeholders satisfaction analysis, (iii) Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) gender marker, (iv) Focus Group discussions and (v) Case Study/Field Visits.

### 1.3.2 Overall approach

#### **In-depth discussions and stakeholder mapping**

The evaluation team organized in-depth discussions with current Oxfam evaluation group manager that included a UK (Mr Ben Philips) and CO (Mr Felisberto Afonso) based staff to understanding Oxfam's response history, draft and map key stakeholders from international, national and local level including disaster risk management entities and local actors. Though the initial kick off meeting was held, there was limited time i to learn from them how Oxfams' implementation response was. This being, the evaluation team arranged time to discuss the response implementation with these key informants. The stakeholder map was updated along with the evaluation process.

#### **Desktop Review**

The desk review helped the evaluation team to perform an examination of all Oxfam cyclone Idai and Kenneth response documents and project databases. Once compiled, the document was studied to aid the evaluation team in gaining clear understanding of priorities, evolution, and full coverage of funded projects response, targeted affected people, sectors covered, and cluster and geographic spread of the impact. All previous appeals launched under Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) mechanism and especially those of the United National clusters, developed through OCHA support, formed a baseline foundation for the present evaluation. In addition, the evaluation team used supplementary materials to gain more perspectives including the following: ALNAP Evaluation of

Humanitarian Action; ALNAP Real Time Guide; CHS Quality and accountability (*See annex 2, documents accessed*).

### Stakeholder satisfaction

The evaluation team assessed the requirements to improve / optimize the benefits of the response, including identification of potential / priorities for additional interventions based on the success and benefits already achieved and crucial actions to accompany the provision of the proposed services, as a result of the late arrival of some equipment for humanitarian aid and without which most efforts would not achieve the projected goals (*See illustration below*).



Figure 3: Diagram adapted to analyse stakeholder satisfaction

### IASC gender marker

The Gender Marker is a tool that the project team used to assess how Oxfam’s Cyclone Response Programme was accountable, gender sensitive and responsive. The team looked at the humanitarian project design and delivery to see how balanced it was between saving lives and alleviating suffering of the affected people and the attention payed to gender issues (*See the details of gender marker below*).




Figure 4: IASC Gender Marker

## E-Survey

The project team developed the Electronic Survey (E-survey) and planned to administer it to Oxfam stakeholders since some of them left the country after the response or when the government put in place travel restrictions in the context of COVID19. However, when the evaluation team started approaching the target group/stakeholder engaged in response to both IDAI and KENNETH to consult on their preferred way to share insight on the response, the feedback was very positive and most of the interviewee preferred skype and zoom. So, the evaluation team administered the questionnaire through their preferred means of information and communication technology (ICT) (*See details of key informants engaged in fig 3 below & the KY questionnaire in annex 2*).




Figure 5: Key informants engaged in the evaluation

Oxfam had good level of institutional memory that aided the evaluation team to get the perspective of all stakeholders. For implementing partners (IP) in Cabo Delgado, given the restrictions associated with COVID19 and the ongoing conflict, the project team reached out to the IP through skype calls. The target group for the skype and telephone calls are:

- Oxfam's SAF humanitarian Team.
- Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Team (GHT).
- UN clusters (Primarily WASH, Health, Food Security).
- Technical Working Groups on Livestock, Cash and AWD).

In relation to field/household data, the team used Open Data Kit (ODK) to collect data. This tool reduced data entry errors and easily exported data to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis (*See section 1.5.1, key informant questions*).

## Focus Group discussion and Interviews with Key Informants (KII)

### ▪ Key informants

Key informants were purposefully selected based on stakeholder mapping done during the evaluation's inception phase. In addition to interviewing Oxfam staff engaged in the response at either field, country, regional or global levels, the evaluation team also interviewed other stakeholders (drawn from implementing partners, government, UN agencies, national and international organizations).

Data t collected was first stratified according to each actor or beneficiary and in line with the results expected from the humanitarian assistance provided by Oxfam and its IP. In the districts and or communities visited the priority target group were those directly benefiting from the project intervention, most of them living in resettlement centres (*See table 1 below, resettlement centres visited*).


**Table 1: Resettlement Centers (RC) visited in Sofala and Zambezia provinces**

Province	District	RC Name	Nº of family in the RC
Sofala	Dondo	Mutua	720
	Nhamatanda	Kura	164
	Buzi	Guara-gura	1900
Zambezia	Maganja da Costa	Sopa	410
		Mussaia	350
		Landrinho	510

▪ **Focus Group discussion and Household survey**

Communities affected by emergency represented a primary source of information for this independent evaluation (see chart 1 above). The chart illustrates the number of Household including women and men engaged in household survey and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) in three district of Sofala province (Dondo, Buzi and Nhamatanda) and Zambezia province (Maganja da Costa) to generate inputs for this evaluation. An average of six people participated in each focus group. Participants in the focus group discussions were selected to achieve a balanced representation based on geographical location and their status as displaced and or resettled.

The FGD did exceed 45 minutes and it aided to gather perceptions and opinions from the affected women and men and girls and children covered by Oxfams’ response. On the other hand, for the wide set of stakeholders who form one of the main targets and mechanisms for the implementation of the response, the project team conducted semi-structured interviews with the stakeholders (*See figure 3 below*).



**Figure 6: Illustrates the total number of households (women and men) engaged in the survey.**

### Case Study / field visits

The evaluation team assess the entire Oxfam direct and indirect response (led by Oxfam and its IP) to both cyclone Idai and Kenneth to grasp the results that may be attributed to or achieved with Oxfam contribution. This information was anecdotal in nature and not representative of other DEC -funded projects.

For these visits, the evaluation team designed a questionnaire to help assess their relevance and effectiveness. Site visits were organized to visit approximately five districts (due to weather conditions and access, the team visited 3 districts in Sofala province and 1 district in Zambezia province). With the field visit the evaluation team was able to capture the following aspects, allowing an exploration of the range of impacts and challenges that Oxfam's humanitarian response had (*See success history in chapter 7*):

- Food security, WASH and health issues targeted.
- implementing partner (UN, NGO, and INGO).
- Success and areas requirement further attention in the future.
- Alignment with local government/community (strong or none). The site visits did not represent mainly the best, most ideal or most easily accessible cases, but elements to prevent producing nearly similar and biased results.



Focus group discussions with affected beneficiaries in the resettlement centers

### 1.4 Constraints and limitations

During the inception phase the evaluation team identified the main challenges to conduct a quality evaluation and subsequently developed a Contingency Plan that helped to mitigate their effects. Most of the challenges were related with the Covid 19 pandemic (*see COVID 19 response plan in annex 4*) and other that emerged throughout the evaluation. These challenges/ limitations and how the team mitigated them are described below.

- **Availability and quality of monitoring data.** By its nature, the cyclone idai and Kenneth are sudden-onset disaster and demanded a subsequent response in the context where capacity needed to be prioritized and the operating context was volatile and rapidly changing. This situation contributed to gaps in monitoring data.
- **Interviews with key informants.** The evaluation took place about fifteen months after the acute phase of the emergency was over. Therefore, most of the regional and GHT left the country, meaning that many individuals prioritized for interviews were no longer in country. However, this situation was mitigated via remote interview (skype and zoom). This enabled the evaluation team to gain an external perspective for each phase of the response.
- **Perspectives from affected communities.** Due to the short duration of the field visits, the number of focus group discussions carried out was limited (3 in Sofala and 3 in Zambezia province). This was complemented by household's surveys, which allowed to learn how the affected population were served by Oxfam and its IP interventions. Triangulation of results from focus group discussions and interviews nevertheless enabled the evaluation team to gain a reasonable perspective on the response vis-à-vis disaggregated groups.

Overall, Oxfam’s engagement and its IP in the evaluation process was highly appreciated. The majority of the key informants viewed the evaluation as a useful exercise and this, along with the excellent logistics support provided, helped to facilitate the evaluation team’s work to mitigate the constraints and to develop a reasonable evidence base from which to draw concrete conclusions.

## 1.5 Data analysis

Correlated to the methodological approach described above, data collection was carried out using tools previously elaborated for each of the components to answer questions related to humanitarian response provided evidencing qualitative questions about Efficiency, Relevance, Coordination and Sustainability (DAC criteria). The project team developed surveys and adopted the global humanitarian assessment tools and IASC gender marker to address qualitative aspects.

The surveys were analysed using **SPHINX and / or R software** to allow a better categorization and visualization of the respondents' results. The results obtained in this analysis were introduced in the model of stakeholder satisfaction analysis. In this context, the first phase of analysis highlight aspects of Efficiency, Relevance, Coordination, and the second phase mirrored Sustainability/connectedness; the third aggregated all the results of the <<indicators>> Efficiency, Relevance, Coordination and Sustainability, connectedness, coverage, coherence, impact components to determine the lessons learned.

### 1.5.1 Evaluation Key questions

This evaluation aimed at drawing evidence-informed conclusions to address the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of appropriateness/relevance, effectiveness, coordination, connectedness, and coverage. The evaluation key questions (EKQ) are shown in Table 2 below. The EKQ were based on the Terms of Reference and were further developed in the inception report by considering relevant findings from the inception phase.

**Table 2: Evaluation KEY Questions OECD/DAC criteria**

EVALUATION CRITERIA	QUESTIONS	METHODOLOGY
Approaches most likely to help answer the question CODES: DR=Desk Review (on-going)   KII= Key Informants Interview   CS=Case Study/Field Visits		
Relevance	1. How relevant is Oxfam and its IP response to humanitarian needs in the selected districts affected by cyclone IDAI and kenneth? Is the humanitarian response associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps? Is this the appropriate mechanism?	1. KII/ES
	2. Are the funded activities in line with local needs and priorities? Do they meet the criteria for project selection?	2. KII, DR
	1. To what extent does the Oxfam funded projects attain their stated objective(s)?	1. CS
	2. To what extent do the individual project activities produce the expected results? How do we know? Give examples	2. CS
	3. Are sufficient quality control mechanisms in place for: 1) planning and design, 2) approval of projects, 3) fund	3. KII, DR

Effectiveness	disbursement, and 4) monitoring, reporting and review?	
	4. Did the Oxfam response contribute to strengthening the coordination mechanisms and the role of the HCT coordination in Mozambique? If yes, how? If no, what were the inhibiting factors?	6. KII
Efficiency	1. To what extent does the Oxfam response function efficiently? Could the efficiency be improved, and, if so, how?	1. KII
	2. How much funding was passed on to NGOs? How long did it take to forward the disbursements? When were NGO programmes implemented? Are there any differences or criteria to disbursement to NGOs?	2. DR, KYI
	3. How long did it take for Oxfam to disburse to Implementing Partners?	KII
Connectedness	1. What is the current relationship between the Oxfam response and other humanitarian financing mechanisms, including but not limited to: agency internal resources, bilateral contributions, other funds, global funds? How much of the Flash Appeal did the Oxfam address?	1. DR, KII
	2. What effect has the presence of Oxfam have on the overall levels of humanitarian funding available for a crisis? What is the optimal size for the fund for response in cat 1 response?	2. KII
	3. To what extent has the Oxfam intervention contributed to local capacity building and made linkages to recovery and longer-term development programmes?	3. KII, DR
Cross cutting	1. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by the Oxfam take gender equality into consideration? Was gender equality a consideration in the selection of individual projects?	1. DR, KII
	2. To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by Oxfam take into consideration vulnerable and marginalized groups?	2. DR, KII, CS

### 1.5.2 Strengths and challenges of the methodological approach

The strength of this choice of methodologies is derived from its triangulation of multiple sources of information. A larger number of sources typically fosters a finer level of understanding. The methodology proposed, however, has found imperfect solutions to compensate for two interlinked fundamental challenges:

- high turn-over of regional and GHT personnel.
- the short time frame for the field assessment and security constraints in Cabo Delgado.

One solution identified by the consultant team to reach the humanitarian personal that left the country was to use tools such as skype, zoom and phone calls hoping to capture their perspectives. In fact, with these tools the team was able to reach out to the regional and GHT engaged in idai and Kenneth response (*See fig 3, above Key informants engaged in the evaluation*).

### 1.5.3 Structure of findings and the present report

The evaluation results, conclusions and recommendations compiled in this report are aligned with three main sources of evidence of very different nature:

- **Qualitative evidence** was compiled from observation and from discussions with key informants, focus group discussion, interviews (formal and informal) and success stories. As for most evaluations, the largest portion of findings for the present effort is derived from this *qualitative* evidence.
- **Database review and analysis:** a source of information that relies entirely on the rigor and validity of the Oxfam reports, project database from March 2019 to date.
- **Gray Literature review:** past evaluation reports, humanitarian project reports, Oxfam emergency dossier were carefully reviewed to gain perspective for this evaluation.

All of the three sources above produced *data*—pieces of information that, when triangulated and compared across the full set, become *information*. If the information appears pertinent, it is considered a *finding*, or a result. Descriptive text in this evaluation results from both qualitative and quantitative findings; it is systematically compiled and derived from the pieces of evidence tallied above. When the *analysis* of a piece of evidence aligns across cases or sources to tell a story within this evaluation it is then substantiated and serves to fuel *conclusions* and eventually *recommendations*.

All of the evidence compiled—qualitative and quantitative—is filtered through the eyes and ears of the evaluation team. It is thus invariably *subjective* but gains validity through rigorous triangulation, the profile and experience of the evaluator and a transparent presentation. Most of the conclusions and recommendations are also therefore inevitably subjective, although derived from all possible sources of evidence.

In the present evaluation report, compiled evidence is laid out through results in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

- In Chapter 2, Context, timeline, and Oxfam operational capacity. The evidence is derived from desk review and analysis of **timing and stakeholders** that are crucial to fully understand Oxfam and its implementing partners intervention.
- In Chapter 3, evidence is compiled from all sources to foster a solid understanding of Oxfam and its IP response strategy.
- In Chapter 4, based on desk review and key informants' insights to understand how far Oxfam and its IPs went in relation to assistance to affected populations and the level of compliance with key humanitarian accountability and quality management principles.
- In chapter 5, to discuss the results, evidence is aligned to highlight Oxfam and its IP **achievements**, as compared to its original objectives.
- In chapter 6, evidence is aligned to review Oxfam and its IP works against the OCECD/DAC principles
- In chapter 7 and 8, evidence is compiled from all sources including FGD to understanding how Oxfam and its IP navigated the cross-cutting issues and finally, derived the conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

Together, these eight chapters form the *results* of the evaluation which were developed in reference to the Evaluation's Terms of Reference questions which helped to articulate specific/single, measurable, achievable, result-oriented and time-bound (SMART) recommendations.

## 2. COUNTRY CONTEXT, EVENT TIMELINE AND OXFAM'S OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

### 2.1 Context

Mozambique is one of the most risk-prone countries in the world, ranking third among African countries most exposed to multiple weather-related hazards and the impact of climate change (SADC risk profile 2019 Global Risk Index). Most of the risks and vulnerability are a function of its geographical location which makes the country unsurprisingly exposed to impacts of a variety of extreme natural events, such as floods, droughts, cyclones, coastal erosion, rising water levels, and soil salinisation, which are becoming increasingly stronger and more frequent. These events combined with the country's limited capacity to prevent damage and losses, t have a high likelihood of causing disasters as described below.

In March and April 2019, Mozambique was hit by two consecutive tropical cyclones that left trails of death, damage, and destruction in their paths. The Tropical Cyclone Idai weather system's impact came in three waves: in early March, the low pressure system caused flooding in Zambezia and Tete; on 14 March, Cyclone Idai made landfall near the port City of Beira – home to 500,000 people – tearing roofs off homes and buildings; finally, over the weekend of 16-17 March, the weather system carried torrential rains across multiple areas, causing rivers to overflow and leaving people stranded on trees and houses. On 25 April, Tropical Cyclone Kenneth made landfall in Cabo Delgado province, flattening entire villages.

This is the first time in recorded history that two strong tropical cyclones (above Category 2) have made landfall in Mozambique in the same season and the first time that a cyclone has made landfall as far north as Kenneth. The cyclones devastated two distinct swathes of the country. Cyclone Idai hit the central region of Mozambique, leaving an estimated 3,000km<sup>2</sup> of land submerged and damaging more than 240,000 houses. Subsequently, Cyclone Kenneth struck the northern region, destroying more than 45,300 houses. This came on top of droughts in other areas of country, as well as violent extremism in parts of Cabo Delgado. Overall, it is estimated that close to 2.2 million people needed urgent assistance following the cyclones and floods (374,000 people from Cyclone Kenneth and 1.85 million people from Cyclone Idai).

The cyclones have compounded an already serious food insecurity situation in Mozambique. From September to December 2018, an estimated 1.78 million people (IPC phase 3 and above) were severely food insecure in the country, according to the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) analysis and the food security and nutrition assessment conducted by the Technical Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition (SETSAN). Of these, an estimated 814,700 severely food insecure people in five provinces – Cabo Delgado, Gaza, Inhambane, Sofala and Tete - were prioritized as being in most urgent need of assistance, with the most affected provinces being Tete (more than 359,300 people) and Gaza (more than 318,200 people).

Following Cyclone Idai's landfall, more than 715,000 hectares of crops were destroyed, while Cyclone Kenneth affected nearly 55,500 hectares of crops and caused loss of livelihoods, including fishing. Both cyclones made landfall during the critical harvest period, effectively wiping out the food of thousands of families, prolonging an already difficult lean season and leaving many without the prospect of another full harvest until March 2020. All communities in Manica and 80 per cent in Sofala have reported harvesting less than half of their maize due to Cyclone Idai.

Due to the facts mentioned above, Oxfam, as a humanitarian organization operating in Mozambique developed its comprehensive strategy and plans to respond to the cyclones in Mozambique, immediately after the cyclone Idai in March 2019. The strategy was reviewed and in April it

incorporated the cyclone Kenneth response. In June, it was further revised based on the changing context and emerging humanitarian needs. The overall objective of Oxfam's cyclone response is "to provide life-saving assistance, protection, dignity, cooking equipment, cash transfers for food and essentials, and organisation of awareness-raising sessions on gender equality to help prevent a spike in gender-based violence which often happens after a disaster, and safety for people affected by Cyclone Idai and Kenneth".

## 2.2 Event timeline

In the immediate aftermath of the storm, rapid aerial assessments were carried out to gather a general overview of the scale and severity of the crisis, information from which was used to inform immediate operational decision-making regarding priority areas for response. The GoM immediately implemented a series of actions in response to the unfolding disaster, including the:

- declaration of a National State of Emergency on 19th March 2019.
- implementation of immediate search-and-rescue operations, and provision of humanitarian aid.
- appeal for international assistance.
- establishment of a post-Cyclone Idai Post-Disaster Recovery Programme (PREPOC) on 26 March.
- approval of the ToR for the PREPOC on April 2, 2019.
- creation of the Post-Cyclone Reconstruction Office on April 09, 2019.
- extension of the Scope Assessment for Cabo Delgado and Nampula Cyclone following Cyclone Kenneth, on April 30, 2019.
- training of ministry staff / central and provincial sectors, district and municipal levels on the post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) methodology and calculation of damage, loss and recovery needs.
- conduct of the PDNA, approved by the Council of Ministers on May 7th; and
- development of the Final Report of the PDNA, which was approved by the Council of Ministers.

An international appeal for assistance in the amount of USD\$281.7 million was launched by the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The HCT also commissioned a MIRA assessment to inform the humanitarian response. Oxfam is part of the HCT and through this appeal the organization also got access to funds to respond to this cat 1 event. The cat 1 event required the agency mobilization in response to a sudden onset and/or rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in affected provinces and districts, where the capacity to lead, coordinate and deliver humanitarian assistance did not match the scale, complexity and urgency of the crisis.

## 2.3 Oxfam Operational Capacity

When the cyclone hit the central and northern regions, the Country Office (CO) had recently updated their contingency plan and an Emergency Response Team (ERT). This was accompanied by some training on how to use those plans. The Contingency Plan did not include the potential for a large emergency (cat 1), and it was not widely used. It became clear that the cat 1 event was new for the country in general, for the majority of the humanitarian organization including for Oxfam and its IPs.

The CO was not ready to respond in terms of human resources. Oxfam's Humanitarian Program Manager (HPM) position in Maputo became vacant not long before Cyclone Idai, and the country office also had interim senior management that was new to humanitarian response. There was need first to understand what was happening. The event started as cat 3, but then it became clear that is a

cat 1 event. The CO recognizing its capacity limitation, immediately activated the regional support. This was complemented by the deployment of the global team, it could have been faster, but the country was not ready to receive and manage to many resources (including international staff) in short time.

### 2.3.1 Slow start of the response

Oxfam as a humanitarian organization could have been ready to immediately reach to beneficiary but it was not possible. When the conditions were to be in the field, some positions/ specialities were immediately fulfilled, but other took more time to be fulfilled. There was an attempt to respond but the country capacity limitation impeded the speed of the response. However, Oxfam is not just any organization, it is a humanitarian organization and could have been better prepared for the event particularly in ensuring that relevant expertise was allocated to the field within the right timeframe.

The readers are reminded that for a cat 1 event, the response is expected to be active within 72h, however, Oxfam did it not directly but through its IP based in the central region – Ajoago (*See Oxfam IPs in map below*).

Overall, Oxfam was somewhat slower than other actors to start up a response after Cyclone Idai, but after the delayed , the organization was able to speed up with the implementation of some WASH activities. As reported during the RTE “It was a bit of a shy start up compared to the other COSACA members (RTE 2019).




Figure 7: Oxfam IP during idai and kenneth

### 2.3.2 Mobilization of surge support

While the emergency was progressing the country office was able to quickly mobilize some humanitarian staff to help support the first weeks of the response: the COSACA coordinator (hosted by Oxfam) and one country office WASH Officer were “pre-positioned” in the field to provide information as Cyclone Idai made landfall, and through the regional ERT three additional Oxfam staff from Zambia and Zimbabwe arrived in Maputo two days after Idai. These three staff had been requested by the country on 9 March because of the floods in Zambezia rather than in anticipation of

the cyclone, but they were able to support initial fundraising efforts during the first two weeks following Idai.

Additionally, other staff members from the pre-identified and trained ERT were also mobilized to support the response, in line with the contingency plan. As communication reopened with Beira three days after the cyclone, the true extent of the damage became clearer. Transportation to the affected areas began reopening and one WASH and one EFSVL staff from this group travelled to Beira on 24 March for initial assessments and to start activities. A small team from GHT staff and consultants flew to Maputo and arrived in Beira on 27 March. The first response activities were on 25 March (10 days after Cyclone Idai), when Oxfam's partner AJOAGO distributed about 500 family kits from contingency stocks in its warehouse in Buzi. Oxfam had supported the pre-positioning of these materials. The Mozambique country office had signed MOUs with additional partners, but further activities on the ground with partners were delayed.

Oxfam's initial WASH activities were started within two weeks by one of the WASH staff from the region, as a cholera outbreak occurred in Sofala in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Idai. By the end of March there were over 1000 confirmed cases, increasing to 2500 in the first week of April.

A joint assessment with COSACA and partners started on 4 April and the Zambezia office became operational on 25 April, with some WASH activities beginning in mid-April (e.g. latrine building, hygiene promotion, and lifesaver cube distribution). Similar to Beira, response was somewhat delayed with more impactful activities in Zambezia starting in June. Procurement took a long time in Zambezia in general, including for household NFI kits, seeds and tools. Latrine construction took longer because of the initial international shipment of WASH equipment, which sustained the program while additional fundraising was underway.



Carlotta Jose preparing vegetables from her garden at the Mutua resettlement center.

The Cat funds secured by the country office from the GHT were an important factor in being able to respond more quickly. This was pointed out particularly by the country team but also noted by external actors: for example, one key informant said that access to internal Cat funds was the reason that Oxfam was on time for seed distribution in Cabo Delgado compared to other actors.

Cyclone Kenneth then made landfall on 25 April in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, between the districts of Macomia and Mocimboa de Praia districts in the northern part of the port city of Pemba. In addition to the damage caused by the winds and subsequent rain and flooding, cholera also broke out around the Pemba area by early May. On top of this, northern Cabo Delgado (from the Tanzanian border down to Macomia) was also affected by conflict and insecurity. The dynamics and causes of this situation are not fully clear, but armed attacks by an unknown group(s) is having a significant impact on the people living in this area, with fear of attacks, burning of villages, and killing of residents.

In the acute phase of the emergency Oxfam's response included protection monitoring, creation of community-based protection groups, vegetable seeds and tools, household water treatment (Certeza 1 and Lifesaver cube filters), repair of water systems, well construction, water trucking, latrines and bathing shelters, hygiene and family kits, and hygiene promotion.

#### 2.3.4 Coordination structure and contexts

In any situation where different organisations or different parts of one organisation work alongside each other in emergency conditions, the potential for confusion, conflict and duplication is high. Understanding the constraints, incentives, needs and opportunities for all groups involved is key to a successful disaster response. Coordinated humanitarian action is essential for an effective and contextually relevant emergency response.

At its best, coordination can mean alignment in the elimination of gaps and duplication in services, ensuring common standards and approaches, while collaborating to determine an appropriate division of responsibility and establishing a framework for strategic decision-making and joint planning on issues of common concern. Coordination is also something which continually needs to be worked at and invested in.

Coordination is also an approach to quality and accountability, as it recognises partnerships with public authorities, humanitarian actors and other external organisations as fundamental to *ensure that assistance is well coordinated among all humanitarian assistance*.

##### Disaster coordination structure

Mozambique adopted a Disaster Management Policy in 1999 (revised and approved in 2020) that introduced measures for disaster management, using early warning systems with community involvement, allocating funds for contingencies, and supporting livelihood recovery. Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in Mozambique became a central priority across different government sectors.

The Coordinating Council for Disaster Management (CCGC), under the Council of Ministers and chaired by the Prime Minister, is the political and decision-making body for DRM governance in Mozambique and ensures multi-sectoral coordination. The CCGC is technically advised by the Technical Council for Disaster Management (CTGC), a multi-sectorial organ comprising of government representatives and members of the Humanitarian Country team CT (see Figures 1 below). This disaster management structure at central level is replicated locally through Emergency Operational Centres (COE) which may be at provincial or district levels. A crucial component of the local disaster management mechanism is the Local Disaster Risk Management Committees (LDRMC) at a community level.

The National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC) is the executive arm of the CCGC and responsible for the coordination of DRM activities at the operational level, including Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). It operates under the Ministry of State Administration and Public Function (MAEFP). In addition, in its disaster response coordination activities the INGC is supported by the National Emergency Operations Centre (CENOE). CENOE is in turn supported by a National Civil Protection Unit (UNAPROC) to assist with search and rescue activities. Development partners led by the UN, cooperate with the government under this structure. Decentralized structures for DRM exist, including regional Emergency Operation Centres and District Committees for Disaster Risk Management.




Figure 8: Mozambique Disaster Management structure, Source INGC

### 2.3 stakeholder mapping

Stakeholder hereby signifies all actors that have an interest (actual or idealized) in Oxfam and its implementing partners response to cyclone idai and Kenneth. These stakeholders are numerous and include but are not limited to the following: affected population, Government of Mozambique, Implementing Partners, donors, Oxfam national, regional, and global team, and the British public.

The mapping exercise was conducted with both national and British based staff. From the mapping exercise, resulted that the most important stakeholders include the affected population, the government, Oxfam CO, regional and global levels, implementing partners, donors, and other partners (see table 3 below, stakeholder mapping).

Table 3: Mapping of Oxfam stakeholders

STAKEHOLDERS	ROLES IN RESPONSE	INTEREST AND BENEFITS
<b>Internal</b>		
Oxfam’s Humanitarian Response Programme team;	led the implementation of direct response and IP management	Learn from the operational and managerial response and improve in future responses, as well as in accountability
Oxfam’s SAF humanitarian Team;	support field team in humanitarian response	Learn from the operational and managerial response and improve in future responses, as well as in accountability
Oxfam’s Global Humanitarian Team (GHT);	Source of policy guidance, administrative and regulatory frameworks,	Learn from the operational and managerial response and improve in future responses, as well as in accountability

	guidance and support, surge/standby capacity, accountability, and oversight	
Local NGO partners (AJOAGO, ADEL, CECOHAS, KUKUMBI and KULIMA).	Implementers and supporters of Oxfam and GoM's efforts	Learn lessons, build their humanitarian response capacities, disseminate lessons learned that could potentially be used to better establish its own contributions to the response.
<b>External</b>		
Affected populations (Direct and Indirect);	Ultimate beneficiaries of Oxfam and IP humanitarian response	This group includes leadership and residents and both are assumed to be interested in better understanding how the humanitarian system works (e.g., criteria for receiving assistance and needs met), what is expected from them during and after the experience (e.g., returning to normalcy as soon as possible), and how they ought to be treated (with respect, dignity, no sexual harassment).
Government of Mozambique (especially INGC and line ministries);	Coordination and support to national priorities	As another primary stakeholder, the GoM's interest is assumed to be focused on holding the humanitarian agencies to account for their results in the response and in learning how it might better exercise its role and execute its response in the future
UN clusters (Primarily WASH, Health, Food Security) & Humanitarian I/NGOs operational in the Idai and Kenneth responses.	Implementers and supporters of GoM's efforts	These agencies are also the primary stakeholders. They are assumed to be interested in emerging lessons at both the strategic and operational levels, as well as mutual accountability
Technical Working Groups on Livestock, Cash and AWD);	advised the project management, and management of the cash component of the project	Learn from the operational and managerial response and improve in future responses, as well as in accountability
DEC team and British Pubic	Donated financial assistance to DEC to implement the humanitarian response	To learn how did the financial resource allocated relieved the humanitarian needs of both Idai and Kenneth the affected people and how effective have the resources allocated been used.

### 3. OXFAM DIRECT RESPONSE TO CYCLONE IDAI/KENNETH

#### 3.1 Oxfam Response Strategy – Direct implementation

Oxfam used mixed operational model approach to respond to both cyclone idai and Kenneth. The direct implementation through local partner.

##### 3.1.2 Direct implementation

Oxfam's direct response started in Beira city with a view to scale up to the hardest hit areas which have received little and or inadequate response in both acute and or recovery phases. Through the direct implementation, Oxfam aimed at targeting both resettlement centres, host communities, in and outside camps and sites. And throughout time training staff in several domain of humanitarian response including safe programming guidelines, mainstream gender to achieve minimum standards.

The training also incorporated four overarching humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and guided by the emergency response standards described in: The Core Humanitarian Standard Quality and Accountability (CHS); Sphere Standards; Minimum WASH Requirements; EFSVL Guidelines and standards (including LEGS & Minimum Standards for Market Analysis); and Oxfam's Gender in Emergencies Minimum Standards. Oxfam's new humanitarian approach, including community engagement, adopting a feminist approach and a local humanitarian leadership approach, has also be incorporated into the strategy.

All of this combined was aimed at having the local partner leading the response in case of disaster. Some key informants referred that the rational for the direct implementation was the IP incipient capacity to manage large funds, but this argument was opposed by the other portion of the informant who referred that who started the response in Sofala province was an IP. The same key informant continued and put it as follow:

“This argument is like having a football team Coach that simultaneously player. There will be no equidistance in dealing with issues, there will be duplications and things will hardly go well.”

It means that while the argument for the direct implementation was sound, as it over time will be shifted more and more back to a partner-model, this was not clearly understood by some IPs as Oxfam had started investing in partners capacity to lead the response in ground. Another factor that affected the direct implementation is the fact that it was led by international staff with language barriers, i.e., many international staff did not speak Portuguese, while many staff in organisations (particularly the national organisations) did not speak English. This led to a confused situation, in which some meetings were held in English and some in Portuguese. However, the Portuguese meetings were less known about, and some of the Oxfam international staff were not attending Cluster meetings.

The lack of common language among Oxfam staff and IP was a blocking factor for coordination, as put by key informants. The multitude of languages spoken by the populations is also a blocking factor. Groups such as women, children, and people living in remote areas may be less likely to speak and read Portuguese. This blocked their capacity to sufficiently participate in decision-making. This is one of the factors that slowed down the response as staff had to spend time providing information in different languages if they wished to be inclusive with communities. These constraints resulted also in some duplication, i.e., Oxfam and IP having intervention in the same site.

### 3.1.3 Oxfam implementation through IP

In line with the new humanitarian approach, Oxfam worked before the emergency to strengthen local humanitarian leadership (localization agenda). The agreed way of working with IP was to promote and build their capacity, to ensure that they are able to work autonomously, learning from their strong local connections and contextual analysis, whilst providing support with technical expertise where required. This includes planning to work with local partners on undertaking multi-sectoral needs assessments, which are being centrally coordinated and shared across sectors and agencies, providing local voices across the whole response. The table 6 below described Oxfam's IPs geographic areas and sector of operation.

**Table 4: Oxfam implementing partners (IP)**

	Partner	Location	Activity
1	AJOAGO	Sofala-Buzi	WASH EFSVL
2	KULIMA	Sofala-Nhamatanda	EFSVL WASH
3	KUKUMBI	Zambezia-MdC & Luabo	EFSVL WASH
4	CECOAHS	Zambezia-Namacurra Zambezia-Luabo	WASH WASH
5	ADEL	Cabo Delgado -Macomia	EFSVL EFSVL

As described above the slow start of Oxfam response to cyclone idai affected its partner intervention capacity, particularly as the organization raised less funding than originally expected. Key informants referred that in the first few months of the response, and under the rush to implement response activity, there were serious challenges in communication, delay in contract operationalization, language barrier, including refrain on implementation of certain initiatives, such the ban on cash and voucher assistance by the government through the National Institute for Disaster Management (INGC), the governmental body in charge of natural disaster prevention and mitigation, who consistently opposed to use cash grants and has only anecdotally authorised the use of vouchers.

An example of confusion, as indicated by key informant, partner organizations began mobilizing equipment for the response and communicating plans to local authorities based on the conversations with Oxfam staff, but never received funding for those activities. This put the partner in a difficult situation.

Contracts and disbursements to partners took way too long, such as more than 4 weeks to complete the contracting process and 5 weeks for funding to be disbursed. EFSVL activities with ADEL in Cabo Delgado were completed before funding was received by the partner. ADEL tried to pre-finance but eventually couldn't continue to do so, saying: "Oxfam has many bureaucratic procedures that are not for emergencies (RTE 2019).

Despite overwhelming constraints under the mixed operational model (direct and indirect implementation) key informants loudly voiced activities implemented by Oxfam and partners are appropriate and generally of good quality (more detail described in the sections below). The evaluation team also found a high level of community satisfaction with the activities and with Oxfam staff. Some gaps in assistance exist, with Oxfam's WASH, EFSVL, protection activities and coordination with local partners including government entities.

## 4. HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT

To evaluate humanitarian accountability and quality management, the evaluation team assessed the programme's adherence to the International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) Code of Conduct, the Sphere Standards and principles and the compliance with the HAP 2010 Principles of Accountability. The evaluation team adopted the definition of accountability advanced by HAP, meaning that it is a process of taking into account the views of, and being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and primarily the people affected by authority or power.

It is particularly necessary for organisations such as Oxfam and its IP that provide assistance or act on behalf of people affected by or prone to disasters, such as those in the central and northern region of Mozambique affected by idai and Kenneth not to cause harm to people being assisted. In this regards, the evaluation team assessed the interventions implemented to see if they met affected peoples needs, and reduced the possibility of mistakes, abuse and corruption and based on this recommend improvement in areas that did not perform well (*the fig 9 below illustrates the standards assessed*).




Figure 9: Humanitarian standards observed during response to idai and Kenneth

### 4.1 Adherence to the ICRC Code of Conduct

Overall, the ICRC Code of Conduct was respected in the execution of the project implemented in Idai and Kenneth affected areas. The local cultures, structures, customs, and languages (this was a bit of barrier as the international staff had limitation) were taken into consideration in the implementation of the project and via the participation of the local population in different project activities including water hygiene and sanitation, maintenance of water infrastructure, promotion of hygiene activity including management of the resettlement centers. Oxfam's Dossier and policy for working with local organisations, who are generally more familiarized with local customs and values, is certainly an added value. However, a point worth mentioning is the fact the organization had to combined two implementation approaches, direct implementation and implementation via local partners which brought some mixed results.

The choice of beneficiaries was made without distinction of sex or ethnicity and the most vulnerable groups from the population, such as people in resettlement centres, people affected but stayed in the house benefited from the project. Where possible, local capacities were strengthened, local staff employed, local materials purchased, and business done with local companies.

## 4.2 Respect of the Sphere Standards

The Sphere Minimum Standards in WASH were respected. In the resettlement centers of Mutua, Buzi and Nhamatanda (Sofala province) and Maganja da Costa (Zambezia province) World Food Program, member of the Humanitarian Country team (HCT) and lead of food security cluster provided food and nutritional support to affected population and met the sphere standards because WFP operations are guided by and respect sphere standards.

For the WASH sector, Oxfam respected the distances between latrines and households and the number of latrines built were in line with the sphere standards. While for the water supply, as indicated above the organization had cases of water infrastructure construction directly made by Oxfam and implementing partners, but with the participation of the affected population.

Oxfam partner in Sofala, Zambezia and Cabo Delgado made real effort to involve local communities as much as possible, and beneficiaries were proud of their contributions.

## 4.3 Compliance with the HAP 2010 Principles of Accountability

The Humanitarian Accountability Partnership - International benchmarks were generally met as Oxfam staff demonstrated familiarity with them. Oxfam also built capacity for its IP on the use of HAP principles and have strongly advocated for its observance throughout all phases of the response, despite their shy response in the acute phase. One area that will require further attention, as referred by some key informant is the need to restructure the Country Office team to be able to consistently meet accountability to donor, as to date there are reports that are long overdue.

### 4.3.1 Accountability to affected population and their Level of Involvement

Householder surveys and FGD confirmed that affected population actively participated in all phases of the humanitarian initiatives implemented. They have been integrated throughout all the project cycle in both WASH, food security and livelihoods components. The target communities in affected areas participated in the initial needs' assessment of the project and influenced decision making during project execution.

For the WASH component the local population in Dondo, Buzi, Nhamatanda and Maganja da Costa took the responsibility to manage the water infrastructures constructed. For instance, in Guara-guara resettlement center, affected population are leading the management of the center and process of maintenance of different infrastructures in the center. However, a concern was raised in Buzi as the concrete latrine slabs constructed were very small and presenting risk to the population.



Figure 10: Concrete latrine slab not being used due to technical design issues.

### 4.3.2 Accountability to DEC and to the British public

According to HAP principle members should maintain their commitment to the implementation of the HAP principles even when working through IPs. Oxfam has good knowledge of the Code of Conduct, good practices, WASH standards, humanitarian accountability, and HAP principles. Oxfam is continually transferring this knowledge to its IP in context of geographic localization agenda. However, while this knowledge is clearly embedded in the organization, the insufficient commitment from staff put some threat to this principle as to date there are reports to donors that are long overdue as some portfolio hand over from staff that left the country was not properly managed, i.e, were incomplete.

It is recommended that these important information management and M&E criteria are integrated into Oxfam priority to address. If specific training is needed in proper reporting, hand over management, information management the Oxfam country office, regional and global team should provide needed trainings to their staff and IP, to be fully compliant with this principles.

FINAL

## 5 RESULTS

### 5.1 Meeting Objectives

The present evaluation studied the degree to which Oxfam and its IPs implementation mechanism fulfilled the outcomes and objectives set out in this evaluation ToR, which is to: assess the performance of Oxfam cyclone responses across different sectors and components, and generate key lessons learnt that will be applied in future responses in Mozambique and in similar CAT 1 responses. These objectives were complemented with two additional objectives aimed at identifying strengths and weaknesses of both Oxfam's direct response and the one of its IP.

One of the positive aspects of the idai and Kenneth affected areas has been the targeted nature of its affected population identification. The intervention had maximum impact in the poorest and the displaced sections of the flood affected population.

By general understanding, most of those displaced are the ones who are socially and also financially disadvantaged. No instance of social exclusion was reported.

The humanitarian projects studied in the central and northern regions of the country that included protection, WASH, and EFSVL activities were appropriate and generally of good quality. HH survey and FGD said that those programs generated high levels of community satisfaction. In relation to life-saving this was restricted to project implemented in the acute phase of emergency, which include:

- Provision of water services: a wide range of activities carried out were appropriate for the different contexts of each area. This includes household water treatment, water trucking, operation of batch and package water treatment units, well construction, borehole drilling, repairs to municipal water system (Beira) and household filter distribution. Oxfam was one of the only agencies using bladders which allowed us to set up quickly and re-deploy resources as people were resettled. In some resettlement center, Oxfam implemented water supply activities while in others existing water points were judged sufficient. In Cabo Delgado province Oxfam's IP to prevent cholera outbreak distributed certeza in at risk areas.
- Provision of sanitation services: Oxfam intervention in district of Dondo, Buzi and Nhamatanda supported individual household latrines within resettlement centres. A complementary activity, the protection and hygiene promotion that included distribution of standard hygiene kit (hygiene kits, dignity kits and household NFIs) in communities in Sofala, Cabo Delgado, and Zambezia were appreciated. The provision of water, sanitation and protection services advanced Oxfam stated objective of saving people's lives and with dignity.



Oxfam activist getting consent from Aida Luis Chandimba to write about her story and photo caption.

The Water and sanitation interventions started in accommodation centers (AC) and with the stabilization of the situation moved to resettlement centers (RC). In these locations Oxfam and its IP ensured access to safe drinking water, promoted hygiene behaviour, and provided necessary supplies for treatment and storage of drinking water and personal hygiene. Most of these interventions were found to be relevant, appropriate, and timely, well-coordinated in the acute phase in accordance with key humanitarian guidelines (CHS, HAP and Sphere standards). These projects helped alleviating human suffering and prevented the outbreak of water borne diseases.

The projects implemented after the acute phase was over, were important but linked to recovery objective. These ones could not be linked to live saving.

## 5.2 Operational Strengths and Weaknesses

### 5.2.1 Oxfam strengthen in face of category one cyclone

Oxfam globally is an integral part of the WASH platform and the global network of Humanitarian organizations. Oxfam continues to invest to develop and consolidate WASH standards. Oxfam is also part of the global coalition of WASH which enabled the board of Directors recognition of Oxfam work. During the response to Idai and Kenneth Oxfam demonstrated its expertise in delivering different emergency response related services, as described below.

- **Timely delivery of surge capacity** - During cyclone Idai and Kenneth and given the network of humanitarian partner which Oxfam is part of Oxfam was able to timely deliver surge capacity and foster WASH standards on the ground. Being part of the WASH international was fundamental to delivering needed technical expertise on the ground and to meet the humanitarian needs of the affected population (AP).
- **Flexibility of the management structure** - The management structure was flexible in deploying technical expertise (protection, gender and safeguard specialists) to advance one of the Country Office Strategic Plan Pillar – prevention of gender based violence and foster protection on the ground.
- **Delivery of needed life-saving service** - Timely delivery of water and sanitation supply helped prevent the outbreak of cholera and other water borne diseases. As the intervention sites become flooded the threat of cholera outbreak increased especially when people just moved into accommodation centers (AC). Oxfam mobilized quickly and shipped in WASH supplies, which included collapsible water reservoirs (bladder) and other supply to the affected areas.
- **Advocacy for policy change** - Through the network of in-country humanitarian partners, especially COSACA, Oxfam was able to release several policy statements raising concerns around gender, protection, and lobbied for the non-militarization of the response. Oxfam also advocated with donors to allocate more resources to fund often-overlooked areas, during the response to emergency.
- **Prepositioning of emergency stock on site**- Oxfam had prepositioned emergency stock on site that was quickly delivered to assist people affected in Buzi areas. This is an area that the organization will need to scale up and consolidate as it elevated the Organization relevance and positioning on the ground.
- **Active communication with donors** -the organization maintained an active communication with donors about the ongoing projects and strived to respect the wishes of some donors who did not

want the resources planned for long term development activities to be diverted for emergency response.

- **Country office management active role** - the dedication of the CO management team was very good, they worked overtime for 3 months, including ensuring logistics, support functions to mobilize funds.
- **Work in the field of safeguarding**-This was a new topic for the country, and it was received very well. It consisted in putting in place mechanisms to identify potential safeguarding risk and mitigate against it. The safeguarding was also a system that helped assess Communities' satisfaction with the response provided. In a nutshell, this helped to operationalize the principle of do no harm.

## 5.2.2 Oxfam weaknesses in face of category one cyclone

**System bureaucracy.** Oxfam is part of huge global network of partners that is well positioned to timely respond to cat 1 emergency. However, the disaster (cat 1) that affected Mozambique was faced with bureaucracy that slowed down the response. For instance, it was challenging for Oxfam to work with affiliated organizations to mobilize resources and delivery response on time in Mozambique. It limited the organization work during the acute phase of the disaster.

**Limited role in recovery and resilience.** Oxfam's work in recovery was loose, the organization could have done more due to the links they have in recovery and in building people resilience. For instance, a lot of recovery works was taken over by other partners in Zambezia, Sofala and Cabo Delgado.

**Government restriction on cash assistance.** The restriction imposed by Government of Mozambique in relation to cash assistance slowed down the speed of response on the ground. While this could have quickly provided capacity and choice for affected populations, it seems that the timing for its negotiation, during the acute phase of the emergency, was not appropriate.

**Invest in country office capacity.** There is a need to invest on an in-country office capacity of its own. When it is faulty then it becomes a huge challenge for country.

**Increase attention to business support.** As humanitarian organization that deal with different aspects to operationalize the humanitarian machine, there is need to place more attention on business support service.

**Confederation with different procedures.** Each affiliate has different procedures but when mobilized must work together. Then, the conflict emerges as the affiliate must follow own procedures which takes a lot of time, trying to harmonize them and to find a way to better work together. Moreover, this can create problems for those who manage finances, given that the finance systems were different, etc.

**One Oxfam team.** In case of an emergency to require deployment of staff, the perception of national, regional, and global team should be eliminated to become only one Oxfam. These staff should work closely together and towards the same goal of saving people lives and providing aid without any kind of discrimination. This will reduce the tendency of mistrust between the country office and surge team that is supporting the response.

**Short term deployment of surge capacity.** The surge capacity deployed was very important for the country response. However, most of the time they did not provide continuity and actually caused chaos, particularly, when the hand over process was not properly done, affected the local staff capacity to follow up. This is a big threat for the organization commitment mainly with the donor that trusted the organizations financial resources.

**Joint programming within the consortium.** There is a need to advocate for expanding the scope of work of the COSACA consortium moving forward, for the joint programming so that in a future situation like the cat 1, the consortium is ready with adequate means to respond. This will prevent the competition for funding.

**Preparedness.** The preparedness and preposition of stock on site demonstrated to be crucial. It facilitates the response and support to partners. In regards to this, different issues from internal systems could have been better set up for a response to a cat 1 event. This includes also addressing the link around the ownership of the response by the region and the country in terms of agreeing on the ways of collaboration and coordination issues.

**Country vulnerability and recurrence of disaster.** To be able to better complement the surge capacity deployed, the Country Office needs to be better prepared, i.e., the country office need to have in-country humanitarian capacity with the right skill to rapidly start the response including liaise with the deployed international staff and follow up when they leave the country.

FINAL

## 6. DISCUSSION: ANSWERING KEY QUESTIONS

This chapter returns to the Evaluation key questions (KQ) raised in the Evaluation Terms of Reference to provide answers drawn from the results described in the above preceding chapters and following the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/ Development Assistance Committee (DAC), evaluation criteria of appropriateness/relevance, effectiveness, coordination, connectedness and coverage to draw evidence-informed conclusions. A summary of findings for each EKQ is followed by a narrative referencing (*in blue colour in left side*).

### **Evaluation key question (EKQ) 1: relevance of Oxfam and its ip response to humanitarian needs in districts affected by cyclone Idai and Kenneth?**

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*This evaluation question looks at the extent to which Oxfam and its IP's response was tailored to affected population needs. It also explores whether the response was informed by preparedness and by coherence among sectors, among partners and with the government.*

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
Many of the key informants interviewed and the feedback from the household survey and FGD considered that Oxfam and its implementing partners played a key role in providing humanitarian response to affected populations in the districts affected in Sofala and Zambezia provinces starting in accommodation centres and later in resettlement centres.

They confirmed that the provision of water, sanitation and hygiene was clearly aligned with priority humanitarian needs in the acute phase of the emergency was good (*See graphic below*). The immediate set up of a bladder and provision of clean water to affected people as well as latrines prevented open air defecation and consequently the outbreak of water borne disease. In all areas visited, there was no doubt about the relevance, priority or need of the full package of WASH services provided by Oxfam and its IP. Key informants also referred that Oxfam is one of the key organizations in the world that really focuses on wash.

After the Cyclone Idai there was a threat of cholera outbreak, especially in Beira and Buzi areas due to flooding of latrines and walls. But Oxfam worked hard together with its implementing partners, UNICEF and district government to mobilize community awareness for the correct usage of latrines, especially during the rainy season, distribution of WASH kits (consisting of water reservoir, water treatment -certeza) which prevent deaths related to cholera or other water borne disease.

The organization brought different expertise and knowledge to reinforce its IP implementation capacity. Oxfam also brought expertise to tackle an often-overlooked area, the cross-cutting issues. Therefore, brought gender, protection, safeguarding, and safe-programming experts. Oxfam expertise was complemented by the capacity of its local implementing partners with long term implementation experience on the ground. For instance, AJOAGO was the first responder to affected people. With this partner and in coordination with INGC it was possible to move prepositioned WASH material to assist people in need before many organizations did so. All of this combined, made the Oxfam response very relevant.

**EKQ 1: To what extent was Oxfam and its IP response relevant to humanitarian needs in districts affected by cyclone IDAI and Kenneth?**



**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 1.1 Is the humanitarian response associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps? Is this the appropriate mechanism?**

*This evaluation question analysis how effective and timely the disbursement of funds to IP was to address the critical gaps, and if the mechanisms for disbursing funds to IP was appropriate.*

The key informants interviewed were unanimous in referring that the humanitarian response was associated with funding allocation, but the allocation was not timely and then efficiency was classified as satisfactory (See fig below). Two perspective emerged in relation to efficiency in funding disbursement, first one related to donor perspective that there should be “least possible waste” and implementing partners perspective that it should be “flexible and responsive

to needs” and “direct as possible, with fewer links in the chain.

The donor perspective was consistent that efficiency mostly meant minimizing their own administrative burden by limiting the number of contracts under their direct management. National IP stressed sufficiency in grants to enable execution and continuity of their operations and the need for less onerous transaction costs and barriers to entry.

All agreed that speed was a critical element for efficient funding allocation, but the need for speed could be offset by predictability if the recipient agency was large enough to have the capacity to advance the necessary funds for rapid response. During non-emergency time, or before Idai, oxfam worked to build its IP technical capacity and allocative efficiencies and the geographic location agenda in preparation to position them as the first responder in case of emergency.

- **Technical efficiency** in humanitarian funding can be viewed as a measure of how funding gets from donor to the end user (the aid recipient) with a minimum of impediments, transaction costs, and delays. Examples of technical efficiency in a funding mechanism would therefore include timeliness (meaning either speed or predictable timing). To be technically efficient, moreover, requires a high ratio of sufficiency (the size of the contribution) to the transaction costs entailed

(e.g., hours required for proposal writing, negotiation, reporting, and other administrative and compliance tasks).

- **Allocative efficiency** is concerned with directing funding to where it will have the largest benefit, and therefore relates to relevance/appropriateness and prioritizing the most urgent needs. Examples of allocative efficiency would be funding mechanisms that fill gaps or mitigate against duplication of resources. Similarly, funding mechanisms will have allocative efficiency if they have the flexibility to redirect or modify spending as warranted by changing humanitarian conditions and priorities.
- **Geographic location** refers to the principle of locating responsibility or action at the level nearest to which it is required, i.e., facilitating the assumption of larger roles by local actors in the provision of aid to their own populations (in addition to the effectiveness and sustainability arguments.) In cases where local actors are best placed to respond directly to specific situations and needs.

However, situations will occur where a broader scope of action provides greater allocative efficiency and/or where international actors will represent added value, for instance by providing technical assistance, capacity inputs, centralized procurement, and coordination of multiple efforts for a common outcome (Abby Stoddard, A, at all 2017). Though Oxfam started investing in its IP capacity, the country office and its IP had no previous experience with cat 1 cyclone and missed the opportunity to increase its IP capacities. Key informants interviewed while considering the presence of international expert importance, the humanitarian response machine became heavier and taking the lead in space where the IP could have played a strong role as they know the local culture and the language. The result was a two-pronged approach direct Oxfam implementation and implementation through IP.

Key informants referred that among the factors behind that approach include implementing partners capacity which is still not well structured and is still under constructions and the allocation of high volume of funds and more responsibility could increase the potential risks of fraud, waste, or diversion. Information asymmetry, or what many key informants referred as lack of transparency, made it difficult to get a holistic view of transaction chains. Key informants were in favour of much light in direct implementation and take advantage of the international experts that were exposed to similar cat 1 emergency to reinforce the location agenda.

**EKQ 2: Is the humanitarian response associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps? Is this the appropriate mechanism?**



**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 1.2 FLEXIBILITY. How long did it take for Oxfam to disburse to Implementing Partners?**

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*This evaluation question is related to the previous EKQ and looks at confirming how long it took to disburse to IP given the requirement of responding in the first 72h*

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
The cat 1 cyclone is equivalent to a humanitarian system-wide emergency activation, known as a Level 3 (L3) emergency response. This is an exceptional measure to an exceptional large-scale humanitarian crisis such the cyclone idai and requires mobilization of the entire humanitarian system to ensure an effective response. The L3 mechanism is about the need to rapidly ramp up the response effort so that it is fit-for-

purpose, i.e. has the appropriate leadership, and coordination mechanism to deliver assistance and facilitate protection as the scale, complexity and urgency of a crisis develops.

As per this protocol, the response should be in place in the first 72h to provide humanitarian assistance if one aims at saving people lives. One aspect that is worth mentioning, as best practice is the emergency stock prepositioning. It enabled Oxfam IP Ajoago to be the first responder (first 48) in one of the hardest hit areas, in Sofala province, the Buzi district. In addition to this, Key informants referred that Oxfam had been able also to mobilize the regional and global humanitarian team (GHT) to be in country in the acute phase of the emergency to aid with the response including with funding mobilization.

The speed required for resources mobilization and disbursement to partners was not met, among the reasons pointed include: (i) neither Oxfam nor its IP and most of the humanitarian organizations in country had previous experience with cat 1 events, and the emergency caught most of the humanitarian actors not well prepared to deal with the impact of the disasters. (ii) the access to some community and communication – several areas where underwater and the communication was down, this impacted on the ability to assess the people needs. Even after Vodacom and Movitel re-established the network some locations continued unreachable to due to floods not only for Oxfam but also for other organizations; (iii) the organizations used complex systems that must follow various steps , this might be one of the sources of the constraints. However, it is well recognized that organization needs to have systems to meet the accountability requirements; and (iv) the country office did not have a full overview of the funding flow for the response. While the cyclone created a big exposure of the country and raised expectation regarding the mobilization of more funds to IP (this expectation was shared with the IP and the government), this expectation was defeated, as the funding mobilized target was not met. It made the transfer of funds to partner challenging. A period exceeding a month to disburse funds to respond an emergency is difficult to consider as rapid, therefore they score this as satisfactory (*see fig below*).

**EKQ 3: FLEXIBILITY. How long did it take for Oxfam to disburse to Implementing Partners?**



Based on the above, key informants were unanimous in affirming that the disbursement took long. At the onset of the emergency, Oxfam signed four memorandums of understanding with equal number of implementing partners. From the signing of MoU until the signing of the contract it took about a month and half. There were projects that started one month after the disaster, which is too late to literally save lives. This does not meet the cat 1 emergency requirements which have to follow the five criteria: scale, complexity, urgency, capacity, and reputational risk. All stages of the proposal processing would need to benefit from improvement that make them flow more rapidly and systematically.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 2. General Management EFFICIENCY. To what extent have the desired results been achieved (in terms of provision of humanitarian assistance) as well as meeting the needs of the most vulnerable? Could the efficiency be improved, and, if so, how?**

*This question looks at the results of Oxfam and its IP response, including achievements against planned results, the main contributing factors and obstacles to achievement and the timeliness of the response.*


Key informant interviewed and the observation during the field visit demonstrates that Oxfam and its IP appear to be primed for success in meeting its objectives and outcomes.

The organization had a target amount of fund to mobilize (£23 million) and the organization mobilized about 60% of the amount (£13million).

The target number of people to be assisted was set at 500, 000 and the organization had been close to that number. In this regard, it is encouraging, and the organization was praised by institutional donors, and the UN. The key informants said that the organization was praised due to the significant role the organization played in meeting and or exceeded most targets for water and sanitation, hygiene promotion and distribution of noon food items. All of these contributed to a successful cholera management and targeting of the affected population including establishment of good MEL mechanisms. However, given the magnitude of the disaster, the response was fraught with challenges some mentioned above and other related with the following factors:

- High turnover of international staff was noted as a challenge by several key informants. This did not allow time to think and frame the transition to early recovery with an eye on linkage to development. In this regard, there is a need to plan for staff to remain in posts for longer periods and should plan to have development staff as part of the response (RTE). This would both minimise the disruption to project activities and improve sustainability of the response, while also strengthening external partnerships.
- Establish a stronger mechanism and system to embed international staff into large emergencies like the one caused by idai and Kenneth, like the example of Syria. This facilitates deployment of international staff into a country program and they quickly settle in and work with the systems more efficiently. The in-country system was not set up to deal with the CAT1 emergency, i.e., the systems in place was set up for small emergencies through local partners.
- Improve the planning before the emergency and during the response. When an emergency occurs, the agency should respond quickly and some time in ad hoc manner. But we need to improve the planning and divide the human resources accordingly to create the balance between the need to respond immediately and to ensure consistency on the use of the limited resources available. For instance, if due to resource constraints the decision is not to go to certain areas, the organization shouldn't just go, as this will risk the organization performance and not act in the benefit of the affected people, said one key informant.
- The continuation of the humanitarian mandate will require that the organization continue to work hard to operationalize and effectively defend the core humanitarian principle and core humanitarian standards. To do so, the organization needs to be minimally prepared with resources in standby for an emergency.
- In countries where the organization has staff on standby, they should be well trained and qualified staff and there should be a system that guarantees that were certain capacity is required a right and qualified personnel is deployed. This will ensure that the response is immediate and efficient. The thought about the implications of responding appropriately must be present before, during and after the emergency.

**KEQ 4: EFFICIENCY. To what extent have the desired results been achieved (in terms of provision of humanitarian assistance) as well as meeting the needs of the most vulnerable?**



## Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 2.4 M&E/Accountability, transparency, and quality control of funded projects

*This evaluation question looks at transparency, accountability to affected people and donors and the mechanisms implemented to account to both donors and AAP*

Key informants and our desk review confirmed that at the onset of the disaster and with the presence of the regional and global team, Oxfam had a very strong Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) component. The MEL team put a substantial emphasis on quality control, as well as service (help

desk and hotline that served as a population grievance hotline mechanism and funding tracking mechanism) and capacity building of its IPs as they developed their proposal and started implementing their humanitarian response projects. The MEL team did everything in their power to front load the review process, making every subsequent step of project implementation very smooth. The team took the major responsibility—burden— to monitor the projects implemented in affected sites. These are indicators of quality that make up the daily routines of Oxfam and its IP staff. This enabled the organization and its IP to effectively account for the need of the affected population, and the donors. In relation to the affected population the implementation of protection and hygiene promotion activities, prevention, and promotion of gender equality helped place them at the centre of the operations.

However, with the outbreak of the COVID19 and when the international team started to leave the country, the MEL capacity was severely affected. This brought serious challenges that the organization is facing to date, among them we list some below:

- The complaints and feedback mechanisms established to account for the affected population (AAP), did not have a complementary internal protocol for following up once the complaints or feedback have been presented by the communities affected.
- The emergency response was made by people who have a short-term contract and the exit strategy was not well crafted, i.e., on their way out, the file transfer process was deficient and a lot of important information was lost along the way. Therefore, the in-country MEL team was unable to catch the pieces that fell in the transition process from professional to professional.
- Due to incomplete handover process, there are still donor reports to be completed. To date, the remaining staff that is new to the organization is making calls to former staff that are no longer with the organization to provide insights to inform the reports. This is a threat to the organization accountability to the donors, as the reports are long overdue.
- Key Informants concluded that, there was an overall impression that the organization had been able to mobilize a lot of money from the emergency, which enabled the implementation of activities but now there is no storage of information for later use that is fundamental for the donor compliance, or for internal learning. This is being felt quite strongly. This is recurrent because it happened not only in Mozambique but also in other countries. Something must change in regard to this.

To conclude, sufficient quality control mechanisms were in place in the acute phase of the emergency, but this process was not kept during the transition and recovery phase of the emergency. This situation demonstrates the organization's information management system is fraught with serious faults. Therefore, serious investment is needed to ensure that the system works smoothly and meets the needs of the institution at all stages. For instance, in relation to short term contracts, even if the job is to last for a month, the organization should know what this information is and with whom it is, because when people leave, or end their mission, they leave information. Finally, the separation national or in-country and regional and global team should be invisible, there should be one Oxfam team that is interconnected and working for the same goal.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 2.5. Did Oxfam's intervention strengthen humanitarian COORDINATION mechanisms? If yes, how? If no, what were the inhibiting factors?**

*This question looks at the results of the response, including the extent that humanitarian assistance was well-coordinated and the extent to which duplication of assistance and gaps were minimized.*

It is without a doubt that Oxfam and its IP contributed to stronger coordination of the humanitarian response from the central, provincial to district level. Overall coordination of the response was of high quality, facilitated by close collaboration with INGC. Cluster coordination was variable, with particularly strong performances by the Logistics, and WASH

clusters where Oxfam was one of the key partners. A major factor contributing to the success of the scaleup response was the early decision to deploying GHT expert to coordinate and oversee field-based operations to ensure there is strong partnership with the GoM at provincial and district level as well as the work under the consortium of COSACA (Care, save The children and Oxfam) and CHEMO (Care, Oxfam, World Vision). These structures helped to reduce the bureaucracy and speed up the response. Oxfam was very strong in influencing, so for the donor meeting held in Beira Oxfam worked hard to make gender issues come to the fore (they prepared a position papers and asked other organizations to contribute to the cause). The position paper was presented at the meeting and drew more attention to donors and the organizations received more funds to implement the response.

Under the broader Humanitarian coordination structure, Oxfam was very much in alignment within the cluster system and its presence enhanced humanitarian coordination: Oxfam shared good practices on WASH, lead WASH intervention in field, and forced the clusters to take official position on the appropriateness of WASH intervention including accessing remote areas such the Matxemedge community, in Buzi districts. Its presence was fit inside the wide humanitarian goal of leave no one behind.


Key informants referred that at some points, the cluster effectiveness was variable, influenced by several factors including the availability of surge with the necessary profile, turnover frequency, and handover processes, how resources were prioritized and comparative levels of preparedness. Many GHT expert lacked the required language skills to interact with government officials and other national actors, the language constraints were a disincentive for them to participate in the coordination meetings. This affected Oxfam position in key moments particularly as those cluster coordination meetings served as accountability forum.

**Inadequate communication in the transition to recovery**

While during the acute phase of the emergency Oxfam was strong in communication with the government, key informants expressed concerns with the drop in the quality of communication and coordination. They indicated that the lack of regular communication invited questions and doubt about transparency; it may have given the impression that Oxfam was hiding something. They also expressed concerns in relation to plans presented during the cluster meeting but never shared with the local authorities for follow up. The overall score was satisfactory (*see fig below*)

During the acute phase, Oxfam deployed WASH equipment to provide clean water and equipment to clean the environment. These were essential in preventing the outbreak of diseases. However, the transition was fraught with faults as the organization could have paid more attention to the transition period and communicate more about its exit plan as it would culminate with the demobilization of

equipment. This left the local authorities hopeless as at the time they were in the process of restoring their service delivery capacity.



### Competition for funds

Key informants indicated that at some points coordination either within cluster or within the consortium become weak when the actors started looking inward and competing for international fund.


In relation to network of partners, this consortium played a very crucial role during the response to emergency including advocacy and fundraising. However, there are a number of issues that need to improve within COSACA. To continue consolidating its relevance there is a need to broaden its scope and go beyond fundraising to including joint programming, interoperability in field, definition of role and response, clarification of intervention, i.e., look what roles each member will play in the country either directly or through local implementing partners. This will be a step forward to consolidate the local leadership agenda. The expected outcome will be bringing our partners boots on the ground a little more strongly than the consortium has been doing up to date.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 2.7. CONNECTEDNESS. How do you assess Oxfam's connectedness with other humanitarian actors who have been operating at the national level and in the same locations as Oxfam?**

*This question assesses the results of the response, including the extent that Oxfam and its IP assisted people affected by Idai and Kenneth, and how it was linked to longer-term recovery, development efforts.*

Oxfam was very well connected to other funding mechanisms (through jointly funded efforts from the Humanitarian Country Team, led by OCHA; bilateral donor and DEC) (see fig below). Oxfam was also indirectly connected to other bilateral aid mechanisms. Oxfam had strong connection with local implementing partners, for instance, at

the onset of the disaster, when all places were under water and impassable one of its IP was in the other side of the water and had been able to initiate the response. U.N played a big role in terms of connecting Oxfam in different sectors. Key informants said that the organization was a strong part of the network for the UN clusters and had played a role in different groups. The clusters helped a lot in bringing the organization into collaboration with other actors, and some actors were always a key player in those specific spaces where they were meeting.



However, during the response there was a bit of an issue for Oxfam because the crisis happened in Beira and the headquarters of various organizations were in Maputo. And so, there was a need for the organization to restructure to be able to cover all those coordination structures including attend coordination meetings in in Maputo. For instance, the Country Director attended to quite several meetings in Maputo, while the other part of the team was dedicated to response on the ground. The was quite good collaboration, but a bit of a gap as well. It means that assumptions one makes that when a crisis happens, you're going to operate from the national office, sometimes renders impracticable as in some cases such as with Idai, the organization was not able to operate from the national level but to operate from Beira.

In relation to human resources, key informants indicated that there was a bit of disconnect, while the organization had a heavy machine on the group and start the direct implementation, these machine was not connect to local IP and at some points both ended up with intervention in the same site, for instance in Namacurra and Maganja da Costa, in Zambezia, there were latrines supported directly by Oxfam and other by IP. In the same location one entity use plastic slab and other using concrete slab. key informants were incisive in saying that the spirit of working with partners had to be present in Oxfam at all levels, regardless of the emergency category, i.e., this type of work must belong to the whole family, not just a country in response to localization agenda.

Connection to long term development, the organization invested to create conditions for recovery in Dondo and Maganja da Costa, providing recovery kits consisting of seeds and tools and WASH infrastructure. Key informants felt that the organization could have played a much bigger role such as linking the response initiated to other programs that offers more long-term funding.

Oxfam befitted a lot from the connection with local implementing partners. However, it opened room for taking lessons on how the process was, to consolidate it. The organization should build from what

the country office did and conduct proper assessment of the partners capacities and process. Works closely with them to build their capacity since preparedness.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 2.8 To what extent has the Oxfam intervention contributed to local capacity building (Gov, IP, community members)?**

*This question assesses the results of the response, including the extent that Oxfam and its IP assisted people affected by Idai and Kenneth, and how it was linked to longer-term recovery, development efforts.*

Key informants score Oxfam support to capacity building as satisfactory. Oxfam has been able to initiate the response through its implementing partners, in some sites within the first 48h (in Buzi districts) and in other sites a bit late towards the end of the emergency phase. The partner on the ground played a big role mainly when the

international staff had to leave the country due to covid19. Similarly, the northern region (Cabo Delgado) affected by cyclone Kenneth and coupled with violent extremist, Oxfam's IP led the response and sustained it on the ground. The fact that IP had been able to lead the response on the ground demonstrates that the organization had built some capacity locally, as described below.

**Build partners capacity to work on safeguarding issues**

Oxfam carried out trainings that helped build its IP capacity to implement and become mentor of other organizations especially in the sector of safeguarding, which is one of its strong legacy. Oxfam helped to establish a network of focal points in each IP and transferred knowledge for the operationalization of safeguard policies and for some IPs helped restructure their organization to be able to effectively navigate on this crucial protection topic. Oxfam also contributed to create capacity of humanitarian organizations in general, encompassing Core Humanitarian Principles, basic principles for Disaster Preparedness and response, gender mainstreaming. Moreover, gave opportunity to IP to respond to the cat 1 emergency.

In relation to cross-cutting issues, there are partners who have had a formidable performance and will no longer be the same as before Oxfam's intervention. However, there is still need to move investments to build and consolidate their capacity to manage more funds. This investment should be accompanied by strengthening of the country office capacity with qualified human resources to accompany the process of capacity building of its IP. Currently the Country office does not have that capacity.

**Expand network of humanitarian workers**

The organization also employed quite a good number of local staff in Mozambique which build up the number of future humanitarian actors, i.e., people who can now take an active role in response. In this sense, seen that the country is vulnerable to disaster, if there is another crisis, the organization would probably have a good team within the society that could be recruited and begin to get some work done on the ground.

In relation to the government capacity, while the organization collaborated with different government entities at central and local level, the key informants indicated that they cannot make a strong claim to have built their capacity. But there has been stronger collaboration with government.

**Connection with resilience and long-term development**

In relation to connection with resilience and recovery, key informants provided mixed feedback, there was a bit of a link, although with some tension in areas where the organization did not have normal

operation. For the areas with office and partners there has been quite a clear connection from what the partners were doing before, example partners working with long term WASH and food security. So, they have been working during crisis and during the phasing out (the impact the phase out had on the operation was discussed above). In the areas where the organization was not operating its ability to sustain programming into the long-term recovery was a challenge. Despite Oxfam's preparedness for the transition, they could have done more. The individuals in charge of looking at transition between the emergency phase and the nexus of recovery and development had short term contracts and did not have enough time to prepare the transition and handover, this made the balance between the acute phase for recovery loose. The lessons that could be derived from this reality is that there is need to pay more attention to transition and allocate specialized resources.

### **IPs specific capacity building needs**

Given the country's vulnerability to disasters and the need for IPs continued preparedness for disasters, and above all, to complement the government's efforts, the following areas has been pointed out as requiring Oxfam assistance.

#### **Local emergency preparedness**

- Support IP to develop Contingency Plans to better complement the government's efforts during emergency situations.
- Technical support and training for IP in the development of emergency projects alignment with donor language.

#### **Emergency connection and recovery**

- Technical assistance to create sustainability in humanitarian organizations including maintaining the organization's institutional memorial/including key positions given the country's vulnerability to disasters.
- Technical assistance to develop small projects that links between emergency and recovery phases.

#### **Training in technical skills for specific areas**

- Oxfam has demonstrated extensive technical experience/expertise to quickly establish and operate systems especially in WASH sector to deliver clean water during emergency. Transferring these technical skills and competency to IP would be an asset for the future events.
- Production of simple brochures on the lessons learned from the response to the idai.
- Production of simple brochures that include skills and techniques to implement preparedness, response and recovery actions following international standards.
- Improve technical capabilities including equipping IP with technological means (eg. drones) to conduct rapid assessments especially to reach isolated locations.
- Assist the IP to establish relevant financial system that will allow them to take regular audit, as this seems to be fundamental to build organization sustainability.

## 7 CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

The section below includes summary of Oxfam's work on innovation, targeting unforeseen needs, promotion of gender equality, prioritization of marginal groups including review for safeguarding, safe programming, community engagement.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 3.1 Did Oxfam's intervention support INNOVATION and PILOT actions? If yes, give some examples.**

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*This question assesses the results of the response, including the extent that Oxfam and its IP assisted people affected by Idai and Kenneth, and how it was linked to longer-term recovery, development efforts.*

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Key informants were unanimous in saying that Oxfam and its implementing partners tried implementing and fostering initiatives that could fall under innovation. Some would be more at technical design level that culminated with improvement in services delivery and other in introducing new thematic areas to leave no one behind. Oxfam advocated, and introduced safeguarding principles and safe programming. This was an approach to increase accountability to affected population (AAP). Oxfam had never worked in this area. But the intense way in which the safeguard was implemented can be considered an innovation. In relation to safe programming, it encompasses the "do no harm principle", and it was something new for the national context. It inquires, if Oxfam's intervention is safe for beneficiaries, to partners and even for Oxfam's own staff. Does the organization guarantee that people are safe including when they receive assistance from Oxfam? The feedback mechanism established helped to connect the safeguard and the safe programming and improve the performance of the organization during the emergency.

The use of solar panels in water points in Buzi. Readers are reminded that Buzi district was completely flooded and provision of safe water was a serious challenge. The establishment of water points required electricity service unavailable at that moment due to the floods. The solar panels were installed to help provide the water that has clear link to other basic needs. In the same line the provision of torches for women to use in the night to get access to the toilets.

At the technical design level, there has been some innovations in delivery of latrines. It was challenging to provide this service due to high water table, and most of the latrines constructed had collapsed, increasing the risk of open defecation and consequent water borne disease. So, it is important to build latrines in terrains with very low-water table. Another example worth mentioning was the water provision. Oxfam introduced water bladders (which was flexible and could be easily refilled with water and continue providing water) in resettlement areas which helped to timely provide clean water for people and therefore prevent water borne disease. In a nutshell, instead of taking a lot of time laying pipes and drilling holes, the organization was able to have water immediately.

**Evaluation Key Question (EKQ) 3.2 3.4 Did Oxfam intervention contributed to meet UNFORESEEN needs/ supported UNDERCOVERED / FORGOTTEN emergencies and vulnerable and marginalized groups.**

Key informants referred that Oxfam has been very strong and consistent with its mandate to promote gender in humanitarian context. This was complemented with the desk review that identified high score on gender responsiveness [(2a) see details in the matrix below]):




Figure 11: IASC Gender Marker

Under this component, informants referred also that the areas affected by both cyclone idai and Kenneth are faced with underlying risk and vulnerability associated with high levels of poverty. This includes serious sanitation and water access challenge. When the cyclone hit Sofala province including Beira and Buzi district, in the first 2 to 4 weeks it was perceived as a WASH delivery type of emergency. But assessment conducted identify risks associated with water borne disease and gender related concerns. Oxfam quickly adjusted its response plan to include cholera response.

In the case of Beira, the challenge of sanitation has been known for a long time, however, during the idai Oxfam provided water because it is recognized as a recurring challenge, as there are population without running water. Some of these problems have to do with poverty and could not be ignored.

Other aspects pointed out was gender. Most of the time agencies tend to focus on hardware such as assistance with shelter, foods and non-food items, but miss to timely advance protection to people affected. In this regard, Oxfam right from the beginning deployed a gender expert, protection, and safeguard expert to ensure that gender related concerns are taken care off.

In resettlement centres, when the camp was set up, toilets where build in one side and the tents on the other and the women complained that the toilets were very far and theywhere afraid of going to the toiled atnight. In response to this, Oxfam prioritized light/torches for women.

Oxfam advocated for the government not to be harsh with resettlement. For instance, in a resettlement centre close to the airport the government wanted to relocate people far from the town where mothers have their children enrolled in schools. Amother presented concern in relation to their children not having access to classes outside of Beira. Oxfam advocated to ensure that this need is taken care off. In a nutshell, Oxfam advocacy work helped other agencies and the government to pay attention to displaced people.

In Buzi, the flood caused displacement of some communities whichwere in resettlement areas, but there were also community that was isolated and lost everything including crops but have never received any assistance. So this population wasforgotten but moved by the principle of leave no one behind, Oxfam reached to that location and aided with WASH, food security and sustainable livelihoods.

The organization also conducted a Real Time Evaluation (RTE) after 3 to 4 months of the response and flagged out what can be done better and or needed adjustment and revision such as the intervention with emergency food security and livelihood.

## 7.2 SUCCESS STORIES: AFFECTED PEOPLE IN NHAMATANDA &, DONDO

### SUCCESS STORY 1: Luisa Joao - Kura Resettlement Center, Nhamatanda

The strong winds began, as they had announced on the radios. The roof sheets of her house flew, hugging her three children, she remained in the house hoping that it will pass. At dusk the winds got worse. Fearing the worst and to protect her children, she left her house in the third neighbourhood in Nhamatanda looking for refuge at her parents' home in the second neighbourhood.

When she arrived at her parents' house, the worst had already happened, her parents' house had fallen. She took her children and went to Josias Tongogara school to seek refuge with her three children and her mother. Her father did not leave the house, he stayed to protect his goods and animals.



Luisa Joao at the Kura resettlement center in Nhamatanda

When they arrived at the school, there were already some people there who were also seeking refuge. They were received and placed in a classroom. Their stay at school lasted a week and a half. At this time they received support from the municipality in food supplies. After a week and a half, they were transferred to the temporary centre where they stayed for 3 more weeks. From the provisional centre they were transferred to the resettlement centre in Kura where they have been to date.

Upon arrival, they were given a tent, and space was provided for the tent to be set up. They received kitchen kits, hygiene kits, kits for women that included capulanas and pads among others. In the centre they have no water problems, daily the water is provided. Oxfam set up latrines and they received slabs. They were trained in latrine hygiene, garbage conservation and built tarimbás (high point to dry the dishes).

*Today I managed to build my improved house, I do business selling vegetables among them tomatoes, onions, and broth. I opened a stall in the Nhamatanda market. I'm very well here, I have no intentions and I don't even think about going back" - said Carlotta Jose.*

### SUCCESS STORY 2: Aida Luis - Mutua Resettlement Centre, Dondo

Aida Luis, an elderly woman with a happy look, who in a short time became sad when she started telling us how she arrived at the resettlement centre in Kura after the cyclone Idai. Worried about her pot in the fireplace, she told that she left the Pungwe area when the waters began to rise and went to a nearby school to seek refuge. From the school they were transferred to the Mutua resettlement centre. When they arrived at the centre, it was a forest, each one had to clear their own piece of land which they were attributed, but as an elderly woman, the young people from "Oxfam" cleared the land for her.

The same teenagers-built latrines for her. Unfortunately, the latrines fell during the rains, now I use the neighbour's latrine.


In her backyard she planted vegetables with the seeds she received from Oxfam, but nothing came out due to excess water during the rainy season. Now to sustain herself she relies on the 2600mt voucher she receives on monthly.

*I will not leave this place; I suffered a lot. Thanks to Oxfam, today I do not worry about what I lost. I'm happy because I'm alive," - said Aida Luis.*



Aida Luis, Mutua resettlement center

In conclusion, in relation to OECD/DAC criteria, key informants referred that on scale from 1 to 5 (being 1 – very good, 2-good, 3-satisfactory, 4-Poor, and 5 very poor) Oxfam performed **GOOD** under relevance, MEL, efficiency and **SATISFACTORY** under coordination, timeliness and flexibility. The criteria scored satisfactory are the areas where the organization and its IP will need to pay more attention in the future (*see details in graphic below*).



## 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the conclusions, lesson learned and selected key recommendations (R) that will be useful for Oxfam and its IP when revising preparedness approaches and/or implementing a response during similar CAT 1 emergencies in the future.

### Emergency preparedness

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**Conclusion 1.** Mozambique is one of the most vulnerable countries to disasters in the Southern Africa Region and the third most vulnerable to climate-related impacts which are projected to increase in intensity, frequency and magnitude. Cyclones idai and kenneth are elucidative example.

**Lesson 1.1** The Country Office slow response to the affected population needs is a clear demonstration that it was not ready and or well prepared to deal with the disasters. Though the events magnitude was unpredictability, Oxfam is by nature a humanitarian organization and could have done more, based on its large and long international experience, for its preparedness. Its implementing partners immediate intervention is a clear demonstration that preparedness pays off.

**Recommendation (R) 1.1.1** If Oxfam intends to continue being relevant in the humanitarian field, and given the country' vulnerability, they will need to invest and maintain a core team of qualified multidisciplinary humanitarian staff that is ready to timely initiate a response.

**R1.1.2** The CAT 1 event that affected the country elevated the need for the Country Office and its IP to have multi-hazards and up to date Contingency Plan that is well known, tested, and adequately funded. And the timing to do so is when the Southern African Regional Climate Forecast (SARCOF) releases the forecast.

**R1.1.3.** The preparedness layer of the contingency plan, must include repositioning of stock aligned with the organization sector of work, as demonstrated by its implementing partner, Ajoago.

**R1.1.4.** Under the localization agenda and in alignment with the organization approach to strengthen local partners capacity, the organization is encouraged to establishment new Memorandum of Understand (MoU) or update the existing one in alignment with the revision and update of the organization Contingency Plan.

### Coordination, collaboration an information sharing

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**Conclusion 2.** The organization had a strong coordination and collaboration role with other partners including the UN, and the government in the acute phase of the emergency. This increased the organization and its partner reputation and trust.

**Lesson 2.1** The organization should, throughout the emergency cycle, strive to maintain a meaningfully collaboration and coordination with local, national, and international partners including taking part of relevant coordination forum as this serves as information sharing and accountability forum.

**R2.1.2** The organization should ensure meaningful participation in coordination forums, share report and other relevant strategic information including its management approach. It will clear the confusion of having "a team coach that is simultaneously a player".

**R.2.1.3** The introduction of new topics that may imply structuring of an organization's management approach and style may cause inertia for its acceptance. If, on the hand, the topics do not imply change in management style, such as the safeguarding theme, it will be easily accepted. For instance, the

Oxfam emergency cash component was new for the government and it implied capacity to monitor the process. Therefore, as government at provincial and districts was not ready, the cash component did not proceed.

**R.2.1.4** While crisis creates opportunity to test new tools and approach, organizations are encouraged to work during the preparedness phase, which coincides with the revision and update of key documents such as Contingency Plans to introduce new themes/topic. Preparedness seems to be a good timing to negotiate, familiarize with target stakeholders with the topic and lobby to introduce sensitive topics such as cash availability.

**Conclusion 3.** COSACA consortium played an important role in information sharing, advocacy, fundraising, and had a seat in the HCT. This was crucial for the reputation and trust of the consortium partners including in delivery of relevant services for the affected population.

**Lesson 3.1** The consortium was not designed for large scale emergencies, the COSACA Manifesto” was developed during the response to help clarify a number of points, but it is widely acknowledged that COSACA needs to expand its scope in light of learning from a big emergency.

**R.3.1.2** The COSACA partners need to review its scope in a light of a large-scale emergency and reshape this forum including moving forward to a joint planning, clear division of roles and responsibilities including geographic locations.

#### **Management structure**

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**Conclusion 4.** The value added of surge capacity deployed from the regional and GHT level was decreased by their short deployment durations. The gap created between deployments, had negative impact on teamwork, increased transaction costs for Oxfam, created inconsistencies/ fragilities in relationships with partners and communities.

**Lesson 4.1** Geographic localization refers to the principle of locating responsibility or action at the level nearest to which it is required, i.e., facilitating the assumption of larger roles by local actors in the provision of aid to their own populations (in addition to the effectiveness and sustainability arguments.) In cases where local actors are best placed to respond directly to specific situations and needs.

**R4.1.2** One Oxfam team. In case of an emergency that requires deployment of international staff, the perception of national, regional, and global team should be eliminated to become only one Oxfam. These staff members should work closely together and towards the same goal of saving people lives and aid without any kind of discrimination. When the country accepts to respond to a crisis, such as a CAT1, they need to be flexible and open doors. This will reduce the tendency of mistrust between the country office and the surge team that is supporting the response. It is urgent to find ways to make these teams work better together.

**R4.1.3** Oxfam confederation. At global level establish an operational procedures document needed for business support that is applicable under all affiliates to provide guidelines for approved derogations that can be used in an emergency. It should also include aspects related to partnerships (e.g. business capacity of partners, partner audits, etc.).

#### **Transition to recovery**

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**Conclusion 5.** Oxfam’s work in recovery was loose and the organization could have done more seen the link recovery has in building people resilience. For instance, a lot of recovery work was taken over by other partners in Zambezia, Sofala and Cabo Delgado.

**Lesson 5.1** The slow start of response to idai contributed to later IP intervention, i.e, they intervened at the end of acute phase of the response. This affected the relevance of some IP projects.

**R.5.1.1** The thought of given response in terms of speed in life saving assistance should be balanced with the thought of transition to recovery as this phase is critical to build resilience and reduce community vulnerability to the future disasters.

### **IPs specific capacity building needs**

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Given the country's vulnerability to disasters and the need for IPs continued preparedness for disasters, and above all, to complement the government's efforts, the following areas has been pointed out as requiring Oxfam assistance.

#### **Local emergency preparedness**

- Support IP in development of Contingency Plans to better complement the government's efforts during emergency situations.
- Technical support and training for IP the development of emergency projects alignment with donor language.

#### **Emergency connection and recovery**

- Technical assistance to create sustainability in humanitarian organizations including maintaining the organization's institutional memorial/including key positions given the country's vulnerabilities to disasters.
- Technical assistance to develop small projects that make a link between emergency and recovery phases.

#### **Training in technical skills for specific areas**

- Oxfam has demonstrated extensive technical experience/expertise to quickly establish and operate systems especially in the WASH sector to deliver clean water during emergency. Transferring these technical skills and competency to IP would be an asset for the future events.
- Production of simple brochures on the lessons learned from the response to the idai.
- Production of simple brochures that include skills and techniques to implement preparedness, response and recovery actions following international standards.
- Improve technical capabilities including equipping IP with technological means (eg. drones) to conduct rapid assessments especially to reach isolated locations.
- Assist the IP to establish relevant financial system that will allow them to take regular audit, as this seems to be fundamental to build organization sustainability.

## ANNEXES

### Annex 1: ToR for External Evaluation of Cyclones Idai & Kenneth Responses in Mozambique

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#### Description

##### 1. Background and rationale for the evaluation

Oxfam in Mozambique developed its comprehensive strategy and plan to respond to the cyclones in Mozambique immediately after the cyclone Idai in March 2019 which was reviewed and revised in April to include the cyclone Kenneth response. It was later further revised in June based on the changing context and emerging humanitarian needs. The overall objective of Oxfam's cyclones response is "to provide life-saving assistance, protection, dignity and safety for people affected by Cyclone Idai and Kenneth"

##### 1.1 Objectives of the cyclone idai and kenneth response program evaluation

- The primary objective of this evaluation is to assess the performance of the cyclone responses across the different sectors and components in relation to the set objectives in the revised cyclones response strategy.
- The outcome of this evaluation is expected to also generate key lessons learnt that will be applied in future responses in Mozambique and similar CAT 1 responses for Oxfam. The measurement for which the evaluation would be tailored on the Core Humanitarian Standards' nine commitments and quality criteria.

##### 2. Expected scope of the evaluation

- The scope being outlined are recommendations but must be reviewed, to take into account the current realities posed by Covid-19 and the restrictions that are being imposed by the local government units and agencies governing these proposed areas for the evaluation.
- The evaluation shall be conducted for Oxfam's Cyclones Responses Programme composed of multiple projects and donor funding in Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado provinces of Mozambique.
- The evaluation shall be both qualitative and quantitative in nature.
- Apart from the Core Humanitarian Standards, the evaluation shall be primarily conducted in the backdrop of Oxfam's humanitarian dossier and Oxfam Country Strategy (OCS) for Mozambique.
- The evaluation shall be conducted using diverse range of methodologies with a good balance between desk review and field visits to programme sites; the consultant is expected to visit at least 5 districts (2 districts in Sofala and Zambezia provinces each and 1 district in Cabo Delgado);
- The evaluation findings, analysis and recommendations shall include comparative advantages and disadvantages between Oxfam's direct implementation and local NGO partners led response.
- The evaluation findings, analysis and recommendations shall be specific in nature.
- The evaluation finding and analysis shall include gender segregated information.
- The evaluation findings shall be substantiated with evidences (e.g. case studies, human interest stories, quotes, good practices etc.).

##### 3. The following internal and external stakeholders shall be involved during the evaluation process:

###### 3.1 Internal stakeholders

- Oxfam's Humanitarian Response Programme team.
- Oxfam's SAF humanitarian Team.
- Oxfam's Global Humanitarian Team (GHT).
- Local NGO partners (AJOAGO, ADEL, CECOHAS, KUKUMBI and KULIMA).

###### 3.2 Following external stakeholders shall be involved during the evaluation process:

- Affected populations (Direct and Indirect).
- Government of Mozambique (especially INGC and line ministries).
- UN clusters (Primarily WASH, Health, Food Security).
- Technical Working Groups on Livestock, Cash and AWD).
- Humanitarian I/NGOs operational in the Idai and Kenneth responses.

## Annex 2: Documents consulted

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
The GoM Emergency Contingency Plan 2018/2019;
Mozambique Cyclone Idai: Post Disaster Needs Assessment 2019
OXFAM DOCUMENTS
Oxfam Humanitarian Dossier: Joint Oxfam Response Strategy for Mozambique Cyclone Idai & Kenneth; 25 SitRep on cyclone Idai 28 Sitrep on cyclone Kenneth Cyclone IDAI and Flooding Response Strategy DEC Phase 1 – Phase one March – September 2019 DEC Phase 2 – Phase two October 2019 – March 2020 Oxfam (2012) The Oxfam Humanitarian Dossier Version 4.A Real Time Review of Oxfam’s Response to Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, Mozambique July 2019 Mozambique Country Report: Real-Time Response Review – DEC programme for Cyclone Idai
PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS
IASC (2019) Operational Peer Review (OPR), Mozambique Cyclone Idai Response
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) (2019) Real-Time Evaluation, Mozambique: Tropical Cyclones Idai and Kenneth;
UNICEF (2019) Evaluation report, Independent Real-Time Evaluation of UNICEF’s response to Cyclone Idai in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe
INGC (2019) AVALIAÇÃO RÁPIDA MULTISSECTORIAL PÓS-CICLONE IDAI 14 distritos das províncias de Sofala e Manica Moçambique 1-17 de Abril de 2019
Multi-sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA)
OCHA (2019) HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN 2018-2019, Revised following Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, May 2019.
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) & the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2019) Humanitarian Response Plan. (Revised following Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, May 2019).
GENERAL EVALUATION STANDARDS
The SPHERE Handbook (2018 edition).
IASC (2018) Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations, Process Guidelines. United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Two United Nations Plaza. New York, NY 10017, USA
ALNAP (2014) Evaluation of Humanitarian Action. Pilot guide. Bonino, F. (2014) Evaluating protection in humanitarian action: Issues and challenges. ALNAP Working Paper. London: ALNAP/ODI.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria;
IASC (2018) Guideline the Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action. Reference Group on Gender and Humanitarian Action. February 2018
OTHER
Morinière, Lezlie C. (2011), FINAL REPORT, Independent Consultant External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011.
IASC Operational Peer Review of the Mozambique Cyclone Idai Response. June 2019

## Annex 3: Questionnaire for the KY

### Guide To Key Informant Interview With Oxfam Staff And Implementing Partners And Government Line Ministries

#### Introduction

You have been contacted because of your (or your agency's) link to Oxfam cyclone IDAI and Kenneth Response. Whether you are a fund recipient (implementing partner), a donor or another type of partner/advisor/manager related to Oxfam humanitarian response, as external evaluators of the Oxfam Response, we would like to learn and benefit from your experience. Kindly take 10-15 minutes of your time to share your opinions—good or bad—about the Oxfam response to cyclone Idai and Kenneth mechanism. A widespread set of opinions, although not necessarily representative, will help make the process stronger and more impactful for future emergency situation with similar category. Your answers will not be attributable back to you or your agency—you may remain entirely anonymous if you so desire. If you have not formed an opinion about the Oxfam response, kindly send this e-invite to someone in your agency that may. Even if s/he is no longer working in Mozambique or with your agency, their opinions are important to us.

#### SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION

	Answer/ explanation
Date:	
Please provide your name and the name of your agency, location if willing and scope	
1.1 How would you describe your link to the Oxfam response to cyclone IDAI and Kenneth in Mozambique? Check all that apply Answers: a) recipient/implementing partner; b) donor; c) manager; d) cluster coordinator; e) advisor; f) other, specify	
1.2 O que significou a activação de alerta para ciclones de categoria 1 em termos de capacidade de resposta da organização? ( <i>staff no terreno, stock para resposta primeiras 48h</i> )	
1.3 What did the activation of Category 1 cyclones mean in terms of the organization's responsiveness?	

#### SECTION 2 – 5 EVALUATION CRITERIA

From the scale of 1 to 5 being [5= Very poor, 4= Poor, 3= Satisfactory, 2=Good, 1=Very Good] can you also provide your view, perspective and comments regarding...?	
1. <b>RELEVANCE</b> of Oxfam and its IP response to humanitarian needs in districts affected by cyclone IDAI and kenneth?	
2.1 Is the humanitarian response associated with more timely and effective funding to address the critical gaps? Is this the appropriate mechanism?	
2.2 <b>FLEXIBILITY</b> . How long did it take for Oxfam to disburse to Implementing Partners?	
2.3 General Management <b>EFFICIENCY</b> . To what extent have the desired results been achieved (in terms of provision of humanitarian assistance) as well as meeting the needs of the most vulnerable? a) Could the efficiency be improved, and, if so, how?	

2.4 M&E/Accountability, transparency, and quality control of funded projects	
2.5 Did the Oxfam intervention strengthened humanitarian COORDINATION mechanisms. If yes, how? If no, what were the inhibiting factors?	
2.6 What could be done to improve and solidify partnerships in the future?	
2.7 <b>CONNECTEDNESS.</b> How do you assess Oxfam's connectedness with other humanitarian actors who have been operating at the national level and in the same locations as Oxfam?	
2.8 To what extent has the Oxfam intervention contributed to local capacity building (Gov, IP, community members)? a) Did the Oxfam intervention made linkages to recovery and longer-term development programmes? Examples	
<b>SECÇÃO 3 – CROSS-CUTTING</b>	
3.1 How do you assess the Oxfam Connectedness to other financial mechanisms (agency, bilateral, global, Flash Appeal, etc.)	
3.2 Did Oxfam intervention Supported INNOVATION and PILOT efforts? If yes, give some examples.	
3.4 Did Oxfam intervention contributed to meet UNFORESEEN needs/ supported UNDERCOVERED / FORGOTTEN emergencies. Examples	
3.5 To what extent did the portfolio of projects funded by Oxfam take a) gender equality, b) vulnerable and marginalized group into consideration?	
<b>SECÇÃO 4 – CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS</b>	
4.1 In your opinion, what is the greatest strength/benefit of the Oxfam response to cyclone IDAI and Kenneth? Can you give examples	
4.2 In your opinion, what is the greatest weakness/gap of the Oxfam response to cyclone IDAI and Kenneth?	
4.4 What will be the top lessons learned/ and recommendations can you make to this or future cat 1 programs?	
<i>Any final thought or comment around what we have been discussing.</i>	

## Annex 4: COVID 19 Response Plan

Type of risk	Description of risk	Risk Severity	Mitigation Measure
Risk exposure in individual team members	Data collection requiring contact within less than 1.5m;	Medium	The project team complied with the social distancing, and used masks and complied with all other preventive measures
Participants age group	The people to be engaged in FDG or KII include participants at higher risk of severe disease (e.g, people > 65 years of age, people with underlying health conditions)?	High	For all the interview related sessions the project team made sure to consistently use protective means (mask, alcohol gel)
Space and duration of the primary data collections	Data collection sessions including interview might take place indoors and/or will imply contact with one another for a prolonged period	Medium	The project team strictly implemented prevention measure such as social distancing of 1.5m, have available and accessible COVID 19 preventions measures
Increase cases of infection in project target districts	Risk of exposure to infection and spreading of disease by the project team or participants	High	Opted for teleworking for non-critical tasks to minimize the spreading of COVID-19 in workplace
Postpone the evaluation until the restrictions are lifted and the situation 'normalizes':	This option should be chosen if the risks are high but the criticality in terms of timeframes is low.	Medium	Conduct the evaluation in remote modality: This modality was used to engage stakeholder in Cab Delgado and other staff engaged in the response but had already left the country
Availability of targeted Key informant	Some of the targeted study participants might not be available for the personal interviews due to holidays, being on leave, other commitments, etc.	High	The team always kept in mind and initiates the scheduling of meetings exercise as soon as possible to prevent delays. The team also employed other data gathering techniques such as telephonic surveys, skype meetings, online surveys, and emailing the questionnaire.
Interview responses and willingness to participate	There is a risk that the targeted participants, group of community members might not be interested in participating in the study, for whatever reason.	High	The project team relied on the client to communicate effectively with all stakeholders regarding the study to build awareness and participation.
Subjectivity	Some of the information to be gathered during the consultations might be subjective.	High	The project team employed data triangulation techniques to correct such possible subjectivism.

## Annex 5: Sample of signed consent form

### TÍTULO DO ESTUDO:

#### AVALIAÇÃO INDEPENDENTE DA RESPOSTA DA OXFAM DOS CICLONES IDAI E KENNETH

Caro Sr / Sra

Eu \_\_\_\_\_ faço parte da equipa de consultores engajados para fazer a avaliação da resposta humanitária da Oxfam aos ciclones Idai e Kenneth, realizada nas províncias de Sofala, Zambézia e Cabo Delgado em 2019. O objectivo da avaliação é compreender até que ponto a resposta foi eficaz, eficiente e sustentável.

Nesta discussão de grupo focal faremos uma série de perguntas as quais poderá responder como se sentir confortável em fazê-lo. As perguntas cobrem o seu histórico, sua situação familiar, bem como acesso e interações com agentes comunitários envolvidos na preparação, resposta e recuperação pós desastres. Essas informações podem ser mais detalhadas do que o que normalmente seria solicitado a fornecer se não tivesse participado da avaliação.

Por favor, entenda que sua participação nesta discussão do grupo focal é inteiramente voluntária. Não há nenhuma penalização caso decida não participar e a sua decisão de não participar não afectará os cuidados que você normalmente receberia. Se concordar em participar, apenas precisará de responder às perguntas que deseja responder durante a entrevista. Nota que não precisa de responder as perguntas que o deixem desconfortável. Ainda, tem possibilidade de fazer perguntas à equipe de avaliação a qualquer momento. Tem também a possibilidade de indicar, há qualquer momento, que não está mais interessado em participar na discussão do grupo de focal.

Caso decida em participar no estudo os riscos para si são mínimos e estão relacionados apenas com algum desconforto que possa sentir ao responder a algumas das perguntas detalhadas durante a discussão do grupo focal. Os benefícios incluem com o ribuir para o aprendizado que informará os programas e prestação de serviços em situação de desastres similares no futuro.

#### Confidencialidade

Se decidir em participar, protegeremos as informações sobre si da melhor maneira possível. O que for dito na discussão do grupo focal será mantido em sigilo e será identificado apenas por um número nos registos do estudo. Além disso, seu nome não será registado em nenhuma parte das transcrições do grupo focal ou usado em relatórios ou documentos de estudo.

#### Compensação

Não está prevista nenhuma compensação ao fazer parte deste exercício dado que o objectivo final é compreender a resposta prestada e por via disso criar condições para continuar melhorar e ou melhor prover assistência humanitária no futuro.

#### Contacto para perguntas ou problemas

Receberá informações de contacto do Gestor do projecto humanitário da Oxfam numa folha de papel separada. Poderá contactá-lo a qualquer momento caso tenha dúvida ou necessidade de esclarecimento. Além disso, entre em contato com ele se tiver qualquer problema que julgue que possa estar relacionado com a participação neste estudo.

#### Acordo de Voluntariado

Por favor confirme se tem interesse em participar deste estudo? Em caso afirmativo, solicitamos que assine abaixo.

TÍTULO DO ESTUDO:  
AVALIAÇÃO INDEPENDENTE DA RESPOSTA DA OXFAM DOS CICLONES IDAI E KENNETH

Certifico que a natureza e o propósito, os benefícios potenciais e os possíveis riscos associados à participação neste estudo, conforme descrito neste documento, foram lidos e explicados para mim.

Celesto Lazar Manuel 08.10.2020  
Assinatura ou impressão digital do participante do estudo Data

Se o participante não pode ler o formulário, uma testemunha deve assinar aqui em seu nome: Eu estive presente enquanto os benefícios, riscos e procedimentos eram lidos para o(a) voluntári(o)a. Todas as perguntas que el(e)a tinha foram respondidas e el(e)a concordou em participar do estudo.

MARIA MANUEL VASCO 08.10.2020  
Assinatura da testemunha Data

Certifico que a natureza e o propósito, os benefícios potenciais e os possíveis riscos associados à participação neste estudo foram explicados ao indivíduo acima e que el(e)a concordou voluntariamente em participar.

Graca Pedro e' 08.10.2020  
Assinatura da pessoa que obteve consentimento Data

Tito  
malhana

Jemusse Robson  
Rosa

Jorge  
LUIZA

DORCA

Isabel Chico

Manuel Antonio Nhamiti

HELENA VASCO

Carla DAVIA

Dambene Gausant

Wing Wing Chirai Lourenço

Chara Luis

FAÍMA



### CREDENCIAL

Assunto: **Avaliação da Resposta Humanitária da Oxfam ao Ciclone Idai e Kenneth**

Em 2019, o ciclone Idai e Kenneth afectou o país e causou danos e perdas e levantou a necessidade de assistência humanitária em diferentes sectores. Vários actores humanitários, incluindo a Oxfam, intervieram para fornecer a assistência humanitária necessária, cobrindo WASH, protecção, segurança alimentar, artigos não alimentares, e assistência sanitária.

Actualmente, a Oxfam está a proceder a uma avaliação independente sobre a medida em que os objectivos colectivos previstos no seu Plano de Resposta Humanitária responderam às necessidades e preocupações das pessoas afectadas durante os ciclones Idai e Kenneth nas províncias de Sofala, Zambézia e Cabo Delgado.

Assim, tenho o prazer de vos informar que o Sr. \_\_\_\_\_


\_\_\_\_\_, o Consultor comprometeu-se a realizar esta avaliação de 18 de Setembro a 15 de Outubro de 2020.

A Equipa de Avaliação terá questões relacionadas com a relevância, eficácia, eficiência, sustentabilidade, escalabilidade, e lições aprendidas sobre a resposta humanitária da Oxfam e dos seus parceiros de implementação.

Nós na Oxfam valorizamos muito as contribuições que possa dar e agradecemos a sua cooperação com estes indivíduos.

Caso tenha alguma dúvida sobre a avaliação ou a Equipa de Avaliação, não hesite em contactar-nos.

Atenciosamente



## Annex 7: List of stakeholders interviewed

Name	Location	Position	Interview date	Means Used
<b>Oxfam Country Office</b>				
Rotafina Dongo	Country Office	Country Director	<a href="#">02.10.2020</a>	skype call & Zoon
Helena Chiquele	Country Office	Head of Programmes	<a href="#">30.09.2020</a>	skype call
Felisberto Afonso	Country Office	Humanitarian Programme Manager	<a href="#">19.10.2020</a>	skype call
Emilia Mussa	Sofala	WASH program officer	<a href="#">28.09.2020</a>	skype call
Leonel Manjate	Sofala	EX-PHE Officer	09.10.2020	Telephone
Jose Zeca	Sofala	Ex-MEAL	11.10.2020	skype call
Jaime Cristovão Mafroze	Sofala	Partnership Coordinator	<a href="#">29.09.2020</a>	skype call
<b>Global &amp; Regional Humanitarian Team</b>				
Ben Phillips	UK	Global Humanitarian Officer	<a href="#">29.09.2020</a>	Skype call
Yasmine Wahba	GHT	Global Humanitarian Coordinator	<a href="#">14.10.2020</a>	Skype call
Kata Duaibe	Pacific	Former Emergency Coordinator	<a href="#">30.09.2020</a>	Skype call
Marilia Leti	GHT	Area Manager	30.09.2020	Skype call
Marina Di Lauro	GHT	Protection Advisor	02.10.2020	Skype call
Mary Omondi	GHT		07.10.2020	Skype call
Nienke Hiemstra	GHT Oxfam Novib		08.10.2020	Skype call
Tsitsi Magadza	Zimbabwe	Regional Humanitarian Coordinator	<a href="#">25.09.2020</a>	Skype call
Nelie Nyangua	Malawi	Regional Director	05.10.2020	Skype call
Corrier Kramer	Unicef	WASH Cluster Coordinator	02.10.2020	Skype call
<b>Implementing Partners (IP)</b>				
Jose Mucote	AJOAGO	Sofala-Buzi	29.09.2020	skype call
George Muchenga	KULIMA Project Coordinator	Sofala-Nhamatanda	14.10.2020	skype call
Angelo Amaro	KUKUMBI Executive Director	Zambezia-MdC	16.10.2020	Mocuba (face to face)
Norda Ndeve	Project Officer	Zambezia-MdC	17.10.2020	skype call
Marcos do Amaral	CECOAHS Executive Director	Zambezia-Manacurra	17.10.2020	skype call
Francisco Ngule-Ngule	CECOAHS	Zambezia-Manacurra	17.10.2020	Quelimane (face to face)
Luciano Roque	CECOAHS	Zambezia-Manacurra	17.10.2020	Quelimane (face to face)
Cosme Ossufo	CECOAHS	Zambezia-Manacurra	17.10.2020	Quelimane (face to face)

Carlos Dias	ADEL Executive Director	CD-Macomia	30.09.2020	Skype call
<b>Distrito do Buzi</b>				
Maria Cipriano	Administrator	Buzi	13.10.2020	Buzi (face to face)
Sergio António Costa	Permanent Secretary	Buzi	12.10.2020	Buzi (face to face)
<b>Distrito da Maganja da Costa</b>				
Matilde Pililao	Permanent Secretary	Maganja da Costa	16.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
Genito Abilio Mussualo	Head of District Cabinet	Maganja da Costa	15.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
Lino Armandi Luis	Head of Planning SDAE	Maganja da Costa	16.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
<b>Centro de Sopa</b>				
Eduardo Afonso Inacio	Head of District Post	Maganja da Costa	15.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
Victor Antonio	Community leader	Maganja da Costa	15.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
Simoës Antonio	Community leader	Maganja da Costa	15.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)
Raimundo Real Emilio	Community leader	Maganja da Costa	15.10.2020	M. da Costa (face to Face)