**FIELD**

**EVALUATION**

**OF THE**

**RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION**

**AND**

**FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS**

**FOR**

**SOUTH SUDANESE IDPS AND SOURCE COMMUNITIES**

**IN**

**JUBA STATE**

**EXECUTED BY**

**THE DAUGHTERS OF MARY IMMACULATE-JUBA**

WITH SUPPORT FROM

CARITAS GERMANY,

FREIBURG,

GERMANY

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# LIST OF ACRONYMS

BMZ Bundesministerium für international Zusammenarbeit

(German Federal Ministry for International Cooperation)

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

CR conflict resolution

DMI Daughters of Mary Immaculate

FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation

FGD focus-group discussion

GBV gender-based violence

GIZ Gesellschaft für international Zusammenarbeit

HRM human resource management

IDP internally displaced person

M&E monitoring and evaluation

MEAL monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning

NFI non-food item

NGO non-governmental organization

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

NVP Non-Violent Peaceforce

POC protection of civilian site (camp)

PRC peacebuilding and reconciliation committee

PSN person with special needs

RRP Relief, Rehabilitation and Protection (part of UNMISS)

RRRP Relief, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program

SPLA Sudanese People’s Liberation Army

SWOT strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats

PTA parent-teacher association

TBA traditional birth attendant

UN United Nations

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan

VEC village education committee

VSLA village savings and loan association

WFP World Food Programme

WVI World Vision International

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2011, South Sudan became independent. In 2013, civil war broke out. The war has caused severe human suffering and South Sudanese society is deeply divided. Many forms of violence – armed, ethnic, criminal, looting, and gender-based – are shockingly common. The economy has broken down and inflation is sky-high. Last year a famine could barely be averted and malnutrition is an everyday phenomenon. In 2014, the UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with a protection mandate, in particular to help the many internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Since 2013, DMI has been implementing relief and development projects in the Juba and Wau regions. Its overall goal is *to improve the quality of life for women, children and displaced communities in South Sudan*. DMI has been able to expand geographically and thematically with social organizing as the backbone of its activities. It has done so with support from Caritas Germany.

This field evaluation examines two DMI programs. First, the Relief and Rehabilitation Program for War Victims in the UN Camps and Community Preparedness for Reintegration in the Source Area, Juba, 2016-2018. This program began in 2014, and has been renewed and expanded every year. It is usually called the Relief, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program (RRRP). Second, the food security program “Remove Hunger, Reduce Malnutrition, and Rebuild Resilience of Marginalized Families in 20 Villages around Juba, South Sudan, 2016-2021” is a BMZ-supported agricultural development project with some humanitarian activities.

The overall objective of the current evaluation report is *to assess the challenges in planning, implementing and evaluating the IDP relief, rehabilitation, and reintegration program, as well as the food-security program, in order to determine what both can learn from each other.* In addition, it looks at what DMI Juba and Caritas Gulu can learn from each other from both their humanitarian and developmental work. Although this evaluation also discusses the preliminary results of both programs, it focuses mainly on organizational processes at DMI.

Both programs are part of a larger set of DMI programs that, for instance, also include education and fighting GBV. IDPs, source communities, church organizations, and other local and international organizations highly value DMI in terms of management, relevance, and the impact of its activities.

Overall, target communities are more equipped to deal with the effects of displacement, violence, trauma, and poverty. Most are slowly rebuilding their lives, but poverty and malnutrition will remain common as long as there is no peace or security. Many IDPs are still on the move searching for security, food and medicine. They, and the people in the source communities, also want to improve education and safety, and to rebuild their livelihoods. As a result, there is great pent-up demand for more services. DMI’s programs could easily triple in size, and the full demand would still not be met. In this sense, the relevance and impact of the programs are high.

*Future*

DMI is still a relatively small, but it is growing rapidly. It depends on cooperation with other actors for further enhancing the scope, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of its current and future activities.

It is not clear when and whether the IDPs will return, but in light of the current peace negotiations, DMI will also need to develop contingency plans to deal with their return, closing down the camps, and helping “its” source communities to successfully receive and reintegrate IDPs. In this respect, it can build on its current activities.

This report also provides four building blocks and the next steps to develop a DMI strategy.

# INTRODUCTION

## Background

South Sudan gained independence from the Republic of the Sudan in July 2011 after a referendum in line with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended two decades of armed conflict between the Arab-dominated government in Khartoum and the mostly Christian black majority in the South led by the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).

In December 2013, armed fighting broke out in the capital Juba between troops loyal to President Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riak Machar. Despite a peace agreement in 2015, the conflict, which to some extent follows ethnic fault lines, escalated once again in 2016. Soldiers and police have not received their wages for a long time, and have started preying on the population to keep themselves alive. Gangs and other armed groups roam the country, and fighting crime has stopped in all but name. South Sudan has become a warlord economy, where violence through the expropriation of resources sustains itself.

Since 2013, thousands of lives were lost due to direct violence and many more through the breakdown of social services (e.g., health and education), agriculture, transport, and markets. Currently, out of a population of more than 11 million people[[1]](#footnote-1), 2,5 million people have become refugees in the region (Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)), and 1,76 million IDPs, which include slightly more than 200.000 South Sudanese, mainly Nuer, living inside UNMISS protection of civilian (POC) sites.[[2]](#footnote-2) In 2017, the international community was able to stop localized famine, but malnutrition remains shockingly common throughout the whole country. In 2018, out of 7 million people in need, the Humanitarian Response Plan only targeted 6 million.

To respond to the protection and humanitarian needs of both IDPs and the so-called source communities, the UNMISS was set up. Essentially, it has a protection mandate. Both international and local humanitarian organizations attempt to address the emergency and development needs of the refugees and communities in the affected areas. Recently, the government has issued its National Development Strategy and the UN System is working on its Cooperation Framework. Execution of these plans is not as strong as for example with the ReHoPE strategy in Uganda, because the government lacks capacities, and sometimes uses the aid agencies for aid activities, so that it can focus on the war.

Currently, peace negotiations, supported by leaders from the neighboring countries, are underway. The South Sudanese population fluctuates between jaded skepticism and guarded optimism. They need peace, but their struggle for daily survival is intense. It will take a long time to reverse the war’s destruction and rebuild South Sudan.

## DMI

Daughters of Mary Immaculate (DMI) is an apostolic union of nuns that was founded in Chennai, India, in 1984. It carries out holistic, South-to-South development and humanitarian work in poor, marginalized areas. It has almost three-and-a-half decades of experience of working closely with grassroots communities. As a result, DMI has gained broad experience in community mobilization, women’s empowerment, child labor eradication, household poverty reduction, prevention of child trafficking, food security and livelihood promotion, and working with war-affected communities (e.g., with relief, peace and reconciliation, and community (re-)integration of IDPs).

DMI’s mission is c*ommitted to love and serve the poor and the marginalized, especially women and children to enable them to get their legitimate share in education, health, security and livelihood and to promote peace and reconciliation for peaceful co-existence*. It officially adheres to the core values of dignity, equality, justice, integrity, and follows the key guiding principles of accountability, transparency, participation, empowerment, non-discrimination, secularism and equity. These values and principles imply that it will work across ethnic divides and with people of different religious convictions without discriminating against them.

DMI will continue to stay with the communities it serves, even during war, when the sisters experience threats to their own lives. Many of its sisters have obtained considerable education within their congregation and university degrees, for example, in social work, medicine, computing, and accountancy.

## DMI Juba

DMI came to South Sudan in 2012 and carried out a detailed needs assessment. It became active in 2013, just when the war broke out, and refocused more on relief and rehabilitation.

The overall goal of its 2015-2020 strategic plan is *to improve the quality of life for women, children and displaced communities in South Sudan.* Currently, 21 sisters and 150 staff members are active in Juba State (15 sisters and 125 staff members) and Wau (6 sisters and 18 staff members). The organization’s main objectives are:

1. To promote Peace and Reconciliation Committees (PRC) in (potential) conflict zones and UN camps for peaceful coexistence to integrate and reunify the displaced communities and address their health needs;
2. To promote formal and informal preschools and community schooling for children (3-14 years old) and make them agents of change in rebuilding the country and to provide medical support through community outreach programs;
3. To reach out to 10 clusters of 100 villages in South Sudanese rural communities in the Juba and Wau regions to increase agricultural productivity, household income, and empower female participation in governance;
4. To establish two community technical colleges in the Wau and Juba regions to create employability for youths (girls and boys) and provide life skills for girls to increase household income and improve their self-esteem; and
5. To promote networking and alliances for carrying out lobbying and advocacy with the state through church leaders, community representatives, and NGOs while promoting peace, reconciliation, and influencing policy change.

## DMI Programs

This field evaluation compares two programs[[3]](#footnote-3), namely:

1. The Relief and Rehabilitation Program for War Victims in the UN Camps and Community Preparedness for Reintegration in the Source Area, Juba, 2017-2018. This program began in 2014, and has been renewed and expanded every year. Its title is usually abbreviated as the Relief, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program (RRRP); and
2. The food security program “Remove Hunger, Reduce Malnutrition, and Rebuild Resilience of Marginalized Families in 20 Villages around Juba, South Sudan, 2016-2021” is mainly an agricultural development program with some humanitarian activities. As BMZ is the donor for this 5-year program[[4]](#footnote-4), DMI sisters and staff call it either the food security program or simply the BMZ-program.

In and around Juba, DMI executes several other programs and projects in the areas of peace and reconciliation, promoting employability through technical education, community schooling and promoting teachers, and fighting gender-based violence (GBV), as well as a children’s parliament program that focuses on children’s rights to participate in their communities and society at large.

## Objectives of the Evaluation

At a meeting in the DMI Juba Office on the first day of the evaluation, the sisters gave a first overview of their organization, strategy and activities. We agreed that the objective of the evaluation was

*to assess the challenges in planning, implementing and evaluating the IDP relief, rehabilitation, and reintegration program, as well as the food-security program, in order to determine what both can learn from each other.*

In addition, I also analyzed whether DMI Juba and Caritas Gulu could learn from each other and perhaps even cooperate with each other.

## Scope of the Evaluation

Two months before flying to Juba, I had a preparatory meeting and several phone conversations with Simon Tremmel, the Caritas project officer in the Africa Department in Freiburg, on the scope and questions for this field evaluation. I also exchanged several emails with Sr. Viji, the DMI Mission Director, on the scope, contents and planning of the evaluation. In line with its objectives, this evaluation:

1. assesses the challenges the program and project face in bringing about their intended outcomes and what the unintended consequences are;
2. compares the RRRP program and the food security program in order to make recommendations for strengthening them;
3. identifies learning opportunities between DMI Juba and Caritas Gulu, because both organizations address the needs and opportunities of displaced South Sudanese and the surrounding communities.

The DMI Campus was the base station for this evaluation. It contains the DMI offices and living quarters, a training and conference facility, and the agricultural demonstration site and farmer’s fields. For a total of seven days, we travelled from the DMI campus to POC 1 and 3, and Mangatene Camp, as well as the source communities in Juba to observe RRRP activities and hold interviews and focus groups discussions (FGDs). For the food security program, we took three days to visit three villages, and one day at the campus for the women’s group and the agricultural demonstration site. In the meantime, I also carried out interviews with DMI sisters and staff, as well as with officials of several international organizations.

## Thank You

I carried out the evaluation independently with support of the sisters, in particular Sr. Paschal for POC 1 and 3, and Sr. Rani for the source communities. Sr. Viji helped to prepare the whole evaluation exercise and provided important background information. Sr. Maila provided me with detailed information on both projects and their management. Many other sisters and staff members helped during the field trips and participated in the interviews.

The intensive research for this field evaluation has greatly benefited from the openness and strong support of the DMI sisters and their staff members. When I first heard of DMI, I never expected to eat great Tamil food in South Sudan, or to listen to Tamil songs, or help open a school in a source community.

The members of the IDP and source communities did not just answer my many questions, but also provided insights into their lives and livelihoods, including such difficult and personal issues as GBV, hunger, and theft of income and harvests. It was a very special learning experience to work with all of them. I would like to thank them very much. *Nandrie*.

# METHODS

## Introduction

The data collection methods of this evaluation were a desk review, field visits to the POC 1 and 3, Mangatene camp, and to three so-called source communities (Kapuri, Lokonyo, and Rock City), where I would carry out interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with semi-structured questionnaires. I also worked in the DMI offices, participated in some of its meetings, and received an introduction to its agriculture demonstration site, including a soon-to-be-opened seed bank. I also briefly sat in on a class for agricultural extension workers. For several mornings, I attended the DMI coordination meetings. Wherever possible, I triangulated data from these data collection methods.

At times, I have simplified the language of the objectives of the DMI programs to save words and/or enhance readability.

## Desk Review

The desk review, which partly took place in Germany, consisted of reading Caritas Germany and DMI documents, especially project and strategy documents, as well as scholarly literature on the current humanitarian situation and activities in South Sudan. In addition, the review focused on updates, policy or strategy documents, and evaluations of international organizations involved in the country, in particular from UNHCR, IOM and OCHA. As this evaluation was also intended to identify what mutual learning opportunities exist between DMI in Juba and Caritas Gulu (in Northern Uganda), I also checked documents from my 2017 mid-term evaluation of Caritas Gulu refugee projects.

## Field Visits to the Program Sites

The field visits enabled gaining an insight into the respondents’ workplaces, cultivation, and living areas. For example, farmers showed their fields, irrigation methods, produce, and tools, as well as low yields due to lack of rains in the 2018 rainy season. At POC 1 and 3, as well as Mangatene, we toured the camps to visit tents/tarpaulin shelter, looked at market places, pubs, pit latrines, schools (classrooms, offices/desks, and playgrounds), churches, and medical facilities. I also interviewed officials from various partner organizations at POC 1 and 3 and the German Embassy.[[5]](#footnote-5) To a limited extent, the field visits also helped me to collect other relevant documents from other international organizations present in the camps.

## Questionnaires

In the first week, Dominic Raj, project manager at the DMI African central office in Dar es Salaam, and I developed questionnaires for the specific IDPs and source community groups. Although these questionnaires were to some extent based on questionnaires developed for the evaluation of the Caritas Gulu relief and development activities in 2017 (so that we could compare DMI and Caritas Gulu) obtaining specific enough information to understand the DMI activities in Juba was our primary concern.

As the questions were open-ended, I was able to ask more specific follow-up questions during the interviews. For example, at one source community we noticed that many people, including a pregnant woman, were very skinny, somewhat listless, and probably anemic. In subsequent focus group discussions, I therefore included questions on the food intake of respondents. Similarly, I began asking more questions about theft of income, possessions, and harvest.

In addition to the questionnaires for specific beneficiary groups, DMI staff members and partner organizations each had their custom-tailored, separate questionnaire. We also interviewed the POC Camp Chairman, the main elected IDP representative and leader in POC 1 and 3.

While at the international organizations usually only one respondent replied, but when we would work in the camps or source communities, we usually had several respondents, so that we carried out focus-group discussions. Whenever possible, I carried out the interviews and FGDs alone, but usually a sister would introduce me to the FGD members and sometimes a local DMI staff member helped as translator. Most FGDs started with 4 to 7 participants, but during the course of the focus group more people would come in and participate in the discussion. I usually allowed this to happen. In total, I completed 14 interviews, 16 FGDs, 3 tours of the camps (POC I, III, and Mangatene) and 4 visits of agricultural sites. Appendix 1 contains the different questionnaires. In the camps and villages, I also had many brief, informal conversations with IDPs and source-community members.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **DATE** | **ACTIVITIES** |
| 3th | Arrival in Juba. Introduction in the office, preparation of questionnaires |
| 4th | Presentation by DMI sisters and staff on DMI projects, preparation of questionnaires |
| 5th | Visit to POC 3 and interaction with peace stakeholders, including PRC Members & Leaders, preparation of questionnaires |
| 6th | Visit to POC 1 and 3 education projects; focus group discussions with teachers and pupils; interview with ACTED, preparation of questionnaires |
| 7th | FGD with mothers of malnourished children and pregnant women in POC 3 |
| 8th | **Sunday** |
| 9th | **Independence Day** |
| 10th | FGDs with healthcare promoters and beneficiaries, in particular lactating women, and interview with an international organizations (NVP) in POC 3 |
| 11th | Interviews with community leaders and international organizations (RRP and UNHCR) in POC 3 |
| 12th | FGD with farmer’s association and visit of joint community cultivation area in Kapuri |
| 13th | FGD with farmer association and federation leaders and visit of individual cultivation areas in Lokonyo |
| 14th | FGD with women group and visit of DMI agricultural demonstration site and agricultural extension worker class at DMI Campus |
| 15th | **Sunday** |
| 16th | Interviews with sisters and staff |
| 17th | Visit to Mangatene IDP Camp, informal discussions with IDPs, FGD with teaching staff and pupils, interview at the Germany Embassy. |
| 18th | Visit to Rock City, FGDs with teaching staff and PRC |
| 19th | Office work and interviews with sisters and staff |
| 20th | Office work and final presentation |
| 21th | Farewell and flight to Uganda |

Table 1: Place of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions

## Data Analysis

The qualitative questions and questionnaires were analyzed during desk research in Juba and Bochum. I focused on the description of the project activities, their results, strengths and weaknesses in implementation, and possible improvements. I also looked at some general opportunities and threats for both projects and DMI Juba at the organizational level.

DMI sisters and staff reviewed the first draft of this report and provided feedback. Staff from Caritas Germany also reviewed the second version of this report.

## Limitations

The main limitation of the research was the short period of time (two and a half weeks) to carry out field research. With a longer research period, there would have been more time to develop and test the questionnaires, to crosscheck the outcomes with staff, partner organizations and beneficiaries, and provide feedback. I could then also have held more focus groups and interviews with the IDPs and community leaders. In addition, I would have liked to participate in one or more cluster meetings. Another limitation is that, due to the great variety of activities in both DMI projects, we could not go into detail about their specific impact. I focused mainly on management and execution challenges.

# FINDINGS

## Introduction

This chapter will describe the objectives of the RRRP program and the Food Security program, their implementation processes and results, as well as their main challenges and recommendations. It will compare both programs to see what they can learn from each other.

## The Relief, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration Program

The overall objective of RRRP is to *improve the quality of life of IDPs in the camp and prepare source area communities for reintegration, so that peaceful coexistence is nurtured*. It works in the UNMISS-controlled POC 1 and 3 camps, where almost 40.000 people live in close quarters. An additional camp, Mangatene, was established in 2015 after violence erupted among Nuer clans over a love affair between a boy and a girl from different clans. According to a 2015 community survey, 2.000 people lived in Mangatene camp[[6]](#footnote-6), but many are now leaving because neither UNMISS nor the government protects it, so that it is vulnerable to regular armed robberies. As WFP has stopped providing food support, most IDPs barely have enough to eat.

The population of all camps mainly consists of Nuer, who fled the targeted killing and other forms of violence during the civil war, but also other ethnic groups, including some Dinka, have found their way to the camps. The exact number of IDPs is not known, as the registration process of new arrivals and departures is not functioning well. Moreover, two efforts to have a head count for registration in 2016 and 2017 failed. This influences the availability and quality of services negatively as the total demand for services is regularly unclear. This may, for instance, lead to conflicts in the water line—all water needs to be trucked in[[7]](#footnote-7)—, and to new arrivals that do not receive food handouts. Although the services and living conditions at POC 1 and 3 are generally below Sphere standards, they are in some aspects (e.g., free education) a bit better than in the surrounding communities. Yet, malnutrition is common. Disturbingly, the camp population, mainly Nuer, suffers from ongoing insecurity, including harassment, rape and killing when they leave the camp, for example if they want to attend university or to fetch firewood. Young girls and women also suffer from GBV in the camps and new unregistered arrivals, who cannot obtain food, are especially vulnerable to such violence and other forms of exploitation.

In cooperation with UNMISS, ACTED as camp management organization, and other organizations participating in the clusters, DMI works in POC 1 and 3 in various areas: health, nutrition/food, education, peace and reconciliation, and vocational skills training. It is active in the protection, food security, and health clusters. RRRP has three sub-projects, each with its own objective.

**Objective 1: Enhanced health status of 2.800 beneficiaries in UN camps and 1.800 in source areas (from 1.600 targeted families) through healthcare promoters, supplementary nutritious food and regular medical camps.**

*Implementation Process*

International Medical Corps (IMC) is the main healthcare provider in the POC 1 and 3,[[8]](#footnote-8) and is responsible for the healthcare facilities. However, it cannot address all public health needs. In response to the great demand, DMI aims to improve the health status of 200 pregnant women and 300 malnourished children in the POC 3, as well as in two multi-ethnic settlement/source communities, namely Mangatene, because many IDPs were settling there[[9]](#footnote-9), and Muniki, a neighborhood in Juba, where many IDPs from POC 3 would like to settle.

With its voluntary healthcare promoters and special activities, which also take place at schools, DMI sensitizes 1,600 families on preventive health measures and increases access to medical services. Its monthly medical camps are especially popular and six of them take place per year in POC 3—where DMI has a small health facility for its medical camps—, three in Muniki, and three in Mangatene. The medical camps are one day events, in which people can obtain medical check-ups, obtain prescription medicine and other medical supplies, or are referred to the IMC facilities or hospitals outside the camp. The DMI-trained healthcare promoters carry out sensitization meetings on such topics as hygiene, prevention and GBV during the medical camps and at other times. They are provided with health kits, and each of the 40 healthcare promoters is responsible for 40 target families. Finally, DMI provides nutritious food packages to pregnant and lactating women and malnourished children.

The project activities consist of:

1) establishing lists of the neediest people for its services;

2) distributing nutritious food packages;

3) selecting, training and working with healthcare promoters;

4) carrying out medical camps with treatment and medicine provision;

5) maintaining growth charts for severely malnourished infants and children; and

6) maintaining the necessary records, reports and documents.

*Results*

People in the camps are very happy with the DMI health support because of its quality. IDPs and source communities know they need such support, and can barely obtain it elsewhere. In 2017 IMC briefly had to leave the camp because IDPs were fiercely protesting the limited availability of medicine.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

The voluntary health promoters would like to earn more and to gain a better professional status. Although higher earnings can only be decided upon in cooperation with all of the other organizations in the camps, it may be useful to think about establishing “barefoot doctor”[[10]](#footnote-10) or traditional birth attendant (TBA)/midwifery nurse services that operate in and, where possible, outside the camps. This could also allow the health promoters to gain official employment and earn more money.

* *Check every year whether and how the healthcare promoters can develop into:* 
  + *barefoot doctors as this can enhance the distribution and quality of healthcare over larger areas of source communities and in the camps to more families.*
  + *midwifery nurses or traditional birth attendants, as many women, both in the camps and in the source communities, are unable to reach a hospital during childbirth. This would contribute to reduce the high maternal and infant mortality rates.*

In the near future, it would be very interesting to analyze health reporting and M&E to assess more specifically the actual impact and to look for further methods to improve healthcare. This could, for example:

* *Analyze medical reporting in more detail to determine areas of improvement and follow-up activities.*
* *Carry-out an impact evaluation for this objective (and the other ones of RRRP).*

Most people in the camps can only obtain medicine when they receive support from the international humanitarian organizations. Yet, in DMI, IDP camps and source communities, there will be considerable traditional knowledge of herbal plants and remedies.

* *Set up a demonstration garden with medical herbs and identify with local experts where and how they grow in the wild, whether they can be cultivated, and their exact medical uses. Health promoters could receive training in this respect.*

Mangatene’s health volunteers still come to the health facility, but do not have any drugs or other medical supplies.

* *Together with the members of the health cluster, DMI should look for alternative healthcare provision, for instance, more regular medical camps or a follow-up organization to Islamic Relief.*

**Objective 2: Rights of children protected by ensuring access to quality education for 1.750 children and promoting participatory approaches**

*Implementation process*

Under this objective, 1.750 children (nursery school and primary school (classes 1 to 4)) receive quality education. There is one nursery school without a playground, teacher’s office, and pit latrines in POC 1 and a nursery and primary school with a playground, teacher’s office, and pit latrines in POC 3. DMI wants 250 parents to participate in a parent-teacher association (PTA) (each with 6 parents and five teachers).[[11]](#footnote-11)

DMI has constructed the school buildings. In the camps, which are supposed to be temporary, they have a concrete floor, bamboo walls, and aluminum roofs. In the source areas, DMI is increasingly building permanent, concrete structures with more facilities (pit latrines, playgrounds, teacher’s offices, and a library or kitchen). DMI ensures that schooling is free, and provides education materials, teacher incentives, final exam fees, as well as teacher training workshops for all of its preschool, primary, and upper-primary schools. When parents cannot pay for the school uniform, children can come without the school uniform and often DMI finds other organizations to sponsor the uniforms.

Importantly, DMI also operates a teacher’s training center with an 8-month crash course as part of its community school program, in which some teachers from Mangatene and Muniki also joined. It also employs teachers that have not received formal teacher’s training, and provides these with regular two or three day training on specific topics, such as GBV, leadership, effective teaching skills, conflict management, children’s rights, and the teacher’s code of ethics, so that they can improve their teaching skills over time.[[12]](#footnote-12) DMI also holds special workshops for all upper-primary school teachers on HIV/Aids awareness, GBV awareness, and health and hygiene.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Over the years, the sisters and staff have gradually learned to improve the education of the children. They noticed that the children could not focus, due to a lack of food, and began providing midday porridge for children, so that the children would at least have two additional meals a week. They also noticed that children regularly could not learn, because they were traumatized by war and flight, so they began to provide trauma counseling (see the next objective). Similarly, they noticed that some children were victims of GBV, so they also provided counseling to them, and they began to teach children, especially young girls, how to protect themselves from GBV.

DMI and the schools also organize celebrations for the children at which parents and other relevant organizations are invited, such as Christmas, World Peace Day, African Children’s Day, and International Women’s Day. Together with NVP, NRC and Intersos, DMI organizes World AIDS Day. FAO organizes World Food Day, in which DMI participates. The schools also organize a parent’s day. These celebrations help parents to gain knowledge and highlight the importance of school education for their children.

The main DMI activities are:

1) running preschool and primary schools;

2) conducting classes for upper primary children (class 5-8) (see below);

3) providing basic study materials;

4) providing midday porridge;

5) organizing and reviewing capacity-building training for teachers;

6) forming five education committees and training its members intensively; and

7) ensuring community participation in education and organizing parent-teacher meetings.

*Results*

Several other organizations mentioned DMI schools as the best in the camps. During the last two years, all but one pupil of the DMI POC 3 upper-primary school succeeded with their national exams. In addition, the IDP community in POC 3 took the initiative to set up a parallel upper-primary school. These teachers now work in a second afternoon shift. This parallel upper primary school receives from DMI the same fees, education materials, and training as its own schools, except that the community pays the teacher`s incentives.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

The shift method from POC 3 may be replicated elsewhere, so that community members can develop an upper-primary school and adult education, and school teachers can earn more income. To some extent, this is already happening. For example, next year at the Rock City primary school a year 5 class will be added and the teachers and community members would like to add higher level classes over time. The local PRC also would like to institute adult education.

* *Conduct a study to find out at which locations higher level classes and adult education are being planned and/or where local communities would like to take such initiatives themselves, and which other locations could use such education.*

Overall, DMI should:

* *Continue with gradually expanding the DMI education programs in and outside of POC 1 and 3, for example, into different areas and higher levels of education. This can best be done as part of long-term programs, similar to the food security program.*

**Objective 3: Peaceful co-existence promoted and coping mechanisms enhanced by strengthening PRC processes among the war-affected population.**

*Implementation process*

As their name indicates, the peacebuilding and reconciliation committee (PRCs) actively engages in addressing conflicts, such as between a husband and wife, at a water line, or among clans or ethnic groups. They help war-affected communities to live more peacefully and prepare the resource and IDP communities for reintegration.

PRCs sometimes also undertake supplementary activities, such as working as a savings group or its members making different soap products (shampoo, liquid soap, jik[[14]](#footnote-14), and detol[[15]](#footnote-15)) for use at home or for selling at the market.

To contribute to peace “within oneself” and communities, DMI provides semi-professional counseling services, so that survivors can address their traumas and enhance their coping mechanisms. Twenty sisters and eight staff members received professional training to be able to provide such counseling.

The project activities consist of:

1) organizing intensive conflict resolution training to PRC members;

2) encouraging PRCs on executing peacebuilding activities; and

3) conducting counseling, including identification and intake, the actual counseling sessions, and where necessary follow-up. In other words, DMI also includes pre and post-counseling.

*Results*

The peacebuilding and conflict-resolution activities are popular and people perceive the benefits in their personal lives. For example, one IDP at Rock City recounted how well the local community, which did not belong to his ethnic group, had received him. The supplementary activities also bring people together. Most IDPs still seem to trust their source communities and direct neighbors, but are afraid of politicians, police, military, and thieves. They especially fear checkpoints and armed robberies. Theft is also widespread. As a result, program and income gains are often being annihilated.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

The peacebuilding and conflict activities require continuous reinforcement, and current improvements or peace negotiations do not automatically safeguard stability in the future. Moreover, idle youth and drug abuse in the camps also cause new conflicts. Whether or how DMI will continue or take on new or follow-up activities in this regard also depends on the actions of other actors, such as churches and international humanitarian organizations.

* *Continue together with other actors with the peacebuilding and conflict-resolution activities, as well as counseling services.*
* *Continue to introduce supplementary activities to the PRCs.*
* *Provide, together with other organizations, opportunities for secondary and adult education, as well as recreational activities for (idle) youths (see above).[[16]](#footnote-16)*

Many people move among camps or jobs looking for lost family members. It would considerably help them mentally and practically—perhaps even financially—if they could trace and contact their family members either in South-Sudan itself or in neighboring countries.

* *Establish whether and how IDPs can contact their source communities and/or look for family members, for example with family tracing services and telecommunications (e.g., with Telecommunications Without Borders or the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement tracing services).*

**Objective 4: Employment opportunities created and household income of 320 youths by providing intensive vocational skills training.**

*Implementation process*

Most youth cannot attend secondary education due to the high school fees, security risks, and long distances involved. In the camps, they can barely engage in agriculture. As a result, they lack work opportunities, cannot contribute much to their communities, feel bored, if not trapped, and sometimes exhibit negative coping behavior, including violence, drug use, and unprotected sex resulting in teenage pregnancies or STDs. At the same time, their communities have service needs that cannot be met.

Vocational training can, in principle, help meet these needs. DMI wants to provide vocational training to 320 youths in camps and source communities, so that they can find jobs or work independently. This could also increase household incomes.

Until now DMI could only focus on vocational training in masonry and beautification. It also could not provide its participants with starting capital or tools.

The steps in this sub-project are:

1) Selecting the participants;

2) Purchasing basic training tools and materials;

3) Providing vocational training for 320 youths per year on masonry and beautifi-cation/hairdressing; and

4) Job placement.

*Results*

Until now, 92 participants, IDPs as well as people from source communities, have taken part in the vocational training course. Eighty participants finished the course, of which 20 have now become self-employed. The IDP and source communities regularly express their desire for more vocational training.

*Challenges and Recommendations:*

DMI is currently looking to expand its vocational training to other areas, such as computer applications, agriculture, car repair and maintenance, carpentry, welding, electrical work and plumbing, tailoring and fashion, catering, and hotel management. Some of these vocational training courses cannot be applied easily in the IDP camps, and people from the source communities may have to travel to take part in them.

* *DMI should continue to intensify and expand its vocational training*.

In addition, several management issues have hampered the vocational training courses, especially in POC 3. It was difficult to find space in POC 3, and training equipment in the camp was stolen.

* *Work with ACTED and UNMISS RRP to find and use safe space(s) for vocational training.*

There are two vocational schools in Juba, but they cater to graduates from upper-primary school. Most people in South Sudan do not reach that level of education. DMI therefore works with vocational skills training for people who have only two years of upper-primary schooling.

* *Establish whether cooperation on training with the two vocational schools is possible, as this could save time and costs.*

IDPs in the camps, lactating mothers and parents with small children are generally not able to participate in vocational training because they are obligated to stay home. To address this problem, DMI and (potential) partner organizations may already have or establish outreach centers in or near the settlements. With or without other partner organizations, DMI can see how it can facilitate such centers.

* *Establish outreach centers, in all likelihood in cooperation with vocational training schools/centers in Juba, as well as with other international organizations.*

The needs for vocational training will continue to evolve. Courses may be changed or added (e.g., crafts making, ICT skills, entrepreneurial management). Moreover, some participants may prefer shorter or longer courses with more practice-oriented training.

* *Carry out regular, participatory needs assessments and feasibility studies with the vocational skill students on the types of vocational skills and the actual training duration and contents*.

DMI would like to provide the vocational training participants with starting capital and start-up kits with materials and tools. In the past, that was not possible. Caritas Gulu’s experience in refugee settlements in Uganda has shown that the quality of the tools start-up kits in terms of diversity and durability is often limited. The optimal height of the starting capital also needs to be assessed carefully. Insufficient starting capital and low quality starting kits hamper the participants with starting and expanding their businesses when they need different types of tools or cannot replace their worn-out tools.[[17]](#footnote-17) Unfortunately, most available products come from a small set of producers from China or India, and there are no alternative products readily available on the market.

* *Determine the optimal starting capital and the best composition of the starting kits before the vocational training, and regularly assess whether changes are necessary.[[18]](#footnote-18)*

Vocational skill students sometimes forget to invest (sufficiently) in raw materials. In addition, some students may spend (part of) the start-up capital on personal issues as a solution to their own immediate problems.

* *Help equip students more by developing their business investment plans*.
* *Provide students with a catalogue of potential goods that they could buy*.

In case DMI decides to operate with start-up kits, it should realize that most people who receive them are only partly able to repair tools, such as sewing machines, that break down. This hampers them in the expansion of their business, and sometimes even leads to the discontinuation of their newly established enterprise.

* *Identify local experts, or handymen/repair persons (which is a vocational skill in itself).*[[19]](#footnote-19)
* *Reevaluate the contents of the start-up kits in cooperation with former and current beneficiaries.*
* *Explore which vocational skills graduates can work in groups, so that they can share and afford a greater diversity of tools.*

One important measure of the success of the vocational skills training project is that the participants in turn train many other people with their skills. In some cases, they also employ other people.

* *Develop an outcome indicator in the project document (logframe) to measure this multiplier effect (e.g., number of people trained or employed by graduates from the vocational skills training).*

Many respondents (in all sub-projects) mentioned problems with transport. For example, for carpenters it is often difficult to obtain timber.

* *Identify, together with other organizations (e.g., local transport companies, vocational skill graduates, farmer’s associations and women’s groups), which means of transport are – or can be made – possible (which is also important for agricultural activities (see below)).*

Find a way to address the school fee/lack of education/idleness problem, and the associate problems of boredom and drug abuse (see above).

* *Identify partner organizations that can help make secondary or even university education more accessible.*
* *Develop a vocational training project for youths, so that they can help widows, foster parents for orphans, single-parent families with construction of shelter and, where possible, boreholes.*

## Food Security Program

The overall goal of this program is *to eradicate starvation and malnutrition through promoting sustainable sources of food security for impoverished communities in 21 villages in the Juba region by 2022*. It implies that communities have to shift from subsistence farming to sustainable agriculture. In the process, they learn about different crops and ways to produce and market their surpluses. Greater food security will also facilitate post-conflict rebuilding and (re-)integration of IDPs. Many source communities already have incorporated other IDPs in their midst, and if POC 1 and 3, or Mangatene, will ever be closed, more IDPs will attempt to rebuild their lives in these communities.

**Objective 1: Farmers associations’ capacity strengthened to replicate the best farming techniques and to participate in, manage, implement and sustain the food security project**

*Implementation process*

DMI always emphasizes social organization. It originally began working with women’s groups. In a similar vein, it has initiated Farmer’s Associations (FA). A group of farmers joins hands to work their fields, raise livestock, harvest, and sell surpluses. Together they elect their leaders every two years. DMI educates these farmers through training, IEC materials, and exposure to state-of-the-art farming techniques. As usual for DMI, it also attempts to start with savings and PRCs. When the association has become well established, its farmers should adopt six other villages to replicate the newly learned farming techniques, which will improve their level of organization and food access. In principle, the association can also lobby and advocate at the village, *payam* (= district), and ideally the national level.

The seven project steps are:

1) establishing FAs and elect leadership in each intervention village;

2) establishing a federation of FAs in each village (when there are more than one FAs);

3) organizing training on leadership and management for 40 leaders and 200 members;

4) forming *payam* and state level federation and train 15 federation leaders;

5) carrying out conflict resolution training for 100 women members of FA; and

6) carrying out exposure visit to Kenya (3 staff members and 6 federation leaders).

*Results*

50 farmer’s associations have been founded. In the villages, they are becoming a local way of doing things. Together with the other activities (see below) the program leads to improvements in local agriculture, as well as networking among people present in the source communities (which often have their own IDPs who have decided not to go to the camps). The program increases food production, and contributes to livelihoods and the quality, diversity, and quantity of food intake. Currently, DMI is expanding more rapidly than expected; it now plans that it will work in 40 villages by the end of 2022.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

Farmers would like to bring their produce quicker to other markets, especially when they fetch higher prices in towns further away but, just like the vocational skills students, they lack regular and affordable transport. There may be local bus or transport companies that would like to provide such services regularly, as long as they know that there are enough customers*.*

* *Identify together with other organizations active in the villages, which means of transport are – or can be made—available.*

Many of the saving activities have come to a standstill due to the high inflation. DMI should look which investments (e.g., in grinding mills) would generate income on pace with inflation. At the same, it could develop its savings activities into Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs).

* *Identify ways to deal with the high inflation.*
* *Determine whether saving activities can evolve into VSLAs.*

DMI would like to install a federation of all FAs for knowledge transfer, lobbying and advocacy. It could also help to reinforce existing FAs. Its women’s groups are already in the process of establishing their own federation.

* *Establish the FA federation and see what it can learn from the women’s groups` federation.*
* *Identify which joint activities both federations could undertake, for example in the areas of training, lobbying, and advocacy.*

**Objective 2: Increased agricultural productivity of 6000 families to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and fulfill their children’s basic development (health and education) needs**

*Implementation process*

DMI helps increase productivity by introducing new technologies, such as the shared use of a tractor and an ox-plough. It also provides tools (rake, hoe, spade, weeder, and knife), quality seeds (maize, groundnut, sorghum, and vegetables), and fruit tree saplings. Additionally it teaches how to use the technology, tools, and to properly grow the crops and trees, e.g., by using nursery beds. With the resulting higher income, DMI hopes that their children, especially girls, can attend schools more often and for longer (DMI also has education projects in or close to the villages) and to improve their health. The neediest families also receive livestock (goats and chickens). Especially the goats are new, as the nomadic cattle-rearing tribes traditionally do not allow “agriculturalist” groups to rear cattle. DMI also plans to establish a federation of village farmer’s associations in the second half of 2018.

*Results*

Several farmers have started growing their own produce, such as avocados, red chili peppers, and sunflowers. Ox-ploughs have not been used, because most farmers prefer the tractor. However, the one tractor cannot cover all farmers fast enough, which causes delays with planting. All in all, farmers have noticed that they can diversify and increase their crops and food intake, and then make a higher profit. This has made other farmers curious to try new crops.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

Farmers would like a second tractor. DMI will probably need one relatively soon, as it keeps expanding its areas of operation.

* *Buy a new tractor.[[20]](#footnote-20)*

Help farmers to diversify further and identify additional crops and/or uses of crops.

* *People eat dodo (amaranthus leaves), but do not seem to realize that amaranthus seeds can be eaten with cereals and are in principle a marketable product, or could be preserved for lean times. DMI should identify whether and how these seeds could be harvested and consumed.*
* *Check which crops local farmers are profitably growing and selling (e.g., red chili peppers and avocados). These could then be introduced to other FAs.*
* *Check which farmers are interested in establishing medicinal herbal gardens (see p. 16).*

Similarly, in other parts of Africa, people improve their protein intake with guinea pigs and rabbits, which they can tend close to their homes. As these are rodents, they procreate quickly, but require relatively little space and food. Such small animals are also accepted by the nomadic tribes that rear cattle as being appropriate for “agricultural” tribes. If specific groups (e.g., pregnant women) suffer from a protein deficiency or anemia this would be a possible durable solution.

* *Introduce guinea pigs and rabbits to the FAs.*

DMI does not provide post-harvesting material (e.g., bags) that facilitates bringing produce to the market, so that they can obtain a higher price for fresh(er) goods.

* *Provide post-harvesting bags.*

Despite the fact that DMI has increased agricultural production and provided cooking classes, some farmers are listless, skinny and looking pale. It may be that they have enough food available, but do not prepare it well. Alternatively, they may be going through a lean time, before the coming harvest.

* *Carry out a study on the incidence of malnutrition in the source communities over the year. If there is malnutrition, the reasons for it should be determined, so that the food security program can respond and will achieve its objectives. When necessary, DMI can provide additional healthy food preparation classes.*[[21]](#footnote-21)

This type of study is also important in a more general way for DMI, because it will help the organization to study the outcomes of its work more regularly, in particular as they relate to behavioral changes in the target groups, which are harder to assess than the direct outputs. Hence, such studies would also improve the M&E system of DMI.

**Objective 3: Green demonstration sites promoted and their activities implemented in communities’ joint cultivation areas to ensure landless farmer’s rights to food**

*Implementation process*

Both the green demonstration sites and joint cultivation areas for landless and marginalized people are hallmarks of DMI’s work with local communities. DMI advocates establishing such areas to local leaders, such as traditional chiefs and local government officials. DMI has been very successful in organizing such areas, which are usually bare areas not yet under cultivation.[[22]](#footnote-22) The landless and marginalized people are often already organized into an FA. The DMI sisters and staff then first make the area ripe for cultivation. Experience has shown that they need to help the community with this work because FA members rarely believe at first that they can finish this work and reap its rewards.

A demonstration site shows these farmer’s new or improved crops and their best farming methods (seeds, saplings, boreholes, tools, etc.), so that they can replicate these themselves. In addition, there is a seed bank at this site. DMI also promotes irrigation by helping to construct boreholes and providing treadle pumps to FA members.

The planned activities are:

1) establishing six demonstration sites;

2) selecting the neediest landless people;

3) appointing FA families to guard the demonstration sites;

4) promoting FAs at the sites; and

5) building strong linkages with market outlets, which includes a market survey and constructing market outlets.

*Results*

DMI has been very successful with obtaining land for joint cultivation. It had planned to obtain 120 acres, but until now it has already obtained 1098 acres. Just like northern Uganda, South Sudan is one of the few areas in the world where there is still unused, arable land available. Due to the insecurity, which includes theft and armed robberies of farm equipment and harvests, DMI was only able to start one demonstration site at its campus, where its guards take care of protection.[[23]](#footnote-23) Some farmers work on land next to the demonstration site. DMI now uses several other sites as training grounds/simple demonstration plots, and increasingly works with a governmental agricultural training institute (Ministry of Agriculture Department – Luri County) that can also educate modern farming techniques and crops. Irrigation is also important because the rains have become more infrequent due to climate change. Finally, DMI will soon build its first demonstration outlet so that farmers can sell their agricultural surpluses in a more secure and hygienic manner.

*Challenges and Recommendations*

The challenges and recommendations for this objective are the same as for objective two. Further, working with demonstration sites has been delayed due to the security situation, but should not be abolished:

* *DMI and the FAs, including their federation, should negotiate and lobby for greater security in the source communities, in particular to prevent (as much as possible) theft of harvests or that money from products sold will be stolen on the way home or at night.*
* *Wait for opportunities to open the planned demonstration sites, perhaps at different locations, such as fields next to POC3 (see below).*

In addition, DMI should start planning for climate change. Rains have already become irregular and more scarce, which reduces farm output and threatens to undo gains in food security. Climate change will deeply influence farming over the next decades (if not longer).

* *Develop a strategy for climate change adaptation:*
  + *Use motorized irrigation, for example based on diesel motors or solar panels*[[24]](#footnote-24)
  + *Implement new irrigation techniques (e.g., drip irrigation)*
  + *Identify drought resistant crops and techniques to deal with drought (e.g., rain harvesting)*
  + *Identify experts who can further develop and implement this strategy*

**Objective 4: Intensive vocational education enables farmers to practice improved farming techniques and promote sustainable farming**

As in all DMI programs, education plays a central role. On the one hand, it helps participants to learn new skills, on the other, it reinforces the other program components. DMI has designed an agricultural training program that consists of two types of courses. The first is an in-house 4-month training program at the DMI campus for agricultural extension workers on sustainable farming, which is a form of agricultural vocational training. The extension workers are young people, selected by their communities, who stay at the DMI-Campus during the week, but go home during weekends. DMI has hired expert teaching staff to train the future extension workers. In addition, selected farmers come to practice at the demonstration site and receive three days of training three different times.

The activities for this objective consist of:

1) consulting agricultural expert to design the curriculum;

2) capacity building of project staff;

3) organizing and executing the vocational training on sustainable farming; and

4) sensitizing communities on sustainable agriculture through a public campaign.

*Results*

As described above, the training at the demonstration is taking place. 60 farmers take part in the three-day training on three different occasions. 24 participants currently receive their vocational training to become agricultural extension workers. Five agricultural extension workers are engaged in promoting the best farming methods by providing regular training and influencing farmers to increase their productivity.

*Challenges and recommendations*

The effectiveness of the training is hard to measure because it is an outcome, and not an output. A separate study could measure the impact that the training has in changing agricultural practices towards sustainable farming, diversity, quantity and quality of the food intake, and marketing of surpluses.

* *Carry out an evaluation study of the impact of DMI agricultural training, which can help to identify how the training can be improved in the future and will simultaneously explain to BMZ the impact of its funding.*

This study could be linked with the study to malnutrition that was mentioned above (see p. 25).

## Comparing the RRRP and the food security program

This section compares RRRP and the food security program, in particular what RRRP can learn from the food security program. Both programs address the crucial needs of the population, such as health, education, and forms of social organizing (e.g., healthcare promoters, PRCs, and integrating IDPs). RRRP has a relatively short time span because it is more a humanitarian program than a development one. In contrast, the food security program is a long-term (five years) development program. Yet, every year the RRRP is being renewed so that it increasingly resembles a long-term program.

The insecure context and the overall approach of the international community to internal displacement in South Sudan hinder developing a more long-term program in the camps. UNMISS has a protection mandate, which means that POC 1 and 3, as well as Mangatene, were set up as temporary protection structures. After all, POC stands for protection of civilian sites, as they are officially not IDP camps that are planned and built for longer periods. As a consequence, UNMISS, for example, does not allow building permanent structures in POC 1 and 3. Yet, POC 1 and 3 have existed since 2013. Mangatene was not setup by UNMISS, but by the national government. Currently, the IDPs in Mangatene are barely physically protected and suffer from regular violence (robbery, theft, ethnic violence). They also lack food. Even if peace would be instated tomorrow, the IDPs in POC 1 and 3, as well as in Mangatene, could not return immediately. Nor would it be certain whether the peace would hold. The IDPs fear that the violence of 2016 can repeat itself. In other words, protection is not working well enough for the IDPs.

DMI alone cannot influence the UNMISS mandate or the status of the IDP camps, and the same holds true for the overall security context. The insecurity (violence, killing, theft, etc.) affects the effectiveness and sustainability of the activities of all aid organizations in South Sudan, including DMI, negatively.

What does this mean for the possibility of a longer term DMI strategy for the camps? First, DMI should make a clear distinction between which parts of its context it cannot influence alone, and where it can take decisions alone. The parts it cannot influence alone relate to the overall insecurity, the protection mandate of UNMISS, and the overall setup of the humanitarian system. Here, DMI absolutely should work in cooperation with the other organizations in the clusters and with donor states, for example, their embassies in Juba, and to the extent possible with the local and national governments. DMI alone, or together with other organizations, can develop an advocacy strategy to continue emphasizing the importance of security and to address the strong focus on protection. Protection remains crucial, but the camps have become more than just temporary civilian protection sites. In this sense, the UNMISS protection mandate is incomplete, and does not reflect the facts on the ground (i.e., in and around the camps).

There are two broad ways to address the roles of the IDP camps. The first would be changing the mandate of UNMISS, which is the prerogative of the UN security council in New York. The second will be emphasizing that protection is failing, not just in terms of security in and beyond the weapon-free zones, but also in terms of nutrition, healthcare, and skills development. As DMI activities for pregnant and lactating mothers show, malnutrition and malnourished infants are common in the camps. People also would like to receive better medical care. The medical camps alone are not enough in this respect. Hence, DMI could, together with other organizations, emphasize the importance of agriculture and medicine in the camps and that land should be made available for the IDPs in POC 1 and 3, similar to its joint cultivation areas for landless and marginalized people elsewhere in Juba. Agriculture with a higher degree of food security and medicine are then central protection matters. The second argument (addressing protection failures) is probably easier to implement than the first (changing the UNMISS mandate). To do so, DMI should become a fixture in the protection clusters and team up with embassies that may influence the government and/or UNMISS leadership.

Second, DMI should discuss under which conditions it can implement longer term activities in the camp. It can build on its earlier work, which it has already been expanding upon, and (see table 2) in this way, RRRP can obtain a longer term focus.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Decisions for DMI alone** | **DMI together with other organizations for a higher degree of food security in camps** |
| **General** |  | Lobby in clusters, with IDP representatives, and embassies to address protection failures and to include agriculture in order to fight malnutrition, provide skills, fight idleness and despair. |
| **Social Organizing** | Continue working with women’s groups and health promoters, as well as local education initiatives. | If land would be made available for joint cultivation areas, DMI could start FAs in POC 1 and 3. |
| **Peacebuilding and protection** | Continue with PCRs and women’s groups | PRCs and women’s groups can evolve into FAs, while maintaining a strong focus on peacebuilding and protection |
| **Health** | Continue or intensify medical camps, including working with health promoters.  Continue with health and hygiene education at the schools.  Continue counseling. | Train barefoot doctors and midwifery nurses. |
| **Food security/Agriculture** | Identify to which extent DMI can support the current camp-based agriculture (crops, fruit trees), which takes place in very limited spaces.  Evaluate whether very small livestock (esp. guinea pigs) can be held in the camps. | If joint cultivation area becomes possible, begin with seed distributions, boreholes, demonstration site, herbal garden, and provide vocational agricultural training. |
| **Education** | Expand vocational training beyond masonry and beautification.  Expand schools.  Plan secondary and/or adult education | Begin constructing more permanent structures.  Increase incentives for staff (in cooperation with partners from the education cluster). |
| **Savings** | Deal with the consequences of hyperinflation. Expand into VSLA | Expand together with other forms of social organizing |
| **Security**  (also deforestation and health) | Distribute energy-saving stoves and/or explain how to make (and protect from rain) energy- saving mud stoves | Check whether there is no other agency distributing energy-saving stoves or building mud stoves in the camp. |
| **Return** | Continue/expand food security program | Identify changed role |

Table 2: Comparison of Decisions on the Future of the RRRP and Food Security Programs

While further strengthening its work in the camps, DMI should, similar to UNMISS, make a contingency plan with three scenarios in mind. In the *worst-case scenario*, the security situation in South Sudan worsens and even more people will come to the camps. DMI should then intensify both its current program and see whether it can help introduce more food security activities, in particular establishing joint cultivation areas.

If the *current level of insecurity* continues it should do the same, because it is not clear when the IDPs will be able to leave the camp.

In the *best-case scenario*, peace will be established and hold. In that case, DMI can, in cooperation with its partners and the clusters, help ensure that the IDPs can leave the camps successfully. Many IDPs will resettle in and around Juba, including in source communities that DMI is already serving. It should then build further upon its current reintegration activities, which are part of its social organizing in its food security and other programs.

# COMPARING DMI-JUBA AND CARITAS GULU

Both DMI and Caritas Gulu are Roman Catholic organizations that provide relief and development services to displaced South Sudanese and local communities. The number and magnitude of their activities are growing, and they receive support from Caritas Germany. Both organizations also attempt to professionalize further, and their similarities and differences show ways in which they can learn from each other.[[25]](#footnote-25) Moreover, if the refugees from Northern Uganda return to South Sudan, both organizations should be in close touch to exchange information about the refugees, their needs and return plans.

*Similarities*

As both organizations focus on displaced South Sudanese, their activities overlap considerably. Both link development with relief, and they emphasize self-reliance, as the role of social organizing, food security, PRC, vocational training, and the synergies among these areas show. Interestingly, in their respective countries, UNHCR wanted Caritas Gulu and DMI-Juba to play a more active role in the protection cluster.

*More in Juba, less in Northern Uganda*

Although both organizations carry out forms of social organization and education, DMI goes further with education activities, in particular schools, and with establishing synergies among all of its activities. It works with FAs and women’s groups, and subsequently attempts to form federations of them. Especially with the women’s federation, it has made progress. DMI has also been successful with establishing joint cultivation areas. Caritas Gulu has also started working with such cultivation areas. The Caritas Peacebuilding Committees (PCBs) and DMI-PCRs differ in details, such as the cultural activities in Northern Uganda, but essentially share the same social organization philosophy.

Caritas Gulu also wants to work with Ugandan IDPs, for example with Ugandan victims of land grabbing. Paying attention to the DMIs work with IDPs may offer useful inspiration, as well as working methods.

Just to provide an example on a small scale of operations, DMI has successfully introduced different forms of soap making, which has become a popular income-generating activity. The refugees in Lamwo, a settlement in Northern Uganda, actually asked for more soap.

*More in Northern Uganda, less in Juba*

Caritas Gulu works more with VSLAs, metal and mud energy-savings stoves, NFIs, and cash-based assistance.[[26]](#footnote-26) DMI can introduce VSLA for more income-generating activities. It can also introduce energy-saving stoves, so that IDP women do not need to go (far) out of the weapon-free zone to fetch firewood, which enhances their security. In the end, this also holds true for women at the source communities; people can spend less money on firewood or charcoal; people inhale less smoke that causes respiratory infections, and deforestation is slowed.

*Important in both Juba and northern Uganda*

As indicated in the Recommendations section, there are strategic areas in which both organizations plan to become more active: climate change adaptation, reforestation, and establishing linkages with other actors, such as transport companies, local vocational training institutes, and banks. The ways in which both organizations are doing so requires careful comparison to tease out what works best.

As explained in more detail in the next section, in terms of management, both organizations are professionalizing their work (with the help of different consultants) and can learn from each other in terms of substance and process. In their program management, both organizations can become more outcome oriented. In their organizations, they are currently in the process of improving their presentation and language, and strengthening their M&E, HRM, and finance and accounting systems. In addition, they can carry out more needs assessment or baseline studies, as well as impact studies. They can even consider joint training for their staff members, and *learning visits* to each other on all topics that are mentioned in this section.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **DMI Juba** | **Caritas Gulu** | **Learning Opportunity** |
| **Professio-**  **nalization** | Works with consultants from India and Plan International Khartoum, as well as with Caritas Germany, to improve M&E, HRM, and finance and accounting. | Works with consultants from Caritas Germany and GIZ on strategy formulation, strengthening M&E and more generally organizational development. | Compare strategy, M&E, and organizational change.  Link organizational change to (improving) service delivery |
| **Social**  **Organizing**  **(to strengthen livelihoods and self-reliance / resilience** | Works with women’s groups, FAs, PRCs, health promoters, and local teacher’s incentives, PTAs, and VECs. Especially within women groups, FAs and PRCs, it has also promoted savings. Also works with federations. | Works with PBCs and VSLAs | Compare different forms of social organization. Focus especially on FAs, women’s groups, PRCs/PBCs and saving/VSLAs to identify best practices. |
| **Health** | Works with medical camps, including health promoters.  Carries out health and hygiene education at schools.  Carries out counseling. | Works less in the health care sector | If Caritas Gulu wants to do more in the health sector, it can learn much from DMI. |
| **Food security**  **Agriculture** | Works with joint cultivation area, training fields, seed and tool distributions, boreholes, demonstration site, and vocational agricultural training | Has limited experience with joint cultivation areas.  Agricultural work increasingly linked with VSLAs. | Many similarities, which means that differences in execution offer important learning opportunities. DMI has more experience with joint cultivation areas, Caritas works more with longer established farmers  Expand working with small livestock. |
| **Education** | Expands vocational training beyond masonry and beautification.  Expands schools further.  Plan secondary and/or adult education | Considerable experience with vocational training (in combination with VSLAs), less with schools. Sees need for more secondary and adult education | Compare vocational training activities with each other; Caritas Gulu has more experience in this area. DMI has more experience with other forms of education. |
| **NFI and cash-based assistance** | Education on different forms of soap production very popular. Limited experience with other NFIs. No experience with cash-based assistance | Distributes soap and other NFIs; also has experience with cash-based assistance | Caritas Gulu can introduce local soap production. Compare work on NFIs. Cash-based assistance could be a new service-delivery modality. |
| **Safety and ecurity**  (also with effects on  deforestation  and health) | Has no experience with energy-saving stoves and/or explaining how to make (and protect from rain) energy- saving mud stoves | Has experience with different types of energy-saving stoves | Learn more about best practices with different types of energy-saving stoves, so that women need to fetch less firewood outside the camps. |
| **Climate change** | Wants to do more on climate change adaptation | Wants to do more on reforestation and climate change adaptation, e.g., in agriculture | Compare new and already established methods and activities. |
| **Synergies** | Many synergies through social organizing and combining activities | Displays important synergies, especially with VSLA | Compare synergies among the projects |
| **Return of displaced people** | Continue/expand food security and other programs | Help refugees with their return | Exchange information and experience in case of peace and return to help refugees prepare the return and/or help them upon arrival. |

Table 3: Comparison of DMI Juba and Caritas Gulu

Both organizations and their environments are very dynamic. It will be useful to repeat the learning visits every three to five years to observe which changes and learning has taken place.

# TOWARDS STRATEGY

What does the preceding analysis mean for future strategy formulation of DMI-Juba? It points to the four building blocks of such a strategy: issues that require more attention in the future, internal capacity, contingency planning, and linkages. Generally, it is important to search for the optimal combination of short-term humanitarian aid and more long-term development activities.

## Issues That Require More Attention in the Near Future

Two related issues stood out that DMI is currently not working on, but will need to work on in the future: *climate change adaptation* and *deforestation/tree planting*. For example, the seasonal rains in South Sudan are becoming more rare and irregular. Deforestation intensifies the negative effects of *climate change*, in particular droughts, and is also a manifestation of the *general lack of resources* that can contribute to local conflicts. The previous sections contained some recommendations on both issues. DMI will have to make an explicit strategic choice, whether and how it wants to address both issues. To this end, it could set up specific programs.

The majority of IDPs are women and children, as men are killed, move to look for other family members or food, flee because they are seen as rebels, remain behind to fight, or take care of possessions and agriculture elsewhere in South Sudan. Moreover, women carry out most of the work in the household and with tending the fields. Even so, DMI staff noticed a *silent revolution*: men are increasingly engaging in DMI activities and working with the women. In some cases, they even became part of women’s groups, especially when female group members, due to illiteracy, needed a person who can write and read for their administrative tasks. The potential and actual roles of men in furthering this silent revolution needs more attention.

## Internal Capacity Building

DMI is growing rapidly. This growth should be accompanied with a professionalization process, if the organization wants to maintain and increase the quality of its work. It has already hired consultants to work on this.[[27]](#footnote-27) When DMI continues to pay careful attention to these issues, it will become a more analytical, learning organization.

*Language and management concepts*

The documents from DMI do not sufficiently reflect the quality of its practical, everyday work. Sometimes the presentation and English of its program and project proposals, as well as of its other official documents, should be more professional or up-to-date. This will help DMI to present itself more convincingly to donors and other stakeholders.

For example, DMI needs to employ the terms ‘program’ and ‘project’ more consistently. They are now sometimes used simultaneously, which results in the impression that DMI confuses both concepts. Generally, a project is more time-bound within a rather narrow thematic and/or geographical area. A program is a set of related projects that normally takes place over a longer period of time and can combine thematic and/or geographical areas.

*Indicators*

The current indicators of the DMI projects and programs are output-oriented. Such indicators are useful, because they show whether the project activities have been carried out. However, and especially in more development-oriented programs and projects, it is useful to include more outcome-oriented indicators. This implies that measures of quality and behavioral, or institutional change, should be included. For evaluations, such indicators would provide more information on effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Examples include vocational skills students or farmers that train or employ other people, or measuring the impact of awareness raising/sensitization campaigns on the behavior of DMI beneficiaries.

In its logical frameworks, it could include colons with the baseline value, the current value, and the goal value of such indicators so that the value of (key) outcome indicator can be tracked over time.

*Buzzwords and substance*

In its programs and project, DMI regularly uses overarching concepts, such as resilience and self-reliance. If it wants to, it can add other popular concepts, such as social cohesion. Many of these concepts have become popular buzzwords that are broadly used in development cooperation and humanitarian action, but are rarely well defined and operationalized. In its daily practice, DMI contributes considerably to local resilience and self-reliance. Interestingly, DMI does not work out in detail what it means by resilience and self-reliance, and why it uses these concepts. Operationalizing these concepts in more detail, for example with a so-called “theory of change,” will help DMI with strengthening the coherence of its (expanding) work, presenting its proposals to donors, and with M&E, in particular with impact measurement.

*More M&E*

Although the overall project objectives and sub-project goals are in all likelihood being reached, DMI cannot sufficiently prove yet that it is doing so, or how specific external factors are influencing its operations. DMI can develop its M&E further into monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL). It could for example establish a MEAL position or even a MEAL unit. As the organizations grows, its target groups, donors, and local partners will become more interested in the ways it programs and projects function, as well as in their impact. For example, what is the impact of the new market outlet on the income and safety of its participants? How can DMI measure the synergy among its activities?

Overall, working further on the internal capacity issues above can also make DMI more effective in obtaining funding (e.g., from the Common Humanitarian Fund) where it has had no success so far, and with diversifying its donor base.

*Operational issues*

Working on the capacity-building issues needs to be complemented by greater attention to several operational matters. As mentioned, DMI needs a tractor. It also needs a pick-up truck, as its last one got stolen during an armed robbery of the DMI-compound.

Another issue, related to the professionalization of the organizations and decision-making in the clusters, concerns rapid staff turn-over. DMI would like its staff to stay longer. Local staff members would like to earn more and volunteers, such as the health promoters, would like higher incentives. Their desire is understandable given the high degree of inflation, which has eaten away the purchasing power of their income. However, DMI cannot make decisions here alone. Specifically in POC 1 and 3, it can only raise wages and incentives in agreement with the other organizations working there. Yet, in its HRM, DMI should think about establishing a mix of monetary and non-monetary (e.g., training, travel with learning visits, staff awards, promotion, and career opportunities) incentives for making its staff stay longer in the organization.

At the moment, the sisters are dependent on their drivers, which can be a problem on Sundays when the drivers do not work, or when the drivers are ill. Some DMI sisters and staff could take driving lessons to obtain a driver’s license.

Some DMI staff and sisters speak one or more local languages. But as the organization is growing, there is a need for more staff members and sisters to learn local languages. DMI needs a structured training scheme to do so. This may be done in conjunction with working with local novices (new sisters) that speak one or more South Sudanese languages.

*Other Organizations*

This evaluation could not study in detail what other organizations are doing in the thematic areas that DMI covers. Yet, the functioning of these organizations also contributes to the degree of effectiveness and actual impact of DMI. As stated, UNHCR would like DMI to participate in the protection cluster on a regular basis. A next, broader evaluation should take the other organizations and their implications for the future DMI strategy and activities into account.

Finally, the linkages, cooperation, and impact of the whole aid system in the camps and in the source communities should be studied more often. DMI can carry out (joint) evaluation(s) of the forms and effectiveness of cooperation by the organizations in the camps and source communities.[[28]](#footnote-28)

*Conclusion on internal capacity building*

Taken together, these measures on internal capacity building will make DMI more accountable as a learning organization. These measures will need to be integrated into the plans of the consultants who are currently working with DMI.

## Contingency planning

Nobody knows when the civil war will stop and the IDPs can return. It is possible that violence will flare up again. Hence, DMI needs *contingency planning*. Section 3.3 compared RRRP and the food security program to determine how they can learn from each other, and also argued for contingency planning. DMI as a whole can make a plan along the same lines for all of its programs in three scenarios, namely:

1) the *worst-case scenario;*

2) the *current level of insecurity* continues; and

3) the *best-case scenario*, when peace will hold.

## Linkages

In its social organizing, DMI establishes synergies among its different activities. DMI is working with banks in its savings activities. If DMI could find a way to deal with inflation (see above) and decided to work more with VSLAs, it could also examine whether banks could play a role in strengthening VSLAs. Similarly, the lack of *transport* hampers income-generating activities for the participants in vocational training, farming, and VSLAs. As indicated, DMI could see whether it could work with regular bus companies. It could also discern whether cooperation with vocational training schools in Juba would be useful. In general, establishing linkages among actors, activities, and market is a strategic question on what DMI can do in-house and what it can leave up to other actors, including private enterprises.

## Next Steps

It is not possible to formulate a whole strategy on the basis of a comparison of two DMI programs, but these four building blocks can become components of an overall strategy. In addition, this evaluation describes many challenges and recommendations. DMI should determine which ones it prioritizes for immediate action, which ones it will take up as part of its next strategy, and which ones it will simply not address. Together with its management consultants, DMI can plan its strategy formulation process in six steps:

1. Internally evaluate the degree of realization of the objectives and activities of its current program and strategy. Explaining why, how, and to which extent these objectives were realized is as important as achieving them because it helps to draw the relevant management lessons.
2. Incorporate evaluation lessons from the whole aid system in South Sudan, but especially from Wau and Juba.
3. Determine in which areas DMI needs to work, lobby or advocate with other aid organizations, embassies, donors, or South Sudanese actors, for example to enhance food security through establishing joint cultivation areas close to the POCs. Prioritize further areas for cooperation with other organizations (e.g., protection).
4. Start with formulating a contingency plan and a long-term strategy. Make an environmental scan and a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT)-analysis of DMI.
5. Select specific areas of expertise where DMI would like to develop its capacities further, for example in the areas of relief, development, or climate change adaptation.
   * Think about the optimal combination of short-term humanitarian aid and more long-term development activities.
     + Determine to which extent short-term and long-term programs can be integrated and evaluate the synergies among the activities.
   * If it decides to add new areas, it can either only take one or a few related ones.
6. Indicate where and how DMI wants to build its own capacities:
   * + Need for internal capacity building;
       - Training program for staff-members for organizational growth and development in specific areas.
       - Use broader (joint) evaluations.
       - Learning visits with Caritas Gulu.
       - Professionalize further in M&E/MEAL, HRM, and finance and accounting.

Strategy formulation and implementation will require considerable attention, but DMI is well-placed to do so.

# CONCLUSIONS

This evaluation aims

*to assess the challenges in planning, implementing and evaluating the IDP relief, rehabilitation, and reintegration program, as well as the food-security program, in order to determine what both can learn from each other.*

In addition, this evaluation asks what DMI Juba and Caritas Gulu can learn from each other in their humanitarian and developmental work.

In general, the IDPs and source communities lack resources, skills, and linkages with other actors and markets, so that they struggle with their lives and livelihoods. As no one knows how the conflict in South Sudan will develop, the organizations active in South Sudan need a contingency approach. On the one hand, they need to plan for longer-term capacity and institution-building for IDPs and source communities. On the other hand, they need to make plans for IDP return.

This evaluation indicates that the RRRP and food security programs are going relatively well. Both programs have a very high relevance, and are in the process of realizing their objectives. If the current level of insecurity continues, or actually improves, DMI will probably reach most of its objectives, but this is happening against the background of many unfulfilled needs of the IDP and resource communities. Moreover, ongoing insecurity and violence can wipe out program gains at any time.

DMI is a well-appreciated partner organization. The fact that the sisters remained during the worst violence, even after they had been caught in the crossfire or robbed at gunpoint, has earned them considerable trust. Still, this evaluation also shows several challenges and concomitant recommendations, and discusses several frequently mentioned themes, such as lack of transport that influences the current project and may influence future projects. DMI can also cooperate with Caritas Gulu on learning visits.

It is important to note that many of the above issues cannot—and should not—be addressed by DMI alone and require cooperation with either other humanitarian organizations, embassies and donors or with IDP organizations. Finally, this report also provides building blocks and next steps for a DMI Strategic Plan. DMI is in a good position to expand and professionalize further.

# Appendix I: Questionnaires

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1. OCHA, Humanitarian Response Plan 2018, December 2017, UNOCHA, Juba, South Sudan. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. UNHCR, South Sudan Situation, Regional Update, 1–30 April 2018, p. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Within DMI the conceptual language about program and project management overlaps and sometimes these two concepts are used interchangeably. See chapter 5, where I discuss how DMI can further professionalize and use conceptual language to strategically strengthen its management and activities. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. In fact, the food security program last five years and 4,5 months. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. I took the initiative to interview a staff-member of the German Embassy to learn more about the financing, functions, and management of BMZ projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. At the time, it looked like Mangatene would become a settlement area for returning IDPs. Hence, DMI decided to treat it similar to the source communities for RRRP, see below. After the outbreak of renewed conflict in 2016, in which the Mangatene IDPs were explicitly targeted and looted, the situation in the camp changed for the worse. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. As the water needs to be trucked in, there can also be delays and diversions that reduce water availability and contribute to these conflicts. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. At Mangatene, Islamic Relief supported health care at the camp’s health center, which stopped its activities at the start of 2018, so that except for the DMI medical service camp every four months there is no medical support. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See fn. 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Barefoot doctors were Chinese farmers who received basic medical and paramedical training. They brought healthcare to rural areas where many urban-trained doctors did not want to settle. They promoted for instance family planning, hygiene and preventive healthcare, and treated common diseases. The name barefoot doctor reflects that farmers worked barefoot in the rice paddies. See <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barefoot_doctor>, accessed on 31 July 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. The PTA focuses on the involvement of parents in children’s education, such as planning and monitoring of the school program, food distribution, the uniform, performance of the children, and the children’s participation in the medical camp, as well as school dropouts, especially girls. In addition, the Village Education Committee (VEC) concentrates on financial and administrative school management and infrastructure. It includes the community chief, the head teacher, a representative of DMI management, and about five members of the local community, who are normally part of the PTA. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. In cases of insecurity, the duration of these training sessions has sometimes been reduced from three- or two-days to one day. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. In addition, selected teachers received a three-day training on addressing and preventing GBV. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jik is a soap oil for cleaning in and around the house. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Detol is a hygienic cleaning product against bacteria and other germs. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Potential activities include satellite TV-channels, football, pool tables, chess, phone-charging stalls, and internet cafes to “keep kids out of trouble.” See also the paragraphs on vocational training below. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Some vocational skills training participants, especially those with a nomadic background or family members in other locations, may move. They may thus not finalize the training or use their start-up capital and/or kit. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. There may be a trade-off here between quality and costs. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. If established, training staff of some of the outreach center(s) could carry out (some) of the repairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Caritas Germany suggested to introduce the ox-plough as this may be more sustainable and the tractors are likely to be stolen. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. A similar study is also crucial to measure the level of indicator attainment for the final BMZ report, which is mandatory at the end of project. However, to be able to determine changes in the current program, and to be prepared for the final report, it would be wise to carry out such a study during the course of the project. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. They remain under the ownership of its original owners, but the DMI-supported farmers have the right to use and benefit from the land. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. As a consequence, DMI had to revise the logframe in cooperation with Caritas Germany. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Similar to the tractor and ox-plough Caritas Germany asked whether such forms of motorized irrigation would be sustainable and manageable by the targeted farmers. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Interestingly, in terms of organization, being a sister is not just a profession, but also a vocation (in German: *Kein Beruf, aber ein Ruf*). DMI is an independent congregation within the RC church. Caritas Gulu also works with priests and nuns, but operates as part of the Diocese hierarchy. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. The IDPs in POC 1 and 3 and Mangatene regularly mention their need for NFIs and other goods, such as children’s shoes, sanitary pads, bednets, sleeping mats and mattresses. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Caritas Germany is also accompanying and supporting DMI’s professionalization process. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. There may already be evaluations available that can help DMI in planning activities and formulating strategy. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)